R.A.

9344 vis-à-vis PD 603 on suspension of sentence of juvenile

Declarador vs. Gubaton, G.R. No. 159208, August 18, 2006
RA 9344 (Juvenile Protection Act) took effect on May 20, 2006. Pursuant to P.D. 603 a minor who (a) has
once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or (b) convicted for an offense punishable by death or
life imprisonment or (c) by Military Tribunals cannot avail of suspended sentence. The law was reproduced in
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.
“Punishable” means liable to be punished. It does not mean “must be punished.”. Thus, the term refers to
possible, not to actual sentence. It is concerned with the penalty which may be, and not which is imposed.
Disqualification is based on nature of crime charged and the imposable penalty therefor, and not on the
penalty imposed by the court after trial. It is not the actual penalty imposed but the possible one which
determines the disqualification of a juvenile.
The law merely amended Art. 192 in that the suspension of sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if
he is already 18 or more at the time of the pronouncement of his guilt. The other disqualifications in Art. 192
and Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been deleted from Sec. 38 of RA 9344. Evidently, Congress
intended maintain the other disqualifications in PD 603. Juveniles who have been convicted of a crime
punishable with reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified
from suspension of sentence.

Ortega vs. People, G.R. No. 151085 August 20, 2008

With the advent of R.A. 9344 while petitioner's case is pending, a new issue arises, whether the pertinent
provisions of RA 9344 apply to him, considering that when he committed the alleged rape, he was 13 years old.
However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime,
by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no
criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus,
Guevarra v. Almodovar held:
The basic reason behind the enactment of exempting circumstances in Article 12 - the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. The second
element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to
distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant has no intelligence, the law
exempts him from criminal liability. It is for this reason why minors nine years of age and below are not
capable of performing a criminal act.
Sec. 6 of RA 9344 provides that a child above 15 but below 18 shall be exempt from criminal liability and
be subjected to an intervention program, unless he acted with discernment, in which case, he shall be subjected
to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Likewise, Sec. 64 categorically provides that cases of children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption
from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL's age at the time of the promulgation of judgment but the
CICL's age at the time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of RA 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old.
It is imperative that the law be given retroactive application pursuant to the principle in criminal law that
penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in Article
22 of the RPC. Jurisprudence abounds that the principle has been given expanded application in certain
instances involving special laws. R.A. No. 9344 should be no exception.
The Court is bound to enforce the legislative intent, which is the dominant factor in interpreting a statute.
Intent is the soul of the law.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA
9344's unambiguous language, coupled with clear lawmakers' intent, is most favorable to petitioner. No other
interpretation is justified, for the simple language of the new law itself demonstrates the legislative intent to
favor the CICL.
Petitioner who is now 25 was only 13 at the time of the alleged rape. This was proven by the certificate of
live birth, by petitioner's own testimony, and by the testimony of his mother. Furthermore, petitioner's age was
never assailed in any of the proceedings before the RTC and the CA. Indubitably, petitioner, at the time of the
commission of the crime, was below 15 years of age. Under R.A. 9344, he is exempted from criminal
liability.
However, while the law exempts petitioner from criminal liability for the two counts of rape committed
against AAA, Section 6 thereof expressly provides that there is no concomitant exemption from civil
liability.
The RTC, however, erred in not separately awarding moral damages, distinct from the civil indemnity
awarded to the rape victim. AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of
rape, pursuant to Article 2219 of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional pleading or proof other than
the fact of rape. Moral damages are granted in recognition of the victim's injury resulting from the crime of
rape.
“A final note. While we regret the delay, we take consolation in the fact that a law intended to protect our
children from the harshness of life and to alleviate, if not cure, the ills of the growing number of CICL and
children at risk in our country, has been enacted by Congress. However, it has not escaped us that major
concerns have been raised on the effects of the law. It is worth mentioning that in the Rationale for the Proposed
Rule on Children Charged under R.A. No. 9165, it was found that:
“The passage of Republic Act No. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 raising the age of
criminal irresponsibility from 9 years old to 15 years old has compounded the problem of employment of
children in the drug trade several times over. Law enforcement authorities, Barangay Kagawads and the police,
most particularly, complain that drug syndicates have become more aggressive in using children 15 years old or
below as couriers or foot soldiers in the drug trade. They claim that Republic Act No. 9344 has rendered them
ineffective in the faithful discharge of their duties in that they are proscribed from taking into custody children
15 years old or below who openly flaunt possession, use and delivery or distribution of illicit drugs, simply
because their age exempts them from criminal liability under the new law.
“The Court is fully cognizant that our decision in the instant case effectively exonerates petitioner of rape, a
heinous crime committed against AAA who was only a child at the tender age of six (6) when she was raped by
the petitioner, and one who deserves the law's greater protection. However, this consequence is inevitable
because of the language of R.A. No. 9344, the wisdom of which is not subject to review by this Court. 61 Any
perception that the result reached herein appears unjust or unwise should be addressed to Congress. Indeed, the
Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language of the
law. Our task is constitutionally confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the proven facts, and we
have done so in this case.”

