Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Vol. LXXV No. 2, September 2007

 2007 International Phenomenological Society

Spinoza’s Arguments for the

Existence of God*
martin lin
Rutgers University

It is often thought that, although Spinoza develops a bold and distinctive concep-
tion of God (the unique substance, or Natura Naturans, in which all else inheres
and which possesses infinitely many attributes, including extension), the arguments
that he offers which purport to prove God’s existence contribute nothing new to
natural theology. Rather, he is seen as just another participant in the seventeenth
century revival of the ontological argument initiated by Descartes and taken up by
Malebranche and Leibniz among others. That this is the case is both puzzling and
unfortunate. It is puzzling because although Spinoza does offer an ontological
proof for the existence of God, he also offers three other non-ontological proofs.
It is unfortunate because these other non-ontological proofs are both more con-
vincing and more interesting than his ontological proof. In this paper, I offer
reconstructions and assessments of all of Spinoza’s arguments and argue that Spi-
noza’s metaphysical rationalism and his commitment to something like a Principle
of Sufficient Reason are the driving force behind Spinoza’s non-ontological
arguments.

Spinoza holds a number of highly controversial theses concerning God.

According to him, God is the unique substance, or Natura naturans, in
which all else inheres, who possesses infinitely many attributes, includ-
ing extension, and who is an impersonal being who does not order his
creation according to any providential plan. Perhaps none of these
views of God is entirely without precedent, but Spinoza’s treatment of
them is remarkable in its systematicity and force. Yet, despite the
widely acknowledged boldness of Spinoza’s thinking concerning the
nature of God, it is often thought that the arguments that he offers for
the existence of God merely recapitulate the ontological argument

* I would like to thank Michael Della Rocca, Donald Ainslie, Marleen Rozemond,
and Charlie Huenemann for their detailed comments on drafts of this paper. I am
also indebted to Ed Curley, Phil Kremer, Imogen Dickie, and Eric Watkins for
helpful discussion of the ideas contained in this paper.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 269

given by Descartes in the fifth Meditation and hence contribute nothing
new to natural theology.1
What does it mean to classify an argument as ‘‘ontological’’? There
are more or less fine-grained conceptions of ontological arguments.
According to the most coarse-grained conception, an argument for the
existence of God is ontological just in case its premises are known
a priori.2 But if a philosopher’s arguments are ontological only in this
sense, then it is unfair to criticize their originality on that basis. Com-
mentators who describe Spinoza as an ontological arguer, however,
typically have something more specific in mind, taking Descartes’ onto-
logical argument as their paradigm. Descartes’ ontological argument
works by analyzing the concept of God and purporting to show that
the very nature of that concept entails that it must be satisfied. That is,
it purports to show that the existence of God is a conceptual truth. In
what follows, I shall accordingly understand by ‘ontological argument’
an argument of that form.
It is puzzling that so many commentators see Spinoza as primarily
offering an ontological argument. Spinoza does indeed offer something
like an ontological argument, but that argument is only one of four,
the rest of which are not ontological. Commentators, nevertheless, typi-
cally either ignore all but the ontological argument,3 or, even more
commonly, argue that, appearances to the contrary, all four of
Spinoza’s arguments are, at bottom, ontological.4
This is an unfortunate state of affairs because Spinoza’s ontological
argument is the least interesting, the least original, and the least con-
vincing of the four arguments that he gives. The other three proceed,
I shall argue, on a basis entirely different from that of the ontological
argument. They do not proceed exclusively on the basis of an analysis of
the concept of God. Rather, they all rely, either explicitly or implicitly,
on a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR hereafter). In

1
For example, Jonathan Bennett characterizes Spinoza’s argument for the existence
of God as essentially the same ‘‘sterile and boring’’ argument as Descartes’ in his
Learning From Six Philosophers, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), vol. 1,
p. 122. See also, Harry Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, vol. I, (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1934), pp. 158-213; William A. Earl, ‘‘The Ontological
Argument in Spinoza,’’ and ‘‘The Ontological Argument in Spinoza: Twenty Years
Later,’’ in Marjorie Green ed., Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), and Harold H. Joachim, A Study of
the Ethics of Spinoza, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1902), pp. 51-52.
2
Kant, who helped introduce the term ‘ontological argument’ into the philosophical
vocabulary, understands the term in this way.
3
Cf. Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers.
4
This is the position of Joachim and Earl. Wolfson thinks that all but the third argu-
ment are ontological.

270 MARTIN LIN

this respect my interpretation is similar and indebted to Don Garrett’s.5
There is, however, an important difference between our respective inter-
pretations. Garrett claims that Spinoza holds that something exists nec-
essarily just in case it is self-caused. Spinoza’s strategy in each of his
arguments, according to Garrett, is to show that God is self-caused and
then conclude from this and the equivalence of necessary existence and
self-causation that God exists. This, however, cannot be right, for such
an equivalence would conflict with Spinoza’s necessitarianism. No being,
other than God, is self-caused, according to Spinoza. Yet many (and
arguably all) beings other than God exist necessarily.6 Necessary exis-
tence and self-causation thus cannot be equivalent for Spinoza.
Perhaps Garrett could amend his interpretation by replacing the
equivalence of self-causation and necessary existence with an equiva-
lence between self-causation and necessary existence in virtue of one’s
own nature. This would preserve the validity of Garrett’s reconstructions
without the unwanted consequence of rampant self-causation. More-
over, Spinoza clearly believes such an equivalence. He distinguishes
between things whose existence is necessary in virtue of their own nature
and those whose existence is virtue of the nature of another. The only
thing whose existence is necessary in virtue of its essence is God.7 God
is also the only being who is self-caused.8 So it is indeed true for Spi-
noza that a being is self-caused just in case it exists necessarily in virtue
of its own nature. But the possibility of such an emendation is of little

5
‘‘Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Arguments,’’ Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 198-223.
6
There is a good deal of controversy as to how Spinoza’s commitment to necessitari-
anism should be interpreted. Adherent’s of a moderate interpretation hold that only
God’s existence and facts about the laws of nature are really necessary (see, for
example, E.M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1967), chap. 3. and Edwin Curley and Greg Walski, ‘‘Spinoza’s Necessitarian-
ism Reconsidered’’ in Gennaro and Huenemann eds., New Essays on the Rational-
ists, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)). Those who favor a strong
interpretation think that, for Spinoza, all things are necessary (see, for example,
Don Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s Necessitarianism,’’ in Yovel ed., God and Nature (Leiden:
J. Brill, 1991). What is relevant here is that however Spinoza’s necessitarianism is
interpreted, he thinks that some non-self-caused beings exist necessarily. Spinoza
says that if the existence of a thing follows necessarily from its cause, then given
that cause, that thing necessarily exists (1p33s). For Spinoza all effects follow neces-
sarily from their causes (1a3). Thus, relative to their external causes, all individuals
necessarily exist. That is, a thing exists in very possible world in which its cause
exists. Now, if the external cause itself exists necessarily, it follows that the thing
itself necessarily exists, i.e., exists in every possible world. What is uncontroversial is
that, for Spinoza, at least some things are caused immediately by God and only by
God and thus their existence is necessary too. The immediate infinite modes are an
example of such things. So, although immediate infinite modes exist necessarily, they
are not self-caused. They are, rather, caused by God.
7
1p33s1.
8
1p14.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 271

