Political Law Case Principles PDF

POLITICAL LAW CASES and PRINCIPLES BY CHRISTINE SANTIAGO RUFLO 2010
POLITICAL LAW DEFINE D
EN BANC
[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]
R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION
FACTS:
Respondent judge was charged for having violated (1) Article 1491 of the New Civil Code when he
acquired by purchase portion of a lot which was involved in a civil case decided by him; (2) Article 14 of
the Code of Commerce, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Civil Service Rules, and the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries,
Inc., as a stockholder and a ranking officer while he was a judge of the Court of First Instance.
ISSUE:
Whether the judge is liable.
HELD:
No.
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of Paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code
because the sale took place after finality of the decision; that respondent may not be held liable under
paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce (which is of Spanish vintage), because the
provision partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees and as such is deemed to have been automatically abrogated
with the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States; that respondent cannot be held liable
under Paragraph H, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because there is no showing (a)
that he participated or intervened in his official capacity in the business or transaction of the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., or (b) that said corporation gained any undue advantage by
reason of respondent's financial involvement in it, and because neither the 1935 nor the 1973 Constitution
of the Philippines or any existing law expressly prohibits members of the Judiciary from engaging or
having any interest in any lawful business.
The prohibition in Article 1491 of the Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property
which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that " . . . for
the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the property" Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent
Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as
the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was
no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
Although Article 14 of the Code of Commerce is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it,
however, partakes of the nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government
and certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
Political law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and defines the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887). It must be recalled that a political law
embraces constitutional law, law of public corporations, administrative law including the law on public
officers and election.
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Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article
14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have abrogated because where there is change of
sovereignty, the political laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the
new sovereign.
DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREM ACY
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408
FACTS:
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation
No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to
provide management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
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support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel. In a close bidding held on 18
September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number
of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
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Filipinos, is inoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
HELD:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a nation. It is
supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
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defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of
a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective powers and duties, and
establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all
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private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the doctrine of
constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract
whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons for
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and
contract.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is
usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the
aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the
right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-
executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and
there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Hence, unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
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ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that �
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing .
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
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AM ENDMENT AND REVISION
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA
FACTS:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter,
COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's
Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition, with the proposition: DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM
LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS
4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC. Senator Roco filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not
the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC. Santiago filed a motion for prohibition on the
following arguments: The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; It is true that R.A. No.
6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution, on statutes, and on
local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate
omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
law; Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This
indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect
only upon ratification and not after publication; The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
Delfin filed an "Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the
signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under
COMELEC power and function.
HELD:
st
1 : R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus,
although this mode of amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress provides
for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the
people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its implementation.
Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND �not to REVISE �the Constitution.
But R.A. No. 6735 does not provide a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for
the implementation of the exercise of the right.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
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Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. �The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane
nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and
local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As
pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are
not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle
II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room
for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on its nature and
character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law
which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law,
ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions,
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass.
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on
the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
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promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim:
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potestas delegata non delegari potest. The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
4
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(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard � the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable �to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
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A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
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effected.
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
nd
2 : COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS
ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the
"sufficient standard" tests.
rd
3 : COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
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form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
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total number of registered voters in each legislative district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars,
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in the establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used
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in the immediately preceding election.
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission
must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.]
5
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

VOTERS vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c) 2 and
Section 7 3 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department) 5 and by adding
Article XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that
after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION,
CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
Comelec ruled denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition for lack of an enabling law governing
initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v.
Commission on Elections declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals
to amend the Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition.
HELD:
No.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the Commission on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
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Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.
. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition,"
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The
framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers
also "envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must
"prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that the
entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be
present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can
sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign
on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
A signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen
what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person permitted to describe orally the contents
of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the signer having actually examined the petition, could
easily mislead the signer by, for example, omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions
of the petition that might not be to the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this
case, the person giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are described in
similar terms. . . . (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide sufficient information so that
registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign the initiative petition."); . . . (publication of full
text of amended constitutional provision required because it is "essential for the elector to have . . . the
section which is proposed to be added to or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have
this knowledge. Otherwise in many instances he would be required to vote in the dark.")
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
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Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers intended
that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the
people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 6735,
the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must
sign the "petition . . . as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures — that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the
full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of a signature
sheet 20 after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum on 11
October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature sheet
attached 21 to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete Quirino-
Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Legislative District: Barangay: Signatures:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND
PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the
signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached
to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before this Court on 26
September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show
to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet.
Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned when they
formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
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Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August
2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino
Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his
group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated
that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the
25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering signatures.
Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as well as of
the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as shown by ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass of signatories hereto.
(Emphasis supplied) DSETcC
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines" has posted the full text
of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF
AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt a
common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative Commission on
Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for Constitutional
Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the House of Representatives
in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her Excellency to
recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report sometime in December
2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates against
the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to amend
the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the constitutional
reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to other pragmatic means to
pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES

OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP) SUPPORT THE
PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC) COMMISSION ON CHARTER
CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE
1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at the
Century Park Hotel, Manila. 23 (Underscoring supplied)
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006
petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter Change through
people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The proposals of the
Consultative Commission 24 are vastly different from the proposed changes of the Lambino Group in the
25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound
9
impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to
affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory
Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing
of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation
of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC.
On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim that they
circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not
refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged in the
Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the Transitory
Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead,
the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly
reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition
with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature
sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court that they
circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature sheets do
not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the signature
sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who did not read
the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did
not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo.
546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the signature sheets circulated together with the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in
the petition. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with the
COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu
City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets
did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group alleged
that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This contradicts
what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the draft of the
amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed change
attached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes requires that
the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended petition.
10
Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during the signature-
gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies of the
draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added that he also
asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state with certainty
how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only assure this Court of
the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group expressly
admit that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000 copies of the petition for
initiative . . . ." 25 This admission binds the Lambino Group and establishes beyond any doubt that the
Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed changes to the great majority of the people
who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy
each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company
attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people
signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people
who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the full
text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw the petition before they
signed the signature sheets.
In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment. Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this admission
binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the signature sheet. This
omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in the signature sheets
renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that the amendment
must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The signature sheet is not the
"petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of Parliament can
be re-elected indefinitely; 26
2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost all
the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of
the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution. 28
These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred
or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature
sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during the 2007
local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However, the text of
the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
11
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which
shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. . . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with
the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be
held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections. CDISAc
Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year
term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the 6.3
million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3 million
signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand deception on
the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would require the holding in
2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets.
The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the principles of
local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and
the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling —
when the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the
people in a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to
sign a petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only the
unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone, 29 the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our judicial
responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the proposed amendment
amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting on — the amendment's
proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. . . . . The ballot must give the
electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. . . . . The ballot language in the instant
case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes it impossible to state what it will affect
and effect and violates the requirement that proposed amendments embrace only one subject.
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine, 30 the Supreme Court
of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
12
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The drafters of an
initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often emphasize particular
provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less appealing)
provisions, when communicating to the public. . . . Indeed, initiative promoters typically use simplistic
advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual voters. Many voters will
never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly, there is no process for
amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These difficulties clearly distinguish
the initiative from the legislative process.
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an amendment mandating
the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or before
the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has the
discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the
proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until noon of
the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office
will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all
the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to the exclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to discriminate
against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used to limit, after 30
June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of the existing House of
Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That
is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people . . . in a
petition" — meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to
unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
13
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full text of
the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with
the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution.
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that only
Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers intended,
and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the Constitution. Where the intent
and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the power to propose revisions to the
Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are empowered to propose amendments.
In this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose amendments to the
Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can be no deviation from
the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor, even one backed by
6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed in the Constitution
itself.
This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution — that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One
of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it
rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature.
On the other hand, the significance of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within
the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which
it was framed. 35 (Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle
of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters
the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the
constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes
without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the
constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
14
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions."
The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision." 37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A change in
the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles —
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive — affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. 40 Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation
of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a
radical change in the structure of government.
The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading member
of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance a
switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of its over-all
impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral
system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the Constitution. 41
The Lambino Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also
seeks to merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be
affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
15
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. 44 There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum: With this
distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for both "amendment" and
"revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while the same provisions expressly
provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It would seem that the apparent distinction is
based on the actual experience of the people, that on one hand the common people in general are not
expected to work full-time on the matter of correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation,
profession or vocation; while on the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates
are expected to work full-time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or
vocation. Thus, the difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process
or procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot reasonably be in
the substance or extent of the correction
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the
Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the present initiative constitute a revision if
Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the changes. However, since the Lambino Group as
private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the changes are merely amendments to the
Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of changing the fundamental law of the
land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language. 45 Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such
a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling, 46 the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected
this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed by
initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which the legislature
can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the constitution that
cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction between amendment
and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the proposed enactment, and
that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the constitution." They argue that this ballot
measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines of the original instrument, including profound
impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical restructuring of the government's relationship with a
defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the
16
most basic principles of Oregon constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII,
section 2, and cannot appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions instituted by
initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, . . ., the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of the constitution may
not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII, section 2. After reviewing
Article XVII, section 1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a means of
amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a means of revising
the constitution." . . . .
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." . . . .
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to constitutional
revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the
other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to
60 percent is an amendment and not a revision. 48 Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II 50 of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis
of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on
how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a

deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered.
Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional
conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's initiatives, which do
not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
17
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with the
exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall hereby be
amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article VI are hereby
retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent
with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government; . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with a
unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions
until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary system
of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral parliamentary form of
government."
Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed changes
refer to — the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among the few
countries with unicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the traditional
and well-known parliamentary forms of government — the British, French, Spanish, German, Italian,
Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people who
signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New
Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only
for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-
settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds. 51
18
Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives
to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first comply
with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign the "petition
. . . as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and Erico B.
Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with" the 6.3
million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition. Thus, the
petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic requirement of
RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; . . . ." The proposed Section
4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of government.
Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits submission of the
initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's initiative will still
fail.
(Author’s Note: This is a landmark case. That is why I placed a detailed SC ruling)
DOCTRINE OF FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-34150. October 16, 1971.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
The Constitutional Convention of 1971 was formed. "On October 12, 1971, the Convention passed
Resolution No. 24 submitted by Delegate Jose Ozamiz confirming the authority of the President of the
Convention to implement Organic Resolution No. 1, including the creation of the Ad Hoc Committee
ratifying all acts performed in connection with said implementation."
Upon these facts, the main thrust of the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other
implementing resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force and effect as
laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co incident with the elections of eight senators
and all city, provincial and municipal Officials to be held on November 8, 1971, hence all of Comelec's
acts in obedience thereof and tending to carry out the holding of the plebiscite directed by said resolutions
are null and void, on the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a
power lodged exclusively in Congress, as a legislative body, and may not be exercised by the
Convention, and that, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the proposed amendment in
question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all of the other
amendments to be drafted and proposed by the Convention. On the other hand, respondents and
intervenors posit that the power to provide for, fix the date and lay down the details of the plebiscite for
the ratification of any amendment the Convention may deem proper to propose is within the authority of
the Convention as a necessary consequence and part of its power to propose amendments and that this
19
power includes that of submitting such amendments either individually or jointly at such time and manner
as the Convention may direct in its discretion.
This is a Petition for prohibition principally to restrain the respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment
"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years
"shall be submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said
resolutions to be without the force and effect of law in so far as they direct the holding of such plebiscite
and by also declaring the acts of the respondent Commission (COMELEC) performed and to be done by
it in obedience to the aforesaid Convention resolutions to be null and void, for being violative of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether there are any limitation or condition in Section 1 of Article XV of the Constitution which is
violated by the act of the Convention of calling for a plebiscite on the sole amendment contained in
Organic Resolution No. 1?
HELD:
Yes.
The Court holds that there is, and it is the condition and limitation that all the amendments to be
proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a single "election" or
plebiscite. It being indisputable that the amendment now proposed to be submitted to a plebiscite is only
the first amendment the Convention will propose We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose
of submitting the same for ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1
of Article XV of the Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that
direction are null and void.
We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:
1. The language of the constitutional provision aforequoted is sufficiently clear. It says distinctly that
either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the purpose "may propose
amendments to this Constitution, "thus placing no limit as to the number of amendments that Congress or
the Convention may propose. The same provision also as definitely provides that "such amendments
shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at
which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving no room for doubt
as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or amendments proposed
by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision unequivocably says "an
election" which means only one.
(2) Very little reflection is needed for anyone to realize the wisdom and appropriateness of this
provision. As already stated, amending the Constitution is as serious and important an undertaking as
constitution making itself. Indeed, any amendment of the Constitution is as important as the whole of it, if
only because the Constitution has to be an integrated and harmonious instrument, if it is to be viable as
the framework of the government it establishes, on the one hand, and adequately formidable and reliable
as the succinct but comprehensive articulation of the rights, liberties, ideology, social ideals, and national
and nationalistic policies and aspirations of the people, on the other. It is inconceivable how a constitution
worthy of any country or people can have any part which is out of tune with its other parts.
A constitution is the work of the people thru its drafters assembled by them for the purpose. Once the
original constitution is approved, the part that the people play in its amendment becomes harder, for when
a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they can assume its harmony as an integrated
whole, and they can either accept or reject it in its entirety. At the very least, they can examine it before
casting their vote and determine for themselves from a study of the whole document the merits and
demerits of all or any of its parts and of the document as a whole. And so also, when an amendment is
submitted to them that is to form part of the existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with
deliberation the proposed amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts
and thereby arrive at an intelligent judgment as to its acceptability.
20
This cannot happen in the case of the amendment in question. Prescinding already from the fact that
under Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is provided the
voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that will be required by the final draft of the
constitution to be formulated by the Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there
are other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the proposed amendment,
although it may already be observed that under Section 3, if a voter would favor the reduction of the
voting age to eighteen under conditions he feels are needed under the circumstances, and he does not
see those conditions in the ballot nor is there any possible indication whether they will ever be or not,
because Congress has reserved those for future action, what kind of judgment can he render on the
proposal?
But the situation actually before Us is even worse. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To be more specific, we do not
have any means of foreseeing whether the right to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can
say whether or not later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters for each
level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of the difficulty in other words, lies in that
the Convention is precisely on the verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost
every part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the present Constitution. How
can a voter in the proposed plebiscite intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age
upon the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which presently he is not given
any idea?
We are certain no one can deny that in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the
Constitution may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the
Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the context of the present state of things,
where the Convention has hardly started considering the merits of hundreds, if not thousands, of
proposals to amend the existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of
them cannot comply with this requirement. We are of the opinion that the present Constitution does not
contemplate in Section 1 of Article XV a plebiscite or "election" wherein the people are in the dark as to
frame of reference they can base their judgment on. We reject the rationalization that the present
Constitution is a possible frame of reference, for the simple reason that intervenors themselves are
stating that the sole purpose of the proposed amendment is to enable the eighteen year olds to take part
in the election for the ratification of the Constitution to be drafted by the Convention. In brief, under the
proposed plebiscite, there can be, in the language of Justice Sanchez, speaking for the six members of
the Court in Gonzales, supra, "no proper submission"
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power (Sec. 1, Art. XV. Constitution of the Philippines). Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that
Senators and members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive
their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same function, (Of amending
the Constitution) for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of
all powers of government, including the Constitution itself .
True it is that once convened, the Constitutional Convention became endowed with extraordinary powers
generally beyond the control of any department of the existing government, but the compass of such
powers can be co-extensive only with the purpose for which the convention was called and as it is self-
evident that the amendments it may propose cannot have any effect as part of the Constitution until the
same are duly ratified by the people, it necessarily follows that the acts of the convention, its officers and
members are not immune from attack on constitutional grounds. The present Constitution is in full force
and effect in its entirely and in everyone of its parts, the existence of the Convention notwithstanding, and
operates even within the walls of that assembly.
While it is indubitable that in its internal operation and the performance of its task to propose amendments
to the Constitution it is not subject to any degree of restraint or control by any other authority than itself, it
is equally beyond cavil that neither the Convention nor any of its officers or members can rightfully
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, deny to anyone in this country
the equal protection of the laws or the freedom of speech and of the press in disregard of the Bill of
21
Rights of the existing Constitution. Nor, for that matter, can such Convention validly pass any resolution
providing for the taking of private property without just compensation or for the imposition or exacting of
any tax, impost, or assessment, or declare war or call the Congress to a special session, suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, pardon a convict or render judgment in a controversy between
private individuals or between such individuals and the state, in violation of the distribution of powers in
the Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR

RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
In 2001, when Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was made Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 84 calling for the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be
held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators with a 6-year term each
were due to be elected therein and the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes
shall serve the unexpired term of Senator Guingona, Jr. Later, however, when the COMELEC proclaimed
13 candidates as elected senators in Resolution No. 01-005, petitioners here questioned that validity of
the special election alleging it was not sufficiently distinguished from the regular election.
Allegedly, the COMELEC failed to give notice of the time of the special election. Under the applicable law,
RA No. 6645, however, it was already provided that such special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections. On the allegation that there had
been insufficient notice, thus, misleading the voters, the Court ruled that no evidence actually proved the
same. As to the separate documentation and canvassing of the special election, none was required under
RA No. 6645.
ISSUES:
whether the petition is moot; and
whether petitioners have standing to litigate.
On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on
14 May 2001.
HELD:
No.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to desist from committing
an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an
exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of
repetition yet evading review. The question of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the
Senate in relation to COMELEC's failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special
election is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided before the
date of the election.
"Legal standing" or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act. The requirement of
standing, which necessarily "sharpens the presentation of issues," relates to the constitutional mandate
that this Court settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate
only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing
to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the
22
special election on 14 May 2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a "generalized grievance." This
generalized grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the
voters, who voted in that election. Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity as taxpayers, that the
Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 "tax
money [was] '. . . extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of
legislative power' or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money
[was] deflected to any improper purpose." On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on
standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters' suits involving the right of suffrage. We
accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as voters since they raise
important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely
to arise again.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law." To implement this provision
of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6646. And Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166
subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, thus; . . . in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Thus, in case a
vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, COMELEC is required: (1)
to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60)
days not later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made
by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election's
validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any
call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a
statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy, shall be held at the next general elections
fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election.
Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to
hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and
the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election. Conversely, where the
law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the
time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice
is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity. In the instant case, Section
2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such
vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special
election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona's appointment as Vice-President
in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this
statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such
special election, much less invalidate it.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void. The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special
senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date.
Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest
number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election. Instead, what
petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took place.
This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted
in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding
23
regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not
preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in
that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could
come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election
propaganda during the campaign. More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the
party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who
voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of
their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to
annul elections and will only do so when it is "impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are
unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been
prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise. Otherwise, the consistent
rule has been to respect the electorate's will and let the results of the election stand, despite irregularities
that may have attended the conduct of the elections.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist
in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date
of the election", if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for". Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section
4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation
of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
THEORY OF JUDICIAL R EVIEW
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA vs.

THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS:
Angara and Ynsua are candidates for the National Assembly. Provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed
Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district. respondent Pedro Ynsua filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, asking that respondent be declared the winner.
Angara, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for
its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question
was filed out of the prescribed period.
the petitioner prayed for the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral
Commission which petition was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
HELD:
When the Judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislative, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
24
that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because
the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the governments
of the government.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the
election of the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by
resolution adopted on December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made by the National Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the
resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to
entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly,
submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral Commission of December 9, 1935,
is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents, the Electoral
Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National Assembly,
then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, should be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other.
From the very nature of the republican government established in our country in the light of American
experience and of our own, upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation
of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we
shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to
determine all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within
the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism
adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is
not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the
fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other
European types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type
where the written constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries
which have declined to follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions
prohibiting the courts from exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a
recognition of what otherwise would be the rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound
to assume what is logically their function. For instance, the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly
provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former
Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose constitutions are silent in this
respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia and South Africa.
Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the Czechoslovak
Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of 1931)
especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take
cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and
25
undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run
prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum
abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority,
we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction
over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as
"the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people, acting through their
delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in
view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including
in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under
Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also
significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of the legislature. But it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission
is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. ). If we concede the
power claimed in behalf of the National Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the
Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the period within which
protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral
Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the
regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution
of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be
created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be
presented of the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred
to, but in reality without the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever
the National Assembly has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the
framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural
matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the
Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious
that this result should not be permitted.
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt
to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the
only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much
as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument
which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government
intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and
subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets
forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights
mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms.
Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any
26
living constitution. In the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution,
the possession of this moderating power of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and
development there, has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a
half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication
from section 2 of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope
and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it
by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must
reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
24
and legislative departments of the government. (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called
upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among
the integral or constituent units th
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers"
of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional
25
channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."ereof
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes
difficult the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the
judiciary, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally
to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government
transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of
the legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature
with respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
27
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and
complete, and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and
regulations as to the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated
if the National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner
of conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making
each house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and
qualifications of its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to
prescribe by resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the
time and manner of notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the
costs and expenses of contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest
had been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its
incidental power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the
National Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly of December 3, 1935 can not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a
protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
The writ of prohibition is denied.
CONDITIONS FOR THE E XERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA
FACTS:
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall
be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members,
shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
28
4
President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against
5
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of
6
the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen.. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in
9 10
form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To date,
the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary.
Four months and three weeks since the filingof the first complaint or a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the
House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella
(Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results
of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third
(1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Several petitions were filed questioning he legality of the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of
one year."
Senator Pimentel and Cong. De Vencia contended that the eachment is a political action which cannot
assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review and that judicial review of impeachments
undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they
call upon this Court to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court
should defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings;
(2) whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
fulfilled
HELD:
Yes. It is expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given
an expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This doesn’t lead to conflict between the legislative and the
judiciary because he Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion
57
of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through
the power of judicial review.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
67
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
(2) Essential Requisites for Judicial Review:
(1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement;
(3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
(4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Standing
29
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
73
former is a concept of civil procedure while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties
who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is
whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights
of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights �as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession �which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
77 78
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
79
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
80
interest common to all members of the public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
81
entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
82
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
83
office.
84
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, especially when it is composed of
85
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests, the mere invocation by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of
law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is
too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions
shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
86
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
87
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned to enable the court to deal properly
30
88
with all interests involved in the suit, for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the class, is, under the res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they
89
were before the court. Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as
shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a
class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however,
their petition will stand.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised. Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the
91
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Such liberality does not, however, mean that
the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the
very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.
Pimentel has legal standing he being a legislator who will be deprived to sit in the Impeachment
proceedings. Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an
interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth
in Dumlao v. Comelec, that involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do
petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.
Ripeness and Prematurity
it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
96
court may come into the picture." Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if and
when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The controversy is already ripe because
of the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is
shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate is
clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is bereft of
power to grant it.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out,
i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001
Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
31
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
99
measure. (Italics in the original)
it is clear that judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
Baker v. Carr sets the standards of political and justiciable questions as: (1) a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate
and distinct concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus
now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the
Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial Development Fund
is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Lis Mota
A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is raised, if the record also presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and
the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision
upon such question will be unavoidable.
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if
it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. courts will not
touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
32
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very
lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for
the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject
125
to impeachment." But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion
not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication
may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as
there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred.
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.
134
In Demetria v. Alba, this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of
135
the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding,
declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the
constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' .
. . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if
there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a
constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question under the
Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an independent
state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show that he is
injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of
the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official
interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the
Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment
declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not
entertained although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed
himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations omitted).
33
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

136
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
"judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
[J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at
home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official.
G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED vs.