Improvident plea of guilt; proof of minority; allegation of brother-sister relationship

People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008
Where the accused desires to plead guilty to a capital offense, the court is enjoined to observe the following:
1. It must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea;
2. The court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree of his culpability; and
3. The court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him
to do so if he desires.
There is no definite and concrete rule on how a trial judge may go about the matter of a proper “searching
inquiry.” It is incumbent upon a trial judge to ascertain and be fully convinced that the plea of guilty was
voluntarily made and its consequences fully comprehended by the accused.
Appellant was duly assisted by his counsel, both in his first arraignment and re-arraignment. In fact, it was
his counsel who manifested before the trial court that appellant desired to change his plea from “not guilty” to
“guilty” on all ten charges of rape filed against him by his younger sister.
Besides being assisted by counsel all throughout the proceedings, when appellant was re-arraigned, the
charges were read and explained to him in Ilocano, his native tongue. He cannot now claim that he was
unaware of the consequences of his change of plea.
 More than that, appellant admitted raping AAA. When confronted by AAA, their mother, sister DDD , and
their uncle RB, appellant readily admitted to violating his sister on at least three occasions. Sensing that AAA
was only angered by his fractional admission, and through the prodding of his wife Josephine for him to admit
the whole truth, appellant confessed to the ten counts of rape.
While convictions based on pleas of guilt to capital offenses have been set aside because of the
improvidence of the plea, the same holds true only when such plea is the sole basis of the judgment.
There can only be improvident plea of guilt under Sec 3, Rule 116 where there is a possibility of accused
being meted out the penalty of death. In the words of said section, “When accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry x x x, etc.” The rationale for this is to ascertain that accused
truly understands the dire consequences of his plea. Considering that RA 9346 has prohibited the imposition of
the death penalty, the raison d’etre behind said rule is absent in the case at bar.
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the constitutive acts or
omissions. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of it. Thus, in a prosecution
for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its
commission. The failure to specify the exact date or time when it was committed does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face.
The date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the
gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. In fact, the precise time
when the rape takes place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need not be
stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime has been
committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
It is already too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the information. He had all the time to raise
this issue during the course of the trial, particularly during his arraignment. He could have filed for a bill of
particulars in order to be properly informed of the dates of the alleged rapes. However, he chose to be silent
and never questioned the information. As a result, he is deemed to have waived whatever objections he had; he
cannot now be heard to seek affirmative relief. Further, objections as to matters of form in the information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
Nor was there any defect in the Informations when they merely averred that the victim was the youngest
sister of appellant. Ferolino, said:
“If the offender is merely a relation – not a parent, ascendant, stepparent, or guardian or common
law spouse of the mother of the victim – it must be alleged in the information that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity (as the case may be) within the civil degree. That relationship by consanguinity
or affinity was not alleged in the informations in these cases. Even if it was, it was still necessary to
further allege that such relationship was within the third civil degree.”
The present case is not within the contemplation of said ruling considering that in the Ferolino case, the
victim is a niece of the offender while in the present case the victim is a sister. It was necessary in Ferolino to
require that it must be specifically alleged in the Information that the offender is a relative within the third civil
degree because there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil degree. However, a sister-
brother relationship is obviously in the second civil degree and no other sister-brother relationship exists in civil
law that falls beyond the third civil degree. Consequently, it is not necessary in this case that the Information
should specifically state that the appellant is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree of the
victim. This is an exception to the requirement enunciated in the Ferolino case.
Further, what is required by the Rules is that “the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and
not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances
and for the court to pronounce judgment.”
On the issue of age of the victim, it is enough that the victim testified on her age vis-a-vis the time she was
raped. Pruna set out guidelines as to the appreciation of age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance. Although the best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true
copy of the certificate of live birth of such party, its presentation into evidence is not a sine qua non requirement
to prove her age for the appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance. In the absence of (a) certificate of live birth, (b) authentic document, or (c) testimony of the
victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
Not only did the defense fail to object to complainant’s claim to minority when it was consistently bared
during the trial; the accused, through his plea of guilt, admitted to the victim’s age as alleged in the informations
against him. Furthermore, appellant cannot claim ignorance of the age of the victim as she is his own sister.
Anent the Pruna requirement that the court make a categorical finding as to age, AAA was not able to tell
the exact month and date of the first nine incidents but this is not fatal to her credibility. She is only about 10
years old in 1995 and about 11 in 1996, she being born on Feb. 18, 1985 and therefore it is but natural for her
not to remember the dates more so when it has a very negative, horrifying and traumatic effect and impact on
her life.
In order that the rape be qualified, there need only be one qualifying circumstance present. Here, there are
two – relationship and age. Even assuming that the circumstance of age had not been duly proven, it makes no
difference as to the final outcome of this case as the circumstance of relationship of appellant to the victim
cannot be denied.
RA 9346 took effect on June 24, 2006; appellant’s sentence should be downgraded to reclusion
perpetua. Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty, he is not eligible for parole following Section 3 of the
law.

