3.
) OBJECTIVE ELEMENTS OF SUCCESSION:
Inheritance
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property,
rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished
by his death. (659)
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only
the property and the transmissible rights and obligations
existing at the time of his death, but also those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)
4.) ACCEPTANCE AND REPUDIATION OF
INHERITANCE
Art. 1041. The acceptance or repudiation of the inheritance is
an act which is purely voluntary and free. (988)
Art. 1042. The effects of the acceptance or repudiation shall
always retroact to the moment of the death of the
decedent. (989)
Art. 1043. No person may accept or repudiate an inheritance
unless he is certain of the death of the person from whom he is
to inherit, and of his right to the inheritance. (991)
Art. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property
may accept or repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be
accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians
may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by
judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong
to the persons designated by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to
those mentioned in Article 1030. (992a)
Art. 1045. The lawful representatives of corporations,
associations, institutions and entities qualified to acquire
property may accept any inheritance left to the latter, but in
order to repudiate it, the approval of the court shall be
necessary.(993a)
Art. 1046. Public official establishments can neither accept nor
repudiate an inheritance without the approval of the
government. (994)
Art. 1047. A married woman of age may repudiate an
inheritance without the consent of her husband. (995a)
Art. 1048. Deaf-mutes who can read and write may accept or
repudiate the inheritance personally or through an agent.
Should they not be able to read and write, the inheritance shall
be accepted by their guardians. These guardians may
repudiate the same with judicial approval. (996a)
Art. 1049. Acceptance may be express or tacit.
An express acceptance must be made in a public or private
document.
A tacit acceptance is one resulting from acts by which the
intention to accept is necessarily implied, or which one would
have no right to do except in the capacity of an heir.
Acts of mere preservation or provisional administration do not
imply an acceptance of the inheritance if, through such acts,
the title or capacity of an heir has not been assumed. (999a)
Art. 1050. An inheritance is deemed accepted:
(1) If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger,
or to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
(2) If the heir renounces the same, even though gratuitously,
for the benefit of one or more of his co-heirs;
(3) If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-heirs
indiscriminately; but if this renunciation should be gratuitous,
and the co-heirs in whose favor it is made are those upon whom
the portion renounced should devolve by virtue of accretion,
the inheritance shall not be deemed as accepted. (1000)
Art. 1051. The repudiation of an inheritance shall be made in
a public or authentic instrument, or by petition presented to
the court having jurisdiction over the testamentary or intestate
proceedings. (1008)
Art. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the
prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court
to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.
The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent
sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess,
should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer,
but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance
with the rules established in this Code, it may belong. (1001)
Art. 1053. If the heir should die without having accepted or
repudiated the inheritance his right shall be transmitted to his
heirs. (1006)
Art. 1054. Should there be several heirs called to the
inheritance, some of them may accept and the others may
repudiate it. (1007a)
Art. 1055. If a person, who is called to the same inheritance as
an heir by will and ab intestato, repudiates the inheritance in
his capacity as a testamentary heir, he is understood to have
repudiated it in both capacities.
Should he repudiate it as an intestate heir, without knowledge
of his being a testamentary heir, he may still accept it in the
latter capacity. (1009)
Art. 1056. The acceptance or repudiation of an inheritance,
once made, is irrevocable, and cannot be impugned, except
when it was made through any of the causes that vitiate
consent, or when an unknown will appears. (997)
Art. 1057. Within thirty days after the court has issued an
order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the
Rules of Court, the heirs, devisees and legatees shall signify to
the court having jurisdiction whether they accept or repudiate
the inheritance.
If they do not do so within that time, they are deemed to have
accepted the inheritance. (n)
KINDS OF SUCCESSION
Art. 778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
TESTAMENTARY
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the
designation of an heir, made in a will executed in the form
prescribed by law. (n)
LEGAL OR INTESTATE
Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which
has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the
property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession
shall take place only with respect to the property of which the
testator has not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir
does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the
testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution,
and no right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in
cases provided in this Code. (912a)
MIXED
Art. 780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly
by operation of law. (n)
CONTRACTUAL
Art. 130. The future spouses may give each other in their marriage
settlements as much as one-fifth of their present property, and with
respect to their future property, only in the event of death, to the
extent laid down by the provisions of this Code referring to
testamentary succession. (1331a)
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights
which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a
contract. (1271a)
Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts
it. (618a)
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the
absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other
in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void. (FAMILY CODE)
CASES
ESTATE OF HEMADY v. LUZON SURETY
Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based
on indemnity agreements (counterbonds) subscribed by distinct
principals and by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety (solidary
guarantor). As a contingent claim, Luzon Surety prayed for the
allowance of the value of the indemnity agreements it had
executed. The lower court dismissed the claim of Luzon Surety on
the ground that “whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death,
are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased
to be a guarantor.”
ISSUES: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the
decedent? Are contingent claims chargeable against the estate?
HELD: Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is
that “Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their
assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law.” While in our successional
system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent
cannot exceed the value of the inheritance they receive from him,
the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the
rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and
776 of the New Civil Code expressly so provide, thereby
confirming Article 1311.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled — “Under the
Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are
subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the
deceased (Article 661) and can not be regarded as third parties
with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party,
touching the estate of the deceased x x x which comes in to their
hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject to all
the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they
derive their rights.” The third exception to the transmissibility of
obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are
‘not transmissible by operation of law.’ The provision makes
reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or
obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal
support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts for a piece of work,
partnership and agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code
that regulate guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the
guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the
surety.
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being
rendered intransmissible due to the nature of the undertaking, nor
by stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law,
his eventual liability therefrom necessarily passed upon his death
to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims
provable against his estate. A contingent liability of a deceased
person is part and parcel of the mass of obligations that must be
paid if and when the contingent liability is converted into a real
liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation of the estate
must be deferred until such time as the bonded indebtedness is
paid.
Laura Alvarez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus Yanes, et
al.(grandchildren of the deadz sila) G.R. No. L-68053; May 7,
1990
FACTS: Aniceto Yanes owned 2 parcels of land Lot 773-A and Lot
773-B.
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and
Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and
Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other
private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of
Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Albib.
It is established that Rufino and his children left the province to
settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II.
According to Estelita, from the “Japanese time up to peace time”,
they did not visit the parcels of land in question but “after
liberation”, when her brother went there to get their share of the
sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santiago,
Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot
773.
After Fuentebella’s death, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella sold said
lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. On May 26, 1960, Teodora
Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino filed a complaint
against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez
and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return”
of the ownership and possession of Lots 773 and 823.
During the pendency of said case, Alvarez sold the Lots for
P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. CFI rendered judgment
ordering defendant Rosendo Alvarez to reconvey to plaintiffs the
lots.
ISSUE: W/N the liability of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale
of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B could be legally passed or
transmitted by operation of law to the petitioners without violation
of law and due process.
RULING: The doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction is on the
general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the
deceased to his legitimate children and heirs.
The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party
is not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money
debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate
before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The
reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is
ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount
of the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
“Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a party’s
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The rule is a consequence of the progressive
‘depersonalization’ of patrimonial rights and duties.
Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation
has evolved into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the
persons occupying only a representative position, barring those
rare cases where the obligation is strictly personal, in
consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no
other. . . .”
Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot
escape the legal consequences of their father’s transaction, which
gave rise to the present claim for damages.
Union Bank v. Santibanez, 452 SCRA 228 | Abu
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a loan
agreement in the amount of P128,000.00.
The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal
sum payable in five equal annual amortizations.
On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan
agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one
unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund executed a
promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the
later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.
Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City.
Edmund was appointed as the special administrator of the estate.
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,
Edmund and his sister Florence, executed a Joint Agreement,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and
(1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of
their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter
refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union Bank filed a
Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for
Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there
was no information on his address or the date of his return to the
Philippines. Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan
documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and
void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint
agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed
to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as provided in
Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing
of the joint agreement estopped Florence, and that she cannot deny
her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union
Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the deceased Efraim
Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She
asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her
and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or
third parties.
ISSUE: W/N the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with
the probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim
Santibañez was pending. W/N the agreement between Edmund and
Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate) was void
considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
W/N there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will
is probated.
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the
jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said court is
primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and
distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition
among the heirs until after the will has been probated. In the
present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the
proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in
favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all
the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he
may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject
tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors
among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by
Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves,
is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father’s
holographic will covering the said tractors.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The
bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should
have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the
probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for the purpose of
protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the
speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early
delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold
Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late father.
The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory
notes and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and
signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As
the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court,
at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent
under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
21. SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI
SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F. SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS
SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F.
SANTOS, Petitioners, vs. SPS. JOSE LUMBAO and
PROSERFINA LUMBAO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 169129 March 28, 2007 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:]
TOPIC: II. General Provisions
DOCTRINE: Whatever rights and obligations the decedent have
over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs.
FACTS:
1. Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all
surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs
of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20
October 1985. Petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas
Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
2. Respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter
lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought
from Rita during her lifetime.
3. Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject
property which is a part of her share in the estate of her
deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died
intestate.
a. It was evidence by documents entitled, “Bilihan
ng Lupa”
4. Respondents Lumbao later on took actual possession
thereof and built a house which they have been occupying
as exclusive owners up to the present.
5. Lumbaos made several demands from Rita and the heirs
for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the
issuance of a separate title in their favor.
a. Lumbaos alleged that prior to her death, Rita
informed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she
could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and
her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been
partitioned
6. Lumbaos alleged that the petitioners acted fraudulently
and are conspiring with another by executing a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement portioning among themselves the
properties of Maria, including the subject property.
7. Lumbaos then sent a formal demand to petitioners but the
latter refused to reconvey the subject property. So the
Lumbaos filed a Complaint for Reconveyance before RTC
of Pasig City.
8. Petitioners denied the alleged sale to Lumbaos and that
the Extrajudicial Settlement was duly published as
required by law.
9. Lumbaos then amended their complaint, discovering that
the petitioners executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
in favour of Julieta S. Esplana for P30,000.
10. The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the
Lumbaos to pay them P30,000 for expenses incurred.
11. The CA ruled in favor of the respondent spouses Lumbao.
12. Hence the petition:
a. Petitioners contend that they are not bound by
the “Bilihan ng Lupa” because it is null and void
for being falsified because of the following:
i. one of those documents made it appear
that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo
were witnesses to its execution and that
they appeared personally before the
notary public, when in truth and in fact
they did not.
ii. Identity of the properties were not
established by the evidence presented
iii. Respondents are estopped by laches
from claimining
iv. Claim on the properties had already
prescribed.
ISSUE: Are the petitioner heirs bound to the “Bilihan ng Lupa”
executed by the Rita, their mother, in favor of the respondent
spouses Lumbao?
HELD: Yes. Petition denied.
1. General Rule: heirs are bound by contracts entered into
by their predecessors-in-interest
2. whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over
the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of
succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
 obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs
3. In the present case the heirs cannot escape the obligation
of the deceased since they only inherited the property.
4. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and
their deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights
their mother had and what is valid and binding against
her is also valid and binding as against them.
5. Death of a party does not excuse non-performance of a
contract which involves a property right and the rights
and obligations thereunder pass to the personal
representatives of the deceased.
6. Heirs must reconvey to the respondent Lumbaos the
107sq. m. lot.
OTHER ISSUE: the documents “Bilihan ng Lupa” is presumed
valid being notarized, a public instrument, unless the contrary has
been proved. In the case, petitioners failed to prove the falsity of
the documents.
Borja v. Borja, 46 SCRA 577 | Ang
FACTS: Francisco de Borja filed a petition for probate of the will
of his wife who died, Josefa Tangco, with the CFI of Rizal.
He was appointed executor and administrator, until he died; his
son Jose became the sole administrator. Francisco had taken a 2nd
wife Tasiana before he died; she instituted testate proceedings with
the CFI of Nueva Ecija upon his death and was appointed special
administatrix.
Jose and Tasiana entered upon a compromise agreement, but
Tasiana opposed the approval of the compromise agreement.
She argues that it was no valid, because the heirs cannot enter into
such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco, and at the time the agreement was made, the will was
still being probated with the CFI of Nueva Ecija.
ISSUE: W/N the compromise agreement is valid, even if the will of
Francisco has not yet been probated.
HELD: YES, the compromise agreement is valid.
The agreement stipulated that Tasiana will receive P800,000 as
full payment for her hereditary share in the estate of Francisco and
Josefa.
There was here no attempt to settle or distribute the estate of
Francisco de Borja among the heirs thereto before the probate of
his will. The clear object of the contract was merely the conveyance
by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco de Borja and
Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any other claimant,
creditor or legatee.
And as a hereditary share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or
vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the
Philippines, Art. 777)there is no legal bar to a successor (with
requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate.
Bonilla v. Barcena, 71 SCRA 491 | Angliongto
FACTS: On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors
Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano
Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the CFI of Abra, to quiet title
over certain parcels of land located in Abra.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal
capacity to sue. In the hearing for the motion to dismiss, counsel
for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and
asked for substitution by her minor children and her husband; but
the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the
ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and
has no legal personality to sue.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI erred in dismissing the complaint.
HELD: While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in
court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up
to its completion.
The records of this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena
took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and therefore, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over her person.
Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court “whenever a party
to a pending case dies … it shall be the duty of his attorney to
inform the court promptly of such death … and to give the name
and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other
legal representatives.” This duty was complied with by the counsel
for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested before the respondent
Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for
the proper substitution of parties in the case.
The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the
substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground that a dead
person has no legal personality to sue.
This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides “that
the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent.”
From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become
the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their
rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law. The
moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire
a definite right to the inheritance whether such right be pure or
contingent. The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased
vests in them even before judicial declaration of their being heirs
in the testate or intestate proceedings.
When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died, her claim or right to the
parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not
extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her heirs upon
her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties
in litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is,
therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.
The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title
over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and
principally property and property rights and therefore is one that
survives even after her death.
It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be
substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did, upon being
informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter
was dead, was to dismiss the complaint.
This should not have been done for under Section 17, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the court, if the legal
representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased.
Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its
discretion in not complying with the clear provision of the Rules of
Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No.
856 and refusing the substitution of parties in the case.
Balus v. Balus
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are
the children of the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana
died on 6 September 1978. In 1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of
land as security for a loan obtained from a bank. When Rufo failed
to pay the loan, the property was foreclosed and was subsequently
sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose. The same was not redeemed within the period allowed by
law. Hence, a new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Rufo
died on 6 July 1984. On 10 October, 1989, petitioner and
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
adjudicating to each of the a specific one-third portion of the
subject property. Three years thereafter, respondents bought the
subject property from the Bank and a new title was issued in their
name. Meanwhile, petitioner continued possession of the subject
lot. The respondents thus filed a complaint for recovery of
possession. However, petitioner alleged that respondents’ act of
buying back the property without notifying him inures to his benefit
as co-owner and that he is entitled to a one-third share of the
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property forms part of the
estate of petitioner and respondents’ father
No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of
the estate of Rufo considering that ownership over the same was
transferred to the bank prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance
consists of existing property, as well as accrued property, and
transmissible rights and obligations at the time of death of the
decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost ownership over the subject property
during his lifetime, the same no longer forms part of his estate to
which his heirs may lay claim at the time of his death.
Consequently, his children never inherited the property. The Court
further ruled that petitioner and respondents are not co-owners of
the subject property and there is no property to partition, as the
disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.
Uson v. Del Rosario, 92:530| Andres
FACTS: This is an action for recovery of the ownership and
possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria
Uson against Maria del Rosario and her four illegit children.
Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his
death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino
Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his
common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of
said lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and
her husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to
separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson
was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right
to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon
his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death
of her husband.
2. W/N the illegit children of deceased and his common-law wife
have successional rights.
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of
Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case.
There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a
common-law wife with whom she had four illegitimate children
with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died
in 1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. With
this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in
1945 the five parcels of land he was seized of at the time passed
from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson (Art 777 NCC).
As this Court aptly said, “The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his
death”. From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her
right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and
leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be
the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
2. No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect
even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired.
Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands
in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late
husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor
of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be
asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over
the lands in dispute.
GO ONG VS. CA
G.R. No. 75884
September 24, 1987
FACTS: 2 parcels of land under 1 TCT are owned by alfredo and
when he died, his wife julita go ong was appointed administratrix
of his estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged 1 lot to Allied Banking
Corp. to secure a loan obtained by JK Exports, annotated as a lien
on the original TCT, with the following notation: “mortgagee’s
consent necessary in case of subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of the property…”
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from
Julita. Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for
lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to
secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it
was Julita who promised to secure the court’s approval.
Trial court ruled for Julita, stating that the contract is valid. CA
affirmed with modification the lower court’s decision
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED
OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER’S
ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF
JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
HELD: contract is valid
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial
approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The
CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not
applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal
capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case
where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for
instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for
the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal
and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove,
provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the CA cannot
be faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the
property under administration, by authority of the petitioner, is
valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial approval, with respect
to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights.
Petitioner cited cases arguing that in the settlement proceedings of
the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership
property of the marriage is under administration. While such may
be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the
whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily entered into by the
petitioner.. Under similar circumstances, this Court applied the
provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-
owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership
The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules
of Court cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private
respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal
partnership ended with her husband’s death, and her hereditary
rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art.
777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership
formed between her and the other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493,
Civil Code, supra.).
HEIRS OF REGANON vs. RUFINO IMPERIAL
FACTS: The Heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for
recovery of ownership and possession of about 1 hectare portion
of a parcel of land in Zamboanga Del Norte against Rufino
Imperial. Trial court rendered a decision declaring the heirs of
Reganon as lawful owners of the land and entitled to its peaceful
possession, ordering Imperial to immediately vacate the portion
occupied by him. The court sentenced him to pay. A writ of
execution was granted & the deputy provincial sheriff submitted a
sheriff’s return reporting the garnishment of a carabao and goat
of Imperial for P153.00 and attachment & sale of defendant’s land
for P500.00. (In short, ang properties ni Imperial were not enough
to satisfy the judgment). However, on March 13, 1964, PNB
deposited with PNB-Dipolog Branch the residuary estate of its
former ward, EULOGIO IMPERIAL (predecessor of defendant) in
the amount of P10,303.80. The heirs of Eulogio Imperial
(including the defendant) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition of the Residuary Estate wherein defendant was
apportioned with P1,471.97. When petitioners learned about this
development, they filed an ex parte motion for issuance of an alias
writ of execution and of an order directing the manager of PNB
Dipolog to hold the share of defendant and deliver the same to the
provincial sheriff to be applied to the satisfaction of the balance of
the money judgment. RTC granted the motion and the deputy
provincial sheriff notified the defendant of the garnishment of the
rights, interests, shares and participation that defendant may have
over the residuary estate of the late Eulogio Imperial consisting of
the money deposited in PNB Dipolog. Defendants argue that the
property of an incompetent under guardianship is in custodia legis
and therefore cannot be attached.
ISSUE: Was there transmission of rights from the death the ward,
Eulogio Imperial in favor of his heirs?
YES. When Eulogio Imperial died on Sept. 13, 1962, the rights to
his succession from the moment of his death were transmitted to
his heirs and one of whom is his son Rufino. For, the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death,
and where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is
not burdened with any debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by
force of law, to the dominion, ownership, and possession of the
properties of his predecessor and consequently stands legally in
the shoes of the latter. That the INTEREST OF AN HEIR IN THE
ESTATE of a deceased person MAY BE ATTACHED for purposes
of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before
courts, is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. The heirs of
Eulogio Imperial, including defendant, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition which suffices to settle the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the estate for all practical purposes have
been settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the residuary
estate from the bank and divide it among themselves. The residuary
estate of Eulogio Imperial is NOT EXEMPT from execution.
Blas vs Santos
Facts: Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz
with whom he had three children. He also had grandchildren from
his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899,
Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the
properties he and his former wife acquired during the first
marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his
properties in favor of Maxima the other half for payment of debts,
Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of this,
Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she
understands the will of her husband; that she promises that she’ll
be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties she’ll be
acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his
husband; that she can select or choose any of them depending upon
the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said
legatees/heirs/devisees.
In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina
Santos became administratrix of her estate. In the same year,
Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage,
together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of
Simeon Blas), learned that Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it
was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-tenth of the
properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.
The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon
Blas’ property precisely because Maxima promised that they’ll be
receiving properties upon her death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based
on the promise of Maxima.
HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death.
Though it is not a will (it lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is
still enforceable because said promise was actually executed to
avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas’ estate) hence it is a
compromise.
It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance
of Simeon Blas for the reason that the conjugal properties of his
first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the
conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties
are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the
husband.
Nufable vs. Nufable
Facts: Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land located at
Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948 square
meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived
by his children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and
Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by
said heirs and after due publication and hearing, the then Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued an Order
dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable. However, one
of the heirs, Angel actually mortgaged the entire property to DBP
two months prior to the settlement which property was eventually
foreclosed. Thereafter, Nelson, son of the mortgagors, purchased
said property from DBP. The other heirs now filed for the
annulment of sale in favor of Nelson. The Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed decision granting one-fourth of the property
to Nelson and the other three-fourths to the other heirs. Petitioners
filed this present petition contending that the probate of the Last
Will and Testament of Edras Nufable did not determine the
ownership of the land in question as against third parties.
Issue: Whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras
Nufable and its subsequent probate are pertinent and material to
the question of the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable
who purchased the land in question from, and as acquired property
of, the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Ruling: No, the Last Will and Testament of Edras and its
subsequent probate do not affect the title of Nelson. At the time
when the entire property was mortgaged, the other heirs of Edras
had already acquired successional rights over the said property.
This is so because the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose
of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will
and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted or that the
Settlement of Estate was approved. It is to be noted that the
probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the
subject property in stating that "the land situated in the Poblacion,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this
must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow
anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein."
It was therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property
should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed
twenty (20) years pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code. Thus,
when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject
property to DBP on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage
the entire property. Angel's right over the subject property was
limited only to 1/4 pro indivisoshare. As co-owner of the subject
property, Angel's right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that
portion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-
ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only
alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. Hence,
The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio
Nufable "had no right to mortgage the subject property in its
entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only to
1/4 pro indiviso share of the property in question."
Austria v. Reyes
31 SCRA 754
FACTS: Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the CFI of Rizal a
petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament.
The probate was opposed by the present petitioners, who are
nephews and nieces of Basilia. The will was subsequently allowed
with the bulk of her estate designated for respondents, all of whom
were Basilia’s legally adopted children. The petitioners, claiming
to be the nearest of kin of Basilia, assert that the respondents had
not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law,
thereby making them mere strangers to the decedent and without
any right to succeed as heirs. Petitioners argue that this
circumstance should have left the whole estate of Basilia open to
intestacy with petitioners being the compulsory heirs.
It is alleged by petitioners that the language used imply that Basilia
was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath
one-half of her entire estate to the respondents as the latter’s
legitime, with the inference that respondents would not have
instituted the respondents as heirs had the fact of spurious
adoption been known to her. The petitioners inferred that from the
use of the terms, “sapilitang tagapagmana” (compulsory heirs)
and “sapilitang mana” (legitime), the impelling reason or cause
for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix’s belief that
under the law she could not do otherwise. Thus Article 850 of
the Civil Code applies whereby, “the statement of a false cause for
the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless
it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”
ISSUE: W/N the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion
in barring the petitioners nephews and niece
from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the
decedent in her will.
HELD: No. Before the institution of heirs may be annulled
under article 850 of the CivilCode, the following requisites must
concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated
in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third,
it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.
The decedent’s will does not state in a specific or unequivocal
manner the cause for such institution of heirs. Absent such we look
at other considerations. The decedent’s disposition of the free
portion of her estate, which largely favored the respondents,
compared with the relatively small devise of land which the
decedent left for her blood relatives, shows a perceptible
inclination on her part to give the respondents more than what she
thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Excluding the
respondents from the inheritance, considering that petitioner
nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by
virtue of intestacy, would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially
where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate, as was done in this case.
Intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator should
be allowed to prevail. Granted that a probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the decedent possessed testamentary capacity
and her last will was executed free from falsification, fraud,
trickery or undue influence, it follows that giving full expression to
her will must be in order.
BALANAY vs. MARTINEZ
FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died and was survived by Felix
Balanay Sr. and their 6 children. Felix Balanay Jr, one of the 6
children, filed a petition for the probate of their mother’s notarial
will. Their mother’s will declared that:
a. She owned the “southern half” of the conjugal lots.
b. Her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands be
divided and distributed in the manner set forth in the
will.
Avelina Antonio and Felix Balanay Sr. opposed Balanay Jr’s
petition, but an affidavit was filed where Felix Balanay Sr.
withdrew his opposition and renounced his hereditary rights over
the estate of his wife. Avelina contended that the affidavit of
renunciation was void. A new lawyer, Atty. Montana, appeared in
behalf of Felix Balanay Jr, withdrawing the petition for probate of
will and requesting for an intestate proceeding instead. Such was
granted by the probate court. Felix Balanay Jr. with a new lawyer
filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that Atty.
Montana had no authority to withdraw the petition. The probate
court denied the motion and the will was declared void because of
the disposition where the mother declared that she owned the
“southern half” of the properties. The disposition was declared
illegal because she cannot declare ownership over the undivided
conjugal properties, as her right as a co-owner was inchoate and
pro-indiviso. The court then ordered for intestate proceedings to
commence instead of testate.
ISSUE: WON mixed succession may occur in this case? YES
HELD: For mixed succession to occur, the invalid disposition
must be separable from the valid dispositions. The invalid
disposition must not be a condition to the valid disposition. The
probate court acted correctly in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the will before establishing its formal validity. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be
passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issues. But the probate court erred in declaring that the will was
void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding.The rule is that the invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other disposition, unless it is presumed that the testator would
not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition
had not been made. Hence, if there are certain dispositions in a
will that are not valid, it will not render the whole will invalid. The
will remains valid, and the valid dispositions should be followed.
The rule is testacy is favored over intestacy. The policy of the State
is to give effect to the wishes of the testator as much as possible.
The illegal disposition of Leodegaria declaring that she owned the
“southern half” of the properties can be rendered invalid, but the
entire will is not nullified. Where some of the provisions of a will
are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they
can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention
of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme,
or doing injustice to the beneficiaries. The statement of the testatrix
that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary
to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share
was inchoate and pro-indiviso. But That illegal declaration does
not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded. Hence, testacy
should be favored over intestacy. The valid dispositions of
Leodegaria in her will should be followed, while the invalid ones
shall be effected by operation of law. (mixed succession)
Fernandez/Reyes vs Dimagiba
G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662 October 12, 1967
Facts: On October 22, 1930, Ismaela Dimagiba submitted a
petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta
de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of
the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in
due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and
one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent,
filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the
opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel
by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds
of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the
testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944. After trial, it
was found that the will was genuine and properly executed.
Oppositors Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration,
and/or new trial, insisting that the issues of estoppel and
revocation be considered and resolved which was latter overruled.
On February 27, 1962, after receiving further evidence on the issue
whether the execution by the testatrix of deeds of sale of the larger
portion of her estate in favor of the testamentary heir, made in 1943
and 1944, subsequent to the execution of her 1930 testament, had
revoked the latter under Article 957(2) of the 1950 Civil Code (Art.
869 of the Civil Code of 1889), the trial Court resolved against the
oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
"unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." Whereupon, the
oppositors elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had
been impliedly revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in
favor of the proponent on March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944.
Held: No, the alleged revocation implied from the execution of the
deeds of conveyance in favor of the testamentary heir is plainly
irrelevant to and separate from the question of whether the
testament was duly executed. For one, if the will is not entitled to
probate, or its probate is denied, all questions of revocation
become superfluous in law, there is no such will and hence there
would be nothing to revoke. Then, again, the revocation invoked
by the oppositors-appellants is not an express one, but merely
implied from subsequent acts of the testatrix allegedly evidencing
an abandonment of the original intention to bequeath or devise the
properties concerned. As such, the revocation would not affect the
will itself, but merely the particular devise or legacy. Only
the total and absolute revocation can preclude probate of the
revoked testament
Nazareno v. CA
Facts: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband
and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died
on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad,
Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and
Maximino, Jr. are petitioners in this case, while the estate of
Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the
respondents. After the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an
intestate case and was appointed administrator of his father's
estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo
discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale
conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister,
Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which
were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea,
to Natividad on January 29, 1970. By virtue of these deeds, TCTs
were issued to Natividad for lots 3-B, 3, 10, 11, 13 & 14. Unknown
to Romeo, Natividad sold Lot 3-B, w/c had been occupied by
Romeo, his wife, & Maximino, Jr., to Maximino, Jr. Romeo filed
the present case for annulment of sale w/ damages against
Natividad & Maximino Jr. on the ground that both sales were void
for lack of consideration. Romeo presented the Deed of Partition
& Distribution executed by Maximino Sr. & Aurea in 1962 & duly
signed by all of their children, except Jose, who was then abroad.
However, this deed was not carried out. In 1969, their parents
instead offered to sell to them the lots. He testified that, although
the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that
the sale was for a consideration, they never really paid any amount
for the supposed sale. The transfer was made in this manner in
order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Allegedly, it was
only Natividad who bought the lots in question because she was the
only one financially able to do so. The trial court rendered a
decision declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29,
1970, except as to Lots 3, 3-B, 13 and 14 which had passed on to
third persons. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision of
the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the
name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino
Nazareno, Jr.), as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and
ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno, Sr. Hence,
the present petition.
Issue:
1) Whether the restoration of the titles to the lots in question
to the estate of Maximino Sr. was proper
2) Whether it was the intention of Maximino, Sr. to give the
subject lots to Natividad
Held:
1) Yes. The Nazareno spouses transferred their properties
to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the
payment of inheritance taxes. Facts & circumstances
indicate badges of a simulated sale w/c make the Jan 29,
1970 sale void & of no effect. Natividad never acquired
ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in
her favor is also void for being w/o consideration.
2) Yes. It cannot be denied that Maximino, Sr. intended to
give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. As Romeo
testified, their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor
of Natividad because the latter was the only "female and
the only unmarried member of the family." She was thus
entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings.
As she herself admitted, she intended to convey Lots 10
and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from
abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her
favor. Art. 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an
implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it
appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the
donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial
interest or only a part thereof. There being an implied
trust, the lots in question are therefore subject to collation
in accordance with Art. 1061 which states:
Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order
that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each
heir, and in the account of the partition. As held by the trial court,
the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing, Corp. will have
to be upheld for it is an innocent purchaser for value which relied
on the title of Natividad. (calo)
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA vs. HEIRS OF LIBERATO
M. URETA
Facts: Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He has
14 children. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari
store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling
of copra. In order to reduce inheritance tax Alfonso made it appear
that he sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso
executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in
favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law
wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October
25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which
are the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only
made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was
given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and
their produce. On April 19, 1989, Alfonso's heirs executed a Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were
covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed
by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son,
representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. After their father's
death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name
covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained
a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso
in favor of Policronio. Believing that the six parcels of land
belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to
amicably settle the matter with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts
proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of
Documents, Partition, and Damages against the Heirs of Alfonso
before the RTC on November 17, 1995
Issue: Whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; 2. Whether or
not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid
Ruling: The Deed of Sale was void because it is simulated as the
parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced
no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the
parties. It is only made to avoid tax purposes. The CA also noted
that Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even
after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was undisputed that he
remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed
their produce until his death.
Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed
of Sale: (1) that there was sufficient consideration for the contract;
and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private
transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie
the transaction's validity, except that it must yield to the evidence
adduced.
2) It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is
not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in
change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to
the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or
right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir
who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a
designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each
heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be
considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of
attorney is not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs
is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to
partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved
considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property
resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and
segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.
Natividad vs Natividad
Facts: Sps Leandro and Juliana Natividad alleged that sometime
in 1974, Sergio Natividad (Sergio), husband of respondent Juana
Mauricio-Natividad (Juana) and father of respondent Jean
Natividad-Cruz (Jean), obtained a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, Sergio
mortgaged two parcels of land, one of which is co-owned and
registered in his name and that of his siblings namely, Leandro,
Domingo and Adoracion. This property is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 5980. Sergio's siblings executed a
Special Power of Attorney authorizing him to mortgage the said
property. The other mortgaged parcel of land, covered by OCT No.
10271, was registered in the name of Sergio and Juana.
Subsequently, Sergio died without being able to pay his obligations
with DBP. Since the loan was nearing its maturity and the
mortgaged properties were in danger of being foreclosed, Leandro
paid Sergio's loan obligations. Considering that respondents were
unable to reimburse Leandro for the advances he made in Sergio's
favor, respondents agreed that Sergio's share in the lot which he
co-owned with his siblings and the other parcel of land in the name
of Sergio and Juana, shall be assigned in favor of Leandro and
Juliana. Leandro's and Sergio's brother, Domingo, was tasked to
facilitate the transfer of ownership of the subject properties in
favor of Leandro and Juliana. However, Domingo died without
being able to cause such transfer. Subsequently, despite demands
and several follow-ups made by petitioners, respondents failed and
refused to honor their undertaking.
Respondents filed their Answer denying the allegations in the
complaint and raising that: (1) respondents are not parties to the
contract between Sergio and DBP; (2) there is neither verbal nor
written agreement between petitioners and respondents that the
latter shall reimburse whatever payment was made by the former
or their predecessor-in-interest; (3) Jean was only a minor during
the execution of the alleged agreement and is not a party thereto;
(4) that whatever liability or obligation of respondents is already
barred by prescription, laches and estoppel; (5) that the complaint
states no cause of action as respondents are not duty-bound to
reimburse whatever alleged payments were made by petitioners;
and (6) there is no contract between the parties to the effect that
respondents are under obligation to transfer ownership in
petitioners' favor as reimbursement for the alleged payments made
by petitioners to DBP.
During pendency' of the trial, Leandro died and was substituted by
his heirs, herein petitioners. RTC in favor of petitioners. Filed an
appeal with the CA. Appeal was partly granted in that sps
Natividad are ordered instead to reimburse plaintiffs-appellees
Juliana Natividad and the heirs of the late Leandro Natividad the
amount of P162,514.88 representing the amount of the loan
obligation paid to the Development Bank of the Philippines, plus
legal interest of 12% per annum computed from June 23, 2001 until
finality of the judgment, the total amount of which shall be to the
extent only of defendants-appellants' successional rights in the
mortgaged properties and Juana1 s conjugal share in [the]
property covered by OCT No. 10271.
Issue: Whether there was a verbal agreement in the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement among heirs to the effect that the subject
properties shall be transferred in the name of Leandro as
reimbursement for his payment of Sergio's loan obligations with
the DBP
Ruling: There is nothing in the said document which would
indicate that respondents agreed to the effect that the subject
properties shall be transferred in the name of Leandro as
reimbursement for his payment of Sergio's loan obligations with
the DBP. On the contrary, the second to the last paragraph of the
said Settlement clearly shows that herein respondents, as heirs of
Sergio, have divided the subject properties exclusively among
themselves. Neither can respondents evade liability by arguing that
they were not parties to the contract between Sergio and the DBP.
As earlier stated, the fact remains that, in the Extrajudicial
Settlement Among Heirs, respondents clearly acknowledged
Sergio's loan obligations with the DBP. Being Sergio's heirs, they
succeed not only to the rights of Sergio but also to his obligations.
The following provisions of the Civil Code are clear on this matter,
to wit:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the
property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others either by will or by operation of law.
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.
Art. 781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property
and the transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
his death, but also those which have accrued thereto since the
opening of the succession.
In the present case, respondents, being heirs of Sergio, are now
liable to settle his transmissible obligations, which include the
amount due to petitioners, prior to the distribution of the remainder
of Sergio's estate to them, in accordance with Section I,10 Rule 90
of the Rules of Court.
Puno vs Puno - Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not
automatically become stockholders of the corporation; neither are
they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a
stockholder.
Facts: Carlos L. Puno, who died on June 25, 1963, was an
incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14,
2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of
Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance
against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the
deceased with the latter’s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As
surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges
of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus
prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate
book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into
from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends,
or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner
did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth
certificate names him as “Joselito Musni Muno.” Apropos, there
was yet a need for a judicial declaration that “Joselito Musni
Puno” and “Joselito Musni Muno” were one and the same. The
court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance,
ratiocinating that petitioner’s certificate of live birth was no proof
of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner
submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name “Joselito
M. Puno,” certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila,
and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of
the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth
certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file
its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for
pretrial. The court rendered a decision ordering the plaintiff to
inspect the corporate books and records of the company from 1962
up to the present including the financial statements of the
corporation. CA ordered the dismissal as petitioner was not able
to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L.Puno since
his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and
the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L.
Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to
demand that he be allowed to examine respondent’s books.
Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but
was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an
incorporator of the corporation. MR denied.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to inspect the corporate
books of herein defendant corporation?
Ruling: Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect
respondent corporation’s books and receive dividends on the
stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner anchors his claim on
his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree
with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove
satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the
former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an
illegitimate child on the information of a third person. As correctly
observed by the CA, only petitioner’s mother supplied the data in
the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence
that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son.
In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code
enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of
corporate books, thus —
Sec. 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent. — The records of
all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any
meeting shall be open to the inspection of any director, trustee,
stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on
business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of
excerpts from said records or minutes, at his expense.
Sec. 75. Right to financial statements. — Within ten (10) days from
receipt of a written request of any stockholder or member, the
corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement,
which shall include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable
year and a profit or loss of statement for said taxable year, showing
in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its
operations.
The stockholder’s right of inspection of the corporation’s books
and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the
corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a
shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about
corporate affairs. Such right rests upon the stockholder’s
underlying ownership of the corporation’s assets and property.
Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive
dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the
ownership of the shares.
Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically
become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and
privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The
stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings,
and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the
corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Code provides that no
transfer shall be valid, except as between the parties, until the
transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such
interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the
stocks, the executor or administrator duly appointed by the court
being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and
division of the estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held
by the administrator or executor. Consequently, during such time,
it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the
rights of the deceased as stockholder. Thus, even if petitioner
presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the
son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect
respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividends from
respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book that some of
the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This
would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir
and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
Oscar Reyes vs RTC of Makati, Zenith Insurance Corp and
Rodrigo Reyes
Facts: Oscar and private respondent are two of the four children
of Pedro and Anastacia Reyes. All four own shares of stocks on
Zenith Insurance Corporation, a company that the family
established. Pedro died in 1973 and his estate has been judicially
partitioned among his heirs. When Anastacia died, there appears
to be no similar partition done with her estate including her shares
in Zenith. On May 2009 Rodrigo filed a derivative suite against
Oscar with the SEC for an accounting of the share of stocks which
he alleged was acquired by Oscar aribitrarily and fraudulently.
Oscar moved to have the complaint dismissed as a form of
harassment and not in accordance with the Interim Rules for Intra-
corporate controversies. The RTC of Makati in its designation as
a commercial court denied Rodrigo's motion ruling that it is a valid
derivative suit. Oscar went to to the CA but the CA approved the
RTC ruling. Now Oscar went to the SC for a petition for review on
certiorari under rule 45.
Issue: WON it is a valid derivative suit
Held:
The following are the requirements for a valid derivative
suit:
a. the party bringing suit should be a shareholder during
the time of the act or transaction complained of, the number of
shares not being material;
b. the party has tried to exhaust intra-corporate remedies, i.e., has
made a demand on the board of directors for the appropriate relief,
but the latter has failed or refused to heed his plea; and
c. the cause of action actually devolves on the corporation; the
wrongdoing or harm having been or being caused to the
corporation and not to the particular stockholder bringing the suit.
Based on these standards, we hold that the allegations of the
present complaint do not amount to a derivative suit.
First, as already discussed above, Rodrigo is not a shareholder
with respect to the shareholdings originally belonging to
Anastacia; he only stands as a transferee-heir whose rights to the
share are inchoate and unrecorded. With respect to his own
individually-held shareholdings, Rodrigo has not alleged any
individual cause or basis as a shareholder on record to proceed
against Oscar.
Second, in order that a stockholder may show a right to sue on
behalf of the corporation, he must allege with some particularity
in his complaint that he has exhausted his remedies within the
corporation by making a sufficient demand upon the directors or
other officers for appropriate relief with the expressed intent to sue
if relief is denied.35 Paragraph 8 of the complaint hardly satisfies
this requirement since what the rule contemplates is the exhaustion
of remedies within the corporate setting:
8. As members of the same family, complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes
has resorted [to] and exhausted all legal means of resolving the
dispute with the end view of amicably settling the case, but the
dispute between them ensued.
Lastly, we find no injury, actual or threatened, alleged to have been
done to the corporation due to Oscar’s acts. If indeed he illegally
and fraudulently transferred Anastacia’s shares in his own name,
then the damage is not to the corporation but to his co-heirs; the
wrongful transfer did not affect the capital stock or the assets of
Zenith. As already mentioned, neither has Rodrigo alleged any
particular cause or wrongdoing against the corporation that he
can champion in his capacity as a shareholder on record.
Heirs of Spouses Sandejas Sr. vs. Lina
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to
probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the
seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their
consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court
has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the
estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the
conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still
alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said
provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right
to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue
such course of action before the probate court inures to any person
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be
entitled to the avails of the suit.
Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of
the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the nonfulfillment of
the suspensive condition — court approval of the sale — as
contained in the “Receipt of Earnest Money with Promise
to Sell and to Buy” (also referred to as the “Receipt”). Instead,
they assert that because this condition had not been satisfied, their
obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted
into a money claim.
We disagree. Petitioners admit that the agreement between the
deceased Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was a contract to
sell. Not exactly. In a contract to sell, the payment of the purchase
price is a positive suspensive condition. The vendor’s obligation
to convey the title does not become effective in case of failure to
pay.
On the other hand, the agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and
respondent is subject to a suspensivecondition — the procurement
of a court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of
ownership in the agreement. In accordance with paragraph 1 of
the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots
over to respondent. This they could do upon the court’s approval,
even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a conditional
sale, rather than a contract to sell as determined by the CA.
When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth
or effectivity can take place only if and when the condition happens
or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court’s grant of the Motion for
Approval of the sale filed by respondent resulted in petitioners’
obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his
favor. The condition having been satisfied, the contract was
perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they
had expressly agreed upon.
The CA computed Eliodoro’s share as an heir based on one tenth
of the entire disputed property. It should be based only on the
remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share. Succession
laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved
by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent’s entire estate
– under the concept of conjugal properties of gains — must be
divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the
other half to the heirs of the deceased. After the settlement of the
debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then
distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices.
Santos vs LUMBAO
FACTS: Petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all
surnamed Santos, are the legitimate and surviving heirs of the late
Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October 1985. Petitioners
Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of
Rita. Respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao
are the alleged owners of the 107-square meter lot (subject
property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her
lifetime. On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold
to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property which is a
part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc
(Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. The first
occasion: Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her
mother’s estate through a document denominated as "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. Respondents Spouses Lumbao
claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by
Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected
thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive
owners up to the present. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged
that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent Proserfina
Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property
because the entire property inherited by her and her co-heirs from
Maria had not yet been partitioned.
Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among
themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which
included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao Spouses Lumbao sent a formal demand letter to
petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners
still failed and refused to reconvey the subject property to the
respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter filed a
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages. The trial court denied
the petition

