Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171

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Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/obhdp

How do you fake a personality test? An investigation of cognitive models

of impression-managed responding
Mindy K. Shoss a,⇑, Michael J Strube b
a
Department of Psychology, University of Houston, TX, USA
b
Department of Psychology, Washington University in St. Louis, MO, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Because faking poses a threat to the validity of personality measures, research has focused on ways of
Received 3 February 2010 detecting faking, including the use of response times. However, the applicability and validity of these
Accepted 14 May 2011 approaches are dependent upon the actual cognitive process underlying faking. This study tested three
Available online 28 June 2011
competing cognitive models in order to identify the process underlying faking and to determine whether
Accepted by Paul Levy
response time patterns are a viable method of detecting faking. Specifically, we used a within-subjects
manipulation of instructions (respond honestly, make a good impression, make a specific impression)
Keywords:
to examine whether the distribution of response times across response scale options (e.g., disagree,
Cognition
Faking
agree) could be used to identify faking on the NEO PI-R. Our results suggest that individuals reference
Personality questionnaire a schema of an ideal respondent when faking. As a result, response time patterns such as the well-known
inverted-U cannot be used to identify faking.
Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Introduction Particularly troublesome, 74% of applicants believe that other

Personality measures have re-emerged in personnel selection
because research has supported their validity in such contexts
(Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007). The ease and low cost
of administering these assessments, as well as the lower adverse
impact compared to other selection tools (Hough, Oswald, &
Ployhart, 2001), adds to their attraction. However, researchers
have questioned the validity of these measures in light of research
suggesting that individuals can (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006;
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) and do (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore,
Brannick, & Smith, 2006) effectively distort their responses in
situations where it is advantageous to do so. Recent research sug-
gests that distortions can come at a considerable cost to predictive
validity (Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008), especially for those
who score at the high end of the distribution (Mueller-Hanson,
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003).
Thus, faking undermines the use of personality scales as re-
search instruments and in applied settings (Mesmer-Magnus &
Viswesvaran, 2006). Faking subverts the purpose of content-driven
personnel selection and instead may lead to the selection of appli-
cants who are especially skilled at impression management rather
than especially noteworthy on the intended attribute. At an even
more basic level, faking on selection instruments raises questions
about the basic honesty of applicants and potential employees.
⇑ Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, University of
Houston, Houston, TX 77024, USA.
E-mail address: mmkrischer@uh.edu (M.K. Shoss).
applicants fake on selection assessments (English et al., 2005 as ci-
ted in Griffith & McDaniel, 2006), suggesting considerable pressure
for applicants to fake in order to not be at a significant disadvan-
tage. Not surprisingly, the self-help literature now has many
‘‘how to’’ guides for manipulating responses to personality assess-
ments to increase the chances of being hired (Griffith & McDaniel,
2006).
In response to these issues, researchers have sought to identify
ways to detect fakers, and have suggested that response times
might be useful towards this end (e.g., Holden & Kroner, 1992;
Holtgraves, 2004). However, research findings on the differences
in response times between those faking and those responding hon-
estly have largely been inconsistent. Not only does this call into
question the idea that response times may be useful for identifying
fakers, but also it raises a broader issue of identifying the cognitive
process that underlies faking on personality questionnaires that
might lead to differences in response times.
In the current study, we examine the fundamental assumption
underlying the suggestion to use response times to detect faking—
that the cognitive process engaged while faking is different enough
from honest responding that response times will be consistently
different when an individual is faking than when an individual is
responding honestly. Specifically, we test three competing models
of faking—the self-schema, adopted-schema, and semantic evalua-
tion models—by examining patterns of response times for different
response options. Our approach to testing these models is a novel
one. In contrast to prior studies that have examined average re-
sponse times across items, our approach allows us to explicitly test

