Garlet v.
Garlet
Psychological Incapacity (personality disorder)
Petitioner Yolanda Garlet and respondent Vencidor Garlet got
married in 1994. After 7 years of marriage petitioner and
respondent separated. Petitioner then filed for a Nullity of Marriage
on the ground of respondent’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his
marital obligations to petitioner and their children.
During trial, De Guzman, a clinical psychologist testified that based
on her findings, respondent is suffering from narcissistic type of
personality disorder. She claimed that respondent cannot attend to
responsibility and comply with marital obligations. Moreover,
respondent is also insecure in dealing with mature roles.
Respondent’s traits and attitudes have been present even before
marriage so that any change to his disposition would be difficult to
do. The psychological incapacitation is pervasive, permanent and
clinically proven to be incurable. She mentioned that the root cause
of this is his ordinal position in the family being the youngest boy.
Held:
The SC upholds the decision of CA declaring that the marriage of
respondent and petitioner is valid and subsisting. De Guzman’s
report falls short of establishing respondent’s psychological
incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability so as to render the respondent’s marriage to petitioner
void ab initio. Tested against the present guidelines (doctrine
below), the Court agrees with the CA that the totality of petitioner’s
evidence is insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity.
Doctrine:
In Santos v CA, the Court declared that the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by
a. gravity
b. juridical antecedence
c. incurability
Lucido v. People
RA 7610
During AAA’s stay with Lucido, the former suffered repeated
physical abuse like strangulation, beating (using a belt), pinching
and the touching of her sex organ. Lucido also threatened to stab
AAA if she would tell anyone about it. A case was filed against
Lucido. During trial she offered to plead guilty to the crime of Less
Serious Physical Injuries under RPC or violation of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code. She was found guilty of child abuse under Sec
10 of RA 7610 by the RTC. Petitioner contends that she could not be
convicted of child abuse but only of slight physical injuries under
RPC.
Held:
The SC held that when the incident happened, the victim was a child
entitled to the protection extended by Republic Act No. 7610. Thus,
petitioner was properly charged and found guilty of violating Article
VI, Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Doctrine:
Article I, Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse as
the maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, including any
of the following:
1. Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual
abuse and emotional maltreatment;
2. Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
3. Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival,
such as food and shelter; or
4. Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured
child resulting in impairment of his growth and
development or his incapacity or death
In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live
Birth of Yuhares Jan Barcelote Tinitigan and Avee Kynna Noelle
Barcelote Tinitigan
Name of illegitimate children
Petitioner Jonna Barcelote bore two children out of wedlock with a
married man Ricky Tinitigan. She wasn’t able to register the birth
certificates of her two children. It turned out that Tinitigan
registered the birth certificates and used his surname as the
surname of his children. Barcelote filed a petition in the RTC for the
cancellation of the said birth certificates registered by Tinitigan
without her knowledge and for containing erroneous entries. RTC
ordered the cancellation of the birth certificates.
CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. It ruled that the illegitimate
children can use the surname of their father. RA 9225 amending Art.
176 of the Family Code allows illegitimate children to use the
surname of their father if the latter had expressly recognized them
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, such as in
this case
Held:
The SC does not agree with the CA that the subject birth certificates
are the express recognition of the children's filiation by Tinitigan,
because they were not duly registered in accordance with the law.
The law is clear that illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The use of the
word "shall" underscores its mandatory character. The discretion
on the part of the illegitimate child to use the surname of the father
is conditional upon proof of compliance with RA 9255 and its IRR.
The children shall use the surname of their mother, Barcelote. The
entry in the subject birth certificates as to the surname of the
children is therefore incorrect; their surname should have been
"Barcelote" and not "Tinitigan”.
Doctrine:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother.
Abella v. Cabanero
Filiation
In a Complaint for Support, petitioner Richelle alleged that while she
was still a minor, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent
Cabañero and as a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child. Richelle
prayed for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.
Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise having any
sexual relations with her. Thus, he asserted that he could not have
been the father of Richelle’s child.
RTC dismissed Richelle's Complaint. CA sustained the dismissal of
the Complaint. It ruled that the dismissal of RTC of the Complaint
was proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not been
previously established. As the child's birth certificate did not
indicate that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had not
done anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own. CA
asserted that Richelle "should have first instituted filiation
proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's paternity."
