FIRST DIVISION owned by Rolando Dalida, in whose name it was registered

under TCT No. 192224.[4]

[G.R. No. 149912. January 29, 2004]
Dalida mortgaged[5] the land to petitioner to secure payment
JACINTO V. CO, petitioner, vs. RIZAL MILITAR and LILIA of a loan. After Dalida defaulted in the payment of his
SONES, respondents. obligation, petitioner caused the foreclosure of the
DECISION mortgage.Subsequently, petitioner acquired the land at the
foreclosure sale held sometime in 1982.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On June 19, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina
of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision dated June 30, City, Branch 75, against respondents Rizal Militar and Lilia
2000[1] of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition Sones, who were in possession of the land.
for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 51344, and its Resolution dated
September 10, 2001[2] which denied the motion for Petitioner alleged that he is the registered owner of the
reconsideration. land; that as owner, he declared[6] the same for tax purposes
and has been up to date in the payments of real property
Petitioner Jacinto V. Co claims to be the owner of a parcel of taxes; and that respondents occupancy of the property was
land measuring 396 square meters covered by a Transfer by his mere tolerance but their continued stay became
Certificate of Title No. 81792.[3] The land was formerly unlawful after he demanded that they
vacate the premises. After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner, thus:
In their answer, respondents claimed that they are the owners of
198 square meters each of the disputed land, having bought the Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
same from Burgos L. Pangilinan and Reynaldo Pangilinan who were favor of plaintiff Jacinto Velasco Co and against defendants, Rizal
the owners-developers of a residential subdivision project called Militar and Lilia Sones, as follows:
Immaculate Conception Village, and whose ownership was
covered by TCT No. 13774. a. ordering the defendants and/or all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the subject premises and peacefully surrender
Respondent Militar further claimed that his occupancy of the possession thereof to plaintiff;
property could not be by tolerance of petitioner for the following
reasons: one, he constructed his house way back in June 1966, b. ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff reasonable
long before petitioner acquired title thereto on October 10, 1983; compensation for the use of the premises in question in the
two, he bought the one-half portion of the property, consisting of amount of P500.00 for each defendant per month from June 19,
198 square meters, on April 20, 1966 from B.L. Pangilinan & Sons, 1997 the date of filing of the complaint until the premises are
Inc. and paid for the same in full on October 3, 1973, or 10 years vacated;
before petitioner claimed ownership of said property. [7] He also
c. ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the sum of P 2,000.00 as
assailed the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court, claiming
and for attorneys fees;
that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the proper action should
have been an accion reinvidicatoria filed before the Regional Trial d. to pay the costs of this suit.
Court.[8]
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Sones, on the other hand, alleged that she bought the
other half of the property from the Spouses Burgos and Juanita Respondents appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court,
[10]
Pangilinan on April 6, 1966, and paid for the same in full on which reversed and set aside the same. Petitioner filed a
October 6, 1973. She also argued that the Metropolitan Trial Court petition for review before the Court of Appeals, which denied due
had no jurisdiction over the nature of the action considering that course and ordered the dismissal of the petition.
the same is founded on a property right. She also averred that
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
petitioner registered the subject property in bad faith inasmuch as
the Court of Appeals.[11] Hence, the instant petition raising the
he knew that she was in actual, peaceful, exclusive, adverse and
following errors:
continuous possession of the same and was exercising dominion
and ownership over it when petitioner proceeded with his I.
registration.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court
CONCURRING WITH THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THE correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
DOCTRINE OF OCCUPANCY BY TOLERANCE, IN AN UNLAWFUL petitioner.
DETAINER CASE, CANNOT BE VALIDLY INVOKED BY PETITIONER
WHO HAD NO PRIOR PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY AS In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,[14] it was held that the
HE HAD BOUGHT THE PROPERTY ONLY IN 1982 VIS--VIS THE Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
RESPONDENTS WHO HAD BEEN IN THE PROPERTY SIXTEEN (16) believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
YEARS EARLIER OR AS EARLY AS 1966. integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.
II.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified
THAT THE DISPUTE OVER POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY BY THE by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS BECOMES AN ISSUE AS TO WHO decisional law, the power to pass upon the validity of such
HAS THE BETTER RIGHT OF OWNERSHIP, THE RESPONDENTS WHO certificate of title at the first instance properly belongs to the
HAD DEEDS OF SALE AND IN POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES OR Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for cancellation of
THE PETITIONER WHO ACQUIRED TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN A title.[15]
FORECLOSURE SALE.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of
The principal issue to be resolved in the instant petition is: Who the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership.
between petitioner and respondents has a better right to possess Respondents argument that petitioner is not an innocent
the subject property? purchaser for value and was guilty of bad faith in having the
subject land registered in his name is a collateral attack on the title
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in of petitioner, which is not allowed. A certificate of title cannot be
an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or
property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[16]
of the party litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in
nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the simple WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
expedient of asserting ownership over the property.[12] GRANTED. The June 30, 2000 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 51344 which sustained the October 30, 1998 decision
In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 273, in SCA Case
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and No. 98-200-MK is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The May 26, 1998
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 75, in
the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, Civil Case No. 97-6521 declaring petitioner Jacinto V. Co as having
nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally a better right of possession over the subject parcel of land as
resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining against respondents Rizal Militar and Lilia Sones is REINSTATED.
the issue of possession.[13]
Accordingly, respondents are ordered to vacate the subject
Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the premises and peacefully surrender possession thereof to
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found petitioner. Further, respondents are ordered to pay petitioner
in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of reasonable compensation for the use of the premises in the
action involving possession. amount of P500.00 per month from June 15, 1997 until the
premises are vacated; P2,000.00 as attorneys fees; and costs of the
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the
suit.
parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the
property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991 Cabanlas, Resma & Cabanlas Law Offices for
petitioners.
