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Roger Murray
Tom Wengraf
Introduction*
A colonial metropolis may be seen as a “centre of determination” of its
colonies:1 but equally a colony may escape this conventional dependence and
determinacy to erupt into, even momentarily to absorb, the history of its
metropolis. “French” Algeria has proved the paradigm instance of the
dangerous autonomy of colonial interests and ideologies. Source of wealth of
a colonial lobby which became powerfully entrenched in metropolitan
political and economic institutions, logistic and political base for the over-
throw of the IVth Republic, scene of the most prolonged and brutal colonial
war since Indochina, Algeria in the later ’fifties became the epicentre of
French history.
This complex experience provides an exceptionally rich model in any
general study of decolonization. The intimacy and dialectical movement of
the relations between colony and metropolis constitute an extraordinary
field for conceptual elaboration and “totalization”. Properly, for example,
any theory of the Algerian Revolution must involve and integrate a theory of
French bourgeois society as a whole: how otherwise can the advent, sig-
nificance and implications of Gaullist decolonization be understood?
The theoretical interest of Algerian decolonization is, however, of less
concern here than its political significance. The context, form and hopes
afforded by the long struggle for liberation and its achievement confer on it a
special importance: its future necessarily engages us. For this reason we have
a duty not to make hasty or peremptory judgements, but to try and grasp the
specific structure of possibilities and difficulties which emerged from the
liberation struggle. We must understand the colonial system, the liberation
war, and the problems of independence together, as a totality.
Whatever the options which are now being taken, socialists will be par-
ticularly attentive to certain key indices. One must be the extent to which
democracy is realizable and realized in such pivotal institutions as the
party, the trade unions, the communes and the workers’ councils. A second is
* The final draft of Part I was written by Roger Murray, and that of the second (forth-
coming) part by Tom Wengraf.
1
Portugal and the End of Ultra-Colonialism, NLR 15-17.
The Algerian Revolution
Le Tell (1865)*
* “. . . Let them all, the soldier by his sword, the colon by his plough, the priest by his
prayer and the native by his submission, form a unity, and Algeria will fulfil their destinies
that God has doubtlessly made splendid . . .”
16
government must only come upon the scene in order to ratify developments if
they are good; to disavow then if they are bad.” Thus licenced, military
columns ravaged the country which, though possessing only the rudimentary
and ineffectual administration of an Ottoman vizirate, nevertheless im-
pressed military diarists with its evident civilization. Conquest was initially
pure regression: villages were ransacked, flocks decimated, silos burnt,
populations murdered. Resistance was fierce; the campaigns against Abd-el
Kader lasted 18 years, with the brief interruption of a treaty swiftly broken by
the French commander. Total militarization found its advocates immediately.
“To plunder”, wrote the conservative general Bugeaud to the republican
Cavaignac, “one must be strong. We are condemned to plunder in Africa so
as not ourselves to be plundered in France”. Sententious and brutal, the
heroes of the pacification—Cavaignac, Bugeaud, Saint-Arnaud, Clauzel—
relived the campaigns against the Numidians, restored Christian ruins, and
re-created the colonia of Roman times.
These “centres of colonization” were the nuclei of “French Algeria”, a
colony whose rationale was found in the deliberate project of mass settle-
ment.2 Thus began a process of expropriation, settlement and enrichment
which produced a distinctive human type, the pied noir. The pathological
universe of the French Algerians was initially comprehensible in terms of
their past. These settlers were the product of a hundred years of social
upheaval and defeat: the parasites of the July Monarchy armies, the beaten
proletarians of 1848 and the unemployed of the Ateliers Nationaux, political
deportees of 1851, Alsatians made homeless in 1871, French wine-growers
ruined by phylloxera, the Italo-Slav flotsam thrown up by Italian unification,
the opening of the Suez Canal and Balkan war, refugees from Spain and two
world wars. This human deposit, “France chez elle”, was in large measure
not of French origin. One half of the immigrant population of 1848 was
comprised of Spaniards, Italians and Maltese; in 1876, 153,000 of the total
344,000 Europeans were aliens. This defeated, under-privileged and diffuse
mass was to discover a unity and force in the defence of colonial privileges
and the assertion of an “ultra-French” extremism whose bad faith was
evident even in the 1860’s. “They demand total assimilation with the metro-
pole, excluding its taxes and its duties”.3 With the law of 1889 automatically
naturalizing children of aliens born in Algeria, the IIIrd Republic formally
adopted this clamorous “neo-French” progeny. Between 1881 and 1911 came
the flood tide of immigration: population almost doubled from 410,000 to
752,000 (thereafter rising more slowly to 922,000 by 1948); the littoral
plains, densely settled, took on their distinctive colonial physiognomy with the
installation of European viticulture served by the necessary roads, railways
and port infrastructure. The agrarian and banking pressure groups crystal-
2
Outlined by Maréchal Soult, Minister of War, in 1843: “. . . We cannot wait: it is ab-
solutely imperative that we make colons and construct villages, summon all energies in order
to sanction, to consolidate and to simplify the occupation we achieve by arms . . .” Quoted
by R. Barbé,“Le Question de la Terre en Algérie”, Economie et Politique, November 1955.
3
Letters of Dr. Vital to Ismael Urbain, 1867.
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4 Francis Jeanson succinctly characterized this fundamental motif in the history of the
5 In 1930, 26,153 Europeans owned a total of 2,234,000 ha; in 1950, 22,000 owned 2,726,000
ha, and 85 per cent of European lands were held by 6,385 large colons.
6 Concession of 25,000 ha in the Setif region to the Compagnie Genevoise; 1865 concession
10 ha. Now, European proprietors with less than 10 ha cover hardly 3,000 ha in all.”
The decline of the smallholder over the country as a whole is given in the following table:
European Holdings Below 50 ha.
Number Total Area Covered
1840–95 32,000 600,000 plus
1951 13,000 158,000
R. Barbe, “La Question de la Terre en Algérie”, Economie et Politique, 1955; Recensement
de l’Agriculture, 1951.
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from the indigènes, to establish a caste system that would both instrumenta-
lize and justify an eternal domination. Within this framework all Europeans
were privileged, all were arrivistes, all found their positivity in the negation of
the Muslim majority. Expropriated, pauperized, denied political rights, the
Algerian Muslims were reduced to a human vegetation.
Probleme Algérienne or, more conveniently, in Mohamed Cherif Sahli’s study, “De l’Assimila-
tion, a l’Integration: une mystification politique”, Temps Modernes, November 1955.
The Algerian Revolution
10
Membership was as follows: 48 Europeans, 24 Muslims (of whom 17 Arabs and 7
Kabyles). The 12,512 proprietors in the “colon” section enjoyed the same representation of
24 seats as the 38,593 “non-colons”.
22
liberty, of its institutions and thus of the essential prop and motor of any
collective progress . . . ”11
The ample records of military destructiveness and atavism are also records
of what was destroyed. “More than 50 fine villages, built of stone and
roofed with tiles, were destroyed. Our soldiers made very considerable
pickings there. We did not have the time, in the heat of combat, to chop
down the trees. The task, in any case, would have been beyond our strength.