Held:
It was improper to rule here, as the Court of Appeals did, that it was
impossible to entertain petitioner's child's plea for support without
her and petitioner first surmounting the encumbrance of an entirely
different judicial proceeding.
Dolina v. Vallecera clarified that since an action for compulsory
recognition may be filed ahead of an action for support, the direct
filing of an action for support, "where the issue of compulsory
recognition may be integrated and resolved, is an equally valid
alternative
In Agustin v. Court of Appeals, this Court added that an action to
compel recognition could very well be integrated with an action for
support.
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely
appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner Richelle for
her child. An action for support may very well resolve that issue of
paternity if it involves the same parties, is brought before a court
with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal
relations, and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not
run afoul of any rule.
Heirs of Gilberto Roldan
ArtIcles 172 and 175 Family Code in relation to the succession of
legitimate children
Natalia Magtulis owned Lot No. 4696, an agricultural land in Kalibo,
Aklan. Her heirs included Gilberto Roldan and Silvela Roldan, her
two children by her first marriage, allegedly, Leopolda Magtulis her
child with another man named Juan Aguirre. After her death, Natalia
left the lot to her children. Considering that Gilberta, Silvela, and
Leopolda were all descendants of Natalia, the RTC declared each set
of their respective heirs entitled to 1/3 share of the property.
Petitioners then appealed to the CA. They asserted that the RTC
could not have considered Leopolda the son of Natalia on the mere
basis of his Certificate of Baptism. Petitioners argued that the
baptismal certificate of Leopoldo served only as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament.
Held:
Jurisprudence has already assessed the probative value of baptismal
certificates. In Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained
that a baptismal certificate is "no proof of the declarations in the
record with respect to the parentage of the child baptized, or of
prior and distinct facts which require separate and concrete
evidence.
But in Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. v. Harper, the Court
clarified that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove
kinship "if considered alongside other evidence of filiation."
All told, the Baptismal Certificate and the Marriage Contract of
Leopoldo, which merely stated that Natalia is his mother, are
inadequate to prove his filiation with the property owner.
Doctrine:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Chua v. Republic
Change of Surname
Eric was born on November 8, 1973 to a Chinese father named
Cheong Kiat and a Filipino mother named Melania Sibayan. His
name, as it appears in his birth certificate, is “Eric Sibayan Kiat.”
After his birth, his father Cheong was able to change his surname
from “Kiat” to “Chua.” As such, Eric adopted the name “Eric Sibayan
Chua” and has been using such name ever since. Finding that the
change of name as nothing more than a mere straightening of
records, RTC ordered the Local Civil Registrar to change Eric’s name
to “Eric S. Chua” in his birth certificate. However, the CA granted the
Office of the Solicitor General’s appeal saying that Eric failed to
meet the quantum of evidence required to establish the fact of his
father changing name.
Issue:
Whether or not Eric should be allowed to change name. (YES)
Held:
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, the Court enumerated several
grounds that can be invoked by the person who wants to change his
name. One of such instance is when such change will avoid
confusion. As Eric had established, he had been known as “Eric
Chua” than “Eric Kiat.” Moreover, all his credentials except his birth
certificate bear the name of “Eric Chua.” To compel him to use the
name, “Eric Kiat” at this point will inevitably lead to confusion. It
would result in an alteration of all his official documents, save for
his birth certificate. His children too, will be compelled to have their
records changed. So to deny Eric’s petition, would not only deny
Eric’s identity but also that of his children.
Doctrine:
RA 9048. Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname.
— The petition for change of first name or nickname may be
allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known
by the first names or nicknames in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
PITC v. COA
Supreme Court decisions being part of the law of the land;
Retroactivity of laws
In 1983, President Marcos further reorganized PITC through EO 877.
Section 1 thereof states that the restructuring shall be completed
within six months and that personnel laid off during that period
shall be entitled benefits under EO 756. But apparently, PITC
continued to grant the benefits provided under EO 756 to its
qualified employees even after the lapse of the six-month period.
The legality of such policy was put in issue and was resolved by the
Supreme Court in a Decision. However, pending the resolution of
the motion for reconsideration, PITC still allocated part of its budget
for retirement benefits pursuant to Section 6 of EO 756.
