Complied Cases in Constitutional Law 2

Atty. Frederick Dedace

WHO EXERCISES POLICE POWER?

LAWS

MMDA vs Bel-Air Village Assoc.

March 27, 2000

Puno, J.

FACTS

Petitioner MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private
subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.

On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting
respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996.

Actions Filed:

1. BAVA – applied for injunction; trial court issued temporary restraining order but after due hearing, trial court denied the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
2. BAVA – appealed to CA which issued preliminary injunction and later ruled that MMDA has no authority to order the opening
of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged
in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
MMDA – filed motion for reconsideration but was denied by CA; hence the current recourse.

ISSUES

1. Has the MMDA the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers
2. Is the passage of an ordinance a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public
traffic?

HELD

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, "development authority." All its functions are administrative in nature.

The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that
grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through
their respective legislative councils that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its
proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so ruling.

The MMDA was created to put some order in the metropolitan transportation system but unfortunately the powers granted
by its charter are limited. Its good intentions cannot justify the opening for public use of a private street in a private subdivision
without any legal warrant. The promotion of the general welfare is not antithetical to the preservation of the rule of law.

DISPOSITION

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are affirmed.
MMDA V. GARIN
April 15, 2005

FACTS

The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt
(TVR) by MMDA and his driver's license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on August 1995.

Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court.

Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction, contending that, in
the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to
deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating
the due process clause of the Constitution.

The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified — and therefore unlimited — fines and other
penalties on erring motorists.

The trial court rendered the assailed decision in favor of herein respondent.

ISSUE

WON MMDA, through Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 could validly exercise police power.

HELD

Police Power, having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals
not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. 15 A local government is a "political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." 16 Local government
units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police power through their respective legislative
bodies.

The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation
endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community.

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislative to make, ordain and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for subjects of the same.
There is no provision in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its council to “enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate
funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. All its functions are administrative in nature. It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, P.O., NGO’s and
private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services.”
TEST OF POLICE POWER

BALACUIT V CFI
June 30, 1988

FACTS

The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Ordinance No 640 on 21 April 1969, “penalizing any person, group of persons,
entity or engaged in the business of selling admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay
full payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as managers of theaters assailed the
validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review.
Petitioners contend that it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust, confiscatory and
an undue restraint of trade.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ordinance 640 prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to children 7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional
or not?

HELD

Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the
test of police power. To invoke the exercise the police power, it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with
private rights and adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive
amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at
which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the
due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way, to fix what prices
of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.

It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to
regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. However, to invoke the
exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private
business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts.

The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a valid exercise of police power. While
it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the
regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with
the business or calling subject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own way,
to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay
away.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act
of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of
a common right. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power,
be upheld as valid.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment
is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately
executory
LOZANO VS MARTINEZ
1986

FACTS

Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the
informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions
were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

ISSUES:

1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?

HELD:

The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or
a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on
the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offenseagainstpublicorder.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment
upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although
not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as
currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence
should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can
very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.

DEL ROSARIO VS BENGZON

December 21, 1989

FACTS

On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.
The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of
Administrative Order 62 was amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the
effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections
4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of medical doctors
in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court
to declare some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative Order 62 issued
pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over
which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it
as a petition for prohibition instead.
ISSUE

Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription in
the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.

HELD

Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the constitutional mandate for the State “to
protect and promote the right to health of the people” and “to make essential goods, health and other social services available
to all the people at affordable cost” (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the
use by doctors of “no substitution” and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the
circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since
his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a
brand-name drug with “no substitution,” the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent
would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the population in a still
developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.

TABLARIN VS JUDGE GUTIERREZ

July 31, 1987

FACTS

Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of
medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have
not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition
for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to
enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated
23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of
eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987] and from requiring the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting
applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing
on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE

Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are constitutional.

HELD

Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for admission to
medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote all the important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community. An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of
which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some
consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other
hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.
 MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools.
That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission
to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the government is
entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of
applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold
that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is
useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who
would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying the petition for a writ
of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

ZONING AND REGULATORY ORDINANCES

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL &MOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY MAYOR

1967

FACTS

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition
of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila. They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the
powers of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also asserted
that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process
insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection
from city authorities. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague. The law also classified motels into two
classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary. It was also
unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours. There was also a prohibition for
persons below 18 in the hotel. The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the license of the hotels that
violated the ordinance. The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional. Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.

ISSUE

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause?

HELD

No. Judgment reversed.

"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation. O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford
Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality
of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the
matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the
ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals, particularly fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage
"establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the
city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional
guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or violative of due process. There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided.

Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions
based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.

Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be
implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal corporations are allowed
a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal principle that
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.

