Independent  watchdogs  or  integrated  policy-­‐makers?  

Civil  society  participation  in  the  hybrid  governance  environment  
around  the  Baltic  Sea1  
 
Marta  Reuter    
Stockholm  University  
 
 
Abstract  
The  process  of  transnationalization  and  its  implications  for  civil  society  are  rapidly  
coming  to  the  forefront  in  civil  society  and  third  sector  studies,  as  well  as  in  research  
on  international  governance  where  civil  society  organizations,  along  with  other  
non-­‐state  actors,  are  increasingly  noted  as  playing  an  important  role  in  supra-­‐  and  
international  multi-­‐level  governance  processes.  This  chapter  discusses  
regionalization  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area  as  a  vehicle  for  change  regarding  the  complex  
relationship  between  regional  NGO  networks  and  the  region’s  governmental  actors.  
 
Introduction  
When  we  try  to  make  sense  of  the  transformations  taking  place  in  Scandinavian  
and   Northern   European   civil   societies,   transnationalization   must   be   considered  
as   one   of   the   crucial   factors,   for   two   reasons.   First,   because   it   fundamentally  
affects   civil   society   actors   at   the   organizational   level   by   creating   new   political  
and   economic   opportunity   structures   and   obliterating   old   ones;   thereby  
prompting   the   development   of   new   strategies,   the   re-­‐formulation   of   goals   and  
the   re-­‐making   of   organizational   identities.   Second,   because   civil   society  
organizations   themselves   play   an   important   role   in   the   transnationalization  
process,  actively  shaping  the  complex  political,  cultural  and  economic  push-­‐and-­‐
pull  dynamics  that  ultimately  decide  its  direction  and  scope.    
 

                                                                                                               
1
Chapter in Wijkström, F. and A. Zimmer (2011, eds.) Nordic Civil Society at a
Cross-Roads. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

  1  
Research   on   transnationalization   points   often   to   the   blurring   of   borders   –  
geographical,  but  also  institutional  –  as  one  of  the  inherent  characteristics  of  this  
process  (Djelic  and  Sahlin-­‐Andersson  2006).  This  phenomenon  will  be  the  focus  
of  the  present  chapter,  where  I  seek  to  explore  transnationalization  as  one  of  the  
“drivers”   behind   the   current   transformations   that   affect   civil   society   in   Northern  
Europe.  In  particular,  I  want  to  illustrate  the  way  in  which  transnationalization  is  
accompanied   by   the   increasing   dissolution   of   boundaries   between   civil   society  
and  the  other  societal  spheres,  in  this  case  primarily  the  state,  and  the  increasing  
organizational  hybridization  that  is  the  result  of  this  blurring.    
 
The  setting  
The   discussion   will   be   set   in   the   context   of   the   wider   debate   on   transnational  
governance   and   its   implications   for   civil   society.   The   notion   of   governance   has  
from   the   very   start   assumed   a   greater   role   for   non-­‐state   actors   such   as   civil  
society   organizations   in   policy-­‐making,   both   in   the   national   and   in   the  
international  arena.  In  the  particular  context  that  will  be  the  empirical  focus  of  
this   chapter,   namely   the   cross-­‐border   regionalization   process   that   has   been  
unfolding  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area2  in  the  last  twenty  years,  the  idea  (and  ideal)  of  
transnational  governance  at  a  regional  level  has  been  discursively  linked  to  the  
political   efforts   promoting   the   development   of   a   regional   civil   society.   The  
involvement   of   non-­‐governmental   organizations   (NGOs)   and   other   non-­‐state  
actors   in   the   transnational   region-­‐building   project   has   been   one   of   the   most  
important  themes  in  the  political  and  academic  regionalist  discourses,  projecting  
the   image   of   the   emerging   region   as   one   where   regional   integration   is   driven  
from  ‘below’  and  ‘within’,  and  where  states  and  their  agencies  are  not  the  only,  
or   even   the   key,   engines   in   this   process   (Weaver   and   Joenniemi   1991;   Joenniemi  
1993;  Waever  1993;  Lehti  2002)  
 

                                                                                                               
2
The Baltic Sea area or region (the terms will be used alternately here) is usually defined as consisting
of the Northern and Eastern European countries that border on the Baltic Sea, i.e. Germany, Denmark,
Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. In some institutional contexts also the
Nordic countries not bordering on the sea – Iceland and Norway – are seen as part of the region.

