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The path to 5G in Australia:

Architecture evolution from 4G to 5G

August 2018

Authors: Dr David Soldani, Dr Malcolm Shore and Mr Jeremy Mitchell

Table of Contents
Preface...................................................................................................................................... 3

Foreword .................................................................................................................................. 5

Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 7

5G use cases ............................................................................................................................. 7

5G definitions and standard updates..................................................................................... 8

Option 2: NR gNB connected to 5GC....................................................................................... 9

Option 3: Multi-RAT DC with EPC ......................................................................................... 9

Option 4: Multi-RAT DC with the 5GC and NR as Master ...................................................... 9

Option 5: LTE ng-eNB connected to 5GC .............................................................................. 10

Option 7: Multi-RAT DC with the 5GC and E-UTRA as Master........................................... 10

Family of usage scenarios ....................................................................................................... 10

3GPP 5G roadmap .................................................................................................................. 10

Spectrum ................................................................................................................................ 11

5G reference architecture and migration strategies .......................................................... 12

5G core and slicing ................................................................................................................ 17

5G security aspects ................................................................................................................ 20

5G deployment scenarios ...................................................................................................... 23

References .............................................................................................................................. 28

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This position paper outlines the most relevant technology transition options from the current
4G telecommunications network ecosystem into a 5G network ecosystem. In this paper, we
set out the frameworks and roadmaps that Australian communication service providers may
take to 5G. This is about an evolutionary transition from 4G into 5G and, while there will be
fundamental changes in network abilities and services delivered, the network principles
remain the same [1].

There is a clear standardised interface and separation between Core Network (CN) and Radio
Access Network (RAN) across the whole transition of deployments and in a final 5G standalone
environment [2].

The 3GPP 5G System design follows requirement from various organisations. The most
prominent input is perhaps the NGMN 5G Whitepaper [3], which provides functional design
and migration considerations from a network operator perspective.

As in previous 3GPP systems, the 5G Access-Core Network boundary has been set out in the
3GPP global standards with a clear functional split and offers globally accepted principles. This
enables the adoption of different business models, and the utilisation of RAN equipment from
one vendor and core elements from other network infrastructure providers, as it is currently
in 4G networks in Australia.

Huawei is one of the major wireless vendors in Australia, delivering Radio Access Network
equipment in three of the four foremost communication service providers. Huawei has also
delivered Australia’s largest private 4G LTE network. Globally Huawei is the only company that
can supply a full end to end 5G technology solution, from chipset, devices, Radio Access and
Core. In Australia, Huawei is focusing its business opportunities in the same footprint currently
undertaken in the 4G networks, i.e. only supplying Radio Access Network technology. That
means Huawei will not be tendering for core network opportunities with the major telecom

5G will be the driver of next wave of economic productivity growth across the globe. The Asia
Pacific region is leading in the commercial delivery of 5G technology with Japan, South Korea
and China already announcing a timetable of commercial 5G rollouts. Huawei is already
working closely with operators and governments in these countries. We are also delivering 5G
trials in the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand and working with the corresponding
governments and operators to ensure their citizens have access to best performing, secure
and privacy preserving 5G technologies.

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We want Australian telecom operators to have the same opportunity to purchase the world’s
best 5G technology. We also understand the importance of security in these technologies, and
this is why we are offering to share our knowledge, ideas and practices in this area and work
with the Government to independently evaluate any Huawei products, if necessary.

Jeremy Mitchell David Soldani Malcolm Shore

Director Corporate Affairs Chief Technology Officer Cyber Security Officer
Huawei Australia Huawei Australia Huawei Australia

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“The 5G System has been designed for connecting people, homes and organizations,
increasing mobile broadband speed, reliability and number of connections per square
kilometre. Latency has been also reduced to support a variety of new services, especially
from vertical sectors. The 5G System consists of Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-
RAN, New Radio and Evolved LTE) and 5G Core Network (5GC, supporting end to end flow
based QoS and network slicing) separated by a standardized, unified and open interface,
which allows a multivendor deployment. The paper reflects well the latest developments
of 3GPP technical specifications for 5G Systems, and provides a clear path to 5G in
Australia. In this nation, Huawei tenders only for the RAN part of the Network, where
security risks can be managed as in earlier Network generations.

In order to be on the same level playing field as others leading countries, such as USA, UK,
Europe, China, South Korea and Japan, Australia needs to allow competition for accessing
state of art technologies at competitive price, stimulate and attract new investments from
overseas, and assemble top experts in the ICT field, e.g. build an Australian Technology
Platform (ATP), to develop a Strategic Research and Innovation Agenda (SRIA) for Australia.”

Latif Ladid
Chair, 5G World Alliance, Luxembourg
President, IPv6 FORUM
Fellow of the IEEE
Chair, EU IPV6 Task Force (www.ipv6.eu)
Emeritus Trustee, Internet Society (www.isoc.org)

“This is the most comprehensive document I have seen on 5G, transition from 4G to 5G
with sufficient technical depth on radio access network, core network and security and all
the interfaces. The document reflects perfectly the global standard set by 3GPP in its Release
15 on 5G and more importantly the approach is standards compliant. From my understating
of other equipment vendors and operators’ plans in other countries and specifically in the
UK, all have adopted the same approach which utilises the huge investment already made
in 4G deployment whilst modernising their network with 5G capability. Furthermore, due to
the fact that Radio Access Network (RAN) is separated from the 5G Core Network and
designed only to forward packets transparently to terminals and core, any security risk can
be managed as in earlier RAN generation.”

Rahim Tafazolli
Regius Professor of Electronic Engineering
Institute for Communication Systems and 5G Innovation Centre
Director, University of Surrey, UK
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“5G mobile communications will continue the ever-growing availability of high quality video
and broadband data, and unlock a vast array of new applications including IoT, machine-to-
machine, and augmented reality services. There are a number of significant leaps forward,
compared to 4G technology, while building on many of the successful features of existing
equipment and infrastructure, in an approach that allows for a staged and integrated roll-
out with multi-vendor technology mixes. This paper summarises the main technical aspects
of 5G technology and network architecture, highlighting the separation and standardised
interfaces between the radio access network (RAN) and the core network functions
encompassed in the 5G standard. These aspects underpin the flexibility, security and
interoperability of future 5G network architectures and will be key to their success.”