moment. Whether or not Garrett’s equivalence can be patched so as to
avoid a conflict with Spinoza’s necessitarianism, none of Spinoza’s argu-
ments for the existence of God relies upon any such equivalence. Once
we fully appreciate the strength of the PSR and how adeptly Spinoza
exploits that strength in his arguments, we shall see that there is no need
to add the powerful equivalence of self-causation and necessary exis-
tence (in virtue of one’s own nature or otherwise) in order to derive the
existence of God from Spinoza’s premises. Moreover, correctly appreci-
ating the role of the PSR in Spinoza’s arguments allows us to see how
Spinoza can appeal to the PSR in supporting some of his other central
metaphysical claims. Or so I shall argue.
Spinoza’s reliance on the PSR might be surprising to some since the
PSR is usually associated with Leibniz, and its role in Spinoza’s think-
ing sometimes fails to receive the proper emphasis.9 In fact, it consti-
tutes one of the most important of the commitments that shape
Spinoza’s metaphysics. By neglecting Spinoza’s non-ontological argu-
ments, commentators have contributed to this failure to fully appreci-
ate the importance of the PSR to Spinoza’s system. By showing how
Spinoza’s arguments rely on the PSR, I hope to demonstrate its cen-
trality to Spinoza’s thinking with respect to the important case of
God’s existence and, by extension, to all aspects of his system that pre-
suppose the existence of God.
I shall conclude by considering a well-known problem that Spinoza’s
argument for monism presents for his arguments for the existence of
God. Garrett has pointed out that Spinoza’s arguments of the existence
of God can be easily adapted to prove the existence of any other sub-
stance, say a substance with only one attribute. Spinoza tries to rule
out such alternative substances with his argument for monism. But
Spinoza can legitimately conclude from that argument no more than
that at most one substance with any particular attribute exists. Only on
the assumption that a substance with all the attributes exists does that
argument lead to the monism conclusion. Thus the variant on
Spinoza’s arguments which proves the existence of a single attribute
substance together with Spinoza’s argument for the claim that only one
substance of a particular attribute exists would prove the nonexistence
of God. Building upon the work of Michael Della Rocca, I shall argue
that, here too, understanding how the PSR figures into Spinoza’s

9
I do not mean to suggest that commentators have not noticed Spinoza’s commit-
ment to the PSR. Rather, my claim is that they have not made it out to be the driv-
ing force behind his metaphysics, as I believe it is. Notable exceptions to this are
Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1984), pp.
24ff; Garrett, ‘‘Spinoza’s ‘Ontological’ Arguments’’; and Michael Della Rocca,
‘‘A Rationalist Manifesto,’’ Philosophical Topics, 31.

272 MARTIN LIN

thinking on the subject shows how such an argument for the nonexis-
tence of God can be blocked.

1. The First Argument

The first argument is the only one of Spinoza’s four arguments
which might be accurately characterized as an ontological argument.
Spinoza begins by inviting us to conceive, if we can, that God does
not exist. If the nonexistence of God is conceivable, then his essence
does not involve existence (1a7). The essences of substances involve
their existence (1p7). God is a substance (1d6). Therefore, God’s
essence both does and does not involve his existence, which is
absurd. Q.E.D.
Obviously, the claim that the essence of a substance involves exis-
tence (1p7) provides a crucial premise for the first argument. The dem-
onstration of 1p7 proceeds as follows:

1. A substance cannot be produced by anything else. (1p6)

2. A substance is self-caused. (by 1)

3. Therefore, the essence of a substance necessarily involves exis-

tence. (by 2 and 1d1)

The conclusion of 1p7d, it is important to note, is not unambiguously

the claim that substances necessarily exist. What the conclusion states
is merely that substances have essences that involve their existence,
whatever that might mean. And while one possible interpretation of
what it means for an essence to involve existence is that such things
exist necessarily, the use to which 1p7 is put in the first argument does
not require such an interpretation.
Let us now look at the reasoning by means of which Spinoza
reaches his conclusion in 1p7. He seems to think that (2) follows
directly from (1), which, of course, it does not. It does, however, follow
from (1) and certain consequences derivable from 1a1, which says that
everything is either in itself or in anther. That is, modes inhere in sub-
stances and substances inhere in themselves. For Spinoza, inherence
implies causation.10 Hence:

10
The use of 1d3, 1d5, and 1a1 in 1p4d establish that inherence implies conception.
Since, as discussed above, conception implies causation, inherence must also imply
causation. See Don Garrett, ‘‘Conatus Argument,’’ in Koistinen and Biro eds., Spi-
noza: Metaphysical Themes, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 136-137
for a useful discussion of these texts and the relationship between causation and
inherence.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 273

1.1. Everything is either caused by itself or by another
Substances then must be self-caused because they are not caused by
another.
Let us now return to a fuller discussion of the first argument. What
follows is a reconstruction that fills in a number of suppressed premises:

4. God does not necessarily exist. (assumption for reductio)

5. If God does not necessarily exist, then it is conceivable that

God does not exist.

6. It is conceivable that God does not exist. (by 4 and 5)

7. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence does

not involve existence. (1a7)

8. God’s essence does not involve existence. (by 6 and 7)

9. God is a substance. (1d6)

10. If anything is a substance, then its existence involves essence.

(1p7)

11. God’s essence involves existence. (by 9 and 10)

12. God necessarily exists. (by 8 and 11)

An obvious potential problem with this argument is (9). In order to

assess the truth of (9), we need first to understand its meaning. This in
turn depends upon the correct semantics for an apparent singular term
like ‘God’. This is, unfortunately, an issue fraught with controversy.
There are two main options. The most popular is to assign an individual
as the semantic value of a singular term like ‘God’. But if we understand
the semantics of (9) in this way, the argument begs the question of
God’s existence since the sentence contained in (9) does not otherwise
express a proposition. If the semantic value of ‘God’ is an individual,
then it is semantically defective if there is no such individual. Sentences
containing semantically defective names do not express propositions.
Alternatively, we could treat ‘God’ as a quantifier expression. The
argument, however, fares no better if ‘God’ is construed in this way.11
The most natural way to construe ‘God’ as a quantifier expression in
the context of this argument is as a universal quantifier expression:

11
I am indebted on this point to Charlie Huenemann.

274 MARTIN LIN

 13. If anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily.

14. If (if anything is God, then it does not exist necessarily), then
(if anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable).

15. If anything is God, then its nonexistence is conceivable.

16. If a thing can be conceived as not existing, then its essence

does not involve existence.

17. If anything is God, then its essence does not involve existence.

18. If anything is God, then it is a substance.

19. If anything is a substance, then its essence involves existence.

20. If anything is God, then its essence involves existence.

21. God necessarily exists.

This argument is invalid because (17) and (20) are not contradictory.
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that not only does the contradic-
tory of (17) not follow from Spinoza’s premises, but it begs the ques-
tion of the existence of God: there is something that is God and its
essence involves existence. So, the first argument is either invalid (when
‘God’ is construed as a quantifier expression) or question begging
(when ‘God’ is construed as a singular term).
My discussion of Spinoza’s first argument for the existence of God
has assumed that either ‘God’ is a singular term the semantic value of
which (if it has any value at all) is an object or ‘God’ is a disguised
quantifier expression. Spinoza’s argument may not be vulnerable to the
criticisms I have lodged if this assumption is incorrect. There are, how-
ever, no obvious alternative construals of ‘God’, certainly none,
of which I am aware, that are plausible in themselves and would save
Spinoza’s argument.12 In the absence of such an alternative, we must
provisionally conclude that Spinoza’s first argument fails.

12
Perhaps Spinoza’s reasoning could be saved by adopting a Meinongian semantics
for non-referring names. ‘God’, then, could take a nonexistent object as its seman-
tic value and (9) would beg no important questions. This move, however, quickly
leads to existentially quantifying over nonexistent objects. But if this possible, then
I have no idea what the existential quantifier means. For this reason, I reject
Meinongian semantics.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 275

 2. The Second Argument
The second argument appeals to the PSR. The basic idea is that a
cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible and so he
must exist.
The first premise of the second argument is the PSR:

22. If something exists, there must be a cause of its existing and if

something does not exist, there must be a cause of its nonexis-
tence.