ISSUE: Whether herein petitioners are legally bound to comply
with the "Bilihan ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January
1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein
respondents spouses Lumbao? YES
HELD: At time of the execution of the documents denominated as
"Bilihan ng Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother
of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her co-heirs. The exact
metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents
Spouses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. It
does not make the contract of sale between Rita and respondents
Spouses Lumbao invalid while an estate remains undivided, co-
owners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or
undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
them
o The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the
selling co-owner.
o Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
When the estate left by Maria had been partitioned, the 107- square
meter lot sold by the mother of the petitioners to respondents
Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited
by them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this
case measures 467 square meters. The 107-square meter lot
already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer be
inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part
of their inheritance as it was already sold during the lifetime of
their mother.
The "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9
January 1981, being valid and enforceable, herein petitioners are
bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such documents
are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto. The
general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their
predecessors-in-interest applies in the present case. Article 1311
of the NCC is the basis of this rule: whatever rights and obligations
the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs
by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and
obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the
inheritance of the heirs. The heirs cannot escape the legal
consequence of a transaction entered into by their predecessor-in-
interest because they have inherited the property subject to the
liability affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is
privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They
only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and
binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The
death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract
which involves a property right and the rights and obligations
thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased.
Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party
when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter
of the contract. Despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they
are still bound to comply with the provisions of the "Bilihan ng
Lupa". They must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao
the 107- square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners’
mother. Petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses for having been compelled
to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest.
TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION
A. Definition
Art. 779. Testamentary succession is that which
results from the designation of an heir, made in a will
executed in the form prescribed by law.
B. Wills vs Succession
Wills – Art. 783. A will is an act whereby a person is
permitted, with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate,
to take effect after his death.
Succession – Art. 774. Succession is a mode of
acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance
of a person are transmitted through his death to another
or others either by his will or by operation of law.
C. Characteristics of a Will
1. Purely statutory – granted only by civil
law.
2. Purely personal – (Articles 784-787)
Non delegable; personal participation of
the testator is required
3. Free and intelligent – without fraud,
violence, deceit, duress or intimidation.
No vitiated consent.
4. Disposes of property – if it does not, it
will be useless. It can be probated but a
useless expense. Only valid as to form.
5. Revocable and ambulatory – not fixed.
Can be taken aback while the testator is
alive. It only becomes irrevocable upon
death of the testator.
6. Formal or solemn – if the form is
defective, it cannot be cured, thus void.
7. Executed with testamentary capacity –
there must be a testamentary capacity of
the testator.
8. Executed with animus testandi – there
must be an intent to dispose mortis
cause the property of the testator. There
must be real intent to make a will or a
disposition to take effect upon death.
Intent must appear from the words of the
will.
9. Unilateral – does not involve an
exchange of values or depend on
simultaneous offer and acceptance.
10. Mortis Causa – takes effect upon the
person’s death. (Art. 777)
11. Individual – one person. Joint wills are
prohibited under Art. 818
D. Construction and Interpretation
Art. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of
different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be
operative shall be preferred.
Art. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or
when no person or property exactly answers the
description, mistakes and omissions must be
corrected, if the error appears from the context of the
will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the oral
declarations of the testator as to his intention; and
when an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will,
as to the application of any of its provisions, the
testator's intention is to be ascertained from the
words of the will, taking into consideration the
circumstances under which it was made, excluding
such oral declarations.
Art. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their
ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be
gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates
 a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that the will was drawn solely by the
testator, and that he was unacquainted with such
technical sense.
Art. 792. The invalidity of one of several
dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be
presumed that the testator would not have made such
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had
not been made.
E. Law Governing Extrinsic Validity
a. As to time of execution (Art. 795)
Art. 795. The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made.
1. Formal Validity
a. Time criterion.-- law at the time of execution;
subsequent laws cannot apply retroactively.
b. Place criterion.-- Under Art 815-817, five (5)
choices are available to the testator:
1. Citizenship
2. Residence
3. Domicile
4. Execution
5. Philippines
2. Intrinsic Validity
a. Time.-- time of death bec. of Art. 777