After the finality of the 2010 Decision, the PITC resident COA
auditor informed PITC that the accrual of the retirement benefits
under Section 6 of EO 756 has no legal basis in accordance with the
SC Decision. She advised PITC to stop the payment of such benefits.
However, PITC argued that it could continue to allocate part of its
budget for the said benefits while the motion for reconsideration
was still pending and that should the Supreme Court deny the
motion, PITC believe that the Decision should be applied
prospectively. PITC filed a second motion for reconsideration, but it
was still denied. It was only then that PITC stopped paying the
benefits.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the doctrine of prospectivity of laws would
apply to the instant case. (NO)
2. Whether or not the retroactive application of the 2010
Decision would divest qualified PITC employees of their
vested right to receive the retirement benefits under EO
756. (NO)
Held:
In Columbia Pictures v. CA, the Court held that judicial
interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law was
originally passed. The only qualification is that when a doctrine of
the Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to
the parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted in good faith.
The 2010 Decision did not reverse and old doctrine nor adopted a
new one. The Court merely construed the meaning and application
of Section 6 of EO 756. Prior to the 2010 Decision, there is no other
ruling that explained the nature of the retirement benefits under
Section 6 of EO 756. Thus, the Court’s interpretation in the 2010
Decision retroacts to the date when EO 756 was enacted. Moreover,
the fact that PITC continued to grant retirement benefits from the
time of the issuance of EO 756 until the Court Decision in 2010 does
not impair vested rights of the employees. As previously held by the
Court in KMG v. COA, “practice, no matter how long continued
cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to the law. The
limitations provided by law must be enforced even if it prejudices
certain parties due to a previous mistake committed by public
officials in granting such benefit.”
Doctrine:
Judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that
law was originally passed.
Salazar v. Felias
Family home
Remedios Felias, representing the Heirs of Catalino Nivera, filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages
against Spouses Romualdo and Felisa Lastimosa to recover four
parcels of land located in Pangasinan. During the trial of the case,
Romualdo died. As such, he was substituted by his wife, Felisa and
their children (collectively called Heirs of Lastimosa).
RTC rendered a Decision declaring the Heirs of Catalino Nivera as
the absolute owners of the parcels of land in question and thereby
ordering the Heirs of Lastimosa to vacate the lands and to surrender
possession thereof. The Heirs of Lastimosa did not appeal the RTC’s
ruling.
Meanwhile, Felicitas Salazar (daughter of Romualdo) along with two
other children of Spouses Lastimosa filed a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment with the CA. Felicitas contends that she was deprived
of due process when she was not impleaded in the first case. CA
dismissed her Petition. SC affirmed with finality CA’s ruling. The
Heirs of Catalino Nivera opted to execute the judgment of the
Court, but the Heirs of Lastimosa filed an appeal before the CA. The
appeal was denied.
In this Petition, one of the arguments of Felicitas was that the
execution cannot continue because it is being enforced against the
family home. In this regard, she invokes Article 155 of the Family
Code exempt the property from execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the property is part of the family home under
Article 155 of the Family Code. (NO)
Held:
The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and
free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and that
land on which it is situated. It confers upon a particular family the
right to enjoy such properties. It cannot be seized by creditors
except in certain special cases. However, it must be noted that it is
not sufficient for the claimant to merely alleged that a property is a
family home. Whether the claim is premised under the Old Civil
Code or the Family Code, the claim for exemption must be set up
and proved.
Guided by the aforementioned rules, it becomes apparent that
Felicitas cannot conveniently claim that the subject property is her
family home without sufficient evidence proving her allegations.
Since Felicitas was unable to convincingly prove and substantiate
her claims, the execution of the Court’s judgment must be in order.
Doctrine:
Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Moreno v. Kahn
Family home; earnest effort requirement
Petitioner Jose claimed that he and his family have been occupying
two parcels of land since May 1998 and is co-owned by his full-
blooded sister, respondent Consuelo Moreno Kahn-Haire (Consuelo)
and his nephews and nieces (Consuelo's children), respondents
Rene Kahn (Rene), Rene Luis Pierre Kahn (Luis), Philippe Kahn
(Philippe), and Ma. Claudine Kahn-McMahon.