20,000 men armed with axes could not in six months cut down the olives
and fig trees which cover the beautiful landscape which lay at our feet”.12
“There were still numerous bands of the enemy on the summits, and I was
hoping for another engagement. But they refused to come down and I
began to chop down the fine orchards and to set fire to the magnificent
villages under the enemy’s eyes” (1846); “I left in my wake a vast confla-
gration. All the villages, some 200 in number, were burnt down, all the
gardens destroyed, all the olive trees cut down” (1851).13 The indigenous
people, near 6 million in 1830, was reduced to 221- million by 1852.14
This society was complex and differentiated: its constituent elements were
related by multiple internal movements and transactions which gave con-
sistency to the whole. Tell and Sahara, town and country, desert and oasis,
were linked through the mediation of nomads, traders, artisans and preachers.
Outside the cities, the largest genuine collectivity was the tribe, united by real
or fictive genealogical descent from an eponymous ancestor, collective
proprietor of a determinate geographical space and the flocks it supported.
The tribal identity was defined in opposition to “other” tribes, to which it
was linked in time of peace by a necessary complementarity, just as it was
linked to the town.
“The commercial relations between tribes take place by means of markets
held on regular days on sites often at some distance from camps and settle-
ments. They also come to trade in the towns, always taking care to carry
away the maximum quantity of currency to hoard . . . As for the trade in
the province as a whole, Oran has become its chief entrepôt since the depart-
ure of the Spaniards.
“It amounted to a total of about 2,000,000 francs exchanged mainly for
cereals or other local products, which were exported exclusively by way of
Oran but also through Arzew, Rio-Salado and Tafna, and almost always via
gone to Paris on behalf of the Algerians estimated the population on the eve of the invasion
at ten millions; while Marechal Bugeaud declared to the Chamber of Peers on January 24th,
1845, “nous croyons qu’il y a sous notre domination environ quatre millions d’Arabes.” At
this date—after fifteen years of fighting—most of Kabylie and the towns of the South had
not yet been “pacified”.
24
Jewish intermediaries who, together with a few Moors, handle urban trade
under a monopoly from the Bey”.15
The tribe, led by its sheik was formed through the federation or vertical
integration of clans (c’offs), and its basic particle was the patriarchal-
patrilinear family. At once a social, economic and religious unit, the family
was the structural model of the whole system, indivisible, consecrated by the
joint execution of the traditional agrarian rituals as also by the koranic
insistence on the primacy of the family within the umma. The myth of the
“anarchy” of arabo-turk Algeria cannot survive serious historical inspection.
The Algerian experience of colonial brutality and violence is perhaps only
exceeded by that of the Indians of North America and the tribes of South
West Africa. “Pacification”—which required an army of 100,000 men by the
1840’s—aimed at the systematic military and economic shattering of the
tribes. Tribal resistance was only finally overcome with the defeat of Moq-
rani’s uprising in 1871. The submission of Abdel Kader (1847), heralded in the
textbooks, had marked only the conquest of the Tell perimeter: the following
years were almost uninterruptedly given over to campaigns against the
tribes of Greater and Lesser Kabylie, against the Ouled Sidi Sheikh, against
the nomadic tribes of the South. Between 1830 and 1870, there were only five
years of “peace”—1859–64—and this was a period of massive emigration from
the Constantinois. Emigration, which was considerable,16 facilitated settlement.
But where occupation was maintained, the French resorted to administrative
and judicial measures to seize the most fertile lands and to replace tribal
political authority. The Senatus-consulte of 1863 created a new administrative
unit, the douar, which was superimposed without regard to the existing
articulation of traditional society; fractions were split, tribes intermingled.
Only in the Kabylie and the Aures did the old institutions to some extent
survive; in the Arab plains, the officials and institutions of the douar (espe-
cially the council, or djemaa) came to replace older forms.
“A veritable social vivisection”, the programme of appropriation fell into
two parts. First, annexation of lands classified as Beylik (public domaines,
including habous*, arbitrary restriction of Arch (communal, tribal lands)
combined with outright sequestration of “rebel” properties (for example, the
500,000 ha sequestration in Kabylie following Moqrani’s defeat). Secondly,
the juridical transformation of melk (private and family) lands, formerly
protected by the traditional institution of indivision (the collective integral
inheritance of property by all heirs), into “individual” property (Loi Warnier
of 1873); thus “liberated”, the lands could be bought or confiscated through
economic mechanisms—that is, through usury and extortion. Land legislation
15
Captain Tatareau, Memoire sur le province d’Oran, 1833, cited by Launay op. cit.
16
Augustin Berque, a Colonial Administrator and author of a story about “La Bourgeoisie
Algerienne”, (Hesperis, 1948), listed the major departures. 1830, 1832, 1834, 1860, 1870,
1875, 1888, 1898, 1910 and 1911 (the famous Teemcen exodus). Oran which had 40,000
inhabitants in 1831 had sunk to 2,895 in 1861.
* The habous, the medieval mortmain, was created out of charitable inalienable donations
to religious institutions; however, the revenues deriving from the property were retained for
the use of the donor and his heirs.
The Algerian Revolution
was completed by special codes relating to forests, mines etc. Thus, the
European colonate possessed itself of one quarter of the total cultivated
surface: and two-fifths of the land had been francisée, were subject to the
control of French law (all European-owned lands plus 2,243,000 ha); of the
land remaining under Muslim and traditional laws, two-fifths were melk
(private property) and one-fifth arch (tribal).17 Vast in extent, this appropria-
tion takes on fuller significance when the disposition of European lands is
examined: over 80 per cent of the Mitidja, 90 per cent of the Sahel and
Alger plains, over 80 per cent in the plains of Bone, Philippeville and parts of
Oranie. These were the most fertile and productive lands in all Algeria.
More important, this physical in implantation had dynamic and disruptive
implications which shattered the traditional social system.
The “explosion” of Algerian society, the consequence of the project of
settlement, revealed itself in a triple assault on traditional social organization
and culture. Economically, the seizure of land, deflection of streams, con-
fiscation of forests dislocated the ecological equilibrium of a rural economy
based on the inter-relation of extensive pastoral-cerealculture routines, and in
so doing extinguished urban artisanal and commercial prosperity. Socio-
logically, a process of radical atomization and displacement was set in
motion: thus, “the nomadism of he shepherds, moving in great caravans
made up of an entire tribe or of clans headed by their sheikh, has very fre-
quently given way to the nomadism of the work-hungry driving towards the
towns destitute individuals who have been torn from their traditional way of
life and cut off from their now completely disintegrated community”.18
Demographic advance exaggerated the disequilibrium of the population:
resource ratio and necessitated a desperate exodus of the masculine population
to the larger towns and to France.19 The urbanized indigènes reduced by
physiological misery to a collective anonymity, could thus permanently
confirm the solipsistic racism of the colonial situation in Algeria. The
eradication of the original structures of the Algerian people was completed by
a systematic cultural pauperization. In 1834, General Valaze had noted that,
“nearly all the Arabs can read and write: in each village, there are two
schools”. There followed the most appalling recidivism. Faithful to their
interests, the representatives of the colonate applied a policy of suffocation of
traditional lettered culture, whose conclusion was the statutory classification
of Arabic as a “foreign language” in 1938; the importation and circulation of
Arabic texts was restricted, the instruction at mosques degenerated.20
17
Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians, Beacon Press 1962, p. 121.
