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POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

DEFINITION/SCOPE

DIDIPIO EART-SAVERS MULTIPURPOSE ASSOCIATION VS DUZON (G.R. NO. 157882)


FACTS:

Overview

(This petition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7942 the Philippine Mining Act of
1995, together with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of DAO 96-40, and of the Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) entered into by the Republic of the Philippines
and Arimco Mining Corporation (AMC), a corporation established under the laws of Australia and owned
by its nationals. Petitioners embrace various segments of the society. These include Didipio Earth-Savers
Multi-Purpose Association, Inc., an organization of farmers and indigenous peoples organized under
Philippine laws, representing a community actually affected by the mining activities of CAMC.)

On 20 June 1994, President Ramos executed an FTAA with AMC over a total land area of 37,000
hectares covering the provinces of NuevaVizcaya and Quirino. Included in this area
is Barangay Dipidio, Kasibu, Nueva Vizcaya.

On 7 September 2001, counsels for petitioners filed a demand letter addressed to then DENR
Secretary Heherson Alvarez, for the cancellation of the CAMC FTAA for the primary reason that Rep.
Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations DAO 96-40 are unconstitutional.

Petitioner’s Argument

Petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40
which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust taking of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall not
be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert that
public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation

Petitioners claim that the entry into a private property by CAMC, pursuant to its FTAA, is for
more than a momentary period, i.e., for 25 years, and renewable for another 25 years; that the entry into
the property is under the warrant or color of legal authority pursuant to the FTAA executed between the
government and CAMC; and that the entry substantially ousts the owner or possessor and deprives him of
all beneficial enjoyment of the property. These facts, according to the petitioners, amount to taking. As
such, petitioners question the exercise of the power of eminent domain as unwarranted because
respondents failed to prove that the entry into private property is devoted for public use.

Petitioners quickly add that even assuming arguendo that there is no absolute, physical taking, at the very
least, Section 76 establishes a legal easement upon the surface owners, occupants and concessionaires of a
mining contract area sufficient to deprive them of enjoyment and use of the property and that such burden
imposed by the legal easement falls within the purview of eminent domain.

Respondent’s Argument

Traversing petitioners assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision
but a valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents
concluded that to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to
regulate by purchase

Public respondents are of the view that petitioners eminent domain claim is not ripe for
adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties nor do they allege that
their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account of CAMCs FTAA. In effect,
public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not a justiciable controversy which this
Court can take cognizance of.

In a letter dated 19 February 2003, the MGB rejected the demand of counsels for petitioners for the
cancellation of the CAMC FTAA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the questioned Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-
40; Republic Act No. 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DAO 96-40 are
within the scope of the power of eminent domain of the government.

RULING:

YES.

Distinction between Police Power and Eminent Domain


The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state (and of those entities to
which the power has been lawfully delegated) to condemn private property to public use upon payment of
just compensation. On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose;
hence, no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the exercise of police power, property rights of private
individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the state.

A thorough scrutiny of the extant jurisprudence leads to a cogent deduction that where a property
interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare, or
where property is destroyed because its continued existence would be injurious to public interest, there is
no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public
purpose, there is compensable taking.

In Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi defines taking under the concept of eminent domain as entering
upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under the warrant or color of legal
authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in
such a way as to substantially oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.

In the exercise of its police power regulation, the use of the property by the owner was limited,
but no aspect of the property is used by or for the public. The deprivation of use can in fact be total and it
will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein.
However, in the regulation of the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof,
such restriction constitutes compensable taking.

Justification for the Exercise of Eminent Domain

While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of
property, it need not always be the case. In Ayala de Roxas v. City of Manila, the Court declared:

And, considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be


the object thereof, is not merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one
tending to prevent the exclusive use of one portion of the same, by expropriating it for
public use which, be it what it may, can not be accomplished unless the owner of the
property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to protect
the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is only adequate
remedy when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing
short of an arbitrary restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with
which the same is invested.
In Republic v. Castellvi,[38] this Court had the occasion to spell out the requisites of taking in
eminent domain, to wit:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally


appropriated or injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

A regulation which substantially deprives the owner of his proprietary rights and restricts
the beneficial use and enjoyment for public use amounts to compensable taking. In the case under
consideration, the entry referred to in Section 76 and the easement rights under Section 75 of Rep.
Act No. 7942 as well as the various rights to CAMC under its FTAA are no different from the
deprivation of proprietary rights in the cases discussed which this Court considered as taking.

The entry referred to in Section 76 is not just a simple right-of-way which is ordinarily
allowed under the provisions of the Civil Code. Here, the holders of mining rights enter private
lands for purposes of conducting mining activities such as exploration, extraction and processing
of minerals.

On top of this, under Section 75, easement rights are accorded to them where they may build
warehouses, port facilities, electric transmission, railroads and other infrastructures necessary for mining
operations. All these will definitely oust the owners or occupants of the affected areas the beneficial
ownership of their lands. Actual eviction of the land owners and occupants need not happen for this Court
to intervene. Without a doubt, taking occurs once mining operations commence.

REPUBLIC VS TALE (G.R. NO. 129079. DECEMBER 2, 1998)

FACTS:

Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land located in
Barangay Salawag, Dasmarias, Cavite covered [by] TCT No. 14701 containing an area of Four Hundred
Eighty Three Thousand Three Hundred Thirty One (483,331) square meters more or less.

Sometime in September 1982, the Philippine Government, , negotiated with the Japanese International
Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN
Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the
proposed project was Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which involved the
establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an agency now under the
Department of Trade and Industry.

On March 30, 1983, PHRDC and private respondent Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of
Agreement, to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property in favor
of PHRDC. Pursuant thereto, the CMDF took possession of the property and erected buildings and other
related facilities necessary for its operations.

In December 1983, Philippine Women University entered into a purported contract of lease with PHRDC
on a ten (10)-hectare piece of land which stipulated, among other things, a rental of P200,000.00 per
annum for an initial term of four (4) years from January 1, 1984 to January 1, 1988. As the donee of the
Helen Benitez’s land, through a Deed of Donation dated December 1984 executed a year after the
contract of lease.

After the expiration of the lease contract on January 1, 1988, negotiations began on the purchase of the
property in question on a plain offer of BENITEZ to sell the same, at the agreed price of P70.00 per
square meter.

However, for reasons known only to her, BENITEZ did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale thus reneging
on her commitment to sell the lot in question.

Thereafter, in a letter dated August 15, 1995, BENITEZ and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment
of rentals and to vacate the premises within 30 days from notice. It later filed an unlawful detainer suit
against petitioner.

Petitioner, through the Department of Trade and Industry, instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain,
pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25, 1985.

On May 24, 1996 respondent Judge issued an Order (Annex D, Petition) granting petitioners Motion for
Issuance of a Writ of Possession.

However, the Order dated May 24, 1996 is hereby set aside and reconsidered. The Writ of Possession
issued in consonance therewith is hereby quashed.

In denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, the respondent judge, Hon. Lucenito N. Tagle,
reiterated his position, adding that the present case is different from the ordinary action for eminent
domain because prior to the filing of this case, there was already an ejectment suit instituted against
plaintiff-corporation. Agreeing with the trial court, private respondent contends that the writ of possession
is warranted only in cases where the party seeking [it] is not yet in possession [of] the property sought to
be expropriated

She also points out that since Presidential Decree (PD) 42 provides that the plaintiff shall have the right to
take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved, the writ of possession it requires to be
issued is not to maintain possession but intended for the purpose of taking or entering possession.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the execution of writ of possession is necessary in the exercise of eminent
domain despite the actual possession of the property.

RULING:

YES.

The respondent judge is required to issue a writ of possession in favor of petitioner, pursuant to
Section 7 of EO 1035, which reads:

SEC 7. Expropriation. If the parties fail to agree in negotiation of the sale of the land as provided in the
preceding section, the government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned shall have authority to
immediately institute expropriation proceedings through the Office of the Solicitor General, as the case
may be. The just compensation to be paid for the property acquired through expropriation shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1533. Courts shall give priority to the adjudication of cases on
expropriation and shall immediately issue the necessary writ of possession upon deposit by the
government implementing agency/instrumentality concerned of an amount equivalent to ten per cent
(10%) of the amount of just compensation provided under P.D. No. 1533; Provided, That the period
within which said writ of possession shall be issued shall in no case extend beyond five (5) days from the
date such deposit was made.

Under this statutory provision, when the government or its authorized agent makes the required
deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

The plaintiff admitted that it is already in possession of subject premises. Such being the case, it
is obvious that plaintiffs purpose in securing a writ of possession is only to utilize it as leverage in the
ejectment suit filed against it by defendant Benitez wherein the issue is possession

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of
land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking
of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership

In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also
the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and
occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be
exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need
for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess
did not attend its initial physical possession of the property because the lease, which had authorized said
possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as
well.
Ineludibly, said writ is both necessary and practical, because mere physical possession that is gained
by entering the property is not equivalent to expropriating it with the aim of acquiring ownership over, or
even the right to possess, the expropriated property.
It would be circuitous, if not legally absurd, for this Court to require petitioner to first vacate the
property in view of the adverse judgment in the unlawful detainer case, and soon afterwards, order the
trial court to issue in petitioners favor a writ of possession pursuant to the expropriation proceedings.