0749-5978/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.05.003
164 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
the nuanced predictions these models make for how response time
patterns associated with faking compare to the well-known in-
verted-U response time pattern for honest responding (Kuiper,
1981). As a result, we are not only able to test competing models
of faking, but are also able to examine whether response time pat-
terns can be used to identify faking.
Our study, therefore, advances the literature on faking by shed-
ding light on the cognitive processes underlying faking and, in
doing so, indicating whether response time patterns are a viable
way of detecting faking. As these models of faking take as their
starting point the cognitive processes presumed to underlie honest
responding, we begin by discussing cognitive models of honest
responding. We then describe the models of faking and the predic-
tions that each makes for response time patterns across response
options.
Cognitive models of honest responding
Despite the fact that reading a 20-item scale takes about
1.5 min, the average administration time for the same length scale
is about 10–15 min (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006). Therefore, other
cognitive processes are likely engaged when an individual re-
sponds to a personality assessment. For example, Holtgraves
(2004) argued that these cognitive processes include a retrieval
stage, during which one gathers the information necessary to for-
mulate a response, and a judgment stage, during which one maps
the retrieved information onto the response options and selects the
appropriate response.
More specifically, others have argued that honest responding
requires accessing a self-schema in the retrieval phase and com-
paring item responses to the exemplars that define the individual
when making judgments about the response option to select (Kui-
per, 1981). The endpoints of a response scale (e.g., strongly agree,
strongly disagree) are more likely to correspond to simple, clear,
and easily retrieved exemplars, leading to fast responses because
comparison to self-relevant information is accomplished with little
effort (see also Popham & Holden, 1990). In contrast, middle re-
sponse options (e.g., agree somewhat, slightly disagree) corre-
spond to more complex, conflicting, or context-dependent
exemplars, requiring more thought (e.g., extensive retrieval) and
resulting in longer response times. The resulting ‘‘inverted-U ef-
fect’’ has now been confirmed by numerous studies (e.g., Casey &
Tyron, 2001; Mueller, Thompson, & Dugan, 1986). Recently,
Akrami, Hedlund, and Ekehammar (2007) reported its presence
for responses to the NEO Personality Inventory, the measure used
in the current study.
When individuals fabricate responses to questionnaire items,
additional processes are likely to be engaged as attempts are made
to manage or project an impression that deviates from the true or
honest self. Several models of impression-managed responding
have been proposed, each with implications for how response
times might deviate from the inverted-U pattern.
Cognitive models of impression-managed responding
Vasilopoulos, Reilly, and Leaman (2000) discussed three dis-
tinct, mutually exclusive models of the cognitive processes that
might guide impression-managed responding. In the self-schema
model, individuals access their self-schemas but decide to make re-
sponses inconsistent with those schemas, which requires some
deliberation while the social desirability of responses is consid-
ered. The adopted-schema model is similar to the self-schema mod-
el except that impression-managed responses involve referencing
a schema of an ideal respondent, not one’s own self-schema. The
semantic-exercise model suggests that impression-managed re-
sponses require a simple semantic evaluation of how the trait
being assessed relates to either a favorable or stereotypic image.
Responses are selected solely on the basis of social desirability,
rather than by the extent to which they are self-referent.
Research examining these models has primarily examined aver-
age response times across items, rather than examining average re-
sponse times for particular response options, and has resulted in
inconsistent and conflicting findings. Supporters of the self-schema
model cite research indicating that the social desirability implica-
tions of questionnaire items have been found to correlate with re-
sponse times, reflecting the delayed judgment stage implied by
this model (McDaniel & Timm, 1990). For example, Holtgraves
(2004) varied the social desirability signals of instructions for a
personality assessment and found that response times were posi-
tively associated with social desirability concerns. In contrast, Hol-
den and colleagues (Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden & Kroner, 1992)
found that impression-managed response times for responses con-
sistent with an ideal applicant were identical to honest-responding
response times, which they note is consistent with the use of an
adopted-schema. Finally, Hsu, Santelli, and Hsu (1989) found that
impression-management was associated with faster responses
than honest responding, consistent with the semantic-exercise
model, which suggests a judgment stage without a retrieval stage.
Contributing to the confusion, Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) sug-
gested that the variation in findings may be a result of differences
in the manipulation of the impression management task. They pre-
dicted that when the ideal job characteristics are not familiar or an
individual is merely trying to make a global positive impression,
response times would be slower than honest-responding response
times because no clear impression is being constructed. Consistent
with these predictions, they found that impression-management
was associated with slower response times than honest responding
for a low job familiarity (fake-good) condition, whereas a high job
familiarity (fake-specific) condition was associated with slightly
quicker responses. These results indicate that schema strength,
characterized as familiarity with the job, may influence the average
speed with which individuals respond to personality inventories.
These findings, however, do not lend clear support for a given mod-
el and make the interpretation of prior research on the response
times associated with faking difficult to interpret.
We suggest that past research contains a number of problems
that limit the ability to test model validity. One major problem is
the use of between-subjects designs. These designs require the
use of a standardization technique to control for individual differ-
ences in reading speed and simple response time that might ob-
scure comparisons across conditions. For example, Holden (1998;
Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 1991) used a double-standardization
technique to analyze the response latency data for a number of
studies that assigned participants to either a fake or honest
responding condition. In this approach, response times are first
standardized across items within each subject, in order to control
for reading speed, and then response times are standardized across