This is the first explicit statement of the PSR in the Ethics, although
it is plausible to think that it is foreshadowed by 1a3,13 which says
that:

From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily and con-
versely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect
to follow.

To derive the psr from 1a3, it is necessary to interpret ‘‘effect’’ as

meaning any event, and not just that which is produced by some cause.
But such an interpretation is reasonable since otherwise 1d3 is so trivial
as to make one wonder why Spinoza would bother to state it. It is also
necessary to interpret ‘‘effect’’ as including events which involve
absences, e.g., the car’s having no gas. But given the fact that Spinoza
clearly believes that absence involving events require causes, it seems
plausible to think that 1a3 is meant to apply to such events as well.
Spinoza next claims that:

23. The cause or reason for the nonexistence of anything is either

internal (its nature involves a contradiction) or external (some
external cause prevents its existence).

Spinoza here assumes that if anything has an internal cause of its non-
existence, then its nature involves a contradiction. What does this mean
and is it true? Spinoza does not say explicitly what he means, but he
does provide an instructive example: the nature of a square circle. In
what sense does the nature of a square circle involve a contradiction?
Square circles are contradictory in that they possess the properties of
being closed figures every point on which is equidistant from its center
and of not being a closed figure every point of which is equidistant

13
My discussion of 1a3 and its relation to the PSR is indebted to Garrett’s ‘‘Argu-
ments,’’ p. 202.

276 MARTIN LIN

from its center. The nature of a square circle, however, possess no such
contradictory properties. (The nature of a circle is not a circle.) Never-
theless, if it were exemplified, then its exemplification would entail a
contradiction. This then is what it is for a nature to be contradictory.
The assumption that the only possible internal cause of nonexistence
is a contradictory nature might appear tendentious. Why cannot there
be a nature that cannot be externally produced and yet does not con-
tain the internal causal resources to produce itself? Such a nature
would seem to be an internal cause of the non-exemplification of itself.
If there could be such a nature, then Spinoza would first need to show
that God’s nature is not like that.
Recall the above characterization of contradictory natures: a nature
is contradictory just in case if it were exemplified, its exemplification
would entail a contradiction. Substances are ontologically independent.
Thus they cannot have external causes for their existence or for any-
thing else. So, being a substance and lacking self-causal power jointly
entail nonexistence. But if such a nature were exemplified it would
exist. It would thus both exist and not exist. That is, such a nature is
self-contradictory.
Given then that no internally coherent nature can prevent itself from
being exemplified,14 the PSR together with premise (23) dictates that
every nature is:

a. internally coherent, exemplified, and has an external cause or

b. internally coherent, unexemplified and has an external cause or

c. internally incoherent and unexemplified or

d. internally coherent, exemplified, and has an internal cause.

The PSR rules out the possibility that a nature is:

e. internally coherent, unexemplified, and does not have external

cause.

14
I here treat existence as a second-order property, viz., as that property that proper-
ties have if and only if they are exemplified. I do so because no part of Spinoza’s
argument requires that we treat existence as a first-order property (for example, his
argument does not rely on the idea that existence is a perfection and so is con-
tained in our concept of a perfect being) and since such a conception of existence is
vulnerable to well known objections, I see no reason to saddle Spinoza with that
problematic view.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 277

 (1) rules out alternative (a) with respect to substances. Since Spi-
noza’s argument concerns the existence of God, a substance, (a) is
ruled out.
From (13) it follows that:

24. If a cause or reason for the nonexistence of God is impossible,

then God’s existence is necessary.

Since, given the psr, the nonexistence of God is possible only if there is
a cause or reason for his nonexistence, if such a cause or reason
is impossible, then his nonexistence is impossible, i.e., his existence is
necessary.
In order to establish God’s necessary existence, all Spinoza needs to
do is to rule out alternatives (b) and (c). That is, all he needs to do is
establish the impossibility of a cause or reason for God’s nonexistence.
He argues as follows:

25. If God didn’t exist, there would be either an internal or exter-

nal cause or reason.

26. If it were internal then the nature of God would be incoherent.

27. The nature of God is not incoherent.

The only support for premise (27) that Spinoza offers is the assertion
that it would be absurd if the nature of a supremely perfect being were
incoherent. This is not obviously so. But as we shall see presently, the
third and fourth arguments provide some reason for Spinoza to claim
that an absolutely infinite being is coherent. In the meantime, let us
assume that God’s nature is internally coherent, and so Spinoza can
rule out alternative (c). He turns next toward ruling out (b) with the
following line of argument:

28. If God didn’t exist, then there would be an external cause.

29. No external cause can prevent or take away God’s existence.

Premise (29) is supported by the following considerations. Spinoza

believes that causation and conception are equivalent:

i. x causes y if and only if y is conceived through x.

278 MARTIN LIN

 He also believes that:

ii. If y is conceived through x, then y and x are conceived through

the same attribute.

Now Spinoza believes that no two substances can be conceived through

the same attribute.15 Therefore, no two substances can causally interact.
On the assumption that an external cause of a substance must involve
another substance, we can thus conclude that no external cause can
prevent God’s existence.16,17
Premise (27) rules out alternative (c) and premise (29) rules out alter-
native (b). We have thus ruled out every possible cause or reason for
God’s nonexistence—i.e., a cause or reason for God’s nonexistence is
impossible.
Therefore:

30. God necessarily exists. (by 25, 26, 27, and 29)

3. The Third Argument

The third argument begins with the assumption that to be able to exist
is a power, and conversely, to be able to not exist is a lack of power.
Spinoza then goes on to argue that given that some finite things exist
(e.g., we exist), an infinite being must exist. His argument can be sum-
marized as follows:

31. To be able to exist is to have power and being able to not

exist is to lack power.

32. If a finite being exists, and an infinite being does not, then a
finite being is more powerful than an infinite being. (by 31)

15
1p5.
16
That only causes involving substances can causally influence substances is a conse-
quence of a number of Spinoza’s metaphysical principles. First, every thing is either
a substance or a mode of a substance (1a1). Second, if one thing causes another,
then the latter can be conceived through the former (1a4). Modes are conceived
through substances (1d5). Substances are not conceived through modes (1p1).
Modes cannot, therefore, causally influence substances. So, only a substance can
causally influence a substance.
17
The argument that I have given above accurately paraphrases 11pd, but Michael
Della Rocca has pointed out to me that Spinoza actually has available to him a
much more direct route to (29). If an external cause can prevent God’s existence,
then, if God exists, his existence would be dependent on something. But substances
are, by definition, conceptually and causally self-contained. Thus, the existence of
God (or any other substance) cannot depend upon something else.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 279

 This claim is problematic. A nonexistent thing cannot stand in any
relation to anything. ‘‘I’m taller than Goliath because Goliath, not
existing, has no height!’’ Perhaps the following is a more felicitous way
of putting Spinoza’s point:

32.* If the nature of a finite being is exemplified and the nature of

an absolutely infinite being is unexemplified then a finite
being possesses more power than the nature of an absolutely
infinite being.

That Spinoza would have found this an acceptable paraphrase can be

seen by the scholium to this argument. There he offers another argu-
ment which he claims has the same basis as the third. But in that text
he speaks of the power to exist of natures of things and not of things
themselves. The argument continues:

33. It is impossible that a finite being possesses more power than

the nature of an absolutely infinite being.