It is well-settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted even
by the fundamental law.Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, in mandating that [p]rivate property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, merely imposes a limit on the governments
exercise of this power and provides a measure of protection to the individuals right to property.Thus,
in J.M. Tuason & Co. and Cuatico, the Court merely enforced the constitutional limitation regarding the
payment of just compensation. Clearly, an ejectment suit ordinarily should not prevail over the States
power of eminent domain.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL


DEVELOPMENT (G.R. No. 150936)

FACTS:

Overview

Before us is a Petition for Review seeking to reverse and set aside the November 23, 2001 Decision,
directing the National Power Corporation (NPC) to pay the value of the land expropriated from
respondent for the use thereof in NPCs Leyte-Luzon HVDC Power Transmission Project. Apparently, the
project is for a public purpose.

One of these lands, [where] only a portion will be traversed by the transmission lines, is owned by
[respondent] MANUBAY AGRO-INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION.

On 03 December 1996, [petitioner] filed a complaint for expropriation before the Regional Trial Court of
Naga City against [respondent] in order to acquire an easement of right of way over the land which the
latter owns.

Thereafter, the court a quo issued an order dated 20 January 1997 authorizing the immediate issuance of a
writ of possession and directing Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff to immediately place [petitioner] in
possession of the subject land.

On 03 and 06 March 1997, respectively, Commissioners Ramon Albeus and Isidro Bulao, Jr. submitted
their individual appraisal/valuation reports. The commissioner for the [petitioner], Commissioner Albeus,
finding the subject land irregular and sloppy, classified the same as low density residential zone and
recommended the price of P115.00 per square meter. On the other hand, Commissioner Bulao,
commissioner for the [respondent], recommended the price of P550.00 per square meter.
The RTC approved Chairperson Minda B. Teoxons recommended amount of P550 per square meter as
just compensation for the property.

Affirming the RTC, the CA held that RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938, did not preclude
expropriation.

Petitioner contends that the valuation of the expropriated property -- fixed by the trial court and affirmed
by the CA -- was too high a price for the acquisition of an easement of a mere aerial right of way, because
respondent would continue to own and use the subject land anyway. Petitioner argues that in a strict
sense, there is no taking of property, but merely an imposition of an encumbrance or a personal
easement/servitude under Article 614[10] of the Civil Code.Such encumbrance will not result in ousting or
depriving respondent of the beneficial enjoyment of the property. And even if there was a taking,
petitioner points out that the loss is limited only to a portion of the aerial domain above the property of
respondent. Hence, the latter should be compensated only for what it would actually lose.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NPC, in the acquisition of an easement, can only compensate the portion that
will be affected by the Project.

RULING:

NO.

The expropriation was not to be limited to an easement of a right of way. espondent alleged that it had
already authorized petitioner to take possession of the affected portions of the property and to install
electric towers thereon. The latter did not controvert this material allegation.

Granting arguendo that what petitioner acquired over respondents property was purely an easement of a
right of way, still, we cannot sustain its view that it should pay only an easement fee, and not the full
value of the property. The acquisition of such an easement falls within the purview of the power of
eminent domain.

an easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and respondent retains full
ownership of the property. The acquisition of such easement is, nevertheless, not gratis. As correctly
observed by the CA, considering the nature and the effect of the installation power lines, the limitations
on the use of the land for an indefinite period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property. For
this reason, the latter is entitled to payment of a just compensation, which must be neither more nor less
than the monetary equivalent of the land.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word just is used to intensify
the meaning of the word compensation and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.

The parcels of land sought to be expropriated are undeniably undeveloped, raw agricultural land. But a
dominant portion thereof has been reclassified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Naga -- per Zoning
Ordinance No. 94-076 dated August 10, 1994 -- as residential, per the August 8, 1996 certification of
Zoning Administrator Juan O. Villegas Jr. The property is also covered by Naga City Mayor Jesse M.
Robredos favorable endorsement of the
issuance of a certification for land use conversion by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the
ground that the locality where the property was located had become highly urbanized and would have
greater economic value for residential or commercial use.

The nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the principal criterion for determining how
much just compensation should be given to the landowner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
and its surroundings, as well as its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.

CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORECO) VS CA (G.R. No.


109338. November 20, 2000)

FACTS:
On February 19, 1993, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction for the demolition of electric posts
resulting in the cutting off of power supply to various business establishments and barangays in
Camarines Norte.
The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration as well as the admission of the
supplemental petition on the ground that the petition had been decided.
As a response to the public’s urgent basic need, petitioner re-constructed its power lines along the
provincial road leading to the Port of Osmea upon authority of the District Engineer of the Department of
Public Works and Highways [DPWH].
On April 23, 1993, however, petitioner received a letter dated April 10, 1993, stating that Vines
Realty was the owner of the roadside and that petitioner could not construct power lines therein without
its permission. Petitioner promptly replied that the power lines were constructed within the right of way
of the provincial road leading to the port of Osmea as granted by the District Engineer of DPWH.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Electric cooperatives, like CANORECO, are vested with the power of eminent
domain.
RULING:
YES.
The acquisition of an easement of a right-of-way falls within the purview of the power of eminent
domain. Such conclusion finds support in easements of right-of-way where the Supreme Court sustained
the award of just compensation for private property condemned for public use.The Supreme Court, in
Republic vs. PLDT thus held that:

"Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why said power may not be
availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title and
possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an
easement of right-of-way."

However, a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except the easement.Vines Realty
retains full ownership and it is not totally deprived of the use of the land. It can continue doing what it
wants to do with the land, except those that would result in contact with the wires.
The acquisition of this easement, nevertheless, is not gratis. Considering the nature and effect of the
installation power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use. For these reasons, Vines Realty is entitled to payment of just
compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the money equivalent of the property.
The value of the land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria
for determining just compensation. No matter how commendable petitioners purpose is, it is just and
equitable that Vines Realty be compensated the fair and full equivalent for the taking of its property,
which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
Moreover, CANORECO only sought the continuation of the exercise of its right-of-way easement
and not ownership over the land. Public utilities power of eminent domain may be exercised although title
is not transferred to the expropriator.
Consequently, we rule that a courts writ of demolition can not prevail over the easement of a
right-of-way which falls within the power of eminent domain.

REPUBLIC VS PLDT (G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969)

FACTS:

The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers
through its branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That
office was created on 1 July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94.

Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own
Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk
lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call private parties. Its application for the use of
these trunk lines was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a statement,
above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by the rules and regulations of the PLDT
which are on file with the Public Service Commission. One of the many rules prohibits the public use
of the service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use.

On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, entered into an
agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint overseas telephone service whereby the
Bureau would convey radio-telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local
residents.

On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, complained
to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau was violating the conditions under which their
Private Branch Exchange (PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented
trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of government offices but
even to serve private persons or the general public, in competition with the business of the PLDT; and
gave notice that if said violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would
sever the telephone connections.

When the PLDT received no reply, it disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau
at midnight on 12 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone
services, from the rest of the world, except the United States.

Subsequently, plaintiff commenced suit against PLDT asking the court that judgment be
rendered ordering PLDT to enter into contract with BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT’s
telephone system throughout the country under such terms and conditions as the court may consider
reasonable and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restraint the
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore connections which have been severed.

The Court of the First Instance rendered judgment stating that it cannot compel PLDT to
enter such agreement. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PLDT may be compelled to enter into contact with the Republic through BOT.

RULING:

YES.

The Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of the eminent domain, require
the PLDT to allow interconnection of the Government Telephone System and that of PLDT,as the
needs of government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be
determined by the court. Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking
or appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason
appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property
may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way.

The use of the PLDT’s lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both
telephone systems is not much different. In either case, private property is subjected to a burden
for public use and benefit. If under Section 6, Article XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in
the interest of national welfare, transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render services
in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.

Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users of both
telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use.
JURISDICTION OVER A COMPLAINT FOR EMINENT DOMAIN

BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU V. HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PASTOR

G.R. NO. 138896, JUNE 20, 2000

FACTS:

Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) a Complaint
to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that "eminent domain is an exercise of the
power to take private property for public use after payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the
action also involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this Court.

The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for eminent
domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be expropriated would determine
whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the RTC. Concluding that the action should have
been filed before the MTC since the value of the subject property was less than P20,000, the RTC
ratiocinated in this wise:

“The instant action is for eminent domain. It appears from the current Tax Declaration of the land
involved that its assessed value is only One Thousand Seven Hundred Forty Pesos (P1,740.00). Pursuant
to Section 3, paragraph (3), of Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of,
real property with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property involved is located.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC should take cognizance of the expropriation case. -Yes

HELD:

Yes. Under Section 19 (1) of BP 129, which provides that RTCs shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation; ” The present action involves the exercise of the right to eminent domain, and that such right
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
There are the two phases of expropriation cases.

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, “of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint.” An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on the merits. So, too, would an
order of condemnation be a final one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before
the Trial Court, “no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the propriety thereof) shall
be filed or heard.”

The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court
of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis
of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally dispose of
the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON V. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA

G.R. NO. 146886. APRIL 30, 2003

AN EXPROPRIATION SUIT IS INCAPABLE OF PECUNIARY ESTIMATION. ACCORDINGLY, IT


FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, REGARDLESS OF THE
VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.

FACTS:

At the root of this present Petition is the controversy surrounding the two (2) Complaints for
eminent domain which were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating a 144 square
meter-parcel of land, otherwise known as Lot 4381-D situated in Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna and
owned by herein petitioner. Petitioner acquired from Makiling Consolidated Credit Corporation the said
lot pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale which was executed by and between the former and the latter.

The first Complaint for eminent domain was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna ('MTC') following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on
the purchase offer of (P200,000.00). The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of
providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.

MTC issued an order dismissing Civil Case No. 3648 'for lack of interest' for failure of the
respondent and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC, in its Order dated May 3, 1999, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof.