b. Place.-- Law of citizenship of decedent.
b. As to place of execution (Art. 810, 815-819,
17)
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will
which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he
is authorized to make a will in any of the forms
established by the law of the country in which he
may be. Such will may be probated in the
Philippines.
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces
effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities
prescribed by the law of the place in which he
resides, or according to the formalities observed in
his country, or in conformity with those which this
Code prescribes.
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen
or subject of another country, which is executed in
accordance with the law of the country of which he
is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved
and allowed by the law of his own country, shall
have the same effect as if executed according to the
laws of the Philippines.
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will
jointly, or in the same instrument, either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article,
executed by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be
valid in the Philippines, even though authorized by the
laws of the country where they may have been executed.
F. Law Governing Intrinsic Validity
a. As to time (Art. 2263)
Art. 2263. Rights to the inheritance of a person who
died, with or without a will, before the effectivity of
this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of
 1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of
Court. The inheritance of those who, with or without
a will, die after the beginning of the effectivity of
this Code, shall be adjudicated and distributed in
accordance with this new body of laws and by the
Rules of Court; but the testamentary provisions shall
be carried out insofar as they may be permitted by
this Code. Therefore, legitimes, betterments,
legacies and bequests shall be respected; however,
their amount shall be reduced if in no other manner
can every compulsory heir be given his full share
according to this Code.
b. Place of Execution (art. 16)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found.
G. Capacity to make a Will
a. Requisites (Art. 796-803)
Art. 796. All persons who are not expressly
prohibited by law may make a will.
General rule: All persons have the testamentary
capacity to make a will.
Exception: Incapacity, when expressly prohibited by
law:
(1) disqualified by reason of age (Art.
797);
(2) disqualified by reason of mental
incompetence. (Art. 798.)
Art. 797. Persons of either sex under eighteen years
of age cannot make a will.
Art. 798. In order to make a will it is essential that
the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary
that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the
time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his
bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of
sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his disposition is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will;
but if the testator, one month, or less, before making
his will was publicly known to be insane, the person
who maintains the validity of the will must prove
that the testator made it during a lucid interval.
Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate
an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity.
Art. 802. A married woman may make a will without
the consent of her husband, and without authority of
the court.
Art. 803. A married woman may dispose by will of
all her separate property as well as her share of the
conjugal partnership or absolute community
property.
b. Supervening incapacity

Art. 801. Supervening incapacity does not invalidate
an effective will, nor is the will of an incapable
validated by the supervening of capacity.
This article makes explicit what was mentioned in
Art. 800. The requirement is that sanity should exist
only at the time of execution. Subsequent insanity
does not affect the validity of the will nor an invalid
will be validated by the recovery of the senses of the
testator.
by some other person in his presence and under his express
direction at the end thereof, at the presence of witnesses;
B. Attestation- Attested to and
subscribed by at least 3 credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another;
c. Signature on every page- Each
and every Page must be signed by the testator or by the person
requested by him to write his name, and by instrumental witnesses
in the presence of each other, on the left margin;
d. Pagination- Each and every page
of the will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page;
e. Attestation Clause- Must
contain an Attestation clause, stating the following:

1. The number of pages of the

will,
H. Form of Wills
1. Kinds of Will
2 testator signed the will and
Art. 804. Every will must be in
writing and executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. every page in the presence of witnesses, or caused some other
Art. 810. A person may execute a
holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed person to write his name under his express direction,
by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be 3. All witnesses signed the will and
witnessed. every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
2. Formal requisites of Notarial will
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be another;
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the
testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and D. Acknowledgement- Must be
by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one acknowledged before a Notary public.
another.
3 REQUIREMENTS FOR
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and HANDICAPPED TESTATOR
the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid,
each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and Art. 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally
all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two
the upper part of each page. persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable
manner, the contents thereof. (n)
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the
will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and Art. 808. If the testator is blind, the will shall be read to him twice;
every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, once, by one of the subscribing witnesses, and again, by the notary
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental public before whom the will is acknowledged.
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
4 WITNESSES TO THE
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, WILLS
it shall be interpreted to them.
a. QUALIFICATIONS art. 820
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public 1. Of sound mind
by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be 2. AT least 18 yrs of age
required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the Office 3. able to read and write
of the Clerk of Court. 4. Not blind, deaf or dumb

a. Singing by the Testator- 5. Not have been convicted by

Subscribed by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written final judgment of falsification of document, perjury or false
testimony.
 6. Domicile in the Philippines
– his habitual residence must be in the Philippines. (NCC
art. 50)
Note: While a blind or deaf may not be a witness, he could be a
testator in notarial will.
B. Time of Determining Qualifications
The presence of of the
qualification of witnesses is determined at the time of
attestation of the will. If the witness attesting the execution of
the will are competent at the time of attesting, their becoming
subsequently incompetent shall not prevent the allowance of
the will.
C. Devisees and legatees as Witnesses
Art. 823. If a person attests the execution of a will, to whom or to
whose spouse, or parent, or child, a devise or legacy is given by
such will, such devise or legacy shall, so far only as concerns such
person, or spouse, or parent, or child of such person, or any one
claiming under such person or spouse, or parent, or child, be void,
unless there are three other competent witnesses to such will.
However, such person so attesting shall be admitted as a witness as
if such devise or legacy had not been made or given.
D. Creditors as Witnesses
Art. 824. A mere charge on the estate of the testator for the
payment of debts due at the time of the testator's death does not
prevent his creditors from being competent witnesses to his will.
5 FORMAL REQUIREMENTS OF HOLGRAPHIC WILLS
a. General requirements
Art. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be
entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator
himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out
of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Art. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary
that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature
of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are
in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least
three of such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any competent witness referred to in the
preceding paragraph, and if the court deem it necessary, expert
testimony may be resorted to. (619a)
Art. 812. In holographic wills, the dispositions of the testator
written below his signature must be dated and signed by him in
order to make them valid as testamentary dispositions. (n)
Art. 813. When a number of dispositions appearing in a
holographic will are signed without being dated, and the last
disposition has a signature and a date, such date validates the
dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior
dispositions.
Specific Requirements ( hindi ko ako sure kung ito nga)
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or
alteration in a holographic will, the testator must authenticate
the same by his full signature. (n)
Art. 815. When a Filipino is in a foreign country, he is
authorized to make a will in any of the forms established by the
law of the country in which he may be. Such will may be
probated in the Philippines. (n)
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in
the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the
law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes. (n)
Art. 817. A will made in the Philippines by a citizen or subject
of another country, which is executed in accordance with the
law of the country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which
might be proved and allowed by the law of his own country,
shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws
of the Philippines. (n)
Art. 818. Two or more persons cannot make a will jointly, or
in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal benefit or
for the benefit of a third person. (669)
Art. 819. Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed
by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country
where they may have been executed. (733a)
6. Substantial Compliance Rule
Art. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or
undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and
imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will
was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all
the requirements of Article 805
7. Probate
A. Concept Probate is a special proceeding
mandatorily required for the purposed of establishing the will.
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court
having jurisdiction for the allowance of his will. In such case, the
pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills
after the testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court
as may be necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the
testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either
during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.
B. Needs for Probate
It is essential because under the law no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved
And allowed in accordance with the rules of Court. Even only one
heir is instituted , there must still be judicial order of adjudication
– Thus, in probate proceeding , the court
1. Orders the probate proper of the will
2. Grants testamentary letters or letter will be annexed
3. Hears and proves claims against estate
4. Orders the payments of lawful death
5. Authorize the sale, mortgage or any other
encumbrance or a real estate
6. And directs the delivery of the estate properties to
those who are entitled thereto. – book of Paras
C. Modes of GUYS MAY KULANG AKO DITO
LETTER C AND D
Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition
the court having jurisdiction for the allowance of his
will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testator's a death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional
Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance
of wills on petition of the testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the
will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.
E. effects of allowance/disallowances
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the
following cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the
influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence, on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that
the instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing
his signature thereto.
I. INTERPRETATION
ART. 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of different
interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.
 Articles 788-794 lays down the rules of construction and
interpretation.
 The underlying principle here is that testacy is preferred to
intestacy, because the former is the express will of the decedent
whereas the latter is only his implied will.
 In statutory construction, the canon is: “That the thing may
rather be effective than be without effect.”
 A similar principle in contractual interpretation is found in
Art1373, which provides that “if some stipulation of any
contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be
understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to
render it effectual.”
ART. 789. When there is an imperfect description, or when no
person or property exactly answers the description,
mistakes and omissions must be corrected, of the error
appears from the context of the will or from extrinsic
evidence, excluding the oral declarations of the testator as
to his intention; and when an uncertainty arises upon the
face of the will, as to the application of any of its provisions,
the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the will, taking into consideration the circumstances
under which it was made, excluding such oral declarations.
 2 KINDS OF AMBIGUITY REFERRED TO –
1. LATENT – not obvious on the face of the will
 When there is an imperfect description or when no
person or property exactly answers the description
a) Latent as to PERSON – “I institute to ¼ of
my estate my first cousin Jose” and the
testator has more than one first cousin named
Jose.
b) Latent as to PROPERTY – “I devise to my
cousin Pacifico my fishpond in Roxas City”
 and the testator has more than one fishpond
in Roxas City.
2. PATENT – obvious on the face of the will
 When an uncertainty arises upon the face of the will,
as to the application of any of its provisions
a) Patent as to PERSON – “I institute ¼ of my
estate to some of my first cousins.
b) Patent as to PROPERTY – “I bequeath to my
cousin Pacifico some of my cars.”
 In both cases, the ambiguity is evident from a
reading of the testamentary provisions
themselves; the ambiguity is patent [patere – to
be exposed]
 HOW TO DEAL WITH AMBIGUITIES –
 The provisions of this article do not make a distinction in
the solution of the problem of ambiguities – whether latent
or patent.
 Hence, the distinction between the 2 kinds of
ambiguity is, in the light of the codal provisions,
an all but theoretical one.
 The ambiguity should, as far as possible, be cleared up or
resolved, in order to give effect to the testamentary
disposition.
 Based on principle that testacy is preferred to
intestacy.
 Ambiguity may be resolved using any evidence admissible
and relevant, excluding the oral declarations of the
testator as to his intention.
 Reason for the statutory exclusion is that a dead
man cannot refute a tale.
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them
in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be
taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily
appears that he was unacquainted with such technical
sense.
 Similar rules are laid down in Rule 130 Sections 10 and 14 of
the Rules of Court –
Sec10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal
meaning – The language of a writing is to be interpreted
according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its
execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.
Sec14. Peculiar signification of terms – The terms of a
writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and
general application, but evidence is admissible to show that
they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification,
and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in
which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.
 In contractual interpretation, a similar principle is expressed in
Article 1370 par1:
Art1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no
doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative;
and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be
preferred which will prevent intestacy.
 A similar rule is found in Rule 130 Sec11 of the RoC –
Sec11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions – In the construction of an instrument where there
are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.
 In contractual interpretation, Articles 1373 and 1374 lay down
similar principles –
Art1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit
of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
Art1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful one that sense
which may result from all of them taken jointly.
ART. 792. The invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made.
 This article makes applicable to wills the SEVERABILITY OR
SEPARABILITY PRINCIPLE in statutory construction
frequently expressly provided in a separability clause.
 The source of this article is Art2085 of the German Civil Code
which provides that the invalidity of one of several dispositions
contained in a will results in the invalidity of the other
dispositions only if it is to be presumed that the testator would
not have made these if the invalid disposition had not been
made.
ART. 793. Property acquired after the making of a will shall
only pass thereby, as if the testator had possessed it at the
time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the
will that such was his intention.
 This article creates problems which would not have existed had
it not been so nonchalantly incorporated in the Code, an implant
from the Code of Civil Procedure and ultimately from
American law.
 The problem springs from the fact that this article makes the
will speak as of the time it is made, rather than at the time of
 the decedent’s death [which is more logical because that is
when the will takes effect according to Article 777].
 Illustration – X executes a will in 1985 containing a legacy: “I
give to M all my shares in BPI.” The testator dies in 1990,
owning at the time of his death ten times as many BPI shares as
he did when he made the will.
 Under Article 793, the shares acquired after the will
was executed are NOT included in the legacy.
 Article 793 therefore departs from the codal philosophy of
Articles 774 and 776 and constitutes an EXCEPTION to the
concept of succession as linked to death and rendered
legally effective by death.
 Prof. Balane suggests the provisions be reworded as: “Property
acquired after the making of a will passes thereby unless the
contrary clearly appears from the words or the context of the
will.”
 In the meantime, it is suggested that a liberal application of the
article be allowed.
 Can the word “expressly” in this article be interpreted to
mean “clearly” even if it might be stretching a point?
ART. 794. Every devise or legacy shall cover all the interest
which the testator could device or bequeath in the property
disposed of, unless it clearly appears from the will that he
intended to convey a less interest.
 This article should be read together with Art929, which
provides that “if the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part
of or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or devise
shall be understood limited to such part or interest, unless the
testator expressly declares that he gives the thing in its entirety.
 GENERAL RULE – in a legacy or devise the testator gives
exactly the interest he has in the thing.
EXCEPTIONS – he can give a less interest [Art794] or a greater
interest [Art929] than he has.
 In the latter case, if the person owning the interest to be
acquired does not wish to part with it, the solution in
Art931 can be applied wherein the legatee or devisee shall
be entitled only to the JUST VALUE OF THE INTEREST
that should have been acquired.
J. CODICIL AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
ART. 825. A codicil is a supplement or addition to a will, made
after the execution of a will and annexed to be taken as a
part thereof, by which disposition made in the original will
is explained, added to, or altered.
ART. 826. In order that a codicil may be effective, it shall be
executed as in the case of a will.
 Codicil v. Subsequent Will
 Codicil – explains, adds to or alters a disposition in a prior
will.
 Subsequent will – makes independent and distinct
dispositions.
 But the distinction is purely academic because Art826
requires that the codicil be in the form of a will anyway.
 Must the Codicil conform to the form of the will to which it
refers? NO. A holographic will can have an attested codicil and
vice versa. Both may also be of the same kind.
ART. 827. If a will, executed as required by this Code,
incorporates into itself by reference any document or
paper, such document or paper shall not be considered a
part of the will unless the following requisites are present:
(1) The document or paper referred to in the will
must be in existence at the time of the execution of
the will;
(2) The will must clearly describe and identify the
same, stating among other things the number of
pages thereof;
(3) It must be identified by clear and satisfactory
proof as the document or paper referred to
therein; and
(4) It must be signed by the testator and the witnesses
on each and every page, except in case of
voluminous books of account or inventories.
 Article only refers to documents such as:
1. Inventories
2. Books of Accounts
3. Documents of Title
4. Papers of Similar Nature
 DOES NOT include documents that make testamentary
dispositions, or else the formal requirements of a will would be
circumvented.
 Can holographic wills incorporate documents by reference?
 NO. Par4 of Art827 requires signatures of the testator and
the witnesses on every page of the incorporated document
[except voluminous annexes]. It seems therefore that only
attested wills can incorporate documents by reference,
since only attested wills are witnessed.
 Unless testator executes a holographic will and
superfluously has it witnessed.
L. REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITIONS
ART. 828. A will may be revoked by the testator at any time
before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is
void.
 A will is essentially REVOCABLE or AMBULATORY.
 This characteristic cannot be waived even by the testator. There
is no such thing as an irrevocable will.
 This characteristic is consistent with the principle in Art777
that successional rights vest only upon death.