Jaime Y Sindiong for private respondents.
MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and
MISAMIS ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS,
INC.,petitioners, GANCAYCO, J.:
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA Between the one who has actual possession of an
F. EDUAVE and RUDYGONDO EDUAVE, respondents. island that forms in a non-navigable and non-flotable
river and the owner of the land along the margin
nearest the island, who has the better right thereto?
This is the issue to be resolved in this petition.
The parties to this case dispute the ownership of a
certain parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Tagoloan,
Misamis Oriental with an area of 16,452 square meters,
more or less, forming part of an island in a non-
navigable river, and more particularly described by its
boundaries as follows:
North — by the Tagoloan River,
South — by the Tagoloan River,
East — by the Tagoloan River and
West — by the portion belonging to Vicente
Neri.
Private respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental1 an action to quiet title and/or
remove a cloud over the property in question against
petitioners.
Respondent Court of Appeals2 summarized the
evidence for the parties as follows:
The appellant [private respondent Janita
Eduave] claims that she inherited the land from
his [sic] father, Felomino Factura, together with
his co-heirs, Reneiro Factura and Aldenora
Factura, and acquired sole ownership of the
property by virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial
Partition with sale (Exh. D). The land is declared
for tax purposes under Tax Decl. No. 26137
(Exh. E) with an area of 16,452 square meters
more or less (Exh. D). Since the death of her
father on May 5, 1949, the appellant had been in
possession of the property although the tax
declaration remains in the name of the
deceased father.
The appellants further state that the entire land
had an area of 16,452 square meters appearing
in the deed of extrajudicial partition, while in
[the] tax declaration (Exh. E) the area is only
4,937 square meters, and she reasoned out that
she included the land that was under water. The
land was eroded sometime in November 1964
due to typhoon Ineng, destroying the bigger
portion and the improvements leaving only a
coconut tree. In 1966 due to the movement of
the river deposits on the land that was not
eroded increased the area to almost half a
hectare and in 1970 the appellant started to
plant bananas [sic].
In 1973 the defendants-appellees [petitioners
herein] asked her permission to plant corn and
bananas provided that they prevent squatters to
come to the area.
The appellant engaged the services of a
surveyor who conducted a survey and placed
concrete monuments over the land. The
appellant also paid taxes on the land in
litigation, and mortgaged the land to the Luzon
Surety and Co., for a consideration of
P6,000.00.
The land was the subject of a reconveyance
case, in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Oriental, Branch V, at Cagayan de Oro City,
Civil Case No. 5892, between the
appellant Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio
Factura which was the subject of judgment by
compromise in view of the amicable settlement
of the parties, dated May 31, 1979. (Exh. R);
That the heirs of Antonio Factura, who are
presently the defendants-appellees in this case
had ceded a portion of the land with an area of
1,289 square meters more or less, to the
appellant, Janita Eduave, in a notarial document
of conveyance, pursuant to the decision of the
Court of First Instance, after a subdivision of
the lot No. 62 Pls-799, and containing 1,289
square meters more or less was designated as
Lot No. 62-A [sic], and the subdivision plan was
approved as Pls-799-Psd-10-001782. (Exh. R; R-
1 and R-2);
The portion Lot No. 62-A, is described as
follows:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 62-A, Psd-10-
001782 being a portion of Lot 62, Pls-
799, Tagoloan Public Land Subdivision)
situated in Bo. Sta. Cruz, Municipality of
Tagoloan, Province of Misamis Oriental.
Bounded on the W, and on the N along
lines 4-5-1 by Lot 62-B of the
subdivision plan 10-001782; on the E by
line 1-2 by Lot 64; Pls-799; on the S,
along line 2-3-4 by Saluksok Creek,
containing an area of one thousand two
hundred eighty nine (1,289) square
meters more or less.
Appellant also applied for concession with the
Bureau of Mines to extract 200 cubic meters of
gravel (Exh. G & G-1); and after an ocular
inspection the permit was granted (Exh. K, and
K-1 and K-2). That the appellant after permit was
granted entered into an agreement with
Tagoloan Aggregates to extract sand and gravel
(Exh. L; L-1; and L-2), which agreement was
registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
(Exh. M; M-1; and M-2);
The defendants-appellees [petitioners herein]
denied the claim of ownership of the appellant,
and asserted that they are the real owners of
the land in litigation containing an area of
18,000 square meters more or less. During the
typhoon Ineng in 1964 the river control was
washed away causing the formation of an
island, which is now the land in litigation. The
defendants started occupying the land in 1969,
paid land taxes as evidenced by tax declaration
No. 26380 (Exh. 4) and tax receipts (Exhs. 7 to
7-G), and tax clearances (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Photographs showing the actual occupation of
the land by the defendants including
improvements and the house were presented as
 evidence (Exh. 11 to 11-E). The report of the
Commissioner who conducted the ocular
inspection was offered as evidence of the
defendants (Exh. G).