MANUEL L. MORATO
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by Kilosbayan, questioning the opening by the PAGCOR
of a casino in Cagayan de Oro. The previous case denied the petition of Kilosbayan saying that "the
morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. . . . It is left to Congress to
deal with the activity as it sees fit. By authorizing the holding the lottery for charity, Congress has in effect
determined that consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be
given this authority.
It is noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the law allowing lotteries. It is the contract
entered into by the PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case, therefore, does not raise
issues of constitutionality but only of contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the agreement,
cannot raise.
ISSUE:
Whether Kilosbayan has legal standing to question the allowance of lottery.
HELD:
No.
Nor does Kilosbayan's status as a people's organization give it the requisite personality to question the
validity of the contract in this case. The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of
independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means,"
34
that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties-in-interest or those with
standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases
involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, § 5.
This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision making in
the courts from decision-making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of
suits by just any party.
It is nevertheless insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to taxpayers and concerned
citizens in cases involving "paramount public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and
legislators have indeed been allowed to sue but then only (1) in cases involving constitutional issues and
(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these requirements on standing.
Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds,
where a tax measure is assailed as unconstitutional. are allowed to question the validity of election laws
because of their obvious interest in the validity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the
constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance" which must be settled early.
Petitioners do not have the same kind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an
interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power" or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.
Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se, is no assurance of
judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), this Court is vested
with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
Petitioners' suit does not fall under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits.
Neither do the other cases cited by petitioners support their contention that taxpayers have standing to
question government contracts regardless of whether public funds are involved or not.
Thus, petitioners' right to sue as taxpayers cannot be sustained. Nor as concerned citizens can they bring
this suit because no specific injury suffered by them is alleged. As for the petitioners, who are members of
Congress, their right to sue as legislators cannot be invoked because they do not complain of any
infringement of their rights as legislators.
Indeed, as already stated, petitioners' opposition is not really to the validity of the ELA but to lotteries
which they regard to be immoral. This is not, however, a legal issue, but a policy matter for Congress to
decide and Congress has permitted lotteries for charity.
Nevertheless, although we have concluded that petitioners do not have standing, we have not stopped
there and dismissed their case. For in the view we take, whether a party has a cause of action and,
therefore, is a real party-in-interest or one with standing to raise a constitutional question must turn on
whether he has a right which has been violated.
[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997.]
RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) vs. ROBERT MIRASOL
FACTS:
35
The Local Government Code, which took effect on January 1, 1992, provides, in Section 532(a), that the
first election for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) shall be held thirty days after the next local election. The
first local election under the Code was held on May 11, 1992.
Accordingly, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 2499, providing guidelines for the
holding of the general election for the SK on September 30, 1992. The guidelines placed the SK elections
under the direct control and supervision of the DILG.
The DILG, however, through then Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, issued a letter-resolution exempting the
City of Manila from holding election for the SK on the ground that the election previously held on May 26,
1990 was to be considered the first under the newly enacted Local Government Code.
Private respondents filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of Manila to set aside the
resolution of the DILG, arguing that the Secretary of the DILG had no power to amend the resolutions of
the COMELEC calling for general elections of SKs and that the DILG resolution in question denied them
the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners maintain that the Secretary of the DILG had authority to determine whether the City of Manila
came within the exception clause of Section 532(d) so as to be exempt from holding the election on
December 4, 1992. COMELEC's placing the SK election under the direct control and supervision of the
DILG did not contravene Art. IX, C, Sec. 2(1) of the Constitution which provides that the COMELEC shall
have the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." Elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of
the COMELEC in the same way that contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
Section 532(d) may thus be deemed to be a curative law. Curative laws, which in essence are
retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under existing
laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws. Such laws are recognized in this
jurisdiction.
The decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, is REVERSED.
ISSUE:
Whether the holding of the second elections on May 13, 1996 rendered this case moot and academic.
HELD:
No. It is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by the parties. For one thing,
doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May 26, 1990 KB elections in Manila
because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the trial court and these officers continued
in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." For the question whether
the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in
connection with every SK election and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such
elections.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996
LUIS MALALUAN, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EVANGELISTA
FACTS:
While the Regional Trial Court had found petitioner Luis Malaluan to be the winner of the elections for the
position of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the COMELEC, on the contrary, found private
respondent Joseph Evangelista to be the rightful winner in said elections. Petitioner assumed the office of
Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office.
(COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared private
respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. It is significant to note that the
36
term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This
petition, thus, has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioner's right to the mayoralty
seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of office contested in the election protest has the
effect of rendering the same moot and academic.
Indeed, this petition appears now to be moot and academic because the herein parties are contesting an
elective post to which their right to the office no longer exists. However, the question as to damages
remains ripe for adjudication. The COMELEC found petitioner liable for attorney's fees, actual expenses
for xerox copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments from March, 1994 to April, 1995, en masse
denominated as actual damages, default in payment by petitioner of which shall result in the collection of
said amount from the bond posted by petitioner on the occasion of the grant of his motion for execution
pending appeal in the trial court. Petitioner naturally contests the propriety and legality of this award upon
private respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the damages in favor of private
respondent.
HELD:
YES.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000.]
RAMON A. GONZALES vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY

COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
FACTS:
The Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada by
virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order "to study and recommend proposed amendments
and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same." Petitioner disputes
die constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds. First, he contends that it is a public office which only the
legislature can create by way of a law. Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such a body the
President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution — the
amendment of the fundamental charter. In this petition for prohibition and mandamus filed by petitioner
Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails the constitutionality of the creation
of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. Petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR and the presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants from acting as such
It is alleged by respondents that, with respect to the PCCR, this case has become moot and academic.
ISSUE:
Whether the creation of the PCCR has become moot and academic.
HELD:
Yes. With respect to the PCCR, this case had become moot and academic since the PCCR no longer
exists. Petitioner lacks standing to seek judicial redress as a citizen because he has not shown that he
has sustained or is in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR.
Neither can he file a taxpayer's action which is proper only when there is an exercise by Congress of its
taxing or spending power. Funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the
President, and not from public funds made by law.
37
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues
involved have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCR was instructed to complete its
task on or before June 30, 1999. However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order
No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commission's work, viz —
SECTION 6. Section 8 is hereby amended to read as follows: Time Frame. The Commission shall
commence its work on 01 January 1999 and complete the same on or before 31 December 1999. The
Commission shall submit its report and recommendations to the President within fifteen (15) working days
from 31 December 1999. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20,
1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allotted to it.
Thus, the PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its raison d'etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the
petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve.
Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCR from acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an
inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is well established that
prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this
point, any ruling regarding the PCCR would simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is
definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power.
The question in standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." In assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. Nos. 43 and 70, petitioner asserts his interest as a citizen and taxpayer. A citizen
acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
Coming now to the instant case, petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. . . .. Neither does he claim that his
rights or privileges have been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCR's activities. Clearly, petitioner has failed to establish his
locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress as a citizen.
A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer's
action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. . . .
Coming now to the instant case, it is readily apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of E.O. No. 43, as amended by E.O.
No. 70. Under Section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3 million is "appropriated" for its operational
expenses "to be sourced from the funds of the Office of the President." . . . The appropriations for the
PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. In fact, there was no appropriation at all. "In a
strict sense, appropriation has been defined 'as nothing more than the legislative authorization prescribed
by the Constitution that money may be paid out of the Treasury,' while appropriation made by law refers
to 'the act of the legislature setting apart or assigning to a particular use a certain sum to be used in the
payment of debt or dues from the State to its creditors.'" 21 The funds used for the PCCR were taken
from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executive's power to
transfer funds pursuant to Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution.
In the final analysis, it must be stressed that the Court retains the power to decide whether or not it will
entertain a taxpayer's suit. In the case at bar, there being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power, petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a
taxpayer, but rather, he must establish that he has a "personal and substantial interest in the case and
that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." In other words, petitioner
must show that he is a real party in interest — that he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment
or that he will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does petitioner presume to
make such a representation. There being no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power,
petitioner cannot be allowed to question the creation of the PCCR in his capacity as a taxpayer.
EN BANC
38
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.
PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the ―AFP‖), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B.
Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the ―LOI‖) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA
and Domestic Airport.
IBP’s Argument:
the ―IBP‖) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN

FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION
5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO

PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS

UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
(2) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review; and,
(3) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.
HELD:
No.
39
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence of an actual and
appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question
is the lis mota of the case.
The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case.
―Legal standing‖ or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term ―interest‖ means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges ―such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.‖
In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support
of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an
interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated,
the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its
fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the
standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be
affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National
President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing
him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have
varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National
President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by
virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly
represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.
Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been
violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed
―militarization‖ of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause
more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed ―injury‖ not personal in character, it is
likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since
petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the
questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines.
This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise
constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this
Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy.
Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance
of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In
not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues
raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.
In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing
tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the
petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 138570. October 10, 2000.]
BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, PHILCONSA, IBP, SALONGA, et.al vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA
FACTS:
40
The instant petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailed the agreement forged between the RP and the
USA — THE VISITING FORCES AGREEMENT, which formalized, among others, the use of installations
in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel to strengthen their defense and security
relationship. On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA, and then transmitted to
the Senate his letter of ratification and the VFA for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Art. VII of the
1987 Constitution. The Senate subsequently approved the VFA by a 2/3 vote of its members.
From these consolidated petitions, petitioners — as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens

and taxpayers — assailed the constitutionality of the VFA and imputed to respondents grave abuse of
discretion in ratifying the agreement.
At the outset, respondents challenge petitioners' standing to sue, on the ground that the latter have not
shown any interest in the case, and that petitioners failed to substantiate that they have sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the operation of the VFA. 12 Petitioners, on the other hand, counter that
the validity or invalidity of the VFA is a matter of transcendental importance which justifies their standing.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have legal standing to question the VFA.
HELD:
No.
Petitioners have no locus standi to bring the suit because they have not shown any interest in the case
nor have they substantiated that they have sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
operation of the VFA; that as taxpayers, they have not established that the VFA involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds raised by taxation; that whether the President referred the VFA to the
Senate and the latter extended its concurrence under Section 21 , Article VII, or Section 25, Article XVIII,
is immaterial, for in either case, the fundamental law is crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is
mandatory; that with regard to the ratification by the President of the VFA and the exercise by the Senate
of its constitutional power to concur with the VFA, the Court, absent clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents, is without power to meddle with such affairs purely executive and
legislative in character and nature; and that with the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final
acceptance and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the USA, it now becomes
obligatory, under the principles of international law, to be bound by the terms of the agreement.
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the
law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way."
He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of. In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they
have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA.
As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending powers. On this point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act
complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. . . Clearly,
inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence of any
allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended, petitioners, as
taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA. Similarly, Representatives Wigberto
Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus
standi to maintain the present suit. . . [T]he allegations of impairment of legislative power, such as the
delegation of the power of Congress to grant tax exemptions, are more apparent than real. While it may be
true that petitioners pointed to provisions of the VFA which allegedly impair their legislative powers,
petitioners failed however to sufficiently show that they have in fact suffered direct injury.
41
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in these cases.
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General, the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the
absence of a board resolution from its Board of Governors authorizing its National President to
commence the present action. 19
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of the issues
raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the procedural
barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20
where we had occasion to rule:
". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive
orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and
ruled that 'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure' We have since then applied the
exception in many other cases.
"Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of the government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. . . ."
Again, in the more recent case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., 24 this Court ruled that in cases of
transcendental importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.
Although courts generally avoid having to decide a constitutional question based on the doctrine of
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the departments of the government a becoming respect for each
others' acts, 25 this Court nevertheless resolves to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
(I included this discussion because I didn’t see this case under the treaty-making topic)
2. POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL LAW; PACTA SUNT SERVANDA; EFFECT OF RP'S

RATIFICATION OF THE VFA AND USA'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE VFA AS A TREATY; CASE
AT BAR. — The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to the terms of the
VFA. For as long as the United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty, and
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed marked compliance with
the mandate of the Constitution. Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA
and the concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our nation's
consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the obligations and
responsibilities embodied thereunder. With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final
acceptance, and with the exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it
now becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to be bound
by the terms of the agreement. Thus, no less than Section 2, Article II of the Constitution, declares that
the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. As a
member of the family of nations, the Philippines agrees to be bound by generally accepted rules for the
conduct of its international relations. While the international obligation devolves upon the state and not
upon any particular branch, institution, or individual member of its government, the Philippines is
nonetheless responsible for violations committed by any branch or subdivision of its government or any
official thereof. As an integral part of the community of nations, we are responsible to assure that our
government, Constitution and laws will carry out our international obligation. . . Article 26 of the
convention provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
them in good faith." This is known as the principle of pacta sunt servanda which preserves the sanctity of
treaties and have been one of the most fundamental principles of positive international law, supported by
the jurisprudence of international tribunals.
42
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER TO ENTER INTO TREATIES

AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS IS VESTED IN THE PRESIDENT; CASE AT BAR. — As regards
the power to enter into treaties or international agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the
President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds vote of all the members of the Senate. In
this light, the negotiation of the VFA and the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts
which pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast executive and diplomatic powers
granted him no less than by the fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. Consequently, the acts or judgment calls of the
President involving the VFA — specifically the acts of ratification and entering into a treaty and those
necessary or incidental to the exercise of such principal acts — squarely fall within the sphere of his
constitutional powers and thus, may not be validly struck down, much less calibrated by this Court, in the
absence of clear showing of grave abuse of power or discretion.
FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
EN BANC
G.R. No. 100318 July 30, 1991
GOVERNOR EMILIO M.R. OSMEÑA, (Province of Cebu) vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Republic Act 7056, "An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave the Way for
Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and Authorizing Appropriations Therefor.
The petitioners' claim they have actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case not
only because, as public officials, they have taken an oath to support and defend the Constitution but also
because, as taxpayers, they have an interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and, more
importantly, lawfully disbursed. They pray for this Court to declare Republic Act No. 7056 as
unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid and inoperative because it violates the mandate of the Constitution
for the holding of synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992, it
provides that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992
and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified violates Section 2, Article
XVIII, and which in effect, shortens the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd
Monday of November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
Solicitor General prays for the denial of the petition arguing that the question raised by petitioners is
political in nature and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also questions the legal standing
of the petitioners, who, he contends are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the Court, there being
no justiciable controversy for resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar.
HELD:
Yes.
What is before us is not a discretionary act of Congress or the Executive that may not be reviewed by us
because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of Republic Act 7056.
And even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us is political in nature, We would still not
be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in
proper cases even political questions provided naturally, that the question is not solely and exclusively
political (as when the Executive extends recognition to a foreign government) but one which really
necessitates a forthright determination of constitutionality, involving as it does a question of national
importance.
We hold in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us in the case at bar, is
justiciable rather than political. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come within our
powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As
43
for the other alleged procedural flaws �lack of court standing, etc., assuming the existence of such flaws,
the same may be brushed aside, conformably with existing doctrine so that the important constitutional
issue raised may be addressed.
Accordingly, We are left with no other alternative but to uphold the jurisdiction of the Court over the
present cases. It goes without saying that We do this not because the Court is superior to the Executive
and/or Legislative but simply because the Executive, the Legislative and this Court are subject to the
Constitution as the supreme law.
that where serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of
these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must,
technicalities of procedure." This is not a mere advisory opinion.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
SAMUEL C. OCCENA vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
NATIONAL TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as
taxpayers. The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang
1
Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. They contended that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law.
ISSUE:
Whether the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law
HELD:
Yes.
It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to
declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded:
"This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that
there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973,
the present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court
and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all
doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot
be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect.
As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as
well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but
may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be
stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the
meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the
present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago.
During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII
FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area. One Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born
American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger brother,
Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila.
44
Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in
May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los
Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses appeared
in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
Salonga was charged with the violation of R.A 1700 or the Anti-Subversive Law
ISSUE:
Whether the case is already moot or academic upon the court’s declaration that the prosecution failed to
prove a prima facie case against the petitioner.
HELD:
No.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme
Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by
the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers
of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of
protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as
excessive and, therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was
pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless rendered a decision and
stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from
setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of
lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail
shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly
be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new
charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Stan, this Court discussed the
constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity.
(Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26
petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was
facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The fact that the petition was
moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating
one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to
establish a prima facie case against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to
overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. They have taken the
initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this Court will
not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the
records.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-68379-81. September 22, 1986.]
EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR
FACTS:
The petitioner and the private respondent (Pacificador) were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa. The former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being
the nominee of the KBL with all its perquisites of power. On the eve of the elections, several followers of
the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension
45
in the province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters
against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate of the ruling party. The
petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of
the said body.
The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because made only
by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution.
Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. This happened during the Marcos era and the Batasang Pambansa was abolished. The
petitioner complains that the proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests
involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision, considering the
importance of the offices involved.
The respondents, for their part, argue that
only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be — in fact, should be —
filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
ISSUE:
Whether the issue is already moot and acaemic upon the abolition of Batasang Pambansa.
HELD:
No.
There are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this
Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case
has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the
government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not
always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled
and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when although the
dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that
we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of
and as a restraint upon the future.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000.]
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
ABS-CBN conducted a radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during
the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official
Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections
(Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation assailing the COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April 21, 1998 approving the
issuance of a restraining order to stop petitioner ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
Because of the issuance of this resolution, petitioner filed the instant case, and on May 9, 1998, the Court
issued the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioner.
ISSUE:
46
1. Whether it is moot or premature because of failure to file a motion for reconsideration
HELD:
No.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election
has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998
election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election.
The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit
polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that
could well crop up again in future elections. 6
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees." 7 Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls
and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to
exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to
prevent a miscarriage of justice, 8 when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection
of labor, 9 when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, 10 or when the need for
relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available. 11
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty
(20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998.
Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to
obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence;
the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari is therefore justified.
The Supreme Court found the petition meritorious. The Court ruled that the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech
and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest,
orderly and credible elections. Moreover, the Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative
effect of exit polls — disorder and confusion in the voting centers — does not justify a total ban on them.
Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution was too broad, since its application is without qualification
as to whether the polling is disruptive or not. Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive
behaviors around the voting centers. There was no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to
interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither had any evidence been presented proving that the
presence of exit poll reporters near the election precincts tended to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Accordingly, the petition was granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was made
permanent.
WHAT COURT M AY EXERCISE JUDICIAL REVIEW
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18128. December 26, 1961.]
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., HON. HERMOGENES CALUAG, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City, Branch IV) and HON. NICASIO YATCO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City, Branch V), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division), THE
CHAIRMAN-ADMINISTRATOR OF THE LAND TENURE ADMINISTRATION, BRUNA ROSETE and
BUENAVENTURA DIZON
FACTS:
47
Landowner J. M. Tuason & Company had also applied for a writ of prohibition in the CFI against the Land
Tenure Administration, the Auditor General, and the Solicitor General, to restrain them from instituting
expropriation proceedings of the petitioner Company's land in Quezon City, generally known as the
"Tatalon Estate", as expressly and specifically authorized by Republic Act No. 2616, that became law,
without executive approval, on August 3, 1959; the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act was
unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its property for the benefit of
squatters and occupants, even if the property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold
to the public; and that respondent officers threatened to enforce said law by initiating expropriation
proceedings.
After injunction was issued, the evictees in Quezon City cases Q-1401 and 1402, Bruna Rosete and
Tranquilino Dizon, petitioned the Court of First Instance to suspend the order of demolition of their
houses, on the grounds that they were tenants of the Tatalon Estate.
The tenants contended that that as beneficiaries under section 4 of Republic Act No. 2616, they were
entitled to a stay of the demolition proceedings against them; and that Judge Yatco abused his discretion
in refusing to suspend the same until the expropriation case was terminated.
Respondent Tuason & Company, Inc., moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction of the Court of
Appeals, pointing out that said Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of certiorari proceedings and to
issue injunctions was only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; that the orders of execution issued by the
Quezon City Court are not appealable; that the prohibition proceedings in case No. Q-5527, involving (as
they did) a question of constitutionality of a statute, were likewise not appealable to the Court of Appeals;
and that said Court, therefore, was without jurisdiction to pass over the questioned orders and that its
injunction was improperly issued, not being in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower courts can entertain questions of constitutionality of a law.
HELD:
Yes.
That the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 2616 could be invoked as a defense in the
expropriation proceedings does not alter the right of respondent Tuason & Company to invoke it in the
prohibition case, without awaiting the initiation of the condemnation case. In any event, the issue of
constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time
and effort to appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of the property sought to be
condemned if it turned out that the condemnation was illegal.
It is urged by amicus curiae that Courts of First Instance have no jurisdiction to entertain actions assailing
the constitutionality of statutes or treaties, because section 10 of Article VIII of the Constitution prescribes
that —
"No treaty or law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
members of the (Supreme) Court."
This contention is, however, destroyed by the terms of section 2 of Article VIII, wherein the Constitution
itself inhibits Congress from depriving the Supreme Court —
"of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of error, as the
law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in —
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive orders
or regulations is in question."
Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in
cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. Construing both provisions together, it is
readily discerned that the two-thirds vote of the Supreme Court, required by section 10 of Article VIII,
conditions only the decisions of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is true that, as argued by the petitioner Land Tenure Administration, the mere fact that a statute is
alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. But the
48
rule is not without exceptions. In Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil., 125, this Court quoted with approval
from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the rule that —
"It is recognized, however, that an injunction will lie to restrain the threatened enforcement of an invalid
law where the lawful use and enjoyment of private property will be injuriously affected by its enforcement .
. .",
and the petition for a writ of prohibition in Q-5527 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City pleads
precisely this threatened injury to the proprietary rights of Tuason & Company, Inc., as owners of the
Tatalon Estate. Whether this injury is real or not must be decided on the evidence submitted in that case,
and we are in no position to resolve it in the certiorari proceedings now before us. Our task here is merely
to determine absence or excess of jurisdiction: and on the facts and applicable law, we can not say that in
the issuance of the preliminary injunction by the Court of First Instance of Quezon City there was such
grave abuse of discretion as would constitute excess of jurisdiction.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A prohibiting the interprovincial
transportation of carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the above measure. The court also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.
Petitioner contends that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a right to
be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that the
measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge
to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether lower courts can entertain constitutionality questions.
HELD:
Yes.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
6
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to
"review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide,"
final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
7
certain measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance
by these lower courts.
And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means
conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the
8
need to declare them so, then "will be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," to recall Justice
Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the path of least resistance by
simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe
9
the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.
Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the
task for fear of retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of
the bench, especially this Court.
49
The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree,
promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President
Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his
legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that whenever in his judgment
there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in
order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and
effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power
then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since
the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of
this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more
fundamental question of due process.
POLITICAL QUESTIONS
EN BANC
G.R. No. 146738 March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused
the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. In a tumultuous
session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment. At 1:20 p.m.,
the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a
snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At
3:00 p.m., Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs
22
of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and
Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of
Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
23
withdrawing our support to this government." A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
24
and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. Some Cabinet secretaries,
25
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage,
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial
second envelope. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of
power started at Malaca�ang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara,
Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for
the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now
Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez.
Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At 2:30
p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malaca�ang Palace.29 He issued the following press
statement saying that he strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order
in our civil society. It is for this reason that I now leave Malaca�ang Palace, the seat of the presidency of
this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.
Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23,
in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malaca�ang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio
Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
35
Arroyo. US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House
36
conveying US recognition of her government.
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
37
Representatives. The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
38
Philippines." It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
50
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution.
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
47
terminated. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she voted against the closure
of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case
and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was still qualified to run for another
elective post.
Estrada faced several charges in the Office of the Ombudsman. petition for prohibition with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further
proceedings or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel, petitioner, on Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the
Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting
capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence,
are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases
at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended
th
the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by
foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the political thicket, which the
Court cannot enter.
ISSUE:
Whether the case a bar presents a political question.
HELD:
No.
To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude
still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question
doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to
55
be refined in the mills of constitutional law. In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to
determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or
56
Baker v. Carr, viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack
of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these
formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability
on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of 'political
questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
57
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case is Tanada v.
58
Cuenco, where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the
reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
59
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary
60
has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing
nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the
so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this
Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
51
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of
habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v.
61 62
President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at
bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political
question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited
cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful
63
revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution
declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning
that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial
scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the
government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the
64
EDSA Shrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to
preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the
powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.1�wphi1.n�t
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I
involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government.
EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition
the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is
extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject
of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it
caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I
presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of
speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the
cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1
74 75 76
of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section 11
of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They
also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the
77
1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that "it is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus, respondent's in
vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN.
PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES
FACTS:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense,
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the ―AFP‖), the Chief of the PNP and the
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In
compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B.
Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the ―LOI‖) which detailed the manner by which the joint
visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in
nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.
The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta
Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA
and Domestic Airport.
IBP’s Argument:
the ―IBP‖) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that:
52
THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:
A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID
DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION;
B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN

FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION
5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION;
C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO

PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT.
II
IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS

UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;
(2) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is
subject to judicial review; and,
HELD:
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by
law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are ―political questions.‖ The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally
interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts
to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
As Tañada v. Cuenco puts it, political questions refer ―to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.‖ Thus, if an issue is
clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of
government or to the people themselves then it is held to be a political question. In the classic
formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, ―[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on the one question.‖
The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that ―(T)he Judicial power shall
be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.‖ Under this definition, the Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue
53
involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is
qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or
validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to
substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether
such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted
either department of government, may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise
or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion,
he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent
of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to
overrule the President’s wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of
whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full
discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails
to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no
justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition
that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate
the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court’s duty
of ―purposeful hesitation‖ before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President’s judgment. To
doubt is to sustain.
There is a clear textual commitment under the Constitution to bestow on the President full discretionary
power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, which embodies the powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief,
provides in part:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law.
xxx
The full discretionary power of the President to determine the factual basis for the exercise of the calling
out power is also implied and further reinforced in the rest of Section 18, Article VII which reads, thus:
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
54
FACTS:
2
House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on
the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
3
Development Fund (JDF)."
4
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
5
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The
complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen. The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment
9
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being
10
insufficient in substance. To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the
House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
11 12
complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro.
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision
of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year."
petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the
issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance,
and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in
14
Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," posits that his right to bring an
impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November
28, 2001 by the House of Representatives.
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental importance.
House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of
special appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much
less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of
government under the Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate
impeachment cases.
ISSUE:
Whether the issue is a political question that is beyond judicial review.
HELD:
No.
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure. However, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred
101 102
upon political bodies. Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive Secretary which
raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the
political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a Constitution is a
political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a presidential
system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The powers of
government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the Executive
and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
55
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
From record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is
not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section
1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this clarification it is
gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2) those which
"are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle
to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases."
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus
now apply this standard to the present controversy.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court has no
jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political
question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
113
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding
to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
114
standard therefor. Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question
which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
EFFECT OF DECLAR ATIO N OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990
HORTENCIA SALAZAR vs. HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ
FACTS:
56
A sworn statement was filed by Rosalie Tesoro complaining against her employer fro failure to
surrender her PECC Card. POEA directed the employer Salazar to report to POEA office. Having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER. Upon
serving the order, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers �practicing a dance number and saw
about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted
for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar. The petitioners asked immediately
returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof.
Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No.
1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the
Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose."
Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to
the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure
powers
ISSUE:
May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?
HELD:
No. Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of
the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23127. April 29, 1971.]
FRANCISCO SERRANO DE AGBAYANI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN
FACTS:
Plaintiff obtained the loan in the amount of P450.00 from defendant Bank secured by real estate
mortgage. As of November 27, 1959, the balance due on said loan was in the amount of P1,294.00. As
early as July 13 of the same year, defendant instituted extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings in the office
of defendant Provincial Sheriff of Pangasinan for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining
unpaid. Plaintiff countered with his suit against both defendants on August 10, 1959, her main allegation
being that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from
the date of maturity, July 19, 1944. She sought and was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction
against defendant Provincial Sheriff, which was made permanent in the decision now on appeal.
Defendant Bank in its answer prayed for the dismissal of the suit as even on plaintiff's own theory the
defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945, when Executive Order
No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative act extending the period of
moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the
bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of a law declared to be unconstitutional
HELD:
The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, for that matter an
executive order or a municipal ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of any
legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental
57
law once judicially declared results in its being to all intents and purposes a mere scrap of paper. As the
new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. 3 It is understandable why it should
be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its
terms cannot survive.
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently
realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary,
in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative or executive act was in
operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being
nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and
justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to such
a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always he erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, — with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."
THE PHILIPPINES AS A ST ATE
STATE, DEFINED
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008
THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN

and/or VICE-GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PIÑOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP)
FACTS:
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the
Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia.
The MILF is a rebel group. The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to
materialize because the petitioners applied for a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.
Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of
which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic
principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation
Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli
Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."
A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with
the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading
to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed
on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between
government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.
58
8
Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
9
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD
including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners
pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government
under present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM.
ISSUE:
Whether the Bansangmoro Judicial Entity (BJE) is a state.
HELD:
Yes.
The MOA-AD alludes to the international law concept of association. Association is referred to in
paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is
in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central Government.
4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be
associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance
based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and functions
in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace
compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.
The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the
still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in
international law, and the MOA-AD - by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed
itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.
Keitner and Reisman state that
[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the
basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,
while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground
between integration and independence.
For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia
151
(FSM), formerly part of the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, are associated
states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S.
dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own travel documents, which is a
mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security
Council and by their admission to UN membership.
According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the
capacity to conduct foreign affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such
as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking, postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The
U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the governments of the
Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting
either government.
In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the
authority and obligation to defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government,
moreover, has the option of establishing and using military areas and facilities within these associated
states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having access to these
territories for military purposes.
It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an
international association between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is
subordinate to the associated nation's national constitution, and each party may terminate the association
consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the admission of the U.S.-associated
59
states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is actually based
152
on an underlying status of independence.
In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional
device of former colonies on their way to full independence.
MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of
association, specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of
the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the
ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be
consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.
These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the
status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
"associative" relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state
in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its
validity the amendment of constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.
SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
The BJE is a far more powerful

entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national
government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
154
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent
population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory,
the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter
to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific
provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the
Constitution and the laws.
Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be
effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for
the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)
As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term "autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would
still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for
inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
60
Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas
under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM
and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render
another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then
was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
The MOA-AD, moreover, would not

comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution
since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and
national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region. (Underscoring supplied)
Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would
require an amendment that would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new
legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any
new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other
provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with
treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states:
"The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries:
provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only the
155
President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary instructs:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign
relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
with other states. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the
MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development."
(Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be
a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the
act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally
been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing
156 157
statutory law, among which are R.A. No. 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.
Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of
"Bangsamoro people" used in the MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:
61
1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros". The Bangsamoro people refers to those who
are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether
mixed or of full blood. Spouses and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The
freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the
Organic Act, which, rather than lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous
peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples,
as follows:
"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino
citizens residing in the autonomous region who are:
(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish
them from other sectors of the national community; and
(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have
retained some or all of their own social, economic, cultural, and political institutions."
Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of
ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro
people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of Territory, the Parties simply agree
that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and historic
territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the
aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region."
International laws do not strictly require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the
instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more
specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its application by the
different States.
There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples
their own police and internal security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will
provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like the forced dispossession of their lands - a
function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so essential to indigenous
people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights
less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an
acknowledgement of the right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it
upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate
States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights
recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as follows:
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or
person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the
United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign
and independent States.
Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the
Constitution, it would not suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with
other laws unnecessary.
It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled
with the Constitution and the laws as presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the
signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law or grave abuse of discretion on
their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall not
take effect until these laws are amended.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-13250. October 29, 1971.]
62
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA
FACTS:
This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, administrator of the estate of the
deceased Doña Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95
as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interests and penalties, on the transfer of intangible
personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de
Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national,
by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco. At the time of her
demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." The respondent denied
the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the
acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the
exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication.
HELD:
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with
Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control
bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning
under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an
organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience its
commands. 10 It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense
and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as
"the juridical personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light its historical development. The
stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by
means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and
subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would
point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order
and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisites satisfied, international law does not
exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality petitioner has not
successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January
6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the
State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as
did the Tax Court, that the Ancillary Administrator is entitled to exemption from the inheritance tax on the
intangible personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state
in the American Union was lacking in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was
held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18
What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that
even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the tradition sense, did
fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justice
Bengzon, who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Riene v. Collector of Internal
Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it — proof of the
laws of Liechtenstein — that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible
personal property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that
pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig
Kiene being a resident of Liechtenstein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling "The
Collector — hereafter named respondent — cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of
this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident
foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia
sequuntur personam'. Such property admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the
shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance
taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that demand
reciprocity — as in this case. And the exemption must be honored."
63
CITIZENSHIP, IMPORTANCE
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128195 October 3, 2001
ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Dinglasan sold to Lee, a Chinese citizen, parcel of land. But the former owners of the land moved for the
annulment of sale and recovery of the land assailing the validity of the sale because of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring ownership of private agriculture land, including residential, commercial
or industrial land. They said that the sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the
Constitution. Lee asked for the reconstitution of title but the Solicitor-General opposed because the
petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee
Liong did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not
qualified to own the subject land. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land
through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than
sixty years.
ISSUE:
Whether Lee is qualified to own land in the Phiippines.
HELD:
No. The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of
26
the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands,
27
save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire
the land in question. The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate
the transaction, for it was still contrary to the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of
the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the illegality of the transaction was not
29
the parties to the transaction. "In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto by virtue
of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the
30
constitutional violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party."
The proper party to assail the sale is the Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the
Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of reconstitution of title. While it took the
Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action. Prescription
never against the State
Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto,
the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to
32
other defenses, as hereafter set forth.
In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in
the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by
his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the
Solicitor General does not dispute.
The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to
protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more
public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If
land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the
33
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Thus,
the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of
34
the invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
MODES OF ACQUISITION; CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
64
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]
ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