ART. 829. A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a
person who does not have his domicile in this country, is
valid when it is done according to the law of the place
where the will was made, or according to the law of the
place in which the testator had his domicile at the time;
and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is
in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
 RULES FOR REVOCATION
 Revocation made in the Philippines.
 Philippine Law
 Revocation made Outside Philippines.
1. Testator not domiciled in Phils.
 Law of place where the WILL was made
 Law of place where the testator was domiciled at
time of revocation.
2. Testator domiciled in Phils. [Art829]
 Philippine Law – consistent with domiciliary
principle followed by this article
 Law of place of Revocation – principle of lex loci
celebrationis
 Law of place where the WILL was made – by
analogy with rules on revocation where testator is
a non-Philippine domiciliary.
 Curious that the law departs from the nationality theory and
adopts the domiciliary theory.
ART. 830. No will shall be revoked except in the following
cases:
(1) By implication of law; or
(2) By some will, codicil, or other writing executed as
provided in case of wills; or
(3) By burning, tearing, canceling, or obliterating the will
with the intention of revoking it, by the testator
himself, or by some other person in his presence, and
by his express direction. If burned, torn, cancelled, or
obliterated by some other person, without the express
direction of the testator, the will may still be
established, and the estate distributed in accordance
therewith, if its contents, and due execution, and the
fact of its unauthorized destruction, cancellation, or
obliteration are established according to the Rules of
Court.
 MODES OF REVOKING A WILL UNDER
PHILIPPINE LAW
1. BY OPERATION OF LAW
 May be total or partial
 Examples of revocation by operation of law
a) Preterition – Art854
b) Legal Separation – Art63 par4 FC
c) Unworthiness to succeed – Art1032
d) Transformation, alienation or loss of the object
devised or bequeathed – Art957
e) Judicial demand of a credit given as a legacy -
Art936
2. BY A SUBSEQUENT WILL OR CODICIL
 Requisites for valid revocation by a subsequent
instrument –
a) Subsequent instrument must comply with
formal requirements of a will
b) Testator must possess testamentary capacity
c) Subsequent instrument must either contain
an express revocatory clause or be
incompatible with the prior will
d) Subsequent instrument must be probated to
take effect
 Revocation by subsequent will may be Total or
Partial, Express or Implied
a) Total – whole prior instrument is revoked
b) Partial – only certain provisions or
dispositions of the prior instrument is
revoked
c) Express – revocation of prior instrument is
stated in the subsequent instrument
d) Implied – incompatibility between
provisions of prior and subsequent
instruments.
3. BY PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
 Four ways to destroy –
a) Burning
b) Tearing
c) Cancelling
d) Obliterating
 Physical destruction may be done by the testator
personally or by another person acting in his presence
and by his express direction.
 Unauthorized if without express direction of
testator. But what if with express direction but
not in his presence?
 Arguable. May say that it is authorized and
therefore the destroyed instrument is revoked
because of the intent and consent of the
testator to revoke and destroy, and that the law
does not provide that without the testator’s
presence, destruction will become
unauthorized.
 On the other hand, it may be argued that the
testator’s presence is required because at any
time during the actual burning, destroying, etc.
he may put a stop to the destruction if he
changes his mind, and that is precisely why his
presence is required?
  Effect of unauthorized destruction – Will may still be
proved as lost or destroyed [Art830 NCC and Rule
76 RoC]
 However, this is possible only if the will is
attested; if the will is holographic, it cannot be
probated if lost, even if the loss or destruction
was unauthorized, unless a copy survives.
 Elements of a Valid Revocation by Physical
Destruction
a) CORPUS – physical destruction itself; there
must be evidence of physical destruction
b) ANIMUS –
 Capacity and intent to revoke
 Testator must have completed
everything he intended to do
 Both corpus an animus must concur.
 Loss or unavailability of a will may, under certain
circumstances, give rise to the presumption that it had
been revoked by physical destruction
 Where a will which cannot be found is shown
to have been in the possession of the testator
when last seen, the presumption is, in the
absence of other competent evidence, that the
same was cancelled or destroyed.
 Same presumption arises where it is shown
that testator had ready access to the will and it
cannot be found after his death.
 But such presumptions may be overcome by
proof that the will was not destroyed by the
testator with intent to revoke it.
ART. 831. Subsequent wills which do not revoke the previous
ones in an express manner, annul only such dispositions in
the prior wills as are inconsistent with or contrary to those
contained in the latter wills.
 Revocation of a will by a subsequent will or codicil may be
express [through a revocatory clause] or implied [through
incompatibility].
 In the old Civil Code, mere fact of a subsequent will, provided
that it is valid, revoked the prior one, except only if the testator
provides in the posterior will that the prior will was to subsists
in whole or in part.
 The present rule provides that the execution of a subsequent
will does not ipso facto revoke a prior one.
ART. 832. A revocation made in a subsequent will shall take
effect, even if the new will should become inoperative by
reason of the incapacity of the heirs, devisees or legatees
designated therein, or by their renunciation.
 Efficacy of the revocatory clause does not depend on the
testamentary disposition of the revoking will, UNLESS the
testator so provides. Revocation is generally speaking, an
absolute provision, independent of the acceptance or capacity
of the new heirs.
 An EXCEPTION is where the testator provides in the
subsequent will that the revocation of the prior one is dependent
on the Capacity or Acceptance of the heirs, devisees or legatees
instituted in the subsequent will.
 DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
 DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION
 Where the act of destruction is connected with the making
of another will as fairly to raise the inference that the
testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the
efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted,
the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative,
the revocation fails and the original will remains in full
force.
 This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The
failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose
validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents
the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to
make at some time a will in place of that destroyed will not
render the destruction conditional. It must appear that the
revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new
will. [Molo v. Molo]
 It must be remembered that dependent relative revocation
applies only if it appears that the testator intended his at of
revocation to be conditioned on the making of a new will or on
its validity or efficacy.
 In Molo v. Molo, the Samson v. Naval doctrine was cited,
providing that “A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking
a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason that it
was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the Code
of Civil procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the
effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch as said
revocatory clause is void.”
 Question – supposing the institution of heirs, legatees or
devisees in the subsequent will is subject to a suspensive
condition, is the revocation of the prior will absolute or
conditional?
 Depends on the testator’s intent.
 If the subsequent will contains a revocatory clause which
is absolute or unconditional, the revocation will be
absolute regardless of the happening or non-happening of
the suspensive condition.
 But if the testator states in the subsequent will that the
revocation of the prior will is subject to the occurrence of
the suspensive condition, or if the will does not contain a
revocatory clause, the revocation will depend on whether
the condition happens or not.
 If the suspensive condition does not occur, the
institution is deemed never to have been made
 and the prior institution will be given effect. [i.e.
no revocation of prior will]
 This is in accord with the juridical nature of
suspensive conditions, and is an instance of
dependent relative revocation.
 Is the rule on dependent relative revocation applicable if the
revocation of the will is by physical destruction?
 YES. If testator executes a subsequent will revoking the
prior will but conditioned on the validity of the subsequent
will, then if the subsequent will is declared invalid, the
prior will subsists.
 In Molo v. Molo, in an obiter, SC held that the physical
destruction of the will DID NOT revoke it, based on the
inference made by the court in that case, that the testator
meant the revocation to depend on the validity of a new
will.
 But apart from the fact that the statement is obiter because
the facts did not clearly show that the will had been
destroyed, it is arguable whether the prior will should be
deemed to subsist despite its physical destruction. Can it
not be argued that the act of the testator in destroying the
will in fact confirmed his intent to revoke it?
 In the case of Diaz v. De Leon, the testator executed a prior
will but destroyed it and executed another will revoking
the former. However, the second will was found to be not
executed with all the necessary requisites to constitute
sufficient revocation. The court then held that the intention
of revoking the will was manifest from the fact that the
testator was anxious to withdraw or change the provisions
he had made in his first will. Therefore, the court
concluded that original will presented having been
destroyed with animo revocandi, the original will and last
testament cannot be probated and was effectively revoked.
 In Molo, revocation of the prior will was not allowed
because the court inferred that the testator meant
revocation to depend on the validity of the new will, so in
that case the rule on dependent relative revocation was
applied.
 However, in De Leon, court held that the testator’s intent
to revoke the prior will was not dependent on the validity
of the subsequent will so even if the second will was void
and insufficient as revocation, the prior will was still
revoked because such revocation was not dependent on the
validity of the second will [?!!]
ART. 833. A revocation of a will based on a false cause or an
illegal cause is null and void.
 Wills are revocable ad nutum or at the testator’s pleasure. The
testator does not need to have a reason to revoke the will.
 However, precisely because the law respects the testator’s true
intent, this article sets aside a revocation that does not reflect
such intent.
 REQUISITES FOR A FALSE / ILLEGAL CAUSE TO
RENDER REVOCATION VOID –
1. CAUSE MUST BE CONCRETE, FACTUAL AND NOT
PURELY SUBJECTIVE
 If a testator revoked on the stated ground that the heir
was Ilocano and all Ilocanos are bad, it would just be
prejudice and the revocation is valid because it is
based on a subjective cause.
2. IT MUST BE FALSE
3. THE TESTATOR MUST NOT KNOW OF ITS FALSITY
4. IT MUST APPEAR FROM THE WILL THAT THE
TESTATOR IS REVOKING BECAUSE OF THE CAUSE
WHICH IS FALSE.
 If the revocation is by physical destruction, and the revoked
will is holographic, then though the revocation be void, probate
will not be possible, UNLESS a copy of the holographic will
survives.
 The rule regarding nullity of revocation for an illegal cause
limits the freedom of the testator to revoke based on an illegal
cause, but this is due to public policy considerations.
 It must be noted that the illegal cause should be stated in the
will as the cause of the revocation.
ART. 834. The recognition of an illegitimate child does not lose
its legal effect, even though the will wherein it was made
should be revoked.
 The part of the will which recognizes an illegitimate child is
NOT revocable because recognition is an irrevocable act.
Therefore, even if the will is revoked, the recognition remains
effective.
 Under the Family Code, admission of illegitimate filiation in a
will would constitute proof of illegitimate filiation. According
to Article 175 of the Family Code –
Art175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Art173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Art172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
 Basically, the principle laid down in Art834 remains unaltered
regarding these admissions contained in wills.
L. REPUBLICATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS
ART. 835. The testator cannot republish, without reproducing
in a subsequent will, the dispositions contained in a
previous one which is void as to its form.
ART. 836. The execution of a codicil referring to a previous will
has the effect of republishing the will as modified by the
codicil.
 If the testator wishes to republish a will that is void as to form,
the only way to republish it is to execute a subsequent will and
reproduce [copy out] the dispositions of the original will. Mere
reference to the prior will in the subsequent will is not enough.
 A will is void as to form if it does not comply with the
requirements of Arts804-818; 810-814; 818-819.
 If the testator wishes to Republish a will that is either:
1. VOID for a reason other than a formal defect, or
2. Previously REVOKED
 The only thing necessary to republish it is for the testator
to execute a subsequent will or codicil referring to the
previous will. There is no need to reproduce the provisions
of the prior will in the subsequent instrument.
 Why the difference on the rules between nullity as to form and
nullity based on other grounds? Prof. Balane says because
Art835 is from Argentine Law whole Art836 is from California
Law. Go figure.
ART. 837. If after making a will, the testator makes a second
will expressly revoking the first, the revocation of the
second will does not derive the first will, which can be
revived only by another will or codicil.
 Illustration
In 1985, X executed will 1
In 1987, X executed will 2 and expressly revoked will 1
In 1990, X executed will 3, revoking will 2
- When will 3 revoked will 2, it did not revive will 1.
 This article is based on the theory of INSTANT
REVOCATION
 That the revocatory effect of the 2nd will is immediate.
 However, such theory is inconsistent with the principle
that wills take effect mortis causa.
 Furthermore, to be effective for the purpose of revoking
the first will, the second will must be probated. But it has
already been revoked by the third will. A revoked will now
has to be submitted to probate?
 Article applies only when the revocation of the first will by the
second will is EXPRESS. If the revocation by the second will
is implied due to incompatible provisions, the article will not
apply and the effect will be that the first will is revived.
 However, when will 3 is itself inconsistent with will 1,
there is still revocation.
 Also keep in mind Article 831 – Implied Revocations only
annul such dispositions in the prior wills as are inconsistent
with or contrary to those contained in the latter wills.
 EXCEPTION – when the second will is holographic and it is
revoked by physical destruction, because then the possibility of
its probate is foreclosed, unless of course a copy survives.
M. ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
ART. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
The testator himself may, during
his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the
allowance of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after the
testator’s death shall govern.
The Supreme Court shall
formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be
necessary for the allowance of wills on petition of the
testator.
Subject to the right of appeal, the
allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the
testator or after his death, shall be conclusive as to its due
execution.
 Probate of a will is MANDATORY.
 TWO KINDS OF PROBATE
1. POST MORTEM – after the testator’s death
2. ANTE MORTEM – during his lifetime, features:
 Easier for the courts to determine mental condition of
a testator
 Fraud, intimidation and undue influence are
minimized
 Easier correction of formal defects in the will
 Once a will is probated ante mortem, the only
questions that may remain for the courts to decide
after the testator’s death will refer to the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary dispositions.
 Rules on Probate for both post and ante mortem are found in
Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.
 Finality of a Probate Decree
 Once a decree of probate becomes final in accordance with
the rules of procedure, it is res judicata.
 Scope of a Final Decree of Probate
 A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution of the will, i.e. as to the will’s extrinsic and
formal validity only.
 Gallanosa v. Arcangel enumerates what are covered by
the term Formal Validity and therefore conclusively
settled by a final decree of probate –
a) That the testator was of sound and disposing mind
b) That his consent was not vitiated
 c) That the will was signed by the required number of
witnesses, and
 That all the formal requirements of the law
have been complied with.
d) That the will is genuine.
 Another way of defining the scope of a final decree of
probate is to refer to art839. Any action based on any of the
grounds for disallowance of a will enumerated in Article
839 can no longer be pursued once there is a final decree
of probate.
 GENERAL RULE – A decree of probate, therefore does not
concern itself with the question of INTRINSIC validity and the
probate court should not pass upon that issue.
 EXCEPTION - When the probate of a will might become an
idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
 On the authority of Nepomuceno v. Ca, a probate court may
pass upon the issue of intrinsic validity if on the face of the will,
its intrinsic nullity is patent.
ART. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following
cases:
(1) If the formalities required by law have not been
complied with;
(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally
incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;
(3) If it was executed through force or under duress,
or the influence of fear, or threats;
(4) If it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary or of some other person;
(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by
fraud;
(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intent
that the instrument he signed should be his will at
the time of affixing his signature thereto.
 An Exclusive Enumeration of the grounds for disallowance of
a will.
 These are matters involved in formal validity. Once a probate
decree is final, such decree forecloses any subsequent challenge
on any of the matters enumerated in this article.
 If any of these grounds for disallowance are proven, the will
shall be set aside as VOID.
 A will is either valid or void. If none of the defects
enumerated in this article are present, it is valid; if any one
of these defects is present, the will is void. The issue of
formal validity or nullity is precisely what the probate
proceedings will determine.
 There is no such thing as a Voidable Will.
 GROUNDS FOR DISALLOWANCE OF A WILL
1. FORMALITIES
 Those referred to in Articles 804-818, 818-819 and
829-821
2. TESTATOR INSANE OR MENTALLY INCAPABLE AT
TIME OF EXECUTION
 Articles 798 – 801 on testamentary capacity and
intent
3. FORCE, DURESS, INFLUENCE OF
FEAR OR THREATS
 Force or Violence – when in order to wrest consent,
serious or irresistible force is employed.
 Duress or Intimidation – when one of the contracting
parties is compelled by a reasonable and well-
grounded fear of imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person or property of
his spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give his
consent. Age, sex and condition of the person are
borne in mind. Threat to enforce a just or legal claim
through competent authority does not vitiate consent.
4. UNDUE & IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE
 Undue Influence – when a person takes improper
advantage of his power over the will of another,
depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of
choice. Circumstances such as the following shall be
considered: confidential, family, spiritual and other
relations between parties, or fact that person unduly
influenced was suffering from mental weakness or
ignorant or in financial distress.
5. SIGNATURE PROCURED THROUGH FRAUD
 Fraud – when through insidious words or
machinations of one of the contracting parties, the
other is induced to enter into a contract which,
without them, he would not have agreed to.
6. MISTAKE OR TESTATOR DID NOT INTENT
INSTRUMENT TO BE HIS WILL WHEN HE AFFIXED
HIS SIGNATURE THERETO
Mistake – must refer to substance of the thing which is the object
of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. Mistake as to
identity or qualifications only vitiates consent when such were the
principal cause of the contract. A simple mistake of account gives
rise to correction
CASES FOR READINGS
Vitug v. CA
FACTS:
- Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of
Dolores Vitug’s (deceased) estate. Rowena Corona was the
executrix.
- Romarico, the deceased’s husband, filed a motion with the
probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stock
and real properties belonging to the estate to cover alleged
advances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds.
- The advances were used to pay estate taxes.
- Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advances came
from a savings account which formed part of the conjugal
partnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was
no ground for reimbursement.
- Romarico claims that the funds are his exclusive property,
having been acquired through a survivorship agreement
executed with his late wife and the bank.
- The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the
spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the sole
property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible
or withdrawable by such survivor.
- The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement and granted
the motion to sell.
- CA reversed stating that the survivorship agreement constitutes
a conveyance mortis causa which did not comply with the
formalities of a valid will. Assuming that it was a donation inter
vivos, it is a prohibited donation (donation between spouses).
ISSUE:
- WON the survivorship agreement was valid.
RULING:
- YES.
- The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should be embodied
in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by
which a capacitated person disposes of his property and rights
and declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.
- In this case, the savings account involved was in the nature of
conjugal funds.
- Since it was not shown that the funds belonged exclusively to
one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.
- It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to take effect
after the death of one party. It is also not a donation between
spouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s own
properties to the other.
- It was an error to include the savings account in the inventory of
the deceased’s assets because it is the separate property of
Romarico.
- Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.
- A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
capacitated person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.
- Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC. However,
its operation or effect must not be violative of the law (i.e. used
as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transfer property
in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forced heir)
- .
Danilo ALUAD, et al., petitioners vs. Zenaido ALUAD,
respondent
G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008
FACTS:
-Petitioner’s mother, Maria Aluad and respondent Zenaido Aluad
were raised by the childless spouses Matilde and Crispin Aluad.
-Crispin was the owner of six lots of Pilar Cadastre, Capiz. After
his death, Matilde adjudicated the lots to herself and thereafter, she
executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos in favor
of Maria covering all the six lots.
-The Deed provided that such will become effective upon the death
of the Donor, but in the event that the Donee should die before the
Donor, the present donation shall be deemed rescinded. Provided,
however, that anytime during the lifetime of the Donor or anyone
of them who should survive, they could use, encumber or even
dispose of any or even all of the parcels of the land.
-Matilde sold one of the lots to Zenaido and subsequently, Matilde
executed a last will and testament devising four (4) of the lots to
Maria and the remaining lot to Zenaido. Maria died a few months
after Matilde’s death.
-Thereafter, Maria’s heirs (herein petitioners) filed before the RTC
a complaint for declaration and recovery of ownership and
possession of the two lots conveyed and donated to Zenaido,
alleging that no rights have been transmitted to the latter because
such lots have been previously alienated to them to Maria via the
Deed of Donation.
-The lower court decided in favor of the petitioners however, CA
reversed said decision upon appeal of Zenaido which held that the
Deed of Donation was actually a donation mortis causa, not inter
vivos and as such it had to, but did not, comply with the formalities
of a will. Due to the denial of the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, the present Petition for Review has been filed.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not the Deed of Donation is donation inter vivos and
whether or not such deed is valid.
RULING
-If so, whether or not Matilde Aluad has the right to convey the lots
in question to Zenaido Aluad.
-The Court finds the donation to Maria Aluad (petitioner’s mother)
one of mortis causa, it having the following characteristics:
-It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee
before the death of the transferor, or what amounts to the
same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
-That before the death of the transferor, the
transfer should be revocable, by the transferor at will, ad
nutum, but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
-That the transfer should be void of the transferor
should survive the transferee.
-The phrase in the earlier-qouted Deed of Donation “to become
effective upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other
interpretation than to mean that Matilde did not intend to transfer
the ownership of the six lots to petitioner’s mother during the
former’s lifetime. Further the statement, “anytime during the
lifetime of the DONOR or anyone of them who should survive,
they could use, encumber or even dispose of any or even all the
parcels of land herein donated,” means that Matilde retained
ownership of the lots and reserved in her the right to dispose them.
For the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than
those established by law is an attribute of ownership. The phrase,
“anyone of them who should survive” is out of sync. For the Deed
of Donation clearly stated that it would take effect upon the death
of the donor, hence, said phrase could only have referred to the
donor.
-The donation being then mortis causa, the formalities of a will
should have been observed but they were not, as it was witnessed
by only two, not three or more witnesses following Article 805 of
the Civil Code. It is void and transmitted no right to petitioner’s
mother. But even assuming arguendo that the formalities were
observed, since it was not probated, no right to the two lots was
transmitted to Maria. Matilde thus validly disposed the lot to
Zenaido by her last will and testament, subject to the qualification
that her will must be probated. With respect to the conveyed lot,
the same had been validly sold by Matilde to Zenaido.
De la Cerna v. Potot
FACTS:
- Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a
joint last will ad testament where they willed that their 2 parcels
of land be given to Manuela Rebaca, their niece and that while
each of them are living, he/she will continue to enjoy the fruits
of the lands mentioned.
- Bernabe died. Gervasia submitted the will for probated. By
order of Oct. 31, 1939, the Court admitted for probate the said
will but only for the part of Bernabe.
- When Gervasia died, another petition for probate was instituted
by Manuela, but because she and her attorney failed to appear in
court, the petition was dismissed.
- When the same was heard, the CFI declared the will void for
being executed contrary to the prohibition on joint wills. On
appeal, the order was reversed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the will may be probated
RULING:
- Admittedly the probate of the will in 1939 was erroneous,
however, because it was probated by a court of competent
jurisdiction it has conclusive effect and a final judgment
rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon
the whole world. However, this is only with respect to the estate
of the husband but cannot affect the estate of the wife;
considering that a joint will is a separate will of each testator.
- The joint will being prohibited by law, its validity, in so far as
the estate of the wife is concerned, must be reexamine and
adjudicated de novo.
- The undivided interest of the wife should pass upon her death to
her intestate heirs and not to the testamentary heir. Thus as to
the disposition of the wife, the will cannot be given effect.
A decree of probate decree is conclusive on the due execution and
the formal validity of the will subject to such probate
. survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
Dacanay v. Florendo (No. L-2071 | Sept. 19, 1950)
FACTS:
• Isabel Florendo and Tirso Dacanay executed a joint and
reciprocal will on Oct. 20, 1940.
• Isabel died. In a special proceeding in the CFI of La Union,
Tirso sought to probate their joint and reciprocal will,
which provides that whoever of the spouses, joint
testators, shall survive the other, shall inherit all the
properties of the latter, with an agreement as to how the
surviving spouse shall dispose of the properties in case of
his or her demise.
• The relatives of the deceased Isabel V. Florendo opposed
the probate of said will on various statutory grounds.
• After receiving from counsels written arguments but before
hearing the evidence, the trial court issued an order
dismissing the petition on the ground that the will is null
and void ab initio for having been executed in violation
of Article 669 of the Civil Code (prohibition against the
execution of joint wills).
• Tirso Dacanay appealed. He argues thet Art. 669 of the Civil
Code is repealed by Act No. 190, Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides for and regulates the extrinsic
formalities of wills. Dacanay further contends that
whether two wills should be executed conjointly or
separately is but a matter of extrinsic formality.
ISSUE:
WON the joint and reciprocal will executed by Isabel Florence and
Tirso Dacanay is null and void ab initio — YES
RULING:
• The matter has already been decided in In re Will of Victor
Bilbao. Wherein the spouses Victor Bilbao and Ramona
Navarro executed a joint will, which provides that all their
respective private properties and conjugal properties shall
be transmitted to either of them, who may survive the
other. This will was denied probate by virtue of Art. 669
of the Civil Code. Justice Montemayor of the Supreme
Court reasoned that Art. 669 is not repealed by Section
614 and 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure because a
number of cases decided by the Court wherein several
articles of the Civil Code regarding wills have not only
been referred to but have also been applied side by side
with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Art.
669 has not been repealed expressly and it is not
incompatible with the Code of Civil Procedure.
• The reason for the prohibition on the execution of joint
wills, especially as regards husband and wife, is that when
a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse
who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and
dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his
or her own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or
she desires to favor.
• And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does
the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the
spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the
• Several writers (Justice Willard, Sinco, Capistrano, Judge
Camus) is of the opinion that Art. 669 is still in force. It
has also been reproduced word for word in Art. 818 of the
 New Civil Code. The implication is that the Philippine
Legislature that passed this Act and approved the New
Civil Code, including the members of the Code
Commission who prepared it, are of the opinion that the
provisions of Art. 669 of the old Civil Code are not
incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Notes: How is the prohibition on joint wills is an exception to
the application of foreign law?
Balane:
General Rule: Apply Article 17 (lex loci celebrecionis), which
provides that the forms and solemnities of
wills is governed by the laws of the country
in which they are executed.
Exception: Article 818. Joint wills executed by Filipinos are
void, regardless of the place of execution. A
joint will is void, even when executed by
Filipinos in a foreign country, and such foreign
country authorizes joint wills.
Rabadilla v. CA
FACTS:
- Aleja Belleza, in a codicil appended to her Last Will and
Testament, bequeathed a lot to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla subject to
certain conditions:
A.) That should Jorge die before the testator, the property
shall be inherited by the latter’s spouse and children
B.) That if the ownership of the property is finally transmitted
to Jorge, he shall be liable to deliver until he dies 75 piculs
of sugar a year to Maria Belleza while she is still alive.
C.) That in case of Jorge’s death, his heirs shall also be
imposed the same obligation.
D.) And that if the heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this
said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the
obligation to deliver yearly 100 piculs of sugar to Maria
Belleza, provided that the buyer, lessor or mortgagor be
near descendants and sister of the testator.
- The will also provided that in case the buyer, lessor or mortgagor
fails to fulfill said obligations, Maria Belleza is entitled to forfeit
the lots in favor of the testator’s descendants.
- Jorge Rabadilla died, and his spouse and children succeeded him.
- Now, Maria Belleza filed a complaint against Jorge’s heirs due
to alleged violations of the Codicil and asked for the property to
be reconveyed to the near descendants of Aleja Belleza on the
ground that:
A.) the lot was mortgaged to PNB, not a near descendant of
the testator,
B.) that the heirs failed to deliver the piculs of sugar beg.
1985,
C.) that PNB also did not comply with the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar/year.
- RTC dismissed the claim. On Appeal, the CA ruled that indeed
the heirs violated the obligations imposed upon them and
therefore the land should be seized and reconveyed to the estate
of Aleja. However, they should file a separate proceeding to re-
open the estate and have it distributed to Aleja’s heirs.
- Belleza Appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Article 882 of the CC on modal institutions
govern the disposition rather than the provisions on institution
through simple substitution.
RULING:
- The SC affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals in applying
Art 882 of the Civil Code.
- The Court held that the disposition in question in favor of Jorge
Rabadilla could neither be simple substitution or
fideicommissary.
- In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.
- In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil
do not provide for said 3 conditions. What the Codicil provides
is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall
be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
- It could not also be a fideicommissary because the element that
the first heir is obliged to preserve and transmit the property to
a second heir is not present.
- In this case, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil
to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the near
descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Without the duty to
preserve, there is no fideicommissary substitution.
- Also, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the
first heir or the fiduciary.
- In this case, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the
first heir or the fiduciary.
- The disposition was in the nature of modal institutions. Here, the
testator imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
- In conditional substitution however, the efficacy of the
inheritance is subject to the condition.
- In case of doubt, the institution must be considered as modal and
not institutional.
- In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in
default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation.
- Elements in Fideicommissary Sub:
A) the first heir is obliged to preserve and transmit the
property to a second heir
B) the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the
property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree
from the first heir or the fiduciary.
- In modal institution, the testator states (1) the object of the
institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by
the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the
heir. A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee
but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.
Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes
-November 27, 2006, there was a petition for the probate of an
alleged holographic will which was denominated as “Kasulatan sa
pag-aalis ng mana.” The private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground that
the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did
not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil
Code. According to private respondents, the will only showed an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest son,
Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was
preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case,
private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is
called upon to rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is
not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face
of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of
the property of the decedent.
-Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: (1) generally, the authority of the probate court is
limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will;
(2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic
validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a disposition of
the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply
because Segundo’s will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs
to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
-The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate
proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed where
petitioners argued as follows:
-First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of
the Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate the
court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause
notice of such time and place to be published three weeks
successively previous to the appointed time in a newspaper of
general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the
heirs, legatee and devisees of the testator Segundo;
-Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an
heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng
Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a compulsory heir. Thus,
there is no preterition in the decedent’s will and the holographic
will on its face is not intrinsically void;
-Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners
and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo,
to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the direct line
of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was
no institution of an heir;
-Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will
that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge
was mandated to proceed with the hearing of the testate case; and,
- Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case
will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo.
ISSUE:
-whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as
a holographic will.
RULING:
-A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil
Code, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of
the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made
in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
-The document, although it may initially come across as a mere
disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of a
holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis
causa (Article 783) can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition
of the latter’s property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is
an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator in favor of
those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.
-Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will
of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and
give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be
given effect.
-Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who
is not learned in the law should be construed more liberally than
the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the
testator. In this regard, the document, even if captioned as
Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended by the testator to be
his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance
with law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is
probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.
Dizon- Rivera v Dizon
FACTS:
- In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate
granddaughter. Marina is the appellee while the others were the
appellants
1. Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in
Pampango. The beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs
and six grandchildren
2. In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties
 (assessed at P1.8 million) which included real and personal
properties and shares of stocks at Pampanga Sugar Central
Devt Co
3. During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was
name the executor of the deceased’s estate
4. In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided
in accordance with her testamentary disposition where she
devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the
partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the
other heirs
5. Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition
adjudicating the estate as follows:
a. the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was
P129,254.96, which was comprised of cash and/or
properties specifically given to them based on the will
b. Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that
they received in the will less the cash/properties to
complete their respective legitime
6. The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a
counter-partition on the estate where Marina and Tomas
were to receive considerably less
7. The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition
citing that Art 906 and 907 NCC specifically provide that
when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same shall
be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the
oppositors was upheld, it will substantially result in a
distribution of intestacy which is a violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE:
-WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in
this case
RULING:
-Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary
disposition admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that
interpretation by which the disposition is to be operative shall be
preferred" and "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two
modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." In Villanueva v. Juico, the SC held that "the intentions
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised
at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal
meaning of the testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise."
-The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal
law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely
in his last will, amount to the only law whose mandate must
imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors,
heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties
nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will.
Thus, the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
-ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent
was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that
after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as
the expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for the
probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in
accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my
wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance
with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby
she specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven
other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was
a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a
person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not
prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
-CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of
partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the properties
respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her
will and the differential to complete their legitimes were taken from
the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously
favored by the decedent in her will.
-Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions
support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by
the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed
by oppositors-appellants whereby they would reduce the
testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half
and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and
legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and
apply the other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the
seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
-EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon
each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him",
from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of
the latter, and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law
-DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will
of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all
devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and
the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for some
small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this
opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her
testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the
beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said
dispositions were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of
the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of
her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in
case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them
shall die before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the
time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said
deceased."
-COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here,
distribution and partition of the entire estate was made by the testatrix,
without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime
which would require collation to determine the legitime of each heir
nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for
the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
-CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR
LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of
their legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been
complied with in the approved project of partition, and they can no
longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the
estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the
executrix-appellee.
OTHERS:
-The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give
to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition
submitted by the contending parties, that project which will give
the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be
adopted. Thus, where the testatrix enumerated the specific
properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix
repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a
partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an
attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the
designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific properties
assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or
partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in the nature
of devises.
-The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note
the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of
the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law
has reserved it for certain heirs who are, therefore, called
compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the
testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a
beneficiary for each property. Necessarily, the testamentary
dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It
is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is
the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
IN RE: PROBATE OF WILL OF JOSE RIOSA
GR L-14074
MALCOLM; November 7, 1918
NATURE
Appeal from decision of CFI Albay which disallowed the will of
RIosa
FACTS
- Jose Riosa made a will in January 1908, disposing of his entire
estate. The will was executed according to the law in force at that
time, complying with all the requisites then required. He died April
17, 1917. However, between the execution of the will and his
death, the law on formalities on execution of wills was amended
by Act No. 2645 (July 1, 1916; it added formalities required such
as signatures on each page of the will). The new law, therefore,
went into effect after the making of the will and before the death of
the testator, without the testator having left a will that conforms to
the new requirements.
ISSUE
WON the will is valid
HELD
1. YES
The validity of the execution of a will must be tested by the statutes
in force at the time of its execution and statutes subsequently
enacted have no retrospective effect.
All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective
operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to
give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is
necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt,
the doubt must be resolved against the restrospective effect.
-The language of Act No. 2645 gives no indication of retrospective
effect. Such, likewise, has been the uniform tendency of the SC on
cases having special application to testamentary succession.
- Our statute announces a positive rule for the transference of
property which must be complied with as a completed act at the
time of the execution, so far as the act of the testator is concerned,
as to all testaments made subsequent to the enactment of Act No.
2645, but is not effective as to testaments made antecedent to that
date.
- the court considered 3 views in addressing the issue:
(1) validity of wills are tested by the laws in force at the time of
death of the testator (considered the right of one to make a will as
an inchoate right). This view was rejected by the court. “The act of
bequeathing or devising is something more than inchoate or
ambulatory. In reality, it becomes a completed act when the will is
executed and attested according to the law, although it does not
take effect on the property until a future time.”
(2) validity of wills must be tested by statutes in force at time of
execution. This view is the one adopted by SC
(3) statutes relating to the execution of wills, when they increase
the necessary formalities, should be construed so as not to impair
the validity of a will already made and, when they lessen the
formalities required, should be construed so as to aid wills
defectively executed according to the law in force at the time of
their making. The court did not directly address this view, but
clearly stated that they are adopting the 2nd rule
ENRIQUEZ v ABADIA
95 Phil 927
MONTEMAYOR; August 9, 1954
FACTS
- September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of
Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will
and Testament. He died on January 14, 1943 .
Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a petition for its probate
which was opposed by some cousins and nephews who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will.
- One of the attesting witnesses testified without contradiction that
in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father
Sancho wrote out in longhand said will in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left
hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets
of which the document is composed, and numbered the same with
Arabic numerals, and finally signed his name at the end of his
writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said three
witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation
clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
- The trial court found said will to be a holographic will. Although
at the time it was executed and at the time of the testator's death,
holographic wills were not permitted by law , the trial court still
admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho
Abadia. The TC did so because at the time of the hearing and when
the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force,
which permitted the execution of holographic wills. According to
the trial court, to carry out the intention of the testator is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form.
ISSUE
WON The New Civil Code may be applied to the probate of Father
Abadia’s will
HELD
No.
Article 795 of the new Civil Code expressly provides: "The validity
of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in
force at the time it is made."
The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law in force at the
time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but at the time the instrument was executed.
One reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator
about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the. legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act.
From the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title
of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of
execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of
reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to
observe and follow the legal requirements at the time of its
execution then upon his death he should be regarded and declared
as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit by intestate
sucession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements
or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs
of their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The
general rule is that the Legislature can not validate void wills.
JIMENEZ v FERNANDEZ
184 SCR 190
PARAS; April 6, 1990
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- land in question is the Eastern portion of parcel of residential land
with an area of 436 sqm situated in Barrio Dulig, Labrador,
Pangasinan in the name of Sulpicia Jimenez. The entire parcel of
land with area of 2,932 sqm, formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez.
Fermin has 2 sons named Fortunato and Carlos Jimenez. Fortunato
who predeceased his father has only one child, the petitioner
Sulpicia. After the death of Fermin, the entire parcel of land was
registered under Act 496 in the name of Carlos Jimenez and
Sulpicia Jimenez (uncle and niece) in equal shares pro-indiviso
with respective OCTs issued on February 28, 1933. Carlos died on
July 9, 1936 and his illegitimate daughter, Melecia Cayabyab, also
known as Melecia Jimenez, took possession of the eastern portion
of the property consisting of 436 sqm.
- January 20, 1944, Melecia sold said 436 sqm portion to Edilberto
Cagampan. Defendant Teodora Grado executed a contract entitled
"Exchange of Real Properties" whereby the Edilberto transferred
said 436 sqm portion to the Teodora, who has been in occupation
since.
- August 29, 1969, Sulpicia executed an affidavit adjudicating unto
herself the other half of the property appertaining to Carlos, upon
manifestation that she is the only heir of her deceased uncle.
Consequently, TCT was issued on October 1, 1969 in Sulipicia’s
name alone over the entire 2,932 sqm property.
- April 1, 1970, Sulpicia, joined by her husband, instituted the
present action for the recovery of the eastern portion consisting 436
sqm occupied by defendant Teodora and her son.
- TRIAL COURT: dismissed the complaint and held defendant
Teodora the absolute owner of the land in question
- CA: affirmed in toto, MFR deined.
ISSUE