The sketch plan prepared by Eng. Romeo
Escalderon (Exh. 12) shows that the plaintiffs'
[private respondents'] land was across the land
in litigation (Exh. 12-A), and in going to the land
of the plaintiff, one has to cross a distance of
about 68 meters of the Tagoloan river to reach
the land in litigation.3
On 17 July 1987 the trial court dismissed the complaint
for failure of private respondents as plaintiffs therein to
establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of
ownership over the land in litigation. The court found
that the island is a delta forming part of the river bed
which the government may use to reroute, redirect or
control the course of the Tagoloan River. Accordingly,
it held that it was outside the commerce of man and
part of the public domain, citing Article 420 of the Civil
Code.4
As such it cannot be registered under the land
registration law or be acquired by prescription. The trial
court, however, recognized the validity of petitioners'
possession and gave them preferential rights to use
and enjoy the property. The trial court added that
should the State allow the island to be the subject of
private ownership, the petitioners have rights better
than that of private respondents.5
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, respondent court
found that the island was formed by the branching off
of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on
Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code6 the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court,
declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land subject of this case and ordered
petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver
possession of the land to private respondents.7
In the present petition, petitioners raise the following
as errors of respondent court, to wit:
1. Whether [or not] respondent court correctly
applied the provisions of Articles 463 and 465
of the new Civil Code to the facts of the case at
bar; and
2. Whether [or not] respondent court gravely
abused its discretion in the exercise of its
judicial authority in reversing the decision
appealed from.8
Petitioners point out as merely speculative the finding
of respondent court that the property of private
respondents was split by the branching off or division
of the river. They argue that because, as held by the
trial court, private respondents failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence the identity of their
property before the same was divided by the action of
the river, respondent court erred in applying Article 463
of the Civil Code to the facts of this case.
It must be kept in mind that the sole issue decided by
respondent court is whether or not the trial court erred
in dismissing the complaint for failure of private
respondents (plaintiffs below] to establish by
preponderance of evidence their claim of ownership
over the island in question. Respondent court reversed
the decision of the trial court because it did not take
into account the other pieces of evidence in favor of
the private respondents. The complaint was dismissed
by the trial court because it did not accept the
explanation of private respondents regarding the initial
discrepancy as to the area they claimed: i.e., the prior
tax declarations of private respondents refer to an area
with 4,937 square meters, white the Extra-judicial
Partition with Sale, by virtue of which private
respondents acquired ownership of the property,
pertains to land of about 16,452 square meters.
The trial court favored the theory of petitioners that
private respondents became interested in the land only
in 1979 not for agricultural purposes but in order to
extract gravel and sand. This, however, is belied by
other circumstances tantamount to acts of ownership
exercised by private respondents over the property
prior to said year as borne out by the evidence, which
apparently the trial court did not consider at all in favor
of private respondents. These include, among others,
the payment of land taxes thereon, the monuments
placed by the surveyor whose services were engaged
by the private respondent, as evidenced by the pictures
submitted as exhibits, and the agreement entered into
by private respondents and Tagoloan Aggregates to
extract gravel and sand, which agreement was duly
registered with the Register of Deeds.
Private respondents also presented in evidence the
testimony of two disinterested witnesses: Gregorio
Neri who confirmed the metes and bounds of the
property of private respondents and the effects of the
typhoon on the same, and Candida Ehem who related
on the agreement between private respondents and
petitioners for the latter to act as caretakers of the
former.9 The trial court disregarded their testimony
without explaining why it doubted their credibility and
instead merely relied on the self-serving denial of
petitioners.10
From the evidence thus submitted, respondent court
had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of
private respondents actually existed and was Identified
prior to the branching off or division of the river. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, properly applied Article
463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over
a portion of land separated or isolated by river
movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to
such separation or isolation.11
Notwithstanding the foregoing and
assuming arguendo as claimed by petitioners that
private respondents were not able to establish the
existence and identity of the property prior to the
branching off or division of the Tagoloan River, and
hence, their right over the same, private respondents
are nevertheless entitled under the law to their
respective portion of the island.
It is clear petitioners do not dispute that the land in
litigation is an island that appears in a non-flotable and
non-navigable river; they instead anchor their claim on
adverse possession for about fifteen years. It is not
even controverted that private respondents are the
owners of a parcel of land along the margin of the river
and opposite the island. On the other hand, private
respondents do not dispute that the island in question
has been in the actual physical possession of
petitioners; private respondents insist only that such
possession by petitioners is in the concept of
caretakers thereof with the permission of private
respondents.
This brings Us, as phrased earlier in this opinion, to the
underlying nature of the controversy in this case:
between the one who has actual possession of an
island that forms in a non-navigable and non-flotable
river and the owner of the land along the margin
nearest the island, who has the better light thereto?