  2  
These   two   parallel   processes   –   (a)   the   construction   of   transnational/regional  
governance  structures,  and  (b)  the  development  of  a  ‘regional  civil  society’  that  
would  be  able  to  actively  participate  in  these  structures  –  might  be  seen  as  two  
sides   of   the   same   coin,   as   naturally   inter-­‐linked   parts   of   a   larger   process   of  
transnational,   post-­‐Cold   War   region-­‐building   with   the   aim   of   binding   together  
the   formerly   separated   societies   of   Northern   and   Eastern   Europe.   Seemingly,  
these   processes   go   hand   in   hand;   Rosenau   and   Czempiel’s   famous   notion   of  
‘governance   without   government’   (1992)   assumes   both   the   wish   to   introduce  
new  problem-­‐solving  mechanisms  located  at  least  partly  beyond  the  framework  
of  the  nation-­‐state,  and  the  necessity  to  encourage  new,  non-­‐state  actors  to  play  
a  more  active  role  in  policy-­‐making.    
 
However,   little   attention   has   so   far   been   given   to   the   tensions   that   these   two  
objectives   may   generate   in   relation   to   each   other.   Above   all,   the   focus   of   much   of  
the  ‘governance  without  government’  literature  on  the  ascent  of  non-­‐state  actors  
tends   to   obscure   the   fact   that   the   state   and   its   agencies,   for   all   their   new  
discreteness,     generally   continue   playing   a   dominant   role   in   political   governance  
structures   both   at   the   national   and   the   international   level.   They   are   by   far   still  
the   most   important   actors   for   the   other   players   to   relate   to,   work   with,   or  
position  themselves  against.  Additionally,  what  often  gets  lost  in  the  analysis  is  
the   fact   that   the   relationship   is   often   an   extremely   unequal   one,   with   the   state  
actors  retaining  most  of  the  power,  and  also  dictating  the  rules  of  the  game  in  the  
new  governance  setting.    
 
This  is  particularly  true  in  the  international  arena,  where  states  are  accustomed  
to   being   the   key,   if   not   the   only,   actors.   In   the   context   of   transnational  
phenomena   such   as   cross-­‐border   regionalization,   this   means   that   civil   society  
organizations   have   to   create   their   own   transnational   cooperation   structures,  
while   at   the   same   time   carving   out   a   space   for   themselves   in   the   emerging  
regional   governance   environment,   above   all   in   relation   to   their   governmental  
partners.    
 

  3  
  Given  that  the  general  attitude  of  CSOs  towards  the  state  (and  vice  versa)  differs  
enormously   across,   but   also   within,   individual   societies,   it   is   interesting   to   ask  
what   this   process   looks   like.   What   does   it   mean   for   civil   society   actors   from  
different   countries   and   different   civil   society   regimes   (Salamon   and   Anheier  
1998)  to  be  drawn  into  a  transnational  governance  environment,  which  almost  
by   definition   requires   the   development   of   an   intense   –   if   not   always   close   –  
relationship  with  domestic  and  international  state  actors?  And  how  is  the  scope  
and   character   of   that   relationship   negotiated   within   the   new   or   emerging  
transnational  CSO  structures?  
 
These   questions   touch   upon   one   of   the   fundamental   uncertainties     inherent   in  
the   concept   of   transnational   governance,   namely   the   nature   of   the   relationship  
between  the  state  and  civil  society,  but  also,  more  narrowly,  on  the  question  of  
how  this  relationship  affects  and  transforms  the  involved  parties  themselves.  As  
Djelic  and  Sahlin-­‐Andersson  (2006)  note,  there  is  a  need  for  governance  research  
to  look  in  greater  detail  at  the  identity  of  the  actors  participating  in  governance  
arrangements  and  at  the  ways  in  which  they  interact  with  each  other,  as  well  as  
construct   and   re-­‐construct   themselves   in   the   course   of   that   interaction.  
Especially   the   certain   ‘entanglement’   that   results   from   multiple   and  
multidirectional   connections   between   actors   and   activities   within   the  
governance  framework  deserves  more  attention  from  social  scientists.  
 