18 Pierre Bourdieu, Sociologie de l’Algérie P.U.F. 1961, p. 62.
19 The urban population as a percentage of the total population soared from 13.9 per cent
in 1886 to 24.9 per cent in 1954. Between 1936 and 1954, Muslim urban population increased
by 824,000.
20 Maurice Wahl, a partisan of cultural “assimilation”, bitterly attacked the destructive-
ness of French policy. “We began by destroying almost entirely the meids (primary schools),
zaouias (rural schools, all stages), medersas (higher schools) and all the other Muslim schools
existing before 1830 . . . Later we took certain confused initiatives . . . whose results have
been only mediocre and sometimes negative”.
26
cent of the population by Ch-André Julien) had intermixed with Arabs even
before the hilalian invasions in such geographically pivotal areas as the
valley of the Cheliff; and Islamization, linquistic conversion to Arabic, a
hypothetical genealogical assimilation had long blurred the basic opposition
between nomadic, militant Arabs and Berber sedentarists forced up into the
rugged country of greater and lesser Kabylie. By the mid twentieth century
there were far more “arabized” Berbers than pure Arabs. The common
enemy, colonializing and Christian, contributed to further obliterate the
separation which the French could still successfully exploit in Morocco.
Intolerable population density creeated a large Berber proletariat and sub-
proletariat in the towns; while in he hills the French superimposed on the
democratic assembly of the collectivity (djemaa) the caidate of the Ottoman
Empire. Intermediate and transitional forms (transhumance, semi-stabiliza-
tion) multiplied between sedentarist and nomad, to cope with the shrinking
spatio-temporal dimensions of indigenous agriculture.21 As population
mounted, vital space and flocks dwindled.22 The nomad, traditionally the
aristocratic exploiter and “protector” of the ksourien (sedentary agricultura-
lists), declined into peripheral beggar or, later, Saharan employee. The
town, formerly an economic, religious and cultural entrepôt for a defined
rural milieu to which it remained attached by fundamental affinities of
structure and value, was now transformed into the quite distinct “colonial
town”, symbol of fracture and estrangement. The process was classic—
uncontrollable growth, disintegration of family and artisanal corporation,
internal dichotomy of ville and casbah or medina, proliferation of new social
categories united more by common situation than by common organization:
the unemployed, the sub-proletariat, a new parasitic petty bourgeoisie,
“intellectuals” produced by some western education.
Fluid and mobile, Algerian society did not totally dissolve before the
impact of colonization. The tenacity and resistance with which initial settle-
ment had been met continued to manifest themselves—but on a reduced
scale and at the level of fundamental, intimate values. It might be said that
colonization revealed the basic unit of the social system: the extended
patrilinear family.23 The family was not irreducible but its adaptability as a
following percentages of nomads, semi-nomads and sedentarists: 58 per cent, 17.6 per cent
and 24.3 per cent in the High Plains and Saharan Atlas; 30.3 per cent, 12.8 per cent and 56.8
per cent in the pre-Saharan zone; and 27.7 per cent, 8.8 per cent and 63.4 per cent in the
Sahara proper.
22 From 1845 onwards, observers notec the suppression of pasture rights by the europeans
on lands they occupied and also in the forests, In 1914. Professor Flamand warned that
“the regions of the High Tell are now almost completely closed for pastures” and that “the
roll-back towards the South has its limits”. See R. Barbé, op. cit., who gives figures:
mean of years all herds all muslim herds only
1906–1915 8,961,000 8,218,000
1946–1953 4,350,000 3,837,000
23
On this subject, consult P. Bourdieu, op.cit.; Saddia and Lakhdar, L’Aliénation Col-
onialiste et la Résistance de la Famille Algérienne, Lausanne 1961 or Temps Modernes for
June and July 1961; and Frantz Fanon, L’An V de la Révolution Algérienne, Maspero 1960.
28
24 The character of the 1939 “Congres des Confreries religieuses” is evoked in their pious
resolution, “That the marabout should concern himself with the spiritual instruction of his
adepts; that the administrator should attend to administration; and whoever has some de-
mand, whether on his behalf or on that of another, for his correligionnaries, should apply to
the superior Administration by way of his local authorities: this will certainly be the most
profitable for him.” Cited by Jacques Berque, Le Maghreb entre Deux Guerres, p.307.
The Algerian Revolution
* As Governor-General, Jules Cambon, pointed out in the Senate in 1894. “After the
Turkish authorities had disappeared . . . there was no day on which we did not try to destroy
the great families. . . because we found them to be forces of resistance. We did not realize that,
in suppressing the forces of resistance in this fashion, we were also suppressing our means of
action. The result is that we are today confornted by a sort of human dust on which we have
no influence and in which movements take place which are to us unknown. We no longer
have any authoritative intermediaries between ourselves and the indigenous population.” (Le
Gouvernement-Générale de l’Algerie 1891–1897, Paris 1918, p.59)
30
*
The work of Albert Camus, for all its aesthetic merits, stands as a stupefying monument
to the solipsism of the pied-noir.
25
Readers specially interested in ecomonic analyses of Algerian “underdevelopment”
should consult Rene Gendarme, L’Economie de l’Algerie, Armand Colin (1959) and the
essays collected in Francois Perroux, L’Algerie de Demain, PUF (1962). Both are strongly
biased towards “co-operation”; See Fidel Castro on Tshombe, Maspero, 1962.
The Algerian Revolution
32
* Colonel Martin at Ghardaia reported in 1922: “. . . What, for the last four years, I have
seen at Djelfa, is hardly encouraging. Every kind of bad weather, as bad as they can be, follow
in succession to annihilate whatever has been painfully planted: long icy winters, almost
without rain; from spring onwards, sirocco gales that wither and burn, belated frosts that
occasionally in the month of June—I have seen this myself—destroy the corn already in the
ear, torrential rains, and the hail which at the beginning of the summer finishes off whatever
has so far resisted . . .” (Quoted by R. Barbé, op. cit.)
26
Table from André Gorz, “Gaullisme et neo-colonialisme,” Temps Modernes, March 1961
—an important article to which further reference will be made. Quintennial figures of
European cereal productivity are given in R. Barbé, “La Question de la Terre”, Economie
et Politique, November 1955.
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{
% of total of Muslim holdings 37.0 15.9
Muslim % of area of Muslim holdings 46.2 22.2
Agriculture % of area of combined European 80.7 54.5
and Muslim holdings
{
%of total of European holdings 17.0 42.6
European % of area of European holdings 29.7 49.7
Agriculture % of area of combined European 19.3 45.5
and Muslim holdings
Eastern Algeria, more humid and mountainous with a more extended semi-
continental hinterland, is thus left predominantly to the indigenous agri-
culturalists; the west, with its far deeper plains and corridors, is par excellence
the European zone, given over to the vine, citrus fruits and market-garden
produce. In Oranie were clustered almost half of all European holdings.
The European avoidance of mountains and arid plains obeyed the simple
logic of easy profitability. The concentration in the Sahelian plains and in the
Department of Oran was historically linked with the installation of the vine as
a dominant crop; as viticulture advanced, so the regional structuration was
27
Taken from Hildebert Isnard, “Structures De l’Agriculture Musulmane en Algérie à La
Veille de l’Insurrection”, Mediterranée, Oct-Dec, 1960.