The parcel of land in question is part of an island that
formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from
a small mass of eroded or segregated outcrop of land,
it increased to its present size due to the gradual and
successive accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this
regard the Court of Appeals also did not err in applying
Article 465 of the Civil Code.12 Under this provision, the
island belongs to the owner of the land along the
nearer margin as sole owner thereof; or more
accurately, because the island is longer than the
property of private respondents, they are deemed ipso
jure to be the owners of that portion which
corresponds to the length of their property along the
margin of the river.
What then, about the adverse possession established
by petitioners? Are their rights as such not going to be
recognized? It is well-settled that lands formed by
accretion belong to the riparian owner. 13 This
preferential right is, under Article 465, also granted the
owners of the land located in the margin nearest the
formed island for the reason that they are in the best
position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of
the same.14 In fact, no specific act of possession over
the accretion is required.15 If, however, the riparian
owner fails to assert his claim thereof, the same may
yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as
indeed even accretion to land titled under the torrens
system must itself still be registered.16
Petitioners may therefore, acquire said property by
adverse possession for the required plumber of years
under the doctrine of acquisitive prescription. Their
possession cannot be considered in good faith,
however, because they are presumed to have notice of
the status of private respondents as riparian owners
who have the preferential right to the island as
recognized and accorded by law; they may claim
ignorance of the law, specifically Article 465 of the Civil
Code, but such is not, under Articles 3 and 526 of the
same code, an adequate and valid defense to support
their claim of good faith.17 Hence, not qualifying as
possessors in good faith, they may acquire ownership
over the island only through uninterrupted adverse
possession for a period of thirty years.18 By their own
admission, petitioners have been in possession of the
property for only about fifteen years. Thus, by this
token and under the theory adopted by petitioners, the
island cannot be adjudicated in their favor.
This case is not between parties as opposing riparian
owners contesting ownership over an accession but
rather between a riparian owner and the one in
possession of the island. Hence, there is no need to
make a final determination regarding the origins of the
island, i.e., whether the island was initially formed by
the branching off or division of the river and covered
by Article 463 of the Civil Code, in which case there is
strictly no accession because the original owner
retains ownership, or whether it was due to the action
of the river under Article 465, or, as claimed by
petitioners, whether it was caused by the abrupt
segregation and washing away of the stockpile of the
river control, which makes it a case of avulsion under
Article 459.19
We are not prepared, unlike the trial court, to concede
that the island is a delta which should be outside the
commerce of man and that it belongs to the State as
property of the public domain in the absence of any
showing that the legal requirements to establish such a
status have been satisfied, which duty properly
pertains to the State.20 However, We are also well aware
that this petition is an upshot of the action to quiet title
brought by the private respondents against petitioners.
As such it is not technically an action in rem or an
action in personam, but characterized as quasi in
rem which is an action in personam concerning real
property.22 Thus, the judgment in proceedings of this
nature is conclusive only between the parties23 and
does not bind the State or the other riparian owners
who may have an interest over the island involved
herein.
WHEREFORE, We find no error committed by
respondent court and DENY the petition for lack of
sufficient merit. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED, without pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts[1] by
reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction.
Challenged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] are
the May 19, 2006 Decision[3] and August 15, 2006
Resolution[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89783 which dismissed petitioners Petition for
Review and denied their Motion for Reconsideration
respectively. Said assailed CA Decision which affirmed the
February 28, 2005 Resolution[5] of the Office of the
President (OP), in O.P. Case No. 04-F-262, states, viz:
In fine, we hold that public respondent Office of the
President, in affirming the resolution of the Secretary of
the DPWH which sustained the resolution and the
demolition order of the OBO, committed no grave abuse
of discretion, the same being supported by evidence and
having been issued in accordance with law and
jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Resolution dated February 28, 2005 of the Office of the
President of the Philippines, issued through the Deputy
Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs in O.P. Case No. 04-F-
262, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners beseech this Court to reverse and set aside
said Decision and consequently, to alter a string of
consistent Resolutions issued by the OP in the said O.P.
Case No. F-262, the Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) in NBC Case No. 17-03-I-
MLA,[7] and the Office of the Building Official (OBO) of the
City of Manila in NBC Case No. NG-2002-06.[8]
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner-spouses Ricardo Hipolito, Jr. and Liza Hipolito
(petitioners) allege that on June 15, 1989, Edeltrudis
Hipolito y Mariano (Edeltrudis)[9] entered into an
[10] [11]
agreement with Francisco Villena (now deceased) to
rent a portion of the property located at 2176 Nakar
Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila and to construct an
apartment-style building adjacent to the existing house
thereon. The contract was for a period of 20
years. Pursuant to the agreement, Edeltrudis built a
three-storey apartment building without securing a
building permit. Petitioners inherited the apartment
building upon the death of Edeltrudis.
In 2002 or 13 years after the execution of the agreement,
petitioners and the heirs of Francisco Villena, all residing
in the property, were informed that respondent Atty.
Carlos D. Cinco (Atty. Cinco) acquired the subject property
through a deed of sale sometime in 1976.
On June 17, 2002, herein respondents Atty. Cinco,
Teresita Cinco and Dr. Carlota Balde Cinco (respondents)
filed with the OBO a verified request[12] for structural
inspection of an old structure located at 2176 Nakar
Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila.