These  issues  will  be  explored  in  the  present  chapter  with  the  empirical  focus  on  
the  Baltic  Sea  region  and  on  a  few  cross-­‐border  non-­‐governmental  organization  
(NGO)   networks   that   have   emerged   there   in   the   last   twenty   years.   The   networks  
have   all   come   into   existence   in   a   very   particular   discursive   environment,  
encouraged   by   a   political   and   intellectual   momentum   where   the   idea   of  
transnational   governance   –   translated   into   the   concept   of   ‘bottom-­‐up   region-­‐
building’  –  has  had  considerable  political  appeal  during  the  last  fifteen  years.  For  
the   NGOs   participating   in   the   emerging   regional   cooperation   networks   this   has  
meant  having  to  relate  to  the  political  and  financial  opportunities  generated  by  
this   momentum,   and   also   to   the   expectations   created   by   the   support   and  
enthusiasm   of   various   state   actors   for   the   idea   of   regional   governance.   The  

  4  
chapter  will  focus  above  all  on  the  way  these  opportunities  and  risks  connected  
to   the   relations   with   the   region’s   governmental   structures   are   perceived   and  
negotiated   within   the   studied   NGO   networks,   and,   in   a   wider   perspective,   on  
what  the  character  of  these  relations  can  tell  us  about  transnational  governance  
and  the  role  of  civil  society  in  it.    
 
Non-­‐governmental   organizations,   the   specific   form   of   civil   society   organization    
focused  on  in  this  chapter,  are  a  peculiar  sort  of  organizational  animal.  Just  as  in  
the  case  of  the  notion  of  civil  society  itself,  there  is  no  general  agreement  on  what  
an  NGO  actually  is,  and  there  are  many  competing  definitions  of  the  concept  (for  
an  overview  see  Vakil  1997).  With  the  spread  of  English  as  the  unofficial  lingua  
franca   of   the   globalization   process,   the   term   NGO   is   being   increasingly   used   in  
different  international  arenas  as  a  catch-­‐all  phrase  that  denotes  all  those  different  
kinds   of   civil   society   organizations   that   act   in   these   arenas   in   different   capacities.  
This   is   particularly   the   case   in   the   context   of   Baltic   Sea   regionalization   (where  
transnational   cooperation   is   conducted   in   English,   a   foreign   language   to   all   the  
involved   parties),   with   the   term   NGO   routinely   used   here   by   different   actors   as  
shorthand   for   civil   society,   regardless   of   what   kind   of   voluntary   organization   is  
implied.   This   chapter   adopts   this   broad   understanding   of   the   term,   which   is   used  
here  as  a  proxy  for  ‘civil  society  organization’.      
 
Transnationalization  and  governance  
The   concept   of   transnationalization   as   it   is   used   in   contemporary   political   science  
and   international   relations   refers   to   the   multiple   local   and   regional-­‐level  
processes   that   in   the   aggregate,   result   in   what   in   the   public   debate   has   become  
known   as   “globalization”.   In   these   fields   the   notion   of   transnationalization   is  
frequently   used   to   denote   the   general   increase   in   the   scope   and   intensity   of   the  
relations,   interactions   and   transactions   that   take   place   between   both   state   and  
non-­‐state   actors   across   national   borders   (Risse-­‐Kappen   1995).   The   range   of   the  
actors   is   not   confined   to   formal   organizations   and   authorities   –   it   is   just   as  
important   to   consider   the   myriad   of   networks   and   individuals   who   daily  
contribute  to  the  transnationalization  process  through  their  informal  activities  on  

  5  
state  borders:  civic  groups  networking,  tourism,  small-­‐scale  trade,  as  well  as  more  
sinister  activities  such  as  smuggling  and  trafficking.  
 
The   scope   and   importance   of   transnationalization   is   still   very   much   an   empirical  
question;   transnational   activities   can   be   distinctly   local,   but   they   can   also   span  
whole   regions,   as   in   the   case   of   the   “new”   cross-­‐border   regionalism   that   the  
Baltic   Sea   area   is   an   example   of.   In   contrast   to   the   kind   of   ‘macro   regions’  
situated  somewhere  between  the  national  and  the  global,  such  as  the  EU  or  the  
ASEAN,   the   cross-­‐border   region   is   a   sort   of   geo-­‐political   hybrid     which   can  
encompass  several  whole  countries  within  its  confines,  or  transcend    territorial  
state   limits   while   including   only   specific   provinces,   micro-­‐regions   or   local  
communities   from   different   countries.   Inclusion   in   such   cross-­‐border   regions  
often   results   in   increased   international   status   for   the   organizational   entities  
involved  (see  e.g.  Keating  1998).  
 