The second Complaint for eminent domain, was filed before Branch 37 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna ('RTC'). This Complaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D
for the erection of a multi-purpose hall of Barangay Masili, but petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss,
opposed this Complaint by alleging in the main that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 in that
respondent's] cause of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.

Judge issued an order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which
ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding.

With the subsequent approval of Municipal Ordinance No. 2000-261, and the submission thereof
in compliance with [the] Judge's Order dated June 9, 2000 requiring herein respondent to produce the
authority for the expropriation through the Municipal Council of Calamba, Laguna, the assailed Order
dated August 4, 2000 was issued in favor of Barangay Masili . . . and, on August 16, 2000, the
corresponding order for the issuance of the Writ of Possession over Lot 4381-D."

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In dismissing the Petition, the CA held that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna
(Branch 37) did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders. It ruled that the
second Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case No. 2845-99-C) was not barred by res judicata. The
reason is that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), which dismissed the first Complaint for eminent domain
(Civil Case No. 3648), had no jurisdiction over the action. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case; - NO
(2) Whether or not the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata; - NO

(3) Whether or not the CA erred when it ignored the issue of entry upon the premises - NO

HELD:

1. JURISDICTION OVER EXPROPRIATION

PETITIONER CLAIMS THAT, SINCE THE VALUE OF THE LAND IS ONLY P11,448, THE MTC HAD
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.

On the other hand, the appellate court held that the assessed value of the property was P28,960.
Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved
was beyond the P20,000 jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs. An expropriation suit does not
involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its
authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
should be filed with the regional trial courts.

It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the
government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private
property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the
expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
government's exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is
duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with the propriety of
the expropriation." To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of
the value of the land, because the subject of the action is the government's exercise of eminent domain —
a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

2. RES JUDICATA

Petitioner claims that the MTC's dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain was with
prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of dismissal. She contends that the
filing of the second Complaint before the RTC should therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. It
provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as
to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action. The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1)
the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is— between the first and the second
actions — an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res judicata
finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an adjudication on the merits.

3. LEGALITY OF ENTRY INTO PREMISES

Petitioner argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC's Writ of Possession over her
property, issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling dismissing the Complaint.
We are not persuaded. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN
AN EXPROPRIATION CASE ARE EXPRESSLY AND SPECIFICALLY GOVERNED BY SECTION 2 OF
RULE 67 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. On the part of local government units,
expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Accordingly, in
expropriation proceedings, the REQUISITES FOR AUTHORIZING IMMEDIATE ENTRY ARE AS
FOLLOWS: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the
deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated
based on its current tax declaration.

In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it had filed
the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was proper, because it had complied
with the foregoing requisites.

The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain
and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION V. CA AND ANTONIO POBRE

G.R. NO. 106804. AUGUST 12, 2004

Facts:

Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) is a public corporation created to generate geothermal,
hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC is authorized by
law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Antonino Pobre
(Pobre) is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land (Property) located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of
Tiwi, Albay. Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as Tiwi Hot
Springs Resort Subdivision. On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal
mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property and found it suitable for domestic use and
potentially for commercial or industrial use. On 18 February 1972 Pobre leased to NPC for one year
eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan. NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC
dumped waste materials. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the
Property. Then NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554
square meters of the Property. Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation.
Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected
by NPCs actions and for the payment of damages. Then NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second
expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already
abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobres opposition. The trial court issued its
Decision in favor of Pobre. NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue: Whether or not that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court with interest until fully
paid is just and fair. -Yes

Held:

Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for public use
upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation. The power of eminent domain
may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities such as NPC.
Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain.[18] Eminent Domain was the
former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took
effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now
Expropriation.

In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, the Court compelled the
National Housing Authority (NHA) to pay just compensation to the landowners even after the NHA had
already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government agency could not
initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a persons property, and then just decide not to proceed with the
expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and capricious and was condemned by the Court
in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to the landowners for the prejudice that they had
suffered.
Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss. [50] The trial and appellate courts endeavored
to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property is
reasonable considering that the Property was already an established resort-subdivision. NPC has itself to
blame for not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square meter valuation,
the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre is P3,448,450.

The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking up to the
time of full payment by the government. In accord with jurisprudence, we fix the legal interest at six per
cent (6%) per annum. The legal interest should accrue from 6 September 1979, the date when the trial
court issued the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that NPC fully pays Pobre.

Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. The court may award
temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the
court finds that a party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved with certainty
from the nature of the case. As the trial and appellate courts noted, Pobres resort-subdivision was no
longer just a dream because Pobre had already established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for it
was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC permanently damaged Pobres Property. NPC did not just
destroy the property. NPC dashed Pobres hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resort-
subdivision.The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such
entities cannot trifle with a citizens property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary
power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we
hold NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective damages are
imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.
WHO MAY EXERCISE POWER

LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP VS.THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI


G.R. NO. 136349 JANUARY 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the owner of a parcel of land in Pasig City, sought to
be expropriated by the Respondent Local Government for the "sports development and recreational
activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan, pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993. Again,
in 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with
the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of
our community”. Petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her
property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable
to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community”. Respondent reiterated that
the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to
its poor residents”. Subsequently, Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint
for expropriation, praying that the trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for
the condemnation of the property; commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the just
compensation; and that judgment be rendered. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss which the trial court
denied. On special civil action for
certiorari
Appellate Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is genuine necessity for the expropriation of the petitioner’s property. -No

HELD:
There is no genuine necessity for the expropriation. Where the taking by the State of private property is
done for the benefit of a small community which seeks to have its own sports and recreational facility,
notwithstanding that there is such a recreational facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be
considered to be for public use.
The Court held that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioner’s property. Records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council,
indicated that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private,
non-profit organization, not the residents of Canioganas the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s.
1993 authorizing the expropriation,. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering
that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area,
which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.

Constitution attaches to the property of the individual requires not only that the purpose for the taking of
private property be specified. The genuine necessity for the taking, which must be of a public character,
must also be shown to exist.

Power of eminent domain


"the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use, whenever the public
exigency requires it, which can be done only on condition of providing a reasonable compensation
therefor.
Power of the State or its instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from
sovereignty and inherent in government.

Lodged in the legislative branch of the government, delegated to LGU, public entities and public utility
corporations, subject only to Constitutional limitations.

Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly
authorized by statute. (Local Government Code of 1991, Section 19) "SEC. 19.
Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws: Provided, however That, the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was not accepted.
DOROTEO LAGCAO AND URSULA LAGCAO V JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA,
G.R. NO. 155746 OCTOBER 13, 2004

Facts:

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029,
situated in Capitol Hills, Cebu City, with an area of 4,048 square meters. In 1965, petitioners purchased
Lot 1029 on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of Cebu to
the petitioners. This prompted the latter to sue the province for specific performance and damages in the
then Court of First Instance.

On July 9, 1986, the court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and ordered the Province of Cebu to execute
the final deed of sale in favor of petitioners. On June 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court. Pursuant to the ruling of the appellate court, the Province of Cebu executed on June 17,
1994 a deed of absolute sale over Lot 1029 in favor of petitioners. Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 129306 was issued in the name of petitioners and Crispina Lagcao.[3]

After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take possession of the lot only to discover that it was already
occupied by squatters. Thus, on June 15, 1997, petitioners instituted ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cebu City, rendered a decision on
April 1, 1998, ordering the squatters to vacate the lot. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCCs decision
and issued a writ of execution and order of demolition.

However, when the demolition order was about to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote
two letters[4] to the MTCC, requesting the deferment of the demolition on the ground that the City was
still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the MTCC issued two
orders suspending the demolition for a period of 120 days from February 22, 1999.Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a
resolution which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.[5] Then, on June
30, 1999, the SP of Cebu City passed Ordinance No. 1772[6] which included Lot 1029 among the
identified sites for socialized housing. On July, 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843[7] was enacted by the SP of
Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of
Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to be used for the
benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants thereof. For this purpose, the
ordinance appropriated the amount of P6,881,600 for the payment of the subject lot. This ordinance was
approved by Mayor Garcia on August 2, 2000.

On August 29, 2000, petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
1843 for being unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its decision on July 1, 2002 dismissing the
complaint filed by petitioners whose subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
August 26, 2002.

Issue:

Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land
owned by petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws. -Yes

Decision:

Yes, the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel of land owned by
petitioners contravenes the Constitution and applicable laws. The petition is GRANTED and the July 1,
2002 decision of Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Under Section 48 of RA 7160,[9] otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,[10] local
legislative power shall
be exercised by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The legislative acts of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature.[11] By virtue of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
government units the power to expropriate. Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted pursuant to Section
19 of RA 7160:

SEC. 19. Eminent Domain. − A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws xxx. (italics supplied).
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the SP of Cebu
City to provide socialized housing for the homeless and low-income residents of the City.

However, while we recognize that housing is one of the most serious social problems of the country, local
government units do not possess unbridled authority to exercise their power of eminent domain in
seeking solutions to this problem.

There are two legal provisions which limit the exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws;[12] and (2) private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.[13] Thus,
the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19
of RA 7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must comply with the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws.

The due process clause cannot be trampled upon each time an ordinance orders the expropriation of a
private individuals property. The courts cannot even adopt a hands-off policy simply because public use
or public purpose is invoked by an ordinance, or just compensation has been fixed and determined.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof provide:

SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. − Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:

(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;

(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;


(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet been acquired;

(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS which have not yet been
acquired; and

(f) Privately-owned lands.

Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries, the
priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary
priority to on-site development of government lands. (Emphasis supplied).

SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. − The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
banking, donation to the Government, joint venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes
of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided further, That where expropriation is resorted to,
parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: xxx.
(Emphasis supplied).