34
more fully realized. The vineyards attained their maximal extent in 1929
(approximately 400,000 ha), after which a statutory limitation was imposed in
the period of contraction that followed.
The vine dominated colonial Algeria not merely economically but also
politically and psychologically. The extraordinary affective significance of
North African viticulture was partially formulated by Jules Ferry as early as
1892:
Colonial viticulture is a project of estrangement of the indigène. “The
colonizing genius is made up in large part of audacity and self-confidence;
an extra measure is required by those intrepid winegrowers who, despite
the blows of usury and phylloxera, push inexorably forward, wherever
there is arable land and roads, to establish those long rows of green
shoots, almost as though they were anxious to consecrate, with the most
French of crops, the definitive peaceful appropriation of the African soil in
the name of France”.
28
Launay, p. 102.
36
29 Useful material on the composition and mechanisms of the “colonial lobby” will be
found in Claude Bourdet, “Les Maitres de l’Afrique du Nord”, Temps Modernes, Dec.
1952; Pierre Rondiere, “Le Lobby en Action”, Nouvelle Critique, Dec. 1955; and the special
number of Economie et Politique, 1956 on “La France et Les Trusts”.
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all aspects of political influence and could lead him sooner or later to the
conquest of political power”.30
But it was the colonial situation of the European rural economy that
ultimately explains its conservatism and its political weight. Colonial eco-
nomic structures perpetuated and “froze” agrarian preponderance; while the
social degradation of the indigènes inhibited internal organized combativity.
Economic “assimilation”—the customs union, the monopole du pavillon, the
absence of any restriction on the flow of capital to France—had discouraged
Algerian industrialization. The export orientation of European agriculture
(105 out of a total 190 milliards agricultural product in 1953) both revealed and
reinforced a disinterest in the expansion of the internal market; aimed at
France, European export-production assured the colons of a steady return
flow of French manufactures and luxury commodities. The system once in
place became its own justification. The existence of the wretched mass of
poverty-stricken fellahs, unemployed and sub-proletariat was invoked by big
colons and French trusts alike as an argument for changing nothing. The
large colons claimed to fear the inevitable rise in agrarian salaries consequent
on industrial implantation; French industry was apprehensive about and
actively sabotaged, the creation of possibly threatening subsidiaries in a
cheap labour zone.31 This convergence was the base of the colonial lobby’s
interest in the status quo; it could only be confronted by a politically de-
termined metropolitan government acting in changing economic conditions.
The Third Republic entirely lacked any developmental perspective for
Algeria, as the structural surplus of the Algerian budget demonstrated. Even
in 1944 the Director of Algerian economic affairs stated baldly “It is not for
us to take the initiative of industrialization, which would place us as a colony
in an aggressive position vis-a-vis French industry”. Only in 1949, with the
initiation of the quadrennial Plans d’Equipement et Modernisation, did the
surplus give way to a deficit, covered by French government loans and
grants (which were in effect government subsidies to French industry). As
late as 1954, “out of a total of 96 milliards of economic investments, 47 are
consecrated to amortisation, 22 to new infrastructural investment, and only 26
milliards to new superstructural investment . . .”32
Thus, the domination of the agrarian colonate is to be seen in the basic
sectoral imbalance of the Algerian economy, which betrays the classic
colonial sectoral physiognomy marked by (i) preponderance of agriculture
over industry; (ii) hypertrophy of the tertiary sector:
Gross Domestic Product 1954
Agriculture, livestock, fishing etc 33.4%
Industry, mines, construction, works 27.4%
Transport, commerce, services 39.2%
30
De Peyerimhoff, Enquête sur la colonisation officielle.
31
For example, the famous intervention of the trust Beghin against the construction of a
sugar refinery near Afreville.
32
Rene Gendarme, p.40. See also F. Jeanson, La Revolution Algérienne.
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33
Maurice Parodi, author of a study of the SAP, commented: “It is the banker’s function
which wins against that of agricultural promoter. The reason for this is simple: the director
of an SAP has banking responsibilities which are crucial in the eyes of the central authorities
(central fund of the SAP and the commisariat of the “paysannat” and SAP) . . . The director
of an SAP is thus noted, above all else, for his provident administration of funds, for the
guarantees with which he can protect himself, for his assessment, or better still, avoidance of
risks. In other words, his responsibilities as a banker are measurable, controllable, whereas
his responsibilities as a promoter of traditional agriculture are not quantifiable, and even
worse, can become the object of measures falsified by tendentious statistical representations”.
See Launay, p.233.
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34
Montagnac, Lettres d’un soldat.
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revolution; and the actual historical experience is given the rigorous necessity
of an idea. Yet if “assimilation” had to be proved chimeric and negotiation
had to be replaced by war, it should not be forgotten that these were only the
painful results of a complex struggle, of missed chances and debilitating
divisions. It is true that we can now discern the profound meaning of the
period in a historical exhaustion of classical political solutions (whether
integrationist or nationalist) which revealed the incapacity of existing
political formations (PPA-MTLD, UDMA) to satisfy the aspirations of
which they had been the formulating agents. But the experience of men like
Ben Badis, Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas is distorted if seen only as the
objective and subjective preparation of the Algerian people for revolutionary
war.
The colonial situation in Algeria was at once total in its overall trans-
formation of the context in reference to which was ordered the whole system
of social relations and values, and yet partial and differentiated in its impact.
It neither completely liquidated the past nor proposed a coherent future.
Geographically selective settlement, juxtaposition of “zones” of advanced
technology and productive method with decaying subsistence cultivation and
nomadism, differential social and psychological penetration (for example the
greater immunity of the women, symbolically withdrawn from the social
scene, the lack of European “presence”, in the mountains—Aures, Nementcha,
Djurdjura etc)—these were the phenomena of colonial incoherence in
Algeria. An abrupt but partial transformation had detonated a crisis of
disaggregation. Traditional society and its values were decomposing. New
social forces were manufactured by the colonial situation—deruralized fellahs
swarming into the towns to constitute a neo-proletariat or a diffuse sub-
proletarian mass, a dependent and parasitic petty bourgeoisie of subaltern
professional strata, commercial intermediaries, a small landowning elite.
Cultural differentiations were aggravated as religious and literacy standards
declined, while French education and techniques were correspondingly
valorized. The relative homogeneity of the Algerian people was shattered; the
picture was one of a plurality of atomized groupings, differentially situated in
terms of social role, cultural orientation and political aspiration. The future of
the nation was contained in the strategy which, taking account of these real
divisions and of the implacable hostility of the settlers to all amelioration, could
overcome them in a unifying efficacity, could discover a revolutionary praxis.
The history of Algerian political struggle from the First World War until
1954 is dominated by three motifs: the general movement of politically
conscious Algerians from “assimilationist” demands to militant nationalism;
the continual deflection and sabotage of the periodic metropolitan liberalizing
initiatives by the entrenched colonate; and the immense difficulty in these
circumstances of evolving an effective nationalist strategy. These were the “con-
stants” of Algerian political life; it now remains to define its phases and content.