Inherent  to  the  concept  of  transnationalization  is  a  focus  on  an  increasing  blurring  
of   boundaries,   be   it   geographical   ones   or   those   between   different   political  
structures   or   institutional   spheres.   Conceptually,   transnational   activities  
presuppose   the   crossing   of   national   borders.   At   the   same   time,   they   often   also  
involve   the   crossing,   negotiation,   and   (re)-­‐invention   of   cultural   borders.   In   the  
case   of   cross-­‐border   regions,   for   example,   the   exact   boundaries   of   a   region   are  
usually   not   fixed.   Who   belongs   to   the   region   and   who   does   not   is   a   matter   of  
perpetual  political,  economic  and  socio-­‐cultural  negotiation.  At  the  same  time,  the  
new  political  and  economic  structures  and  arrangements  that  emerge  in  the  wake  
of  transnationalization  show  more  often  than  not  distinctly  hybrid  characteristics,  
mixing   logics   and   rationales   from   different   institutional   spheres.   Here,   again,  
cross-­‐border   regionalization   can   serve   as   an   example,   as   it   is   to   a   high   extent  
characterized  by  the  emergence  of  mixed-­‐actor  collectivities  and  structures,  with  
partnerships   and   cooperation   projects   furthering   the   goals   of   very   different   kinds  
of  organizations  (Söderbaum  2002).    
 
As  many  observers  have  noted,  the  processes  of  transnationalization  seem  to  be  
accompanied   by   an   unprecedented   growth   in   regulatory   activities   and   actors  

  6  
stretching   beyond   the   nation-­‐state,   linking   the   notion   of   transnationalization  
closely   to   the   ever   more   important   concept   of   governance   (Djelic   and   Sahlin-­‐
Andersson  2006).  This  concept,  too,  focuses  to  a  great  extent  on  the  blurring  of  
boundaries   between   different   institutional   entities   and   spheres.   Just   as  
transnationalization   can   be   seen   as   juxtaposed   to   the   nation-­‐state,   blurring   the  
borders   between   “in”   and   “out”,   governance   is   usually   seen   as   juxtaposed   to  
government,   blurring   the   borders   between   those   who   govern   and   those   who   are  
governed.   Even   more   importantly   for   our   discussion,   the   phenomenon   of  
‘transnational   governance’   marries   these   two   ideas,   thus   creating   distinctly   new,  
hybrid,  political-­‐geographic  landscapes  (cf.  Appadurai  1996)    
 
Governance  without  government?    
The   point   of   departure   of   the   academic   discussion   on   governance   that   has  
emerged  since  the  1990s  has  been  the  changing  role  of  the  nation-­‐state  and  what  
many   observers   see   as   the   decreasing   ability   of   national   governments   to   rule  
effectively.   In   the   field   of   public   administration   studies,   concepts   such   as   the  
’hollowed-­‐out  state’  (Jessop  2002)  and  ’negotiated  state’  (Nielsen  and  Pedersen  
1990)   have   been   employed   to   illustrate   the   perceived   loss   of   authority   and  
legitimacy   of   the   (welfare)   state   and   of   the   representative   political   institutions,  
and   the   upward,   downward   and   outward   dissipation   of   their   competencies   to  
non-­‐state   actors,   transnational   and   supranational   organizations   and   local   and  
regional   government   bodies   (Daly   2003).   Since   the   1990s,   the   capacity   of   the  
national  governments  to  insulate  their  societies  and  economies  from  undesirable  
global  pressures  has  increasingly  been  put  in  doubt,  and  the  status  of  the  state  as  
the  only,  or  at  least  the  main,  provider  of  welfare  services  has  become  a  topic  of  
regular  debate  (Peters  and  Pierre  1998).    
 