R.A. 9344 vis-à-vis Probation Law and Dangerous Drugs Law

Padua vs. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
PP was charged and convicted for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is
clear under Sec. 24 that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of probation.
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,
regardless of the penalty imposed cannot avail of the privilege granted by PD 968. When the words and phrases
of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation [plain-meaning rule or verba legis.]
Speech is the index of intention.
The intention in Sec. 24 is to provide stiffer and harsher punishment for those persons convicted of drug
trafficking or pushing while extending a sympathetic and magnanimous hand in Sec. 70 to drug dependents who
are found guilty of violation of Sec. 11 and 15. The law considers the users and possessors of illegal drugs as
victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug traffickers and pushers, like PP,
are categorically disqualified from availing the law on probation, youthful drug dependents, users and
possessors alike, are given the chance to mend their ways. Had it been the intention of to exempt from the
application of Sec. 24 the drug traffickers and pushers who are minors and first time offenders, the law could
have easily declared so.
The law indeed appears strict and harsh against drug traffickers and drug pushers while protective of drug
users. To illustrate, a person arrested for using illegal or dangerous drugs is meted only 6 months rehabilitation
in a government center, as minimum, for the first offense under Sec. 15, while one charged and convicted of
selling dangerous drugs shall suffer life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000 to P10
Million.
PP cannot argue that his right under RA 9344 was violated or that Sec. 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, "Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law" applies herein. Sec. 68 of RA 9344 and Sec. 32 of A.M. 02-1-18-SC
both pertain to suspension of sentence and not probation.
Suspension of sentence under Sec 38 could no longer be retroactively applied for petitioner's benefit
because once a child under 18 is found guilty of the offense charged, instead of pronouncing the judgment of
conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Sec. 40 however,
provides that once the child reaches 18, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child, order
execution of sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches
the maximum age of 21. Petitioner already reached 21 or over and could no longer be considered a child. Thus,
the application of Sec 38 and 40 appears moot and academic.