Acting on the request, Building Inspector Engineer
Leonardo B. Rico (Engr. Rico) conducted an initial
inspection. In his memorandum Engr. Rico reported that
two old and dilapidated buildings made of wooden
materials were found in the premises and recommended
that the matter be referred to the Committee on
Buildings (Committee) for further appropriate action and
disposition.
Deemed as a petition for condemnation/abatement
pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC) and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations, the verified request
of the respondents was referred to the Committee for
Hearing/ Investigation.
With prior notices to the parties and the tenants, three
hearings were subsequently held from August 12, 2002 to
September 20, 2002 for purposes of resolving the focal
issue of the structural stability, architectural
presentability, electrical and fire safety aspect to
determine [whether] or not the subject buildings are still
safe for continued occupancy.[13] On September 20, 2002,
Victoria Villena, wife and heir of Francisco Villena and
owner of one of the two buildings, filed a counter
manifestation questioning respondents personality to file
the petition for condemnation, and refuting the technical
evaluation reports of Engr. Rico and respondents
commissioned engineer. Whereupon, the Committee was
constrained to schedule an ocular inspection of the
subject buildings on October 7, 2002. A report on the
ocular inspection conducted was thereafter submitted
through a Memorandum[14] dated October 8, 2002, which
states:
x x x The subject structure is a 3-storey at the rear portion specifically the tenants thereat, hence, it is strongly
and Two (2)[-] storey at the front made up of wooden recommended that the subject building be declared
materials with G.I. sheet roofings. dangerous and ruinous in pursuance of Sec. 214 and 215
and Rules VII and Rule VIII of the Implementing Rules and
II. Findings: Regulations of P.D. 1096.
1. Corrugated G.I. sheet roofings and its
Ruling of the Office of the Building Official
accessories incurred extensive
deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering In a Resolution[15] dated March 26, 2003, the OBO
declared the buildings dangerous and ruinous, and
2. Ceiling boards [bulging] attributed to water
recommended their demolition, to wit:
leaks from defective roofing.
xxxx
3. Exterior and interior wooden boards
deteriorated. On the basis of the ocular inspection report submitted by
the Committee on Buildings and the findings of the OIC,
4. Doors/windows including its jambs City Electrical Division DEPW which form part of this
deteriorated/[dilapidated]. resolution, it appearing that the subject structures
5. No provisions of firewall on the sides abutting incurred an extensive degree of
private lot. [dilapidation]/deterioration by 60-80% attributed mainly
to long weather exposure, termite infestation and neglect
6. Rafters, purlins, and girts deteriorated due to of maintenance on its architectural and structural
neglect of maintenance. component which constitute architectural eyesore,
structurally unsafe as well as electrical hazards thereby
7. Vibrations were felt on the wooden flooring
endangering the life, health property and welfare of the
when exerting wt. An indication that its support suffered
general public particularly the tenants thereat [sic].
[material] fatigue due to wear and tear and termite
infestation. Such sorry condition of said structures exist to the extent
that remedial/ rehabilitation which is no longer practical
8. Wooden columns incurred
and economical as it would entail/ necessitate a total
deterioration/[dilapidation] due to weathering and
overdone thereof [sic].
termite infestation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Committee on
9. Open wiring installation/fire hazard.
Buildings and in consonance with the findings of the OIC,
10. With notices of condemned installation No. 2K3- City Electrical Division DEPW the subject buildings are
62042 EPM issued by OIC, City Electrical Division, DEPW. hereby found and declared Dangerous and Ruinous and
strongly recommending the issuance of the corresponding
11. Inadequate water supply and drainage system. Demolition Order in pursuance of Section[s] 214 and 215
of the National Building Code and Rule VII and VIII of its
12. Outmoded T & G due to neglect of maintenance.
Implementing Rules and Regulations further directing the
13. Inadequate sanitary/plumbing installation. tenants/ occupants thereat to vacate the premises within
fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to pave the way for
III. RECOMMENDATION: its peaceful and orderly [d]emolition activity.

From the foregoing, the subject buildings [appear] to SO ORDERED.

have incurred extensive deterioration/[dilapidation]
[attributed] mainly to long weather exposure, poor A Demolition Order[16] addressed to the respondents was
maintenance and termite infestation on its architectural accordingly issued on even date with petitioners and their
and structural components by 60-80% which constitutes tenants duly furnished with a copy thereof.
an Architectural eyesore, structurally unsafe as well as
Petitioners thus appealed[17] to the DPWH.
fire and electrical hazard thereby endangering the life,
safety, health and welfare [of] the general public
Ruling of the Department of Public Works and Highways
In their appeal, petitioners prayed for the reversal of the
Resolution of the OBO and for the setting aside of the
Demolition Order on the ground that same were
anomalously issued. They likewise contended that
respondents petition for condemnation was actually an
attempt to circumvent their rights as builders in good
faith. Petitioners prayed for a separate inspection of the
two buildings by an impartial body.