Similarly,   within   the   international   relations   (IR)   and   the   international   political  
economy   (IPE)   fields   the   perceived   crisis   of   the   nation-­‐state   has   been   a   central  
theme   in   the   debate   on   transnational   governance   that   has   unfolded   since   the  
mid-­‐1990s,  with  scholars  trying  to  grasp  the  extent  of  the  post-­‐Cold  War  changes  
in   the   international   environment.   Here,   both   the   crumbling   of   the   bi-­‐polar  
international   system   and   the   increasing   awareness   of   the   social,   economic   and  

  7  
political  consequences  of  globalization  have  led  to  a  growing  dissatisfaction  with  
the   traditional   view   of   the   state   as   the   only   relevant   actor   in   the   international  
arena.  In  these  research  fields,  the  world  is  increasingly  seen  as  entering  a  new,  
post-­‐modern   and   post-­‐Westphalian   era,   where   global   affairs   are   managed  
through   a   complex   web   of   transnational   organizations   and   regimes   seeking  
collective,   consensual   solutions   to   common   problems   (e.g.   Hettne   1999;   Hettne  
2000).   The   concept   of   governance   has   been   welcomed   with   open   arms   in   this  
discussion   as   a   useful   analytical   tool   that   could   help   make   sense   of   the   new  
emerging   patterns   of   international   cooperation   and   power   distribution   (e.g.  
Rosenau  and  Czempiel  1992).  
 
Governance,   both   on  the   national  and  on  the  international  level,  has  been  from  
the  beginning  conceived  of  in  opposition  to,  or  at  least,  in  contrast  to  the  notion  
of   government.   While   the   latter   is   understood   in   terms   of   direct   control,  
resorting,  if  necessary,  to  pure  coercion,  the  former  implies  steering  through  less  
direct,   softer   means   with   emphasis   on   consensus,   articulation   of   needs,  
mediation   of   differences,   and   deliberation.   ’Influence’,   as   opposed   to   ’power’,   is  
the   keyword   in   this   context;   shared   goals   and   not   formal   authority   are   supposed  
to  keep  regulatory  mechanisms  in  place  (Czempiel  1992).  The  territorial  base  of  
political  control  so  important  for  the  concept  of  government  has  also  been  called  
into   question,   as   the   processes   of   transnationalization   and   the   development   of  
new   communication   technologies   are   seen   as   making   the   territorial-­‐based  
steering   systems   increasingly   obsolete,   or   at   least   unable   to   satisfactorily  
perform   their   functions   (Daly   2003).   Parallels   have   been   drawn   here   to   the  
governance  structures  prevalent  in  Europe  during  the  Middle  Ages,  a  time  when  
politics  was  not  organized  in  terms  of  unambiguous  geography  (Kobrin  2002).  
 
The  heterogeneity  of  the  actors  involved  in  governance  arrangements  is  usually  
one   of   the   most   emphasized   features   of   governance.   Governance   has   been  
referred   to   as   ”the   result   of   interactive   social-­‐political   forms   of   governing”  
(Rhodes   1996),   and   in   governance   research,   a   lot   of   attention   is   given   to   the  
more  or  less  formal  partnerships  and  the  mutual  resource  dependencies  linking  
the   different   actors.   State   actors   are   conceptualized   as   being   in   a   constant  

  8  
process  of  bargaining  with  the  other  members  of  the  relevant  networks  (Peters  
and   Pierre   1998),   with  decision-­‐making   processes   within   the   individual  
organizations  being  constrained  by  their  network  membership  (Bache  2000).    
 
In   this   context   it   is   not   surprising   that   the   relation   between   state   and   civil  
society,  both  at  the  national  and  international  levels,  has  been  at  the  very  core  of  
the   governance   debate.   Governance   has   for   example   been   conceptualized   as  
‘embedded   in’   and   ‘interwoven   with’   state-­‐civil   society   interactions   (Weiss  
2000:800).   The   twin   phenomena   of   (1)   the   emergence   of   transnational   civil  
society   structures   and   (2)   their   increasing   involvement   in   international   policy-­‐
making   in   close   interaction   with   domestic   and   international   state   agencies   are  
often   conceptualized   as   essential   parts   of   the   new   developing   transnational  
governance   structure.   A   ‘transnational’   or   ‘global’   civil   society   is   seen   as   an  
integral   part   of   a   complex   system   of   multi-­‐layered   decision-­‐making   processes   on  
the   international   level   that   should   –   and   according   to   many   observers  
increasingly   does   –   involve   both   state   and   non-­‐state   actors   (Commission   on  
Global  Governance  1995;  Risse-­‐Kappen  1995;  Colàs  2001).  
 