subjects within each item, to control for item-specific factors such
as item length. Casey and Tryon (2001) attempted to improve on
Holden’s technique by having participants push a key after they
had finished reading the question, then a key for an answer. The re-
sponse time for the individual was the time difference between
both key pushes, assumed to just measure psychological response
time. However, individuals may begin the retrieval process as they
are reading or may not remember or be able to separate when
reading the question ends and thinking about a response begins.
In other words, the standardization process may remove variability
due to response distortion—the variability of primary interest in
response fabrication research. Indeed, empirical results indicate
higher response-distortion estimates for within-subjects designs
(that require no standardization) than for between-subjects de-
signs (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2006).
 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
Table 1
Predicted response time patterns for models of impression-managed responding.
Model Schema Response process Predicted response time distribution for
fake good condition
Self-schema Self Retrieval and prolonged Flatter and slower compared to honest
judgment stages responding
Adopted- Ideal Retrieval and judgment Indistinguishable from honest
schema Respondent stages responding
Semantic- None Judgment stage only Flatter and faster than honest
exercise responding
Note. The honest responding condition is expected to produce a significant inverted-U pattern, consistent with past research.
A second, related problem is that these studies generally com-
pare average response times between items (i.e., averaging to-
gether response times regardless of the response option
selected), eliminating the possibility of using more subtle patterns
such as the inverted-U effect to detect honest versus faked re-
sponses. Moreover, using response time distributions allows com-
peting tests of the previously described cognitive models, as each
has distinct implications for the way impression-managed
responding should emerge with regard to the inverted-U pattern.
If response time distributions across response options are different
when individuals fabricate their responses compared to respond-
ing honestly, then response time distributions could be a viable
method to detect faking in applied settings. We describe implica-
tions of the three models for response latency distributions in
the following discussion. This information is also summarized in
Table 1.
Self-schema model
Recall that the self-schema model of impression-managed
responding suggests that individuals access their self-schemas
but decide to make responses inconsistent with these schemas in
an attempt to appear more socially desirable. This deliberation
about social desirability prolongs the judgment stage in Holt-
graves’ (2004) conceptualization. Moreover, the self-schema model
suggests that extreme dissimulated responses should engage rela-
tively more cognitive processes than less extreme responses. Re-
sponses on the end-points of the scales (e.g., strongly agree),
which ordinarily are retrieved and selected easily when the re-
sponse is honest, require additional thought, especially if an indi-
vidual’s self-schema indicates that a moderate response would
be honest. On average, this process produces a flatter response dis-
tribution than occurs for honest responding and one that is slower
overall due to the added deliberation about social desirability of re-
sponses relative to the self. Additionally, this model suggests no
differences between the distributions when individuals are trying
to make a general good impression versus a very specific impres-
sion—both involve additional deliberation that takes additional
time, especially for extreme responses.
Adopted-schema model
According to the adopted-schema model, individuals access a
schema of an ideal respondent. Provided that individuals have a
schema of what a good applicant might look like, the adopted sche-
ma model predicts a pattern of response times that should be also
be inverted-U shaped because the responses are ‘‘honest’’ with re-
spect to the referenced schema—the referenced schema is adopted
as if it were one’s own. The adopted-schema model can be taken to
make a more extreme prediction, however, in line with the results
reported by Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) suggesting that schema
strength may affect response times. To the extent that a clear sche-
ma is available and is simpler than the self-schema or a general
good impression schema, the adopted schema model predicts an
even more pronounced inverted-U pattern for impression-man-
aged responding and overall responses times that are faster.
165
Predicted difference between fake-good and fake-specific
conditions
No difference
Fake-specific will show a faster and more pronounced
inverted-U distribution than fake-good
No difference
Semantic-exercise model
The semantic-exercise model involves a social desirability
assessment of each item. In Holtgraves’ (2004) conceptualization,
this model corresponds to the elimination of the retrieval stage.
Responses are selected solely on the basis of social desirability,
rather than by the extent to which they are self-referent or reflect
an ideal schema. Response times may show an inverted-U distribu-
tion to the extent that extreme responses more readily convey a
good impression. However, given that a semantic evaluation en-
gages relatively few cognitive processes, moderate responses
(e.g., somewhat agree) should also be made relatively quickly.
Thus, although an inverted-U may emerge, this will be less pro-
nounced than in the honest-responding condition, and response
times will be generally faster than is true for honest responding.
Because selection merely requires a semantic evaluation, this
model suggests there will no differences between the response
time distributions when individuals are trying to make a general
good impression versus a specific impression.
The current study
The present study employed a within-subjects design in which
participants responded to the NEO PI-R under each of three condi-
tions: (a) honestly, (b) to make a good impression, and (c) to make
a specific impression. Both general and specific impression-man-
aged conditions were included because the three models make
different predictions for the response time distributions under
fake-general and fake-specific instructions. Thus, including a
fake-specific condition is necessary to provide a complete test of
the models.
Within the specific impression condition, participants were gi-
ven one of two sets of instructions—to respond as if applying for
a job in accounting or to respond as if applying for a job in public
relations. Given that popular stereotypes of these positions involve
greater differences in levels of extraversion than in levels of other
dimensions (e.g., openness), we expected this condition would pri-
marily involve a manipulation of the extraversion dimension. Prior
research has found increased extraversion scores as a result of fak-
ing (Bagby & Marshall, 2003), but this may depend on the impres-
sion one is trying to make. Although faking to make a generally