34. Nothing exists or the nature of an absolutely infinite being is

exemplified. (by 32, and 33)

35. We exist.

36. Therefore, an absolutely infinite being, i.e., God, necessarily

exists. (by 34 and 35)

A number of things about this argument seem problematic. First, the

meanings of the curious notions ‘‘being able to exist’’ and ‘‘being able
to not exist’’ and their identification with having and lacking power
respectively are obscure. Second, it is not obvious that a finite thing
cannot be more powerful than the nature of an infinite thing, because
Spinoza hasn’t yet established any connection between infinity and
power. Moreover, even granting Spinoza’s assumptions, it does not fol-
low that God exists necessarily since that nothing exists is still possible,
although contingently false, from the point of view of this argument.
Taken on their own these difficulties with the third argument are
intractable; but, we shall see when we consider the fourth argument, it
is possible to fill in the gap between the notions of infinity and
power by connecting them both to Spinoza’s notion of reality and
applying the PSR, thus rendering the third argument much stronger in
retrospect.

280 MARTIN LIN

 4. The Fourth Argument
Spinoza claims that the basis of the fourth argument is the same as the
third. It differs from it, however, in that it is a priori and includes a
premise which refers to the notion of ‘‘reality.’’ It can be summarized
as follows:

37. To be able to exist is a power.

38. The more reality the nature of a thing has, the more power to
exist it has.

39. The nature of an absolutely infinite being has an absolutely

infinite power of existing.

40. Therefore, the nature of an absolutely infinite being is exempli-

fied, i.e., an absolutely infinite being exists.

This argument, as it stands, is obviously invalid. We can, however,

make it valid by supplying the additional premise:

39.1. If a nature has an absolutely infinite power of existing, then

it is exemplified.

In order to find a use for (38) we must assume that (39) is supposed to
follow from (38) together with the following suppressed premise:

38.1. The nature of an absolutely infinite being has infinite reality.

Although the argument thus supplemented is valid, it remains mysteri-

ous. In particular, why should anyone believe premises (38)-(39.1)?
What is needed is some further explication of the relationship between
reality and power on the one hand, and reality and infinity on the
other.
The first question is how we should understand Spinoza’s notion of
reality. Premise (38) implies that reality is a variable quantity. It might
seem more natural to think that reality is either on or off. Existent
things are real and nonexistent things are not. Spinoza, however, clearly
thinks that reality is something that admits of degrees. Such a notion of
reality will be familiar to readers of Descartes from his argument for the
existence of God from our idea of an infinite being, which appears in
the third Meditation and Principles of Philosophy I, §§17-18. This is
an argument which Spinoza knows well and comments on in his

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 281

geometrical exposition of Descartes’ Principles.18 Commentators such as
Curley and Normore have argued that the notion of reality at work in
Descartes’ argument can be explained in terms of relative ontological
dependence.19 On this interpretation of reality, x is more real than y just
in case the existence of y depends on the existence of x. God is the most
real being because his existence does not depend upon anything else.
Minds and bodies are less real than God because they depend on God.
Modes of thought and extension are less real than minds and bodies
because they depend on minds and bodies. I believe that if we take
Spinoza to be relying upon this notion of reality in the fourth argument,
we can better understand why he believes (38.1). But to see how, we
need to turn first to Spinoza’s conception of finitude and infinitude.
In 1d2, Spinoza says that something is called finite if it can be lim-
ited by another of the same nature—an extended thing by an extended
thing, a thinking thing by a thinking thing. What kind of limitation
does Spinoza have in mind here? I think a number of considerations
suggest that the limitation in question is causal. First of all, the require-
ment that the limited thing have something in common with the limit-
ing thing is the same requirement which Spinoza uses to rule out causal
interaction between substances of different attributes. It is further sug-
gested by the fact that later on Spinoza describes being finite as the
result of a partial negation of the existence of some nature.20 The PSR
requires that the negation of the existence of some nature requires a
cause. If a total negation requires a cause, then it is natural to think
that there must be a cause for a partial negation as well. Something is
thus finite if it is limited by an external cause. Substances cannot be
limited by external causes and thus are infinite. Hence the infinitude of
a substance follows from its utter causal independence. Having identi-
fied reality with independence, we can conclude that anything infinite is
real to the highest degree, i.e., absolutely real.
Next, we need to establish a connection between power and reality.
Once again the PSR provides us with the key. Something is absolutely
real, as we have seen, if it is independent of external causes. If some-
thing is independent of external causes, then nothing external can exert
any causal influence on it. Preventing existence, it seems obvious, is a
form of causal influence. Therefore, nothing can prevent a possible nat-
ure with infinite reality from being exemplified. So if an absolutely real

18
DPP, G I ⁄ 159-160.
19
E.M. Curley, Descartes Against the Skeptics, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1978), p. 130. Calvin Normore, ‘‘Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes
and His Sources,’’ in Essays on Descartes’ Meditations, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty
ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp. 226-227.
20
1p8s.

282 MARTIN LIN

being did not exist, its nonexistence would have to be a brute fact and
hence violate the PSR. Therefore, there are no possible circumstances
in which an absolutely real nature is unexemplified. In other words, an
absolutely real being necessarily exists. If there are no possible circum-
stances in which a thing does not exist, then it would be natural to
describe that thing as possessing an absolutely infinite power of exist-
ing. To see this, let us represent the power of something as a function
from possible contexts to effects. Some x has the power to bring about
an effect e just in case there is a possible context which maps x onto e.
For instance, I have the power to lift one hundred pounds because
there are possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds.
The greater the power to bring about e the greater the number of pos-
sible contexts which map onto e. For example, if there are only rela-
tively few possible circumstances in which I lift one hundred pounds
(perhaps I can do so only if I am well rested or have had a good
breakfast) then I have less power to lift one hundred pounds than if
there are relatively many possible circumstances in which I lift one hun-
dred pounds. God’s nature has an absolutely infinite power of existing
because every possible circumstance maps onto its exemplification. For
this very reason, God also exists necessarily. If there is no possible cir-
cumstance compatible with a thing’s nonexistence, then that thing
exists necessarily. In other words, if a nature has an absolutely infinite
power of existing, then it is exemplified. We now have a justification of
(39.1) above.
Before continuing, a word on the notion of a ‘‘possible circumstance’’
or a ‘‘possible context’’ is in order. Given Spinoza’s necessitarianism,
the only possible circumstances are the actual circumstances, and thus
my characterization of power might seem to imply that a thing only has
the power to do what it actually does. But there are, according to
Spinoza, two sources of necessity: the essence of a thing and its causes.21
Things from whose essences alone existence doesn’t follow still exist nec-
essarily but not in virtue of their own natures. Rather, they necessarily
exist in virtue of their causes. So while no non-actual situation is possi-
ble—since any non-actual situation will be incompatible with the ordo
naturae, which is itself entailed by the divine nature—we can still ask
whether or not two or more essences are compatible with each other.
Doing so can inform us about the natures of things. For example, while
a counterfactual situation in which I took a lethal dose of cyanide yet
lived is made impossible by the ordo naturae, it is also impossible given
my nature and the nature of cyanide. A counterfactual situation in
which I ate an apple and lived is also made impossible by the ordo

21
1p33s.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 283

naturae, but it is not made impossible by my nature and the nature of
apples. In this sense, then, we can speak of a counterfactual situation
that is possible per se—i.e., not made impossible by the natures of the
involved individuals—without implying that such situations are possible
tout court. Moreover, claims about what is possible per se, may be per-
spicuous ways of making claims about essences. For example, that the
circumstance in which I ate an apple and lived is not impossible per se
tells us something about my nature and the nature of apples. So when I
speak of representing power of existing by a function from a nature and
a possible circumstance to the exemplification of that nature, I am
speaking a circumstances which, while perhaps made impossible by the
ordo naturae, are not made impossible by the essences of the individuals
that they involve.22
I claimed in the last section that a proper understanding of the
fourth proof would clarify ceratin puzzles concerning the third proof.
Here is how. We can take what we have learned about Spinoza’s
understanding of power, reality, and infinity and show why Spinoza
believes premise (33) of the third argument: It is impossible that a finite
being possess more power than an infinite being.
To get there, we must first note that Spinoza thinks that for any
given finite thing there is some external cause capable of preventing its
existence. As he writes in 4a1:
There is no singular thing [i.e. finite thing] in nature than which there is not
another more powerful and stronger. Whatever one is given, there is another
more powerful by which the first can be destroyed.