Held:
Non-compliance with the earnest effort requirement under Article
151 of the Family Code is not a jurisdictional defect which would
authorize the courts to dismiss suits filed before them. Rather, it
merely partakes of a condition precedent such that the non-
compliance therewith constitutes a ground for dismissal of a suit
should the same be invoked by the opposing party at the earliest
opportunity, as in a motion to dismiss or in the answer.
In this case, a plain reading of the records shows that the RTC
ordered the dismissal of Jose's complaint against respondents for
his alleged failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code
even before respondents have filed a motion or a responsive
pleading invoking such non-compliance. As such ground is not a
jurisdictional defect but is a mere condition precedent, the courts a
quo clearly erred in finding that a dismissal was warranted under
the given circumstances.
Doctrine:
Article 151. No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or
petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts
were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Sarto v. People
Bigamy
Petitioner Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for
allegedly contracting two marriages: the first marriage with Maria
Socorro and the second marriage with Fe Aguila, without first
having the prior marriage legally terminated.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that all the elements of bigamy are
present namely:
I. That the offender has been legally married;
 II. That the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved;
III. That the offender contracts a second or subsequent
marriage;
IV. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
People v. Nuyte
RA 7610
Nelson Nuyte was charged in six separate Informations, with one
count of rape under Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and
five counts of violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 committed
against a minor, AAA who is at the time of the commission of the
offense 14 years old.
Held:
The Informations charging Nuyte for violation of Sec 5 (b) of RA
7610 reveals that each of the informations contained elements of
both crimes of rape defined Under Art 266-A of the RPC and child
abuse defined under Sec 5(b) of RA 7610. However, the offender
cannot be accused of both crimes as it would result in double
jeopardy.
In such a case, the Supreme Court must examine the evidence of
the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or
intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader scope of
coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim. In
this case, the prosecution was able to establish that the appellant
forced her to lie down on a grassy ground and, at knifepoint,
inserted his penis into her vagina.
Republic v. Cote
Recognition of Foreign Divorce
On July 31, 1995, Rhomel Cote and respondent Florie Grace Cote,
both Filipinos, were married in Quezon City. On Aug 23, 2002,
Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce in Hawaii on the ground that
their marriage was irretrievably broken, which was granted by the
Family Court of Hawaii. On April 7, 2011, the RTC granted her
petition and declared Florie to be capacitated to remarry after the
RTC’s decision attained finality and a decree of absolute nullity has
been issued on the basis of Article 26 par (2).
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies in a
case involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce. (NO)
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court misapplied Sec. 20 of
A.M. No. 02-11-SC. It was an error for the RTC to apply the said rule
as a basis for denial of petitioner’s appeal. Instead Sec 3 of Rule 41
of the Rules of Court should govern since Florie followed the
procedure for cancellation of entry in the civil registry, which is a
special proceeding. Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled that
A.M. No. 02-11-SC only covers void and voidable marriages that are
specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code. Void and
voidable marriages contemplate a situation wherein the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce on
the other hand, ends a legally valid marriage and is usually due to
circumstances arising after marriage.
Republic v. Javier
Psychological incapacity
Martin filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and
Joint Custody of Common Minor Child under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In order to support his claims, Martin testified himself and
presented the psychological findings of Dr. Adamos. It appears from
the findings that both parties are suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. RTC dismissed the Petition. However, the CA
overturned RTC and ruled that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriage of Martin and Michelle is void for
psychological incapacity. (YES)
Held
The totality of evidence shows that Martin is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage.
Martin showed several pieces of evidence to support his petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. This notwithstanding, the Court
disagrees with the CA's findings that Michelle was psychologically
incapacitated. There were no other independent evidence
establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's
alleged psychological incapacity. While this Court cannot discount
their first-hand observations, it is highly unlikely that they were able
to paint Dr. Adamos a complete picture of Michelle's family and
childhood history. There were no other independent evidence
establishing the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's
alleged psychological incapacity.
Doctrine:
In Santos v CA, the Court declared that the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by:
a. gravity
b. juridical antecedence
c. incurability
Republic v. Catubag
Judicial declaration of presumptive death
Ludyson and Shanaviv married sometime in 2003. Ludyson was
working overseas in order to provide for his family. On July 12,
2006, while working abroad, private respondent was informed by
his relatives that Shanaviv left their house and never returned.