WON Melecia Cayabyab (aka Melecia Jimenez) has right to
transfer (Melecia to Edilberto) (and consequent transfer (Edilberto
to Teodora)) over the said property given that she is illegitimate
child of Carlos Jimenez
HELD
NO
Reasoning
- Melecia is not the daughter of Carlos Jimenez and therefore, had
no right over the property in question. Teodora et al failed to
present concrete evidence to prove that Melecia Cayabyab was
really the daughter of Carlos Jimenez. Assuming that Melecia was
the illegitimate daughter of Carlos Jimenez there can be no
question that Melecia had no right to succeed to the estate of Carlos
Jimenez and could not have validly acquired, nor legally
transferred to Edilberto Cagampan that portion of the property
subject of this petition.
- It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent (A777 CC). Moreover, A2263 CC says “Rights to the
inheritance of a person who died with or without a will, before the
effectivity of this Code, shall be governed by the Civil Code of
1889, by other previous laws, and by the Rules of Court . . ." Since
Carlos died on July 9, 1936, the successional rights pertaining to
his estate must be determined in accordance with the Civil Code of
1889.
Cid v. Burnaman: To be an heir under the rules of Civil Code of
1889, a child must be either a child legitimate, legitimated, or
adopted, or else an acknowledged natural child for illegitimate not
natural are disqualified to inherit. (Civil Code of 1889, Art. 807,
935)
- Even assuming that Melecia was born out of the common-law-
relationship between her mother (Maria Cayabyab) and Carlos
Jimenez, she could not even be considered an acknowledged
natural child because Carlos Jimenez was then legally married to
Susana Abalos and therefore not qualified to marry Maria
Cayabyab and consequently Melecia Cayabyab was an illegitimate
spurious child and not entitled to any successional rights in so far
as the estate of Carlos Jimenez was concerned.
- Melecia could not even legally transfer the parcel of land to
Edilberto who accordingly, could not also legally transfer the same
to Teodora.
- Melecia’s possession or of her predecessors-in-interest would be
unavailing against Sulpicia who was the holder pro-indiviso with
Carlos Jimenez of the Torrens Certificate of Title covering a tract
of land which includes the portion now in question, from February
28, 1933, when the OCT was issued.
Benin v. Tuason: No possession by any person of any portion of
the land covered by said original certificate of titles, could defeat
the title of the registered owner of the land covered by the
certificate of title.
30. Miciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil 867
FACTS: A will of a Turkish testator (Joseph Brimo) provided
that his Philippine estate is disposed of in accordance with the
Philippine Law. The testator further provided that whoever fails to
comply with this request (that his estate be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law) would forfeit his inheritance. The
Appellant (Andre Brimo), one of the brothers of the deceased
Joseph Brimo, opposed the Appellee (Juan Miciano)'s partition
scheme of the estate which denies his participation in the
inheritance.
ISSUE: Whether the Turkish Law or Philippine Law be the basis
on the distribution of Joseph Brimo's estates. Will Andre Brimo
forfeit his inheritance?
RULING: The court held that the provision of a foreigner's will
that his properties shall be distributed according to Philippine law
and not his national law is NOT LEGAL because it expressly
ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 16 of
the civil Code, such national law of the testator is the one to govern
his testamentary dispositions. Testator’s estate shall be distributed
according to his national (Turkish) law. He cannot provide
otherwise. The appellant's inheritance will not be forfeited because
the provision is not legal. Even if the testator’s wishes must be
given paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator
contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a
will should not be given effect. A person’s will is merely an
instrument which is PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It
should be subject to the provisions of the Philippine laws. The
estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his
national law. He cannot provide otherwise. The SC held that those
who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance because that
provision is not legal.
Cayetano vs Leonidas
FACTS: The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her
death and was a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that
the testatrix died in Manila while temporarily residing with her
sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last will and
testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that after
the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the
County of Philadelphia, U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of
the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among other things
that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void. The
petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was
divested of his legitime which was reserved by the law for him.
ISSUES
[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the
intrinsic validity of a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.
[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the
capacity to succeed of Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING
[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039
of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This
was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA
358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has
not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s national law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.”
[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation
of the decedent. (Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs
Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that
the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the
estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger,
the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and
would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs. HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding
Judge of Branch XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and
NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United
States of America and a permanent resident of Philadelphia. She
executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat, and that while
in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died
in the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and
in the United States of America. The Last Will and Testament of
the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate
by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the
probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of
the said foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills.
Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, was appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
This was opposed by Adoracion’s father, Hermogenes Campos,
who earlier filed an Affidavit of Self-adjudication not being aware
that Adoracion had left a will. He later died and was substituted by
Polly Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.
A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the
petitioner Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the
rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining children
and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.
Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of
a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting
a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir
in complete disregard of Law of Succession.
ISSUE:Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in
case the testator was a citizen of another country.
RULING:No. Applying Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil
Code, the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by
the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such
law should not apply because it would be contrary to the sound and
established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by
Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the
decedent must apply.
Dacanay v. Florendo
SUMMARY: Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate a joint and
reciprocal will with his deceased wife Isabel Florendo. The will
provides that he will inherit all the properties of Florendo. The
relative of Florendo opposed the probate. The trial court dismissed
the petition for probate on the ground that the said will is null and
void ab initio for violating Art 669 of the Civil Code. Dacanay
argues that the prohibition of Art 669 is against joint wills and not
reciprocal wills and that Art 669 is already repealed, contending
that whether two wills should be executed conjointly or separately
is but a matter of extrinsic formality. The Court affirmed the ruling
of the trial court and held that the reason for the provisions is that
when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument, the spouse
who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character and dominant
is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit
or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to favor. And,
where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of the
spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless or
desperate, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other. The Court
ruled that considering the wisdom of the provision and that fact that
it is not yet expressly repealed, Art 669 is still in force.
DOCTRINE: The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code
prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons
conjointly or in the same instrument either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person, is not unwise and is not
against public policy.
The reason for this provision, especially as regards husband and
wife, is that when a will is made jointly or in the same instrument,
the spouse who is more aggressive, stronger in will or character
and dominant is liable to dictate the terms of the will for his or her
own benefit or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to
favor.
And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either one of
the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous, wicked, faithless
or desperate, knowing as he or she does the terms of the will
whereby the whole property of the spouses both conjugal and
paraphernal goes to the survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose
of the other.
FACTS: Tirso Dacanay is seeking to probate a joint and reciprocal
will with his deceased wife Isabel V. Florendo. The will provides
in substance that whoever of the spouses, joint testators, shall
survive the other, shall inherit all the properties of the latter, with
an agreement as to how the surviving spouse shall dispose of the
properties in case of his or her demise. The relative of deceased
Isabel Florendo opposed the probate of said will on various
statutory grounds. Trial court issued an order dismissing the
petition for probate on the ground that the said will is null and void
ab initio having been executed in violation of Art 669, CC.
ISSUE: Whether the joint and reciprocal will of the spouses is
void?
 Dacanay’s arguments:
o The prohibition of Article 669 of the Civil Code is
directed against the execution of a joint will, or the
expression by two or more testators of their wills in a
 single document and by one act, rather than against
mutual or reciprocal wills, which may be separately
executed.
o Upon this premise, however, he argues that Article 669
has been repealed by Act. No. 190, which he claims
provides for and regulates the extrinsic formalities of
wills, contending that whether two wills should be
executed conjointly or separately is but a matter of
extrinsic formality.
RULING: YES. The Court cites the case “In re Will of Victor
Bilbao,” which involves a joint will executed also by the spouses.
The petitioning spouse also forwarded the same argument -- that
Art 669 of the Civil Code has been repealed by Secs. 614 and 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190.
 In that case, the Court said, through Mr. Justice Montemayor:
o The provision of article 669 of the Civil Code
prohibiting the execution of a will by two or more persons
conjointly or in the same instrument either for their
reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person, is
not unwise and is not against public policy.
o The reason for this provision, especially as regards
husband and wife, is that when a will is made jointly or in
the same instrument, the spouse who is more aggressive,
stronger in will or character and dominant is liable to
dictate the terms of the will for his or her own benefit
or for that of third persons whom he or she desires to
favor.
o And, where the will is not only joint but reciprocal, either
one of the spouses who may happen to be unscrupulous,
wicked, faithless or desperate, knowing as he or she does
the terms of the will whereby the whole property of the
spouses both conjugal and paraphernal goes to the
survivor, may be tempted to kill or dispose of the other.
o Considering the wisdom of the provisions of this article
669 and the fact that it has not been repealed, at least
not expressly, as well as the consideration that its
provisions are not incompatible with those of the Code of
Civil Procedure on the subject of wills, we believe and
rule that said article 669 of the Civil Code is still in
force.
o The Court is not alone in this opinion. The following cites
that the articles is still in force:
 Mr. Justice Willard as shown by his Notes on the
Civil Code, believes that this article 669 is still in
force.
 Sinco and Capistrano in their work on the Civil Code,
Vol. II, favorably cite Justice Willard's opinion that
this article is still in force.
 Judge Camus in his book on the Civil Code does not
include this article among those he considers
repealed.
o Lastly, we find that this article 669 has been reproduced
word for word in article 818 of the New Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386). The implication is that the
Philippine Legislature that passed this Act and approved
the New Civil Code, including the members of the Code
Commission who prepared it, are of the opinion that the
provisions of article 669 of the old Civil Code are not
incompatible with those of the Code of Civil Procedure.
NOTES: Art 669, CC: Two or more persons cannot make a will
conjointly or in the same instrument, either for their reciprocal
benefit or for the benefit of a third person. Art 818, NCC: Two or
more persons cannot make a will jointly, or in the same instrument,
either for their reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person.
Art 819, NCC: Wills, prohibited by the preceding article, executed
by Filipinos in a foreign country shall not be valid in the
Philippines, even though authorized by the laws of the country
where they may have been executed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF ABADA vs. ABAJA
G. R. no. 147145 31 January 2005
FACTS: Abada and his wife Toray died without legitimate
children. Abaja, filed with CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for
probate of the will of Abada. The latter allegedly named as his
testamentary heirs his natural children, Eulogio Abaja and Rosario
Cordova. (respondent Abaja was the son of Eulogio). One
Caponong opposed the position on the ground that Abaja left no
will when he died and if such was really executed by him it should
be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and
attested as required by law; (2) it was not intended as the last will
of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the
same grounds invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of
Abada, Joel Abada et. al. also opposed the petition. The oppositors
are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
Respondent Abaja filed another petition for the probate will of
Toray. Caponong and Joel Abada et. al opposed the petition on the
same grounds. Caponong likewise filed a petition praying for the
issuance in his name of letters of administration of the intestate
estate of Abada and Toray. RTC admitted the probate will of Toray
since the oppositors did not file any motion for reconsideration, the
order allowing the probate of Toray’s will became final and
executory. The court also assigned one Caponong-Noble as special
administratix of the estate of Abada and Toray. Caponong –Noble
moved for the dismissal of the petition for the probate will of
Abada which was denied by the Court. During the proceeding, the
judge found out that the matter on hand was already submitted for
decision by another judge admitting the probate will of abada.
Since proper notices to the heirs has been complied with as well as
other requirements, the judge ruled in favor of the validity of the
probate will. RTC ruled only on the issue raised by the oppositors
in their motions to dismiss the petition for probate that is whether
the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. It
held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter
forecloses all other issues. Caponong-Noble filed a notice of
appeal. CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA ruled in sustaining the RTC
admitting the probate will of Abada.
HELD: No, CA is correct. Caponong-Noble proceeds to point out
several defects in the attestation clause. Caponong-Noble alleges
that the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages on
which the will is written. The allegation has no merit. The phrase
"en el margen izquierdo de todas y cada una de las dos hojas de
que esta compuesto el mismo" which means "in the left margin of
each and every one of the two pages consisting of the same" shows
that the will consists of two pages. The pages are numbered
correlatively with the letters "ONE" and "TWO" as can be gleaned
from the phrase "las cuales estan paginadas correlativamente con
las letras "UNO" y "DOS." Caponong-Noble further alleges that
the attestation clause fails to state expressly that the testator signed
the will and its every page in the presence of three witnesses. She
then faults the Court of Appeals for applying to the present case the
rule on substantial compliance found in Article 809 of the New
Civil Code. The first sentence of the attestation clause reads:
"Suscrito y declarado por el testador Alipio Abada como su ultima
voluntad y testamento en presencia de nosotros, habiendo tambien
el testador firmado en nuestra presencia en el margen izquierdo de
todas y cada una de las hojas del mismo." The English translation
is: "Subscribed and professed by the testator Alipio Abada as his
last will and testament in our presence, the testator having also
signed it in our presence on the left margin of each and every one
of the pages of the same." The attestation clause clearly states that
Abada signed the will and its every page in the presence of the
witnesses. However, Caponong-Noble is correct in saying that the
attestation clause does not indicate the number of witnesses. On
this point, the Court agrees with the appellate court in applying the
rule on substantial compliance in determining the number of
witnesses. While the attestation clause does not state the number of
witnesses, a close inspection of the will shows that three witnesses
signed it.This Court has applied the rule on substantial compliance
even before the effectivity of the New Civil Code.
An attestation clause is made for the purpose of
preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved.
A will, therefore, should not be rejected where its attestation clause
serves the purpose of the law. x x x
We rule to apply the liberal construction in the probate of
Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of
Abada and of three other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that
there are three witnesses to the will. The question on the number of
the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and
without the need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court
explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal construction,
thus:
The so-called liberal rule does not offer any puzzle or
difficulty, nor does it open the door to serious consequences. The
later decisions do tell us when and where to stop; they draw the
dividing line with precision. They do not allow evidence aliunde
to fill a void in any part of the document or supply missing
details that should appear in the will itself.lThey only permit a
probe into the will, an exploration within its confines, to
ascertain its meaning or to determine the existence or absence
of the requisite formalities of law. This clear, sharp limitation
eliminates uncertainty and ought to banish any fear of dire results.
The phrase "en presencia de nosotros" or "in our presence" coupled
with the signatures appearing on the will itself and after the
attestation clause could only mean that: (1) Abada subscribed to
and professed before the three witnesses that the document was his
last will, and (2) Abada signed the will and the left margin of each
page of the will in the presence of these three witnesses. Finally,
Caponong-Noble alleges that the attestation clause does not
expressly state the circumstances that the witnesses witnessed and
signed the will and all its pages in the presence of the testator and
of each other. The last part of the attestation clause states "en
testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos en presencia
de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness,
every one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator."
This clearly shows that the attesting witnesses witnessed the
signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the
will in the presence of one another and of the testator.
SUROZA v. HONRADO
110 SCRA 381 (1981)
FACTS: Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will in
July 1973 when she was 73 years old. The will, which was in
English, was thumbmarked by Marcelina, who was illiterate. Upon
her death, the will which bequeathed all her estate to a supposed
granddaughter was presented for probate. Opposition to the probate
was made by Nenita Suroza, the wife of the alleged adopted son of
Marcelina on the ground of preterition of said son, Agapito, and on
the ground that the will was void because Marcelina did not appear
before a notary public and because it is written in English which is
not known to Marcelina. The presiding judge denied the opposition
of Nenita Suroza and admitted the will to probate.
ISSUE: Was there sufficient evidence on record to show that the
will on its face was void?
HELD: Upon perusing the will and noting that it was written in
English and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix,
respondent Judge could have readily perceived that the will is void.
In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was
a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its
concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That could only
mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator. Thus, a will
written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is
void (Acop v. Piraso, 52 Phil.660). “What constitutes a
Signature”: A complete signature is not essential to the validity of
a will. Perhaps to provide for greater authenticity, what should be
found at the end of the will is the testator’s customary signature.
However, since the law does not require his full signature, the
initials or even a thumb mark by the testator may be deemed
sufficient to comply with this requirement. A thumb mark at the
end of the will may be considered as a valid signature especially
when a testator cannot affix his signature due to some medical
condition such as paralysis.
Suroza v. Honrado 110 SCRA 388
FACTS: Spouses Mauro Suroza and Marcelina Salvador, who
were childless, reared a boy named Agapito. Agapito and his wife
Nenita de Vera had a daughter named Lilia. Nenita became
Agapito’s guardian when he became disabled. A certain Arsenia de
la Cruz also wanted to be his guardian in another proceeding but it
was dismissed. Arsenia then delivered a child named Marilyn Sy
to Marcelina who brought her up as a supposed daughter of
Agapito. Marilyn used the surname Suroza although not legally
adopted by Agapito. When Marcelina (who was an illiterate) was
73 years old, she supposedly executed a notarial will which was in
English and thumbmarked by her. In the will, she allegedly
bequeathed all her properties to Marilyn. She also named as
executrix her laundrywoman, Marina Paje. Paje filed a petition for
probate of Marcelina’s will. Judge Honrado appointed Paje as
administratrix and issued orders allowing the latter to withdraw
money from the savings account of Marcelina and Marilyn, and
instructing the sheriff to eject the occupants of testatrix’s house,
among whom was Nenita. She and the other occupants filed a
motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that Agapito
was the sole heir of the deceased, and that Marilyn was not the
decedent’s granddaughter. Despite this, Judge Honrado issued an
order probating Marcelina’s will.
Nenita filed an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admit
opposition with counter-petition for administration and
preliminary injunction, and an opposition to the probate of the will
and a counter-petition for letters of administration, which were
dismissed by Judge Honrado. Instead of appealing, Nenita filed a
case to annul the probate proceedings but Judge Honrado dismissed
it. The judge then closed the testamentary proceeding after noting
that the executrix had delivered the estate to Marilyn, and that the
estate tax had been paid.
Ten months later, Nenita filed a complaint before the SC, charging
Judge Honrado with having probated the fraudulent will of
Marcelina. She reiterated her contentionthat the testatrix was
illiterate as shown by the fact that she affixed her thumbmark to the
will and that she did not know English, the language in which the
will was written. She further alleged that Judge Honrado did not
take into account the consequences of the preterition of testatrix’s
son, Agapito. Judge Honrado in his comment did not deal
specifically with the allegations but merely pointed to the fact that
Nenita did not appeal from the decree of probate and that in a
motion, she asked for a thirty day period within which to vacate the
house of the testatrix. Nenita subsequently filed in the CA a petition
for certiorari and prohibition against Judge Honrado wherein she
prayed that the will, the decree of probate and all the proceedings
in the probate case be declared void. The CA dismissed the petition
because Nenita’s remedy was an appeal and her failure to do so did
not entitle her to resort to the special civil action of certiorari.
Relying on that decision, Judge Honrado filed a MTD the
administrative case for having allegedly become moot and
academic.
ISSUE: W/N disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge
for having admitted to probate a will, which on its face is void
because it is written in English, a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she
and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as
admitted by the notary himself.
HELD: YES. Respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting
that it was written in English and was thumbmarked by an
obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the
will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that
English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix.
But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read
to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language”. That could
only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be
executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in
the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where
Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the
“testator” instead of “testatrix”. Had respondent judge been careful
and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to the
language of the will but also that there was something wrong in
instituting the supposed granddaughter as sole heiress and giving
nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.
Furthermore, after the hearing conducted by the deputy clerk of
court, respondent judge could have noticed that the notary was not
presented as a witness. In spite of the absence of an opposition,
respondent judge should have personally conducted the hearing on
the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether
the will was validly executed.
Matias v. Salud G.R. No. L-10751, 23 June 1958
FACTS: The CFI denied probate of the will of Gabina Raquel. It
must be noted that Gabina Raquel was suffering from herpes zoster
that afflicted the right arm and shoulder of the testatrix, which
made writing difficult and a painful act. Thus, upon the insistence
of the attorney, Gabina attempted to sign, but since it was so
painful she just managed to thumbmarked the foot of the document
and the left margin at each page. The parties opposing the probate
of the will contended that the will was void due to the irregularities
in the execution thereof.
One of the points raised by the oppositors was that the finger mark
can not be regarded as the decedent’s valid signature as it does
not show distinct identifying ridgelines. And since the finger mark
was an invalid signature, there must appear in
the attestation clause that another person wrote the testator’s name
at his request.
ISSUE: W/N the will was valid.
HELD: YES. As to the clarity of the ridge impressions, it is
so dependent on aleatory requirements as to require dexterity that
can be expected of very few persons; testators should not be
required to possess the skill of trained officers.And as to the
validity of the thumbprints as signature, the SC held that it has been
held in a long line of cases that a thumbprint is always a valid and
sufficient signature for the purpose of complying with the
requirement of the article. Furthermore, the validity of thumbprints
should not be limited in cases of illness or infirmity. A thumbprint
is considered as a valid and sufficient signature in complying with
the requirements of the article.
GARCIA v. LACUESTA
90 Phil 189 (1951)
FACTS: The will is written in the Ilocano dialect and containsthe
following attestation clause: “We, the undersigned, by these
presents do declare that the foregoing testament of Antero Mercado
was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this
attestation clause and that of the left margin of the three pages
thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation clause; this
will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood
by the testator, and it bears the corresponding number in letter
which compose of three pages and all them were signed in the
presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the
presence of the testator and all and
each and every one of us witnesses.” The will appears to have been
signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero
Mercado, followed below by “A reugo del testator” and the name
of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to have written a
cross immediately after his name.
ISSUE: Was the will in compliance with Article 805?
HELD: No. The Supreme Court in affi rming the ruling of the
Court of Appeals held that the attestation clause is fatally defective
for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Florentino
Javier to write the testator’s name under his express direction, as
required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein
petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for such recital
because the cross written by the testator after his name is a
sufficient signature and the signature of Atty. Florentino Javier is
a surplusage. Petitioner’s theory is that the cross is as much a
signature as a thumbmark, the latter having been held sufficient by
this Court in the cases of De Gala v. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil.,
104; Dolar v. Diancin, 55 Phil., 479; Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil.,
848; Neyra v. Neyra, 76 Phil., 296 and Lopez v. Liboro, 81 Phil.,
429. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is
the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by
which he signed his name. After mature refl ection, we are not
prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and
the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Meaning of “in the presence of” : Presence of the witnesses
depends upon the opportunity of the witnesses to see the execution
of the will. “In the presence of each other” does not depend upon
proof of the fact that the eyes of the witnesses were precisely cast
upon the instrument at the moment of each and every subscription.
“In the presence of each other” depends on existing conditions and
positions of the witnesses in relation to each other such that by
merely casting their eyes in the proper direction, they could have
seen each other sign, without changing their relative positions or
existing conditions.
TABOADA v. ROSAL
118 SCRA 195 (1982)
FACTS: Petitioner Taboada presented for probate the alleged last
will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in Cebuano-
Visayan dialect, the will consists of 2 pages. The first page contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or
bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin
by the 3 instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains
the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end
of the attestation clause by the 3 attesting witnesses and at the left
hand margin by the testatrix. The respondent Judge denied probate
of the will for want of formality in its execution, that is, that the 3
subscribing witnesses did not sign at the same place or at the end
of the will as the testator did.
ISSUE: Does Article 805 of the Civil Code require that the
testatrix and all the three instrumental and attesting witnesses sign
at the end of the will and in the presence of the testatrix and of one
another?
HELD: It must be noted that Article 805 uses the terms attested
and subscribed. Attestation consists in witnessing the testator’s
execution of the will in order to see and take note mentally that
those things are done which the statute requires for the execution
of a will and that the signature of the testator exists as a fact. On
the other hand, subscription is the signing of the witnesses’ names
upon the same paper for the purpose of identification of such paper
as the will which was executed by the testator. Insofar as the
requirement of subscription is concerned, it is our considered view
that the will was subscribed in a manner which fully satisfies the
purposes of identification. The signatures of the instrumental
witnesses on the left margin of the fi rst page of the will attested
not only to the genuineness of the signature of the testatrix but also
the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clauses.
While perfection in the drafting of a will may be desirable,
unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored,
especially where the authenticity of the will is not assailed. The
objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and
satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed
at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the
testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly
identified by the subscribing witness to be the same will executed
by the testatrix. “Placement of Attesting Signature”: The attesting
signature of the testator must be found at the logical end of the will,
otherwise the will is void. The attesting signature of the witnesses
must be found at the end of the attestation clause, otherwise the
will is void.
Icasiano vs. Icasiano
G.R. No. L-18979 June 30, 1964
Facts: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of
Josefa Villacorte and for his appointment as executor thereof. It
appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12,
1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her
lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an original and a carbon
copy. On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer
only brought the original copy of the will while the carbon
duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses
failed to sign one of the pages in the original copy but admitted he
may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed the
will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the
testator and other witnesses in his presence.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing
witnesses to affix his signature to a page is sufficient to deny
probate of the will
RULING: No, the failure to sign was entirely through pure
oversight or mere inadvertence. Since the duplicated bore the
required signatures, this proves that the omission was not
intentional. Even if the original is in existence, a duplicate may still
be admitted to probate since the original is deemed to be defective,
then in law, there is no other will bu the duly signed carbon
duplicate and the same can be probated.
The law should not be strictly and literally interpreted as to
penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single
witness over whose conduct she has no control of. Where the
purpose of the law is to guarantee the identity of the testament and
its component pages, and there is no intentional or deliberate
deviation existed.
Note that this ruling should not be taken as a departure from the
rules that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page.
The carbon copy duplicate was regular in all respects.
Icasiano v. Icasiano
11 SCRA 422
FACTS:
Celso Icasiano filed a petition for the allowance and admission to
probate of the alleged will of Josefa Villacorte, and for his
appointment as executor thereof. Natividad and Enrique Icasiano,
a daughter and son of the testatrix, filed their opposition thereto.
During the course of the trial, on 19 March 1959, Celso, started to
present his evidence. But later, on 1 June 1959, he then filed an
amended and supplemental petition, alleging that the decedent had
left a will executed in duplicate and with all the legal requirements,
and that he was submitting the duplicate to the court, which he
found only on 26 May 1959. Natividad and Enrique filed their
opposition, but the will and its duplicate was admitted to probate
by the trial court. Hence, this appeal by the oppositors.
Oppositors-appellants (Natividad and Enrique) in turn introduced
expert testimony to the effect that the signatures of the testatrix in
the duplicate are not genuine, nor were they written or affixed on
the same occasion as the original, and further aver that granting
that the documents were genuine, they were executed through
mistake and with undue influence and pressure because the
testatrix was deceived into adopting as her last will and testament
the wishes of those who will stand to benefit from the provisions
of the will, as may be inferred from the facts and circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will and the provisions and
dispositions thereof, whereby proponents- appellees stand to profit
from properties held by them as attorneys- in-fact of the deceased
and not enumerated or mentioned therein, while oppositors-
appellants are enjoined not to look for other properties not
mentioned in the will, and not to oppose the probate of it, on
penalty of forfeiting their share in the portion of free disposal.
ISSUE:
Was the trial court correct in admitting the will and its duplicate to
probate given the allegations of forgery of the testator’s signature,
or that the will was executed under circumstances constituting
fraud and undue influence and pressure?
(Not raised by the appellants in the case but discussed by the Court
and in Sir’s book) Is the failure of one of the witnesses to sign a
page of the will fatal to its validity?
HELD:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that both the will
and its duplicate are valid in all respects.
On the allegations of forgery, fraud and undue influence:
The Court is satisfied that all the requisites for the validity of a will
have been complied with. The opinion of a handwriting expert
trying to prove forgery of the testatrix’s signature failed to
convince the Court, not only because it is directly contradicted by
another expert but principally because of the paucity of the
standards used by him (only three other signatures), considering
the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident variability of her
signature, and the effect of writing fatigue.
Similarly, the alleged slight variance in blueness of the ink in the
admitted and questioned signatures does not appear reliable,
considering that standard and challenged writings were affixed to
different kinds of paper, with different surfaces and reflecting
power. On the whole, the testimony of the oppositor’s expert is
insufficient to overcome that of the notary and the
two instrumental witnesses as to the will’s execution, which were
presented by Celso during the trial.
Nor is there adequate evidence of fraud or undue influence. The
fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither.
Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a
testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. The
testamentary disposition that the heirs should not inquire into other
property and that they should respect the distribution made in the
will, under penalty of forfeiture of their shares in the free part, do
not suffice to prove fraud or undue influence. They appear
motivated by the desire to prevent prolonged litigation which, as
shown by ordinary experience, often results in a sizeable portion of
the estate being diverted into the hands of non- heirs and
speculators. Whether these clauses are valid or not is a matter to be
litigated on another occasion. It is also well to note that fraud and
undue influence are mutually repugnant and exclude each other;
their joining as grounds for opposing probate shows absence of
definite evidence against the validity of the will.
On the failure of a witness to sign a page in the original, but signed
all pages in the duplicate:
The records show that the original of the will consists of five pages,
and while signed at the end and in every page, it does not contain
the signature of one of the attesting witnesses, Atty. Jose V.
Natividad, on page 3 thereof; but the duplicate copy attached to the
amended and supplemental petition is signed by the testatrix and
her three attesting witnesses in each and every page.
Witness Atty. Natividad, who testified on his failure to sign page 3
of the original, admits that he may have lifted two pages instead of
one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page 3 was signed
in his presence.
The failure Atty. Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely
through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as
by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of
signatures in every page. The text of the attestationclause and the
acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that
no one was aware of the defect at the time. Therefore, Atty.
Natividad’s failure to signpage 3 of the original through mere
inadvertence does not affect the will’s validity.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact
that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective
page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of
the notary public before whom the testament was ratified by
testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly
and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of
the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had
no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity
of the testament and its component pages is sufficiently attained,
no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on
record attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites.
This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict
and literal application of the statutory requirements, where the
purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal
tenor of the law, this Court has held that a testament, with the only
page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41
Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for the correlative
lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to mark the first page
either by letters or numbers is not a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro,
81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court’s policy to
require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in
existence and available, the duplicate is not entitled to probate.
Since they opposed probate of the original because it lacked one
signature in its third page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-
appellants run here into a dilemma: if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon
duplicate, and the same is probatable. If the original is valid and
can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not
be considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said
duplicate serves to prove that the omission of one signature in the
third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not
intentional.
CANEDA V. CA
222 SCRA 781
FACTS:
On December 5, 1978, Mateo Caballero, a widower without any
children and already in the twilight years of his life, executed a last
will and testament at his residence before 3 witnesses.
He was assisted by his lawyer, Atty. Emilio Lumontad.
In the will, it was declared that the testator was leaving by way of
legacies and devises his real and personal properties to several
people all of whom do not appear to be related to the testator.
4 months later, Mateo Caballero himself filed a case seeking the
probate of his last will and testament, but numerous postponements
pushed back the initial hearing of the probate court regarding the
will.
On May 29, 1980, the testator passed away before his petition
could finally be heard by the probate court.
Thereafter one of the legatees, Benoni Cabrera, sought
hisappointment as special administrator of the testator’s estate.
Thereafter, the petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of
the testator, instituted a second petition for intestate proceedings.
They also opposed the probate of the testator’s will and
the appointment of a special administrator for his estate.
Benoni Cabrera died and was replaced by William Cabrera as
special administrator and gave an order that the testate proceedings
for the probate of the will had to be heard and resolved first.
In the course of the proceedings, petitioners opposed to the
allowance of the testator’s will on the ground that on the alleged
date of its execution, the testator was already in poor state of
health such that he could not have possibly executed the same.
Also the genuineness of the signature of the testator is in doubt.
On the other hand, one of the attesting witnesses and the notary
public testified that the testator executed the will in question in
their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that
the testator was in good health and was not unduly influenced in
any way in the execution of his will.
Probate court then rendered a decision declaring the will in
question as the last will and testament of the late Mateo Caballero.
CA affirmed the probate court’s decision stating that it
substantially complies with Article 805.
Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the attestation clause in the will of the testator is fatally
defective or can be cured under the art. 809.
HELD: No. It does not comply with the provisions of the law.
Ordinary or attested wills are governed by Arts. 804 to 809. The
will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator
and the attesting witnesses. The attestation clause need not be
written in a language known to the testator or even to the attesting
witnesses.
It is a separate memorandum or record of the facts surrounding the
conduct of execution and once signed by the witnesses it gives
affirmation to the fact that compliance with the essential
formalities required by law has been observed.
The attestation clause, therefore, provides strong legal guaranties
for the due execution of a will and to insure the authenticity thereof.
It is contended by petitioners that the attestation clause in the will
failed to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses
witnessed the testator sign the will and all its pages in their
presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
And the Court agrees.
The attestation clause does not expressly state therein the
circumstance that said witnesses subscribed their respective
signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
The phrase, “and he has signed the same and every page thereof,
on the space provided for his signature and on the left hand
margin,” obviously refers to the testator and not the instrumental
witnesses as it is immediately preceded by the words” as his last
will and testament.”
Clearly lacking is the statement that the witnesses signed the will
and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another. That the absence of the statement required by law is a fatal
defect or imperfection which must necessarily result in the
disallowance of the will that is here sought to be probated.
Also, Art. 809 does not apply to the present case because
the attestation clause totally omits the fact that the attesting
witnesses signed each and every page of the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other. The defect in this case is not only
with respect to the form or the language of the attestation clause.
The defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the
will itself which is clearly lacking in this case.
Therefore, the probate of the will is set aside and the case for the
intestate proceedings shall be revived.
Article 809 cannot be used to cure the defects of the will when it
does not pertain to the form or language of the will. This is because
there is not substantial compliance with Article 805.
AZUELA v. COURT OF APPEALS
487 SCRA 119
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does
not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
FACTS:
Felix Azuela filed a petition with the trial court for the probate of
a notarial will purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo on June
10, 1981 and notarized on the same day. The will consisted of two
(2) pages and was written in Filipino. The attestation clause did not
state the number of pages and it was not signed by the attesting
witnesses at the bottom thereof. The said witnesses affixed their
signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will though.
Geralda Castillo opposed the petition, claiming that the will was a
forgery. She also argued that the will was not executed and attested
to in accordance with law. She pointed out that the decedent’s
signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will
was not properly acknowledged.
The trial court held the will to be authentic and to have been
executed in accordance with law and, thus, admitted it to probate,
calling to fore “the modern tendency in respect to the formalities
in the execution of a will…with the end in view of giving the
testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes.” According to
the trial court, the declaration at the end of the will under the sub-
title, “Patunay Ng Mga Saksi,” comprised the attestation clause and
the acknowledgement, and was a substantial compliance with the
requirements of the law. It also held that the signing by the
subscribing witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the
will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead
of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfied the purpose of
identification and attestation of the will. The Court of Appeals,
however, reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered the
dismissal of the petition for probate. It noted that the attestation
clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus
rendering the will void and undeserving of probate.
Azuela argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil
Code that “the number of pages used in a notarial will be stated in
the attestation clause” is merely directory, rather than mandatory,
and thus susceptible to what he termed as “the substantial
compliance rule.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject will complied with the requirements of
the law and, hence, should be admitted to probate.
HELD: The petition is DENIED.
A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of
pages on which the will is written is fatally defective. A will whose
attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does
not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally
defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A
notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial
rejection.
Prior to the New Civil Code, the statutory provision governing the
formal requirements of wills was Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Extant therefrom is the requirement that the attestation
state the number of pages of the will. The enactment of the New
Civil Code put in force a rule of interpretation of the requirements
of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that
may vary from the philosophy that governed the said Section 618.
Article 809 of the Civil Code, the Code Commission opted to
recommend a more liberal construction through the “substantial
compliance rule.” However, Justice J.B.L. Reyes cautioned that the
rule “must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be
supplied by an examination of the will itself: whether all the pages
are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each
and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized…But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check
against perjury in the probate proceedings.” The Court suggested
in Caneda v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993,
222 SCRA 781): “the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the
need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and,
correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of
the will being assailed.
However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation
clause and ultimately, of the will itself.”
The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on
which the will was written remains a fatal flaw, despite Art. 809.
This requirement aims at safeguarding the will against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and thus
preventing any increase or decrease in the pages. Following
Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the
will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as
was the situation in Singson and Taboada. In this case, however,
there could have been no substantial compliance with the
requirements under Art. 805 of the Civil Code since there is no
statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as
to the number of pages which comprise the will. There was an
incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having
been allotted for the insertion of the number of pages in the
attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in.
The subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested
to by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will,
they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause. Art. 805
particularly segregates the requirement that the instrumental
witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will
be attested and subscribed by them. The signatures on the left-hand
corner of every page signify, among others, that the witnesses are
aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the
witnesses are referring to the statements contained in the attestation
clause itself. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested
will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin
of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause, such
signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the
clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were
directed towards a wholly different avowal.
The notary public who notarized the subject will wrote, “Nilagdaan
ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa
Lungsod ng Maynila.” By no manner of contemplation can these
words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is
the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It
might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though
it does not follow to the usual language thereof. A jurat is that part
of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
It may not have been said before, but a notarial will that is not
acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to
before a notary public. The importance of the requirement of
acknowledgment is highlighted by the fact that it had been
segregated from the other requirements under Art. 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Art. 806. The express
requirement of Art. 806 is that the will be “acknowledged”, and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The acknowledgment coerces the
testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an officer
of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their
own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain
of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons
who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a
further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in
making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had
designated in the will.
DEFECTS:
(1) AC did not state number of pages
(2) Witnesses did not sign the AC
(3) No acknowledgment by a notary
(4) No signature of the testator in each and every page
(5) Pages were not numbered consecutively