Thus, another ocular inspection was conducted by the
Inspectorate Team of the DPWH to determine the actual
physical condition of the subject buildings. The
Inspectorate Team reported thus:
There are two (2) Buildings/Structures subject of this
appeal. For proper identification of the two
(2) Storey Residential Building located at front No. 2176
Nakar Street, San Andres Bukid, is designated as Building I
while the Three (3) Storey Residential Building located at
the rear portion is designated as [B]uilding 2.
Building 1
Building I is pre-war vintage (t)wo (2)[-](s)torey structure
generally made of wooden materials. Corrugated G.I.
roofing sheets and its accessories are extensively
corroded and deteriorated due to long existence, weather
exposure and improper maintenance. Gutters and [down
spouts] are already missing. Interior and exterior wooden
board partitions are deteriorated by about eighty percent
(80%). Roof eaves and media agues are deteriorated and
some wooden members are ready to collapse. Doors and
windows including [their] jambs are deteriorated by
about eighty percent (80%). Wooden stair[s] leading to
second floor is rotten and deteriorated due to long
existence and termite infestation. Wooden board
floorings are sagging and vibration can be felt when
walking on it. Plywood ceiling boards are deteriorated by
about eighty percent (80%).
The wooden roof framing parts such as rafters, purlins,
and girts are rotten. Majority of the wooden posts are
termite infested and deteriorated. The wooden beams
and floor joists are noted to have incurred deterioration.
Vibration is felt at the second floor wooden flooring when
walked upon, an indication that its wooden structural
supports show signs of material fatigue due to wear and
tear and termite infestation. Structural components of
the structure were observed to have deteriorated by
about seventy five percent (75%).
Sanitary/Plumbing fixtures and systems within the
building are noted outmoded, inadequate and not
properly maintained. Inadequate water supply and
drainage system within the building is noted. The comfort
room is useable and functioning but is not properly
ventilated and unsanitary.
The electrical wiring insulation shows sign of brittleness
due to excessive exposure to ambient heat, moisture and
time element. Excessive octopus connections and
dangling of wires/extensions [sic] cords are observed.
Some switches and convenience outlets are detached and
defective. Junction/pullboxes are not properly covered
thus exposing electrical wiring connections. Some
electrical wiring installations are attached to deteriorated
parts of the building. The electrical wiring installations
are already old, not properly maintained and inadequate
to conform to the rules and regulations of the Philippine
Electrical Code (PEC).
Building 2
Building 2 is a three (3)[-](s)torey structure located at the
back of the Building I, and the usage is purely for
residential purposes. The building is constructed [out] of
wooden materials, corrugated G.I. roofing sheets and
plain G.I. sheets for its accessories. The said building was
constructed sometime in 1989, however, the construction
is not in accordance with the standard and the
requirements of the National Building Code (PD 1096).
Corrugated G.I. roofing sheets are corroded and
deterioration is about seventy percent (70%). [Down
spouts] and gutters are no longer in place. Interior and
exterior wooden board sidings have incurred about sixty
percent (60%) deterioration. Some rooms have no proper
ventilation due to excessive partitioning. Eaves [have] no
ceiling. Wooden board floorings are sagging and vibration
is felt when walked upon due to undersized wooden
framing. Substandard ceiling height. Plywood ceiling
boards are bulging. No fire resistive wall provided
between the two buildings.
As to the Structural, Sanitary/Plumbing and Electrical
aspects, Building 2 has the same findings as in Building I.
From the foregoing, it appears that the subject building
attained a degree of dilapidation that repair works are no
longer practical and economical to undertake.
Therefore, it is recommended that the Demolition Order
issued by the OBO, Manila be sustained.[18]
On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of the DPWH rendered a
Resolution[19] dismissing the appeal of the petitioners for
lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the OBO and
the issuance of the Demolition Order.
In the same Resolution, the Secretary of the DPWH
opined:
xxxx
In condemnation proceedings of dangerous and ruinous
building pursuant to the National Building Code (NBC)
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), the
authority of the Building Official is confined to the
assessment of the physical condition of the building
sought to be condemned and abated, and depending on
the degree of its deterioration and dilapidation, to issue
appropriate order, taking into consideration the welfare
and safety not only of its occupants, but the public in
general as well. Corollary thereto, said official is
mandated under the Code, even in the absence of a
petitioner or complainant, to motu propio initiate
condemnation proceedings of reported dangerous and
ruinous buildings. The inclusion thereof of the 3-storey
building which appellant claims to have been built by
Ediltrudis Villena on the subject property in the
hearing/investigation of the case was within the bounds
of the duties and responsibilities of the OBO. In the said
proceedings, the Building Official shall not delve on issues
affecting contract involving the property or of the
building subject of the case or of lessee-lessor
relationship, since those are matters within the
competence of the court to pass upon.
Appellants allegation that inspection of the premises was
done without their participation and [that they were] not
given the chance to engage the services of an engineer
deserves scant consideration. Records revealed that
appellants who actively participated in the proceedings of
the case were duly furnished with copies of appellees
petition for condemnation and the technical evaluation
report of their (appellees) commissioned engineer, and
were enjoined to submit their counter technical report.
They however failed to comply. Appellants who at the
same time are residents of the building subject of the
proceedings could have easily participated or hire[d] an
engineer to represent them in the inspection conducted
by the Committee on Buildings on the premises as they
were duly notified about it and of which they signified
their conformity during the hearing on September 20,
2002. x x x[20]
Undaunted, petitioners filed an appeal[21] with the OP.