Worried about his wife's sudden disappearance and the welfare of
his children, private respondent flew back home. Ludyson looked
for his wife in Enrile Cagayan, but to no avail. He then proceeded to
inquire about Shanaviv's whereabouts from their close friends and
relatives, but it proved useless as well. Ludyson travelled as far as
Bicol where Shanaviv grew up, but he still could not locate her. He
even sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his
wife’s disappearance. After almost seven years of waiting, private
respondent filed with the RTC a petition to have his wife declared
presumptively dead where it was granted.

Held:
The requisite of diligent search was not met. First, private
respondent failed to present any evidence of his alleged friends or
relatives to corroborate his act of inquiring about his missing wife's
whereabouts from both friends and relatives. Moreover, no
explanation for such omission was given. As held in the previous
cases, failure to present any of the persons from whom inquiries
were allegedly made tends to belie a claim of a diligent search.
Second, private respondent did not seek the help of other
concerned government agencies, namely, the local police
authorities and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). It would
be ideal for the aggrieved spouse to seek the aid of the authorities
in searching for the missing spouse. Finally, aside from the
certification of Bombo Radyo's manager, private respondent bases
his "well-founded belief' on bare assertions that he exercised
earnest efforts in looking for his wife.
Doctrine:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
Republic v. Manalo
Recognition of foreign divorce
Marelyn Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage
by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese Court.
Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese
national named Yoshino Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by
Manalo in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated
December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court.
The RTC denied the petition for lack of merit and stated that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized
based on Article 15 of the Civil Code. It states does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the
country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to
foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or
in another country and that unless Filipinos are naturalized as
citizens of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over
issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the
determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages.
Held:
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who
initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It
does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or
the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is
bound by the words of the statute.The legislature is presumed to
know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and
to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a
statute there should be no departure.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained"
should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow
the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to
carry out such ends and purposes.
Doctrine:
Article 26. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Tadeo v. Republic
Judicial declaration of presumptive death
Estrellita, pursuant to Art. 41 of the Family Code, filed before the
RTC a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her
husband Wilfredo who was a member of the Philippine
Constabulary. On September 15, 1979, he set out from their
conjugal home to serve in Arayat, Pampanga but he never made
contact or communicated with the Estrellita nor his relatives and
has been declared missing ever since. Estrellita has been constantly
pestering the Philippine Constabulary for any news regarding her
husband but the Philippine Constabulary had no answer to his
whereabouts, all the information that the Constabulary knew was
that Wilfredo was assigned to a place frequented by the New
People’s Army.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that the petition for declaration of
presumptive death filed by Estrellita is not an action that would
have warranted the application of Art. 41 of the Family Code
because petitioner was not seeking to remarry. It is clear that based
on the provision, it is only applicable for the purpose of contracting
a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
In this case, the petitioner was only filing for the declaration of
presumptive death for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638. Instead, the
declaration of presumptive death contemplated should be Art. 390
or 391 of the Civil code
Doctrine:
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse
had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purposes of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided for in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect
of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Juego Sakai v. Republic
Recognition of foreign divorce
Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai got married on August
11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the wedding rites therein. After two
years, the parties, by agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said
country dissolving their marriage. On April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgement before the
RTC to which the RTC affirmed and recognized the divorce between
the parties as valid and effective under Philippine Laws.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the rulings of the RTC and
ruled that the second of the following requisites under Article 26 of
the Family Code is missing: (a) there is a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and (b) a
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry. This is because the divorce herein was consensual in
nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by Sakai
alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also obtained the
divorce herein, said divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines.
In addition, the CA ruled that petitioner's failure to present
authenticated copies of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her
cause.
Held:
Despite the fact that petitioner participated in the divorce
proceedings in Japan, and even if it is assumed that she initiated the
same, she must still be allowed to benefit from the exception
provided under Paragraph 2 of Article 26. Consequently, since her
marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had already been dissolved by virtue of
the divorce decree they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating
Toshiharu to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
However, the Court ruled that it cannot yet grant petitioner's
Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has yet
to comply with certain guidelines. The Court has held that in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment, it must be
acknowledgment that Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice
of foreign judgments and laws. This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under the
rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
Racho v. Tanaka
Recognition of Foreign Divorce
The case of Republic v. Manalo teaches that a plain reading of Par. 2
of Article 26 only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse
should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce
decree was granted. Verbal legis non est recedendum, from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. Moreover,
assuming that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean
that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien
spouse, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to
do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
other yield conclusion inconsistent with the general purpose of the
act.