Nothing was found in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9 and
10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property without any attempt to
first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish
that the other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA 7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the
passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evidence of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners
property as required by Section 19 of RA 7160.[20] We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be
constitutionally infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due process.

For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to
enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. It must be in accordance with
certain well-established basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that an ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable.[21] Ordinance No. 1843 failed to comply
with the foregoing substantive requirements. A clear case of constitutional infirmity having been thus
established, this Court is constrained to nullify the subject ordinance. We recapitulate:

first, as earlier discussed, the questioned ordinance is repugnant to the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution, RA 7279 and RA 7160;

second, the precipitate manner in which it was enacted was plain oppression masquerading as a pro-poor
ordinance;

third, the fact that petitioners small property was singled out for expropriation for the purpose of
awarding it to no more than a few squatters indicated manifest partiality against petitioners, and

fourth, the ordinance failed to show that there was a reasonable relation between the end sought and the
means adopted. While the objective of the City of Cebu was to provide adequate housing to slum
dwellers, the means it employed in pursuit of such objective fell short of what was legal, sensible and
called for by the circumstances.

REPUBLIC V CA & HEIRS OF LUIS SANTOS G.R. NO. 146587 JULY 2, 2002

FACTS

Sep. 19, 1969: PH Information Agency instituted (3) expropriation proceedingsbefore the RTC of
Bulacan, covering a 544,980 sqm of contiguous land situatedalong MacArthur Highway, Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the continuedbroadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the
"Voice of thePhilippines" project.PIA, took over the premises after the previous lessee, the "Voice of
America,"had ceased its operations thereat. PIA deposited P517,558.80, the sumprovisionally fixed as
being the reasonable value of the property.

Feb. 26 1979, RTC rendered a decision ordering PIA to:


> pay the defendants the just compensation for said property at the rate of P6per sqm, with legal rate of
interest from Sept. 19, 1969, until fully paid.76,589-square meter property owned by Luis Santos,
predecessor-in-interest ofRs, forms part of the expropriated area. PIA failed to pay to Rs 5 years later, or
on May 9 1984, Rs filed → a manifestation with a motion seeking payment for the expropriated property.
RTC Bulacan, after ascertaining that the heirs remained unpaid in the sum of P1,058,655.05, issued a writ
of execution served on PIA, through the OSG. Order was not complied with -> Rs filed a motion urging
the RTC to direct the provincial treasurer of Bulacan to release to them the amount of P72,683.55, a
portion of the sum deposited by PIA at the inception of the expropriation. RTC granted the motion.

In the meantime, Pres. Estrada issued Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hec. of the expropriated
property to the Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to be
used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining portion was retained by the
PIA. Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action was taken on their case until Sept. 16 1999 when PIA
filed its manifestation and motion to permit the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000 by way of
just compensation for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final computation
as might be approved by the court. Santos heirs, opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a
countermotion to adjust the compensation from P6 per sqm to its current zonal valuation pegged at P5k
per sqm or, in the alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property. Mar.1 2000,: RTC
Bulacan ruled in favor of Rs, vacating its decision of Feb. 26 1979 and declaring it to be unenforceable on
the ground of prescription.

CA outrightly denied PIA's petition for certiorari.

> based on S4, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure Hence this petition by PIA.
> the motion which Rs had filed on Feb. 17 1984, followed up by other motions subsequent thereto, was
made within the reglementary period that thereby interrupted the 5-yr prescriptive period within which to
enforce the 1979 judgment.
> the receipt by Rs of partial compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on July 23 1984 constituted partial
compliance on the part of Ps and effectively estopped Rs from invoking prescription expressed in Section
6, Rule 39, of the RoC.

Rs' Answers:
> pursuant to S6, Rule 39, of the RoC, the failure of PIA to execute the Feb judgment, within 5 years after
it had become final and executory, rendered it unenforceable by mere motion.
> The motion for payment, dated May 9 1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum
of P72,683.55, could not be considered as having interrupted the 5-year period, since a motion, to be
considered otherwise, should instead be made by the prevailing party, in this case by PIA.
> the P72,683.55 paid to them was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner when it first entered
possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so regarded as a partial payment.
> PIA has no right to transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even
while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.

Note: The petition being imbued with public interest, SC resolved to give it due course and to decide the
case on its merits.
Issue

WON there was GAD on the part of the RTC.

Held: Yes

(1) Eminent domain defined


The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to
appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. Fundamental to the
independent existence of a State, it requires no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are
taken as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of
the power.

In the hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope matching that of taxation, even that of
police power itself, in many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State needs for public use
and, as an old case so puts it, all separate interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the right to resume the possession of the
property whenever the public interest so requires it.

The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation proceedings.
Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for the condemning authority is
not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the condemn or in
effect merely serves notice that it is taking title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts
title or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for
the taking.
(2) The power is not without its limits:

> first, the taking must be for public use, and


> second, that just compensation must be given to the private owner of the property.
These twin proscriptions have their origin in the recognition of the necessity for achieving balance
between the State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the other hand, by effectively
restraining the former and affording protection to the latter.

In determining "public use," two approaches are utilized:


> the first is public employment or the actual use by the public, and
> the second is public advantage or benefit.

(3) The expropriated property has been shown to be for the continued utilization by the PIA, a significant
portion thereof being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan State University and for the
propagation of the Philippine carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public purpose.
Rs question the public nature of the utilization by PIA of the condemned property (present use differs
from the purpose originally contemplated). The argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a
public character upon its expropriation. PIA, as the condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is. Rs' reliance on the pronouncement in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs.
Vda. de Villaroya is misplaced, The grant of the power of eminent domain to local governments under
RA 7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-encompassing power vested in the
legislative branch of government. For local governments to be able to wield the power, it must, by
enabling law, be delegated to it by the national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of eminent
domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but only of inferior, domain or only as broad or
confined as the real authority would want it to be.

(4) Precedent Cases: In Valdehueza vs. Republic where the private landowners had remained unpaid ten
years after the termination of the expropriation proceedings, SC ruled:
“xxx plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots - which are still devoted to
the public use for which they were expropriated - but only to demand the fair market value of the same.”

The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Alfonso vs. Pasay City.


The judgment rendered by the RTC in 1979 on the expropriation proceedings provides not only for the
payment of just compensation to Rs but likewise adjudges the property condemned in favor of PIA over
which parties, as well as their privies, are bound. Petitioner has occupied, utilized and, for all intents and
purposes, exercised dominion over the property. The exercise of such rights has amounted to at least a
partial compliance or satisfaction of the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of nonexecution. The right of the expropriatory authority is far from that of an
unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After condemnation, the paramount title is in the public
under a new and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a disputed title, condemnation
proceedings provide a judicial process for securing better title against all the world than may
be obtained by voluntary conveyance.

Rs, in arguing laches against PIA did not take into account that the same argument could likewise apply
against them. Rs first instituted proceedings for payment against petitioner on May 9 1984, or five years
after the 1979 judgment had become final.

(5) The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one
who receives, and one who desires to sell, it fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having
jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the
court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to
place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking
occurred.

Note: A1250 of the Civil Code, providing that, in case of extraordinary inflation or deflation, the value of
the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis for the payment when no
agreement to the contrary is stipulated, has strict application only to contractual obligations. In other
words, a contractual agreement is needed for the effects of extraordinary inflation to be taken into account
to alter the value of the currency.
CONLUCSION: RTC Bulacan in issuing its order, dated 01 March 2000, has acted beyond its lawful
cognizance, the only authority left to it being to order its execution.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is GRANTED. CA & RTC decisiond are SET ASIDE. Case remanded to the
RTC for the proper execution of its decision promulgated on 26 February 1979 which is hereby
REINSTATED.

> just compensation: P6 per sqm, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum computed from the date of
"taking" of the property, i.e., 19 September 1969, until the due amount shall have been fully paid.

JESUS IS LORD CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION V CITY OF PASIG GR 152230

FACTS:

The Municipality (now City) of Pasig needed an access road from ER Santos St., a municipal road near
the Pasig Public Market, to Brgy. Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig, where 60 to 70 houses were located. The road
had to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code, so that fire trucks could pass
through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the road for water and
electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the 1,791- square
meter property of respondents Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco
Kho (Ching Cuangcos) which is abutting E. R. Santos Street.

The Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal to initiate
expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefor. The ordinance
stated that the property owners were notified of the municipality’s intent to purchase the property for
public use as an access road but they rejected the offer.

Municipality filed a complaint against the Ching Cuangcos for the expropriation of the property under
Sec. 19 of RA 7160. It appended to the complaint a photocopy of the letter addressed to defendant
Lorenzo Ching Chuangco.

City of Pasig deposited with the RTC 15% of the market value of the property based on the latest tax
declaration covering the property. On plaintiff’s motion, RTC issued a Writ of Possession. Plaintiff
caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the dorsal portion of the TCT under the name of Jesus
is Lord Christian School Foundation (JILCSFI) which had purchased the property.

City of Pasig constructed therein a cemented road with a width of three meters; the road was called
Damayan Street.

Ching Cuancos claimed, in their answer that, as early as Feb ’93 they had already sold the property to
JILCSFI via deed of sale. JILCSFI filed a motion to intervene as defendant-in-intervention which the
RTC granted. It averred that the City of Pasig’s exercise of eminent domain was only for a particular class
and not for the benefit of the poor and the landless.

The City of Pasig offered in evidence a photocopy of the letter of Engr. Jose Reyes addressed to Lorenzo
Ching Cuanco to prove that the plaintiff made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property to the co-
owners. However, the RTC rejected the same letter for being a mere photocopy.