One might reasonably wonder about the axiomatic status of this claim,
as it does not appear to be self-evident.23 But if we grant this assump-
tion, then it follows that there is at least one situation incompatible
with the existence of any finite thing.
We are now is a position to say why a finite thing cannot have more
power of existing than an infinite thing, as was asserted in premise (33)
of my reconstruction of the third argument. If a finite thing had more

22
C.f., Don Garrett, ‘‘Teleology in Spinoza and Early Modern Philosophy,’’ in
Gennaro and Huenemann, eds., New Essays on the Rationalists, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p. 316.
23
While Spinoza does not attempt to demonstrate in the Ethics any of the axioms he
presents in that work, there is reason to believe that Spinoza believes that at least
some of the Ethics’ axioms can be demonstrated. Henry Oldenburg complained to
Spinoza (in Ep. 3) that some of Spinoza’s axioms aren’t ‘‘indemonstrable principles,
known by the light of Nature, and requiring no proof.’’ Spinoza responds (in
Ep. 4) that he doesn’t hold the axioms to be indemonstrable, and then proceeds to
try to give a proof of some of them. Spinoza never, however, attempts a proof of
4a1.

284 MARTIN LIN

power of existing than an infinite thing, then, by definition, there would
be fewer possible circumstances compatible with the nonexistence of a
finite thing than an infinite thing. But whereas no possible circum-
stances are compatible with the nonexistence of an infinite being, there
is at least one incompatible with the nonexistence with any finite being.
Therefore, it is impossible for a finite being to have a greater power of
acting than an infinite one. We can also dispense with the worry that
the nature of a finite being which actually exists may involve a greater
power of existing than the nature of an infinite being that is unexempli-
fied. There can be no circumstances in which the nature of an infinite
being is unexemplified. But this line of reasoning does not depend in
any way upon the a posteriori premise that some finite being exists.
Thus we see that force behind Spinoza’s third argument comes from an
entirely a priori source, which is just what we should expect given that
Spinoza describes the fourth argument as an a priori argument that has
the same basis as the third.

5. The PSR and 1p16d

I claimed above that my interpretation distinguishes itself from
Garrett’s by, among other things, the light it sheds on aspects of
Spinoza’s metaphysics not directly connected to his arguments for the
existence of God. In this section, I intend to substantiate this claim by
showing how the reasoning contained in Spinoza’s arguments for the
existence of God as I have interpreted them can also provide support
for Spinoza’s claim that God creates every possible mode. This is an
important result because, although this claim is very important to Spi-
noza’s system, Spinoza’s argument for it is vulnerable to a powerful
objection that stems from a widespread view of God’s creative power.
I conjecture that this objection did not worry Spinoza, because he was
aware that the reasoning that he uses to establish the existence of God
can be adapted to respond to this objection as well. In any event, that
my interpretation of Spinoza’s arguments for the existence of God
coheres well with other important aspects of Spinoza’s metaphysics is
evidence, although hardly decisive, in favor of it.
In 1p16 and 1p16d, Spinoza writes:

From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow [sequi] infi-
nitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which
can fall under an infinite intellect.)

Dem.: This proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends

to the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any-
thing a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 285

 (i.e., from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more prop-
erties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e., the
more reality the essence of the defined thing involves. Bust since the
divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by d6), each of which
also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its necessity
there must follow infinitely many things in infinite modes (i.e., every-
thing which can fall under an infinite intellect), q.e.d.

1p16d tries to establish that an omnipotent God exercises all of his

power. This claim amounts to something like a principle of plentitude:
God creates every possible thing. This is not at first obvious because
Spinoza discusses the issue in terms of what ‘‘follows from’’ God’s nat-
ure and it is not obvious what kind of relation ‘‘following from’’ is. Is
it causal, logical, explanatory, or something else? If I am right and this
text concerns what God creates, then ‘‘following from’’ must have a
causal dimension. We can see that it does have a causal dimension
from the three corollaries that Spinoza alleges follow from 1p16, all of
which pertain to causal relations. A further difficulty for the plenitude
interpretation is that 1p16d concerns the question of what properties
follow from the definition of God. And that seems to pertain to the
ways that God is, not what he does. But, for Spinoza, everything other
than God is a mode of God and hence has an adjectival relation to
God. So, if there is no limit to the modes that follow causally from
God, then there is no limit to God’s power. And if every mode that
can follow from God’s nature does follow, then God exercises all of his
power.
Here then is how I understand 1p16d:

P1. If something is unconstrained by external causes (i.e., has

infinite reality), then it causes every conceivable thing.

P2. God is unconstrained by external causes.

C. So, God causes every conceivable thing.

There are many things here with which a philosopher might want to
take issue. I shall confine myself here to considering one objection that
stems from a widespread view of God that I shall call ‘‘the standard
view.’’ The standard view holds that while God has infinite power and
hence cannot be bound by external causes, that power need not be
exercised. This would entail a denial of premise (P1). How can Spinoza
defend (P1) against the standard view? I propose that Spinoza can
respond with an argument that is, in many respects, parallel to his
argument for the existence of God.

286 MARTIN LIN

 Suppose that God didn’t exercise all of his power. Then there would
be a possible mode that God doesn’t create. There must be a cause or
reason for its nonexistence. This cause is either internal to the mode,
external to God, or God himself. It can’t be something external to
God, because then something external to a substance would causally
influence a substance, which is impossible. It can’t be internal to the
mode, because, ex hypothesi, it is a possible mode and only self-
contradictory things have internal causes for their nonexistence.24 So
the only candidate for causing the mode to not exist is God. In virtue
of what might God be the cause of the nonexistence of a possible
mode? It might be that, while the mode is possible per se, it is not
possible relative to God’s nature. That is, God’s nature doesn’t contain
the possibility of creating such a mode. But then God would not be
omnipotent, which the adherent of the standard view cannot accept. So
perhaps God chooses not the create the mode. This is how the standard
view typically characterizes God’s power. There is no possible mode
that he cannot create, but, for any possible mode, God may choose not
to create it.
That God contingently chooses not to create some possible mode,
however, conflicts with the PSR. Here is a proof. First, a few prelimi-
naries are in order. Let choice be the putative truth that God contin-
gently chooses not to create some possible mode. For each truth p let
d(p) be the sufficient explanation of p. (Note that every truth has
exactly one sufficient explanation. It has at least one by the PSR. It has
at most one by the principle of explanatory exclusion.)25 A class Y of
truths is the explanatory class of some truth p just in case Y is the
smallest class that contains p, and is closed under conjunction, and is
closed under the function d. Let W be the explanatory class of choice.
Let q be the conjunction of every truth in W.