Iain Collings
Fellow of IEEE
Deputy Dean
School of Engineering
Macquarie University
Sydney, Australia

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This document has been prepared for the Critical Infrastructure Centre (CIC), Prime Minister
& Cabinet (PMC) and other Australian National Security agencies to clarify some important
design and security aspects of 5G systems, and addresses the main questions asked by the
Australian Government, especially on the deployment of Next Generation Radio Access
Networks (NG-RAN) in mobile communication and information infrastructures in Australia.

The paper first presents the most relevant 5G use cases for the Australian market in 2018-19,
and beyond; 5G concept and definitions; 3GPP updates, in terms of system architecture and
enabling technologies and corresponding timelines; and spectrum availability, linked to
possible 5G deployments in Australia. Then, the paper discusses the 5G functional architecture,
possible configuration options, enabling technologies and network migration strategies, and
related 5G security aspects, in Australia, and globally. This is followed by a description of the
possible 5G deployment scenarios, in a multivendor environment, and the Huawei product
portfolio and site solution in Australia. Conclusions are drawn on the main security aspects of
the 5G systems.

5G use cases

In Australia, carriers have showcased 5G networks at 2018 Gold Coast Commonwealth Games,
ahead of the announced 5G services launch in 2019, see for example [4] and [5]. The most
important use cases are, as depicted in Figure 1:

1) 5G fixed wireless access (FWA): Complements fibre networks and replace the last 50-200m
fibre. It provides a “Gigabit-Speed Internet” experience at home. For each household, the
sustainable speed is 100Mb/s in the downlink (DL) @ 3.5GHz/1800MHz with 5G/LTE shared
uplink transmission (SUL), and up to 800Mb/s-1Gb/s @ 26GHz. See e.g. [6].
2) Virtual (VR), Augmented (AR) and Mixed Reality (MR): A full immersive and interactive
experience for 5G Hotspots, in-vehicle infotainment, gaming, etc. The most important 5G
requirements are: Latency < 10 ms; Bandwidth > 1Gbps; and cell capacity with more than
500 connections. See e.g. [7].
3) Industrial Processes Automation: Remote drilling, wireless service robots, drone traffic
management, etc. The 5G system is expected to support latency below 10 ms, and speed
above 10 Mb/s. See e.g. [8].
4) Remote Control of Vehicles: Truck control in mining sector, truck platooning,
autonomous driving, etc. The 5G system is expected to support latency below 10 ms, and
deliver a speed above 50 Mb/s. See e.g. [9], [10].

As explained in the following sections, the 3) and 4) services are expected to be provided only
in specific and safe areas, or deploying dedicated network, such as GSM-R (railways).

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Fixed Wireless Access V/A/M Reality Process Automation Remote Control
• 5G fixed wireless access (FWA) • 5G Hotspots • Remote Drilling • Truck Control in Mining
• Complement fiber networks • In-vehicle infotainment • Wireless Service Robots • Truck platooning
• “Gigabit-Speed Internet” • Gaming • Drone Traffic Management • Autonomous driving
5G Network requirements 5G Network requirements 5G Network requirements 5G Network requirements
• Sustainable 100Mb/s/h in DL • Low latency < 10 ms • Low latency <10 ms • Low latency < 10 ms
• Up to 1Gb/s (mmW) • Large bandwidth > 1Gb/s • Large bandwidth > 10 Mb/s • Large bandwidth > 50 Mb/s
• 100MHz @ 3.5GHz/1800MHz SUL • Cell capacity > 500 Connections
• 800MHz-1GHz @ 26GHz
• Replace the last 50-200m fiber

10ms 5G NR

HF+LF HF+LF Hybrid Networking E2E Latency

0.12m Break Distance


HF RTT 50Mbps UL Live Video
For HD FoV Uploading DL Remote Control

HF Indoor CPE Processing

Screen response ~2ms
Macro on Tower Outdoor CPE ~2ms
Refresh @ 120fps 52.3 km
Micro on Pole Indoor CPE

~ 8ms
Car & Cameras Remote Control

Showcases at 2018 Gold Coast Commonwealth Games (April 4 to 15 2018) and launch of 5G service in 2019

Figure 1. Examples of use cases in Australia.

The above use cases are examples of services that require the deployment of a new radio
technology, and, in some cases, a next generation core network, as none of the previous 3GPP
network generations (3GPP releases), i.e. 2G, 3G and 4G, supports all of such stringent
performance requirements and targets [9], [10].

5G definitions and standard updates

5G Wireless is defined as the 3GPP Release 15 (R15) and later releases (R16, 17, etc.) of LTE
and New Radio (NR) mobile communication systems. It is thus an LTE advanced pro evolution
and a NR technology that adds to existing networks in a 3GPP Non-Stand Alone (NSA) or 3GPP
Stand Alone (SA) architecture configuration. 3GPP will propose its standards to be adopted by
ITU, being compliant with the International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) for 2020 and
beyond (ITU IMT 2020), which expands and supports diverse usage scenarios and applications
with respect to current mobile network generations, purposed primarily for voice, mobile
internet and video experience [9].

The Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) represents the newly defined radio
access network for 5G, and provides both NR and LTE radio access [2], see Figure 2.

An NG-RAN node (i.e. base station) is either:

 A gNB (i.e. a 5G base station), providing NR user plane and control plane services; or
 An ng-eNB, providing LTE/E-UTRAN services towards the User Equipment (UE).

The 5G System (5GS) consists of NG-RAN and 5G Core Network (5GC), as shown in Figure 2 a).

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NG-RAN in relation to the 5G System 3GPP Option 3 | LTE-NR Dual Connectivity (EN-DC)
(Other vendors)

(Other vendors)

(Other vendors)
(Other vendors) (Other vendors) (Other vendors)


Standardised and Standardised
unified interface interface

Xn X2-U


gNB (NR) gNB (NR) en-gNB
Xn Xn (NR) X2 X2

Xn X2

ng-eNB (eLTE) ng-eNB (eLTE) eNB (LTE) eNB (LTE)

a) b)
Figure 2. Overall 5G Architecture: a) 5G system (5GS); b) 3GPP Option 3.

The NG RAN operates in both so-called “Stand-Alone” (SA) operation and “Non-Stand-Alone”
(NSA) operation. In SA operation, the gNB is connected to the 5G Core Network (5GC); in NSA
operation, NR and LTE are tightly integrated and connect to the existing 4G Core Network
(EPC), leveraging Dual Connectivity (DC) toward the terminal. In a DC architecture, a Master
Node (MN) and a Secondary Node (SN) concurrently provide radio resources towards the
terminal for an enhanced end-user bit rate (speed or throughput) [2]. Moreover, 3GPP has
defined the following architecture configurations [2], [11], [12].