RTC issued an order in favor of plaintiff. The plaintiff and intervenor are hereby directed to submit at
least two (2) names of their recommended commissioners for the determination of just compensation
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

RTC held that, as gleaned from the declaration in Ordinance No. 21, there was substantial compliance
with the definite and valid offer requirement of Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, and that the expropriated
portion is the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas Bukid.

CA affirmed the order of the RTC. CA declared that the letter of Engr. Reyes, inviting Lorenzo Ching
Cuanco to a conference to discuss with him the road project and the price of the lot, was a substantial
compliance with the "valid and definite offer" requirement under said Section 19. In addition, the CA
noted that there was also constructive notice to the defendants of the expropriation proceedings since a
notice of lis pendens was annotated at the dorsal portion of the TCT. Finally. CA upheld the public
necessity for the subject property based on the findings of the trial court that the portion of the property
sought to be expropriated appears to be, not only the most convenient access to the interior of Sto. Tomas
Bukid, but also an easy path for vehicles entering the area, particularly fire trucks. Moreover, the CA took
into consideration the provision of Article 33 of the LGC’s IRR, which regards the "construction or
extension of roads, streets, sidewalks" as public use, purpose or welfare. JILCSFI filed a MR. CA denied
the MR.
ISSUE/s:

1. Was there a valid expropriation on the part of the municipality? None

2. W/N the expropriation of the subject property is subject to the

1. essential requisites for an easement of right of way? NO

HELD:

1. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power
to appropriate any property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.

• However, this power still has its limits. The Constitution provides that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. Also, the due process and equal protection clauses are
safeguards against arbitrary exercise of governmental power.

• The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents,
is necessarily in derogation of private rights. When the sovereign delegates the power to a political unit
or agency, a strict construction will be given against the agency asserting the power. The authority to
condemn is to be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor.

• Corollarily, the respondent, which is the condemnor, has the burden of proving all the essentials
necessary to show the right of condemnation. It has the burden of proof to establish that it has complied
with all the requirements provided by law for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.

The Court declared that the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain by
a local government unit must be complied with:

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, in
behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

It is incumbent upon the condemnor to exhaust all reasonable efforts to obtain the land it desires by
agreement. An offer is a unilateral proposition which one party makes to the other for the celebration of a
contract. The offer must be complete, indicating with sufficient clearness the kind of contract intended
and definitely stating the essential conditions of the proposed contract.

The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage
settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense
and delay of a court action. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice.

A letter offered only to prove the municipality’s desire or intent to acquire a property for a right-of-way
does not prove that the LGU made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an
access road before filing the complaint for expropriation

•In this case, respondent failed to prove that before it filed its complaint, it made a written definite and
valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road. The only evidence adduced by the
municipality is the photocopy of the letter purportedly bearing the signature of Engr. Jose Reyes, to only
one of the co-owners, Lorenzo Ching Cuanco. In that letter, the respondent offered the letter only to prove
its desire or intent to acquire the property for a right-of-way. The document was not offered to prove that
the respondent made a definite and valid offer to acquire the property. Respondent also failed to adduce
evidence that copies of the letter were sent and received by all the co-owners of the property (Lorenzo
Cuanco, Victor Cuanco and Ernesto Kho)

There is no legal and factual basis to the CA’s ruling that the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the
dorsal portion of the owner’s certificate of title is a substantial compliance with the requisite offer.
•In this case, it was annotated long after the complaint had been filed in the RTC against Ching Cuancos.

In the absence of competent evidence that, indeed, the municipality made a definite and valid offer to all
the co-owners of the property, the declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were already
notified of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road is not a compliance with
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160

•In here, the whereas clause in the ordinance that “the property owners were already notified by the
municipality of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road” is not deemed a
substantial compliance with the law.

A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its
members may still be expropriated.

•Petitioner contends that the property can no longer be


expropriated by the respondent because it is intended for the construction of a place for religious worship
and a school for its members. However, in Manosca v CA, the term public use is one of constant growth.
As society advances, its demands upon the individual increases and each demand is a new use to which
the resources of the individual may be devoted. . . . for “whatever is

beneficially employed for the community is a public use.”

2. Where property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the expropriator is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil
Code—case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent
domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is
capricious and wantonly injurious.

•Hence, expropriation is justified as long as it is for public good & there is genuine necessity of public
character. The Government can’t capriciously choose what private property should be taken.

The testimony of witnesses that although there were other ways through which one can enter the vicinity,
no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the property sought to be
expropriated is more than sufficient to establish that there is a genuine necessity for the construction of a
road in the area—absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice.

•But in this case, respondent failed to show the necessity for constructing the road particularly in the
petitioner’s property and not elsewhere. We note that the whereas clause of the ordinance states that the
51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E. R.
Santos Street.

•The respondent’s complaint also alleged that the said portion of the petitioner’s lot has been surveyed as
the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent failed to adduce a preponderance of
evidence to prove its claims.

An ocular inspection is part of the trial as evidence is thereby received and the parties are entitled to be
present at any stage of the trial—where the property owner was not notified of any ocular inspection of
the property, any factual finding of the court based on the said inspection has no probative weight.

•In this case, nowhere in the record shows that an ocular inspection
was conducted during trial. If, at all, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection of the property during
trial, the petitioner wasn’t notified. Hence, petitioner was deprived of its right to due process.

Petition is granted. CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC is ordered to dismiss the complaint of City
of City of Pasig without prejudice to refiling thereof.
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. CA, JUDGE FELIPE S. TONGCO
AND
THE CITY OF MANILA
G.R. NO. 125218 JANUARY 23, 1998
FILSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED VS. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.

G.R. NO. 128077 JANUARY 23, 1998


FACTS:

Petitioner, Filstream International, Inc., is the registered owner of the properties subject of this dispute
consisting of adjacent parcels of land situated in Tondo II, Manila. On January 7, 1993, petitioner filed an
ejectment suit before the MTC Manila against the occupants (respondents) on the grounds of termination
of the lease contract and non-payment of rentals. Judgment was rendered by the MTC against respondents
ordering them to vacate the premises and pay back rentals to petitioner. The decision was affirmed by
RTC Manila and CA on appeal and the decision became final and executory for lack of further action.

However, it appeared that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings, private respondents a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Exchange against petitioner Filstream before the RTC of Manila. It
was at this stage that respondent City of Manila came into the picture when the city government approved
Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate the acquisition by negotiation,
expropriation, purchase, or other legal means certain parcels of land which formed part of the properties
of petitioner then occupied by private respondents. Subsequently, the City of Manila approved Ordinance
No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of certain parcels of land owned by petitioner's predecessor-in-
interest. The said properties were to be sold and distributed to qualified tenants of the area pursuant to the
Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.

Pursuant to the complaint for eminent domain filed by respondent City of Manila for the expropriation of
parcels of land owned by petitioner Filstream, the trial court issued a Writ of Possession in favor of the
former which ordered the transfer of possession over the disputed premises to the City of Manila.
Petitioner’s motion to dismiss complaint and subsequent motions for reconsideration were denied,
including a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. Hence this instant petition for review on certiorari.

Meanwhile, owing to the finality of the decision in the ejectment suit the MTC of Manila issued a Writ of
Execution as well as a Notice to Vacate the disputed premises and an order of demolition. Upon
respondents’ motion, the RTC of Manila issued a TRO enjoining the execution of the writ. On appeal to
CA, the TRO was sustained. Hence this petition for certiorari.
Issues:

1.Whether the dismissal of petitioner’s appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on purely
procedural and technical grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law
(CA dismissed the petition for non-compliance with Sec. 2(a) of Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of
the Court of Appeals by failing to attach to its petition other pertinent documents and papers and for
attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and unreadable).

2.Whether the City of Manila validly expropriated petitioner Filstream's properties.

Ruling:

1.YES. A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in this case would defeat rather than meet
the ends of justice as it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of petitioner. At stake in the
appeal filed by petitioner before the CA is the exercise of their property rights over the disputed premises
which have been expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in favor of the City of Manila. In
effect, the dismissal of their appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on the aforementioned grounds
is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law as it would automatically validate
the expropriation proceedings which the petitioner is still disputing. It must be emphasized that where
substantial rights are affected, as in this case, the stringent application of procedural rules may be relaxed
if only to meet the ends of substantial justice.

2.NO. The Court found nothing that would indicate that respondent City of Manila complied with Sec. 9
and Sec. 10 of R.A. 7279. Petitioner Filstream's properties were expropriated and ordered condemned in
favor of the City of Manila sans any showing that resort to the acquisition of other lands listed under Sec.
9 of RA 7279 have proved futile. Evidently, there was a violation of petitioner Filstream's right to due
process which must accordingly be rectified.
Indeed, it must be emphasized that the State has a paramount interest in exercising its power of eminent
domain for the general good considering that the right of the State to expropriate private property as long
as it is for public use always takes precedence over the interest of private property owners. However we
must not lose sight of the fact that the individual rights affected by the exercise of such right are also
entitled to protection, bearing in mind that the exercise of this superior right cannot override the guarantee
of due process extended by the law to owners of the property to be expropriated. In this regard, vigilance
over compliance with the due process requirements is in order.