However,  for  all  the  hype  about  the  inclusivity  of  the  governance  arrangements  
and  the  heterogeneity  of  the  actors  involved  there,  the  relationship  between  the  
state   and   the   non-­‐state   actors   has   in   the   (transnational)   governance   literature  
surprisingly   often   been   conceptualized   in   a   rather   simplistic   manner   as   a   zero-­‐
sum   game,   with   the   influence   of   one   kind   of   actors   decreasing   as   the   influence   of  
others   increases   (for   relevant   critique   of   this   approach,   see   for   example   Djelic  
and   Sahlin-­‐Andersson   2006).   This   can   often   be   observed   in   studies   of  
transnational   NGO   activity   which   focus   on   the   ways   in   which   NGOs   succeed   or  
fail   in   wrenching   power   (or   influence   over   the   agenda)   from   state   actors   on   a  
given  issue.    
 
Similarly,  the  already  mentioned  catchphrase  ‘governance  without  government’  
so  popular  in  the  1990s,  expresses  a  general  view  of  the  state  as  rapidly  losing  its  
relevance   as   the   main   policy-­‐maker,   to   the   benefit   of   other,   non-­‐state   actors.  
While  in  the  realm  of  public  administration  studies  this  slogan  has  been  used  in  a  

  9  
rather  symbolic  way,  referring  to  the  gradual  broadening  of  the  range  of  actors  
involved   in   policy-­‐making   (e.g.   Kohler-­‐Koch   1996;   Moran   2002),   in   the   field   of  
international   relations,   with   no   world   government   in   view,   it   has   often   been  
employed   in   a   more   direct,   literal   way.   As   Risse   (2004)   notes,   “to   the   extent   that  
the   international   system   contains   rule   structures   and   institutional   settings,   it  
constitutes   ‘governance   without   government’   by   definition”.   Here,   the   increasing  
visibility   and   activity   of   non-­‐state   actors   (mainly   in   the   form   of   multinational  
enterprises   and   non-­‐governmental   organizations,   NGOs)   in   the   international  
arena   are   traditionally   seen   first   and   foremost   as   logical   consequences   of   the  
erosion  of  the  capacities  of  the  state.    
 
This  focus  on  the  relative  transfer  of  power  and  influence  from  one  kind  of  actors  
(the   states)   to   another   (a   multiplicity   of   various   non-­‐state   agents)   gives,  
however,  an  oversimplified  picture  of  a  far  more  complex  phenomenon.  It  seems  
to   miss   the   fact   that   the   state   remains   a   highly   powerful   actor,   one   that   is   to   a  
greater   extent   embedded   in   complex   constellations   of   actors   and   structures  
(Djelic   and   Sahlin-­‐Andersson   2006).     More   generally,   it   obscures   the   intricate  
patterns  of  interaction  and  reciprocal  influence  among  different  kinds  of  actors  
involved   in   governance   arrangements,   as   well   as   the   transformation   and   re-­‐
invention  of  these  actors  that  might  follow  from  regular  interaction  (ibid.)  As  the  
discussion  of  the  Baltic  Sea  region  case  below  will  show,  the  influence  dynamic  
between   governmental   and   non-­‐governmental   actors   in   a   transnational  
governance  environment  is  indeed  much  more  complicated  than  the  ‘governance  
without  government’  catchphrase  implies.  
 
The  ‘bottom-­‐up  region’:  transnational  governance  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area?  
In  the  European  context,  the  process  of  transnationalization  has  in  recent  decades  
been   driven   not   only   by   the   complex   dynamic   of   EU   integration,   but   also   by   the  
countless   cross-­‐border   regionalist   projects   that   during   the   last   twenty   years   have  
created  a  patchwork  of  economic,  cultural  and  political  cooperation  areas  across  
the  continent.  As  Keating  (1998)  has  noted,  by  the  end  of  the  1990s  there  was  not  
a  border  in  western  Europe  that  was  not  covered  by  some  sort  of  trans-­‐frontier  
regionalist   program   or   activity.   Today   the   same   could   probably   be   said   about  

  10  
Europe  as  a  whole,  and  certainly  about  its  northern  parts,  where  the  former  East  
and  West  meet  along  the  old  trace  of  the  Iron  Curtain.    
 