P1. The sufficient explanation of every contingent truth is a

contingent truth.
P2. No contingent truth is self-explanatory.
P3. If p 2 W, then d(p) „ p (because no contingent truth is
self-explanatory) and d (p) 2 W (because W is by definition
closed under d). (P1, P2)
P4. q 2 W.
C1. So, d (q) „ q and d (q) 2 W. (P3, P4)

24
1p11d.
25
Did Spinoza accept the principle of explanatory exclusion? I suspect he did, but for
present purposes, the answer to this question doesn’t matter. The assumption that
he did is not essential to the proof; it merely simplifies it. So, for the sake of expo-
sition, I shall here assume it.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 287

 P5. For any contingent conjunction p, the sufficient
explanation of p is not a conjunct of p.
C2. d(q) is not a conjunct of q. (P5)
P6. Every member of W is a conjunct of q.
C3. So, d(q) is a conjunct of q. (C1 and P6) This contradicts
C2. q.e.d.

We have now ruled out every candidate explanation of the nonexis-

tence of a possible mode: it cannot be explained by anything external
to God nor anything internal to God or the mode itself. Since these
alternatives are exhaustive, if there were a possible mode that did not
exist, then its nonexistence would be inexplicable. Hence, according to
the psr, the nonexistence of a possible mode is impossible.
We are now in a position to see the advantages of my interpretation
over Garrett’s. Recall that Garrett’s reconstruction of Spinoza’s argu-
ments include an equivalence between necessary existence and self-
causation. According to him, Spinoza uses the PSR to establish that
God is self-caused. That together with the equivalence of self-causation
and necessary existence allows Spinoza to conclude that God necessar-
ily exists.
As I argued above, this equivalence is either inconsistent with
Spinoza’s necessitarianism or it must be patched up. The most obvious
patch would be to replace the equivalence between self-causation and
necessary existence with an equivalence between self-causation and exis-
tence that is necessary in virtue of its own nature. But then the style of
reasoning that Spinoza employs in his arguments for the existence of
God would have no application in cases of existence that is necessary
in virtue of the nature of another. The existence of every possible mode
is necessary in virtue of the nature of another (viz., God), so the rea-
soning that supports the claim that God necessarily exists can have no
bearing on the necessary existence of the modes and Spinoza has no
defence against the standard view. Garrett’s mistake lies in underesti-
mating the power of Spinoza’s PSR and its centrality to his metaphys-
ics. There is no need for Spinoza to appeal to Garrett’s equivalence.
The psr together with Spinoza’s assumptions about substances and
causation suffice. Moreover, the very same style of reasoning allows
Spinoza to handle otherwise telling objections to some of his other
main metaphysical theses.

6. The Monism Argument Adapted to Prove the Nonexistence of God

There is a well-known problem with Spinoza’s arguments. Having
attempted to prove the existence of God, Spinoza goes on to try to

288 MARTIN LIN

prove, using the no-shared attribute theorem introduced in 1p5, that
there is no substance other than God. God has all the attributes. If
there were some substance other than God, then it would share an
attribute with God. But no two substances can share an attribute.
Therefore, there are no other substances. It would seem, however, that
some of Spinoza’s arguments for the existence of God would equally
well serve to prove the existence of some substance other than God.
Take for example the second argument. Replace every mention of God
in that argument with an expression referring to a substance other than
God, e.g., a merely extended substance (in other words, a substance
with exactly one attribute, extension). For everything there is a cause
or reason, as much for its nonexistence as for its existence. If a merely
extended substance did not exist, it would be because it was internally
incoherent or externally prevented. No external cause can influence a
substance. A merely extended substance isn’t incoherent. Therefore, a
merely extended substance exists. The argument thus transformed
seems to work just as well as the argument for the existence of God.
The problem is not just that this result contradicts the claim that there
is no other substance than God (1p14), but, along with the no-shared
attribute theorem, a merely extended substance would preclude the
existence of God. In this way, at least some of the arguments presented
for 1p11 would equally well serve as arguments for the nonexistence of
God.
Garrett has argued that Spinoza recognizes these difficulties and
designs the third and fourth arguments with an eye toward blocking
such alternative arguments.26 First of all, in the third argument he
defines power of existing so that if x exists and y does not, then, ipso
facto, x has a greater power of existing than y. Second, in the fourth
argument he claims that an absolutely infinite being, i.e., a being with
infinitely many attributes, has an absolutely infinite power of existing.
From these two premises it follows that it is not possible for a less than
absolutely infinite attribute to exist because that would imply, together
with the no-shared attribute theorem, that a substance with a greater
power of existing did not exist. But what it is for x to have a greater
power of acting than y is to be such that y cannot exist if x does not
exist.
Della Rocca has argued that this response begs the question against
someone, e.g., an orthodox Cartesian, who believes that substances
have one and only one attribute. He writes:

26
Garrett ‘‘‘Ontological’ Argument,’’ p. 211.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 289

 A Cartesian would deny (and, in Ep 8, de Vries does deny) that a sub-
stance could have more than one attribute. For this reason, we can
see that a Cartesian would hold that a certain difference between God
(as Spinoza defines God) and [a merely thinking substance] gives
[a merely thinking substance] more power to exist than God.
Although [a merely thinking substance] and God both have thought,
they differ in that God has other attributes besides thought, and [a
merely thinking substance] does not. This difference, a Cartesian
would say, is clearly to the detriment of God (as Spinoza defines
God) since the notion of a substance having more than one attribute
is simply incoherent, whereas the notion of a substance having just
one attribute is perfectly legitimate. Thus, the Cartesian would say,
God would be precluded from existing by God’s very concept, but [a
merely thinking substance] would not be precluded by [a merely think-
ing substance’s] concept.27

Della Rocca’s worry harks back to the concern I expressed earlier in

connection with premise (27) of the second argument: The nature of
God is not incoherent. Spinoza offers no explicit argument for this and
given his definition of God as a substance with infinitely many attri-
butes, any philosopher who, like Descartes, denies that a substance can
have more than one attribute would challenge it. So in addition to
meeting the challenge that single attribute substances pose for the exis-
tence of God, part of the pay off of this section will be to offer some
support for (27).
Della Rocca has suggested a Spinozistic argument that might estab-
lish the correlation of attributes and power. The argument begins with
the claim that for every attribute A there is some substance that has A,
i.e., every attribute exists. This follows from the fact that, for Spinoza,
each attribute is conceptually self-contained. And we have already seen
from the second argument that Spinoza has reasons to believe that any-
thing conceptually self-contained necessarily exists.28 From Spinoza’s
belief that no two substances share an attribute and the claim that
every attribute exists, Della Rocca concludes that if A is an attribute
then one and only one substance has A. The important question is how
are these uniquely possessed attributes distributed among substances?
Here Della Rocca invokes the Principle of the Identity of Indiscern-
ibles: if x is not identical to y, then there is some difference between
x and y that explains their nonidentity. Thus, if the extended substance
is not identical to the thinking substance, then there is some difference
between them that explains their nonidentity. Perhaps we can explain

27
Della Rocca, ‘‘Spinoza’s Monism,’’ p. 26.
28
Della Rocca thinks that Spinoza would here rely on 1p7 not the second argument.
But, as was shown previously, 1p7 does not contain any claim about necessary
existence.