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY v. COURT OF APPEALS October 25, 1995

Petitioner: Iron and Steel Authority (hereinafter ISA), a juridical entity created by PD 272, whose
purpose is to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines

Respondents:

1.Court of Appeals

2.Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (hereinafter MCFC), as private respondent. MCFC owns a non-
operational chemical fertilizer plant in Iligan City

Recit-ready:

Marcos, through PD 272, created the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) to develop the iron and steel industry
of the Philippines. ISA had a lifespan until August 1988, and was given the power to initiate
expropriation of land for the use of the state. Private respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer (MCFC) had
lands in Iligan which were to be expropriated in favor of the government. MCFC refused to accept the
offer of 1.76M pesos as compensation, so a trial ensued. During the course of the trial, the statutory term
of ISA expired. MCFC contended that because of the expiration, ISA no longer retained juridical
personality. ISA asked if the Republic of the Philippines be substituted as the petitioner, by presenting a
Letter of Instruction from the President which directed the Solicitor General to proceed with the case. The
trial court and CA ruled in favor of MCFC, and dismissed the case on this ground. The Supreme Court
held that since ISA is a non-incorporated government agency, its powers, functions and properties are re-
assumed by the Republic. This re-assumption thus led the Republic to assume the role of petitioner in the
expropriation case. Also, there was no need for Congress to pass a new law which would allow the
Republic to continue an expropriation case instituted by a non-incorporated agency. The Congress
delegated the power of eminent domain to the President, by allowing him to direct and institute
expropriation proceedings. ISA, being a creation of the President, and the Solicitor General, being
directed by the Letter of Instruction, had the power to institute expropriation proceedings.

Facts:

In 1973, Marcos issued PD 272, which created the Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) to develop and promote
the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Section 4 of PD 272 provides that ISA has the power “to
initiate expropriation of land required for basic iron and steel facilities for subsequent resale and/or lease
to the companies involved if it is shown that such use of the State's power is necessary to implement the
construction of capacity which is needed for the attainment of the objectives of the Authority.”

ISA, under PD 272, had a lifespan of only five years, but a subsequent EO extended it further by ten
years. Thus, its expiration would come on August 1988.

The National Steel Corporation (NSC), a government-owned corporation, embarked on an expansion


program by planning to construct a steel mill in Iligan. Then President Marcos issued a proclamation,
which reserved tracts of public land to NSC.

Part of the land possessed by Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. (MCFC) is part of the land declared to be
reserved to NSC.MCFC and NSC were instructed to reach an agreement for MCFC’s compensation
rights, and if the negotiations fail, then ISA would step in. The negotiations indeed failed, so ISA stepped
in. ISA wanted the land to be possessed by the government, and that MCFC be compelled to accept an
expropriation fee of 1.76M pesos as compensation.

While the trial was ongoing, ISA’s juridical personality ceased as its expiration date came. MCFC filed a
motion to dismiss, since ISA no longer had any personality. The motion to dismiss was granted. ISA filed
a motion for reconsideration, invoking that

(1)ISA still had personality because it still had outstanding affairs or obligations, and (2) if the first
argument fails, then the Republic of the Philippines be the substitute petitioner. ISA showed, as evidence,
a Letter of Instruction (LOI) from the President (it was already Cory at that time) instructing the solicitor
general to continue with the expropriation proceedings. This was also denied.

The dismissal of the case was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, but such dismissal of the case was
“without prejudice to the refiling of a new complaint for expropriation if the Congress sees it fit.” In other
words, the CA said that Congress has to pass a law which would, in effect, allow ISA to retain its juridical
personality in order for the case to prosper.
Main Issue: W/N the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in view of the
expiration of ISA's term

Held: YES. CA decision was reversed and set aside. The case was remanded, with the Republic being the
substitute of ISA.

Issue relevant to our topic: W/N “fresh legislative authority is necessary before the Republic of the
Philippines may continue the expropriation proceedings initiated by its own delegate or agent” – NO!
(See Ratio III)

Ratio:

I.ISA is a non-incorporated government agency A. Who may be parties to a suit

1. Natural or juridical persons

2. Entities authorized by law to institute actions

B.The powers vested by PD 272 (such as the power to initiate expropriation proceedings) to ISA are
powers normally attributed with juridical personality.

C. There are two kinds of government corporations:

1. Incorporated agencies or instrumentalities

a. They are vested with juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic or of the
government b. Examples: NPC, PPA, NHA, PNOC, PEA, PNR

2. Non-incorporated agencies or instrumentalities

a. They are “agents and delegates” of the government.

b. They are not vested with a distinct juridical personality.


c. There has to be a provision in the law or charter which provides for a distinct juridical personality

d. Since there was no provision in PD 272 giving ISA a distinct juridical personality, then ISA falls under
this category.

II.Expiration of the statutory term of non- incorporated government agencies A. When the statutory term
of a non-incorporated government agency expires, “the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets
and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines,”
unless otherwise provided by law.

1.If the statutory term of an incorporated agency expires, then the law or its charter provides for the
effects to its powers, duties, functions and properties.

B. ISA clearly can be substituted by the Republic, since basically ISA’s personality was re-assumed by
the Republic.

1.Under the Rules of Court, substitution or addition of parties to a suit may be allowed: “a party may be
dropped or added by order of the court, on motion of any party or on the court's own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just.” III. Power of eminent domain

A. The power of eminent domain is primarily vested in the Congress. B. However, through the
Administrative Codes of 1917 and 1987, the

Congress delegated the power of eminent domain to the President.

1.The Administrative Code of 1917, which was in effect when Marcos created ISA, already provided that
the President may “direct the Secretary of Justice, where such act is deemed advisable, to cause the
[expropriation] proceedings to be begun in the court having proper jurisdiction”

2. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the one currently in effect, states that: “The President shall
determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
National Government, and direct the Solicitor General, whenever he deems the action advisable, to
institute expopriation proceedings in the proper court.”

C. By creating ISA, and by granting ISA the power to institute expropriation proceedings, “the President,
exercising the power duly delegated under both the 1917 and 1987 Revised Administrative Codes, in
effect made a determination that it was necessary and advantageous to exercise the power of eminent
domain in behalf of the Government.”
D.Thus, “[n]o new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA,
in fact to continue to prosecute the expropriation proceedings.”

E.Notwithstanding the powers of ISA, the subsequent expropriation proceedings were validly instituted,
since ISA showed the LOI issued by Cory, directing the Solicitor General to proceed with the suit.

SAN ROQUE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER,


VS.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES), RESPONDENT.
G.R. NO. 163130, SEPTEMBER 7, 2007

Facts:

The subject parcels of land are located at Lahug, Cebu City. It was originally owned by Ismael D.
Rosales, Pantaleon Cabrera and Francisco Racaza. Subject parcels of land, together with seventeen (17)
others, were the subject of an expropriation proceeding initiated by the then Commonwealth of the
Philippines docketed as Civil Case No. 781. Judge Felix Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500.00
as pre-condition for the entry on the lands sought to be expropriated. On 14 May 1940, a Decision was
rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title of the subject parcel of land was not
transferred to the government.

Eventually, the land was subdivided and T.C.T. No. 11946 was cancelled and new titles were issued by
the Register of Deeds of Cebu. Two parcels covered by T.C.T. Nos. 128197 (Lot No. 933-B-3) and
128198 (Lot No. 933-B-4) were acquired by defendant -appellee. In 1995, defendant-appellee begun
construction of townhouses on the subject parcels of land.

Plaintiff-appellant filed the present case (Records, pp. 1- 15) alleging that it is the owner of the subject
parcels of land by virtue of the 1938 Decision in the expropriation case, thus, T.C.T. Nos. 128197 and
128198 are null and void. It argued that defendant-appellee, had no right to possess the subject properties
because it was not its lawful owner.

In its Answer, defendant-appellee claimed that it was a buyer in good faith. It also claimed that there was
no valid expropriation because it was initiated by the executive branch without legislative approval. It
also alleged that the expropriation was never consummated because the government did not actually enter
the land nor were the owners paid any compensation.
The RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint and upholding SRRDC's ownership
over the subject properties as supported by SRRDC's actual possession thereof and its unqualified title
thereto. It also found that there was no valid expropriation since the records are bereft of a showing that
consideration was paid for the subject properties.

Aggrieved, the Republic appealed the decision to the CA insisting on its absolute ownership over the
subject properties.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision on the finding that the appeal from the CFI Decision in the
expropriation case was never perfected by the original owners of the subject properties, and thus, the
expropriation of Lot No. 933 became final and binding on the original owners, and SRRDC, which
merely stepped into the latter's shoes, is similarly bound.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in holding that the (a)validity of the expropriation proceedings; (b) respondent had a
better right to the subject properties and (c) respondent is not guilty of laches

Ruling:

The CA disregarded relevant facts and ignored the evidence, noteworthy among which is that when the
Republic filed its complaint with the RTC, it alleged that the CFI Decision in Civil Case No. 781 had long
become final and executory. However, this assertion would compound the

Republic’s predicament, because the Republic could not adequately explain its failure to register its
ownership over the subject property or, at least, annotate its lien on the title. Trying to extricate itself from
this quandary, the Republic belatedly presented a copy of an Exception and Notice of Intention to Appeal
dated July 9, 1940, to show that an appeal filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933 effectively
prevented the Republic from registering its title, or even only annotating its lien, over the property.

The CA’s categorical pronouncement that the CFI Decision had become final as no appeal was perfected
by SRRDC’s predecessor-in-interest is, therefore, contradicted by the Republic’s own allegation that an
appeal had been filed by the original owners of Lot No. 933. Not only did the CA fail to resolve the issue
of the Republic’s failure to register the property in its name, it also did not give any explanation as to why
title and continuous possession of the property remained with SRRDC and its predecessors-in-interest for
fifty-six years. The CA ruling that disregards these established facts and neglects to reconcile the
contradiction mentioned above does not deserve concurrence by this Court.
In Republic v. Lim, Court emphasized that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an
unwilling owner until compensation in paid.