Option 2: NR gNB connected to 5GC

In this option, the gNBs are connected to the 5GC through the NG interface. The gNBs
interconnect through the Xn interface.

Option 3: Multi-RAT DC with EPC

In this option, commonly known as Multi-Radio Access Technology (Multi-RAT), LTE-NR Dual
Connectivity (EN-DC), a UE is connected to an eNB that acts as a Master Node (MN) and to an
en-gNB that acts as a Secondary Node (SN). An en-gNB is different from a gNB in that it only
implements part of the 5G base station functionality, which is required to perform SN
functions for EN-DC. The eNB is connected to the EPC via the S1 interface and to the en-gNB
via the X2 interface. The en-gNB may also be connected to the EPC via the S1-U interface and
to other en-gNBs via the X2-U interface. Notice that the en-gNB may send UP to the EPC either
directly or via the eNB.

Option 4: Multi-RAT DC with the 5GC and NR as Master

In this option, a UE is connected to a gNB that acts as a MN and to an ng-eNB that acts as an
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SN. This option requires the 5G Core to be deployed. The gNB is connected to 5GC and the ng-
eNB is connected to the gNB via the Xn interface. The ng-eNB may send UP to the 5G Core
either directly or via the gNB.

Option 5: LTE ng-eNB connected to 5GC

In this option, the ng-eNBs are connected to the 5GC through the NG interface. The ng-eNBs
interconnect through the Xn interface. Essentially this option allows the existing LTE radio
infrastructure (through an upgrade to the eNB) to connect to the new 5G Core.

Option 7: Multi-RAT DC with the 5GC and E-UTRA as Master

In this option, a UE is connected to an ng-eNB that acts as a MN and to a gNB that acts as an
SN. The ng-eNB is connected to the 5GC, and the gNB is connected to the ng-eNB via the Xn
interface. The gNB may send UP to the 5GC either directly or via the ng-eNB[2].

Family of usage scenarios

The family of usage scenarios for IMT for 2020 and beyond for 5G include: 1) “Enhanced
mobile broadband (eMBB)” addressing human-centric use cases for access to multimedia
content, services and data; 2) “Ultra-reliable-low latency communications (URLLC)” with
strict requirements, especially in terms of latency and reliability; and 3) “Massive machine
type communications (mMTC)” for a very large number of connected devices and typically
transmitting a relatively low volume of non-delay-sensitive information [9].

3GPP 5G roadmap

As illustrated in Figure 3, the completion of the first 5G phase (Phase 1 or Release 15, R15) of
the NR Access technology was in June 2018, in its NSA configuration [12]. The SA option will
be finalized by September 2018. The 3GPP R15 will support eMBB and some elements of
URLLC, e.g. flexible numerology and reduced scheduling interval.

Both LTE and NR use orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) as the waveform.
LTE uses a fixed numerology of 15 kHz sub-carrier spacing (SCS) and operates below 6 GHz.
The new 5G radio is for all spectrum options. To this end, 5G supports a flexible numerology,
which consists of different Sub Carrier Spacing (SCS), nominal Cyclic Prefix (CP), and
Transmission Time Interval (TTI), or scheduling interval, depending on bandwidth and latency
requirements. At higher SCS, the symbol duration decreases, and hence also the length of a
slot. The slot is the basic frame structure at which most physical channels and signals repeat.
In NR, slots can be complemented by a “mini-slot” based transmissions to provide shorter and
more agile transmission units than slots. In LTE and NR a slot comprises 14 OFDM symbols,
which leads to a slot length of 1 ms at 15 kHz SCS.
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2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

RAN Rel-13 Rel-14 Rel-15 Rel-16

11-15/06/2018 1Q 2020
Completion of New Radio (NR) Access Technology
(including URLLC specifics) ASN.1
(Phase II, R16)

LTE-Adv Evolution
03/18 | Opt. 3 09/18 | Opt. 2 03/19 | Opt. 7/4/5

Non- Stand
Full IMT-2020
5G NR = 5G New Radio Standalone alone
eMBN = enhanced Mobile broadband (NSA-NR) (SA-NR) NR
URLLC = Ultra-Reliable and Low Latency Communications
mMTC = massive Machine Type Communications Phase 1 Phase 2

R15 R16
NR Framework Architecture NR Improvement Vertical Digitalization
• Waveform & Channel Coding • UL&DL Decoupling • New Multiple Access • uRLLC
• Frame Structure, Numerology • CU-DU Split • eMBB Enhancement • mMTC
• Native MIMO • e2e Slicing • Self-Backhaul • D2D/ V2X
• Flexible Duplex ( Others: uRLLC ) • Unlicensed
Spectrum Spectrum
• 600MHz to 52.6GHz • Up to 100GHz

Figure 3. 3GPP definition of 5G: LTE evolution and New Radio (NR), supporting new usage scenarios [12].

By using higher numerologies in NR, the slot duration decreases, which is beneficial for lower
latencies. The intention of NR is to support a mix of numerologies on the same carrier. A more
profound URLLC analysis can be found, e.g., in [13] and [14].

The second 5G phase (Phase 2 or Release 16, R16), supporting usage scenarios, including
URLLC and mMTC, will be frozen in Q1 of 2020, or later [12].


5G NR is expected to increase spectrum efficiency and support contiguous, non-contiguous,

and much broader channel bandwidths than available to current mobile systems. 5G new
radio will be the most flexible way to benefit from all available spectrum options from 400
MHz to 90 GHz, including licensed, shared access and license exempt bands, FDD and TDD
modes, including Supplementary Uplink (SUL), LTE/NR uplink sharing (ULS), and narrowband
and wideband Carrier Components (CC) [11]. Operating band combinations for SUL and ULS
may be found in [15].

A multi-layer spectrum approach is required to address such a wide range of usage scenarios
and requirements [16]:

• The "Coverage and Capacity Layer" relies on spectrum in the 2 to 6 GHz range (e.g. C-
band) to deliver the best compromise between capacity and coverage.

• The "Super Data Layer" relies on spectrum above 6 GHz (e.g. 24.25-29.5 and 37-43.5
GHz) to address specific use cases requiring extremely high data rates.

• The "Coverage Layer" exploits spectrum below 2 GHz (e.g. 700 MHz) providing wide-
area and deep indoor coverage.