Broadly, the critical turning-point in Algerian politics occurred with the
disruption and revelations caused by the Second World War. The reasons for
44
35
La Nuit Coloniale, p.114
36 5,000 in 1912; 100,000 in 1924; 300,000 in 1936. “L’Algérie sous le signe des Ultras”
A. P. Lentin, Cahiers Internationaux.
The Algerian Revolution
France, the Etoile and the parties which succeeded it found it difficult to
extend their action to Algeria owing to the continuous and systematic
repression to which it was exposed by its radicalism. The Etoile was dissolved
between 1929–32, and Messali spent only one out of the next 14 years at
political liberty in Algeria; for the remainder he was in prison or in exile, yet
his political influence after the Second World War was to prove considerable.
By the end of the ’twenties, then, Algerian politics was already marked by a
basic division which, despite later programmatic mutations and periods of
frontist alliance, continued to manifest itself in various forms for the next
two decades. Two recognizable and distinct political “pedigrees” can be
followed right through to 1954: Etoile Nord Africaine-PPA-MTLD; Elus-
UPA-AML-UDMA.37 The persistence of this cleavage, which originally corre-
sponded to fundamental differences in objective, right up to the beginning of
the liberation war, is to be partly attributed to certain temperamental
antagonisms between Messali and Abbas. But it also had an objective basis in
the divergent social character and strategies of the parties. Yet in fact both
tendencies betrayed a common inability to come to terms with the in-
creasingly obvious inefficiency of legal means of struggle and a common
failure to penetrate and mobilize the countryside and so enlarge a political
clientele whose growth was tied to urbanization and French education.
However, during the 1930’s a whole series of agitations and incidents dis-
turbed the immobile density of the bled, and engulfed it in a process of
transformation which paralleled the purely political mobilization of the
urban petty bourgeoisie and overseas workers.
Observers and historians of the Maghrebine social scene between the wars
agree in according a pivotal importance to these rural movements—new
associations, agricultural trade unions, the Islamic reformism of the Ulemas—
which often generalized beneath patriotic “synonyms” and traditional
symbolism an outright political nationalism. This re-animation of local life
was naturally related to the political movements in France and in the Algerian
37 The Etoile, dissolved in 1929, remained clandestine till 1933 when Messali was imprison-
ed for reconstituting a banned association; re-emerging briefly with the Popular Front, the
Etoile was again dissolved in Jan. 1937 (by this time Messali had definitively broken with the
CP). On March 11th, 1937, the PPA was formed though this too was dissolved a little over
a year later. Its clandestine presence during the war was considerable, as its increasing in-
fluence in the “Amis du Manifeste” and the 1945 United Front demonstrated.The Constantine
uprising was the signal for further repression; Messali was deported and the party banned.
On his release in 1947, Messali established the MTLD, Mouvement pour le triomphe des
Libertés Democratiques (October 1946), as a legal front for the PPA. The PPA was never
legitimized, however, and the MTLD continued to operate, somewhat ambiguously, until
its split in 1954. The other and more respectable wing descends as follows: disoriented by
the collapse of this Blum-Viollette project the Elus fragmented—Dr. Bendjelloul, created the
Reassemblement franco-musulman algérien (July 1938), destined for a swift demise, while
Abbas formed the Union Populaire Algérienne (April 1938). Abbas was far the most dynamic
leader and during the war launched a series of memoranda defending Algerian self-deter-
mination; The “Manifeste du Peuple Algerien” was the basic document of the war years. In
1944, Abbas created the “Association des Amis du Mamifeste” in which Ulemas, Elus,
Communists and clandestine PPA members all collaborated in 1945, for a brief period in
a Nationalist Common Front. Following the Constantine insurrection, Abbas launched
UDMA, which contested the elections on a programme of association with France. Hence-
forth, we will refer to parties by their initials.
The Algerian Revolution
38
Berque, p.283
39
Launay, p.148.
48
40 There had been mounting social unrest, which combined with political demonstrations,
since the summer of 1936: at the end of June, there were over 10,000 strikers in Algeria;
armed bands roamed the countryside, arresting motorists and invading properties. Inter-
estingly, the Congress in October condemned “the agitation which is continuing and ex-
tending throughout the country to the detriment of social order and public tranquillity” and
denounced “appeals to Muslims tending to organize them into illegal groups, to the great
damage of the unity of Muslim Algerians”. In February and March 1937, renewed agitation
broke out—strikes, demonstrations, banditry, fights with the gendarmerie. Nouschi, La
Naissance du Nationalisme Algérien (Ed. de Minuit, 1962), pp. 88–92; Berque, p.286.
The Algerian Revolution
The lessons of this experience were multiple. The first was the total com-
plicity and fusion of the administration in Algeria with the colonial lobby, the
“préponderants” of the existing order (large colons, banks, concessionary
companies). As Andre Nouschi remarks, “any French government inspired
with reformist intentions had no chance of putting through a liberal pro-
gramme unless it decided at the same time both to effect a vigorous and
complete overhaul of the administration, from top to bottom, and also to
implement a drastic reorientation of the Algerian press”.41 As it was, settlers
and officials (largely recruited locally) acted as one: the Federation des maires
et adjoints speciaux d’Algerie, meeting on February 8th, 1938, voted by 298
votes to two for unanimous resignation and paralysis of the administration if
the project came up for discussion in the metropolitan assembly. Secondly,
the effectiveness of this homogeneous, irreconcilable resistance to any—even
the most timid—metropolitan reforms, was a political education in itself, a
crucial demystification for Algerian politicians who henceforth would find it
less and less possible to “recourir a la France liberale”. Messali alone had
consistently opposed the project; even Sheikh Ben Badis, who before the 1936
elections had replied to Abbas’s famous assimilationist statement (“I shall
not die for the Algerian nation because this nation does not exist”) with an
article upholding Algeria’s historic and cultural claims to national inde-
pendence, had invested real hopes in Leon Blum. On his return from Paris
with the delegation of the Congress, Ben Badis wrote, “we did not go to
France to demand Algerian independence, because our first task was to
liberate our minds and emancipate them from maraboutism”. The disclosure
of the power realities, the weakness of the metropolitan government when
confronted by an alliance of the largely self-governing colonate with the
French Right in defence of colonial capitalism, inevitably led towards a
radicalization of demands. Disillusion and bitterness was extreme among
francophile Algerian politicians, though not all of them immediately turned
to the outright nationalism of Messali. In April 1938, Abbas launched the
UPA aiming to regroup élus and popular forces behind a somewhat con-
fused and vague integrationist programme. But the logic was irresistible, as
Violette had foreseen in 1935: ‘Take care, the natives of Algeria, and
through your own fault, still have no country; they are looking for one. They
ask us to let them enter the French nation. Let them do so swiftly, for
otherwise they will create their own “. Messali, though imprisoned, gained in
credit from the defeat of the assimilationists. During 1938, his new nationalist
party, the PPA, made considerable headway in Algeria: in November 1938,
M. Boumendjel, a PPA candidate, was elected a municipal counsellor in
Algiers, while the following April a PPA tramway employee named Douar was
elected a conseiller general. Both workers and intellectuals began to gravitate
towards the party. This movement was cut brutally short: on September
26th, 1939, the PPA was dissolved by administrative decree.
41
Nouschi, p.79
50
42
See Q. Hoare’s discussion “What is Fascism?”, NLR 20.