TEODORO C. CRUZ
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen. The
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for
certiorari assailing the HRET's decision. The issue now before the Supreme Court is whether
respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered
a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:
Whether Cruz needs to undergo the process of naturalization
HELD:
No.
A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is
the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-born or naturalized, depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to
reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows: (1) Those who are citizens
of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or
mothers are citizens of the Philippines; (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and (4) Those who
are naturalized in accordance with law.
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the
naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof.
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On
the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic
Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision
granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation
when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted
of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial
to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
65
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand,
naturalization as a mode for reaquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act
No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship
must possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost
their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed forces of the
allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the
taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the
Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. In Angat v.
Republic, we held: . . . . Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630],
the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition
in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he
had last resided in the Philippines.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives. The petition was dismissed by the Court.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., vs. The COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, respondents.
FACTS:
Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng
Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Fornier asked to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen,
he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an
alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley
and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether FPJ is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
66
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and
a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata
and jus sanguinis �had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
28
29
to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did
not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
30
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan
F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F.
Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza
Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate
of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the
same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of
FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old,
married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe
submitted before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his
own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including
respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -
The fact of the matter �perhaps the most significant consideration �is that the 1935 Constitution, the
fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000.]
CIRILO R. VALLES vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ,
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines.
She was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since
then, she has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as
well. She served as Provincial Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In
1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
67
opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, alleging as ground therefor her alleged Australian
citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship,
the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing
reliance on the admitted facts that:
a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian
national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR); and
c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration
and immigrant certificate of residence, private respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a
citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.
Petitioner argues that the private respondent’s renunciation of her Australian citizenship on January 15,
1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian
passport cancelled did not automatically restore the status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply
with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171.
ISSUE:
Whether the principle of res judicata applies.
Whether there was valid renunciation of Australian citizenship.
Whether she is qualified to run for public office.
HELD:
Yes .
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine
of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a
Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine
citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she
has nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship because private respondent's application for an
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and the issuance to
her of an Australian passport.
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
68
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign county
upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time
of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her
husband's country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioner's
contention that the application of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and
in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an
application for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
American passport only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were
just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of
citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively
result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the aforecited case of
Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of one's citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of
registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were
mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at
the most, private respondent had dual citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino, as well.
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
country has not been included as a ground for losing one's Philippine citizenship. Since private
respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner's claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water.
Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship,
still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which states:
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable.
Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing
situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence
69
of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court explained that
dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance.
". . . the phrase 'dual citizenship' in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, . . . 20 must be
understood as referring to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification."
Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough
that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. 11 This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and
defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such
declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated
her Australian citizenship.
Private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in

the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and, as a result the Australian passport of
private respondent was cancelled. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were
enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process
of repatriation holds no water.
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.
12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally
does not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,
an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that the
doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must be present:
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof;
and
3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the
weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler.
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999.]
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR
VICENTE D. CHING
FACTS:
Vicente D. Ching is the legitimate son of spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino. Ching was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since birth, he resided in the
70
Philippines. He is also a Certified Public Accountant and a registered voter of Tubao, La Union. In fact, he
was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the synchronized
elections. Having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University, Baguio City, he filed
an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was conditionally admitted to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
On 5 April 1999, the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful
examinees. However, because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take
his oath and instead, he was required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In compliance therewith,
on 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation with attached Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship
and Oath of Allegiance dated 15 July 1999.
The Court held that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship was clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching had offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
ISSUE:
Whether Ching is a Filipino citizen, hence be allowed to take his oath.
HELD:
No.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien
father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition
by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority"
are Philippine citizens.
It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine
citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of
citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial
challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution.
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes
the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under
Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be
made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-
71
one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the
age of majority.
The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three
(3) years from reaching the age of majority. However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the
three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to
mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled
that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person
concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension
of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was
born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was
made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after
he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the
age of majority."
In the present case, Ching, having been born 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when
he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he
had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of
majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified
public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine
citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
election.
Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to
elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable
and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991
ANTONIO Y. CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE

ONG, JR
FACTS:
FACTS:
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed as the winner. The petitioners filed election protests against the
private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines
The HRET found Ong to be a natural-born citizen.
72
ISSUE:
Whether Ong is natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Whether Ong elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Yes.
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a
certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration. The father of the private
respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish
an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community. As Jose
Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural
values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.
In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal
affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance of Samar an
application for naturalization and declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen. This became final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance. Jose Ong Chuan took his
Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him. At the time Jose
Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary
education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other
Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were concerned. After elementary,
the private respondent, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His
status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino.
Private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.
For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those elections. Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of
Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are
combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine
citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected
citizenship before that date.
The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against
Filipino women. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive. The provision in question
73
was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier
laws, conferred the status of a natural-born. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers
and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both
considered as natural-born citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident
of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members. It is
for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly,
and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine
citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to
correct the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which
would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage.
Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status
to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came
of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not
only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship
inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement
would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was
nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In the case of In
Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and
the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The
private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of
deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in
public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and
other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is
doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a
Filipino when he turned (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only
have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship?
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his
premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his
death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of
the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of
Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process.
Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest.
Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the
citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the
respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother
and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first
formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with
a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have chosen.
NATURALIZATION: JUDICIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CONGR ESSIONAL
74
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-21289. October 4, 1971.]
MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG vs. THE
COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the
interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines,
she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a
pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines and was permitted to stay for a period of one month. On
the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner
Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962,
she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction
with preliminary injunction. At the hearing, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write
either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She
could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.'
ISSUE:
Whether Lau became a Filipino citizen upon marriage to Moya.
HELD:
We hereby hold that portion of Section 9(g) of the Immigration Act providing:
"An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure
from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers
of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in
accordance with the requirements of this Act."
does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become
Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon them
the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside
here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this
Court has vehement]y expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by aliens to convert their
status from temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the
legal provision already mentioned,
". . . It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary
visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently,
without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve him of the
departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of 'change' or 'correction', for
the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to
enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim
should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the
meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came,
contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-
evident."
75
On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary
visitor but who has in the meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for
a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is
entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of
his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this hag been conferred upon him. Consider,
for example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that
they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed
permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine
whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which
such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd
construction.
In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions,
the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed, therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.
Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as
temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of
nationality naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they
may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor
confiscate their bonds.
The naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring
upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the
Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-avis aliens, if only
because by its very nature and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is
inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines.
The avowed policy of "selective admission" more particularly refers to a case where a citizenship is
sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no
doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to be come citizens. There is here
a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application
is cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to
accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operations of law proves in legal proceedings that
he satisfies the statutory requirements, the cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizens of the
Philippines.
We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section
15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes
ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of
the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows
the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that
she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Section 16 is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization a Filipino,
who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be
considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should not follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be
denied that same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law" (Section 1 [5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision,
include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of
76
citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as,
for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage
of an alien woman to a citizen.
The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons
who are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated
in the provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related, the effect is for
said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that
all alien wives and all minor children of the Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso
facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does
mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen
of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them.
Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences.
The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen
unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in
plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact
necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in
evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to
Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws
then in force.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,

whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the
occasion may demand.
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien
woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other
things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing
of the said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and
her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited Section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 104654 June 6, 1994
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH
28, MANILA and JUAN G. FRIVALDO
FACTS:
Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization captioned: "In the Matter of Petition of Juan G. Frivaldo to be Re-
admitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63. He was readmitted. A motion
was filed by Quiterio H. Hermo. He alleged that the proceedings were tainted with jurisdictional defects,
and prayed for a new trial to conform with the requirements of the Naturalization Law. Friva;do was
elected as governor of Sorsogon. Petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation
of private respondent as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon on the grounds that private
respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine citizenship is being questioned by the State in G.R. No.
77
104654. Petitioner further prayed that the votes case in favor of private respondent be considered as
stray votes, and that he, on the basis of the remaining valid votes cast, be proclaimed winner.
Petitioner further claims that the grant of Filipino citizenship to private respondent is not yet conclusive
because the case is still on appeal before us.
Further, another petitioner argues that assuming the decision to be valid, private respondent’s oath of
allegiance, which was taken on the same day the questioned decision was promulgated, violated
Republic Act No. 530, which provides for a two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be
taken by the applicant; and (4) that the hearing of the petition on February 27, 1992, was held less than
four months from the date of the last publication of the order and petition.
private respondent alleges that the precarious political atmosphere in the country during Martial Law
compelled him to seek political asylum in the United States, and eventually to renounce his Philippine
citizenship.
Frivaldo claims that his petition for naturalization was his only available remedy for his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. He tried to reacquire his Philippine citizenship through repatriation and direct act of
Congress. However, he was later informed that repatriation proceedings were limited to army deserters or
Filipino women who had lost their citizenship by reason of their marriage to foreigners. His request to
Congress for sponsorship of a bill allowing him to reacquire his Philippine citizenship failed to materialize,
notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives in his favor.
ISSUE:
Whether Frivaldo is qualified to run for public office.
HELD:
No.
Private respondent, having opted to reacquire Philippine citizenship thru naturalization under the Revised
Naturalization Law, is duty bound to follow the procedure prescribed by the said law. It is not for an
applicant to decide for himself and to select the requirements which he believes, even sincerely, are
applicable to his case and discard those which be believes are inconvenient or merely of nuisance value.
The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was
never such a citizen. It does not provide a special procedure for the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
by former Filipino citizens akin to the repatriation of a woman who had lost her Philippine citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien.
The trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The
proceedings conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void
for failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization Law.
Under Section 9 of the said law, both the petition for naturalization and the order setting it for hearing
must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation. Compliance therewith is jurisdictional (Moreover, the publication and posting of the
petition and the order must be in its full test for the court to acquire jurisdiction
The petition for naturalization lacks several allegations required by Sections 2 and 6 of the Revised
Naturalization Law, particularly: (1) that the petitioner is of good moral character; (2) that he resided
continuously in the Philippines for at least ten years; (3) that he is able to speak and write English and
any one of the principal dialects; (4) that he will reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of the petition until his admission to Philippine citizenship; and (5) that he has filed a declaration of
intention or if he is excused from said filing, the justification therefor.
The absence of such allegations is fatal to the petition
Likewise, the petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons who vouched for the
good moral character of private respondent as required by Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
Private respondent also failed to attach a copy of his certificate of arrival to the petition as required by
Section 7 of the said law.
The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the hearing of the petition
was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of the order advancing the date of
hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the
petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting period.
78
A decision in a petition for naturalization becomes final only after 30 days from its promulgation and,
insofar as the Solicitor General is concerned, that period is counted from the date of his receipt of the
copy of the decision
Section 1 of R.A. No. 530 provides that no decision granting citizenship in naturalization proceedings
shall be executory until after two years from its promulgation in order to be able to observe if: (1) the
applicant has left the country; (2) the applicant has dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or
profession; (3) the applicant has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government
promulgated rules; and (4) the applicant has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the country or
contrary to government announced policies.
Even discounting the provisions of R.A. No. 530, the courts cannot implement any decision granting the
petition for naturalization before its finality.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 35947. October 20, 1992.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILLIAM LI YAO
FACTS:
William Li Yao, a Chinese national, filed a petition for naturalization and thereafter declared Li Yao, for all
intents and purposes a naturalized Filipino citizen, it appearing that he possesses all the qualifications
necessary to become a naturalized Filipino and none of the disqualifications provided for by law.
However, in view of the provisions of Republic Act No. 530, this decision shall not become final and
executory until after two (2) years from its promulgation and after this Court, on proper hearing, with the
attendance of the Solicitor General or his representative, is satisfied, and so finds, that during the
intervening time the applicant herein has (1) not left the Philippines, (2) has dedicated himself
continuously to a lawful calling or profession, (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of
Government promulgated rules, (4) or committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or
contrary to any Government announced policies.
After the petitioner has complied, within the two year probation period, with the provisions of Republic Act
No. 530, he was allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen, and the Clerk of Court is
directed to issue in his favor the corresponding certificate of naturalization.
About fifteen years later, the Solicitor General, filed a motion to cancel William Li Yao's certificate of
naturalization on the ground that it was fraudulently and illegally obtained for the following reasons:
"1. At the time of the filing of the petition, the applicant was not qualified to acquire Filipino citizenship
by naturalization because:
a. He was not a person of good moral character, having had illicit amorous relationship (sic) with
several women other than his lawfully wedded life, by whom he fathered illegitimate children
b. Nor had he conducted himself in an irreproachable manner in his dealings with the duly
constituted authorities:
(i) In contracting marriage, he used the name Francisco Li Yao without prior judicial authority to use
the aforesaid first name Francisco, the same not appearing to be his baptismal name
(ii) He was also known and had used the name and/or alias LI CHAY TOO, JR. before the last World
War, and under which name, a trust fund was created for him (iii) He evaded the payment of lawful taxes
due to the government by underdeclaration of income as reflected in his income tax returns
(iv) He committed violations of the Constitution and Anti-Dummy laws prohibiting aliens from
acquiring real properties by employing dummies in the formation of a private domestic corporation, which
acquired the real properties.
(v) He made it appear, falsely, in the baptismal certificate of an illegitimate son he fathered, named
William Jose Antonio, that the latter's mother is Juanita Tan Ho Ti, his law-mother is another woman
79
ISSUE:
Whether the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization of the deceased petitioner-appellant William Li
Yao made by the government through the Office of the Solicitor General is valid.
HELD:
Yes.
Section 18 (a) of Com. Act No. 473, known as the Revised Naturalization Act, provides that a
naturalization certificate may be cancelled "[i]f it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained
fraudulently or illegally." It is indisputable that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if it is
subsequently discovered that the applicant therefor obtained it by misleading the court upon any material
fact. Law and jurisprudence even authorize the cancellation of a certificate of naturalization upon grounds
or conditions arising subsequent to the granting of the certificate. Moreover, a naturalization proceeding is
not a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein, not constituting res judicata as to any
matter that would support a judgment cancelling a certificate of naturalization on the ground of illegal or
fraudulent procurement thereof.
The lower court based its order of cancellation of citizenship on the finding of evasion of payment of
lawful taxes which is sufficient ground, under Sec. 2 of the Revised Naturalization Law requiring, among
others, that applicant conduct himself "in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of
his residence in the Philippines in his relation with constituted government as well as with the community
in which he is living," to strip him of his citizenship without going into the other grounds for cancellation
presented by the Solicitor General. In the case entitled In the Matter of the Petition for Naturalization as
Citizen of the Philippines, Lim Eng Yu v. Republic, it was held that the concealment of applicant's income
to evade payment of lawful taxes show that his moral character is not irreproachable, thus disqualifying
him for naturalization.
Assuming arguendo, that appellant, as alleged, has fully paid or settled his tax liability under P.D. No. 68
which granted a tax amnesty, such payment is not a sufficient ground for lifting the order of the lower
court of July 22, 1971 cancelling his certificate of naturalization. The legal effect of payment under the
decree is merely the removal of any civil, criminal or administrative liability on the part of the taxpayer,
only insofar as his tax case is concerned.
Taking into account the fact that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government
and against the applicant, this Court has repeatedly maintained the view that where the applicant failed to
meet the qualifications required for naturalization, the latter is not entitled to Filipino citizenship. More
specifically, the Court has had occasion to state: "Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges
that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred
except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is
a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must
be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could constitute ample ground for divesting one of
said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of the law must be proved to the satisfaction
of the Court.
LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP
EN BANC
G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ
Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to
80
1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his
retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.
On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he
continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and
lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the
Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on
November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of
Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate.
On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter in Samar. His application was
approved by the Election Registration Board. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.
Respondent Neil M. Alvarez, who was the incumbent mayor of Oras and who was running for reelection,
sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras
for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000,
when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Coquilla won.
ISSUE:
Whether Coquilla is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
No.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation, but rather to "domicile" or legal residence that is, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)." A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice)
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in
the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, petitioner was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration
laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8,
�1427(a) of the United States Code provides:
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a
"greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
Nor can petitioner contend that he was "compelled to adopt American citizenship" only by reason of his
service in the U.S. armed forces. It is noteworthy that petitioner was repatriated not under R.A. No. 2630,
which applies to the repatriation of those who lost their Philippine citizenship by accepting commission in
the Armed Forces of the United States, but under R.A. No. 8171, which, as earlier mentioned, provides
for the repatriation of, among others, natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity. In any event, the fact is that, by having been naturalized abroad, he lost
his Philippine citizenship and with it his residence in the Philippines. Until his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.
Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when
he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in
that year and by "constantly declaring" to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived
either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship,
or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an
immigrant visa under �13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of
28
29
Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire
Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
30
national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case
he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien.
81
In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on October 15,
1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement "Philippine Immigration
[�] Balikbayan" in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the
31
added inscription "good for one year stay." Under R.A. No. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been naturalized in a foreign
country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a "visa-free
entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year" (�3(c)). It would appear then that when petitioner
entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as
such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien
and as a non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a citizen of the Philippines
32
under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern, Samar.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections in support of his contention that the
residency requirement in �39(a) of the Local Government Code includes the residency of one who is not
a citizen of the Philippines. Residency, however, was not an issue in that case and this Court did not
make any ruling on the issue now at bar. The question in Frivaldo was whether petitioner, who took his
oath of repatriation on the same day that his term as governor of Sorsogon began on June 30, 1995,
complied with the citizenship requirement under �39(a). It was held that he had, because citizenship may
be possessed even on the day the candidate assumes office. But in the case of residency, as already
noted, �39(a) of the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must have been a resident of
the municipality "for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election."
Nor can petitioner invoke this Court’s ruling in Bengzon III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
What the Court held in that case was that, upon repatriation, a former natural-born Filipino is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.]
ANTONIO BENGSON III vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and

TEODORO C. CRUZ
FACTS:
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States
Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of
allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation
under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen. The
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent
Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET likewise
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner thus filed the present petition for
certiorari assailing the HRET's decision. The issue now before the Supreme Court is whether
respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered
a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE:
HELD:
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided
by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by
direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reaquiring
Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications and none of the
82
disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in
the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States
at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity.
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. In Angat v. Republic, we held: . . . .
Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to
do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
REACQUISITION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.]
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22,
1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had
sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said,
was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial
Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA
revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of
the Philippines because his naturalization as an American citizen was not "impressed with voluntariness."
In support he cited the Nottebohm Case, [1955 I.C.J. 4; 49 A.J.I.L. 396 (1955)] where a German
national's naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had been obtained for reasons of
convenience only. He said he could not have repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the
Special Committee on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 270 had not yet been organized
then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen should be a sufficient act of
repatriation. Additionally, his active participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the United States, thus restoring his Philippine citizenship. He
ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to disqualify him for being time-barred under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo
was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the
election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They
also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing
as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their
petition were to be considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from
Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof of his
naturalization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18,
1988, as provincial governor
HELD:
83
No.
The Court cannot agree that as a consequence of martial law he was coerced into embracing American
citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary
choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.
e Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law principle of effective nationality
which is clearly not applicable to the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us
because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No
third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as
its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines
under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign
of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to
determine under its law who are its nationals."
It is also worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in Liechtenstein whereas in the
present case Frivaldo is rejecting his naturalization in the United States. If he really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States. Such laws do not concern us here. The alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as
his adopted country. It should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship,
such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the loss of
his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest that the lack of that body
rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not specious. Such a conclusion would open
the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their
abandoned citizenship without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines.
It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that
is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions — surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is
not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 125793. August 29, 2006.]
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and
DEPORTATION and WILSON SOLUREN
FACTS:
Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when petitioner was seven years
old, 4 his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the United States. By derivative
naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by
virtue of naturalization 6 ), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for
one year. Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID.
Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative
Code. He was deported. Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order. that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a
non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13,
84
paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa. At this point, Tabasa is already 35 years old.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid
repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.
HELD:
No.
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine
Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October 23, 1995. It
provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:
Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos
who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:
(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;
(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
association for the predominance of their ideas;
(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or
(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases
Tabasa did not lose his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born
Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.
TDAcCa
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor
children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine
citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation
will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino
subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the
former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine
citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the children acquire the citizenship of
their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must
be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child
does not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act
like the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a
minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner
acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation
as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is
absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The privilege
under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for
repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or
economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic or political reasons in
deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent's and not his. The privilege of repatriation
under RA 8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired
citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the
minor children at the time of repatriation.
85
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly
reacquire Philippine citizenship by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003
(Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the
Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:
SECTION 1. Composition. — The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the
Solicitor General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted. ICacDE
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant
to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the
same. If their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration
(emphasis supplied).
SECTION 3. Implementing Rules. — The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.
SECTION 4. Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999,
applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth
certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were
imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons
for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then,
executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such
registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995
Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to
process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a
confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should have
instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171
Even if petitioner — now of legal age — can still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless
failed to prove that his parents relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his
parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that
under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for
repatriation to set forth, among others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship,
whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in case of
[a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
economic necessity should be specified." 23
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must
prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes
that the reference to 'political or economic reasons' is "merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely
accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
Petitioner's argument has no leg to stand on.
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of
repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to
aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), 25 which was enacted on
June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the
86
opportunity to repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on account of political or economic necessity" in
relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended
to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino women who
lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens.
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of
renouncing allegiance to one's native country constitutes a "necessary and unavoidable shifting of his
political allegiance," and his father's loss of Philippine citizenship through naturalization "cannot therefore
be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity." 27
This argument has no merit. SacTCA
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to one's native country is necessarily a political act, it does
not follow that the act is inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To
reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship
speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and political
refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like
to escape from punishment, and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a
better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the
satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit
their Philippine citizenship for political or economic exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step,
and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the
1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in
the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure,
and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the
requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who
can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said
requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation
Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore,
he is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
This theory is incorrect.
As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that
his case falls within the coverage of the law.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132244. September 14, 1999.]
GERARDO ANGAT vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Petitioner Gerardo Angat was a natural born citizen of the Philippines. He lost his citizenship by
naturalization in the United States of America. In 1991, he returned to the Philippines. On March 11,
1996, he filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City a petition to regain his status as a
citizen of the Philippines. On May 10, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was notified of the
initial hearing scheduled on January 27, 1997. However, on September 20, 1996, upon motion of the
petitioner, he was allowed to take the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines which was
scheduled on October 3, 1996. On October 4, 1996, the trial judge issued an Order declaring the
petitioner as repatriated and a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act No.
8171. On March 19, 1997, the OSG filed a Motion asserting that the petition itself should have been
dismissed by the court a quo for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum was the Special Committee
on Naturalization consistent with Administrative Order No. 285. On September 22, 1997, the trial court set
aside its Orders dated September 20, 1996 and October 04, 1996 and dismissed the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to its refilling before the Special Committee on
Naturalization.
87
ISSUE:
Which forum has jurisdiction over the petition for repatriation.
HELD:
R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October 1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a)
of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Under Section 1 of the Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 725, dated 05 June 1975, amending
Commonwealth Act No. 63, an application for repatriation could be filed by Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens, as well as by natural born Filipinos who lost their Philippine
citizenship, with the Special Committee on Naturalization. The committee, chaired by the Solicitor General
with the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency as the other members, was created pursuant to Letter of Instruction ("LOI") No. 270, dated 11
April 1975, as amended by LOI No. 283 and LOI No. 491 issued, respectively, on 04 June 1975 and on
29 December 1976. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue of President Corazon C. Aquino's
Memorandum of 27 March 1987, it was not, however, abrogated. In Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, the Court observed that the aforedated memorandum of President Aquino had merely directed
the Special Committee on Naturalization "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings .
. . under Letter of Instruction (`LOI') 270."
Indeed, the Committee was reactivated on 08 June 1995; hence, when petitioner filed his petition on 11
March 1996, the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted pursuant to LOI No. 270 under P.D. No.
725 was in place. Administrative Order 285, promulgated on 22 August 1996 relative to R.A. No. 8171, in
effect, was merely then a confirmatory issuance. The Office of the Solicitor General was right in
maintaining that Angat's petition should have been filed with the Committee, aforesaid, and not with the
RTC which had no jurisdiction thereover. The court's order of 04 October 1996 was thereby null and void,
and it did not acquire finality nor could be a source of right on the part of petitioner.
It should also be noteworthy that the petition in Case No. N-96-03-MK was one for repatriation, and it was
thus incorrect for petitioner to initially invoke Republic Act No. 965 and R.A. No. 2630 since these laws
could only apply to persons who had lost their citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
commission in, the armed forces of an allied foreign country or the armed forces of the United States of
America, a factual matter not alleged in the petition. Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person
desiring to re-acquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all
that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the
fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 163256. November 10, 2004.]
CICERON P. ALTAREJOS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSE ALMIÑE and VERNON