favorable impression and specific impressions appropriate for
many jobs likely involve portraying oneself as extraverted, some
jobs may call for a more introverted nature. This study, in addition
to testing the aforementioned models, determined if respondents
could dissimulate in this way when the circumstances called for it.
As noted previously, the cognitive models have different impli-
cations for response time distributions, both their shape and their
overall level. Prior research does not make a strong case for a par-
ticular model, so we note here the predicted pattern for each of the
models (see Table 1). The self-schema model predicts a flatter re-
sponse time pattern for the fake-good and fake-specific conditions
compared to the honest response condition and overall response
times that are significantly slower. The adopted-schema model
predicts an inverted-U pattern for the fake-good condition that
166 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
should be indistinguishable from that found in the honest-
responding condition. But, the adopted-schema model also makes
a more specific prediction with regard to the specific instruction
conditions (especially for the extraversion dimension that under-
lies these instructions) that allows it to be differentiated from hon-
est responding. For the extraversion dimension, the inverted-U for
the fake-specific public relations condition should be more pro-
nounced than for the other conditions. The instruction to fake
appropriateness for a public relations job represents a very specific
and clear ideal that, if adopted, should produce a particularly pro-
nounced inverted-U pattern. Moreover, because both the public
relations and the accountant jobs likely represent clearer and more
specific ideals than faking to make a general positive impression,
the overall response times for them should be significantly faster
than for honest responding or general fake-good responding. The
semantic-exercise model predicts generally faster response times
for the faking conditions than for honest responding, and a less
pronounced inverted-U effect.
Method
Participants
Sixty-two participants were recruited from the Psychology
Department Volunteer Participant Pool. Twenty-five participants
identified themselves as European Americans, 6 as African Ameri-
cans, 4 Hispanic, 11 Asian Americans, and 4 as other ethnicities.
The average participant age was 19.38 (SD = 1.19). Two partici-
pants neglected to return for the second session, resulting in their
first session data not being used in the analyses. Of the 60 partic-
ipants included in the analyses, 22 were men and 38 were women.
Design
This experiment used a within-subjects manipulation of re-
sponse instructions: honest, fake-good, and fake-specific. The
fake-specific response instructions were manipulated between
subjects, resulting in two fake-specific conditions that instructed
participants to dissimulate so as to obtain a position in either
accounting or public relations. Although we expected the fake-spe-
cific conditions to be primarily a manipulation of the extraversion
dimension, we used job positions in order to increase realism and
generalizability of our findings to selection contexts. In addition,
individual difference assessments (NEO-PI-R dimension scores)
from the honest responding condition were incorporated into sta-
tistical analyses to determine if response-time patterns were mod-
erated by particular personality characteristics.
Procedure
The experiment was administered by computer and required
approximately one hour for the first session and half an hour for
the second session. In the first session, participants were asked
to respond honestly to the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and
response times were recorded without participants’ knowledge.
At the end of the session, participants responded to a brief demo-
graphic questionnaire.
During the second session, participants completed the NEO PI-R
twice: (a) under non-specific instructions to give a good impres-
sion, and (b) under specific instructions to respond as an ideal can-
didate for one of two jobs. All participants responded to the general
instructions to fake good. Participants were randomly assigned to
just one of the specific instruction conditions. The computer pro-
gram counterbalanced the instructions and measured response
times.
Instructions for non-specific good impression
Please answer the questions as if your responses were going to
be read by potential employers for a job you really want or gradu-
ate school admissions committees for a school you really want to
go to. You should try to present yourself in the best light possible
so, for each item, select the response that you feel will give you the
highest score and make you look like the best applicant.
Instructions for specific impression—public relations
Please answer the questions as if you were the ideal candidate
for a position in public relations. According to the top public rela-
tions firms, an ideal candidate has the following qualities: outgo-
ing, confident, credible, creative, takes initiative, and exercises
good judgment.
Instructions for specific impression—accounting
Please answer the questions as if you were the ideal candidate
for a position in accounting. An ideal candidate in accounting is de-
tailed-oriented, punctual, has good time management, and is
disciplined.
Measures
Personality
The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992)
is a 240-question assessment measuring the Five Factor Model
dimensions of personality: Neuroticism (Cronbach’s a = .90), Extra-
version (a = .93), Openness to Experience (a = .85), Agreeableness
(a = .91), and Conscientiousness (a = .91). Each dimension is mea-
sured using 48 items, each rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). This measure was
developed for use with adults without overt psychopathology
and has been found to have a high level of internal consistency
and test–retest reliability over long periods of time. For this reason,
it has been translated into many different languages and used in
many different cultures.
Results
Faking estimates and manipulation check
The effectiveness of the instructions was assessed by comparing
scores from the NEO scale administered under the three instruc-
tion conditions in a 2 (Specific Instructions: Extravert versus Intro-
vert)  3 (Type of Instruction: Honest, Good Impression, Specific
Impression) analysis of variance with the latter factor treated as
a repeated measure. Results and specific comparisons among con-
ditions for all scales are presented in Table 2. Based on previous re-
search demonstrating that applicants responding to the NEO PI-R
exhibited higher mean conscientiousness than non-applicants
(Griffin, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004), we expected a significant in-
crease in conscientiousness scores when participants attempted
to make a good impression compared to their honest responses.
Also, based on prior faking research (McFarland, Ryan, & Ellis,
2002; Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 2000), we expected elevated
extraversion and agreeableness scores and lower neuroticism
scores in the fake-good condition compared to the honest respond-