CRUZ VS PARAS
1983

FACTS

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assailed the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the
Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage
in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy
and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due
hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of
police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE

WON a municipality may rely on its police power to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. NO.

HELD

Police power granted to municipal corporations: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.- The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience
of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."

US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of police power is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law, an act of the
legislature, against public policy, or is unreasonable, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right.

US v. Salaveria: The general welfare clause has two branches:

1. It attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law.
2. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity.
**reasonableness, consonance with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, consistency with the laws or
policy of the State.

It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments
made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed.

VELASCO VS VILLEGAS
February 14, 1983

FACTS

In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the
constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a
barber shop. They contend that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.

ISSUE

Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power

HELD

No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power
measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the
business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the
ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”

The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a
1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in
statutory form the police power to a municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal
authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is
well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”

MAGTAJAS VS PRYCE PROPERTIES

1994

FACTS

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties
Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the operation of the
casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation
of casino for the general welfare.

ISSUE
Whether the Ordinances are valid.

HELD

No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in
the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:Sec. 16.

General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific
and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform
to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is authorized
by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Local councils
exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance
the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

Wherefore, the petition is denied.

TANO VS SOCRATES
August 21, 1997

FACTS

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish
and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching , gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and
shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.
Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and
resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood,
and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

HELD

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer from
any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies
as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence
fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of
subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section
2, Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and
the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned
ordinances cannot be doubted.

ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY VS CA

March 31, 2000

FACTS

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists,
Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedo
dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not allowed to practice
optometry within the city (but may sell glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under
the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within
Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in
assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise
of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a
contract.

ISSUE

Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD

NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within
the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal
application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely
impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are
ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.

CITY OF MANILA VS JUDGE LAGUIO

April 21, 2005

FACTS
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION
OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed
as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not
market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate
motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided
as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD

The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

1. Must not contravene with the Constitution or statute

2. Must not be unfair or oppressive
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory
4. Must be general and consistent with public policy
5. Must not be unreasonable

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon;
and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment
of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION VS CITY OF MANILA

January 20, 2009

FACTS

On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774 entitled “An Ordinance” prohibiting short time admission in hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an operator of mini
hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their
patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by
the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is
empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor
of the City.

ISSUE

Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.

HELD

The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process
clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists
who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or
less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must
appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of
private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining
to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS

BAUTISTA VS JUNIO
January 31, 1984

FACTS

The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private motor
vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the
due process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.

Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation
of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise
unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.”

Respondents denied the above allegations.

ISSUE

Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional
rights.

HELD

No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may
cut into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which contains
a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set
forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA VS BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION

September 30, 1982

FACTS

Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon
accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis

On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or
to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as
well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for
operation.

ISSUES:

A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential
Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?

HELD

As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort
of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can
prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.

MIRASOL VS DPWH
June 8, 2006

FACTS

Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles at the toll way on the
ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying
the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in
the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

ISSUE

Whether or not administrative regulation banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional.

HELD

No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The
sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that
assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public
safety.

ANGLO FIL TRADING VS LAZARO

September 2, 1983

FACTS

Respondent Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) implemented a policy of integrating contractors engaged in stevedoring services and
have only one stevedoring contractor to engage in cargo-handling services in Manila South Harbor to insure efficiency and
economy in cargo-handling operation and provide better service to port users and to amply protect the interest of labor and the
government as well. The evaluation of performance of existing contractors made by a special committee created by PPA resulted
to an award in favor of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. (OTSI).

Petitioners with hold-over permits, contends that the award is invalid because contracts entered into with local and foreign clients
or customers would be impaired.

ISSUE

Whether the issuance of a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion, and on the policies, rules and regulations
implemented by the latter, or whether the non-issuance thereof is an unlawful deprivation of property rights.