VERSOZA
FACTS:
The Commission on Elections disqualified petitioner from being a candidate for the position of mayor of
San Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen. Petitioner alleged that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus
entitled him to run for an elective office. He took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his
Certificate of Registration was registered with the proper civil registry only after six years or on February
18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner completed all the requirements
of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the
elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is qualified to run for the mayoralty position.
HELD:
Yes.
88
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8171, thus: "Sec. 2.
Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registration in the proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue the certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen." The law is clear that repatriation is effected "by
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration." Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau
of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen. In this case, petitioner took his
Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997, but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil
Registry of Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau of Immigration
on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the requirements of repatriation only after he filed
his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the citizenship qualification must be
construed as "applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term." In
the same case, "the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application." In
said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on
June 5, 1975. The Court therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute, which
is retroactive in nature. . . . [P]etitioner's repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997.
Petitioner was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the May 10, 2004
elections. Apparently, the COMELEC was cognizant of this fact since it did not implement the assailed
Resolutions disqualifying petitioner to run as mayor of San Jacinto, Masbate.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP AND DUAL ALLEGIANCE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercado and private respondent Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati
in the May 11, 1998 elections. The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a
pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. The Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending until after the election. The board of
canvassers tabulated the votes but suspended the proclamation of the winner. Petitioner sought to
intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC en banc reversed the decision and declared private
respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC en banc, the board of
canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the
resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office
of the vice mayor of Makati.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondent is qualified to run, considering that he has dual citizenship.
HELD:
Yes.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national
by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of
a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a
citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
89
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the
Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers' country such children are
citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine
citizenship. There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article
IV, Section 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law."
In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d)
and in R.A. No. 7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas,
one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is
just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control." By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the
same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such
an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as
a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo vs. COMELEC it was held: It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983
Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual
citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for
any elective local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold
that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that,
when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long renounced and had
long abandoned his American citizenship — long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in
the interim — when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his
Filipino citizenship." On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995: "By
the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every
certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government." These factual
findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been
effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive
upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse. Until the filing of his
certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, private respondent had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to
him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar vs. COMELEC applies mutatis mutandis to private
respondent in the case at bar: . . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a Filipino and
an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino,
possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason
that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either "express" or
"implied." To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is
not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution
of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On
the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact
90
that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist,
and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.]
LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which
accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and
local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be
advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of
Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 20032 , they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their
lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however,
urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter's registration, as
the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely
be eligible to vote in future elections. aced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,
petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. The
holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and
academic, but insofar only as petitioners' participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader
and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to
participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine
citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
HELD:
Yes.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law,
who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year
and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. .
...
SEC 2. The Congress shall provide . . . a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for
the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes Congress to devise a system wherein an
absentee may vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the
preceding section, be allowed to vote.
COMELEC invites attention to the same Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to vote,
as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing
provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to repeat, requires residency in the
Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights,
COMELEC argues:
4. 'DUALS' MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES
4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225 is logical. The 'duals,' upon
renouncement of their Filipino citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically and
legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to the homeland as a consequence. Having
subsequently acquired a second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, 'duals' must, for purposes of voting, first of
all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile through positive acts; 13
The Court disagrees.
91
As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise their right
to vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A.
9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.
Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body:
1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been consequently
expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other countries, subject, however, to the strict
prerequisites indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA 9225; 15
Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that
law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the right of
suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms
adverted to in the following wise:
"Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad exercise their
right to vote;
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under
this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of elections;
While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A.
9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. — The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below
eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall
be deemed citizens of the Philippines.
It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age
had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail
themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither
no rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of
suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such absurd
situation.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.]
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER — HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice
FACTS:
Petitioner filed the instant petition against respondent, then Secretary of Justice Simeon Datumanong, the
official tasked to implement laws governing citizenship. 1 Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be
issued to stop respondent from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose
Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No.
9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Petitioner contends that Rep. Act No. 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and
3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains that
Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain
their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3 permits dual allegiance
because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to regain their Philippine citizenship by
92
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign allegiance. 2 The Constitution, however,
is categorical that dual allegiance is inimical to the national interest. ASEcHI
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy that
"Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not allow dual allegiance
since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective renunciation and repudiation of his
foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme
authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the
Republic.
ISSUES:
(1) Is Rep. Act No. 9225 unconstitutional?
(2) Does this Court have jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance?
HELD:
No.
The intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 5 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. HCSDca
Petitioner likewise advances the proposition that although Congress has not yet passed any law on the
matter of dual allegiance, such absence of a law should not be justification why this Court could not rule
on the issue. He further contends that while it is true that there is no enabling law yet on dual allegiance,
the Supreme Court, through Mercado v. Manzano, 6 already had drawn up the guidelines on how to
distinguish dual allegiance from dual citizenship. 7
For its part, the OSG counters that pursuant to Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, dual
allegiance shall be dealt with by law. Thus, until a law on dual allegiance is enacted by Congress, the
Supreme Court is without any jurisdiction to entertain issues regarding dual allegiance. 8
To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of
Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
9 Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance. 10 Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Neither can we subscribe to the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of
Mercado had already set the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.
That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction
between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
SOVEREIGNTY
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-26379. December 27, 1969.]
WILLIAM C. REAGAN, ETC., petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
FACTS:
93
petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of Bendix Badio, Division of Bendix Aviation
Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United States Air Force, was assigned at Clark
Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 . . . Nine (9) months thereafter and before his tour of duty
expired, petitioner imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free 1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at
$6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other charges."4 Then came the following: "On July 11, 1960,
more than two (2) months after the 1960 Cadillac car was imported into the Philippines, petitioner
requested the Base Commander, Clark Air Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was granted provided
that the sale was made to a member of the United States Armed Forces or a citizen of the United States
employed in the U.S. military bases in the Philippines. On the same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold
his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie Johnson, Jr. (Private first class), United States Marine Corps,
Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, as shown by a Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On the
same date, Pfc. Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000.00 as evidenced
by a deed of sale executed in Manila." 5
As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after deducting
the landed cost of the car as well as the personal exemption to which petitioner was entitled, fixed as his
net taxable income arising from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34, rendering him liable for
income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he sought a refund from respondent claiming
that he was exempt, but pending action on his request for refund, he filed the case with the Court of Tax
Appeals seeking recovery of the sum of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.
It is petitioner’s contention, seriously and earnestly pressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was
made outside Philippine territory and therefore beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said income tax of P2,979.00 was legally collected by respondent for petitioner.
HELD:
The Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme, its
commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms.
That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be
exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its sovereignty.
Any state may by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There may
thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which
it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to,
may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence. Its laws may as to some person
found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing
another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it
does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain
their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it
does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the
military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory.
Petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his car in the Clark Field Air Base, which
clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines to tax. The
Military Bases agreement does not lend support to the assertion that said base has become a foreign soil
or territory.
Petitioner, at one time a civilian employee of an American Corporation providing technical assistance to
the United States Air Force in the Philippines, would seek to impart plausibility to his claim of not being
subject to tax for the sale of his car in the Clark Field Air Base, by the ostensible invocation of the
exemption clause in the Military Bases Agreement by virtue of which a "national of the United States
serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or
defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by reason of such employment" is not to be
taxed on his income unless derived from the Philippine sources or sources other than the United States
sources. The contention on its face is devoid of merit as the source in the instant case clearly was
Philippines.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: DOCTRINE OF NON -SUABILITY OF THE STATE
Basis:]
94
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-30671. November 28, 1973.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR
FACTS:
On July 3, 1961, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.
J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and against the
petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special
Proceedings. 8. On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order
declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal
Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order
dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26, 1969, . . . 10.
On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal (respondent herein) served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the `monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits, sufficient to
cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution'; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment on June 30, 1969 . . . 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine National
Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Comptroller, . . ." 2
The paragraph immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge, Honorable
Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of execution against the properties of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant
thereto are null and void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde and
Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification being that the total award
was in the amount of P2,372,331.40.
ISSUE:
Whether the Order issued is valid
HELD:
No.
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of sovereignty that the
state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable
why it must be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological
jurisprudence supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may
be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its
multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability
of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity on the part of our people to go
to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the
absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be
imagined." 7
This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made explicit in the revised charter. It
is therein expressly provided: "The State may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both
dictated by logic and sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-
settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the
State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit
claimant's action `only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may
not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious
considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
95
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific
objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an attempted garnishment of a
salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11
speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule, which has
never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due
government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the process of garnishment.
One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may not be sued in its own courts except by
express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit
indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as
they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter, although the
defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which
covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration of public policy forbids it." 12
In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the Philippines could rightfully
allege a legitimate grievance
SUIT AG AINST ST ATE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 70853. March 12, 1987.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS:
Feliciano filed a complaint with the then CFI against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4)
lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the property in question from
Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954;
that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to
the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria; that upon plaintiff's purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it
to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954;
that on November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines
Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started subdividing and
distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation
established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should therefore be
excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be
declared legal, valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the
settlers.
The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising by way of affirmative defenses
lack of sufficient cause of action and prescription.
On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued the questioned order
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor
General, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the
dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State and also on the ground that the
existence and or authenticity of the purported possessory information title of the respondents'
predecessor-in-interest had not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of title,
or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches.
ISSUE:
96
Whether the state can be sued in this case
HELD:
No.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this
case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private person who
is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is not an action in rem,
but an action in personam. It is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment
therein binds only such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is
directed against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental
agency created by Republic Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which
under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State has consented
to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to
be misinterpreted. There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself fails to
allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should
have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when the case was tried before
the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be
invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from the Proclamation itself,
when it established the reservation "subject to private rights, if any there be." We do not agree. No such
consent can be drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing private rights
from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can not be construed as a waiver of the
immunity of the State from suit. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred
lightly, but must be construed in strictissimi juris. Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only
be made by an act of the legislative body.
Neither is there merit in respondent's submission. which the respondent appellate court sustained, on the
basis of our decision in the Begosa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within
the rule of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the Government of any of its
lands or its funds. It is contended that the complaint involves land not owned by the State, but private land
belonging to the plaintiff, hence the Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is
some sophistry involved in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still
remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State precisely to compel the
latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property. In other words, the plaintiff is out to
establish that he is the owner of the land in question based, incidentally, on an informacion posesoria of
dubious value, and he seeks to establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines
in an action in personam.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-27299. June 27, 1973.]
QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioner, vs. THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
FACTS:
del Mar averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command
(a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained an
honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical
disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans
97
Board (the PVA's predecessor) granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that
in March 1950, the said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on the ground that his
receipt of a similar pension from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans
Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States Army in the Far East during
World War II, precluded him from receiving any further monthly life pension from the Philippine
Government; that he wrote the said Board twice, demanding that it continue paying his monthly life
pension, impugning the cancellation thereof as illegal; and that his demands went unheeded.
The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension from the United States
Government effectively barred him from claiming and receiving from the Philippine Government the
monthly life pension granted him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five living
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also asserted that it is discretionary on
its part to grant or discontinue the pension sought by del Mar. In addition, it alleged that the action of del
Mar was premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention, and that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar's demand
partakes of a money claim against the PVA — a mere agency of the Philippine Government — and, in
effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suable without its consent.
ISSUE:
Whether PVA as an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines exercising governmental
functions as to be entitled to exemption from suit.
HELD:
Yes.
As a general proposition, the rule — well-settled in this jurisdiction — on the immunity of the Government
from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of property." 4 Needless to state, in such actions,
which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no option but to dismiss them
Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception It finds no application where a claimant institutes an action
against a functionary who fails to comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the
public funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 5 As clearly discernible
from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 102667. February 23, 2000.]
AMADO J. LANSANG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC
FACTS:
In 1970, the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) started operating several kiosks in Rizal Park
under a verbal contract of lease with the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government
initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks. The contract was terminated in 1988 by
the new chairman of NPDC, herein petitioner, by serving written notice to respondent Iglesias, President
of GABI, with a demand to vacate the premises. GABI filed an action for damages and injunction with the
trial court alleging that petitioner acted beyond the scope of his authority when he showed malice and bad
faith in ordering GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Perusal of the complaint disclosed that petitioner, as
Chairman of NPDC, acted under the spirit of revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment in
serving the notice of termination to Iglesias who is totally blind and who was deceived into signing the
notice. The complaint failed to categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. The trial court
rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It ruled that the complaint was a suit against the State which
could not be sued without its consent. It further ruled that GABI, a mere concessionaire, cannot claim
damages for termination of contract. The decision was, however, reversed by the Court of Appeals ruling
that the mere allegation that a government official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to
protect him from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority. It found petitioner liable for
moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys fees. Hence, this petition.
98
ISSUE:
Whether the state can be sued in this case.
HELD:
No.
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in
the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where
satisfaction of the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a
positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.
The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are
unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity,
from liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.
Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his
personal capacity, although the acts complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public
position.
We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal
capacity. The complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman
of the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity. Also, it is evident from
paragraph 4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering
the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not be the subject of a lease contract.
Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and
kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous administrator. This being
so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private
respondents, who may be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does
not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115634. April 27, 2000.]
FELIPE CALUB and RICARDO VALENCIA, DEPARTMENT of ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL

RESOURCES (DENR), CATBALOGAN, SAMAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MANUELA T.
BABALCON, and CONSTANCIO ABUGANDA
FACTS:
A vehicle loaded with forest products was apprehended by a composite team of DENR and the elements
of the Philippine Army. Constancio Abuganda, a certain Abegonia and several John Does were charged
with violation of Section 68, Presidential Decree 705, as amended. After trial, Abegonia and Abuganda
were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Subsequently, Abuganda and the owner of the
vehicle, Manuela Babalcon, filed a complaint for the recovery of the impounded vehicles with an
application for replevin against the petitioners Felipe Calub and Ricardo Valencia of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in Catbalogan, Samar. The trial court granted the application for
replevin and issued the corresponding writ. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the
99
trial court. Petitioners then filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. After
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the respondent RTC judge from conducting
further proceedings in the civil case for replevin, this Court referred this case to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals denied the said petition for lack of merit. It ruled that the mere seizure of a motor vehicle
pursuant to the authority granted by Section 68 [78] of P.D. No. 705, as amended, does not automatically
place the conveyance in custodia legis. It also found no merit in petitioner's claim that private
respondent's complaint for replevin is a suit against the State ruling that a suit against a public officer who
acted illegally or beyond the scope of his authority could not be considered a suit against the State and
that the public officer might be sued for illegally seizing or withholding the possession of the property of
another.
ISSUE:
Whether Calub is performing his official functions, hence a suit against the state.
HELD:
Yes.
Well established is the doctrine that the State may not be sued without its consent. And a suit against a
public officer for his official acts is, in effect, a suit against the State if its purpose is to hold the State
ultimately liable. However, the protection afforded to public officers by this doctrine generally applies only
to activities within the scope of their authority in good faith and without willfulness, malice or corruption.
In the present case, the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them
in the discharge of their official duties. The acts in question are clearly official in nature. In implementing
and enforcing Sections 78-A and 89 of the Forestry Code through the seizure carried out, petitioners were
performing their duties and functions as officers of the DENR, and did so within the limits of their
authority. There was no malice nor bad faith on their part. Hence, a suit against the petitioners who
represent the DENR is a suit against the State. It cannot prosper without the State's consent.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32667. January 31, 1978.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
FACTS:
Pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the now defunct Court of Industrial Relations in favor of private
respondent and against the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, respondent clerk of court, in his
capacity as special deputy sheriff, served a notice to garnish the funds of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation which were deposited with petitioner bank. Petitioner moved to quash the notice of
garnishment but respondent Court denied the motion. Claiming that respondent Court's denial amounted
to grave abuse of discretion because the appointment of the clerk of court as authorized deputy sheriff
was contrary to law and the funds subject of the garnishment "could be public in character", petitioner
instituted instant certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether the state will be liable under the order of garnishment.
HELD:
No.
100
The premise that the funds of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation could be spoken of as
public in character may be accepted in the sense that the said corporation is a government-owned entity.
However, it does not follow that they are exempt from garnishment because the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, as a government-owned and controlled corporation, has a personality distinct and
separate from that of the government. Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes like any other corporation.
By engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests
itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations.
Waiver by the State of its right of immunity from suits does not automatically subject its properties and
funds to execution or garnishment because such would amount to a disbursement without any proper
appropriation as required by law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-35645. May 22, 1985.]
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM I. COLLINS and ROBERT
GOHIER vs. HON. V.M. RUIZ
FACTS:
United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in
the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States. United States invited the
submission of bids for the following projects:
1. Repair fender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay, Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to shoreline revetment,
NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach, NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the
company received from the United States two telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and
for the name of its bonding company. The company complied with the requests. In its complaint, the
company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids because "A request to confirm a price
proposal confirms the acceptance of a bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices."
Company received a letter which was signed by William I. Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is
one of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to receive an award for the
projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at
the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company sued the United States of America
and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering
Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the
work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order the
defendants to pay damages.
The defendants entered their special appearance "for the purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of
this court over the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of
the complaint being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States
of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any other suit for the
causes of action asserted in the complaint."
ISSUE:
101
Whether the USA can be sued.
HELD:
No.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and
equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity when he said in his Order
denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion: "A distinction should be made between a strictly
governmental function of the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non-governmental acts."
However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's considered opinion that entering into a contract
for the repair of wharves or shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his reply citing the ruling in the
case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:
'It is however contended that when a sovereign state enters into a contract with a private person, the state
can be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level of an individual from which it can be
implied that it has given its consent to be sued under the contract.
'We agree to the above contention, and considering that the United States government, through its
agency at Subic Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor
services within the Subic Bay Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can bring an action
before our courts for any contractual liability that political entity may assume under the contract. The trial
court, therefore, has jurisdiction to entertain this case
The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the following reasons:
In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America supra, plaintiff brought suit in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to collect several sums of money on account of a contract between plaintiff and
defendant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over
defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a)
it had no jurisdiction over the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed to
exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of dismissal was elevated to this
Court for review.
In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:
"It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI
of the contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the United States Government, or, stated
differently, it has failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against said Government, the lower
court acted properly in dismissing this case." (At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State immunity from suit was purely
gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has no value as an imperative authority.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a
State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of
102
the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably
a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.
That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by a State but
the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs
leased three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its military officials. The
plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the term of the leases had
expired, They also asked for increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the court. The Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss;
sustained by the Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on certiorari. In denying
the petition, this Court said:"On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the belief and we hold
that the real party defendant in interest is the Government of the United States of America; that any
judgment for back or increased rentals or damages will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and
Tillman and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S. Government. On the basis of the ruling in the
case of Land vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already stated, the present action must be
considered as one against the U.S. Government. It is clear that the courts of the Philippines including the
Municipal Court of Manila have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful detainer. The question of
lack of jurisdiction was raised and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The U.S. Government
has not given its consent to the filing of this suit which is essentially against her, though not in name.
Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a foreign government without said government's
consent, which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of his country. The principles of
law behind this rule are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we deem it unnecessary to
cite authorities in support thereof."
In Syquia, the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding
the United States was not deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the
contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis
KINDS OF GOVERNMENT
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5a 1 . November 16, 1945.]
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO CHAM) vs. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH
FACTS:
It is contended that the military occupation of the Philippine Islands by the Japanese was not actual and
effective because of the existence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains and even towns and
villages; and consequently, no government de facto could have been validly established by the Japanese
military forces in the Philippines under the precepts of the Hague Conventions and the law of nations.
The presence of guerrilla bands in barrios and mountains, and even in towns of the Philippines whenever
these towns were left by Japanese garrisons or by the detachments of troops sent on patrol to these
places, was not sufficient to make the military occupation ineffective nor did it cause that occupation to
cease, or prevent the constitution or establishment of a de facto government in the Islands. The
belligerent occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese invaders became as accomplished fact from the
time General Wainwright, Commander of the American and Filipino forces in Luzon, and General Sharp,
Commander of the forces in Visayas and Mindanao, surrendered and ordered the surrender of their
forces to the Japanese invaders, and the Commonwealth Government had become incapable of publicly
103
exercising its authority, and the invader had substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate
government in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao.
"According to the rules of Land Welfare of the United States Army, belligerent or so-called military
occupation is a question of fact. It presupposes a hostile invasion as a result of which has rendered the
invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority, and that the invader is in position to
substitute and has substituted his own authority for that of the legitimate government of the territory
invaded." (International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, by Hyde, Vol. II, pp.
361, 362.) "Belligerent occupation must be both actual and effective. Organized resistance must be
overcome and the forces in possession must have taken measures to establish law and order. It
doubtless suffices if the occupying army can, within a reasonable time, send detachments of troops to
make its authority felt within the occupied district." "Occupation once acquired must be maintained . . .. It
does not cease, however, Nor does the existence of a rebellion or the operations of guerrilla bands cause
it to cease, unless the legitimate government is reestablished and the occupant fails promptly to suppress
such rebellion or guerrilla operations."
But supposing arguendo that there were provinces or district in these Islands not actually and effectively
occupied by the invader, or in which the latter, consequently, had not substituted his own authority for that
of the invaded government, and the Commonwealth Government had continued publicly exercising its
authority, there is no question as to the validity of the judicial acts and proceedings of the court
functioning in said territory, under the municipal law, just as there can be no question as to the validity of
the judgments and proceedings of the courts continued in the territory occupied by the belligerent
occupant, under the law of nations.
(2) It is submitted that the renunciation in our Constitution and in the Kellog-Briand Pact of war as an
instrument of national policy, rendered inapplicable the rules of international law authorizing the
belligerent Japanese army of occupation to set up a provisional or de facto government in the Philippines,
because Japan started was treacherously and emphasized war as an instrument of national policy; and
that to give validity to the judicial acts of court sponsored by the Japanese would be tantamount to giving
validity to the acts of these invaders, and would be nothing short of legalizing the Japanese invasion of
the Philippines.
In reply to this contention, suffice it to say that the provisions of the Hague Conventions which imposes
upon a belligerent occupant the duty to continue the courts as well as the municipal laws in force in the
country unless absolutely prevented, in order to reestablish and insure "I'ordre et la vie publice," that is,
the public order and safety, and the entire social and commercial life of the country, were inserted, not for
the benefit of the invader, but for the protection and benefit of the people or inhabitants of the occupied
territory and of those not in the military service, in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society
may not be unnecessarily deranged.
As a necessary consequence of such occupation and domination, the political relations of its people to
their former government are, for the time being, severed. But for their protection and benefit, and the
protection and benefit of others not in the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be
unnecessarily deranged, the municipal laws, that is, such as affect private rights of persons and property
and provide for the punishment of crime, are generally allowed to continue in force, and to be
administered by the ordinary tribunals as they were administered before the occupation. They are
considered as continuing, unless suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent."
The fact that the belligerent occupant is a treacherous aggressor, as Japan was, does not, therefore,
exempt him from complying with said precepts of the Hague Conventions, nor does it make null and void
the judicial acts of the courts continued by the occupant in the territory occupied. To deny validity to such
judicial acts would benefit the invader or aggressor, who is presumed to be intent upon causing as much
harm as possible to the inhabitants or nationals of the enemy's territory, and prejudice the latter; it would
cause more suffering to the conquered and assist the conqueror or invader in realizing his nefarious
design; in fine, it would result in penalizing the nationals of the occupied territory, and rewarding the
invader or occupant for his acts of treachery and aggression.
(3) We held in our decision that the word "processes," as used in the proclamation of General
Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944, cannot be interpreted to mean judicial processes; it should be
construed to mean legislative and constitutional processes, by virtue of the maxim "noscitur a sociis."
Since the proclamation provides that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void," the word "processes" must be
interpreted or construed to refer to the Executive Commission, Ordinances promulgated by the President
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of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and the Constitution itself of said Republic, and others that
are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the world "processes" is associated.
The statement of Wheaton that "when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid, it must be remembered
that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should all be reversed (by the restored government
or its representatives) no international wrong would be committed," evidently does not mean that the
restored government or its representatives may reverse the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
during the belligerent occupation without violation of the law of nations does not always and necessarily
cause an international wrong. As the said judicial acts which apply the municipal laws, that is, such as
affect private rights or persons and property and provide for the punishment of crimes, are good and valid
even after occupation has ceased, although it is true that no crucial instances exist to show that, were
they reversed or invalidated by the restored or legitimate government, international wrong would be
committed, it is nonetheless true and evident that by such abrogation national wrong would be caused to
the inhabitants or citizens of the legitimate government. According to the law of nations and Wheaton
himself, said judicial acts are legal and valid before and after the occupation has ceased and the
legitimate government has been restored. As there are vested rights which have been acquired by the
parties by virtue of such judgments, the restored government or its representative cannot reverse or
abrogate them without causing wrong or injury to the interested parties, because such reversal would
deprive them of their properties without due process of law.
It is argued with insistence that the courts of the Commonwealth continued in the Philippines by the
belligerent occupant became also courts of Japan, and their judgments and proceedings being acts of
foreign courts cannot now be considered valid and continued by the courts of the Commonwealth
Government after the restoration of the latter. As we have already stated in our decision the fundamental
reasons why said courts, functioning during the Japanese regime, could not be considered as courts of
Japan, it is sufficient now to invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case of the Admittance, Jecker vs. Montgomery (13 How., 498; 14 Law. ed., 240), which we did not
deem necessary to quote in our decision, in which it was held that "the courts, established or sanctioned
in Mexico during the war by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more than the agents
of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory, and to protect the
inhabitants in their persons and property while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject
to the military power, and their decision under its control, whenever the commanding officer though
proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a
question of prize or no prize."
(Author’s note: This case is weird. No clear facts are mentioned. It merely laid down the arguments and
immediately went on to the Court’s ruling.)
DOCTRINE OF PARENS P ATRIAE
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 9959. December 13, 1916.]
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE

AHORROS DE MANILA
FACTS:
About $400,000 were subscribed and paid into the Treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of
the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damages by the earthquake which took place in the
Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and on October 6 of that year, a central relief
board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus voluntarily
contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted #365,703.50 to the
various sufferers named in its resolution. There was later distributed, in accordance with the above-
mentioned allotments, the sum of $40,299.65, leaving a balance of #365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the
petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, the Philippine Government, by order dated the 1st
of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of the relief
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fund in installments of $20,000 each. On account of various petitions of the persons and heirs of others to
whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those
amounts, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2109, empowering and directing the Treasurer of the
Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad to recover, "through the Attorney-General and
in representation of the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80,000, together with interest, for the
benefit of those persons or their heirs appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette by
the GPI, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
for the sum of $80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
HELD:
Funds collected as a result of a national subscription for the relief of those damaged by an earthquake
constitute, under article 1 of the Law of June 20, 1849, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a
special charity of a temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution.
The law of June 20, 1849, the royal order of April 27, 1875, and the instructions promulgated on the latter
date conferred upon the former sovereign authority to supervise and control certain private or special
charities of a temporary nature.
While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of ceded territory, and
an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of
municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the
new ruler. Laws conferring upon the Government power to supervise and control special charities are not
in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the United States.
In 1863 the inhabitants of the Spanish dominions contributed funds for the relief of those damages by an
earthquake in the Philippine Islands and the money was remitted to the Philippines to be distributed by a
central relief board. Part of the funds contributed were turned over to the board. Part of the funds
contributed were turned over to the "Monte de Piedad" to be held at the disposal of the relief board. The
Philippine Government is the proper party to maintain an action to recover the funds thus loaned or
deposited for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the contributors.
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF THE PHILIPPIN E GOVERNMENT
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997.]
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA vs. EDGARDO ANGARA
FACTS:
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership thereto
of the vast majority of countries, has revolutionized international business and economic relations
amongst states.
Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goal,
as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving "Philippine
access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its
exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products."
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-
countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits
and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition
before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to
"develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
and locally produced goods." petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine
106
Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its implementation and
enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment of public officials and
employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heads of various
executive offices concerned therewith.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene the
provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
HELD:
No.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its
power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of
Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some
sections of Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of
action in the courts. They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for
legislation."
While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
The constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national economy" does not necessarily rule
out the entry, of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates neither "economic seclusion"
nor "mendicancy in the international community."
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation", "national treatment", and "trade without discrimination"
cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity, that apply
to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocal", the
fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,"
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of
the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete
internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong
have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of
laissez faire.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it
is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or
impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land,
and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. One of the oldest and most fundamental
rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good
faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the
parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations
such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."
When the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter members, it consented to restrict
its sovereign rights under the "concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." Under Article 2 of the UN
Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in
107
accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which
the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action." Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines
has entered into many other international pacts — both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations
on Philippine sovereignty the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign
powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial
surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same
privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes
the Philippine commitments under WTO-GATT. The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a
portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the
Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations."
ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 91332. July 16, 1993.]
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
FACTS:
Philip Morris, Incorporated is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Virginia, United
States of America, while two other plaintiff foreign corporations, which are wholly-owned subsidiaries of
Philip Morris, Inc., are similarly not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated
transaction. As registered owners of "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and "LARK" per certificates of registration
issued by the Philippine Patent Office on April 26, 1973, May 28, 1964, and March 25, 1964, plaintiffs-
petitioners asserted that defendant Fortune Tobacco Corporation has no right to manufacture and sell
cigarettes bearing the allegedly identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of
Section 22 of the Trademark Law, and should, therefore, be precluded during the pendency of the case
from performing the acts complained of via a preliminary injunction
For its part, Fortune Tobacco Corporation admitted petitioners' certificates of registration with the
Philippine Patent Office subject to the affirmative and special defense on misjoinder of party plaintiffs.
Private respondent alleged further that it has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to
manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word
which cannot be exclusively appropriate. Petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction was denied
premised upon the following propositions:
Plaintiffs admit in paragraph 2 of the complaint that ". . . they are not doing business in the Philippines
and are suing on an isolated transaction . . ." This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale,
manufacture, importation, expor[t]ation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.
With this admission, defendant asks: "how could defendant's "MARK" cigarettes cause the former
"irreparable damage" within the territorial limits of the Philippines?" Plaintiffs maintain that since their
trademarks are entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which
the Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as
such, have the force and effect of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is
an action for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation
is sufficient even in the absence of proof to support it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name.
HELD:
108
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement
of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent
clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part
of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in
the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of
international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000.]
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ
FACTS:
As a probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty, private respondent contended that he
should be furnished a copy of the US government request for his extradition and its supporting
documents even while he is still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice. The Secretary of
Justice, however, feared the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process.
HELD:
No.
First. P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee
shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing
of the petition for extradition in the extradition court. There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty
and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of
Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to
comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in the
treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter,
amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its
conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any
motion of equity, or general convenience, or substantial justice." Second. All treaties, including the RP-US
Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in light of its object and purpose." . . . It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines
forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism
and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes will
not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be the unbending
commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state. It ought to
follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the
escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. . . . Third. An equally
compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties
with the Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the
meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and
enforcement is accorded great weight. The reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest
Orient Airlines, et al., where we stressed that a treaty is a joint executive legislative act which enjoys the
presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted
and given the force of law in the country." . . . Fourth. . . . An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not
a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or
109
innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be
extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation. . . . Private respondent's plea for due process . . . collides with important state
interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. . . . Petitioner
avers that the Court should give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition
Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its
laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on matters relating to
foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers. Considering that
in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the right being
claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak,
we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice. . . .
The supposed threat to private respondent's liberty is perceived to come from several provisions of the
RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional arrest and temporary detention. . . .
Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be
provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the
extradition request from the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until
today, the United States has not requested for private respondent's provisional arrest. Therefore, the
threat to private respondent's liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real. Nor can the threat to
private respondent's liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069. . . . It is evident from the above
provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the extradition
hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for
extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is
no certainty that a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to
private respondent's liberty is merely hypothetical.
DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORM ATION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.]
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department

of Justice vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO
FACTS:
Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented
by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and
documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for
appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the
Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a (TRO) which
prohibited (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the
Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition
alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States (2) tax evasion (3) wire fraud (4) false statements (5) illegal campaign contributions. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest"
pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
110
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner's application for an arrest warrant be set for
hearing. RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing. In that hearing, petitioner
manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Petitioner US government filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the procedure adopted
by the trial court of first hearing a potential extraditee, Mark Jimenez, before issuing a warrant for his
arrest under Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Petitioner contended that the procedure gives Jimenez notice to
escape and to avoid extradition. Petitioner also assailed the trial court's granting of Jimenez's prayer for
bail, which allows him to go on provisional liberty while extradition proceedings are pending. Petitioner no
longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the Extradition Court, but resorted directly to the Supreme
Court instead of the Court of Appeals to obtain relief.
ISSUE:
Whether prospective extraditees are entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be
issued?
Whether they are entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are
pending?
HELD:
No.
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement
in the experience of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will
not flee the jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a
propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent — (1) leaving the requesting state
right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state
despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are
bailable — eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his
predisposition to avoid them at all cost: These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high
risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is
there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time?
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to
qualify the arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing parties, receiving facts
and arguments from them, and giving them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate." The law could not have intended the
word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness
in the determination of whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. By using the phrase "if it appears,"
the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is
not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately
upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is
expected merely to get a good first impression — a prima facie finding — sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused. Moreover, the law specifies that
the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after
receiving the summons. In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word "hearing" is
notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a hearing at that stage been intended, the
law could have easily so provided. It also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are
summary in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable
interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.
111
It is evident that respondent judge could have already gotten an impression from these records adequate
for him to make an initial determination of whether the accused was someone who should immediately be
arrested in order to "best serve the ends of justice." He could have determined whether such facts and
circumstances existed as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that the
extradition request was prima facie meritorious. In point of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that "probable cause" did exist. We stress that the prima facie existence of
probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter
for hearing upon motion of Jimenez. Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by
Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination —
under oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of
a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his
discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence
of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential
extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate
the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best serve the ends of justice" in extradition
cases.
As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as
well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and
detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to
bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to
the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like
extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The rule, we repeat, is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules
to protect and enforce constitutional rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to include the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to
the "life, liberty or property" of every person. It is "dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation
calling for its application." Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that,
after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law, bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Contrary to the contention, of Jimenez his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings
does not amount to a violation of his right to due process. We reiterate the familiar doctrine that the
essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those
present in an extradition case — call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present
case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears
the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental
fairness. Contrary to his contention, we find no arbitrariness, either, in the immediate deprivation of his
liberty prior to his being heard. That his arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the
extradition request meets the requirements of the law and the relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge's
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independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's custody, to apply
for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND ST ATE
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 45459. March 13, 1937.]
GREGORIO AGLIPAY vs. JUAN RUIZ
FACTS:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks the
issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage stamps
commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty- third International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers
to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to
the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage for printing as follows:
"In the center is a chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16,
20, 36, and 50 centavos." the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof,
to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner
herein.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress.
HELD:
No.
It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
"No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or
for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or to any
penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium."
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.
Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it is
sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union of
church and state is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the church, and
the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and aims. The Malolos
Constitution recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
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December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions to the Philippine Commission,
reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied
in the Constitution of the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino People. It is almost trite to
say now that in this country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government,
from the highest to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the Constitution, bind
themselves to recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is
religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino
people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish
a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and
placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating
influence of religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and
laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes sectarian aid is not
prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed. Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made legal holidays because of the secular idea that their
observance is conducive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and
bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws
of the state
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in question
under the provisions of Act. No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. this Act is as follows:
No. 4052. — AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND MAKING THE
SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE
APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW
DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be "advantageous
to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does not authorize the
violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or application of public money or
property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the
issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the
letter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists to this country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event considered of
international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people". It is significant to note that the
stamps as actually designed and printed instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally
planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as
follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937." What is emphasized is not the
Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is
obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked
with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in
character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
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We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate the
complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a constitutional
inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and persecution, care should
be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by the Government or its officials
that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or
institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional infraction in the
case at bar. Act. No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, discretion to issue postage stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed
advantageous to the Government. "Even if we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor
judgment in issuing and selling the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to
take in weight. Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a
gap exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming
within a constitutional inhibition.
HONEST PUBLIC SERVIC E AND FULL DISCLOSUR E
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989.]
RICARDO VALMONTE vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that Belmonte be directed to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady
Imelda Marcos. Not having yet received the reply of the (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner
Valmonte wrote respondent another letter.On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners,
filed the instant suit.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners are entitled to access to information requested.
HELD:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry
can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The
postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect
the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation
adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is
not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the
exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-
hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant
to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well in checking abuse
in government.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern", and is further "subject to such limitations as may
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be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions
involving public interest", and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
The government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the
same function of service to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising
a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of
the right to information.
The consideration in guaranting access to information on matters of public concern does not however,
accord to citizen the right to compel custodian of public records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire such information.
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in

his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management,
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In
that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
HELD:
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition. R.A. No. 9189, entitled, "An Act
Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes," appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof
which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment
into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein
petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public
funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The challenged provision of law involves a
public right that affects a great number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction
over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod
sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, where the Court held: Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of
sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the
importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987
Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the
Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these petitions. Indeed,
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in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional right of suffrage of a
considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to
take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule
in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De
Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of is framers
through their debates in the constitutional convention. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a
system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an
overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the
circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee
voting. Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside
abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic
uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this country's leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering the novelty of
the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would
spawn constitutional problems especially because the Constitution itself provides for the residency
requirement of voters. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt
as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems
that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to
provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is
in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in
fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated
upon on the Senate floor.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process. Which does not
require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those
who are disqualified. As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration
or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as
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long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of
the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must
establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system
for absentee voting. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution
that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise." To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent
to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are disqualified to
run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for
obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent
residents in their host countries. In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A.
9189, they may still be considered as a "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of suffrage. It must
be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to "resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the
removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia."
Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not
actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and
8(c) of the law.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent body "except
those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the
same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact
election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory
powers over its rule-making authority. By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has
empowered the COMELEC to "issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act." This provision of law follows the
usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law — the legislature grants an
administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations implementing the law it has enacted,
in recognition of the administrative expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law
is enacted and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative
function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to review,
amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and amend the IRR of the
COMELEC. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a
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situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of
law unconstitutional.
Similarly, the phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first
sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than
three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee" found in the second paragraph of the same section are
unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries
wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions
provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its
constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.
C.J PUNO’S DISSENT IN MACALINTAL V. COMELEC
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; ELECTION LAWS; THE OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT OF 2003
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189); THE MAJORITY ERRED IN RULING THAT SECTION 2 OF ARTICLE V OF
THE CONSTITUTION DISPENSED WITH THE RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT'S PROVIDED UNDER
SECTION 1 OF THE SAME ARTICLE. — The intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission to
apply the residence requirements to absentee voters is evident from its deliberations. They precisely used
the phrase "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD" to stress that the absentee voter must have all the
qualifications in Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution. In the course of the deliberations, Fr. Bernas
perceived a problem that may arise from the meaning of the second residence requirement on the place
of registration and voting. As noted, a qualified voter normally registers and votes in the place where he is
domiciled or has resided for six months. Fr. Bernas feared that the second residence requirement may
pose a constitutional obstacle to absentee voting "unless the vote of the person who is absent is a vote
which will be considered as cast in the place of his domicile." Following the observation of Father Bernas
and to obviate the constitutional problem, the members of the Constitutional Commission then discussed
the system of registration of qualified Filipinos abroad who will be allowed to vote. It was agreed that their
registration abroad would be considered as registration in a particular locality in the Philippines where he
is domiciled, and the vote cast abroad would be considered cast in that particular locality. It is crystal
clear from the deliberations, that the majority erred in ruling that Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution
dispensed with the residence requirements provided under Section 1 of the same Article.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN "IMMIGRANT" OR A "PERMANENT RESIDENT" OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY IS

DEEMED TO HAVE ABANDONED HIS DOMICILE IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In Romualdez-Marcos v.
COMELEC, we ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with
purpose. This change of domicile is effected by a Filipino who becomes an "immigrant" or a "permanent
resident" of a foreign country. Thus, we held in Caasi v. Court of Appeals, viz: Miguel's application for
immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to
such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits
to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green
card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor. . . The doctrine in Caasi is by no means
new. Our election laws have continuously regarded "immigrants" or "permanent residents" of a foreign
country to have lost their domiciles in the Philippines and hence are not qualified to run for public office.
There is no reason not to apply the Caasi ruling in disputes involving the qualification of voters. In
essence, both cases concern fulfillment of the residence requirements. Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189
itself reinforces the applicability of the Caasi doctrine. As observed by the majority, Rep. Act No. 9189
disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in another country "because
immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his
country of origin."
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3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE MAJORITY RULING ON THE NATURE OF THE AFFIDAVIT TO BE
EXECUTED BY AN "IMMIGRANT" OR A "PERMANENT RESIDENT" IS INCONSISTENT. — I submit
that the majority ruling on the nature of the affidavit to be executed by an "immigrant" or a "permanent
resident" is inconsistent. On one hand, it theorizes that the act "serves as an explicit expression that he
had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin." This concedes that while an "immigrant" or a
"permanent resident" has acquired a new domicile in a foreign country by virtue of his status as such,
Rep. Act No. 9189 would consider him not to have abandoned his domicile in the Philippines. On the
other hand, the majority also theorizes that the affidavit constitutes an "express waiver of his status as an
immigrant or permanent resident," and upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration, "he may still be
considered as a 'qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad' for purposes of exercising his right of
suffrage." This presupposes that the "immigrant" or "permanent resident" abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines, but seeks to reacquire this domicile by the execution of the affidavit. The first theory is
untenable. Its inevitable result would be the establishment of two domiciles, i.e., domicile in the
Philippines and domicile in a foreign country where he is considered an "immigrant" or a "permanent
resident." This ruling will contravene the principle in private international law that a person can be
domiciled only in one place at a given time. The second theory is equally untenable. A person who has
abandoned his domicile of origin by establishing a domicile of choice cannot just revert back to his
domicile of origin. He must satisfy the same requisites for acquiring a new domicile, i.e., an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with the purpose. An existing domicile
cannot be lost by abandonment alone, even if there is an intent to acquire a new one; the existing
domicile continues until a new one is in fact gained. To abandon domicile, a person must choose a new
domicile, actually reside in the place chosen, and intend that it be the principal and permanent residence.
That is, there can be no change of domicile without the concurrence of act and intent.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE REQUIRED AFFIDAVIT MERELY PROVES THE INTENT TO RETURN BUT
NOT THE OTHER REQUISITES FOR RE-ACQUIRING THE DOMICILE OF ORIGIN; WHAT MAKES
THE INTENT EXPRESSED IN THE AFFIDAVIT EFFECTIVE AND OPERATIVE IS THE FULFILLMENT
OF THE PROMISE TO RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES AND UNTIL THEN, THE ABSENTEE DOES
NOT POSSESS THE NECESSARY REQUISITES AND THEREFORE, CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A
QUALIFIED VOTER. — With due respect, I submit that the affidavit merely proves the intent to return but
not the other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Intent, which is not coupled with actual
physical transfer, is not sufficient either to abandon the former domicile or to establish a new domicile.
Thus, the view that domicile could be established as soon as the old is abandoned even though the
person has not yet arrived at the new domicile, has not been accepted. To stress, the burden of
establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who asserts it. A person's declarations as to what he
considers his home, residence, or domicile are generally admissible "as evidence of his attitude of mind."
However, whatever the context, "their accuracy is suspect because of their self-serving nature,
particularly when they are made to achieve some legal objective." In the case at bar, the burden rests on
an "immigrant" or a "permanent resident" to prove that he has abandoned his domicile in the foreign
country and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines. A self-serving affidavit will not suffice, especially
when what is at stake is a very important privilege as the right of suffrage. I respectfully submit that what
makes the intent expressed in the affidavit effective and operative is the fulfillment of the promise to
return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a mere test of intent but the "principal confirming
evidence of the intention of the person." Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a domiciliary of
another country. Until then, he does not possess the necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be
considered a qualified voter.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; COUNTING THE VOTES OF IMMIGRANTS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS WHO
FAIL TO RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES WILL DILUTE THE VALID VOTES OF FULLY QUALIFIED
ELECTORS; MAY RESULT IN THE ANOMALY WHERE THE HIGHEST PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF THE
LAND WILL OWE THEIR ELECTION TO "IMMIGRANTS" OR "PERMANENT RESIDENTS" WHO
FAILED TO FULFILL THEIR PROMISE TO RETURN TO THE COUNTRY OR WHO REPUDIATED
THEIR DOMICILE HERE. — The only consequence imposed by Rep. Act No. 9189 to an "immigrant" or a
"permanent resident" who does not fulfill his promise to return to the Philippines is the removal of his
name from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia. But his vote would be counted and accorded the same weight as that cast by bona fide qualified
Filipino voters. I respectfully submit that this scheme diminishes the value of the right of suffrage as it
dilutes the right of qualified voters to the proportionate value of their votes. The one person, one vote
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principle is sacrosanct in a republican form of government. The challenged provision which allows the
value of the valid votes of qualified voters to be diminished by the invalid votes of disqualified voters
violates the sovereignty of our people. The validation by the majority of this unconstitutional provision may
result in the anomaly where the highest public officials of our land will owe their election to "immigrants" or
"permanent residents" who failed to fulfill their promise to return to our country or who repudiated their
domicile here.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 18.5 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189 EMPOWERING THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS TO PROCLAIM THE WINNING CANDIDATES SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS
LIMITED TO THE POSITIONS OF SENATORS AND PARTY LIST REPRESENTATIVES. — On its face,
Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. It gives the impression that Congress abdicated to COMELEC its constitutional duty to
canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I agree with the majority
that the impugned provision should be given a reasonable interpretation that would save it from a
constitutional infirmity. To be sure, Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates should be construed as limited to the positions of
Senators and party-list representatives.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE LEGISLATIVE VETO POWER OR CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER
OVER THE AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TO ISSUE RULES AND
REGULATIONS IN ORDER TO ENFORCE ELECTION LAWS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL; THE POWER
TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS IN ORDER TO ADMINISTER ELECTION LAWS HAS
BEEN VESTED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION TO THE COMMISSION AND IT
CANNOT BE TRENCHED UPON BY CONGRESS IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS OVERSIGHT POWERS.
— The Constitution divided the powers of our government into three categories, legislative, executive,
and judicial. Although not "hermetically sealed" from one another, the powers of the three branches are
functionally identifiable. In this respect, legislative power is generally exercised in the enactment of the
law; executive power, in its execution; and judicial power, in its interpretation. In the absence of specific
provision in the Constitution, it is fundamental under the principle of separation of powers that one branch
cannot exercise or share the power of the other. In addition, our Constitution created other offices aside
from the executive, the legislative and the judiciary and defined their powers and prerogatives. Among
these bodies especially created by the Constitution itself is the COMELEC. The COMELEC occupies a
distinct place in our scheme of government. As the constitutional body charged with the administration of
our election laws, it is endowed with independence in the exercise of some of its powers and the
discharge of its responsibilities. The power to promulgate rules and regulations in order to administer our
election laws belongs to this category of powers as this has been vested exclusively by the 1987
Constitution to the COMELEC. It cannot be trenched upon by Congress in the exercise of its oversight
powers.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 17.1 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR IT
ALLOWS CONGRESS TO NEGATE THE EXCLUSIVE POWER OF THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS TO ADMINISTER AND ENFORCE ELECTION LAWS AND REGULATIONS GRANTED BY
THE CONSTITUTION ITSELF; SAID POWER IS EXCLUSIVE AND IS NOT MEANT TO BE SHARED BY
ANY OTHER BRANCH OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT. — I join the majority in holding that
Section 17.1 of Rep. Act No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it allows Congress to negate the exclusive power
of the COMELEC to administer and enforce election laws and regulations granted by the Constitution
itself. This is not to maintain that the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
COMELEC, or the system it devised to implement voting by mail cannot be challenged. If they are illegal
or constitute grave abuse of discretion, the courts can strike them down in an appropriate case. This
power is vested to the courts under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defining the scope of judicial
power, and more specifically under Section 5, Article VIII empowering this Court to review, revise,
reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, "all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question." Again, this power is exclusive and is not meant to be shared by
any other branch or agency of the government.
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LEGISLATIVE DEP ARTMENT
COMPOSITION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177597. July 16, 2008.]
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
FACTS:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao
forms part of the (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, (R.A. 6734), as amended by Republic Act No.
9054 (R.A. 9054). Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao's first
legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the
ARMM in the plebiscite held.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM's legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were
the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao's
first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan's creation in a plebiscite. Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status
of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province"
under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato City's query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007
"maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District
of Maguindanao".
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007
Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao's first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City
because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of
"Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City", prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902
and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that
Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution 10 and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy, Sema indicated that she was seeking
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election as representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City". Respondent Dilangalen added
that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed
Maguindanao's first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could
not reapportion Maguindanao's first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as
the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato
City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
for the creation of a legislative district within a city.
ISSUE:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
HELD:
No.
The creation of any of the four local government units — province, city, municipality or barangay — must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in
the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress
to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However,
under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils,
the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established
in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, under the Local Government Code, "only . . . an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities
or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the
power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the
delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not
one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the
present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power
to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of
the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member . . . "
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also
the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the
city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the
same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
123
The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion
legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion
legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create
legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress
itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable
membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress
can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC 29 we held
that the "power of redistricting . . . is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make
laws", and thus is vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is
logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body. SaCDTA
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic
act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the
Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly,
to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of R.A. 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The
Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power . . . except on the following matters: . . . (k) National
elections. . . . ." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to
national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always
elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law. 30 ADCTac
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant,
a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. 31 It would be incongruous for a regional
legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers
extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds
and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the
legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices,
respectively, and it can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to
operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction . . . ." SHEIDC
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of
Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative
district for Shariff Kabunsuan.
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province
of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional.
Sema contended that "when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment."
The contention has no merit.
124
The Constitution ordains:
"The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members
who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of
their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by
law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise.
Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same
number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified
electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as
practicable, contiguous and compact territory."
Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the
creation of a province — for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of
Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The
requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof
refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those
incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the
general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein
alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by
statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute
— which cannot provide otherwise — nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without
a reapportionment.
There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a
province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of
120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under
consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with
the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned
requirements. 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of R.A. 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative
districts "indirectly" through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of
the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided
under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new
provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created
merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from
Congress' power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress' power to create provinces
which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative
district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that "each province
shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the
constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It
merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a
legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative
districts. In short, only an act of Congress can trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of
the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative
district.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its
creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of
Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the
census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the
surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which requires that "[E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand . . ., shall have at
least one representative."
Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of
Representatives. Under Section 19, 33 Article VI of R.A. 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create
provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of R.A.
125
7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000
square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000.
Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must
be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution
empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3
of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created . . . shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member", refers to a province created by
Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual
membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in
the present 14th Congress, there are 219 district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the
House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of
the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list
candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less
than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by
law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are
limited "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws,
. . . ." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (R.A. 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is
established "within the framework of the Constitution". This follows Section 15, Article X of the
Constitution which mandates that the ARMM "shall be created . . . within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines".
TEaADS
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the
creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of
municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of R.A.
7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such
municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution
of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities
necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The
ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly
cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial
jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201,
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
(AUTHOR’S NOTE: Pardon the lengthy decision. This is a landmark case. Judgment calls that we read,
at least the full length of the SC decision.)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTAT IVES
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]
ROBERT V. TOBIAS vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS
126
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged
to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this
legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed
R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of
these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners
contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities
have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has
the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as
aforecited.
ISSUE:
Are the contentions of the petitioners valid?
HELD:
No.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against
the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on
R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit
since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
127
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with
the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is
the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora,
the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong
district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to
him.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 118577. March 7, 1995.]
JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Makati." 1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners Juanito
Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
"1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of
Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code; it increased the legislative
district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a
general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every
census
ISSUE:
Whether the above-stated contentions are correct.
HELD:
No.
The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the
limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be
avoided by the Local Government Code in requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be
spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed technical descriptions
similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners seem to imply. To require such description in
128
the law as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government seeks to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the needs of their
constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No.
7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter
but defeat the spirit of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the
other way around. This could not be the intendment of the law. Too well settled is the rule that laws must
be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or
would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act
In the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. 114783, December 8, 1994, this Court ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a
new city. The Constitution (Section 5(1), Article VI) clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of
not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the
Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a
general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only
be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each
local government unit nationwide, would create an unequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time. That
intolerable situation will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be forever whole or it is not
sovereignty.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000.]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,

MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs.
FACTS:
Petitions for certiorari were filed assailing two (2) Comelec Resolutions ordering the proclamation of thirty-
eight (38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House
of Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941."
Comelec, together with the respondent parties, averred that the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in the House under the Constitution was mandatory and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 was unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it mathematically
impossible to fill up the house party-list complement.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the basis of
having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to the
proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended that (1)
129
under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least two percent of
the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of Representatives; and (2)
additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those which had garnered the two
percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the winning parties, as provided by said
Section 11.
ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent
allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of
RA 7941 constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party
be determined?
HELD:
Determination of the Total
Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving at the
number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into
a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
———————————— x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation 16 means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be provided
by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list seats. To illustrate,
considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the 1998 national elections,
the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
—— x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic question,
however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the time and
under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
Twenty Percent Allocation
a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up has been
left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by which it prescribed
130
that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must obtain at least two percent
of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." [A] simple reading of Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with
the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The
Constitution explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative,
Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however
deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain
at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list
seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three
seats in the House of Representatives. [T]he foregoing statutory requirements, show that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in Congress.
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties, organizations
and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually
represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the proposed bill. . . The
two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the law,
but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state, all government
authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by them. But to have
meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of people.
Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small
groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a multiparty
system of representation . . . Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress
set the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having
hurdled the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-
representations into the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would
dominate the party-list seats, if not the entire House.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 177271. May 4, 2007.]
BANTAY REPUBLIC ACT OR BA-RA 7941 vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941, for short) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR,
for short) assail the various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to
participate in the forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining
whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector each seeks to represent. In the second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P.
Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-
0724 dated April 3, 2007 effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales'
previous letter-request.
131
Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales' requests.
The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline
"COMELEC WON'T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", 7 with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says
party-list polls not personality oriented."
ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various
party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
2. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names
of said nominees.
HELD:
Yes.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. 17 And since every citizen by the simple fact of
his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of locus standi are ordinarily
unavailing.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people's right to know is limited to
"matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. Similarly,
the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
national security.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list
groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be
shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested
disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and
duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same provision requires to be posted
in the polling places on election day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read
into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that
prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect
of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May 2007 elections. The interpretation
thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7
of R.A. No. 7941.
The Comelec's reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. 20 While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
132
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. Hence the need for voters to be informed about matters that have
a bearing on their choice. The ideal cannot be achieved in a system of blind voting, as veritably
advocated in the assailed resolution of the Comelec. The Court, since the 1914 case of Gardiner v.
Romulo, 21 has consistently made it clear that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that
would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election. 22 So it must be here
for still other reasons articulated earlier.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941's and UP-LR's posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the qualifications of their
nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a
party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 172103. April 13, 2007.]
CITIZENS' BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List System, issued
Resolution No. NBC 04-004 3 promulgated on June 2, 2004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one
of those which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list representatives. Based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 19, 4
CIBAC received a total number of 493,546 votes out of the 12,627,852 votes cast for all the party-list
participants, which, by applying the formula adopted by the Supreme Court in Veterans Federation Party
v. COMELEC, 5 resulted in a percentage of 3.9084. 6 In the computation for additional seats for the
parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%, thereby
foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system for having
received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.
Petitioner CIBAC, together with Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL) and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), filed a
Joint Motion for Immediate Proclamation 8 entreating the COMELEC en banc to recognize their
entitlement to an additional seat and that their second nominees be immediately proclaimed. They based
their claim on Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna), applying the following Veterans formula:
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats
Votes Cast for First Party for First Party
ISSUE:
whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner CIBAC an additional
seat in the House of Representatives under the party-list system by using the simplified formula instead of
the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula.
HELD:
133
The Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters to determine the
winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes." 13 (Emphasis supplied.)
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2% threshold,
"proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and other qualified
party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans:
[H]ow do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given by the law is
that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one seat. Proportionally, if
the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it should be entitled to twice
the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for computing the number of seats to
which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes
–––––––––––– = of first party relative
Total votes for to total votes for
party-list system party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six percent of
the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to two additional
seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is equal to or greater
than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one additional or a total of two
seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party shall not be entitled to any
additional seat.
We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the maximum
number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total number of
available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest rank and are
thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the parties are
entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of Representatives.
HEAcDC
xxx xxx xxx
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to,
based on proportional representation. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
Additional seats No. of votes of
for concerned = concerned party No. of additional
134
party ––––––––––––– x seats allocated to
No. of votes of the first party
first party (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of additional seats
to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary.
In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and are not rounded off for
the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the awarding of a number of seats in
excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute proportional representation is
restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of two additional slots. An increase in the
maximum number of additional representatives a party may be entitled to would result in a more accurate
proportional representation. But the law itself has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need
to work within such extant parameter.
From a scrutiny of the Veterans and Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formulae in determining the
additional seats for party-list representatives, it is readily apparent that the Veterans formula is materially
different from the one used in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna. In Veterans, the multiplier used was
"the [number] of additional seats allocated to the first party," while in the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula, the multiplier "allotted seats for first party" was applied. The dissimilarity in the multiplier
used spells out a big difference in the outcome of the equation. This divergence on the multiplier was
pointed out and stressed by respondent COMELEC. Nevertheless, petitioner insists that the correct
multiplier is the ALLOTTED seats for the first party referring to the three (3) seats won by Bayan Muna
which emerged as the winning first party, as allegedly prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna.
The phrase "applying the relevant formula in Veterans to BUHAY" admits of no other conclusion than that
the Court merely applied the Veterans formula to Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna in resolving the
additional seats by the other qualified party-list groups. However, it appears that there was an inaccurate
presentation of the Veterans formula as the Court used the multiplier "allotted seats for the first party" in
Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna instead of the "[number] of additional seats allocated to the first
party" prescribed in the Veterans formula. It is apparent that the phrase "[number] of additional" was
omitted, possibly by inadvertence from the phrase "allotted seats for First Party." The disparity is material,
substantial, and significant since the multiplier "[number] of additional seats allocated to the First Party"
prescribed in the Veterans formula pertains to a multiplier of two (2) seats, while the multiplier "allotted
seats for the first party" in Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula can mean a multiplier of
maximum three (3) seats, since the first party can garner a maximum of three (3) seats.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner's case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC is not entitled to
an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 20 18 contained in the petition shows that the first
party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of 1,203,305 votes. Petitioner
CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was proclaimed that the first party, Bayan
Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats 19 based on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-
004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following
result:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional Additional
—————— = seats allocated to = Seats for
No. of votes of the first party concerned
first party (Emphasis supplied.) party
135
Applying this formula, the result is as follows:
495,190
———— x 2 =
1,203,305
0.41152493 x 2 = 0.82304986
This is a far cry from the claimed Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used the multiplier
"allotted seats for the first party," viz: EHSCcT
Additional Seats = Votes Cast for Qualified Party x Allotted Seats
Votes Cast for First Party for First Party
Applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula to CIBAC, it yields the following result:
Additional seats = 495,190 x 3 = 1.2345
1,203,305
Unfortunately, it is the Veterans formula that is sanctioned by the Court and not the Ang Bagong Bayani
and Bayan Muna formula that petitioner alleges.
Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1), then it did not obtain
or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate from our ruling in Veterans that "in
order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not
entitled to an additional seat.
The simplified formula has already been abandoned.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Petitioners Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and Bayan Muna filed the present petitions under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 37851 issued by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations
and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented.
ISSUES:
Whether political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
HELD:
136
Yes.
Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8,
Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-
list system. Indubitably, therefore, political parties — even the major ones — may participate in the party-
list elections.
Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in
order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to
win a seat in Congress. He explained: "The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections,
we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have about
1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly
even if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the
purpose and objectives of the party-list system."
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, . . . ." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines
"political party" as "an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their
adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public
office."
"Proportional representation" in Sec. 2 of RA 7941 does not refer to the number of people in a particular
district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in
a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
Lack of well-defined constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral group, like
voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those with
disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates
the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a
fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in
connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which
they are associated or related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or
specialized by those in immediate association.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show — through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record — that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a
conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
137
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling
"Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors . . . to be elected to the House
of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are
political parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented.
In view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong, which is
allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system.
Furthermore, the Constitution provides that "religious denominations and sects shall not be registered."
The prohibition was explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission in this wise: "[T]he
prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition here
against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect
as a political party."
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which
enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows: "(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means
to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers
or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes; (5) It violates or fails to
comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its
petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be
a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors;
so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens
"who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the
working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine
representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.
As previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be
able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as
a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a
party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district . . . .
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137329. August 9, 2000.]
138
ROGELIO M. TORAYNO SR., GENEROSO ELIGAN and JACQUELINE M. SERINO, petitioners, vs.
FACTS:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to set aside a Comelec Resolution ruling that private
respondent Vicente Y. Emano possessed the minimum period of residence to be eligible to vote in
Cagayan de Oro, as well as be voted mayor thereof. SEHTAC
Petitioners claimed that private respondent could not have changed his residence to Cagayan de Oro City
because he discharged his duties as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three consecutive terms
immediately preceding the 1998 elections and he remained a resident of the province until he filed his
certificate of candidacy for Mayor on March 25, 1998.
ISSUE:
Whether Emano is qualified to run
HELD:
Yes.
Generally, in requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek
to be elected, the Constitution or the law intends to prevent the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer
unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from
[seeking] an elective office to serve that community." Such provision is aimed at excluding outsiders "from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing
residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of
the community. This purpose is "best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the area
for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice."
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of Misamis Oriental and remains a
geographical part of the province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more important, it is itself the
seat of the provincial government. As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their functions
in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less, getting acquainted with its concerns and interests.
Vicente Y. Emano, having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms and consequently
residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to adopt it as his permanent place of residence. . . .
Private respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de Oro City while discharging his
duties as governor of Misamis Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there together with his
family. He even paid his 1998 community tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and
purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for
mayor thereof.
(AUTHOR’S NOTE: I don’t see party-list issue here. Seriously)
QUALIFICATIONS AND T ERM OF OFFICE
EN BANC
139
[G.R. No. 157870. November 3, 2008.]
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private
offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue.
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486,
prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in
connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May
10, 2004 elections, 1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to
nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution;
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be
a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board
(DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.
ISSUE:
Whether Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification
for candidates for senator?
Whether Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution?
HELD:
Yes, there is an imposition of new qualification which is prohibited.
140
No, on the second issue.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36 (g), validly impose qualifications on candidates
for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36 (g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously
as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test". Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to
what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the
drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement. CHDTEA
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165, that the provision does
not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would
work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates
for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and
revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal
would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.
RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003.]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO

ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
FACTS:
Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. Petitioner cited the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In
that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the assailed law is constitutional.
141
HELD:
Yes.
According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article. Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under existing
election laws and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with
domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this country,
the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to
establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into
being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is
precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the
largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission
explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee voting. The Court, however,
declared certain provisions of the law unconstitutional, namely, portions of Secs. 17.1, 19 and 25, as they
trampled on the constitutional mandate of independence of the Commission on Elections. The Court also
upheld Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to
canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged
with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. The Court likewise upheld Sec. 5 (d) of the
law. It also declared that pursuant to Sec. 30 of the law the rest of the provision of said law continues to
be in full force and effect.
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it behooves the Court to
take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule
in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De
Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great document.
Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary
implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the
language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of is framers
through their debates in the constitutional convention. R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the
mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a
system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The
Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless pronouncements of the
Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile. Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an
overseas Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the
circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee
voting. Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos reside
abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small measure to the economic
uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this country's leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and considering the novelty of
the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would
spawn constitutional problems especially because the Constitution itself provides for the residency
requirement of voters. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt
as to the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems
that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to
provide a system for overseas absentee voting.
142
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents' domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. It is
in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. That Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in
fact the subject of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated
upon on the Senate floor.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process. Which does not
require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailed law which enumerates those
who are disqualified. As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration
or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as
long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of
the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not
otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must
establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is
required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system
for absentee voting. Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution
that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise." To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent
to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders are disqualified to
run for any elective office finds no application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for
obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent
residents in their host countries. In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A.
9189, they may still be considered as a "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of suffrage. It must
be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to "resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her
registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in another
country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return "shall be cause for the
removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia."
Contrary to petitioner's claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law
prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad" is not physically present in the country.
The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting
established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have
retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical
absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
143
Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not
actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and
8(c) of the law.
TERM VS. TENURE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 96859. October 15, 1991.]
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR.,
FACTS:
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987 and
thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was
scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and addressed
to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and functions as elected
Member of Congress."
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of Muslim
Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman because Section
67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, Being contrary thereto, and
therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be shortened,
are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the Senators, Members
of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30,1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election."
ISSUE:
Whether Mitra was correct in removing Dimaporo’s name in the Roll.
HELD:
Yes.
In B.P. Blg. 881 members of the legislature included in the enumeration of elective public officials are to
be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of their certificates of candidacy for
another office, except for President and Vice-President.
144
This statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office by
discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making
it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is
consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty
and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature (22
R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure) may be affected by
circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may
not exist at all. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy
for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains
and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself
as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its application to
present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of
the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by
impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds found in Article
VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are not exclusive. As held
in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution of the circumstances
which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others. Neither does it preclude the
legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the constitution or statutes are
merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall become vacant not as a penalty but
simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it not be preposterous to say that a
congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not one of the grounds provided for in the
Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never intended such absurdity.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore
the ousted official.
The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he exercises administrative
powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both the Speaker and House
Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove petitioner's name from the
Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881. When the Commission on
Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that petitioner had filed his certificate of
candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents had no choice but to abide by the clear
and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do
so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute
imposing the duty.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140335. December 13, 2000.]
145
THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
The President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission.
She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the
Commission on Appointments, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. On February 24,
1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of
office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998,
opined that petitioner's term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on, February 02, 1999.
Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,
1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de Leon; wrote the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on
whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminus staff may be paid their salaries
notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02,1999. On February 18, 1999, the
General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that "the term of Commissioner Gaminde has
expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent."
Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance
No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-
terminus staff, effective February 02, 1999. Petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on
Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing
petitioner's appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the
issue of petitioner's term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment
paper which set the expiration date on February 02, 1999, and that the Commission was bereft of power
to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the
President. Petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit
denied the motion in Decision No. 99-129.
ISSUE:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to
which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment
paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her.
HELD:
In Republic vs. Imperial, we said that "the operation of the rotational plan requires two conditions, both
indispensable to its workability: (1) that the terms of the first three (3) Commissioners should start on a
common date, and, (2) that any vacancy due to death, resignation or disability before the expiration of the
term should only be filled only for the unexpired balance of the term." Consequently, the terms of the first
Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start
on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the
appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the
regular recurrence of the two-year interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing
conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02,
1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification,
the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter.
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of the first
appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we considered the plain
language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the
1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term of office for Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first appointees terms of seven, five and three years,
without reappointment. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
146
capacity. There is no need to expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to
coincide with the effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).
Transitory Provisions contemplate is "tenure" not "term" of the incumbent Chairmen and Members of the
Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, who "shall
continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution, unless they are sooner removed for
cause or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office or appointed to a new term
thereunder." The term "unless" imports an exception to the general rule. Clearly, the transitory provisions
mean that the incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year
after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the
appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their
becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term
thereunder, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the
Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing
for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution.
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her appointment
paper. On. September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment. She
accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by the term of the
appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter dated April 07, 1998,
of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term would expire on February 02,
2000, was in error What was submitted to the Commission on Appointments was a nomination for a term
expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her successor must be deemed to start on February 02,
1999, and expire on February 02, 2006. We adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto officer in good
faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual
service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and
other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.
ELECTION
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
In 2001, when Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was made Vice-President of the Philippines, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 84 calling for the COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special election to be
held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators with a 6-year term each
were due to be elected therein and the senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes
shall serve the unexpired term of Senator Guingona, Jr. Later, however, when the COMELEC proclaimed
13 candidates as elected senators in Resolution No. 01-005, petitioners here questioned that validity of
the special election alleging it was not sufficiently distinguished from the regular election.
Allegedly, the COMELEC failed to give notice of the time of the special election. Under the applicable law,
RA No. 6645, however, it was already provided that such special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate
shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections. On the allegation that there had
been insufficient notice, thus, misleading the voters, the Court ruled that no evidence actually proved the
147
same. As to the separate documentation and canvassing of the special election, none was required under
RA No. 6645.
ISSUE:
On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on
14 May 2001.
HELD:
No.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the
Senate and the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by law." To implement this provision
of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6646. And Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166
subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, thus; . . . in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the
special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Thus, in case a
vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of the term, COMELEC is required: (1)
to call a special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than sixty (60)
days not later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case of a vacancy in the Senate,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give
notice to the voters of, among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the
special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as
would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of
voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void. The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special
senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date.
Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest
number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the
special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election. Instead, what
petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such notice, no special election took place.
This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted
in the elections of 14 May 2001 with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding
regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC does not
preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election, the office to be voted in
that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would determine the winner. Such actual notice could
come from many sources, such as media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election
propaganda during the campaign. More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the
party who stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who
voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of
their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to
annul elections and will only do so when it is "impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are
unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been
prevented by violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise. Otherwise, the consistent
rule has been to respect the electorate's will and let the results of the election stand, despite irregularities
that may have attended the conduct of the elections.
Neither is there basis in petitioners' claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special
senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the
candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist
in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC "fix the date
of the election", if necessary, and "state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for". Similarly,
petitioners' reliance on Section 73 of B.P. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section
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4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is
misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation
of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
ORG ANIZATIONS AND SE SSIONS
QUORUM
[G.R. No. L-2821. March 4, 1949.]
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO
FACTS:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada requested that his right to
speak on the floor on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Tañada and Senator Prospero
Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate
President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at the
appointed time (10:00 A. M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed his
appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A. M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he did not
immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution
submitted by Senators Tañada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read slowly and
carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senators Francisco and
Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that the
session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order. Except Senator Sotto who was
confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senators were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and his
partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Tañada from delivering his privilege speech.
The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes, but
this motion was likewise opposed by Senators Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of the
above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada repeatedly
stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then presiding,
continuously ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Tañada insisted on being
recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of any senator who
would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the actions of his
follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of order!" everytime the
latter would ask for recognition of Senator Tañada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At
about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized by
petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Tañada.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the session
hall followed by Senators David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the rest of the
senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melecio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore, urged by those
senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
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Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so made — that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent
thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved, Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary,
because the Assistant Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the
latter abandoned the session.
Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech.
Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-Tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded
it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the position
of the President of the Senate and designating the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of
the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippine Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioner asks the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippine Senate and oust respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether a quorum was present
HELD:
Yes.
The subject matter of this quo warranto proceeding — to declare petitioner the rightful President of the
Philippines Senate and oust respondent — is not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in view of
the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon 46 Phil., 83., 1)
and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not
be interfered with nor taken over by the judiciary. The selection of the presiding officer of the Philippine
Senate affects only the senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them.
The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over this quo warranto proceeding, in the light of events
subsequent to the original resolution.
The Court held that there was a quorum in the session of the Philippine Senate (composed of twenty-four
Senators being in the United States. there is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz
was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the
Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous
endorsement
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minutes say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator
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Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the
Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not
mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs.
Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the
House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of
the Senate for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did
not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this
decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator Avelino,
it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being
essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the
Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amendable at any time by that majority. And at
any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from
the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them
beyond the shadow of a doubt.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127255. August 14, 1997.]
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioners, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called sin taxes on the
manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petitioners brought this suit against herein respondents
claiming that the latter violated Rule VIII, Section 35, Rule XVII, Section 103, Rule XIX, Section 112, Rule
XVI, Section 97, Rule XX Section 121-122, Rule XXI Section 123 and Rule XVIII Section 109 of the
House Rules. For this matter, petitioners assert that violation of the House Rules is a violation of the
Constitution thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether SC has jurisdiction to inquire into House Rules
HELD:
No.
Supreme Court finds no ground for holding that congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting
Republic Act 8240. It is clear from the facts of the case that what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than the constitutional
requirement for the enactment of a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution,
pertaining to the existence of the quorum. The established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself. Verily, it
151
follows that the case at hand does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone
beyond the constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise of Article VIII, Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No. 7198 by speaker of the House and
President of the Senate and certification by secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment.
Cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire
into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the
absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted
by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.'
Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or
violate fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection
to the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal." CIHAED
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look
into the internal proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as
long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that each of the three
departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade without
upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry
into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise
our power.
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely
of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction"
so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as
this involving approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a
viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It
has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending
the Tariff and Customs Code were approved. Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that
some other way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages,
the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of the
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors,
our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
152
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem."
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the
request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. Indeed,
considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays
had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the
precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It would appear, however, that the
session was suspended to allow the parties to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m.
on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if
there was anything he wanted to say. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their
own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners insisted on
the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's
question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence.
And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and
would have put an end to any further consideration of the question.
Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo
was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a
quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously
present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his objection by his
continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a
quorum.
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on
November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence,
is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on
the following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent
urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be
recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals
have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the most permanent
character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals."
As already noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment
has been duly proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of
procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when
153
petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in
excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was
permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-22041. September 11, 1924.]
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL
FACTS:
A resolution was adopted by the Philippine Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5,
1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for
the period of one year as he is hereby, declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the
privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Senator for
the Sixth District on the occasion of certain, phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate
regarding the credentials of said Mr. Alejandrino.
This is, in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine Senate against the Philippine Senate
and certain of its official employees. Without, therefore, at this time discussing any of the other interesting
questions which have been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the issue here suggested.
ISSUE:
May the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of
Senator Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official position?
HELD:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands lacks jurisdiction by mandamus to restrain or control action
by the Philippine Legislature or a branch thereof.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised to find the general rule of mandamus to
be, that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very
obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character which
therefore pertain to their legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts
cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a
member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the
expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.
"The Congress is the Legislative Department of the Government; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department; though the acts of both,
when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cognizance.
FIRST DIVISION
154
[G.R. No. L-17144. October 28, 1960.]
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR. vs. SALIPADA K. PENDATUN
FACTS:
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House of Representatives from the Second District of the province of
Cebu, took the floor of this Chamber on the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A Message to
Garcia; saying that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the gravity or seriousness of a
criminal case, the culprit can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can come across with a
handsome dole and other anomalies in the Garcia administration.
House of Representatives in response to the speech, created a special committee of fifteen Members to
be appointed by the Speaker to investigate the truth of the charges against the President of the
Philippines and for such purpose it is authorized to summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the production of pertinent papers before it, and if Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to require him to show cause why he should not be punished by the
House.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged: first, the Resolution violated his constitutional
absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House; second, his words constituted no
actionable conduct; and third, after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House took up
other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has
intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer
therefor nor be subject to censure by the House. Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition
for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada
K. Pendatun and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity. Osmena failed to substantiate his allegation, hence he was
suspended.
ISSUE:
Whether Osmena is liable.
HELD:
Yes.
While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member
thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison,
suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior. The courts will not
resume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department with the
legislature.
155
The House of Representatives of the United States has taken the position that personal attacks upon the
Chief Executive constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took
action against offenders, even after other business had been considered.
While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which
the Constitution did not impair.
ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE
[G.R. No. L-1123. March 5, 1947.]
ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL.vs. JOSE LOPEZ VITO
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines to be
appended as an ordinance thereto." three of the plaintiff senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives
had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections as having been elected senators
and representatives in the elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were suspended by the
Senate shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged irregularities in their election. The eight representatives since their election had not been allowed
to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of the Speaker, for the same reason, although
they had not been formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been introduced in the
House of Representatives, but that resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House when the
present petition was filed.
As a consequence these three senators and eight representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned within the computation of the necessary three-
fourths vote which is required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If these members of
Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been
short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
At the threshold we are met with the question of the jurisdiction of this Court. The respondents deny that
this Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the courts of an enrolled bill or resolution.
HELD:
It will be seen upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2210, that, roughly, it provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1) by the journals, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their order;
and (2) in case of acts of the legislature, by a copy signed by the presiding Officers and secretaries
thereof, which shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of the
issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the enrollment theory, for, as
already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section
313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of
the law and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the
156
journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such copy
out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to
have been noted between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand
that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the explicit provision
that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
In view of the foregoing considerations, we deem it unnecessary to decide the question of whether the
senators and representatives who were ignored in the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
were members of Congress within the meaning of section 1 of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-17931. February 28, 1963.]
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC. vs. HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ
FACTS:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later
promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment
of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and December 1959,
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. — which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardboard producers — bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main raw materials in the
production of said glues — and paid therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In
May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as
margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee
therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of said
amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the ground
that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of Section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2069.
"urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from "urea" and
"formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative
conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress
intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this
view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said
House, by members thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin
fee.
HELD:
Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill — which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of
"urea and formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President
157
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress
and approved by the Executive — on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy
is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
JOURNAL ENTRY RULE V. ENROLLED BILL THEO RY
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-23475. April 30, 1974.]
HERMINIO A. ASTORGAvs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS
FACTS:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the House of
Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21, 1964. Forthwith
the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces
and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in
case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial
amendments to Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those amendments were
approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the
journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.
Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of
the amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments
which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of Representatives thereafter signified
its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The
printed copies were then certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President. On
June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the President of the
Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon
became Republic Act No. 4065.
Senator Tolentino, who on July 5, 1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him and approved on the Senate
floor. A subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by the
Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on which his signature appeared had never been
approved by the Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not
make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses
of Congress informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads
and chiefs of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued
an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a
petition with this Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with
Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the Executive
Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and
the members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
158
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since it was not the bill
actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill
itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue.
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a
bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the government,
11 is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he
had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even
greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and
indisputable in logic.
HELD:
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
"The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate, in
open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has
passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President,
that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and
is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by
Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of
the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to coequal and
independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if
the attestation is absent and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to
the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals may still be
resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the
presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when
the bill is approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President." 12 In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a similar provision in the State Constitution,
said that the same "makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage and it follows that if a
bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it has 'passed
both houses' will satisfy the constitutional requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by
the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no
attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No.
4065 would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to
the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute.
The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine whether or not
the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
159
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of misprinting and
other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the
Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to
the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the
alleged law, which admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed
and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become
law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the
law-making body.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065
entitled "AN ACT DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICE-MAYOR OF THE
CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared not to have been duly enacted and
therefore did not become law.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29658. February 27, 1969.]
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO
FACTS:
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at the behest of
Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when the bill emerged
from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record."
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of
House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page proofs of the bill as
finally approved by both Houses of Congress (annex G), the following provision appears:
"SECTION 10. Minimum qualifications for appointment as Chief of a Police Agency. — No person may
be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either the Armed Forces of the Philippines or has served as chief of
police with exemplary record or the National Bureau of Investigation or the police department of any city
and has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years or any high school
graduate who has served the police department of a city or has served as officer in the Armed Forces for
at least eight years from the rank of captain and/or higher."
It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or,"
was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire
provision and substituted what now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or has
served as chief of police with exemplary record, or has served in the police department of any city with
rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher."
HELD:
160
The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows that
Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We
cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other
branches of the Government demands that We act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the
said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in
the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth
of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation
which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. After all, House
cleaning - the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be suggested by the petitioner - can
best be effected by the occupants thereof. Expressed elsewise, this is a matter worthy of the attention not
of an Oliver Wendell Holmes but of a Sherlock Holmes. Indeed the course suggested to us by the
petitioner would be productive of nothing but mischief.
In Mabanag vs. Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil. 1, we held that an enrolled bill "imports absolute verity and is binding
on the courts." This Court held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact that the vote of
three-fourths of the members of the Congress (as required by the Constitution to approve proposals for
constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on account of the suspension of some members of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate. Thus in Mabanag, the enrolled bill theory was adopted.
Whatever doubt there might have been as to the status and force of the theory in the Philippines, in view
of the dissent of three Justices in Mabanag, was finally laid to rest by the unanimous decision in Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963.
We are not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled
bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must be entered on the
journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be affected by a failure to have
such matters entered on the journal, is a question which we do not now decide. All we hold is that with
respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the
event of any discrepancy.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS
COMPOSITION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
TANADA v. CUENCO
FACTS:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens
Party, whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the
Philippines, was one of the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the general elections
held in November, 1955, in which Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco
Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto, Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed
elected. Subsequently, the election of these Senators-elect — who eventually assumed their respective
seats in the Senate — was contested by petitioner Macapagal, who had, also, run for the Senate, in said
election — in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on
behalf of the Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias,
as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of
the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then,
upon nomination of Senator Primicias, on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the
161
objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J.
Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the
Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as technical assistant and
private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondents; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said
Electoral Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case
at bar against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio
and Placido Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate
consists of 23 Senators who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator — namely, petitioner,
Lorenzo M. Tañada — belonging to the Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in
nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without power or color of authority and in clear
violation . . . of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming membership in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents had "acted
absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the Constitution,
usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical
assistants and private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado — who caused said appointments to
be made — as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators
Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo
M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as representative of the Citizens Party
in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of petitioner Diosdado
Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided by an Electoral Tribunal
composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than three (3) Senators upon nomination of the
party having the second largest number of votes therein, together with three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members
belonging to the Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the petitioner
Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista
Senators having been nominated and chosen in the manner alleged . . . herein- above."
HELD:
The term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the Government . It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In the case at bar, the question for determination is whether
the election of two senators, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon
nomination by another senator, who is a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number
of votes in the Senate, on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that
said members of the tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination *** of the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is
not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional limitations. It is clearly within the legitimate
province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the proceedings in connection therewith.
Hence, this Court has, not only jurisdiction, but, also the duty, to consider and determine the principal
issue raised by the parties herein.
The main objective of the framers of the Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an
Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress was to insure the
exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking
body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in
each House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or
162
Tribunal so that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said
cases, and thus be induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said
body the same number of representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the
former may be decisive and endow said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of the parties having the
largest and the second largest number of votes in each House therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be
maintained by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals.
The framers of the Constitution intended to prevent the majority party from controlling the Electoral
Tribunals, and the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority and the minority
parties therein, with the Justice of the Supreme Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the
resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution for the
selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. It
constitutes the essence of said Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void.
While it is true that the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, would in effect be
limited to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members it must be conceded that the present composition of the
Senate, wherein twenty-three (23) of its members belong to one party and one (1) member belongs to
another, was not foreseen by the framers of the Constitution. Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails
over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan
considerations cannot be decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court,
three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or two (2) members nominated by
the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
If the Nacionalista Party would be allowed to nominate five (5) members to the Senate Electoral Tribunal
instead of three (3), it would have the absolute majority, since there would be one (1) member of the
Citizens Party and three (3) members of the Supreme Court, and hence, the philosophy underlying the
Constitution would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties therein would be
destroyed, and, what is worse, the decisive moderating role of the Justice of the Supreme Court would be
wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance of political
considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely
what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall.
When the election of members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the
nomination of the political parties referred to in the Constitution, the latter thereby indicates its reliance
upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of those chosen
therefor. The delegates to the Convention did not ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to
giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly with the composition of the
Electorals, they believed that, even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake of the
bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to resist the demands of political exigencies, the
pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the party from
which it comes.
FUNCTION OF THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
EN BANC
April 1, 2009
Limkaichong v. COMELEC
163
FACTS:
On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. In the following weeks, two (2) petitions
for her disqualification were instituted before the COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her
locality. Napoleon Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her
disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of the House of
Representatives and alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese
citizens at the time of her birth. Renald F. Villando, also a registered voter of the same locality, filed the
second petition on the same ground of citizenship. He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her
parents were still Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father,
never attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the
cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of qualified
candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
In her separate Answers to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino
since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother, who had
reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time of her birth on
November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father took his Oath of Allegiance on
October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of Naturalization on the same day. She
contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the petitions outright for lack of cause of action. She also
contended that the petitions were dismissible on the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral
attack on her and her father’s citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rule that attack on
one's citizenship may only be made through a direct action for its nullity.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong emerged
as the winner with 65,708 votes or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another congressional candidate,
Olivia Paras who obtained 57,962. Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate.
COMELEC granted the petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for
Representative of the First District directed the Provincial Supervisor of the COMELEC to strike out her
name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend
her proclamation.
The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062
adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with
pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases.
On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration and for
the lifting of the directive suspending her proclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the
winner in the congressional race pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062
On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened
and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives. In the interim,
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De Venecia) allowed Limkaichong to
officially assume the office as a Member of the House of Representatives on July 23, 2007, as shown in
the Journal of the House of Representatives.
164
Despite Limkaichong’s repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for
clarification the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, she filed with this Court a Petition for
Certiorari praying for the annulment of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division and the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred that
since she was already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform her duties and functions as
such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has jurisdiction over any issue
involving her qualifications for the said office.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Negros