ing condition. However, we did not expect a significant difference
in openness scores across conditions based on evidence suggesting
that openness to experience is considerably difficult to fake (Griffin
et al., 2004).
The most relevant NEO scale in our experiment was extraver-
sion and the analysis of variance revealed a significant specific
instruction by type of instruction interaction, F(2, 116) = 20.77,
p < .001. As expected, extraversion scores were significantly higher
 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
Table 2
NEO dimension scores as a function of instruction condition.
Scale Honest (H) Fake-good (FG)
M SD M SD
Neuroticism1 148.47 20.65 94.35
Extraversion2 170.12 24.48 192.65
Openness3 175.50 15.99 178.83
Agreeableness4 162.28 20.43 212.50
Conscientiousness5 165.02 20.20 187.30
1
F(2, 116) = 3.24, p < .01; t-tests revealed significant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, H&FSI.
2
F(2, 116) = 20.77, p < .01; t-tests revealed significant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, FSE&FSI.
3
F(2, 116) = 36.94, p < .01; t-tests revealed significant differences (p < .01) between H&FSI, FSE&FSI.
4
F(2, 116) = 9.37, p < .01; t-tests revealed significant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, H&FSI, FSE&FSI.
5
F(2, 116) = 4.90, p < .01; t-tests revealed significant differences (p < .01) between H&FG.
in the fake-good condition than in the honest responding condi-
tion, in the fake-specific-extraversion condition than in the honest
responding condition, and in the fake-specific-extraversion condi-
tion than the fake-specific-introvert condition. Additionally, neu-
roticism scores were lower in all of the faking conditions than in
the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) = 3.24, p < .01. Similarly,
agreeableness scores were higher in all of the faking conditions
than in the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) = 9.37, p < .01.
Conscientious scores were significantly higher in the fake-good
condition than in the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) =
4.90, p < .01. The pattern of results clearly shows that participants
successfully implemented both the general instructions to make a
favorable impression and the more specific instructions targeted to
particular job characteristics.
HLM analysis
We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to analyze the re-
sponse time data because observations (i.e., response times) were
nested within individuals (Osborne, 2000). Specifically, each indi-
vidual had response times for each response option that he or
she selected while responding to the NEO questionnaire. After re-
verse coding appropriate items, we averaged the response times
for each response option (e.g., agree) for a given scale (e.g., extra-
version) for each individual participant (and separately by condi-
tion). We examined the NEO scales individually so that the
honest and fake-good conditions could be easily compared to the
fake-specific condition, which we expected manipulated primarily
the extraversion dimension. Thus, each person had 25 dependent
variables (response time averages; 5 per each of the 5 NEO scales)
for each experimental condition. HLM uses the data available in the
case of individuals who did not select a given response option
when responding to items in a particular scale. The inverted-U ef-
fect was examined by testing for a quadratic trend in average re-
sponse times across the five response options. Then, we used
moderator variables to determine if the relationship between re-
sponse times and response options was general to all participants
or depended on the experimental manipulations and individual
differences.
Honest responding model specification and analysis
The initial HLM analysis tested the presence of the inverted-U
pattern under the honest responding instructions. The Level 1
model represented the average response times for each participant
as predicted by the selected response options, modeled to include
the linear and quadratic relations between response option and re-
sponse time:
RT ri ¼ p0i þ p1i ROri þ p2i RO2ri þ eri
167
Fake-specific
Extravert (FSE) Introvert (FSI)
M SD M SD
17.56 96.44 22.60 93.57 18.27
13.02 202.80 14.60 164.30 23.19
14.50 185.36 17.75 145.00 24.09
17.05 203.12 21.55 220.29 14.50
15.31 174.44 23.40 163.37 21.10
RTri is the average response time given by participant i for response
option r. ROri refers to the response option (1–5) chosen for ques-
tions from one dimension of the NEO PI-R. The response option var-
iable was centered so that RO could take on values of 2, 1, 0, 1,
and 2 for each individual. Homogeneity of error variance was as-
sumed for each individual and confirmed by analysis of residuals.
HLM assumes that residuals are randomly and normally distributed.
To achieve these assumptions, response time data were trimmed
such that responses over 8 s were excluded from the analysis.
The Level 2 model for analysis of honest responding treats the
Level 1 regression parameters (i.e., the intercept, linear, and qua-
dratic effects of response options on response times) as outcomes
to be predicted. Note that the Level 2 parameters are at the individ-
ual level and reflect the extent to which individual variability ex-
ists in the Level 1 parameters.
p0i ¼ b00 þ r0i
p1i ¼ b10 þ r1i
p2i ¼ b20 þ r2i
Each parameter can be construed as fixed, randomly varying, or
nonrandomly varying (i.e., moderators are present). Tests were
conducted to determine the best model and in all cases either a
fixed or randomly varying model (shown above) was found to be
optimal. The latter implies the presence of individual difference
moderators.
Estimates and standard errors of the fixed coefficients are pre-
sented in Table 3, and results for the extraversion scale are also dis-
played graphically in Fig. 1. The analyses show a robust replication
of the inverted-U response time effect for each of the NEO PI-R sub-
scales with negative and significant quadratic coefficients in each
case. There were several significant linear effects as well; however,
these effects were weak when compared with the quadratic in-
verted-U response time effect. Additionally, as can be seen in the
intercept parameter (p0i), the openness subscale was responded
to more slowly overall than other subscales, supporting previous
research suggesting that these items are more difficult to respond
to than the other Big Five scales (Griffin & Hesketh, 2004). The ro-
bust replication of the inverted-U response time effect in the hon-
est responding condition provides the baseline against which to
assess response patterns in the faking conditions.
The r terms corresponding to error were either fixed at zero or
estimated based on chi-square tests in a preliminary analysis.
These tests of the variance components were significant (p < .05)
for the intercept for each NEO subscale, the linear component for
the agreeableness subscale, and the quadratic component for
extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness sub-
scales. The significant r terms suggest that there is variability
across individuals in terms of the size of these parameters (e.g.,
168 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171