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Frequencies Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Frequencies
(MHz) EU USA Australia Japan
(MHz) EU Africa Arab C.I.S N.A L.A Asia
26G Y Y
C-band Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
28G Y Y
GHz 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 5.0 39G Y
Australia 125 MHz Auction in Oct 2018 Already available for IMT / offical plans 32GHz, 66GHz,
Considered for IMT by regulators Others 42G
Africa Potential for future IMT use and 81GHz


Figure 4. Global spectrum allocation and upcoming auction of 5G spectrum at 3.6GHz in Australia.

5G networks will leverage the availability of spectrum from these three layers at the same
time, and administrations are expected to make available contiguous spectrum in all layers in
parallel, to the greatest extent possible.

Figure 4 depicts the global availability and planning of the frequency ranges for 5G usage and
upcoming auction of 5G spectrum in the 3.6GHz band in Australia. ACMA is preparing to
allocate spectrum in the frequency range 3575MHz – 3700 MHz (125 MHz) in metropolitan
and regional Australia by auction in October 2018 [17]. Frequencies in the 3.4GHz band have
been already assigned in Australia. The 700MHz spectrum (band 28) sold at recent auction
[18], which adds to the spectrum made available in 2013, will be used extensively throughout
Australia to provide 4G mobile broadband or 5G coverage at later time in 2020 or beyond. The
allocation of mmWave spectrum, between 24.25GHz and 27.5GHz (26GHz band), is expected
in Q1 2019.

5G reference architecture and migration strategies

The most likely initial deployment options are illustrated in Figure 5 (see e.g. [2] and [19]-[22]).

3GPP Option 3x (NSA LTE plus NR with EPC) is the configuration that, most likely, more carriers
(network operators) adopt, due to minor investments for their initial 5G deployment, and so
it is by the local players in Australia. It supports eMBB and FWA usage scenarios and Voice
over IP (VoIP) over LTE (VoLTE) or Circuit Switch Fall Back to earlier network releases (3G, 2G).

The 3GPP Option 2 (SA NR with 5GC) is initially adopted by only a few carriers globally. For
taking full advantage from it, a wide coverage rollout is needed, as the interoperation with
4G/EPS is less efficient. Initial partial coverage rollouts may be more suitable for enterprise or
overlay deployments. In the long round, it will support all scenarios (eMBB, URLLC, mMTC),
plus other functionalities than Option 3x, such as Network Slicing and Voice over NR (VoNR).

The medium-long term migration path of 5G networks is illustrated in Figure 6. Ultimately, all
networks will converge to a 3GPP Option 2 architecture configuration (SA NR with 5GC).
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3GPP Non standalone (NSA) 3GPP Standalone (SA)
Deployment 1 2

• eMBB and FWA • eMBB/FWA, URLLC and mMTC
• LTE as anchor with reuse of current • E2E Network Slicing
scenarios EPC + NR introduction • 5GC connected to EPC with min
impact on current LTE network
• Voice: VoLTE or CSFB
• Voice: VoNR

Current | SA LTE with EPC 3GPP Option 3x | NSA LTE+NR with EPC 3GPP Option 2 | SA NR with 5GC


(Other vendors) (Other vendors) (Other vendors)
Standardised and
unified interface



Figure 5. Main initial 5G deployment options [19]-[22].

3GPP Option 3x | NSA LTE+NR with EPC 3GPP Option 7 | NSA eLTE+NR with 5GC

(Other vendors) (Other vendors)
3  7 4 2
1 Standardised and
3  7 2 unified interface

3GPP Option 2 | SA NR with 5GC 3GPP Option 4 | NSA NR+eLTE with 5GC

(Other vendors) (Other vendors)

Standardised and
Standardised and unified interface
unified interface

Figure 6. Long term migration paths [2].

The middle term migration strategies are basically two, depending on the carriers’ spectrum
availability for deploying the NR [2]:

1. From deployed 3GPP Option 3x (NSA LTE + NR with EPC) to 3GPP Option 7 (NSA eLTE +
NR with 5GC). The reasons to go for that are: Leverage 4G (LTE/EPC) installed base; NR
rollout driven by better service (not coverage); and evolved LTE (eLTE) for all wide area
coverage and all use cases. The draw backs are: Full Dual Stack eNB/ng-eNB in LTE RAN to
EPC/5GC; LTE RAN upgrades to eLTE; and required Interworking between LTE and NR. UE
availability is also, currently, questionable. The migration scenario is shown in Figure 7.
2. From deployed 3GPP Option 3x (NSA LTE + NR with EPC) to 3GPP Option 4 (NSA NR +
eLTE with 5GC). This choice is driven by the availability of low band NR (<3 GHz, <1 GHz
for rural). The 5G services are launched with LTE+NR NSA on EPC, the NR and 5GC rollout
are driven by needs of 5G coverage; outside the NR coverage, 5G services may be provided
by 3GPP LTE NSA Option 4 with 3GPP Option 5 (SA eLTE with 5GC). The interworking
between eLTE and NR is also required. The migration scenario is shown in Figure 8.
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(Other vendors)

(Other vendors) (e)LTE
5GC Added
LTE LTE Evolves

(Other vendors) (e)LTE
Standardised and
unified interface

Figure 7. Main migration strategy in Australia: From 3GPP NSA Option 3x to 3GPP NSA Option 7.
(Option 5)

(Other vendors)
(Other vendors)
NR coverage

(Other vendors) (e)LTE
Standardised and
unified interface

Figure 8. Other possible migration strategy: From 3GPP NSA Option 3x to 3GPP NSA Option 4.

As in previous mobile system generations, 3GPP defines a clear functional split between the
Access Network (NG-RAN) and Core Network (5GC) with the overall 5G System architecture
defined in [21] and a more convenient overview of the AN and CN functions in [22]. The two
network domains are separated by a standardised interface (N2 and N3) defined in a set of
specifications, with [23] as the overarching specification which enable multi-vendor RAN – CN
deployments. Also, this interface has been now unified, meaning that all next generation
accesses (trusted/untrusted fixed/mobile 3GPP access points) must support this interface.

The NG-RAN supports inter cell radio resource management (RRM), radio bearer (RB) control,
connection mobility control, radio admission control, measurements configuration and
provisioning, and dynamic resources allocation.

The 5GC is responsible for non-access stratum (NAS) security and idle state mobility handling;
user equipment (UE) IP address allocation and protocol data unit (PDU) control; and mobility
anchoring and PDU session management.

The functional split between the NG radio and core domains is shown through Figure 9 to
Figure 14, where the multi-vendor implementation (equipment from different vendors) of the
corresponding functions is also illustrated.

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Figure 9. NG-RAN and Core Function Splits in 3GPP Standard [19].