HELD

From the viewpoint of procedure, there was no grave abuse of discretion or want of jurisdiction when the CFI judge lifted ex-
parte the temporary restraining order he had earlier issued also ex-parte. Subsequent to the issuance of the questioned order,
the CFI heard the parties on the application for a writ of preliminary injunction and, after hearing the parties' evidence and
arguments, denied the application for the writ. It is also not grave abuse of discretion when a court dissolves ex-parte abuse of
discretion when a court dissolves ex- parte a restraining order also issued ex-parte. Further, the contention that due process was
violated resulting to a confiscatory effect on private property is likewise without merit. In the first place, Anglo-Fil, et. al. were
operating merely on "hold-over" permits, which were based on PPA Memorandum Order 1 (19 January 1977). All hold-over
permits were by nature temporary and subject to subsequent policy guidelines as may be implemented by PPA. Such should have
served as sufficient notice that, at any time, PIPSI's and Anglo-Fil et.al.'s authorities may be terminated. Whether PIPSI, and Anglo-
Fil, et. al. would be issued a Permit to Operate (PTO) depended on the sound discretion of PPA and on the policies, rules and
regulations that the latter may implement in accordance with the statutory grant of power. The latter, therefore, cannot be said
to have been deprived of property without due process because, in this respect, what was given them was not a property right
but a mere privilege and they should have taken cognizance of the fact that since they have no vested right to operate in the
South Harbor, their permits can be withdrawn anytime the public welfare deems it best to do so. Thus, unless the case justifies
it, the judiciary will not interfere in purely administrative matters. Such discretionary power vested in the proper administrative
body, in the absence of arbitrariness and grave abuse so as to go beyond the statutory authority, is not subject to the contrary
judgment or control of others. In general, courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the
administrative departments of the government. This is particularly true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment
or discretion, and to findings of fact.

CHAVEZ VS ROMULO
June 9, 2004

FACTS

GMA delivered a speech to PNP directing PNP Chief Hermogenes Ebdane to suspend the issuance pf Permit to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence PTCFOR). Ebdane issued guidelines banning carrying firearms outside of residence. Petitioner, Francisco
Chaves requested DILG to reconsider the implementation. The request was denied. Hence the petition for prohibition and
injunction against Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo and PNP Chief Ebdane.

ISSUE

Whether or not revocation of PTCFOR is a violation of right to property? Whether or not the banning of carrying firearms outside
the residence is a valid exercise of police power?

HELD

Petition dismissed. Just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, PTCFOR may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked.
Revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege.
The basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order in the society. the assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit
possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to
carry their firearms outside of their residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an
absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be reasonably
imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory
conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the
Declaration of Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: “The correlative power to revoke or recall
a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.”

MMDA VS VIRON TRANSPORT

August 15, 2007

FACTS

Due to the continuing traffic jams that clog the streets of Metro Manila, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the
E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System which states that;
Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY – The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is hereby designated
as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake such infrastructure development
work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-over to more appropriate agencies, if found
suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;
b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agencies and/or entities owning
them;
c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;
d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government agencies, entities, and/or private
persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate the implementation of the project;
e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or implementation of the projects, in
accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in government.
f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local government units, government-
owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;
g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and
h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes of this
Executive Order.

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project. Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council
(MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDA, issued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 2003 expressing full
support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to integrate the different transport modes via the establishment of common
bus parking terminal areas, the MMC cited the need to remove the bus terminals located along major thoroughfares of Metro
Manila.

ISSUE

Whether the E.O. was an unreasonable exercise of police power?

HELD

For the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:
Section 17: The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws,
statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the
recognition that salus populi est suprema lex ─ the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being
delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as
by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government
Code of 1991.
The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as
the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis there for.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized
to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to
establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which,
by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of
transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question.

PIMENTEL VS COMELEC
November 3, 2003

FACTS

Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a
senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law.

ISSUE

Is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on
candidates for Senator?

HELD

Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local
government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring
candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.

REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EXECUTIVE SECRETATY

April 2, 2009

FACTS

There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated during the
examination period among examinees reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The examinees were
provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric
Nursing) and V (Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two Board of Nursing members.
Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful
examinees.- President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).- Review Center Association of the Philippines
(petitioner), an organization of independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR arguing, among
other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and
professional organizations will effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however believed that
suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566.- A dialogue between the petitioner
and CHED took place. Revised IRR was approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR praying to
exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review
centers to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHED’s coverage to public and private
institutions of higher.- In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly contradict the intention of the said
Executive Order No.566; As to the request to clarify what is meant by tie -up/be integrated with an HEI, tie -
up/be integrated simply means, to be in partner with an HEI.

Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying for the annulment of the R I R R , t h e
d e c l a r a t i o n o f E O 5 6 6 a s i n v a l i d a n d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l exercise of legislative power a n d t h e
prohibition against CHED from implementing the RIRR. M o t i o n t o i n t e r v e n e
f i l e d b y o t h e r organizations/institutions were granted by the Court. O n 2 1 M a y 2 0 0 8 , CHED issued CHED
Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008 (CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May
2008 for all existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in acco rdance with the RIRR.
On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved to require the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of
EO 566, the RIRR, and CMO 21, s.2008.

ISSUES

Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHED’s jurisdiction and
whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s rule-making power.

HELD

Police power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and the general welfare
of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.1[37]
Police power primarily rests with the legislature although it may be exercised by the President and administrative boards by
virtue of a valid delegation.2[38] Here, no delegation of police power exists under RA 7722 authorizing the President to
regulate the operations of non-degree granting review centers.
EMINENT DOMAIN