The Algerian Revolution
“inclined before” the defeat of France. The meaning of this genuflection was
swiftly clarified. The famous decret Cremieux of 1870 granting French
citizenship to Algerian jews was annulled in October 1940 and a discriminatory
“numerus clausus” (2.7 per cent) imposed on jewish school children and
students. This regressive measure did not arouse the expected enthusiasm
among Muslims. “They thought that the muslims would rejoice at the
abrogation of the Cremieux decree”, wrote Boumendjel in 1942, “when what
we were in fact able to observe was simply that a citizenship that could be
revoked after 70 years was still open to question at the whim of those who had
bestowed it”. Despite certain overtures, Messali, Abbas, Bendjelloul, all
refused to collaborate. The colonate was irreparably discredited.
It was with the defeat of Vichy in North Africa that nationalist politics in
Algeria really began. After the Anglo-American landings (November 1942)
there was a year of extraordinary social and political fluidity before De
Gaulle and Catroux succeeded in decisively consolidating the authority of the
CFLN. Educated by the sabotage of the Blum-Viollette project and the
fascism of the colonate, encouraged by the democratic anti-fascist propaganda
of the allies (in particular the Atlantic Charter), Muslim leaders and poli-
ticians entered on a phase of intense political activity in which they hoped to
exploit their temporary advantages (the 12 Algerian divisions needed for the
war effort; the absence of an effective constituted power in Algiers). In
February 1943 Ferhat Abbas drafted his Manifeste de Peuple Algerien:
L’Algérie devant le conflit mondial, a text signed by some 50 élus and notables,
in which—though cautiously veiled—the right of self-determination was
posed, along with more familiar and specific demands: freedom of worship
and separation of church and state; freedom of press and association;
universal civic and political liberties; agrarian reform; recognition of arabic
as an official language. In April the Governor-General set up a Commission
d ’Etudes economiques et sociales, whose prolix and fruitless considerations
provoked a more precise and radical “additif ” or supplement (anonymous) to
the original Manifesto (May 26th, 1943). The supplement openly requested
“recognition of the political autonomy of Algeria as a sovereign nation, with
a right of surveillance for France, and military assistance from the allies in
case of conflict”. A turning point had been reached. Ferhat Abbas, along with
many élus, now espoused the idea of an Algerian nation which he had dis-
missed as chimeric in 1936. With Messali’s clandestine PPA and the Ulemas,
Abbas and his supporters would now insist on the Manifesto as a minimum
programme. Further, a common front was possible.
The political distance that had been traversed since 1936 was fully revealed
in the activity of the next two years. For the first time there was an almost
unanimous rejection of “assimilationist” concessions as both anti-nationalist
and anti-democratic. For the first time political differences and rivalries
expressed themselves within a common organization, the loose nationalist
front of the AML, united at least in its broad allegiance to the principles of
the Manifesto and its supplement.
52
Two years later, this unity had been decisively fractured; French authority
—and the influence of the unregenerate colonate—had been re-imposed; and
Algerian nationalism constricted within a new constitutional framework
which was to survive, discredited and hollow, until the war of liberation.
This process of demobilization and fragmentation once again illustrates the
fundamental mechanisms of colonialism in Algeria, and the inadequacy of
all constituted political groupings in face of them. It inaugurated the final,
authentically “pre-revolutionary”, phase of Algerian political history—the
phase of the “Statut” from 1947–54.
How was the “unity” of the AML, and of the Nationalist Common
Front established in February 1945, so quickly dissolved? In the first place,
there were subjective failings. There seems little doubt that few of the re-
sponsible leaders took seriously the primordial necessity for nationalist
unity in confronting the French. The clandestine PPA entered the AML
chiefly because it provided a legal cloak for its continuing activity and
proselytization. The mass support of the PPA was demonstrated at the
Congress of the AML held in March 1945. The Congress was dominated by
PPA supporters who passed resolutions demanding an Algerian parliament
and the release of Messali and rejecting Abbas’s federalist theses. Yet
despite this promising sitation, when Messali was released a little over a year
later there seem to have been no overtures to Abbas and the Ulemas to
reconstruct the Front. A new successor party to the PPA, the MTLD, was
instantly set up to contest the elections to the French Assembly. The Com-
munists, too, had joined with the AML only for tactical reasons: they did not
conceal their opposition to national independence for Algeria, and hoped to
struggle against outright nationalists inside the AML. Secondly although the
AML—and the Nationalist Common Front of 1945—certainly achieved a
greater organizational coherence than had been attained by the Muslim
Congress of 1936 (thus, a six member central committee was created for the
Common Front, two each from Elus, Ulemas and PPA), it still lacked any
effective political discipline. Unity depended on the conjuncture.
More important, however, was the evolution of objective circumstances,
and the way in which the leadership disintegrated before the sequence of
repression and reforms which ensued over the next two years. By early 1945,
a revolutionary situation existed in Algeria: the political agitation generated
by the AML was escaping its control. An acute economic crisis, detonated by
the notably bad harvest of the previous year, had developed out of the
departure of large numbers of troops (essential to the feverish rhythm of the
wartime economy) at a time when the effects of longterm inflation were
making themselves felt (there had been a 665 per cent increase in fiduciary
circulation since 1939). Large-scale demonstrations of unemployed and
starving men took place in many parts of the country; fights with the police
were frequent and anti-French feeling was at a peak. Abbas and the pro-
gressive élus grew increasingly apprehensive as the social situation became
more volatile and inflammatory. In May Algeria was shaken by an uprising
54
With this measure, the final satisfaction of one of the demands made by
Emir Khaled in 1920, there opened an era of futile electoral politics which
achieved little beyond the perfection of the machinery of surveillance and
sabotage by the colonial administration. Since Abbas and Messali were both
deprived of political rights, the PPA and AML recommended abstention in
the elections to the first Constituent Assembly. Nevertheless, 705,000 out of
1,350,000 lower college voters participated: the “assimilationist” parties
(Dr. Bendjelloul’s group of élus, the SFLO and the PCA) shared the lower
college seats between them. However, this result was manifestly artificial and
it was only with the amnesty and re-entry into political life of Abbas (March
1946) and Messali (September 1946) that the political climate really changed.
For the first time, avowed nationalist parties—UDMA, founded by Abbas in
April, and Messali’s MTLD, established in October to replace PPA—could
contest elections, openly organize and propagandize on behalf of their
programmes. The limitations of this formal right were soon to be exposed.
The second Constituent Assembly, elected in June 1946 with 11 of the 13
lower college seats going to UDMA (at this time Messali was still banned, and
abstentions—or concealed PPA votes—exceeded votes cast by 700,000–
633,000), revealed by its unwillingness to confront the problems involved in
modifying Algeria’s constitutional regime, the absence of any seriously
reformist ambitions. Abbas’s project for an autonomous Algerian republic
associated with France as a federal member of the French Union was not even
discussed. Instead, the Assembly submitted to France and the Empire a
constitutional draft in which Algeria retained its former position pending
preparation of a special statute.