The  cross-­‐border  regionalization  process  that  took  off  around  the  Baltic  Sea  in  the  
early   1990s   might   well   be   seen   as   a   sort   of   experimental   laboratory   of  
transnational   governance.   Although   the   term   itself   has   rarely   been   used   in   the  
political  regionalist  discourse  here,  the  ideas  about  the  region’s  future  that  were  
voiced   by   those   involved   in   the   regionalist   project   –   intellectuals,   entrepreneurs  
and   local   politicians   mainly   from   the   Nordic   countries   and   Northern   Germany   –  
corresponded   very   closely   to   the   ideas   voiced   in   the   theoretical   governance  
debate  within  the  social  sciences  in  the  same  period  of  time.    
 
From  the  start,  the  appeal  of  the  Baltic  Sea  regional  project  was  said  to  lie  in  its  
distinctly   ‘post-­‐modern’   character.   The   emerging   transnational   region   was   seen  
by   its   proponents   as   a   creation   suitable   for   a   post-­‐Westphalian   world   of   declining  
nation-­‐states  and  emerging  ‘neo-­‐medieval’  structures  of  loyalty  and  cooperation.  
Terms   such   as   openness,   inclusiveness,   and   flexibility   were   used   in   abundance   to  
underline   the   ways   in   which   the   new   region   would   differ   from   the   state-­‐led  
regionalization   projects   of   the   past.   Its   attractiveness   was   to   lie   not   with   formal  
and   institutional   regional   arrangements   and   governmental   cooperation   schemes  
but  rather  with  horizontal  patterns  of  human  interaction  at  the  grassroots  level,  
that   would   span   the   whole   region   in   a   dense   web   of   economic,   political   and  
cultural   networks,   outside   or   beyond   the   scope   of   the   nation-­‐state   (see   e.g.  
Joenniemi  1993;  Waever  1993)  .    
 
The   notion   of   ‘governance   without   government’   would   have   fitted   extraordinarily  
well  in  this  context,  as,  in  the  view  of  most  academic  observers  at  the  beginning  of  
that   period,   the   Baltic   Sea   cooperation   was   certain   to   take   a   distinctly   non-­‐state  
form  (Waever  and  Joenniemi  1991;  Waever  1993;  Käkönen  1996).  In  retrospect,  
there  is  also  a  broad  agreement  among  the  researchers  concerned  with  regional  
developments  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area  that  inter-­‐governmental  cooperation  has  not  
been   the   most   important   feature   of   the   regionalization   process   (Williams   2001;  
Tassinari  2004).  Instead,  various  forms  of  non-­‐governmental  cooperation  have,  as  

  11  
envisioned  in  the  early  1990s,  been  at  the  forefront  of  the  regionalization  process,  
with   an   impressive   web   of   informal   cooperation   projects   and   cross-­‐border  
networks  thriving  in  the  area.    
 
The   origins   of   this   cooperation   date   primarily   to   the   late   1980s,   when   first  
contacts   were   established   between   activists   from   the   peace   and   environmental  
movements  in  Poland  and  the  Baltic  States  and  their  counterparts  in  Germany  and  
Scandinavia.  In  the  sphere  of  civil  society,  as  in  the  case  of  Baltic  Sea  regionalism  
in  general,  the  enthusiasm  and  curiosity  generated  by  the  fall  of  the  Iron  Curtain  
were   major   forces   behind   the   boom   in   regional   cooperation;   many   Western  
organizations   were   eager   to   assist   in   ‘building   democracy   and   civil   society’   in  
Eastern   Europe,   and   Eastern   activists   welcomed   the   opportunity   to   finally   come  
out   of   their   decades-­‐long   international   isolation   and   embrace   the   advantages  
offered   by   cooperation   with   like-­‐minded   people   abroad.   Today,   the   cooperation  
has   partly   changed   in   character.   While   ten   years   ago   many   of   the   cooperation  
initiatives   that   mushroomed   in   the   region   were   small-­‐scale,   bi-­‐   or   trilateral  
projects  that  often  involved  small  local  organizations,  nowadays,  the  advantages  
of  broader  networking  seem  to  be  getting  increased  appreciation,  with  more  and  
more  all-­‐regional  networks  emerging  in  different  fields.  
 