Figure 10. Overall NG-RAN architecture [2], [19].

Both the user plane and control plane architectures for NG-RAN follow the same high-level
architecture scheme, as depicted in Figure 10. Figure 11 and Figure 12 show the 3GPP 4G and
5G protocol stacks for user and control plane, respectively. The two systems, with similar
architecture, also use the same protocols, except for the Service Data Adaptation Protocol
(SDAP). The SDAP has been introduced in 5G for flow based QoS, as described in the following
sections. It provides mapping between QoS flows and data radio bearers and marking QoS
flow ID (QFI) in both DL and UL packets. There is a single SDAP entity for each PDU session
(GTP Tunnel) [19].

In 4G, the non-access stratum (NAS) supports mobility management (MM) functionality and
user plane bearer activation, modification and deactivation; it is also responsible for ciphering
and integrity protection of NAS signalling [20]. In 5G, NAS-MM supports registration
management functionality, connection management functionality and user plane connection
activation and deactivation; as well as ciphering and integrity protection of NAS signalling.
NAS-Session Management (SM) is responsible for user plane PDU Session Establishment,
modification and release; it is transferred via the AMF, and transparent to the AMF [21].
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As in the previous 3GPP network releases, the NG-RAN and 5GC have crystal clear boundaries,
regardless the implementation. Hence security risks in NG-RAN are manageable as in previous
RAN generations. In Australia, the Huawei equipment is only in the access part of the network.
The core network is provided by other vendors, such as, for example, Nokia and Ericsson.



Relay Relay




L1 L1 L1 L1 L1 L1

LTE-Uu S1-U S5/S8 SGi

UE eNodeB Serving GW PDN GW

Standardised and
Application RAN unified interface Core
PDU Layer PDU Layer

Relay Relay 5G UP


L2 L2 L2 L2

L1 L1 L1 L1 L1 L1


N3 N9 N6

Figure 11. 4G/5G User Plane protocol stack [20], [21].



L1 L1 L1 L1


Standardised and
RAN unified interface Core
5G Relay
Protocol Protocol IP IP
Layer Layer
L2 L2

L1 L1
N2 N11

Figure 12. 4G/5G Control Plane protocol stack [20], [21].

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Add BBU for NR
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Multiple BBU Single BBU


Figure 13. Huawei co-located CU-DU units running on Huawei dedicated hardware and software.

3GPP NG-RAN (NR, or gNB in 3GPP) comes with two possible configurations:

 Central Unit (CU)-Distributed Unit (DU) split: The RAN non-real time protocol stack is
implemented in the CU and the functions more sensitive to delays in the DU close to
the antennas.
 CU-DU co-located at the Edge of the network: All RAN base band functionalities are
running into one box placed closed to the antenna units.

In Australia, only the Huawei CU-DU co-located option using dedicated hardware and software
will be deployed. Huawei has demonstrated that this proprietary solution turns out to be
much more efficient to handle and cost effective with respect to using common hardware. 4G
and NG-RAN elements – the base band units (BBU) – will be actually deployed on the same
site, with no needs of reducing dual connectivity transmission capacity between sites with a
centralized CU deployment. As a result, Huawei and mainstream carriers have agreed on CU
and DU integrated deployment, being 4G/5G co-site deployment the main industry trend. An
example of Huawei site solution is illustrated in Figure 13.

Furthermore, none of the above Huawei NG-RAN solutions that are offered for the Australian
market supports functionalities of core network or external servers. Notice that any local
breakout, e.g. to a Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC) server, or remote break out to internal
(operators’ networks, data centres) or external data networks, such as the Internet, is via third
party equipment, as described in the following paragraphs.

5G core and slicing

The 5G core (5GC) supports many new enabling network technologies [21], [22]. Among other
fundamental technology components, as depicted in Figure 14, the 5GC is characterized by a
layered and service oriented architecture, with control plane (CP) and user plane (UP) split,
and interfaces to subscription, state and policy data. Moreover, the 5GC supports: User plane
session continuity, while the terminal moves across different access points; interworking with
untrusted non-3GPP access; a comprehensive policy framework for access traffic steering,
switching and splitting; and wireless-wireline convergence.

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Data Policy Session Subscription
Data Data Data

• AMF = Access and Mobility Management

• UPF = User Plane Function
• NSSF = Network Slice Selection Function
• SMF = Session Management
5G Core Control Plane
• UDM = Unified Data Management
• PCF = Policy Control Function
• AUSF = Authentication Server Function
• DN = Data Network (External)
5G-Uu (N3IWF-UP)
• AF = Application Function
Multi-access Edge
5G Core User Plane Computing (MEC)

Standardised and unified interface

Figure 14. 5G Core (5GC) functions and interfaces [20], [22].

The separation of control and user planes provides deployment flexibility and independence.
The distribution of core functionality, especially user plane functions, closer to the radio nodes,
i.e. at the edge of the network, enables the placement of applications in the proximity of the
end-user, reducing transport network load and latency. The service based architecture –
including the related Network Repository Function (NRF) for 5GC control plane functions –
allows flexible addition and extension of network functions. Slicing and related Network Slice
Selection Function (NSSF) enable a flexible assignment of users to different network slice
instances that may be tailored to different use cases. The 5GC also supports unified subscriber
management, authorization and authentication functions.

The NG-RAN is not aware of any subscription data. Also, as in earlier network generations, all
user plane and signalling traffic is forwarded to the 5GC through secure tunnels and third party
security gateways, as detailed in the next section.

Other fundamental 5G enabling technologies, end to end, are [11]: Flow based QoS, with a
much higher level of granularity than LTE, which is limited to the bearer service concept (single
pipe between terminal and core network); multi-connectivity, where the 5G device can be
connected simultaneously to 5G, LTE, and WiFi, offering a higher user data rate and a much
more reliable connection; terminal assisted Network Slicing, and E2E network management
and orchestration, with in-built support for cloud implementation and edge computing. The
5G flow based QoS and slicing concept are illustrated in Figure 15. The NG-RAN and UE are
only Slice and QoS aware. Slices consisting of chains of virtual network functions (VNFs) are
supported by the 5GC only [11].