Spouses Carlos v. Tolentino
Property regime
A parcel of land with an area of 1,000 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-90746 issued on March 17, 1967
and registered under Juan C. Tolentino, married to Mercedes
Tolentino. Without Juan’s knowledge and consent, Mercedes and
Kristoff, who were residing in the subject property allegedly forged
a Deed of Donation on Feb. 2011, making it appear that Juan had
Mercedes donate the subject property to Kristoff. In April 2011,
Kristoff offered the sale of the property to Julieta’s brother, Felix,
who is also the administrator of the lot owned by Julieta, which is
adjacent to the subject property.
Held:
Juan and Mercedes appear to have been married before the
effectivity of the Family Code on Aug. 3, 1988 and the presumption
is that when there is no indication that the spouses have adopted a
different property regime, the property relations shall be governed
by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains. Art. 119 of the Civil
Code states that “in the absence of marriage settlements, or when
the same are void the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the
property relations between husband and wife.”
Likewise, Art. 105 of the Family Code supersedes the terms of the
conjugal partnership under the Civil Code. Since the subject
property was acquired on March 19, 1967 or before the effectivity
of the Family Code, it formed part of their conjugal partnership.
Hence, Juan and Mercedes are the absolute owners of their
undivided one-half interests over the subject property.
Republic v. Mola Cruz
Psychological incapacity
Liberato was married to Liezl and they moved to Japan because Liezl
worked as an entertainer in Japan and eventually, Liberato found
work as a construction worker. While living in Japan Liezl started to
act differently. The couple later returned to the Philippines after
Liezl was released from detention due to overstaying in Japan. It
was then that Liezl confessed to Liberato that she had a romantic
affair with a Japanese man. Despite the confession, Liezl did not end
the illicit relationship, which caused Liberato such stress that he was
hospitalized. Liberato expressed his willingness to forgive Liezl but
she chose to walk away from their marriage.
The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl
back. However, Liberato found Liezl's Japanese lover in their house.
To Liberato’s surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her elder
brother. Liberato went along with the charade, and allowed Liezl to
share her bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their home.
Liezl then left Liberato a second time. Liberato tried to move on and
left for Singapore to work in 2008. Though abroad, he continued to
woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already cohabited with
her lover. This prompted Liberato to file a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or
her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently prove
that the respondent spouse's psychological incapacity was grave,
incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
Although sexual infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal
separation, the courts found that such infidelity was duly connected
with the aberrant acts of Liezl as actual manifestations of her
histrionic personality disorder. These traits were especially reflected
in Liezl's highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to
stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese
boyfriend and introducing her husband as her elder brother, all
done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and
lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot
be expected from a married person who reasonably understand the
principle and responsibilities of marriage.
It is clear from the records how much petitioner must love his wife
to endure the pain and humiliation she callously caused him in the
hope that their relationship could still work out. Clearly, Liezl does
not recognize the marital responsibilities that came when she
married petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculum will
better protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of
marriage and family.
PGMC v. AAA
Support (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children)
AAA filed an action for support against her husband, BBB who was a
retired military person before the RTC of Isabela, Basilan. The RTC
ordered the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order decreeing
the respondent to support the petitioner and the minor child
consisting of 50% of his monthly pension to be withheld regularly by
the Pension Gratuity Management Center of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in Taguig.
Held:
The SC cited the case of Republic v. Yahon where the Court therein
held that PGMC may be ordered to automatically deduct a portion
from the retirement benefits of its member-recipients for direct
remittance to the latter’s legal spouse in compliance with the
protection order of the court, pursuant to the provisions of RA 9260
(VAWC).
The Court declared therein that the Anti-VAWC law which is a
special law; a later enactment; a support enforcement legislation;
and one that addresses one form of violence, which is economic
abuse against women and children should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule that retirement benefits are
exempt from execution. The Court therein noted that RA 9262
expreselly authorized the courts to order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the defendant or respondent
by the employer, which shall be remitted directly to the
complainant.