Ruling of the Office of the President
Before the OP, the petitioners asserted that the findings
of the DPWH Inspectorate Team is erroneous and that
they are builders in good faith. However, the OP found no
reversible error to justify the reversal or modification of
the DPWH Resolution, and thus resolved to dismiss the
appeal in a Resolution[22] dated February 28, 2005.
The OP likewise subsequently denied with finality
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[23] in an
Order[24] dated April 25, 2005.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Petition for Review[25] with
the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, petitioners again raised the issues they
advanced before the administrative bodies, particularly
the issue regarding the ownership of the lot vis--vis their
right as builders in good faith.
However, the CA dismissed the petition for review and
affirmed the OP Resolution without addressing the issue
of ownership. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[26] but same was denied in a
Resolution[27] dated August 15, 2006 for being a mere
rehash or repetition of the issues raised in the petition.
Unwilling to concede, petitioners now come before this
Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITIES SUSTAINING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL OF MANILA.
B.
WHETHER X X X THE OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL
GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT OBSERVING THE CARDINAL
PRIMARY RIGHTS/DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS IN THE
CONDUCT OF THE HEARING AND IN THE CONTENTS OF
THE INSPECTION REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE INSPECTION
TEAM INCLUDING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OBO.
C.
WHETHER X X X [THE] OFFICE OF THE BUILDING OFFICIAL
(OBO) OF MANILA OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDS OF ITS
AUTHORITY IN NOT APPLYING ARTICLE 482 AND ARTICLES
694 TO 707 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IN IMPLEMENTING
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 215 OF THE BUILDING CODE
P.D. 1096 IN THIS CASE.
D.
WHETHER X X X THE PETITIONER[S] OR THEIR
PREDECESSOR IN INTEREST [ARE]/IS A BUILDER IN GOOD
FAITH OF THE 3[-]STOREY APARTMENT BUILDING
LOCATED AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE PROPERTY AND
REFERRED TO AS BLDG. 2.
E.
WHETHER X X X THE ACTION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL
ABATEMENT OF NUISANCE IS PROPER IN THIS CASE.[28]
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
At the outset, [i]t bears stressing that in a petition for
review on certiorari [under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court],
the scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the
[CA] is generally confined only to errors of law, and
questions of fact are not entertained.[29] The Supreme
Court is not a trier of facts and it is not duty-bound to
analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below.[30] More so, this Court is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh evidence pertaining to
factual issues which have not been subject of any proper
proceedings below. Well-entrenched and settled is the
rule that points of law, theories, issues and arguments
not brought to the attention of the trial court adequately
and on time need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.[31] The determination of who
owns the subject property, the authenticity of the
evidence of both parties, and whether petitioners are
builders in good faith are questions of fact, the resolution
of which requires the examination of evidence that
should be ventilated in a separate action brought before
a proper forum.
As correctly stated by the Secretary of the DPWH in its
Resolution,[32] the administrative agencies jurisdiction in
this case is confined to the assessment of the physical
condition of the building sought to be condemned and
the issuance of the appropriate order relative thereto.
Issues affecting contract involving the property or of the
buildings subject of the case are not within their
competence to rule upon. Lest this Court becomes a court
of first instance instead of a court of last resort, we
decline to act on matters that have not run the proper
legal course.
Nevertheless, we note that petitioners purported right to
occupy the property has already ended two years ago
when the 20-year period of the lease agreement expired
in year 2009. There being no provision in the contract,
tacit or otherwise, for renewal or extension of the lease,
petitioners no longer have basis to keep hold of Building
2. Hence, the determination of whether petitioners are
builders in good faith is no longer necessary.
As to the other issues, suffice it to say that they boil down
to the question of whether the issuance of the OBO
Resolution and Demolition Order was proper, and
whether the CA erred when it affirmed the Resolutions of
the OP and the Secretary of the DPWH, which in turn,
likewise affirmed the said OBO Resolution.
A Building Official has the authority to order the
condemnation and demolition of buildings which are
found to be in a dangerous or ruinous condition.
[I]t is unquestionable that the Building Official has the
authority to order the condemnation and demolition of
buildings which are found to be in a dangerous or ruinous
condition.[33] This authority emanates from Sections 214
and 215 of the National Building Code (Presidential
Decree [P.D.] No. 1096) which provides:
Section 214. Dangerous and Ruinous Buildings or
Structures
Dangerous buildings are those which are herein declared
as such or are structurally unsafe or not provided with
safe egress, or which constitute a fire hazard, or are
otherwise dangerous to human life, or which in relation
to existing use, constitute a hazard to safety or health or
public welfare because of inadequate maintenance,
dilapidation, obsolescence, or abandonment; or which
otherwise contribute to the pollution of the site or the
community to an intolerable degree.
