FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET

AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for

respondents Williams, Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT

No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The
provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer
legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon
them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to
carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or
by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary or advisable in the
public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is
not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment
of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to
traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It
must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law.
 2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said
Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor

despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its
rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be
founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective
 of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and
of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of

Manila, brought before this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against
the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as
Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of
Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its

resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that
animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30
a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal
Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague
Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of
the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director
of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution
aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and
regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads;
that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first indorsement
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the
latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the
closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the
portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of
Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street
and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the
points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period of one year
from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the
Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted; that as a
consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed
to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the
detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which

the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, is authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national
roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power. This contention is untenable. As was
observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil, 660,
700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case
decided by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases,
namely: ’The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no
valid objection can be made.’ (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Comm’rs. Clinton
County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in
Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to
an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. v.
Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the ’necessity’ of the case."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads
and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or
by executive orders of the President of the Philippines, the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such
rules and regulations, with the approval of the President, may contain
provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such
roads may be temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the
Director of Public Works and his duly authorized representatives whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such action necessary
or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and under
which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not
to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the
legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets
designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by
executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them
temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the
road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not
the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of
the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be
predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads
and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to
traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative
function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It
must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is
confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for
executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion
is the making of the law. As was said in Locke’s Appeal (72 Pa. 491): "To
assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future
event or act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the
public welfare whenever a law is passed relating to a state of affairs not yet
developed, or to things future and impossible to fully know." The proper
distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its
power to make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of
government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation
must depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of
legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36 L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmeña, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public
Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court
had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of powers has been
made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate
legislation," not only in the United States and England but in practically all
modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of
separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by
permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a
larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only
in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules
and regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated
by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
548 constitute an unlawful interference with legitimate business or trade and
abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were
promulgated, aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations
of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve
congestion of traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety.
Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law, and the
state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal
liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to
secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v.
Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which
life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority
because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made
to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The
citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his
mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may be
established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the
government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty
which resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preservation.
The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was
said in the case of Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed.
169), "the right to exercise the police power is a continuing one, and a
business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed situation,
the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public
health and welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in
People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was observed that "advancing civilization
is bringing within the police power of the state today things which were not
thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of
civilization, the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion,
with an increasing desire on the part of the masses and of the government
to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the state, have
brought within the police power many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered."cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social
justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people. The
promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not through a
mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither
communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures
calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi
est suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity

of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a
combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health,
comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number."cralaw virtua1aw library

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied,
with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

Group 6 DigestCalalang vs. Williams

G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Petitioner: Maximo CalalangRespondents: A.D. Williams, Et al.Ponente:
Laurel,
J:
Facts:
Maximo Calalang in his capacity as a private citizen and a taxpayer of Manila
filed apetition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents.It is alleged in the
petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-
drawn vehicles be prohibited from passingalong Rosario Street extending from
Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street from 7:30A m t o 1 2 : 3 0 p m a n d
from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and along Rizal Avenue extending from
t h e railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm for a
period of one yearfrom the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic.The
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to
theDirector of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the
adoption of
them e a s u r e p r o p o s e d i n t h e r e s o l u t i o n a f o r e m e n t i o n e d i n p u r s u a n c e
of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director with the approval from theSecretary of the Public Work
s a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n t o p r o m u l g a t e r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n s t o regulate
and control the use of and traffic on national roads.O n A u g u s t 2 , 1 9 4 0 , t h e
Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of
t h e recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
withmodifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940.The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and causedto be enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are notallowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
Issue:
1.
Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the
respondentspursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitutean unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and
abridgedthe right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?2. Whether the rules and regulations complained of
infringe upon theconstitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice toinsure the well-being and economic security of all the
people?
Held:
1.
No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoidobstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the
public. Inenacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to
relievecongestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety.
Public welfare liesa t t h e b o t t o m o f t h e p r o m u l g a t i o n o f t h e s a i d
law and the state inorder to promote the general welfare may
i n t e r f e r e w i t h p e r s o n a l liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations
. Persons andproperty may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
securethe general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamentalaims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Liberty isa blessing
which should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall
into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery.
The paradox lies in the factthat the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2.
No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the
p e o p l e , t h e adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of
a propere c o n o m i c a n d s o c i a l e q u i l i b r i u m i n t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n s o f t h e
m e m b e r s o f t h e community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures
legally justifiable,or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying
the existenceof all governments on the time-honored principles of
s a l u s p o p u l i e s t suprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of
thep r o t e c t i o n t h a t s h o u l d b e e q u a l l y a n d e v e n l y e x t e n d e d t o a l l
g r o u p s a s a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamentaland paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest
number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.