3GPP for terminal (UE) assisted network slicing defines a new parameter denoted as Single-
Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (S-NSSAI). Each S-NSSAI assists the network in
selecting a network slice instance. The S-NSSAI is composed by the following attributes:
• Slice/Service Type (SST): 1 (eMBB), 2 (URLLC), 3 (MIoT) are the standardised values for
roaming; operator specific settings are also possible;
• A Slice Differentiator (SD): Tenant ID, for further differentiation during the NSI selection.
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Standardised and
unified interface

Slice/QoS UDM NSSF NRF Slice/QoS

aware only

N2 Slice A
(Up to 8 S-NSSIs)
PDU Session  S-NSSAI
Slice B

QoS (IP) Flows

UDM = Unified Data Management NSSF = Network Slice Selection Function NRF = Network Repository Function

Figure 15. E2E QoS management and 5GC Slicing [11], [20], [22].

The Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) consists of a collection of S-NSSAIs.
Maximum eight S-NSSAIs may be sent in signalling messages between the UE and the Network.
The NSSAI is configured (Configured NSSAI) in the UE per Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN)
by the Home PLMN (HPLMN).

The terminal uses the Requested NSSAI (UE) during the Registration Procedure and the
Allowed NSSAI, received from the Access and Mobility Function (AMF), within its Registration
Area (RA). The RA allocated by the AMF to UE has homogeneous support of network slices.
The 5GC supports AMF level slicing per UE type, and SMF and UPF level slicing per Service or
per Tenant, based on S-NSSAI and DNN. An example of two network slices for one terminal
type is illustrated in Figure 15.

IP Flows are mapped onto QoS Flows, which are mapped onto one or more data radio bearers
(DRBs). DRBs are associated to one PDU Session, which is mapped onto one S-NSSAI. The S-
NSSAI is mapped onto one Network Slice Instance (NSI), i.e. one Network Slice; and the NSI is
mapped onto a single Data Network Name (DNN). However, it is not true the vice versa, as
described in the following text. This is how 5G handles the 5G flow based QoS within a given
NSI [11], [20], [22].

The NG-RAN is aware of the slice at PDU Session level, because the S-NSSAI is included in any
signalling message containing PDU Session info, see Figure 16 from 3GPP [19]. Pre-configured
slice enabling in terms of NG-RAN functions is implementation dependent. An example of NG-
RAN slicing is depicted in Figure 17. The medium access control (MAC) scheduling – based on
radio resource management (RRM) policy related to the servile level agreement (SLA) in place,
between communication service provider and tenant, for the supported slice and QoS
differentiation within the slice – is vendor dependent [19]. The 5GC has full control of slice
and QoS management, end to end (E2E).

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Figure 16. 3GPP RAN Support for Network Slicing [12].

5GC PDU Session Slice B NG-RAN

Control Slice A

QoS (IP) Flows GTP-U PDU-Sessions



High Level Split

(3GPP R15 selected )

DU aware
DU scheduling

Low Level Split



Figure 17. NG-RAN Slicing [11], [19], [20].

5G security aspects

5G System security is based on the well-established and proven 4G/EPS security, which has
been further enhanced [24], [25]. NAS security and keying hierarchy are as in 4G. NAS security
is established via the 3GPP Authentication and Key Agreement between NAS entities in UE
and CN (AMF), see Figure 10 and Figure 12. Figure 18 shows the 5GS keying hierarchy, which
is comparable to 4G for the functionality towards the RAN, i.e. all keys for the Access Stratum
(AS = RAN or AN) are derived from the NAS security parameters inside the Core Network and

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signalled the RAN. The main new model of the 5GS is on how the security functionality is
decomposed and distributed inside the Core Network. This enables also that the globally
unique 5G Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI, which is comparable to the IMSI of earlier
system generations) is always signalled encrypted via the RAN towards the CN. It is decrypted
by the home-PLMN and delivered from there to the serving Core Network for any user service,
management and regulatory purposes. In contrast to earlier system generations, where the
IMSI was used in the RAN for recovering from network failures and enabled thereby certain
attacks, the 5G System never exposes the SUPI to the RAN nor does it transfer it in clear via
the radio. Further, 3GPP 5G Release 15 adds an option to perform user plane integrity
protection between UE and gNB. In 3GPP Release 16, security algorithms use up to 256-bit
keys [23], see Figure 19.

With the offered Huawei RAN running on vendor-specific hardware, any security assurance
considerations on running RAN software on a 3rd parties’ platform and on interactions with
the platform’s security does not apply to the Huawei offering. Furthermore, Huawei provides
trusted 5G equipment to ensure that unauthorised software cannot be implanted and
concealing keys cannot be accessed, ensuring element management security. The CN of the
5GS is designed to leverage softwarisation and virtualisation techniques and how to mitigate
related security risks is not discussed in this document, as Huawei is not tendering for CN in

Figure 18. Key hierarchy generation in 5GS [24].

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128-bit keys
4G Support of UP Encryption Expose User ID in initial Access

UP and CP support Both Permanent User ID

Encryption and Integrity Protection Encrypted All time 128-bit keys & 256-bit keys
NAS: ciphering,

RRC: ciph., int. L=256

UP: ciph., int. gNB …

Enhanced Enhanced Stronger

User Data Protection Privacy Protection Security Algorithm

R15 Enhancement R16 Enhancement

Figure 19. E2E Security Enhancement with 5G Evolution [24], [25].

Also, as in 4G, the transport network layer within the RAN and between RAN and core network
domains is protected using IPSec tunnels. Examples of security deployment scenarios for 3GPP
NSA Option 3x (which is the same as with 4G) and SA Option 2, NSA Option 7 and NSA Option
4, architecture configurations are illustrated in Figure 20 and Figure 21, respectively. As shown
in the figures, here with 3GPP Option 2 as an example, the 5G system RAN related transport
adopts the same means as 4G and, therefore, for this aspect, it has the same level of security
as 4G and as 3GPP Option 3x. The Security GateWay (SeGW) is a 3rd party product.

In summary, it can be concluded that the 5G RAN security level is at the same or higher level
than for 4G, depending on deployment options, and is fully under operator control. 3GPP aims
at ensuring the security of data transmission. The Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP)
encryption in the RAN (downlink), see Figure 17, and UE (uplink), ensures security over the air
interface. Carriers ensure the security of Intranet transmission (transport network layer
connecting the access and core network equipment. The application layer ensures the security
of services.

(CU&DU) IPSec Tunnel
Option 3

IPSec Tunnel EPC
(3rd party)
BBU Standardised
LTE Regional DC (POC1)

(CU&DU) IPSec Tunnel
Option 2

IPSec Tunnel 5GC

(3rd party)
(CU&DU) Standardised and Regional DC (POC1)
unified interface

Figure 20. 3GPP NSA Option 3 and SA Option 2 security deployments. The Security Gateway (SeGW), Evolved
Packet Core (EPC) and 5G Core Network (5GC) are 3rd party equipment, e.g. from Nokia or Ericsson.