290 MARTIN LIN

their nonidentity by appealing to their diverse attributes. So, for exam-
ple, the extended substance is not identical to the thinking substance
because it has extension and the thinking substance does not. That is,
the distinguishing feature is the attribute of extension only if the think-
ing substance lacks extension. But the PSR demands that for every fact
there is cause or reason which explains that fact. What fact could
explain the fact that the thinking substance lacks extension? Della
Rocca claims that nothing could account for this lack. To show this he
considers two unsuccessful attempts to explain it, and concludes that
all attempted explanations will share their flaws.
The first attempted explanation begins with the assumption that
the thinking substance is distinct from the extended substance.
Distinct substances cannot share an attribute (1p5). Therefore, the
thinking substance does not share the attribute of extension with the
extended substance. But this begs the question since the nonidentity of
the thinking and the extended substances is the very thing we are trying
to establish, and the assumption on which this putative explanation is
based presumes that nonidentity.
Della Rocca next considers an attempted explanation which begins
with the assumption that thought and extension are mutually exclusive.
Thus, the fact that the thinking substance possesses thought explains
why it does not also possess extension. But this explains a fact involv-
ing extension—the fact that a certain substance does not have it—by a
fact involving thought. This would violate 1p10d, which says that attri-
butes are conceptually self-contained and hence no fact involving one
attribute can be explained by a fact involving another attribute. Clearly
this attempted explanation violates this explanatory barrier between the
attributes, by explaining an extension involving fact (that this substance
does not posses extension) by reference to a thought involving fact
(that this thinking substance possesses thought).
I believe that Della Rocca’s argument provides a genuinely Spinozis-
tic basis for the claim that a substance with fewer than all the attri-
butes is impossible. There is, however, a closely related argument that
also supports that claim—an argument which more perspicuously dis-
plays the connection between that claim and Spinoza’s metaphysical
rationalism. Whereas the main premises of Della Rocca’s argument are
the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and the explanatory bar-
rier between attributes, my variation proceeds from the PSR and the
causal barrier between the attributes. That our two arguments are very
closely related can be seen from the fact that the Principle of the Identity
of Indiscernibles is entailed by the PSR and the fact that, for Spinoza,
explanation and causation are coextensive. But since I take adherence
to the PSR to be the defining feature of Spinoza’s metaphysical

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 291

rationalism, I think my version of the argument has the benefit of high-
lighting the significance of the PSR to both Spinoza’s theism and mon-
ism.
In order to work our way up to the conclusion that any substance
must possess all the attributes, let us begin with a case where we are
trying to determine whether or not some substance possesses some
attribute, say attribute E. For every substance x, x either possesses
attribute E or not. Suppose that x, a substance with only one attribute,
does not posses E. There must be, according to the PSR, a cause for
substance x’s non-possession of E. Causes, for Spinoza must be con-
ceived through the same attribute as are their effects. That is:

iii. If x causes y, then (there is some attribute A such that x is

conceived through attribute A if and only if y is conceived
through attribute A).

Moreover, Spinoza believes that if something can be conceived through

an attribute, then that attribute is sufficient for conceiving of that
thing. That is:

iv. If x is conceived through attribute A, then A is sufficient for

conceiving of x.29

This rules out the possibility that some x is conceived through A and B
together but not through A alone.
Because the psr requires x’s non-possession of E is possible only if it
is the effect of some cause, and because causes and effects must be con-
ceived through the same attribute, we must now ask, through what
attribute is x’s non-possession of E conceived? The fact of x’s non-pos-
session of E cannot be conceived through some attribute other than E,
because in order to conceive of x’s not possessing E it is necessary to
conceive of E. And yet this fact cannot be conceived through E because
substance x cannot be conceived through E. This is because, for Spi-
noza, things are conceived through their essences,30 and attributes are
what an intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance.31
Thus, if x could be conceived through E, then x would possess E. But
x does not possess E and so cannot be conceived through it.
Perhaps, then, x’s non-possession of E is conceivable through a com-
bination of attributes E and some other attribute that x does possess,

29
1p10s.
30
2d2.
31
1d4.

292 MARTIN LIN

T. Then we would conceive of x through T, which x does possess, and
not-possessing-E would be conceived through E. But such a solution
would violate (iv), because neither E nor T would suffice for conceiving
of x’s non-possession of E.
It seems, then, that substance x’s non-possession of E is not conceiv-
able through any attribute. But then, according to (iii), there can be no
cause of x’s non-possession of E. And so, by the PSR, this non-posses-
sion is impossible. That is, for any substance x and for any attribute
E it is not the case that x does not possess E. Consequently, a sub-
stance with fewer than all possible attributes is impossible, and the
threat that single attribute substances would pose to the existence of
God is defeated.
We can also make some sense of Spinoza’s claim that the more reality
a thing has, the more attributes it has.32 As we have seen, reality, for
Spinoza, is equivalent to causal and conceptual independence. Because a
substance is absolutely causally and conceptually independent, nothing
could affect such a substance so as to bring about its non-possession of
an attribute. So any substance with infinite reality possesses every possi-
ble attribute. Any substance with fewer than every possible attribute
would violate the PSR and so is impossible. Even so, each fact of non-
possession of an attribute which is true of some less than infinite sub-
stance would be the result of a causal limitation. Each such limitation
reduces its degree of reality. That is, if some substance didn’t possess, per
impossibile, some one attribute, it would have to be because there was
something capable of preventing it from doing so, which would compro-
mise that substance’s causal and conceptual independence.33 Every attri-
bute lacked would introduce another limitation and further reduce its
causal and conceptual independence. Thus some impossible substances
are even less real than others.

32
1p9.
33
It is often thought that counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents
(i.e., counterpossible conditionals) are vacuously true. Thus the claim that if some
substance didn’t possess, per impossibile, some one attribute, it would not have to
be because there was something capable of preventing it from doing so would also
be true. But the truth of that proposition would undercut Spinoza’s claim that the
more attributes a substance has, the more real it is. I think, however, that there is
good reason to reject the idea that conditionals with impossible antecedents are
vacuously true. As Daniel Nolan points out (‘‘Impossible Worlds: A Modest
Approach,’’ Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 38: 4, Fall 1997, p. 504) the his-
torian of philosophy has especially good reason to reject such a principle. Presum-
ably some philosophers believe that both Plato’s metaphysics and Leibniz’s
metaphysics are false. And not because Forms and monads happen not to exist. If
they are false, they are necessarily so. But it would be absurd for the historian of
philosophy to conclude from this that Plato’s and Leibniz’s metaphysics are equiva-
lent and that different things don’t follow from them.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 293

 7. Assessment
I shall now turn briefly to assessing the persuasiveness of Spinoza’s
arguments. I believe that the second and fourth arguments, as I have
reconstructed them, are valid. The third is invalid because from its pre-
mises the most that can be legitimately concluded is that God exists,
not that God necessarily exists. The first argument is problematic
because, on plausible assumptions about the semantic value of ‘God’, it
either begs the question or is invalid, depending upon whether ‘God’ is
construed as a singular term or as a disguised quantifier expression.
Nevertheless, all of Spinoza’s arguments clearly avoid a number of the
most powerful criticisms lodged against more traditional ontological
and cosmological arguments. Unlike many traditional ontological argu-
ments, they do not suppose that existence is a property or a constituent
of the concept of any being. Unlike many traditional cosmological
arguments, they do not falsely assume that a necessary being must be
perfect. To this extent, at least, they are stronger than many traditional
arguments for the existence of God.
Spinoza’s arguments are not, nevertheless, unobjectionable. Aside
from various quibbles, I think there are two very serious problems with
them, both of which are pillars of nearly all rationalistic metaphysics
and relate in interesting ways to Spinoza’s necessitarianism.
First is Spinoza’s equivalence between conception and causation. The
icy conditions caused the car wreck, but the concept of the car wreck does
not involve the concept of the icy conditions. Smoking causes cancer, but
the concept of the latter does not involve the concept of the former.
The equivalence of conception and causation is, however, crucially
important in Spinoza’s arguments because it secures the inference from
a substance being conceptually self-contained to its being independent
of external causes, particularly in premise (29) of my reconstruction of
the second argument and in establishing the connection between reality
and infinity for the purposes of the fourth argument.
Perhaps Spinoza could argue that the equivalence of conception and
causation is required by the PSR. It cannot be simply a brute fact that a
causal relation obtains between two things. There must be something in
virtue of which it obtains, which explains why it obtains. And this
explanatory factor must either be itself self-explanatory or be part of an
explanatory chain that eventually terminates in something self-explana-
tory. Bennett and Della Rocca have argued that by claiming that causa-
tion is equivalent to conception, Spinoza’s account of causality satisfies
the PSR.34 The explanation of why one thing is causally related to
another is that it is part of the concept of the former that it is so related