GUERRERO V. BIHIS
521 SCRA 394 | Estorninos
FACTS:
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of petitioner Bella A.
Guerrero and respondent Resurreccion A. Bihis, died. Guerrero
filed for probate in the RTC QC. Respondent Bihis opposed her
elder sister's petition on the following grounds: the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; its attestation clause and
acknowledgment did not comply with the requirements of the law;
the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner
and her children procured the will through undue and improper
pressure and influence. Petitioner Guerrero was appointes special
administratrix. Respondent opposed petitioner's appointment but
subsequently withdrew her opposition. The trial court denied the
probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with because the will was "acknowledged" by the
testatrix and the witnesses at the testatrix's residence at No. 40
Kanlaon Street, Quezon City before Atty. Macario O. Directo who
was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE:
Did the will "acknowledged" by the testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses before a notary public acting outside the place of his
commission satisfy the requirement under Article 806 of the Civil
Code?
HELD:
No. One of the formalities required by law in connection with the
execution of a notarial will is that it must be acknowledged before
a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. 6 This formal
requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for the validity
of a will. 7 In other words, a notarial will that is not acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the instrumental
witnesses is void and cannot be accepted for probate. cDICaS
The Notarial law provides: SECTION 240.Territorial jurisdiction.
— The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-
extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in
the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary
shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of
his jurisdiction.
The compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not
complied with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial
Law was breached. Ineluctably, the acts of the testatrix, her
witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.
JOSE GABUCAN VS JUDGE LUIS MANTA
95 SCRA 751 – Remedial Law – Special Proceedings – Probate of
Will – Documentary Stamp on Notarial Will
In 1977, Judge Luis Manta dismissed a probate proceeding because
the notarial will presented in the said case lacked a documentary
stamp. Judge Manta ruled that the lack of of documentary stamp
made the will inadmissible in evidence and as such there is no will
and testament to probate.
Jose Gabucan, a party in the said case, thereafter affixed the
required documentary stamp and then moved for reconsideration
but the judge refused to reconsider his ruling. Hence, Gabucan filed
a petition for mandamus to compel the judge to admit the notarial
will.
ISSUE: Whether or not a notarial will presented in court which
originally has no documentary stamp may still be admitted after the
required documentary stamp was affixed.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the law (the [old] Tax Code – now Sec.
201 of R.A. 8424) requires a notarial will to have a documentary
stamp:
SEC. 238. Effect of failure to stamp taxable document. — An
instrument, document, or paper which is required by law to be
stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted, or
transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor
shall it or any copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same
be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite
stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto and cancelled.
Xxx
Thus, a notarial will without a documentary stamp may not be
admitted in evidence. However, once the said documentary stamp
is affixed, then the deficiency is cured and it can now be admitted
in evidence. The documentary stamp may be affixed at the time the
taxable document is presented in evidence.