Table 3
Honest-responding fixed effects estimation (with robust standard errors).

Scale Fixed effect Coefficient Standard error t df p

Neuroticism Intercept, p0i 3624.36 92.51 39.18 59 .001
Linear, p1i 62.16 27.15 2.29 271 .023
Quadratic, p2i 137.41 22.98 5.98 271 .001
Extraversion Intercept, p0i 3484.36 98.69 35.31 59 .001
Linear, p1i 44.28 26.11 1.70 261 .091
Quadratic, p2i 148.06 28.26 5.24 59 .001
Openness Intercept, p0i 4081.31 98.93 41.25 59 .001
Linear, p1i 37.79 40.18 0.94 59 .351
Quadratic, p2i 181.07 34.38 5.27 59 .001
Agreeableness Intercept, p0i 3516.84 92.19 38.15 59 .001
Linear, p1i 25.57 36.38 0.70 59 .485
Quadratic, p2i 87.75 30.09 2.92 59 .006
Conscientiousness Intercept, p0i 3687.11 97.21 37.93 59 .001
Linear, p1i 94.24 32.41 2.91 264 .004
Quadratic, p2i 89.55 33.30 2.69 59 .010

4400
Honest Responding
4200 Good Impression
4000 Specific Impression (Extravert)

3800 Specific Impression (Introvert)

3600
Response Time (ms)

3400

3200

3000

2800

2600

2400

2200

2000

1800
1 2 3 4 5
Response Option

Fig. 1. Response times as a function of response option for the extraversion dimension of the NEO PI-R under honest response, fake-good response, and fake-specific response
instructions.

in the overall response times or in the shape of the response time
distributions). Attempts to find individual difference moderators
(NEO-PI-R dimension scores) were largely unsuccessful, however.1
This suggests that there may be individual differences not measured
in this study (e.g., alertness) that may cause systematic variability in
response times.
Fake-good response time analysis
significantly as a function of the desire to make a generally good
impression. Examination of response times under the ‘‘fake good’’
instructions required a three-level model. As in the previous anal-
ysis, the Level 1 model corresponded to response times per re-
sponse options, but unlike the previous analysis, required an
additional subscript, s, indicating the nesting of response times un-
der the set of instructions (honest or good impression) under
which they were collected.