Adopted by referendum, the new constitution necessitated further elections
for the first National Assembly of the Fourth Republic. Under the con-
stitution Algerian representation in metropolitan institutions (retaining its
collegiate parity) was fixed at 30 seats in the Assembly (out of a total 627)
and 14 seats in the Council of the Republic (320 seats). UDMA boycotted the
elections, and the lower college sent five MTLD deputies (this was the first
time the party contested elections), two communists (supported by UDMA)
and eight “moderates” (assimilationists) to the National Assembly. Electoral
participation of lower-college voters was only 39 per cent. With the metro-
politan legislature completed by the indirect election for the Council of the
Republic (UDMA took four of the seven lower college seats), and the new
constitution formally in place, attention could now be turned to defining more
precisely the juridical framework and political institutions considered
suitable for post-war Algeria.
The final product of the next months’ deliberations was the “Statut” of
September 20th, 1947, a constitutional formula distinguished by its in-
coherence and its permissiveness vis-a-vis French interests in Algeria. Two
features in the passage of the Statut deserve comment. First, the authoritarian
and unilateral character of the bill. Seven projects were submitted: of these
only the SFIO draft was discussed besides that of the Ramadier coalition
The Algerian Revolution
44 These crucial provisions covered (1) the transformation of the special administrative
regime of the Saharan territories into regular departements; (2) the replacement of the 78
“communes-mixtes” (administrative units covering the nine-tenths of Algeria overwhelm-
ingly muslim in population; they were governed by an administrator and nominated
“commission communale”) by the democratic “communes de plein exercice” already en-
joyed by the Europeans; (3) the enfranchisement of muslim women; (4) the promotion of
Arabic as a recognized statutory language within the French Union; (5) the separation of
Islam from control by the state administration. Of these, only the last had even reached the
stage of committee discussions by 1954. The others remained as testimony to the impotence
of the IVth Republic to enforce its fundamental constitutional principles against the will of
the Algerian colonate.
58
45
Nouschi, p.153.
46
Enfranchized (as it turned out, temporarily) under the electoral law of October 5th, 1946.
47
T. Opperman, op. cit, p. 96. The complete discrediting of all French-administered
elections during 1948–54 made subsequent offers of elections subsequent to a cease-fire
totally unserious to all those with any Algerian experience.
48
The registered electorate in 1947 was: Upper College 409,000 Europeans (88.1 per cent)
and 63,000 Muslims (11.1 per cent); and Lower College 1,301,000 Muslims.
The Algerian Revolution
Parties % of Votes
MTLD 31
UDMA 27
PCA 4
Total 62
Others 38
All 100
These results galvanized the colonial bloc into launching a virulent cam-
paign against the “liberalism” of the socialist Governor-General Chataigneau,
whom they held responsible for this unpleasant freedom of expression of
Muslim opinion. The upper-college deputies, Rene Mayer and Jacques
Chevallier prominent among them, agitated for the dismissal of “Ben
Mohammed” Chataigneau: the Algerian and the French Right-wing Press
was orchestrated behind them. This campaign was successful, and in February
1948 Chataigneau was replaced by Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, a socialist
deputy from Alsace who was to prove violently hostile to “secessionists” and
whose “organization” of the elections is were all that could be desired.
With the victory of Naegelen’s appointment, colonialist and reactionary
forces had definitively restabilized their political position. The equilibrium so
profoundly disturbed by the war of 1939–45 was rediscovered in a systematic
perversion of the Statut which Paris refused to prevent. The context of this
relative political regression was the beginning of the Cold War, the tidal wave
of anti-communism originating with Truman’s Message to Congress and
faithfully relayed throughout Western Europe by spokesmen of the Right and
Centre (and in some cases, of the Left). During 1947, the critical dismissal of
Communist ministers from the Ramadier Government was followed by the
decisive option for Marshall Aid. A frenzy of anti-communism swept the
bourgeoisie and petit-bourgeoisie in France. De Gaulle, anxious to exploit
this fervour for the RPF, denounced the Communist “Fifth Column”. The
French municipal elections of October 1947, emotional and politically
infantilist, registered a 40 per cent “anti-communist” vote: observers spoke of
“a fascist revival”. Henceforth the communists—one-fifth of the population
and one-quarter of the electorate—were effectively “disenfranchised”, and a
bewildering succession of Centre-Right coalitions emerged whose instability
turned the strong political influence of the upper college Algerian deputies
60
49
Quoted by Dorothy Pickles, Algeria and France (1963), p. 58.
50
MTLD obtained 30 per cent of the lower-college votes, UDMA 18 per cent, PCA 2 per
cent—a 50 per cent nationalist role!
The Algerian Revolution
was neither free nor sincere. It is not the voters who choose the successful
candidate. The Administration chose him by using the tested methods
which, in Algeria, are the fruit of disgraceful experience. This fact is not only
indisputable: it is admitted. It occurred to none of the officials I saw to deny
for an instant that, in Algeria, elections are the business of the Administra-
tion . . . One of them declared outright, in the presence of our colleague,
M. Pierre-Henri Teitgen (another MRP deputy) that he “made the elections”,
because such were the orders he received from above . . . Allow me to say
with all frankness, that the methods I witnessed, and which I have good
reason to believe are generally employed for second-college elections to the
General Councils, are intolerable.51
The results of the plurality of elections—an average of two a year for the
Algerian Assembly, the “Conseils Generaux” and the municipalities were
meaningless except as indications of the symbiosis of colonate and ad-
ministration under Governor-General Naegelen and his successor Leonard
(straight from the Paris prefecture of police). The growing perfection of this
system of rule is shown in the steady elimination of nationalist representatives
in the Algerian Assembly.
Second College:
1948 1951 1954
% Seats % Seats % Seats
MTLD 30 9 0.7 4 0 0
UDMA 18 8 11 5 5 5
PCA 2 0 4.3 0 1.3 0
Others 50 43 84 51 93.7 55
M. Clark, op. cit. p. 86
Degeneration was not, however, confined to administrative virtuosity in
the organization of elections. The social and economic situation of the
Muslim population stagnated, and in some respects deteriorated. Rapid
demographic advance (three-quarters of a million 1947–54) aggravated
structural unemployment, under-employment and emigration to France.52
The limited programmes of social and economic amelioration promoted
under Chataigneau atrophied or lapsed altogether. The “Direction de Plan”
was suppressed in 1948. The municipal centres stagnated. The SAR were
converted into mere appendages of the SIP. The credits assigned to soil
restoration were so derisory that the encroachments of erosion (50,000 ha
per annum) exceeded the tempo of restoration (only 30,000 ha per year in
1953 and 1954). The agrarian colonate prospered while the condition of the
Muslims palpably degenerated—to the shocked dismay of those few ob-
servers who took the trouble to observe.53 The colons blocked the implemen-
tation of the “progressive” wartime loi Martin,54 and devoted their energies to
the overproduction of wine. “The losses borne by the Treasury, both through
the disposal of surplus alcohol and through the build-up of stocks, amount to
some 70 milliard francs annually, which is equivalent to the total value of
credits voted to Youth and Sports since 1946”.55
The inadequacy of legal politics became increasingly evident to Algerian
nationalists. “La Republique Francaise donc a triché”, wrote Boumendjel in
1951, “Elle nous a dupe. Et nous serions a droit de prendre acte, le coeur
ulceré, de ce qu’Aimée Cesaire a appele l’impossible contacte”. The de-
termined immobilism of Paris in ace of the perversion of the Statute of 1947
confronted the nationalist parties with fundamental problems of strategy and
organization. The character of the armed insurrection that began in 1954 was
determined by the previous failures of the nationalist parties to resolve these
problems.
