Problem 1.

The given statement is false. In every instance of the stable matching problem, there is not a
stable matching containing a pair (m,w) where m is ranked first on the preference list of w and w
is ranked first on the preference list of m.
Let us consider the following scenario from the stable matching problem say,
M prefers w to w`
M` prefers w` to w
W prefers m` to m
W` prefers m to m`
In this scenario nobody pairs with a person who is ranked first for them. So, in any case the given
statement will remain to be false.

Problem 4.
There will always be a stable assignment of students to hospitals if the two situations which
cause instability never arise.
At one point of time any student will be either committed to the hospital or be free.
ALGORITHM :
Do
While some hospital ‘h’ has an available position for a student
‘h’ offers a position for the next available student ‘s’ on its preference list
If ‘s’ is available
Accept the offer
else
‘s’ is already made himself available to another hospital ‘h`’
If ‘s’ prefers ‘h`’ to ‘h’
‘s’ remains with ‘h`’
Else
‘s’ makes itself available to ‘h’
‘h`’ and ‘h’ are linked with each other in the way that if the number of vacancies in one hospital
get reduced by one it get increased by one in the other.
We need to prove that the there is always a stable assignment of students to hospitals. So,we
need to prove that the two cases which cause instability never arise.
Let us consider the first case.We will try to prove by contradiction.
1. If ‘h’ prefers s` to s,then ‘h’ would have offered a position to s` before it offered to s and
s` has made itself available to another hospital h`.This would make s` not to be free. So,
by .contradiction this case cannot arise
2. For the second case let us consider a pair (s,h). ‘h’ must have offered a position to ‘s’ and
‘s’ must have rejected it for the sake of ‘h`’ which she also prefers.
This goes on to prove that the there can always be a stable assignment of students to hospitals.