Without FULL PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION, there can be no transfer of title from the
landowner to the expropriator. Thus, the Republic's failure to pay just compensation precluded the
perfection of its title over the lot sought to be expropriated. In fact, we went even further and recognized
the right of the unpaid owner to recover the property if within 5 years from the decision of the
expropriation court, the expropriator fails to effect payment of just compensation.

Time and again, we have declared that EMINENT DOMAIN cases are to be strictly construed against the
expropriator. The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State's sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to
observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose. To
disregard this limitation on the exercise of governmental power to expropriate is to ride roughshod over
private rights.

From the records of this case and our previous findings in the related case, the Republic manifestly failed
to present clear and convincing evidence of full payment of just compensation and receipt thereof by the
property owners. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation,
in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of
the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title.

The registration with the Registry of Deeds of the Republic's interest arising from the exercise of it's
power or eminent domain is in consonance with the Land Registration Act. There is no showing that the
Republic complied with the aforesaid registration requirement.

From the foregoing, it is clear that it was incumbent upon the Republic to cause the registration of the
subject properties in its name or record the decree of expropriation on the title. Yet, not only did the
Republic fail to register the subject properties in its name, it failed to do so for 56 years.

LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which
by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The general rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel or laches by the mistakes or errors of its
officials or agents. This rule, however, admits of exceptions. One exception is when the strict application
of the rule will defeat the effectiveness of a policy adopted to protect the public, such as the Torrens
system.

Very telling of the Republic's silence and inaction, whether intentional or by sheer negligence, is the
testimony of Infante, the Republic's witness in the proceedings before the RTC, testifying that several
surveys were conducted on a number of expropriated lots, which surveys showed that the subject lot was
still registered in the name of the original owners. As such, Infante recommended in his report that legal
action be taken. Yet despite aforesaid recommendation, title to subject lot remained registered in the name
of the original owners, ans subsequently, its transferees. This silence and unexplained inaction by the
Republic clearly constitute laches.

The trial court correctly held that title registered under the Torrens system is notice to the whole world.
Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and
the law will not oblige him to go beyond what appears on the face thereof to determine the condition of
the property.

An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought the property from
the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in such property and
pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before ha has notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED


REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE

G.R. No. 72126 January 29, 1988


MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, HON. ADRIANO D. DAEZ, MUNICIPAL
MAYOR, MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PHILIPPINE PIPES & MERCHANDIZING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Brief Summary:

This case is about the expropriation of a private land to be converted to a public road which would
provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Bulacan to ease the traffic in the
area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway. The court ruled that there is no genuine necessity to
expropriate the said land.

FACTS:

In the year 1975, Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of the Municipal
Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 215165 and 37879. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the
storage of the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products.

Later that same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, headed by then Mayor Celso R.
Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975, manifesting the intention to expropriate the
respondent's parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 37879 to be used as public road
which would provide a connecting link between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Valenzuela, Bulacan
and thereby ease the traffic in the area of vehicles coming from MacArthur Highway.

An opposition to the resolution was submitted by the respondent and the issue was investigated in which
the Provincial Board of Bulacan recommended to disapprove or annul the resolution in question because
there was no genuine necessity for the Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's
property to convert as a public road.

On October 21, 1983, however, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano D.
Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose of expropriating anew the respondent's
land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan a special civil action for expropriation, and upon
deposit of the amount ofP24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the PNB, the trial court
issued a writ of possession in favor of the Petitioner.

The respondent went to IAC, on petition for review, which the appellate court

affirmed the trial court’s decision. But upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed and
held that there is no genuine necessity to expropriate the land for use as public road as there were several
other roads for the same purpose and another more expropriate lot
for the proposed public road.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of land by the Municipality of Meycauayan is a valid exercise
of eminent domain?

RULING:

No. It appears obvious to thE Special Committee that there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of
Meycauayan to expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation
for use as a public road. Considering that in the vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot
offered for sale situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought to be
expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed by the company as a site for its
heavy equipment after it is fenced together with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the
same does not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause unjustified damage to the
firm. The desire of the Municipality of Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of
traffic can be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the vicinity maybe at
lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment doing legitimate business therein. Or, the
municipality may seek to expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale for a
wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as observed by the Committee, the lot of the
Corporation sought to be taken will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not
suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the Malhacan area.

REPUBLIC VS. LA ORDEN DE PP. BENEDICTINOS DE FILIPINAS,

G.R. NO. L-12792, FEBRUARY 28, 1961

FACTS:

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend
Azcarraga Street from its junction with Mendiola Street, up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.
To carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of approximately 6,000 square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas,a domestic religious corporation that owns the
San Beda College, a private educational institution situated on Mendiola street. Not having been able to
reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an expropriation proceeding.

On May 27, 1957 the trial court, valued the property in question at P270,000.00 and authorized
appellant to take immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with
the City Treasurer of Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila
to place appellant in possession of the property aforesaid. In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the property sought to be expropriated is already
dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation; (2) there is no necessity for the
proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through a different site which
would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education; (4) That the present action filed by the plaintiff against the defendant is
discriminatory; (5) That the herein plaintiff does not count with sufficient funds to push through its
project of constructing the proposed Azcarraga Extension and to allow the plaintiff to expropriate
defendant’s property at this time would be only to needlessly deprive the latter to use its property. The
trial court granted the motion, holding that the expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this
present petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING: It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and
upon payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have
the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine
whether or not there is a genuine necessity therefor.

It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the Azcarraga
extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of
fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also
up on other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence.

The parties should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors
and others that might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved,
namely, the need to open the extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on
Legarda street. WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

DEVORAH E. BARDILLON V. BARANGAY MASILI OF CALAMBA, LAGUNA

FACTS:

The root of this present petition is the controversy surrounding the two complaints for eminent domain
filed by respondent Barangay Masili to expropriate a 144-square meter-parcel of land, otherwise known
as Lot 4381-D, owned by the petitioners. The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of
providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents.

The first complaint for eminent domain, entitled Barangay Masili, Calamba, Laguna v. Emelita A.
Reblara, Eugenia Almazan and Devorah E. Bardillon, was filed before the Municipal Trial Court.
However, the barangay and the lot owners could not agree with the purchase price of Php 200,000 so it
was dismissed due to the lack of interest of the petitioner land owners.

The second complaint for eminent domain, entitled Brgy. Masili, Calamaba, Laguna v. Devorah E.
Bardillon, was filed before the Regional Trial Court. The petitioner, by way of motion to dismiss,
opposed this complaint by alleging that it violated Section 19 (f) of Rule 16 in that respondent caused of
action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. However, the RTC ruled in
favor of Barangay Masili holding that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation
proceeding. This was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case

RULING: No, the Municipal Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case. An expropriation
suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take property for public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.

In the case of Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor explained that the subject of an
expropriation suit is the government exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Moreover, the value of property to be expropriated, the just compensation that the court is
duty bound to determine, is only incidental to the expropriation suit. The amount is determined only after
the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.

Verily, the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano was decided during the effectivity of Judiciary
Act of 1948 which provides that the Courts of first instance, forerunners of RTC, had the original
jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation.

To summarize, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the
land, because the subject of the action is the governments exercise of eminent domain--- a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.

DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO LAGCAO AND URSULA LAGCAO

V. JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA

FACTS: The case is about the validity of Ordinance No. 1843 authorizing the Mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition of Lot 1029 of the petitioners Diosdado, Doroteo
and Ursula Lagcao.

In 1964, the Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the City of Cebu. One of these lots was Lot 1029 which
the petitioners purchased on installment basis. But then, in late 1965, the 210 lots, including Lot 1029,
reverted to the Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the
City of Cebu to the petitioners which resulted to the filing of the case of the petitioners. The Regional
Trial Court and Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioners and as such deed of sale was executed
and a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was issued in their favor. When the petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that it was already occupied by squatters. Thus, they instituted
ejectment proceedings against the squatters. The Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court
again ruled in favor of the petitioners and as such a writ of execution and order of demolition was issued.
However, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia wrote letters to MTCC requesting the deferment of the
demolition considering that they are still looking for a relocation site for the squatters. Acting on the
mayor’s request, MTCC issued two orders suspending the demolition. During the suspension period, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution and ordinance which identified Lot 1029
as a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279. On July 19, 2000, Ordinance No. 1843 was enacted by
the SP of Cebu City authoring the Mayor of Cebu City to initiate expropriation proceedings for the
acquisition of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of petitioners. The intended acquisition was to
be used for the benefit of the homeless after its subdivision and sale to the actual occupants.

On August 29, 2000 petitioners filed with the RTC an action for declaration of nullity of Ordinance No.
1843 but was dismissed by the respondent Judge. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation by the City of Cebu on the parcel of land owned by
the petitioners is a valid exercise of eminent domain

RULING: No, it is not a valid exercise of eminent domain. The exercise of eminent domain drastically
affects a landowner right to private property, which is as much a constitutionally-protected right
necessary for the preservation and enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the
rights to life and liberty. The foundation of this right is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of
public character, hence, the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property
should be expropriated.

RA 7279 is the law that governs the local expropriation of property for purposes of urban land reform and
housing. Section 9 provides for the priorities in the acquisition of land: (a) those owned by the
government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) alienable lands of the public domain; (c) unregistered or
abandoned and idle lands; (d) those within the declared Areas or Priority Development, Zonal
Development Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program sites which have not yet
been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services which have not yet been acquired
and (f) Privately-owned lands. Furthermore Section 10 of the same act provides “… that expropriation
shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.”

