Mendoza v.

Arrieta

G.R. No. L-32599, June 29, 1979

Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

A three- way vehicular accident occurred involving a car owned and driven bypetitioner Edgardo
Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by respondent RodolfoSalazar, and a gravel and sand truck
owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven byFreddie Montoya. As a consequence of said mishap,
two separate Informations for RecklessImprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed against
Rodolfo Salazar and FreddieMontoya with the CFI of Bulacan. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver
Salazar of anyliability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s jeepand
petitioner’s car was the result of the former having been bumped from behind by thetruck driven by
Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not acomplainant against truck-driver
Montoya but only against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. Afterthe termination of the criminal cases, petitioner
filed a civil case against respondentsSalazar and Timbol for the damages sustained by his car as a result of
the collision involvingtheir vehicles.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for damagesbased on quasi-
delict against private respondents

Held:

Insofar as Timbol is concerned the answer is yes. The respondent Judge wrongfullysustained
Timbol’s allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior joint judgment in acriminal case filed against
him, wherein no reservation to file a separate civil case was madeby petitioner and where the latter
actively participated in the trial and tried to provedamages against Salazar only. For petitioner's cause of
action against Timbol in the civilcase is based on quasi-delict. Respondent Judge committed reversible
error when hedismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Article 31 of the CivilCode provides
that, “When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the actor omission complained of
as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of thecriminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.” Timbol’s submission thatpetitioner's failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action of his right to file anindependent civil action, as required under section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court,
bars theinstitution of such separate civil action is untenable. For inasmuch as Article 31 (in relationto
Articles 2176 and 2177) of the Civil Code creates a civil liability distinct and different fromthe civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, noreservation is required to be made
in the criminal case. And so, to reiterate, the civil casefiled against Timbol is not barred by the fact that
petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminalaction, his right to file an independent civil action based on
quasi-delict.But insofar as Salazar is concerned the answer is no. Inasmuch as civil liability co-exists
withcriminal responsibility in negligence cases, the offended party has the option between anaction for
enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of theRevised Penal Code, and an
action for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana underArticle 2177 of the Civil Code. The action
for enforcement of civil liability based on culpacriminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
is deemed simultaneouslyinstituted with the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for
separate

application by the offended party. The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yieldsthe conclusion
that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against Salazar on culpacriminal and not on culpa
aquiliana as evidenced by his active participation and interventionin the prosecution of the criminal suit
against said Salazar. The latter's civil liabilitycontinued to be involved in the criminal action until its
termination. Such being the case,there was no need for petitioner to have reserved his right to file a
separate civil action ashis action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
case.Salazar cannot be held civilly liable for damages sustained by petitioner’s car forconsidering that the
collision between the jeep driven by him and the car owned and drivenby Mendoza was the result of the
hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven byMontoya, it cannot be said that Salazar was at fault.
Hence, the right of petitioner to claimdamages from Salazar did not arise. Accordingly, inasmuch as
petitioner's cause of action asagainst jeep-owner-driver Salazar is ex- delictu, founded on Article 100 of
the Revised PenalCode, the civil action must be held to have been extinguished in consonance with
Section3(c) which provides that, “Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the factfrom which the

civil right arise did not exist

…”
 GR. No. L-1299
PEREZ VS POMAR

Facts:

August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
asking for the rate of compensation for the services he rendered being an English interpreter between the
defendant and the military authorities at Tabacalera Company. Ruled in his favor for such sum. The
complaint also asked that the defendant be condemned to the payment of damages in the sum of $3,200,
gold, together with the costs of suit. Petitioner also asked that Eugenio Pomar be condemned to pay
damages.

According to the complaint it was alleged that Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of the Compañia
General de Tabacos, verbally requested the plaintiff last December, 8, 1901, to act as interpreter until
May 31, 1902.

Perez services were ready whenever needed. Because of that he abandoned his own soap
company business, Pomar assured him that Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services. The
defendant even gave him flattering promises of employment with the company, but Perez refused. his
only proof as to the same was Mr. Pomar’s word as a gentleman.

To answer the complaint, Pomar denied everything. Instead, he said that Perez borrowed money
from him for his business, and that he delivered 36 arrobas of oil worth $106, and three packages of resin
for use in coloring his soap. Respondent only accompanied him in his trips because he wanted to extend
his business relations, and Pomar occasionally accompanied him because of friendship, and especially
because of the free transportation given him. Because of that Perez acted as interpreter in the
conferences by his own free will, without Pomar requesting him, so no legal relation between him and the
company existed.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is oblige to pay the continued service rendered by the petitioner.

Held:

Yes, because from the testimonies at trial, it appears that Perez indeed rendered services as
interpreter of English. He obtained passes and accompanied Pomar in his journeys in Laguna. But, it
doesn’t appear on record whether Perez was at the disposal of Pomar for 6 months. No contract was filed
or any other innominate contract, but there was tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of services.
Pomar accepted the service, and Perez rendered it expecting that the benefit would be reciprocal. An
obligation arises from this scenario. There was an innominate contract facio ut des. No salary was fixed
for the services, so the court must determine its value, to be determined by the custom and frequent use
of the place in which such services were rendered. The court ruled to Perez. Pomar should pay 200
Mexican pesos, less 50 pesos as to the costs of the suit.
 G.R. No. L-48006
BARREDO VS ALMARIO

FACTS:
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a “kalesa” thereby killing the
16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and
reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the
criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of the taxi (employer of
Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in
the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily
and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against
negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to
file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC
judgment Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven
that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had
had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him – something he failed to overcome
during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would
have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising
from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his
employee (Article 1903).