34
Bennett, Study, pp. 31-31 and Michael Della Rocca, ‘‘A Rationalist Manifesto.’’

294 MARTIN LIN

to the later. Conceptual relations are self-explanatory in the sense that
there can be no further question why bachelors, for example, are unmar-
ried men, once we have analyzed the concept BACHELOR into the con-
stituents UNMARRIED and MAN. Similarly there can be no further
question about why one thing causes another after it has been estab-
lished that the concept of the former implies that it causes the latter.
This response puts Spinoza in the awkward position of having to
maintain that the concept of the car wreck does indeed contain the
concept of the icy conditions. This awkwardness, however, is mitigated
by the fact that Spinoza thinks that we never have adequate ideas of
external particulars like car wrecks or icy conditions.35 Thus if we fail
to discern the conceptual connection between the two, it is open to
Spinoza to claim that this is only because our grasp of these concepts
is incomplete or inadequate. This response is not entirely implausible.
As Tyler Burge has pointed out, most, if not all, people possess con-
cepts that they incompletely grasp.36 For example, one might possess
the concept of a mortgage without knowing exactly what distinguishes
one from any other kind of debt, or one might possess the concept of a
contract without recognizing that some verbal agreements are con-
tracts. On Burge’s account, possession of incompletely grasped con-
cepts depends upon the complete grasp of experts and a disposition on
the part the one who incompletely grasps them to defer to expert judg-
ment. On Spinoza’s account of concepts, however, no finite mind com-
pletely grasps the concept, and so it is beyond finite minds to discover
causal connections between particulars by conceptual analysis.
There is, however, a more serious objection to Spinoza’s claim that a
thing’s causal profile is contained in its concept: whether or not various
causal connections obtain is never, on this view, a contingent matter. If
it is part of the concept of Caesar that Brutus murdered him, then it is
necessary truth that Brutus murdered Caesar. It is thus impossible, on
Spinoza’s view, that Caesar died of old age or in battle. Spinoza, of
course, would not be bothered by the consequence that all causal rela-
tions are necessary since he is arguably committed to the view that all
truths are necessary. Philosophers who do not share Spinoza’s convic-
tion that there are no contingent facts concerning causation, however,
will do well to reject the equivalence of conception and causation.
This brings us to the second problem, the PSR itself. This principle
expresses Spinoza’s basic rationalist orientation. No element or feature

35
The only things we can have adequate ideas of are common notions, the eternal
and infinite essence of God, and the formal essences of singular things (which are
eternal truths). See 2p40s.
36
Tyler Burge, ‘‘Individualism and the Mental,’’ in Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV
(1979).

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 295

of the world is inaccessible to rational understanding. Whether or not a
given individual exists, and if it exists, whether or not it exemplifies a
given property or stands in a given relationship has a complete explana-
tion. All but the first of Spinoza’s arguments presuppose that the PSR
is, and is known to be, true. Moreover, it cannot simply be a brute fact
that the PSR is true. If it were, then the PSR would violate itself. Hence,
the truth of the PSR must be self-explanatory. How could the truth of
such a principle be self-explanatory? It would be reasonable to regard it
as such if it were true logically or analytically. It seems, however, quite
clear that it is not a theorem of logic. Perhaps Spinoza would claim that
it is analytically true. For example, Spinoza might claim that the con-
cept of a thing is a complex concept consisting of the concept of the
most general category of being such that if something is not a thing,
then it does not exist, and the concept of something with a cause or
reason. If such an analysis of the concept of a thing were correct, then
the PSR would be a conceptual truth. It would also be, unfortunately
for the adherent of the PSR, a triviality. For the opponent of the PSR
could characterize a different concept, THING*, such that something is
a thing* just in case it exists. Then the anti-rationalist is in a position to
ask whether of not there are any things* that aren’t things—i.e. don’t
have complete causes or reasons—without denying the PSR is true as
concerns things. Any attempt to claim that the PSR is an analytic truth
will be subject to such evasions. Since such evasions deprive the PSR of
the force that its rationalist adherents ascribe to it, the PSR must not be
an analytic truth.
Some philosophers have thought that the PSR is presupposed by all
rational inquiry, and thus its truth can never be rationally challenged.
But, as Russell points out, if rational inquiry presupposes the PSR, it is
only in the sense that prospecting presupposes the existence of gold.
That is, rational inquiry hopes to find causes and reasons, but should
not assume that such things can be found everywhere.
If there is no explanation of the truth of the PSR, then the PSR is
incoherent. I can think of nothing that would explain the truth of the
PSR, but I know of no argument to show that such an explanation is
impossible. Nevertheless, I think it is fair to say that the burden of
proof rests with the rationalist. Until an explanation of the truth of
PSR is given, the threat of incoherence looms.
If the PSR is not known to be true, is it known to be false? The
PSR entails that all truths are necessary.37 This can be demonstrated by

37
This has been shown by William Rowe in his Cosmological Arguments, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1975), Peter van Inwagen in his Metaphysics, pp.119-
122, and Jonathan Bennett in his Study, p. 115.

296 MARTIN LIN

the following argument. If there are contingent truths, then there is the
set of all contingent truths. If the PSR is true, then there must be an
answer to the question, what is the cause or reason why this set is the
set of contingent truths and not some other set? It cannot be a contin-
gent truth not contained in the set, because it is, ex hypothesi, the set
of all contingent truths. It cannot be a necessary truth. Any necessary
truth is compatible with every possibility, and so cannot answer the
question, why is this set of possibilities actual and not some other?
That is, the necessary truths are the same in all possible worlds so none
of them can explain why one of those possible worlds is the actual
world. It cannot, moreover, be a subset of the set. If it were, then some
subset of contingent truths could determine the entire set of contingent
truths. But this is impossible. To see why, take a seemingly plausible
candidate for being such an explanatory subset, for example, a com-
plete specification of the state of affairs that obtained just after the big
bang and the laws of nature. If the universe were deterministic, this
would suffice to explain why any other contingent fact obtains. It
would not, however, explain itself. Contingent truths are not self-
explanatory. There would be then, at least one brute fact, which vio-
lates the PSR. In sum, the explanation of the entire set of contingent
facts cannot be a necessary truth, nor can it be a contingent truth. All
truths, however, are either contingent or necessary. Hence, if there were
contingent truths, the set of them would have no explanation. And by
the PSR, we can conclude that contingent truths are impossible. In
other words, all truths are necessary truths.
So, the following statements are inconsistent and no one may ratio-
nally believe both:

There is a cause or reason for everything.

That Bush won the election is a contingent truth.

For my own part, I have more confidence in Bush’s victory being con-
tingent than I have in the PSR. Thus I must, on pain of irrationality,
reject the PSR. Such a rejection cuts to the heart of Spinoza’s meta-
physics. As we have seen, at nearly every turn in arguing for the exis-
tence of an absolutely infinite substance, i.e., God, Spinoza appeals to
the PSR. Without God, the metaphysical foundations of nearly all of
his philosophy—the parallelism, the conatus doctrine, necessitarianism,
his accounts of virtue and political legitimacy—are undercut. That is,
however important God is to Spinoza’s system, so too is the PSR.

SPINOZA’S ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 297