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
When any building or structure is found or declared to be
dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without
prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
There is, therefore, no question as to the authority of the
OBO to render the challenged issuances. Here, the
Building Official was authorized to issue the questioned
Demolition Order in view of his finding that the disputed
structures are dangerous and ruinous buildings within the
purview of P.D. No. 1096, in relation to its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. Correspondingly, no irregularity in
the process in which the resolution and demolition order
were issued is evident. As found by the CA, the records
show that the OBO issued the resolution and Demolition
Order only after ocular inspections and hearings were
conducted. Notably, the Inspectorate Team of the DPWH
came up with the same conclusion as the OBO when it
conducted its own ocular inspection of the premises, that
is both Buildings 1 and 2 had structural, sanitary,
plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.[34]
What is more, contrary to the position of the petitioners
that the provisions of the Civil Code on abatement of
nuisances should have been applied in their case, the fact
that the buildings in question could also constitute
nuisances under the Civil Code does not preclude the
Building Official from issuing the assailed Demolition
Order. As provided by P.D. No. 1096, the authority of the
Building Official to order the repair, vacation or
demolition, as the case may be, is without prejudice to
further action that may be undertaken under the relevant
provisions of the Civil Code.[35]
The position taken by petitioners that the OBO is duty-
bound to first order the repair of ruinous and dangerous
buildings is erroneous. Petitioners, in their
[36]
Memorandum, quoted Section 215 of the National
Building Code, thus:
Section 215. Abatement of Dangerous Buildings
When any building or structure is found or declared to be
dangerous or ruinous, the Building Official shall order its
repair, vacation or demolition depending upon the
degree of danger to life, health, or safety. This is without
prejudice to further action that may be taken under the
provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.[37]
A careful reading of the provision shows that it does not
require the OBO to take actions in the same order or
sequence that Section 215 enumerates them. Instead, it
authorizes the Building Official to order either the repair,
vacation, or demolition of the building depending on the
circumstances presented before it, particularly on the
degree of danger to life, health and safety. In the case at
bench, the OBO, based on its assessment of the buildings,
deemed it necessary to recommend and order the
demolition of the said buildings, having found them
dilapidated and deteriorated by up to 80%.
The Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the resolution
issued by the Office of the President
Petitioners find error in the CAs reliance on the report of
the OBO in affirming the resolution of the OP. Petitioners
contend that the initiation of the proceedings in the OBO
was calculated to oust them from the property and to
circumvent their rights as builders in good faith thereby
making the findings and issuances of the OBO
unreliable. Petitioners thus beseech this Court to
ascertain facts that have already been determined by the
administrative agencies involved and thereafter reviewed
and affirmed by the CA.
We find the contention without merit.
The mandate of the OBO is to act motu proprio, or upon
petition validly received, on reported dangerous and
ruinous buildings and structures that pose a threat to the
life, health and well-being of the inhabitants, and the
general public. Hence, the OBO, based on its findings, can
still act on the matter pursuant to such mandate,
notwithstanding petitioners claim that respondents
initiated the proceedings to circumvent their rights under
the law as builders in good faith. Otherwise stated,
respondents motive in initiating the proceedings which
led to the issuance of the challenged OBO Resolution and
Demolition Order is immaterial as far as the OBO is
concerned, so long as it is satisfied that a building or
structure is dangerous and ruinous.
Remarkably, both the DPWH and the OP found no
irregularities in the manner that officials of the OBO
performed their duties and in coming up with its
Resolution and Demolition Order. This conclusion was
affirmed by the CA when it resolved the petition before
it.
We find no error on the part of the CA when it relied on
the findings of fact of the OBO and the other
administrative bodies. As correctly stated by the CA in its
Decision:
The powers granted by law, particularly the National
Building Code to the Building Official regarding
demolition of buildings are executive and administrative
in nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely
administrative and discretionary functions may not be
interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no
supervising power over the proceedings and actions of
the administrative departments of the government. This
is generally true with respect to acts involving the
exercise of judgment or discretion and findings of fact.
The established exception to the rule is where the issuing
authority has gone beyond its statutory authority,
exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave
abuse of discretion. None of these obtains in the case at
bar. (Citations omitted.)[38]
By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said
administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment
thereon; thus, their findings of fact in that regard are
generally accorded great respect, if not finality, by the
courts.[39] Such findings must be respected as long as they
are supported by substantial evidence, even if such
evidence is not overwhelming or even preponderant.[40] It
is not the task of the appellate court to once again weigh
the evidence submitted before and passed upon by the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment
regarding sufficiency of evidence.[41]
Similarly, this Court will not disturb these factual findings
absent compelling reasons to do so. This Court, in
numerous occasions, has cited exceptions to the general
rule that it is not a trier of facts. None of the said
exceptions is present in this case. The conclusion reached
by the administrative agencies involved after thoroughly
conducting their ocular inspections and hearings and
considering all pieces of evidence presented before them,
which finding was affirmed by the CA, must now be
regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.
We take this opportunity to inform petitioners that the
appellate court cannot be expected to actually perform
the inspection itself for purposes of validating the
findings of the administrative bodies. Reliance on findings
of fact of the lower courts or, in this case, administrative
bodies, does not mean that the appellate court does not
conduct its own review. In fact, the appellate court
painstakingly studies every piece of document that comes
into its hands, putting together every piece of the puzzle
to come up with the whole picture of the controversy
brought before it. That is no easy task.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 19, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89783
are AFFIRMED.