The courts found nothing in the records indicating that the City of Cebu complied strictly with Sections 9
and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No. 1843 sought to expropriate petitioners’ property without any attempt
to first acquire the lands listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279. Moreover, prior to the passage of
Ordinance No. 1843, there was no evident of a valid and definite offer to buy petitioners’ property as
required by Section 19 of RA 7160. The SC therefore find Ordinance No. 1843 to be constitutionally
infirm for being violative of the petitioners right to due process.

The petition is hereby granted.


G.R. NO. L-14355 OCTOBER 31, 1919

THE CITY OF MANILA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF


MANILA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

FACTS: The important question presented by this appeal is: In expropriation proceedings by the city of
Manila, may the courts inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?

On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance
of said city, praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public
improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila. The defendant , the Comunidad de Chinos
de Manila [Chinese Community of Manila] oppose the expropriation alleging that its own purpose the
benefit and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila and that the expropriation
was not necessary as a public improvement for other routes were available which would fully satisfy the
plaintiff’s purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead. One of
the defendants, Ildefonso Tambunting, offered ad still offers to grant a right of way for the said
extensionover the land, without cost to the plaintiff, in order that the sepulchres, chapels and graves of his
ancestors may not be disturbed. The land offered, free of charged, would answer every public necessity
on the part of the plaintiff.

The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any
finding as to costs. The City of Manila the appealed the trial’s court decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the expropriation?

RULING: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and
before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. It is well known the fact
that cemeteries may be public or private. Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and no part
can be taken for other public uses under general authority. The cemetery in question is used by the
general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public
cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. The petition of the plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property. For all of the foregoing, the judgement of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
G.R. NO. L-18841 JANUARY 27,1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. PHILIPPINE LONG


DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

FACTS: The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government powers
through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein defendant, PLDT is a public
service corporation holding a franchise to install operates and maintains a telephone system.

Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications
Inc., an American corporation, whereby telephone messages coming from the US and received by RCA’s
domestic station, could automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice versa.

After its creation, the BOT set up its own government telephone system by utilizing its own
appropriations and other equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable the government
offices to call privately. BOT entered into an agreement with the RCA communications for joint
overseas telephone service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local
residents. PLDT complained to the BOT that it was a violation of the condition of their agreement since
the BOT had used trunk lines only for the use of government offices but even to serve private persons or
the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. Subsequently, the plaintiff commenced suit
against PLDT asking the court judgment be rendered ordering the PLDT to execute a contract with the
plaintiff, through the BOT for the use of the facilities of PLDT's telephone system throughout the country
under such conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating that it
could not compel PLDT to enter into such agreement. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection between PLDT and the Government Telephone System can be a
valid object for expropriation.

RULING: Yes. While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone company
to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the
court. The decision of the Court of First Instance, is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition
of the Republic of Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone company to continue
servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and for a compensation, that the trial court
may determine to be just, including the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or
petition.

AYALA DE ROXAS VS. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license to construct a terrace over “the
strip of land 3 meters in width between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said canal of
Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs exclusively to her”; but the defendant refused to grant
the license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because, as the plaintiff has been informed, the
sole reason wherefore the license was denied is because “the said defendants pretend to compel the
plaintiff to leave vacant and without any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters in width
which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in order to use the same as the wharf or public way so
that the plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same manner and for the same purposes as
the public in general, thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of the said strip of the
property which the plaintiff and the former owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during
more than seventy years. Additionally, it was agreed between both parties that the strip above referred to
had not been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of Manila, and that neither had the latter
offered any compensation for the same to the owner thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the petitioners is tantamount to a taking that requires
just compensation

RULING: The easement of a zone for public use, authorized by article 73 of the Law of Waters of 1866,
is developed in articles 160 and 161, inclusive, of said law; the general interest on behalf of which the
easement is supported is determined, for navigation, by articles 160 and 161; for flotation, by article 162;
for salvage, by article 163; and for fishing, by article 164; in all of them the owner of the riverside
property supports the easement “upon being previously indemnified for loss and damage.” Said zone for
public use, the same as a towpath, is solely available for the purposes of navigation, flotation, fishing, and
salvage, being closed to any other use which be attempted; therefore, it is erroneous to pretend that the
right of the owner of the property bordering upon the stream can be reduced to the level of the public
right; on the contrary he should only be called upon to bear those burdens which are in the general
interest, but not without prior, or subsequently indemnity.

If as affirmed in statement No. 4, and accepted by the defendants, the Sibacon Creek is a canal — let us
grant that it is navigable, because it has been held by competent authority — and that under the name of a
public wharf, which is the largest in area, it is desired to establish a towpath, which is the smallest, it must
be remembered that the law does not grant it along navigable canals (art. 157), and, at all events, the
establishment thereof must be preceded by the corresponding indemnity.

Under section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, no legislation shall be enacted in the Philippine
Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; and the due
process of law in order to deprive a person of his property is, according to the Code of Civil Procedure,
reserved to the judicial authority. The refusal to grant a license or the enactment of an ordinance whereby
a person may be deprived of property or rights, or an attempt thereat is made, without previously
indemnifying him therefor, is not, nor can it be, due process of law.

Considering that the easement intended to be established, whatever may be the object thereof, is not
merely a real right that will encumber the property, but is one tending to prevent the exclusive use of one
portion of the same, by expropriating it for a public use which, be it what it may, cannot be accomplished
unless the owner of the property condemned or seized be previously and duly indemnified, it is proper to
protect the appellant by means of the remedy employed in such cases, as it is the only adequate remedy
when no other legal action can be resorted to, against an intent which is nothing short of an arbitrary
restriction imposed by the city by virtue of the coercive power with which the same is invested. The
imposition of an easement over a 3-meter strip of the plaintiff’s property could not legally be done
without payment to it of just compensation.

PEOPLE V FAJARDO

FACTS: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camrines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the
grant of permission to the mayor. After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building
beside the gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the
construction under the rationale that he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a
typhoon.

He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view.

He appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s
constitutionality.

ISSUE: Is the ordinance constitutional?

RULING: No, petition granted. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to
the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be
exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above
sustain this conclusion.

The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation. But while property may be regulated to the interest of the
general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to
preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. To do this legally, there must be just
compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.

The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:

SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have
authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or
repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit
and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall
accrue to the municipal school fund.

Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire
limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or
repaired within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not
conceived and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c).

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS GUTIERREZ

FACTS: This case is about the petition for review on certiorari filed by the National Power Corporation
(NPC) seeking the reversal or modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner National Power Corporation (Napocor) lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents
Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit for the
construction of its 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines,. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the
acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.
Trial court’s ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value
of their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to
proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the
defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one
for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct
ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just
compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots. The lower court rendered judgment ordered Napocor to
pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the
right-of-way easement of the affected area and P800.00 as attorney's fees. Motion for reconsideration was
filed before this court contending that the Court if Appeals committed gross error in adjudging the
petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines,
and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement transmits no rights, except
that of the easement.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for
the land traversed by its transmission lines

RULING: The easement of right-of-way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain.
Considering the nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission lines, the
limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives private
respondents of its ordinary use.

For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation, which should
be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the
loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation (Province of
Tayabas vs. Perez, 66 Phil. 467 [1938]; Assoc. of Small Land Owners of the Phils., Inc. vs. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742; Acuna vs. Arroyo, G.R. No. 79310; Pabrico vs. Juico, G.R. No.
79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. No. 79777,14 July 1989, 175 SCRA 343 [1989]). The price or value of the
land and its character at the time it was taken by the Government are the criteria for determining just
compensation (National Power Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, [1984]). The above price
refers to the market value of the land which may be the full market value thereof. According to private
respondents, the market value of their lot is P50.00 per square meter because the said lot is adjacent to the
National and super highways of Gapan, Nueva Ecija and Olongapo City.

REPUBLIC VS CASTELLVI

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee Carmen M. Vda. De
Castellvi, judicial administratrix of thee estate of Alfonso de Castellvi (Castellvi) over a parcel of land in
San Jose, Floridablanca, Pampanga, Lot No. 199-B with 759,299 sqm.

Petitioner, as a lessee, occupied the property of Castellvi in 1947 on a year to year basis. Before the
expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi
refused. When the AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July
11, 1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the heirs of the property had
decided not to continue leasing the property. Thus on July 1, 1956, the land was deemed as illegally
occupied by the Armed Forces of the Philippines represented by Maj. Gen. Calixto Duque, Chief of Staff
of the AFP.

Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Castellvi, saying that it was
difficult for the army to vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities that
were erected and already established on the property, and that, there being no other recourse, the
acquisition of the property by means of expropriation proceedings.

The respondents had received the amount of P259,669.10 from the petitioner as just compensation after
the Commission on Appraisal declared the market value of the land to be 2,000.00 pesos per hectare. The
Republic was actually placed in possession of the lands on August 10,

1959. The respondents contend that the value of the land should be at 15.00 pesos per sqm and subject to
6% interest per annum from 1947.

Petitioner Republic stated that the “taking ” of Castellvi’s property should be deemed as of the year 1947
by virtue of the lease agreement.

Respondent argued that the two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the power of eminent
domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or
indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted from the
property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and occupied the
Castellvi property in 1947.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of the property occurred in 1947 when the petitioner entered and
occupied the property
RULING: No. The following must be present in the “taking” of property for purposes of eminent
domain: 1) The expropriator must enter a private property. 2) The entrance into private property must be
for more than a momentary period. 3) The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of
legal authority. 4) The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected. 5) The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

The “taking” of Catellvi’s property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. The Court finds
merit in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the “taking” of property under the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance and occupation by the condemnor must be for a
permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was ousted
from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present when the Republic entered and
occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.

Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is to be determined as of the
date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be
expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place
subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12,
1961, 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be
reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.

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