Commercial in confidence Page 22 of 28

(CU&DU) IPSec Tunnel
Option 7

IPSec Tunnel 5GC
(3rd party)
Standardised and
BBU Regional DC (POC1)
eLTE unified interface

(CU&DU) IPSec Tunnel
Option 4

IPSec Tunnel 5GC
(3rd party)
Standardised and
BBU Regional DC (POC1)
eLTE unified interface

Figure 21. 3GPP NSA Option 7 and NSA Option 4 security deployments. The Security Gateway (SeGW),
Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and 5G Core Network (5GC) are 3rd party equipment, e.g. from Nokia or Ericsson.

5G deployment scenarios

The 5G deployment scenarios using an NSA and NSA/SA architecture configuration as

suggested for Australia are depicted in Figure 22 and in Figure 23, respectively.

All network domains, except the Huawei RAN, may run on cloud infrastructures. The far edge
hosts the CU&DU (BBU) functions, as illustrated in Figure 17. This is the area where Huawei
equipment (antennas, radio and base band units) may be deployed.

The edge/regional cloud hosting CN, application server and MEC functions is separated from
the far edge zone, i.e. the RAN, by the standardised NSA RAN or SA RAN interfaces, see Figure
9, Figure 10, Figure 11, Figure 12, and Figure 14, maintaining a clear logical and physical
separation between radio access and core network elements. Any wanted local break out (e.g.
for MEC) is above the RAN and located in the Edge/Regional data centres, using 3rd party
equipment. The core network functionalities may be deployed in the Edge/Regional and
Central part of the infrastructure, with no possibility of running them in Huawei equipment,
e.g. through and end to end VNF orchestration. IoT and application enablement platforms are
also placed in the Central part of the network.

The introduction of the 5G core may be based on software upgrades of the core functions
instantiated in the Edge/Regional segment, namely in the Metro and Edge areas, as shown in
Figure 23, where an example of three network slices is also illustrated for different SLAs, in
terms of throughput, latency and reliability.

Commercial in confidence Page 23 of 28

Standardised interface

Far Edge Edge/Regional Central

(71-76 and 81-86 GHz) 1-2 DC/metro
NR (1-10 Gbps link/carrier)
Metro DC SDN-C

BNG Core (CP) Access DC

4G UE 10xGE CDN Core (UP) WAN

DC/metro IP/ MPLS
S1 area
5G(NSA) UE LTE (100GE SD-WAN) nx10GE/100GE/WDM
NR HB+LB App Enablement

HB S1 nx10xGE Metro DC IoT Platform
ePC+ (UP) Central Core
Indoor CPE HB Macro on RNC BSC
Outdoor CPE Tower Central Cloud
Core (CP)
Indoor CPE Micro on Pole BNG
CDN Core (UP)
1-5 ms RTT (5-30 km)

< 10 ms RTT (100-500 km)

10’s – 100’s of ms RTT (500-5000 km)

Figure 22. 5G 3GPP NSA deployment scenario with existing core network in Australia.

Standardised and
unified interface
Far Edge Edge/Regional Central
W-band (92–114.25GHz)
and D-band (130–
1-2 DC/metro
(100 Gb/s link/multicarrier)
UPF Core (CP)
4G UE 10xGE CDN Core (UP)
Access DC


DC/metro IP/ MPLS
N2/N3 area
5G(NSA) UE eLTE (100GE SD-WAN) nx10GE/100GE/WDM
NR HB+LB App Enablement
(Latency) LB HB N2/N3
nx10xGE Metro DC IoT Platform NEF

ePC (UP) Central Core

5G(SA) UE Indoor CPE HB Macro on
UPF Core (CP)
Outdoor CPE Tower Central Cloud
Indoor CPE Micro on Pole BNG
CDN Core (UP)
1-5 ms RTT (5-30 km)

(Reliability) < 10 ms RTT (100-500 km)

10’s – 100’s of ms RTT (500-5000 km)

Figure 23. 5G 3GPP NSA/SA deployment scenario with 5GC in Australia, and example of network slices with
different SLAs, in terms of throughput, latency and reliability parameters.

North Bound Interface Operator NMS



EMS (3rd Party)
South Bound Interface
3GPP: Firewall
S1/N2/N3 EPC/5GC
3GPP: Core
UE BBU and unified
(CU&DU) Australia interface

Figure 24. Huawei 5G RAN (NG-RAN) EMS Deployment in Australia.

Commercial in confidence Page 24 of 28

Figure 24 shows the Huawei Element Management System (EMS) for the Huawei 5G RAN (NG-
RAN) in Australia.

The Huawei EMS connects to Huawei RAN elements, and handles performance management
(PM), fault management (FM), configuration management (CM), inventory management (IM)
and software management (SM) data of Huawei equipment, only.

Operators have full control on the access of 5G RAN EMS, e.g. firewall and security control
systems such as Citrix System, as currently used with 4G, provide port filtering and monitoring.

Huawei 5G RAN EMS manages RAN elements through its proprietary South Bound Interface
(SBI), which is not standardised by 3GPP. Third Party EMS cannot manage Huawei RAN, as the
EMS is a vendor-specific 5G RAN hardware and software solution. Huawei 5G RAN EMS can
be installed and run only on dedicated Huawei hardware.

The 5GS supports subscriber tracing as 4G also in the RAN and is described in [26]. As in 4G
there will be not any subscriber identities given to the RAN for this.

Figure 25 paints a high level end-to-end security deployment and management process. It is
the operators’ responsibility to ensure network security. For example, the management plane
(MP), control plane (CP) and user plane (UP) must be isolated; in all nodes, security features,
at the different interface, must be enabled for encrypted transmission between elements;
unused ports shall be shut down; and EMS rights controlled and restricted.

Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 26, carriers should deploy a 3rd party Bastion host between
the operation and maintenance (O&M) personnel and the Huawei EMS, which is the only path
for anyone to access the EMS. The bastion host supports, but is not limited to: Complete
identity management and authentication; authorisation based on users; target hosts and time
segments; real-time monitoring; complete operation of the entire process; complete session
audit and playback.


Host Network security deployment
Infrastructure Security network Security network Security Security
planning design implementation management

Vendors’ security design Operator design for security and management

3GPP and other security standards
Figure 25. End to end security deployment and management.
Commercial in confidence Page 25 of 28
As shown in Figure 27, ultra-reliable low-latency services must be provided only in confined
(specific) areas or using dedicated mobile networks, in order to comply with the
corresponding service level agreements, e.g. five nines reliability, dependability and safety
requirements. Also, for services demanding a high level of security, end-to-end security should
be applied at the application layer.