In the previous analysis, only the response times for the honest- RT rsi ¼ p0si þ p1si ROrsi þ p2si RO2rsi þ ersi
responding condition were examined. We next included both the
The Level 2 model examined the variability in the Level 1
honest and fake-good conditions in order to assess whether the
parameters and included a variable to account for the instructions
distribution of response times across response options varied
under which responses were made (honest versus good impres-
1
sion). Therefore, the p coefficients now include variability across
In an attempt to account for individual variability in the honest responding, fake-
conditions.
good, and fake-specific analyses, follow-up analyses were conducted in which
individual difference measures (NEO-PI-R dimension scores from the honest response
condition) were entered as predictors in the highest level model. Very few significant p0si ¼ b00s þ b01s Instructionsi þ r0si
effects emerged and no consistent patterns were found. Thus, it did not appear that p1si ¼ b10s þ b11s Instructionsi þ r1si
the personality traits included in this study were associated with differential abilities
to fake.
p2si ¼ b20s þ b21s Instructionsi þ r2si
 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
The estimates of the fixed coefficients are presented in Table 4.
Because the instruction condition was dummy coded with 0 as-
signed to the honest responding condition, the significance of
the b20 coefficient corresponds to the curvature of the distribution
of response times for the honest response condition. As indicated
by the non-significant b21 coefficients, response distributions for
the neuroticism, extraversion, and openness scales displayed a
significant inverted-U shape in the fake-good condition that was
not significantly different from the honest-responding inverted-
U. Furthermore, the nonsignificant b01 coefficients for all but
the openness scale indicate that overall response times in the
fake-good condition were not distinguishable from the honest
responding condition. Taken together, these results are most con-
sistent with the adopted schema model. Agreeableness and con-
scientiousness were the only two scales for which the curvature
was different between the honest-responding and fake-good con-
ditions, and in both cases the inverted-U pattern was more pro-
nounced in the fake-good condition. Likewise, the only overall
response time difference occurred for openness and was faster
for the fake-good condition. These findings are consistent with
the adopted schema model under the assumption that the fake-
good instruction called to mind a rather specific image to be fab-
ricated with regard to these dimensions (at least more specific
than the participants’ own self-concepts).2 These results are cer-
tainly inconsistent with the self-schema model and the semantic-
exercise model.
Fake-specific response time analysis
Extraversion response times for the specific instruction condi-
tions were also examined in a three-level model that required a
modification at Levels 2 and 3. At Level 2, an additional parameter
was necessary to account for all three instruction conditions which
were dummy coded (specific: 0, 0; honest: 1, 0; fake-good: 0, 1):
p0si ¼ b00s þ b01s Instruction 1si þ b02s Instruction 2si þ r0si
p1si ¼ b10s þ b11s Instruction 1si þ b12s Instruction 2si þ r1si
p2si ¼ b20s þ b21s Instruction 1si þ b22s Instruction 2si þ r2si
These b coefficients were modeled in a Level 3 model where the
fake-specific condition was dummy coded (public relations = 0;
accountant = 1). Recall that the fake-specific condition was a be-
tween-subjects manipulation where half of the participants were
instructed to respond as if applying for a job in public relations
and the other half were instructed to respond as if applying for a
job in accounting:
b00s ¼ c000 þ c001 Specifici þ u00i
b01s ¼ c010 þ c011 Specifici þ u01i
b02s ¼ c020 þ c021 Specifici þ u02i
b10s ¼ c100 þ c101 Specifici þ u10i
b11s ¼ c110 þ c111 Specifici þ u11i
b12s ¼ c120 þ c121 Specifici þ u12i
b20s ¼ c200 þ c201 Specifici þ u20i
b21s ¼ c210 þ c211 Specifici þ u21i
b22s ¼ c220 þ c221 Specifici þ u22i
The key parameter tests are for c010, c001, c211 and c221. The lat-
ter two indicate whether the inverted-U pattern is different be-
tween the two specific instruction conditions when the specific
2 3
The Level 3 model estimated individual variability in the Level 2 parameters. No
interpretable effects were found.
169
response instruction condition is compared to the honest response
condition (c211) and when it is compared to the fake-good condi-
tion (c221). Both parameters were significant [c211, t(177) = 2.80,
p = .006; c221, t(177) = 2.11, p = .036]. These effects are displayed
graphically in Fig. 1. The fake-specific public relations instruction
resulted in a significantly more distinct inverted-U distribution
than the fake-specific accountant instruction, t(118) = 2.56,
p = .012. This between-subjects difference only occurred in the
specific instruction conditions. The c010 coefficient tests whether
the honest responding condition had overall response times that
were different from the public relations condition. This coefficient
was significant [t(58) = 2.16, p = .035] and indicated that honest
responding was significantly slower. The c001 coefficient tests
whether the accountant condition had overall response times that
were different from the public relations condition. This coefficient
was significant [t(58) = 2.04, p = .046] and indicated that the
accountant condition produced the fastest response times overall.
By implication, this condition was also faster than honest respond-
ing. These results support the predictions made by the adopted
schema model that there would be no difference in the quadratic
effect between the honest and fake-good conditions, that the
fake-specific public relations condition would exhibit the most
profound inverted-U relative to the other conditions, and that the
specific impression conditions would produce faster responding
than the honest response condition.3
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the validity of three
competing models of impression-managed responding to a person-
ality test—the self-schema, adopted-schema, and semantic-exer-
cise models. Distinguishing between and testing these different
models is crucial for determining whether response times, specifi-
cally the inverted-U response time pattern, could be used to iden-
tify fakers. We assessed response time patterns for responses to the
NEO PI-R when participants were asked to respond honestly, make
a good impression, and make a specific impression. The latter con-
dition was included to test nuanced predictions made by these pre-
viously hypothesized models of impression-managed responding.
The inverted-U response time pattern found for each of the
scales in the honest response condition replicates previous studies
(Akrami et al., 2007; Kuiper, 1981). In addition, it provides the
baseline for the analysis of response time differences between con-
ditions. Our results support the predictions made by the adopted-
schema model—that all conditions would produce an inverted-U
response time pattern, the inverted-U would be more pronounced
for the fake-specific public relations condition, and response times
would be faster overall for the fake-specific conditions. Thus, it ap-
pears that individuals, when faking, access a schema of an ideal
respondent. This schema may be more or less clear depending on
whether one is trying to portray a particular impression or a more
general good impression.
The differences in the scale scores between conditions suggest
what the schemas used in faking might entail. The individual scale
scores for neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscien-
tiousness differed significantly when individuals responded
honestly compared to when they responded to make a good
impression, as expected. The differences in extraversion scores
between the conditions were particularly interesting. Supporting
prior research findings (Bagby & Marshall, 2003), extraversion
scores were higher when participants were responding to make a
good impression than when they were responding honestly. Those
The Level 3 model also estimated individual variability in the Level 2 parameters.
No interpretable effects were found.
170 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171

Table 4
Analysis of Level-2 model (instruction as a predictor) fixed effects estimation (with robust standard errors).

Fixed effect for: Coefficient SE t df p

Neuroticism Intercept, p0i b00 (intercept) 3625.38 92.87 39.04 59 .001
b01 (condition) 141.09 109.27 1.29 118 .199
Linear, p1i b10 (intercept) 61.09 27.13 2.25 118 .026
b11 (condition) 181.34 65.10 2.79 118 .007
Quadratic, p2i b20 (intercept) 134.92 22.86 5.90 118 .001
b21 (condition) 48.89 48.90 1.00 118 .320
Extraversion Intercept, p0i b00 (intercept) 3484.35 98.52 35.37 59 .001
b01 (condition) 119.94 116.75 1.03 118 .307
Linear, p1i b10 (intercept) 42.37 26.74 1.59 512 .113
b11 (condition) 112.47 47.89 2.35 512 .019
Quadratic, p2i b20 (intercept) 148.06 27.96 5.30 118 .001
b21 (condition) 33.79 41.62 0.81 118 .419
Openness Intercept, p0i b00 (intercept) 4080.90 99.07 41.19 59 .001
b01 (condition) 406.43 91.01 4.47 118 .001
Linear, p1i b10 (intercept) 40.68 40.43 1.01 118 .317
b11 (condition) 71.66 42.07 1.70 118 .091
Quadratic, p2i b20 (intercept) 179.03 34.54 5.18 118 .001
b21 (condition) 20.04 42.19 0.48 118 .635
Agreeableness Intercept, p0i b00 (intercept) 3513.86 91.76 38.29 59 .001
b01 (condition) 143.10 95.41 1.50 118 .136
Linear, p1i b10 (intercept) 20.12 36.18 0.56 59 .580
b11 (condition) 85.51 50.15 1.71 118 .090
Quadratic, p2i b20 (intercept) 86.85 30.05 2.89 59 .006
b21 (condition) 90.84 42.08 2.16 118 .033
Conscientiousness Intercept, p0i b00 (intercept) 3688.12 96.96 38.04 59 .001
b01 (condition) 153.91 111.30 1.38 118 .169
Linear, p1i b10 (intercept) 85.45 32.49 2.63 118 .010
b11 (condition) 31.97 64.66 0.49 118 .621
Quadratic, p2i b20 (intercept) 88.71 33.62 2.64 118 .010
b21 (condition) 109.91 53.79 2.04 118 .043