Oriental is valid;
2. Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;
3. Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in lieu of the
COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;
HELD:
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives, thus:
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives

unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
the election.
When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. It
was not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her father remained a
Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has sided with Camero and
Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional candidate in the First District of Negros
Oriental for having failed to comply with the citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation was
ordered suspended notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the elections.
Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC En Banc
Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her functions as a Member
of the House of Representatives.
Whether Limkaichong’s proclamation was valid.
165
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. Since the execution of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to the valid proclamation of
Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. – A motion to reconsider a

decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling.
A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule against the
validity of Limkaichong’s proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division has sustained the
validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution dated June 29, 2007, the petition
filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that. The COMELEC First Division has also adopted
Limkaichong’s argument that following her valid proclamation, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the
disqualification cases has ceased and that the same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings
filed before the HRET. Notably, the dismissal of Paras’ petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its
Omnibus Order dated January 28, 2008. Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC’s
constitutionally mandated power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the
1[59]
elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the
COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of
justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still pending at the
time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from the electorate, shall be
proclaimed but that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and
resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, in this case, the COMELEC Second Division having failed to
act on the disqualification cases against Limkaichong until after the conduct of the elections, with her
obtaining the highest number of votes from the electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the
PBOC pursuant to Resolution No. 8062.
166
II
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should assume
jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25,
2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her qualifications,
and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.
Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the issue
concerning Limkaichong’s disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC En
Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007, the matter was still
pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc
We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It follows then that the proclamation of a winning
candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the
proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding
before the HRET, the constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of
the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The use of
the word ―sole‖ in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the OEC underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:
RULE 14. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
167
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that
Limkaichong’s proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the HRET from
acquiring jurisdiction.
In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET
from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member’s qualification to sit in the
House of Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
Rule 16. Election protest. -- A verified petition contesting the election of any
Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10)
days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated
as the protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
xxx
Rule 17. Quo Warranto. -- A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days
after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as
the petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
xxx
Rule 19. Periods Non-Extendible. -- The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16

and 17 is jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the
remedy of those who may assail one’s eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the
HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the
2[66]
HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, we ruled that where the candidate has
already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file
an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.
The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R.
Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or petition for quo
warranto within ten days from May 25, 2007. But they did not. In fact, to date, no petition of protest or
petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily, the ten-day prescriptive period for initiating
a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.
However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the House of
Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election but during their
168
entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may
still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding.
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated by
statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an
election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant.
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit Limkaichong
from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's name
in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives because he has no power to allow an alien to sit
and continue to sit therein as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of his legal authority. Moreover,
Biraogo opposes Limkaichong’s assumption of office in the House of Representatives since she is not
qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen and, thus, disqualified by virtue of a final and executory
judgment of the COMELEC En Banc. He relied on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 29,
2007, which affirmed the COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying
Limkaichong from holding public office. He contended that the said Resolution dated June 29, 2007 is
already final and executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res judicata.
De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for honoring the
proclamation of Limkaichong, because it had the hallmarks of regularity, and he had no power to exclude
any Member of the House of Representatives motu proprio. In their Comment on the petition,
respondents De Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a Member in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives and his/her recognition as such becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary
General and the House of Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid Certificate
of Proclamation and Oath of Office.
Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's, substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16, 2008
stating that under the circumstances, the House of Representatives, and its officials, are without recourse
except to honor the validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong until the same is
canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly elected Representative of the
First District of Negros Oriental until it is ordered by this Court, as it was in Codilla, to recognize
somebody else. He went on to state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a
presumptively valid title to the office, the House of Representatives cannot, motu proprio, cancel, revoke,
withdraw any recognition given to a sitting Member or to ―remove‖ his name from its roll, as such would
amount to a removal of such Member from his office without due process of law. Verily, it is only after a
determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and executory
order, that the Member does not have a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly elected Member), that the
House of Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.
169
Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the House of Representatives
should be exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly
completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the elections,
and during the pendency of the proceedings determining one’s qualification or disqualification, would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 45081. July 15, 1936.]
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner, vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
FACTS:
Angara was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly. Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed
before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose
A. Angara, being the only protest filed after the passage of Resolution No. 8 aforequoted, and praying,
among other-things, that said respondent be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the
first district of Tayabas, or that the election of said position be nullified. Angara, one of the respondents in
the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a)
that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative to prescribe the period during which protests against the election of its members should be
presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the
limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. Ynsua,
filed an "Answer to the Motion of Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision
barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the National Assembly, after
confirmation. ET denied Angara’s petition
ISSUES:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
HELD:
Yes.
The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. If the conflict were left undecided
and undetermined, a void would be created in our constitutional system which may in the long run prove
destructive of the entire framework. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining
the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly."
170
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its
totality all the powers previously exercised by the Legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and
appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining
legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting through their
delegates to the Convention to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in
view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with judicial temper by including
in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the
performance and execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although
it is not a power in our tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting
within the limits of its authority, an independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department
than to any other. The location of the provision (sec. 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI
entitled "Legislative Department" of our Constitution is very indicative. Its composition is also significant in
that it is constituted by a majority of members of the Legislature. But it is a body separate from and
independent of the Legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the Legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission
is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a
restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the constitution. If the power claimed for
the National Assembly to regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of
the Electoral Commission to lay down a period within which protest should be filed were conceded, the
grant of power to the commission would be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such a case would
be invested with the power to determine contested cases involving the election, returns, and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all times to the regulative power of the National
Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our Constitution of totally transferring this
authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be created with the resultant
inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of the Electoral
Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without
the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and wherever the National Assembly
has chosen to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution.
The power to regulate on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to
the ultimate control by the Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by
indirection, to the entire abrogation of the constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be
permitted.
The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character
to limit the time within which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. It is a settled rule of
construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary
for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further
constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral
Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise
of its exclusive powers to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members
of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.
The possibility of abuse is not an argument against the concession of the power as there is no power that
is not susceptible of abuse. If any mistake has been committed in the creation of an Electoral
Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all cases relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is political, not judicial, and must be
sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of the government are not
intended to be corrected by the judiciary. The people in creating the Electoral Commission reposed as
much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified cases assigned to it, as it has
171
given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the agencies of the
government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated
with same zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the
sovereign will. That the actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in
given instances, is inherent in the imperfections of human institutions. From the fact that the Electoral
Commission may not be interfered with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its
acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may not be challenged in appropriate cases over which the
courts may exercise jurisdiction.
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom no protests
has been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1936, can not be construed as a limitation upon
the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of members of the Legislature at the time the power to decide election contests
was still lodged in the Legislature, confirmation alone by the Legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to
fix the time for the filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of
its members against whose election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary.
Confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution before he can discharge
his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board of canvassers
is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the National Assembly and to render him eligible to any
office in said body
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 165691. June 22, 2005.]
ROBERT Z. BARBERS vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Barbers and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the Philippines in the 10 May 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections. COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of
Senators proclaiming Biazon as "the 12th ranking duly elected 12th Senator to serve for a term of 6
years, beginning. The COMELEC stated that after the canvass of the supplemental Provincial COCs from
Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and one barangay in Nueva Vizcaya, Biazon obtained 10,635,270 votes
nationwide. On the other hand, Barbers obtained 10,624,585 votes. Thus, Biazon obtained 10,685 more
votes than Barbers. The COMELEC stated that this "difference will not materially be affected by the votes
in certain precincts where there was failure of elections."
Claiming that Biazon's proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation of Biazon
as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines with the COMELEC. Barbers asserted that the proclamation
of Biazon was "illegal and premature being based on an incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted that the
remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and the results of the special elections, which were still to be
conducted, would undoubtedly affect the results of the elections. Biazon asserted that since the
COMELEC has proclaimed Biazon and has taken his oath of office on 30 June 2004, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, not the COMELEC, has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition
The Issues
ISSUE:
Whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition.
172
HELD:
No.
In Javier v. COMELEC, 18 we interpreted the phrase "election, returns and qualifications" as follows:
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all
matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
The word "sole in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscores the exclusivity of the SET's jurisdiction over election
contests relating to members of the Senate. The authority conferred upon the SET is categorical and
complete. It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. Since
Barbers contests Biazon's proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the SET which has
exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers' complaint.
In Pangilinan, we ruled that "where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the
congressional elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal
of the House of Representatives." 22 In like manner, where as in the present case, Barbers assails
Biazon's proclamation as the 12th duly elected Senator, Barbers' proper recourse is to file a regular
election protest with the SET.
Certiorari and prohibition will not lie in this case considering that there is an available and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law to annul the COMELEC's assailed proceedings. We take pains to
emphasize that after the proclamation, Barbers should have filed an electoral protest before the SET.
While the resolution of the issues presented in this petition falls within the sole jurisdiction of the SET, still
we opt to discuss them to show the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC.
JUDICIAL REVIEW ON THE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 92191-92. July 30, 1991.]
ANTONIO Y. CO vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and JOSE

ONG, JR
FACTS:
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of
Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong,
Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern
Samar.
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The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of
Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether SC can take cognizance over the case
HELD:
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution). The authority
conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes
the exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals. The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin vs. HRET
(168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is
original and exclusive. And that, " . . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not
be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it
or even affect the same."
In the case of Robles vs. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1980]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of
the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of
due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting
such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." In the leading
case of Morrero vs. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral
Commission "is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does not venture into
the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government. It
comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave
or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.
In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter
which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide (See Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]).
It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. As constitutional creations invested with
necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the government,
are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme
Court. The power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if
it had remained originally in the legislature (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). In
passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must
permit this exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has placed it
The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak,
to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or
not they have acted within bounds of the Constitution (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution). Yet, in the
174
exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the government branch or agency has gone
beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 137004. July 26, 2000.]
ARNOLD V. GUERRERO vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS
Rodolfo C. Fariñas was elected Congressman in the May 11, 1998 elections. He took his oath of office as
member of the House of Representatives on June 3, 1998. However, a petition to disqualify Fariñas as a
candidate for the elective office of Congressman, claiming that his Certificate of Candidacy was fatally
defective, was haunting the COMELEC. And when the COMELEC ruled that the determination of the
validity of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), this petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was filed.
ISSUE:
Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
HELD:
No.
While the COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption to the position of Congressman
by Fariñas is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET). Under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, the
HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives,
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC's decision to discontinue exercising
jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET's own jurisdiction and functions. The
reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction
between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people's mandate. Whether respondent Fariñas
validly substituted Chevylle V. Fariñas and whether respondent became a legitimate candidate, in our
view, must likewise be addressed to the sound judgment of the Electoral Tribunal. Only thus can we
demonstrate fealty to the Constitutional provision that the Electoral Tribunal of each House of Congress
shall be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective members
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002.]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL
175
FACTS:
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners assail the composition of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ("HRET"
for brevity) 2 and the Commission on Appointments ("CA" for brevity). 3 Petitioners pray that respondents
be ordered to "alter, reorganize, reconstitute and reconfigure" the composition of the HRET and the CA to
include party-list representatives
National elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular vote of party-
list groups and organizations whose nominees would become members of the House. Proclaimed
winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations. Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was
able to send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative
each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA contingent 6 by electing its representatives to
these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political parties
of House members who are to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. From available records, it does not
appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their
representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing of the instant petitions, the House
contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district representatives belonging to the
different political parties.
ISSUE:
Whether the present composition of HRET violates constitutional requirement of proportional

representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.
HELD:
No.
Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives must first show to the
House that they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is
necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court. Consequently, petitioners' direct
recourse to this Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally
mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Otherwise, 'the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the Court speculate on what
action the House may take if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET
and the CA.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally
defined limits, to choose from among its district and party-list representatives those who may occupy the
seats allotted to the House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution 24 explicitly
confers on the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill
the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, 25 each chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose,
within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each
chamber's respective electoral tribunal.
176
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to
designate common nominees to the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests with the
House of Representatives and not with this Court.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the
House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that
after the May 11, 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups
in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions, with
the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the
HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with the House of
Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002.]
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
FACTS:
Codilla and Locsin were both candidates for congressman of Ormoc. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de
la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualification 1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga
and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the
petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Codilla won the elections but COMELEC suspended his
proclamation. Petitioner Codilla, Sr., filed the present Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed
against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the
House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en
banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and
unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
ISSUE:
1. Whether HRET has jurisdiction over the case

2. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion is suspending the proclamation
HELD:
No, on the first issue.
Yes, on the second issue.
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any,
within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the
respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To
ensure compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the
summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has
been completed. Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer,
must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings,
reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of the case. The records of the case do not show that
177
summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on
the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted
petitioner's repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification
because he never received summons. Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from
the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend
his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He
was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by
personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer
to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
Under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the
winning candidate's guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any
specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of
the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent portion of
the Order reads: "Without giving due course to the petition . . . the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to
Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 . . . and
considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders." We hold that absent any
finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely
abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its
jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second
Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office
of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won,
to assume office. A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question
at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her
proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as
a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 106971. March 1, 1993.]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. vs. NEPTALI A. GONZALES
FACTS:
In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27, 1992 and
respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992,
said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following
grounds:
Senator Tañada alleges that the decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by
the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the
Commission on Appointments; The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-
178
party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of
any party in the Commission.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondents’ assumption in the Commission on Appointments is valid.
Whether there is a need to complete the 12-man membership in the CA.
HELD:
No.
Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the
reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the
following grounds:
(1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the
1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof.
"It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP 7.5
LP-PDP-LABAN .5
NPC 2.5
LAKAS-NUCD 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the
basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP
majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by
adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of
Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be
based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party — either the
LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and
election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that
twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties
represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the
Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the
rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the
Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived
of half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional
representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the house of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a
179
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on

the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more
than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members
is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments
and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a diminution of its
rightful membership
We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the Senators
based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and including
Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact
that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission
on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of
election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate.
This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party
system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a
minimum membership in each house. The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson 11 to the effect
that "under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the
members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the
political parties represented in each house of Congress", does not and should not be construed to mean
that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by
Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the
subsequent case of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation
in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere
presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to
membership in the Commission on Appointments.
We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be
elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and
that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI,
Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of
the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership
is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filing up
the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if
it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar.
The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve
Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the
Commission on Appointments, provides that "the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members", and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission "shall meet only while
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such
powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it". In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to
constitute a quorum, "Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum
should come from either house". 14 Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the
Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required
quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly
perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if
respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on
proportional representation, the party he represents still has representation in the Commission in the
presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the
impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote:
180
" . . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with
another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision." 15
The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the
case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have
explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join
their half memberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the
Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-
memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the
LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Tañada to fill up the other slot to complete
the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Tañada
and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional
representation.
Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members
of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the
Constitution to twelve, but the number of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional
representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a
settled rule — that it belongs to this Court.
The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentino's formula to settle temporarily the impasse
concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the
Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article
VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court.
The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the Commission on Appointments
by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers
during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where
power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of
numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist."
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86649. July 12, 1990.]
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG vs. HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR.
FACTS:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives of
the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal Party
(LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate
elected under the banner of KAIBA. House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor
Leader, Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12)
congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. Upon nomination of the
Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the
Commission on Appointments, representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a political party.
As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House
committees, including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments, had to be
reorganized. Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA,
she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal. House
of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza,
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LP, revised the House majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with the new
political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs to enjoin the other respondents from recognizing them as members of the
Commission on Appointments on the theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only
nine (9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of

the minority was clearly invalid and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the
Commission because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the
House.
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments as a
representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and
congresswomen of the Minority
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, alleged: (1) that the
legality of the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question, hence, outside
the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was "strictly in
consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a political party. They
further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had
expressly renounced in writing their respective political party affiliations and formally affiliated with the
LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House.
ISSUE:
Whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties.
HELD:
Yes.
The revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the
House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty
percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may
be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced Majority and the KBL
(respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that this
apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a
member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to be
considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less
than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on
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Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should
have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to
the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they signed
identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The petition
itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected
by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of
their election to the Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the Coalesced Majority and one
from the minority — is unassailable.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989.]
REP. RAUL A. DAZA vs. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal
Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza
was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of
Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined
the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17
members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-
formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members
except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the
LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court to challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent. The contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed
from the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine
announced in Cunanan v. Tan. His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said
body is not based on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political
party and has not yet attained political stability.
Singson stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether LDP is a permanent party that would justify the reorganization in the Commission on
Appointments.
183
HELD:
Yes.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to
the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability
and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the
UNA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly
allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only
that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP Laban
and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP
representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION
OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress
to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also, subsequently thereto. If by
reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion from the political
party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the
representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with
authority to declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by
members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said
vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims
has not provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he
insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed
reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political
party, is not entitled to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties" and therefore cannot
legally claim the right to be considered in determining the required proportional representation of political
parties in the House of Representatives.
The clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the
Comelec.
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the
Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated
August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in
the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The
Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of
the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency of the
Philippines in the election. The Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no
question was raised as to its right to be represented in the Commission on Appointments and in the
Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the Congress.
184
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements among its
members, but these are to be expected in any political organization. But it surely cannot be considered
still temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for
that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only-with all of its seventeen
members — to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be
said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not
only survived but in fact prevailed.
PRIVILEGE OF SPEECH AND DEBATE
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 15905. August 3, 1966.]
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, vs. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG
FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez,
Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of
an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. Upon being summoned, the latter
moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if
were, said letter is a privileged communication.
The letter in question recommended: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed
Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a
professional military man; (4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be
asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed
Forces, including chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence agencies mentioned elsewhere in the
letter, be reassigned, considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano";
and that, "most probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those holding positions by provision of law; (8) that
the Regular Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by battalion strength to the
various stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and Arellano should
disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an investigation of the planned "coup d'etat".
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUES:
185
Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication
HELD:
No.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said publication, defendant was a member of the
House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National Defense, and that pursuant to the
Constitution:.
"The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony,
and breach of the peace. be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place."
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within
the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say in Congress — used in this
provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is
in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to
perform its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein,
it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, when Congress presumably was not in session,
and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned? Addressed to the President, the
communication began with the following paragraphs:.
However, the letter was not libelous, hence will not warrant the petitioners a grant for damages.
CONGRESSIONAL PRIVLEGES
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS
FACTS:
Accused-appellant is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. Accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.
Accused-appellant insisted that having been re-elected by his constituents, he had the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. According to him, his covenant with his constituents cannot be defeated by
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insuperable procedural restraint arising from pending criminal cases. He asserted that the duty to
legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.
When the voters of his district elected accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of
the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results, which he could accomplish within the confines of prison.
ISSUE:
Whether Cong. Jalosjos be allowed to discharge his functions as congressman.
HELD:
No.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free
people expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However,
inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to
high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege
has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater
is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
Accused-appellant's reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that — "The
Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do
otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected
a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and
that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the
Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people," will not
extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo
case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office.
It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same
way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a
congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the
latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of
the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its
terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department: Sec. 15. The Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; . . .. Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the
exemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to
the same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows: Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of
the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest. The
restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within carefully defined parameters is
illustrated by the concluding portion of the provision, to wit: . . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for
a recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. The present
Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the
subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or
187
committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress is
in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by
Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution . . .. However, the accused-appellant has not given any
reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is
a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment
of more than six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an
emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings
for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to
his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special
class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance in this
regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe: . . .
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member of the House of
Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214, North Wing
Building, House of Representatives Complex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement
of staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also provided with an
office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his
constituents." Accused-appellant further admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills and
resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits.
Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of
Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform these acts. When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The
accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24
members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the
physical absence of one or a few of its members.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify
exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded. We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply
to all those belonging to the same class.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense.
Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with
crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v.
Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury
to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus
subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding. The accused-appellant states that the plea of
188
the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape
eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and
evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the
sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he
initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his present motion. This can not be
countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restraints,
it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system.
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICT IONS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 68159. March 18, 1985.]
HOMOBONO A. ADAZA vs. FERNANDO PACANA, JR
FACTS
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He took his
oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor. Elected vice-governor for said
province in the same elections was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and
assumed said office. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for Batasan Pambansa
elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among
the candidates, while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansaand since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. Respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude
respondent therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law,
and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a
local elective official can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected
member of Parliament.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned
from the position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa
elections; and since respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the
Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the
office of governor.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously; and
2. Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can
continue serving as vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said
office is vacated.
HELD:
No, on the first issue.
189
Yes, on the second issue.
The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office
or employment in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution
The only exceptions mentioned therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom
or expediency of the said provision is a matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. It is created for the interest and the benefit of the people. As such, a
holder thereof "is subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may impose" and "he cannot
complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office." It
provides no exceptions save the two offices specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Thus, while it may be said that within the purely parliamentary system of government no incompatibility
exists in the nature of the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is understood in common
law, the incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the case at
bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa
and has been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-mentioned constitutional provision, this
fact operated to vacate his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the same, nor attempt to
discharge its functions.
The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had
no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the Batasan Pambansa. He
maintains that respondent should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-
governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Batas Pambansa elections. The point
pressed runs afoul of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of members of the
Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors,
mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the
coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984
Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections
204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice-governor (member of the Sangguiniang) after the
Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally
legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section 204[2] [a] of the same Local Government
Code
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 51122. March 25, 1982.]
EUGENIO J. PUYAT vs. HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR.
FACTS:
In an election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), the Puyat
Group won six seats to gain control of the Board and of the management of the company. The Acero
Group which won only five seats, questioned the said election in a quo warranto proceeding filed with the
(SEC) wherein they claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted. In the said case,
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez, then member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group objected on constitutional
grounds, thus discouraging Assemblyman Fernandez from further appearing therein as counsel.
Subsequently, however, Assemblyman Fernandez acquired P200.00 worth of stock in the subject
company representing ten (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares, on the basis of which he filed
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an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case alleging legal interest therein. The respondent
Associate Commissioner of the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez
ownership of the said ten shares. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether Fernandez is allowed to personally appear before SEC.
HELD:
No.
Certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez in
the quo warranto case filed before (SEC). He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in the subject
company, representing (10) shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact,"
that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto
suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C.
Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it may be
noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance, he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein. Under those facts and circumstances, we are
constrained to find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative
body" and in our opinion, that is a circumvention of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by
a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or implied prohibited.
APPEARANCE AS COUNSEL
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 53869. March 25, 1982.]
RAUL A. VILLEGAS vs. ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI
FACTS:
These two cases involve the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which used to
read: "No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a Court
with appellate jurisdiction, . . ." Under the amendment, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7,
1981, the said provision now reads: "No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel
before any Court without appellate jurisdiction, . . . ."
In G.R. No. 53869, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by petitioner
against private respondents before the CFI of Cebu. An answer was filed by private respondents through
their counsel, Atty. Valentino Legaspi, a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Petitioner "challenged" the
appearance of Assemblyman Legaspi" as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred under the
Constitution from appearing before Courts of First Instance of original jurisdiction. Respondent Judge
denied the disqualification bid, as well as a reconsideration thereof. Hence, this petition.
In G.R. No. 51928, petitioner Reyes filed Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
against N.V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Exelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio Acero to
annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation to Acero, allegedly on
the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes). Assemblyman
191
Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was questioned on the
ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether both counsels are barred from appearing as counsels.
HELD:
Yes.
In a joint resolution of the two cases, the Supreme Court held that what is prohibited to a Batasang
Pambansa member, under both the original and the amended constitutional provision in issue, is"
appearance as counsel" "before any Court without appellate jurisdiction," hence, since the respective
Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as counsel, were
acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they are barred from appearing as counsel
before said Courts. Writs granted.
The original provision of Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, used to read: "No member of the
National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, .
. ." Under the amendment ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, the same section now
reads: No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without appellate
jurisdiction" Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel"
"before any Court without appellate jurisdiction."
"Appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction by a legal advocate or advising

lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is the common, popular
connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. Judging from the prescribed criteria,
there should be no question that. Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, in preparing the Answer for private
respondents-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II,
appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for
Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the CFI. They represent and plead the cause of another before a
Court of Justice.
Under Section 39 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original
jurisdiction. However, under Section 43 of the same statute, their jurisdiction has been stated to be of two
kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate. They have appellate jurisdiction over all cases arising in City and
Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by Municipal Judges
of provincial capitals or City Judges pursuant to the authority granted under the last paragraph of Section
87 of the Judiciary Act
We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution,
appearance by legislators before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts
exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is true to the time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to
render effective any provision of a Constitution, whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must
be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself.
The objective of the prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, both under the original
and the amended provisions, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the
administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in
trials and thus preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on
a single Judge of the Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where
the latter Court acts in the exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a
party represented by an Assemblyman by virtue of his office possesses is more felt and could be more
feared in original cases than in appealed cases because the decision or resolution appealed from in the
192
latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity but also of correctness in its favor. In fine,
"appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and public interest.
Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez
appeared as counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be
held barred from appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.
LEGISLATIVE MILL
REQUIREMENT AS TO BILLS
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-42571-72. July 25, 1983.]
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ vs. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS
FACTS:
An ordinance was passed by the municipality of Bocaue prohibiting the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of
power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same time alleging that their
rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to
them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism." The cases were assigned to respondent Judge, now Associate Justice. The
answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: "1. That the Municipal Council is authorized by law
not only to regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs invoking
Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not
violative of petitioners' right to due process and the equal protection of the law, since property rights are
subordinate to public interests. That Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal
Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs."
The ordinance was held valid and constitutional. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the ordinance passed is valid.
HELD:
No.
An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof "is valid, unless contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine
Island, or an Act of the Philippines Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a
given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are not prescribed, the
ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
invalid."
In two leading cases, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the state. It cannot
be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
193
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by
overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restriction
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in U.S. vs. Salavaria, 39 Phil. 102 (1918) should
be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation ." It is clear that in the guise of police
regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case
of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investment
made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
The first Section of R.A. No 938 was amended to include not merely "the power of regulate, but likewise
'prohibit . . ." The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to
be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal
council way go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid if support in law. That is not all, however. The title was not in any altered. It was not
change one with. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that or regulation, not
prohibition. There is thus Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give
rise to a constitutional question.
Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was
prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise power "to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals." in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence
extending to all "the great public needs." to quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or
enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two
possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted
by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one that
would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would have to do so is to apply once more for
licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners so close their establishments, the necessary, result of an affirmance, would amount to
no more than a temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees would
undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable outcome can be avoided. it should be.
The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the
plight of those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without
employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of
arbitrariness enters the picture. That it to pay lets, very much less, than full deference to the due process
clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 115455. October 30, 1995.]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS:
194
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added
Tax Law.
Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders Association [CREBA]) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, § 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it
passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on
second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have done
was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of S. No.
1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes the text
(only the text) of the House bill."
ISSUE:
Whether the VAT law is valid considering that as alleged, it did not originate at the House of
Representatives.
HELD:
Yes.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to
propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a House
revenue measure. Art. VI, § 24 of our Constitution reads: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. The power of
the Senate to propose amendments must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other
Bills." Because revenue bills are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the
Senate cannot enact revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and
sent over to it by the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject
matter. This follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress. The provision "but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments" means the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure. To except from the procedure (Re: bill referred to a committee) the amendment of
bills which are required to originate in the House by prescribing that the number of the House bill and its
other parts up to the enacting clause must be preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may
be incorporated in place of the original body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there
is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an
amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the Senate could have made. In point of fact, in several
instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the corresponding
provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the provisions thereof, while showing
differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were
precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill. Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have
enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in
its original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and third readings. It was enough that after it
was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it
required that S. No. 1630 be passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be
referred to the Conference Committee.
The President's certification had to be made of the version of the same revenue bill which at the moment
was being considered. It is enough that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is
under consideration. Since on March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill
which had to be certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210
for immediate enactment because it was the one which at that time was being considered by the House.
This bill was later substituted, together with other bills, by H. No. 11197. As to what Presidential
certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision that the phrase "except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, § 26 (2) qualifies
195
not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must be] distributed to the
members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a bill can become a law it
must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only textual support for such
construction but historical basis as well. This exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in
all cases three readings on separate days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it
can be passed, the need for a law may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency
or public calamity which it is meant to address. The members of the Senate (including some of the
petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630,
because they responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on
the same day. While the judicial department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's
certification, the respect due coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the
Constitution and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the judicial
hand. At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where
it was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually
dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day (March 24, 1994).
Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second reading and
its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third reading. The
purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform the
members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is
progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure to
prepare their positions with reference to it. These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of
R.A. No. 7716.
The public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case submitted a
report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate. These changes
are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The members of both houses could
thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the need of a statement detailing
the changes. Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions
as long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of
the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the House. It
may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is subsequently approved by
the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would not entertain allegations that, because
new provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was thereby a violation of the
constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed." At
all events, under Art. VI, § 16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings,"
including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and procedures of Congress or
its committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
Art. VI, § 26 (1) of the Constitution provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its franchise
by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716. PAL was
exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Now, R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by
amending § 103. Such amendment of § 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716. Congress thereby
clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of
accomplishing the purpose of the law. PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected
in the title of the law by specific reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unneccesary to do this in order to comply
with the constitutional requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the
pertinent provisions of the NIRC, among which is § 103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT.
Actually, it is the bill which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation.
The titles of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to § 103 of the NIRC as among the
provisions sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency
of these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A. No. 7716.
EN BANC
196
[G.R. No. 71977. February 27, 1987.]
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE
BUDGET
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality
of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget
Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general
interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be
affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the grounds relied upon in this petition as
follows: "A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
"C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO

OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION
IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
"E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT AND
THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION."
ISSUE:
Whether the transfer of the funds from one department to another is valid
HELD:
No.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential-Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof.
Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
"The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
"Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads
of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under the
1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of
the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the
constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of
augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for
which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of
197
augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section
16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or
agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to
whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to
be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby
amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: . . ." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public
funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently, was
foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the rules regarding the
appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the
restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibition to transfer an
appropriation for an item to another [Sec. 16(5)] and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among
others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1
of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the
unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, ". . . Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the
enactment of unfounded appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses
accountability for budgetary performance and entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may
well expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development priorities but on political and personal
expediency." 5 The contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was
enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 168056. September 1, 2005.]
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO
ERMITA
Former Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima was charged with contempt by the Supreme Court for
conduct which puts the Court and its Members into dishonor, disrepute and discredit, and degrades the
administration of justice wherein he insinuated that this Honorable Court was pressured or influenced by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo or Malacañang Palace to issue a Temporary Restraining Order
("TRO") in the implementation of VAT. As a result of the TRO, he resigned because it damages the
economic plan of the country.
The Court finds Purisima's explanation unsatisfactory.
Finance officials led by Purisima previously expressed dismay over the suspension of the e-VAT as they
claimed that the TRO would cost the government at least P140 million a day in unrealized revenues.
Purisima hinted that Mrs. Arroyo had a hand in the SC's TRO to save her presidency.
At the time the reports came out, Purisima did not controvert the truth or falsity of the statements
attributed to him. It was only after the Court issued the show-cause order that Purisima saw it fit to deny
having uttered these statements. By then, it was already impressed upon the public's mind that the
issuance of the TRO was the product of machinations on the Court by the executive branch.
198
If it were true that Purisima felt that the media misconstrued his actions, then he should have immediately
rectified it. He should not have waited until the Court required him to explain before he denied having
made such statements. And even then, his denials were made as a result of the Court's show-cause
order and not by any voluntary act on his part that will show utter regret for having been "misquoted."
Purisima should know that these press releases placed the Court into dishonor, disrespect, and public
contempt, diminished public confidence, promoted distrust in the Court, and assailed the integrity of its
Members. The Court already took a beating before Purisima made any disclaimer. The damage has been
done, so to speak. Purisima is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and FINED in the amount of
(P20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution.
(Author’s Note: another stupid case assignment of JSL)
SECTION 29
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991.]
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE,
in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management,
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked." The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860,
as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations
or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus
merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
As to whether or not the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous
amount that had been incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of
the petition, is not an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more
of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and
sound discretion.
FACTS:
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990
budget. The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,8l3,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), "by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose."
The petition seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and
not this Court.
199
ISSUE:
Whether the appropriation budget is violative of Sec 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution
HELD:
No.
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then President
Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the expiration of the
one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on
February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there is a need for a new
legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to the present, has not
approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation in the 1990 budget is an
administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of the
Constitution, i.e.,
"Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments." (Emphasis supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President, 10 then a law must be passed by Congress to
authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate Section 29(1) of
Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows —
'Sec. 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law."
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain
in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed
or revoked. LibLex
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to
cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the
national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the
necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods
and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues —
". . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market
conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or to shift from short-term
to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that could lighten our outstanding debt burden —
debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation
obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously
programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in advance, are based
on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, 'basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate
assumption's which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the
basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to
await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive
to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed. In the meantime,
also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total
200
expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due
dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the continuance of the
person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The
purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the person of Marcos."
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among
others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress
and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate
that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees appropriating public money
are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable
interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they
should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express manner.
The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The
mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold
in international markets incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty
arises in executive implementation as the limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the
Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases as
aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch and covers the
estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary priorities and activities within the
constraints imposed by available revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired
priorities and activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and Management.
Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with the requirements consistent with
the general ceilings set by the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macroeconomic projections of interest rates
(e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels.
Upon issuance of budget call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments
for the year for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and deliberates or acts on the
budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which
specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made
by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization therefor already exists
under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967. Precisely in the light of this subsisting
authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern
itself with details for implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof
upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such approval,
Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part
lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process covers the
various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation authority ceilings, the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal
position, the regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and other
related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
201
Release from the debt service fund is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the Treasury for allotments
from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter in advance of payment schedule, to
ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official billings from the creditors,
remits payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund established for government
security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual performance and
initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired and work accomplished are
compared with the targets set at the time the agency budgets were approved.
Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska, however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact
or 'specific appropriation made by law.' Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution omits any of these
words and simply states:
'Section 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law.'
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form
of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made,
except that it be 'made by law,' such as precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned
presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly
(as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of
laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific
terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which appropriate
public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed whether in
the past or in the present."
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and
P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise
amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not the
country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been incurred
by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not an issue that is
presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political decision for
Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
SECTION 28
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 144104. June 29, 2004.]
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. QUEZON CITY and CONSTANTINO P. ROSAS, in his
capacity as City Assessor of Quezon City
FACTS:
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit entity established by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1823. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung
Center of the Philippines. A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen
and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the same as their private
202
clinics for their patients whom they charge for their professional services. Almost one-half of the entire
area on the left side of the building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the
right side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for commercial purposes
to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients,
both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual
subsidies from the government.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were assessed for real property
taxes in the amount of P4,554,860 by the City Assessor of Quezon City. 3 On August 25, 1993, the
petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from real property taxes with the City Assessor, predicated on its
claim that it is a charitable institution. The petitioner's request was denied, and a petition was, thereafter,
filed before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (QC-LBAA, for brevity) for the
reversal of the resolution of the City Assessor. The petitioner alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3
of the 1987 Constitution, the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of
60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of its hospital
operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner contends that it is a charitable institution and, as
such, is exempt from real property taxes. The QC-LBAA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and
holding the petitioner liable for real property taxes.
The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of Section 28(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it
admits paying patients and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to private
parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from which it derives income
to be used for operational expenses. The petitioner points out that for the years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its
out-patients were charity patients and of the hospital's 282-bed capacity, 60% thereof, or 170 beds, is
allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it receives subsidies from the government attests to
its character as a charitable institution. It contends that the "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does
not necessarily mean "solely." Hence, even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to private individuals
from whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a charitable institution, and its exemption
from the payment of real estate taxes on its real property. The petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v. QC-
BAA 9 to bolster its pose. The petitioner further contends that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it
from the payment of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of Presidential Decree No. 1823 and
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and
Whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property taxes.
HELD:
The petition is partially granted.
On the first issue, we hold that the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions. To determine whether an enterprise is a charitable institution/entity or not, the
elements which should be considered include the statute creating the enterprise, its corporate purposes,
its constitution and by-laws, the methods of administration, the nature of the actual work performed, the
character of the services rendered, the indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, and the use and occupation of
the properties.
In the legal sense, a charity may be fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for
the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds and hearts under the
influence of education or religion, by assisting them to establish themselves in life or otherwise lessening
203
the burden of government. It may be applied to almost anything that tend to promote the well-doing and
well-being of social man. It embraces the improvement and promotion of the happiness of man. The
word "charitable" is not restricted to relief of the poor or sick. The test of a charity and a charitable
organization are in law the same. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to
carry out a purpose reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private
advantage.
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is a non-profit and non-stock corporation which, subject to the
provisions of the decree, is to be administered by the Office of the President of the Philippines with the
Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Human Settlements. It was organized for the welfare and benefit of
the Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the
Philippines. The raison d'etre for the creation of the petitioner is stated in the decree, viz:
Whereas, for decades, respiratory diseases have been a priority concern, having been the leading cause
of illness and death in the Philippines, comprising more than 45% of the total annual deaths from all
causes, thus, exacting a tremendous toll on human resources, which ailments are likely to increase and
degenerate into serious lung diseases on account of unabated pollution, industrialization and unchecked
cigarette smoking in the country;
Whereas, the more common lung diseases are, to a great extent, preventable, and curable with early and
adequate medical care, immunization and through prompt and intensive prevention and health education
programs;
Whereas, there is an urgent need to consolidate and reinforce existing programs, strategies and efforts at
preventing, treating and rehabilitating people affected by lung diseases, and to undertake research and
training on the cure and prevention of lung diseases, through a Lung Center which will house and nurture
the above and related activities and provide tertiary-level care for more difficult and problematical cases;
Whereas, to achieve this purpose, the Government intends to provide material and financial support
towards the establishment and maintenance of a Lung Center for the welfare and benefit of the Filipino
people. 15
The purposes for which the petitioner was created are spelled out in its Articles of Incorporation, thus:
SECOND: That the purposes for which such corporation is formed are as follows:
1. To construct, establish, equip, maintain, administer and conduct an integrated medical institution
which shall specialize in the treatment, care, rehabilitation and/or relief of lung and allied diseases in line
with the concern of the government to assist and provide material and financial support in the
establishment and maintenance of a lung center primarily to benefit the people of the Philippines and in
pursuance of the policy of the State to secure the well-being of the people by providing them specialized
health and medical services and by minimizing the incidence of lung diseases in the country and
elsewhere.
2. To promote the noble undertaking of scientific research related to the prevention of lung or
pulmonary ailments and the care of lung patients, including the holding of a series of relevant congresses,
conventions, seminars and conferences;
3. To stimulate and, whenever possible, underwrite scientific researches on the biological,

demographic, social, economic, eugenic and physiological aspects of lung or pulmonary diseases and
their control; and to collect and publish the findings of such research for public consumption;
4. To facilitate the dissemination of ideas and public acceptance of information on lung

consciousness or awareness, and the development of fact-finding, information and reporting facilities for
and in aid of the general purposes or objects aforesaid, especially in human lung requirements, general
health and physical fitness, and other relevant or related fields;
5. To encourage the training of physicians, nurses, health officers, social workers and medical and
technical personnel in the practical and scientific implementation of services to lung patients;
6. To assist universities and research institutions in their studies about lung diseases, to encourage
advanced training in matters of the lung and related fields and to support educational programs of value
to general health;
7. To encourage the formation of other organizations on the national, provincial and/or city and local
levels; and to coordinate their various efforts and activities for the purpose of achieving a more effective
programmatic approach on the common problems relative to the objectives enumerated herein;
204
8. To seek and obtain assistance in any form from both international and local foundations and
organizations; and to administer grants and funds that may be given to the organization;
9. To extend, whenever possible and expedient, medical services to the public and, in general, to
promote and protect the health of the masses of our people, which has long been recognized as an
economic asset and a social blessing;
10. To help prevent, relieve and alleviate the lung or pulmonary afflictions and maladies of the people
in any and all walks of life, including those who are poor and needy, all without regard to or discrimination,
because of race, creed, color or political belief of the persons helped; and to enable them to obtain
treatment when such disorders occur;
11. To participate, as circumstances may warrant, in any activity designed and carried on to promote
the general health of the community;
12. To acquire and/or borrow funds and to own all funds or equipment, educational materials and
supplies by purchase, donation, or otherwise and to dispose of and distribute the same in such manner,
and, on such basis as the Center shall, from time to time, deem proper and best, under the particular
circumstances, to serve its general and non-profit purposes and objectives;
13. To buy, purchase, acquire, own, lease, hold, sell, exchange, transfer and dispose of properties,
whether real or personal, for purposes herein mentioned; and
14. To do everything necessary, proper, advisable or convenient for the accomplishment of any of the
powers herein set forth and to do every other act and thing incidental thereto or connected therewith. 16
Hence, the medical services of the petitioner are to be rendered to the public in general in any and all
walks of life including those who are poor and the needy without discrimination. After all, any person, the
rich as well as the poor, may fall sick or be injured or wounded and become a subject of charity. 17
As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from
taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient, or confined in the
hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used
altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private
benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution. 18 In Congregational Sunday School, etc. v.
Board of Review, 19 the State Supreme Court of Illinois held, thus:
. . . [A]n institution does not lose its charitable character, and consequent exemption from taxation, by
reason of the fact that those recipients of its benefits who are able to pay are required to do so, where no
profit is made by the institution and the amounts so received are applied in furthering its charitable
purposes, and those benefits are refused to none on account of inability to pay therefor. The fundamental
ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are based is the benefit conferred
upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some extent, of the burden upon the state to care for
and advance the interests of its citizens. 20
As aptly stated by the State Supreme Court of South Dakota in Lutheran Hospital Association of South
Dakota v. Baker: 21
. . . [T]he fact that paying patients are taken, the profits derived from attendance upon these patients
being exclusively devoted to the maintenance of the charity, seems rather to enhance the usefulness of
the institution to the poor; for it is a matter of common observation amongst those who have gone about
at all amongst the suffering classes, that the deserving poor can with difficulty be persuaded to enter an
asylum of any kind confined to the reception of objects of charity; and that their honest pride is much less
wounded by being placed in an institution in which paying patients are also received. The fact of receiving
money from some of the patients does not, we think, at all impair the character of the charity, so long as
the money thus received is devoted altogether to the charitable object which the institution is intended to
further. 22
The money received by the petitioner becomes a part of the trust fund and must be devoted to public trust
purposes and cannot be diverted to private profit or benefit. 23
Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. The petitioner does not lose its
character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of subsidies granted
by the government. As held by the State Supreme Court of Utah in Yorgason v. County Board of
Equalization of Salt Lake County:
205
Second, the . . . government subsidy payments are provided to the project. Thus, those payments are like
a gift or donation of any other kind except they come from the government. In both Intermountain Health
Care and the present case, the crux is the presence or absence of material reciprocity. It is entirely
irrelevant to this analysis that the government, rather than a private benefactor, chose to make up the
deficit resulting from the exchange between St. Mark's Tower and the tenants by making a contribution to
the landlord, just as it would have been irrelevant in Intermountain Health Care if the patients' income
supplements had come from private individuals rather than the government.
Therefore, the fact that subsidization of part of the cost of furnishing such housing is by the government
rather than private charitable contributions does not dictate the denial of a charitable exemption if the
facts otherwise support such an exemption, as they do here.
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the subsidies
from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients and for the operation of the hospital. It even
incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992 from its operations.
Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the second issue, that those
portions of its real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as
these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the
exception. The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. 26
As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn: 27
An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing power of the state will
never be implied from language which will admit of any other reasonable construction. Such an intention
must be expressed in clear and unmistakable terms, or must appear by necessary implication from the
language used, for it is a well settled principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is claimed
under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be construed strictly against the property owner and
in favor of the public. This principle applies with peculiar force to a claim of exemption from taxation. . . .
28
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner, specifically provides that the
petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. — Being a non-profit, non-stock corporation organized
primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all
donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities
or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual use and
benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes, the same further deductible in full
for the purpose of determining the maximum deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes, charges and fees
imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to
equipment purchases made by, or for the Lung Center. 29
It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption
privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were
otherwise, the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques,
non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. 32
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. 33 As Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, explained: ". . . what is
exempted is not the institution itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and
improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposes." 34
206
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
(otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991) as follows:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-
profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes. 35
We note that under the 1935 Constitution, ". . . all lands, buildings, and improvements used 'exclusively'
for … charitable . . . purposes shall be exempt from taxation." 36 However, under the 1973 and the
present Constitutions, for "lands, buildings, and improvements" of the charitable institution to be
considered exempt, the same should not only be "exclusively" used for charitable purposes; it is required
that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such purposes. 37
In light of the foregoing substantial changes in the Constitution, the petitioner cannot rely on our ruling in
Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which was promulgated on September 30, 1961
before the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions took effect. 38 As this Court held in Province of Abra v.
Hernando: 39
. . . Under the 1935 Constitution: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation." The present Constitution added "charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of "lands, buildings,
and improvements," they should not only be "exclusively" but also "actually" and "directly" used for
religious or charitable purposes. The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be
ignored. It must be duly taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were
the words "actually" as well as "directly" not added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct
use of the lands, buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from
taxation . . .
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be entitled to the exemption,
the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution;
and (b) its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively." 40 If
real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted
purposes but is subject to taxation. 41 The words "dominant use" or "principal use" cannot be substituted
for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to the Constitutions and the law. 42 Solely is
synonymous with exclusively. 43
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes is the direct and
immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for which the charitable institution
is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the
property is used for tax-exempt purposes. 44
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real property is actually,
directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for the
treatment of patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying,
other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a canteen. Further, a
portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for her business enterprise under the business
name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center." Indeed, the petitioner's evidence shows that it collected
P1,136,483.45 as rentals in 1991 and P1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the
hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. 45 On the other hand, the portions
of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or
non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.
(Author’s insights: The decision is quite long because in my judgment, everything here is important, not
only for Constitutional law but for Taxation as well. This is a landmark case. I love you. Nyahaha!)
207

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POLITICAL LAW CASES and PRINCIPLES BY CHRISTINE SANTIAGO RUFLO 2010

POLITICAL LAW DEFINE D

[Adm. Case No. 133-J. May 31, 1982.]

R. MACARIOLA vs. HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION

Whether the judge is liable.

DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREM ACY

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408

AM ENDMENT AND REVISION

Section 2 is limited to proposals to AMEND �not to REVISE �the Constitution.

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

[G.R. No. 174153. October 25, 2006.]

RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED

Province: City/Municipality: No. of

Legislative District: Barangay: Signatures:

RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02

RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-LEAGUES

Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

DOCTRINE OF FAIR AND PROPER SUBMISSION

[G.R. No. L-34150. October 16, 1971.]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

We have arrived at this conclusion for the following reasons:

[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004.]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR

whether the petition is moot; and

whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

THEORY OF JUDICIAL R EVIEW

G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936

JOSE A. ANGARA vs.

The writ of prohibition is denied.

CONDITIONS FOR THE E XERCISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:

(2) Essential Requisites for Judicial Review:

Ripeness and Prematurity

These petitions raise five substantial issues:

1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground

5. that the parties are not in estoppel

6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.

1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power

3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity

G.R. No. 118910 November 16, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED vs.

Whether Kilosbayan has legal standing to question the allowance of lottery.

[G.R. No. 108399. July 31, 1997.]

The decision of the RTC of Manila, Branch 36, is REVERSED.

G.R. No. 120193 March 6, 1996

LUIS MALALUAN, vs.

[G.R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000.]

RAMON A. GONZALES vs. HON. ANDRES R. NARVASA, as Chairman, PREPARATORY

[G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000]

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE

A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY

B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN

C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO

IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS

(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing;

From these consolidated petitions, petitioners — as legislators, non-governmental organizations, citizens