LEE V. TAMBAGO
544 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B.
Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal
profession for notarizing a will that is alleged to be spurious in
nature in containing forged signatures of his father, the decedent,
Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the
decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he devised to Vicente
Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged before
respondent on June 30, 1965. Complainant, however, pointed out
that the residence certificate of the testator noted in the
acknowledgment of the will was dated January 5, 1962.
Furthermore, the signature of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of donation which supposedly
contained his purported signature. Complainant averred that the
signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the deed of
donation were "in any way entirely and diametrically opposed from
one another in all angle[s]."
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of the
residence certificates of the purported witnesses Noynay and
Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had likewise been forged
and merely copied from their respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such purported will
was on file in the archives division of the Records Management
and Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and
the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the ethics of
legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be followed in
the execution of wills. The object of solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door on bad faith and fraud, to
avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their
truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is required by law
to be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself. In
addition, it should be attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another. The will in question was attested by only two witnesses.
On this circumstance alone, the will must be considered void. This
is in consonance with the rule that acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code
likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses. An acknowledgment is the
act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually declares to
the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.
The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1)
to safeguard the testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to
assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends
it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the will in
question shows that this particular requirement was neither strictly
nor substantially complied with. For one, there was the
conspicuous absence of a notation of the residence certificates of
the notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in
the same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law. These
omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested will, respondent was
required to faithfully observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded.
GARCIA V. VASQUEZ
32 SCRA 489
ARTICLE 808
FACTS:
This is a petition for appeal from the CFI of Manila admitting to
probate the will of Gliceria Avelino del Rosario (“Gliceria”)
executed in 1960. Likewise, this is also an appeal to remove the
current administrator, Consuelo Gonzales-Precilla( “Consuelo”) as
special administratrix of the estate on the ground of Consuelo
possesses interest adverse to the estate and to order the RD of
Manila to annotate on the registered lands a notice of Lis Pendens.
When Gliceria died she had no descendants, ascendants, bros or
sisses and 90 yrs old. After which, her niece, Consuelo petitioned
the court to be the administratrix of the properties. The court
approved this because Consuelo has been was already managing
the properties of the deceased during her lifetime. What the
respondents allege is that in the last years of the deceased,
Consuelo sought the transfer of certain parcels of land valued at
300k for a sale price of 30k to her husband Alfonso through fraud
and intimidation. In addition, the oppositors presented evidence
that Consuelo asked the court to issue new Certificates of Titles to
certain parcels of land for the purpose of preparing the inventory
to be used in the probate. Also shown was that NEW TCTs were
issued by the RD for certain lands of the deceased after Consuelo
asked for the old TCTs.
At the end of the probate proceedings, the court ruled that
Counsuelo should be made the administrator, and that the will was
duly executed because of these reasons: NO EVIDENCE HAS
BEEN PRESENTED to establish that the deceased was not of
sound mind, that eventough the allegations state that the deceased
prepared another will in 1956 (12pages), the latter is not prevented
from executing another will in 1960 (1page), and that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses prove their
truthfulness.
ISSUE:
Was the will in 1960 (1 page) duly/properly executed?
HELD:
NO. Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Therefore, For all intents
and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was like a blind
testator, and the due execution of her will would have required
observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of
reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading
the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions
thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are
not in accordance with his wishes. Likewise, the 1970 will was
done in Tagalog which the deceased is not well versed but in
Spanish. This creates doubt as to the due execution of the will and
as well as the typographical errors contain therein which show the
haste in preparing the 1 page will as compared to the 12 page will
created in 1956 written in Spanish. ALSO, as to the blindness, there
was proof given by the testimony of the doctor that the deceased
could not read at near distances because of cataracts. (Testatrix’s
vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading
print.) Since there is no proof that it was read to the deceased twice,
the will was NOT duly executed.
ALSO, Consuelo should be removed as administrator because she
is not expected to sue her own husband to reconvey the lands to the
estate alleged to have been transferred by the deceased to her own
husband.
The notice of lis pendens is also not proper where the issue is not
an action in rem, affecting real property or the title thereto.
ALVARADO V. GAVIOLA
226 SCRA 347
FACTS:
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado executed a
notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin” wherein he disinherited an
illegitimate son, petitioner Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked
a previously executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he was present
when the said notarial will was executed, together with three
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, where the testator did
not read the will himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and read the same
aloud before the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the
notary public, the latter four following the reading with their own
respective copies previously furnished them.
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago ng Ilang
Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na May Petsa
Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was executed changing
some dispositions in the notarial will to generate cash for the
testator’s eye operation.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado and was
read in the same manner as with the previously executed will.
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for probate, Cesar
Alvarado filed his opposition as he said that the will was not
executed and attested as required by law; that the testator was
insane or mentally incapacitated due to senility and old age; that
the will was executed under duress, or influence of fear or threats;
that it was procured by undue pressure and influence on the part of
the beneficiary; and that the signature of the testator was procured
by fraud or trick.
ISSUE:
W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be admitted to
probate despite allegations of defects in the execution and
attestation thereof as testator was allegedly blind at the time of
execution and the double-reading requirement under Art. 808 of
the NCC was not complied with.
HELD:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the letter was
not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father was not
totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when the will and codicil
were executed, but he can be so considered for purposes of Art.
808.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial compliance
where the purpose of the law has been satisfied: that of making the
provisions known to the testator who is blind or incapable of
reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling
him to object if they do not accord with his wishes.
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the presence of the
testator, his three instrumental witnesses, and the notary public.

Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed, upon being
asked, that the contents read corresponded with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take place.
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and the codicil
were not sufficiently made known and communicated to the
testator.
With four persons, mostly known to the testator, following the
reading word for word with their own copies, it can be safely
concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was
read to him were the terms actually appearing on the typewritten
documents.
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the
testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will to himself (as
when he is illiterate), is to make the provisions thereof known to
him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance
with his wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial
requirements of law in order to insure the authenticity of the will,
the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not
affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only
defeat the testator’s will.
GONZALES V. CA
90 SCRA 183
ARTICLES 820-821
FACTS:
Isabel Gabriel died on June 7, 1961 without issue. Lutgarda
Santiago (respondent), niece of Isabel, filed a petition for probate
of Isabel's will designating her as the principal beneficiary and
executrix. The will was typewritten in Tagalog and was executed
2 months prior to death of Isabel.
The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gonzales (petitioner), also a
niece of Isabel, on the following grounds: 1. the will is not genuine,
2. will was not executed and attested as required by law, 3. the
decedent at the time of the making of the will did not have
testamentary capacity due to her age and sickness, and 4. the will
was procured through undue influence.
The trial court disallowed the probate of the will but the Court of
Appeals Reversed the said decision of the trial court. The
petitioner filed a petition for review with SC claiming that the CA
erred in holding that the will of the decedent was executed and
attested as required by law when there was absolutely no proof that
the 3 instrumental witnesses are credible.
ISSUES:
1. Can a witness be considered competent under Art 820-821 and
still not be considered credible as required by Art. 805?
2. Is it required that there must be evidence on record that the
witness to a will has good standing in his/her community or
that he/she is honest or upright?
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner submits that the term credible in Article
805 requires something more than just being competent and,
therefore, a witness in addition to being competent under
Articles 820-821 must also be credible under Art. 805. The
competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will
is determined by the statute (Art. 820 and 821), whereas his
credibility depends on the appreciation of his testimony and
arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said
witness is telling the truth. In the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El
Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May
3, 1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency
as a witness is one thing, and it is another to be a credible
witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says.
Trial courts may allow a person to testify as a witness upon a
given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter
decide whether to believe or not to believe his testimony."
2. No. There is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify
initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing
in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and for
being reliable, his honesty and uprightness (such attributes are
presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved
otherwise by the opposing party) in order that his testimony
may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough
that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil
Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind
can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions
propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown
from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved
otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb
and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the
Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under
Article 821 of the Civil Code.
CODOY V. CALUGAY
312 SCRA 333
FACTS:
On 6 April 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and
Eufemia Patigas, devisees and legatees of the holographic will of
the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed a petition for
probate of the said will. They attested to the genuineness and due
execution of the will on 30 August 1978.
Eugenio Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed their
opposition claiming that the will was a forgery and that the same is
even illegible. They raised doubts as regards the repeated
appearing on the will after every disposition, calling the same out
of the ordinary. If the will was in the handwriting of the deceased,
it was improperly procured.
Evangeline Calugay, etc. presented 6 witnesses and various
documentary evidence.
The first witness was the clerk of court of the probate court who
produced and identified the records of the case bearing the
signature of the deceased.
The second witness was election registrar who was made to
produce and identify the voter’s affidavit, but failed to as the same
was already destroyed and no longer available.
The third, the deceased’s niece, claimed that she had acquired
familiarity with the deceased’s signature and handwriting as she
used to accompany her in collecting rentals from her various
tenants of commercial buildings and the deceased always issued
receipts. The niece also testified that the deceased left a
holographic will entirely written, dated and signed by said
deceased.
The fourth witness was a former lawyer for the deceased in the
intestate proceedings of her late husband, who said that the
signature on the will was similar to that of the deceased but that he
can not be sure.
The fifth was an employee of the DENR who testified that she was
familiar with the signature of the deceased which appeared in the
latter’s application for pasture permit. The fifth, respondent
Evangeline Calugay, claimed that she had lived with the deceased
since birth where she had become familiar with her signature and
that the one appearing on the will was genuine.
Codoy and Ramonal’s demurrer to evidence was granted by the
lower court. It was reversed on appeal with the Court of Appeals
which granted the probate.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Article 811 of the Civil Code,
providing that at least three witnesses explicitly declare the
signature in a contested will as the genuine signature of the
testator, is mandatory or directory.
2. Whether or not the witnesses
sufficiently establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deceased’s holographic will.
HELD:
1. YES. The word “shall” connotes a
mandatory order, an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a
statute, is mandatory.
In the case at bar, the goal to be achieved by the law, is to give
effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be prevented is
the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit
will employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.
The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine
the true intent of the deceased.
2. NO. We cannot be certain that the
holographic will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
The clerk of court was not presented to declare explicitly that the
signature appearing in the holographic will was that of the
deceased.
The election registrar was not able to produce the voter’s affidavit
for verification as it was no longer available.
The deceased’s niece saw pre-prepared receipts and letters of the
deceased and did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a
document or write a note.
The will was not found in the personal belongings of the deceased
but was in the possession of the said niece, who kept the fact about
the will from the children of the deceased, putting in issue her
motive.
Evangeline Calugay never declared that she saw the decreased
write a note or sign a document.
The former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
(As it appears in the foregoing, the three-witness requirement was
not complied with.)
A visual examination of the holographic will convinces that the
strokes are different when compared with other documents written
by the testator.
The records are remanded to allow the oppositors to adduce
evidence in support of their opposition.
The object of solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of
wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a
way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law
to restrain and curtail the exercise the right to make a will.
However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document
being adjudged as the will of the testator, which is why if the
holographic will is contested, the law requires three witnesses to
declare that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.
Article 811, paragraph 1. provides: “In the probate of a holographic
will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows the
handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the
will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the
will is contested, at least three of such witnesses shall be required.”
The word “shall” connotes a mandatory order, an imperative
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that
the presumption is that the word “shall”, when used in a statute, is
mandatory.
AJERO V. CA
236 SCRA 488
ARTICLES 813-814
FACTS:
The holographic will of Annie San was submitted for probate.
Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither
the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s
handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were
not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured by
petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.
The petition was also contested by Dr. Ajero with respect to the
disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said
property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she
was not its sole owner.
However, the trial court still admitted the decedent’s holographic
will to probate.
The trial court held that since it must decide only the question of
the identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary
capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of
the will for its failure to comply with the formalities prescribed by
law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.
On appeal, the CA reversed said Decision holding that the decedent
did not comply with Articles 313 and 314 of the NCC. It found that
certain dispositions in the will were either unsigned or undated, or
signed by not dated. It also found that the erasures, alterations and
cancellations made had not been authenticated by decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in holding that Articles 813 and 814 of the
NCC were not complies with.
HELD:
YES. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects
the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will,
but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the
dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be
effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.
Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article
814.
Unless the authenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions
were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator’s
signature, their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack
of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes.
It is also proper to note that he requirements of authentication of
changes and signing and dating of dispositions appear in provisions
(Article 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the
necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will
(Article 810).
This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation
that only the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and not
those found in Articles 813 and 814 – are essential to the probate
of a holographic will.
Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and Article 839 of the
Civil Code enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills. These
lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will.
In a petition to admit a holographic will, the only issues to be
resolved are:
1. whether the instrument submitted is,
indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament;
2. whether said will was executed in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
3. whether the decedent had the
necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was
executed; and
4. whether the execution of the will
and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is
to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on
this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends.
In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the
requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the
testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will no
result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionable handwritten by the testator.
 The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such
insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic
Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves
but not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the
erasures, cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix herein,
her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
Kalaw v. Relova
132 SCRA 237
ARTICLE 814

FACTS:

On September 1, 1971,Gregorio Kalaw, claiming to be the sole heir

of his deceased sister, Natividad Kalaw, filed a petition for the
probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named Rosa Kalaw, a sister

of the testatrix as her sole heir. She opposed probate alleging that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and
insertions without the proper authentication by the full signature of
the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code reading:
Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration
in a holographic will the testator must authenticate the same by his
full signature.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written,

should be given effect and probated so that she could be the sole
heir thereunder.

Trial Court denied petition to probate the holographic will.

Reconsideration denied.

ISSUE: W/N the original unaltered text after subsequent

alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack
of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be
probated or not, with Rosa as sole heir.

HELD:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and

interlineations made by the testator in a holographic Will litem not
been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby
invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular
words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had

only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting
the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator,
the effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked for the
simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which
could remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be
given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the
testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law
by affixing her full signature,