in the fake-specific-public relations condition inflated their extra-
version scores above their fake-good scores. Those in the fake-spe-
cific accountant condition, however, reported essentially the same
level of extraversion as they did when they were responding hon-
estly. This mirrors the results from the response-time analysis, and
suggests it may be more difficult to fake introversion than extra-
version; that is, relatively more thought may need to go into select-
ing extreme responses. Perhaps it is difficult to fake introversion
because the general desire to make a good impression in any job
interview calls for a more outgoing and friendly demeanor. There-
fore, the pressure to make a good impression and to appear to be
an ideal applicant for an accountant position may cancel each
other, resulting in baseline (honest responding) level scores and
a flatter response time pattern than that for the fake-specific extra-
version dimension. However, because this schema is likely less
complex than individuals’ self-schemas and schemas for a general
good impression, response times overall were faster. These results,
however, suggest that individuals are sensitive to stereotypes asso-
ciated with different positions and may reference these stereo-
types when engaging in impression-managed responding (Mahar
et al., 2006).
The analysis of the response time distributions for the impres-
sion-managed responses demonstrates that the inverted-U re-
sponse time effect cannot be used to discern those who are
faking from those who are responding honestly. In fact, using an
individual’s response time distribution could lead to false predic-
tions on both the agreeableness and conscientiousness scales,
where the inverted-U effect was more pronounced in the fake-
good condition than in the honest response condition. This sug-
gests that a good-impression, in general, acts like a category and
individuals can access this category readily when responding. This
also suggests that the self-category is not privileged in any way, an
implication consistent with the adopted-schema model of impres-
sion-managed responding.
The prior literature on faking has suggested that a way to min-
imize the extent of faking would be to have individuals complete
the personality assessment with as few specifics details of the
job made known as possible (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). This study
suggests that doing so would not result in lower levels of faking. In
fact, for the conscientiousness scale, it could result in a higher level
of response distortion. It is also interesting to note that the stan-
dard deviations for the scale scores decreased in the fake good con-
dition. This suggests that individuals shared a consolidated view of
not only what attributes are considered positive, but also at what
levels.
Practically, in addition to suggesting that response time distri-
butions, such as the inverted-U, would be ineffective for detecting
faking, this study also casts doubt on the validity of response times
for detecting faking in general. As previously noted, response times
can depend on a number of different factors including attention
paid to each item, reading speed, time to search for information,
schema clarity, familiarity with questions, test anxiety, and so
forth. Moreover, in practical settings it is nearly impossible to ac-
quire a baseline average response rate with which to compare, gi-
ven the wide range of factors that can influence an individual’s
average response rate. Thus, it seems that researchers and practi-
tioners interested in detecting and reducing faking would do well
to focus on other strategies.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations that warrant additional
investigation. First, the fake-specific manipulation was not a direct
manipulation of extraversion. The manipulation used depended on
individuals’ stereotypes of these two positions, which are
influenced by prior experience interacting with individuals in
these professions. Despite the fact that the strength of the manip-
ulation depended on the participants’ schemas, the results suggest
 M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163–171
that, on average, participants associated public relations with
extraversion and accounting with introversion. Therefore, this
study does appear to provide a manipulation, albeit imperfect, of
the extraversion dimension. In addition, the participants in our
sample were not actual applicants. It would be interesting to
examine response time distributions in samples for which the rel-
evant schemas are especially salient and the application outcome
more consequential.
Second, due to the within-subjects design, participants in this
study responded to the personality items three times. All partici-
pants responded to the items in the honest responding condition
first and to the other two conditions in random order. Therefore,
participants’ responses to the later conditions may have been
biased by their previous responses. However, if responses were
influenced by prior responses then information should be easily
accessible because it was just retrieved. Therefore, we would ex-
pect that the distribution of response times would be flat. The fact
that we found an inverted-U distribution despite any potential
practice effects suggests that our findings are robust.
Additionally, given that the number of participants in this study
is somewhat small, albeit similar to that typically used in other
within-subjects designs (e.g., Browne, Curley, & Benson, 1999),
the power to detect quadratic effects may be reduced. Thus, this
made the statistical analysis relatively conservative. The fact that
the inverted-U was found for all conditions again suggests that this
effect is particularly robust.
In conclusion, this study suggests that individuals access a sche-
ma of an ideal respondent when responding to give a specific
impression as well as to give general good impression. As clearly
defined exemplars are easier to retrieve, response times across
response options have an inverted-U shape. This indicates that
response time distributions, such as the inverted-U, are not effec-
tive in detecting faking. We encourage more research on the cogni-
tive processes involved in responding to questionnaires as well as
ways to mitigate or detect faking.
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