Ultimately, to avoid any potential concerns, in Australia, Huawei does not offer and provide any
kind of network managed services. Those are either from other vendors or handled by the network
operators themselves.

Security audit


personnel EMS
Internal O&M personnel
 Complete identity management and authentication
 Authorization based on users, target hosts, and time segments
The only path for O&M  Real-time monitoring
personnel to access the  Complete operation of the entire process
Huawei EMS  Complete session audit and playback

Figure 26. Example of 3rd party Bastion host for Huawei EMS logs.

High-reliability services are provided only in High-reliability services are provided using private networks
specific areas (E.g. GSM-R)

Carrier network
Area 1 Area 2 Private network Application/S
access ervice

Remote power Regional automatic

distribution control driving Platform
2 2 2
0 0 0
1 1 2
0 6 0

Application layer self-security mechanisms

Figure 27. Examples of deployment of high-reliability and secure services.

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5G is defined by 3GPP Release 15 and Release 16 as an LTE advanced pro evolution and a NG-
RAN/5GS developed in parallel to address different markets and migration scenario needs.
3GPP has already defined the security mechanisms for R15, which have been enhanced with
respect to previous network generations, and Huawei products comply with all of them.

In 2019, the initial 5G deployment is assumed to be based on 3GPP Option 3x, which consists
of a Non Standalone (NSA) architecture configuration of LTE combined with NR and an Evolved
Packet Core Network (EPC), which re-uses the same 3GPP security mechanisms as 4G. End to
end network slicing and a range of 5G specific services/KPIs/use cases are not supported.

Looking at 2020 and beyond, the main migration strategy is to move from 3GPP Non-
Standalone (NSA) architecture Option 3x to 3GPP NSA architecture Option 4, which consists
of a Multi-RAT Dual Connectivity (DC) with the 5G Core Network (5GC) and New Radio (NR) as

In Release 15 (R15), Standalone (SA) Option 2, and later releases (R16, R17, etc.), 3GPP defines
additional security enhancements, such as IMSI encryption and user-plane integrity protection
(R15), roaming security enhancement and 256bit encryption (R16), and Huawei products
implement and will support them.

Ultra-reliable low-latency (URLLC) communication services may be provided only in confined

(specific) areas or using dedicated mobile networks, to comply with the corresponding service
level agreements, dependability and safety requirements. Also, for services demanding a high
level of security, such as driverless cars, service robots, etc. the application system must
support end to end security protection.

In 3GPP specifications, as in previous network generations, the 5GC and NG-RAN functions are
separated by a standardised interface, which enables a multi-vendor deployment. The NG-
RAN remains a “pipe” between user equipment and core network.

The situation is comparable to 4G and earlier generations and any security risk in the NG-RAN
can be managed as done for earlier network generations. Huawei is providing secure NG-RAN
equipment, and operators are ensuring a secure 5G deployment and security maintenance
and management, end to end.

Huawei welcomes any Security Assurance Programme and related 3rd Party Evaluation Centre
in Australia, under the Australian Government supervision, and/or any type of experimental
assessment of any security aspect of Huawei NG-RAN.

Huawei is open to any kind of collaboration on 5G Security with public and private sectors
(organizations) in Australia, and globally.

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[1] D. Kennedy, “5G in Australia: Evolution not Revolution,” Ovum, TMT intelligence informa, June 2018.
[2] A. R. Prasad (Ed.), S. Arumugam (Ed.), "ICT Standardization," Journal of ICT Standardization, May 2018.
[3] NGMN Alliance, “NGMN 5G white paper,” February, 2015.
[4] https://www.crn.com.au/news/telstra-to-launch-5g-services-in-2019-484422
[5] https://www.crn.com.au/news/optus-to-showcase-5g-network-at-2018-gold-coast-commonwealth-
[6] D. Soldani, P. Airas, T. Hoglund. H. Rasanen, and D. Debrecht, “5G To The Home,” IEEE VTC, Spring, 2017.
[7] M. S. Elbamby, C. Perfecto, M. Bennis, and K. Doppler, “Toward Low-Latency and Ultra-Reliable Virtual
Reality,” IEEE Network Magazine, March, 2018.
[8] D. Soldani, et al., “5G Mobile Systems for Healthcare,” IEEE VTC, Spring, 2017.
[9] ITU-T Rec. Y.3101 “Requirements of the IMT-2020 network,” January, 2018.
[10] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Study on scenarios and requirements for next generation access
technologies," 3GPP TR 38.913, v.14.3.0.
[11] D. Soldani, “5G beyond radio access: A flatter sliced network,” Mondo Digitale, AICA, March, 2018.
[12] www.3gpp.org
[13] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Requirements for Further Advancements for Evolved Universal
Terrestrial Radio Access,” TR 38.913, v.14.0.0.
[14] D. Soldani, Y. J. Guo, B. Barani, P. Mogensen, C. L. I, S. K. Das “5G for Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency
Communications,” Special Issue of IEEE Network Magazine, March, 2018.
[15] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “User Equipment (UE) radio transmission and reception; Part 1: Range
1 Standalone,” 3GPP TS 38.101-1 V15.2.0.
[16] Huawei: “5G Spectrum,” Public policy position paper, March 2018.
[17] ACMA: Spectrum tune-up “3.6 GHz band auction system,” 10 April 2018.
[18] ACMA: “Completes high-value spectrum auction at 700 MHz,” 12 April 2017.
[19] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “NR and NG-RAN overall description; Stage 2,” 3GPP TS 38.300
[20] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved
Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access,” 3GPP TS 23.401 v.15.4.0.
[21] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “System architecture for the 5G system; Stage 2,” 3GPP TS 23.501
[22] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Procedures for the 5G System; Stage 2,” 3GPP TS 23.502 v.15.2.0.
[23] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “NG-RAN; NG general aspects and principles, ” 3GPP TS 38.410
[24] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Security architecture and procedures for 5G System,” 3GPP TS
33.501 v.15.0.0.
[25] 3rd Generation Partnership Project Security Aspects: http://www.3gpp.org/DynaReport/33-series.htm
[26] 3rd Generation Partnership Project, “Telecommunication management; Subscriber and equipment trace;
Trace concepts and requirements,” 3GPP TS 32.421 v.15.0.0.

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