1) UDMA
Classically reformist, UDMA suffered defeat and disintegration because of
the colonate’s brutal refusal to join in the (parliamentary) dialogue on which
its existence depended. Socially based on the petit-bourgeoisie and pro-
fessional classes of the small towns, UDMA’s programme and methods were
ill-suited to the conditions of pseudo-legality and accelerating rupture
which characterized Algeria under the Statute. Le Tourneau correctly noted
that “There is a social gulf between the UDMA, party of cadres and mod-
erates and the mass of the population which is half-starving and easy to
arouse”.
Parliamentarianism was the necessary medium of existence for the UDMA
which was neither an islamic nor an arab party, but rather lay and culturally
gallicized. Deprived of the parliamentary platform, and unable to satisfy the
demands of its members, the party declined with each successive electoral
setback. In April 1954, in an UDMA Conference of Cadres, Abbas formu-
lated the impasse with desperate lucidity.56
“We must avow it, the gigantic mystification and cynical swindling of
which Algeria has become a victim since the promulgation of the reforms,
has almost made us disappear. It is certainly evident that a progressive
53
Tillion declared herself “thunderstruck” by the “pauperization” between 1940 and 1955.
In 1940, “these men had been living sparingly but reasonably”. In 1955, “nine families out
of ten were living from hand to mouth” (Algeria: The Realities) 1958 p. 22.
54
Passed in March 1942, the loi Martin enacted that 15 per cent of lands whose value had
been multiplied by state irrigation projects was to be returned to the state for redistribution.
It was further specified that only lands formerly belonging to muslims (in fact, the least
likely to own properties in irrigated areas) could be redistributed among landless muslims;
thus, European properties stayed European. Even so, the achievement was derisory: by
1953, only 71,000 ha had been effected by the law. See Barbé, “La Question de la Terre”.
55 Andre Griset, Le Monde 17.8.55.
56 Quoted by Joan Gillespie, Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution (1960) p. 74.
The Algerian Revolution
party which has based its actions on the respect of legality and which
militates in favour of “revolution by the law” can no longer advance when
the public authorities make arbitrary an institution of the State. There is
all the drama of our Party . . .”
The collapse of the UDMA merely emphasized the incapacity of the
petit-bourgeoisie and the westernized intellectuals to bring a solution—
which could only be a revolutionary one—to the lengthy crisis of Algerian
nationalism. The party’s failure was summarized in its eventual abandon-
ment of systematic opposition in the Algerian Assembly whenever basic
issues were not at stake. It was clear that other forces had to assume the
leadership of the national revolution.
2) MTLD-PPA
More dynamic and militantly nationalist than UDMA, and with a long
pedigree of intransigeance, it seemed that the MTLD might become a mass
revolutionary party, capable of confronting and overthrowing colonial
domination. Its membership, 12,000 in 1952, was put a year later at 24,000 in
Algeria and 6,800 in France. Based on the working-class of the larger urban
centres, the party also attracted into its ranks students and revolutionary
intellectuals such as Dr. Lamine-Debaghine. Rigid discipline and an articu-
lated structuration57 were constantly emphasized. “If I were a teacher, and
the Algerian people my pupil”, cried Messali, “I would have him conjugate
the verb ‘to organize’ every day”.
How was it that the MTLD, far from seizing its historical opportunity, had
disintegrated by the end of 1953 into schismatic and sterile rivalry? The
explanation must be sought in certain special features in the party’s history
and structure.
Firstly, the structural ambiguity of the party was registered in its curious
hybrid title. Founded as a legal successor to the old PPA, it was never clear
whether the MTLD was intended to be a mere parliamentary cloak for the
PPA (to which Messali made frequent references and of which he remained
President) or was a replacement of it. This incoherence reflected a funda-
mental indecision about legal politics: the MTLD participated in the “sterile
parliamentarianism” denounced by the clandestine PPA. The improvised
and irresolute nature of this tactic led to a considerable tension between the
intransigeants of the PPA and the politicians of the MTLD. “Many young
PPA militants who had agitated in clandestinity up to 1946, disaffected by
the new parliamentary tactic of the MTLD and by the collapse of principles
and organization, withdrew from the ranks to give way to newcomers”.58
This dissatisfaction crystallized in the formation in 1947 of the Organisation
57
Clark, p. 70–1.
58 Mostefa Lacheraf, “Le Nationalisme Algerien en marche vers l’Unité”, Temps Modernes,
June 1956. Mostefa Lacheraf typifies the younger revolutionary intellectual who rallied to
the FLN. Appointed as the FLN’s chief propagandist in France, Lacheraf was kidnapped
along with other members of the FLN’s “external delegation” in October 1956.
64
Secondly, both UDMA and the MTLD were unable to overcome their
social origins in successfully assuming the direction of a national revolution
against the colonial system in Algeria. This failure must be partially related to
the relative weakness of the social strata on which they were based—re-
spectively, the commercial and professional petit-bourgeoisie, and the
metropolitan and urban proletariat. This rather close correspondence,
appropriate to conditions of more advanced political struggle, was unsuitable
to the form of national mobilization required in Algeria. Both parties,
socially and regionally exclusive, were unable to penetrate and mobilize the
diffuse rural population, which was difficult to organize and unresponsive to
the unspecific and somewhat corporatist demands which UDMA and the
MTLD advanced. It was above all this lack of an adequate strategy, a
positive perspective of action, which prevented either of the parties from
taking the leadership of a nation whose dominant social force was the
fellahs.
The fundamental problem of strategy was that of legality and illegality. To
adopt electoral and parliamentary forms of struggle within the terms of a
constitution cynically disregarded by the colonate was to accept demobiliza-
tion and defeat: to adopt violent means was to run the risk of another
“Setif ” repression and perhaps with no better results. The parties, by their
nature preferring legal struggle, but forced to recognize the hopeless im-
probability of advance by constitutional methods, were crippled by this
dilemma. Incapable of making history under “Algerian” conditions, the
parties were finally replaced by a completely new kind of organization.
In fact, simultaneously with the manoeuvring of the parties and almost
entirely escaping their control, there had been a constant undercurrent of
violence since 1946. At every election, polling stations and police were
attacked by enraged voters; holdups and assassinations were frequent; the
Aures and other mountain ranges were roamed by gangs of bandits. This
violence, spontaneous and uncanalized, was the force which the Organisation
Secrete hoped to discipline and orient. The creation of an underground
guerilla network, linked to traditional Berber outlaws, and the preparation of
logistic and financial bases between 1947 and 1949, was set back by the
extensive uncovery of the organization by the police in 1950. Documents
were seized and many militants arrested.
But while this blow destroyed he possibility of an armed insurrection at
the beginning of the ’fifties, sporadic violence continued and the Comité
Revolutionnaire pour l’Unite et l’Action (formed in 1954 by the original
leaders of the O.S.) was able to launch the uprising of November 1954,
partly on the basis of the original preparations of the O.S. These inde-
pendent initiatives, opposed by the party leaderships, were to provide the
revolutionary answer to the inflexible domination of the colonate. Just as in
the nineteenth century organized resistance deteriorated into petty banditry,
so now banditry was to prove the origin of national insurrection.