Civil  society  in  the  new  governance  environment  
Significantly,   cross-­‐border   networking   among   non-­‐governmental   organizations  
(NGOs)   and   other   civil   society   groups   has   from   the   very   start   actively   been  
encouraged   by   the   regional   political   actors.   In   fact,   civil   society,   both   as   a   concept  
and   as   an   actual   societal   sphere,   was   singled   out   by   those   involved   in   the  
regionalization   process   –   academic   observers   as   well   as   the   political   region-­‐
builders   –   as   having   a   crucial   role   to   play   in   the   process   of   regional   integration.  
The   notion   of   a   ‘networked   region’   propagated   in   the   beginning   of   the   1990s   in  
various   academic,   business   and   political   circles   in   Northern   Germany   and  
Scandinavia   referred   not   only   to   the   entrepreneurial   and   local   governance  
networks   that   were   beginning   to   develop   in   the   area   after   the   fall   of   the   Iron  
Curtain,  but  also  to  the  numerous  multilateral  cooperation  initiatives  and  projects  
that  were  emerging  at  the  level  of  civil  society.    

  12  
  
Accordingly,   the   need   to   involve   civil   society   in   the   process   of   region-­‐building  
has  been  consistently  emphasised  by  various  governmental  organizations  (GOs3)  
such   as   the   Council   of   the   Baltic   Sea   States   (CBSS)   and   the   office   of   its  
Commissioner  on  Democratic  Development.  This  support  has  been  a  key  part  of  
the   particular   ‘governance-­‐oriented   environment’   characteristic   of   the  
regionalization   process   around   the   Baltic   Sea.   The   CBSS   itself   has   made  
considerable   efforts   towards   supporting   and   further   developing   regional   NGO  
cooperation   structures;   for   example,   by   taking   the   initiative   to   establish   the  
annual  CBSS  Baltic  Sea  NGO  Forum  and  preparing  (in  cooperation  with  the  Baltic  
Sea   Parliamentary   Conference)   a   report   on   NGO-­‐related   legislation   in   the  
region’s  countries  (Ojala  2004).  
 
The   importance   of   civil   society   to   the   achievement   of   the   common   regional   goals  
is  a  regularly  recurring  theme  in  the  speeches  and  statements  of  CBSS  officials.  
The   inclusion   of   civil   society   organizations   in   decision-­‐making   processes   on   all  
levels   –   from   local   to   pan-­‐regional   –   is   also   furthered   by   the   creation   of  
numerous   mixed   cooperation   structures,   where   non-­‐governmental   actors   are  
expected   and   encouraged   to   work   together   with   experts   and   authorities   in  
particular   issue   areas   of   interest   to   them.   Some   of   the   areas   where   the  
development   of   such   ‘epistemic   communities’   has   been   visible   are   for   example  
environment,   spatial   planning   and   child   trafficking   prevention,   with   specific  
projects   such   as   Baltic   21   and   Visions   And   Strategies   Around   the   Baltic   2010  
(VASAB).      
 
In   this   sense,   the   regional   political   environment   in   which   the   many   cross-­‐border  
NGO   cooperation   networks   have   emerged   in   the   last   fifteen   years   could   be  
characterized  as  a  very  supportive  and  encouraging  one.  The  question  is,    what  
has  this  meant  for  the  character  of  the  cooperation  within  the  transnational  non-­‐
governmental   networks   themselves.   In   the   next   section,   the   attitudes   of   the  

                                                                                                               
3
For the sake of simplicity the term ‘GO’ will be used throughout this chapter to denote entities such
as national and local governments, state agencies, authorities etc., i.e. governmental, as opposed to
non-governmental, actors and structures.

  13  
involved   NGOs   towards   their   networks’   relationship   with   authorities   and   state  
agencies  in  the  region  will  be  explored.  What  role  do  the  involved  organizations  
want  to  play  in  the  regional  governance  in  their  fields  of  activity,  and  what  kind  
of   relationship   to   the   regional   governmental   structures   does   this   role   demand?  
And   how   is   the   self-­‐image   of   the   NGOs   involved   in   the   regional   cooperation  
affected   by   the   political   and   financial   opportunities   created   by   the   governance-­‐
oriented  regional  environment?  
 
The  NGO  networks  studied4    
The   larger   study   that   the   empirical   discussion   in   this   section   is   based   on,   has  
been   informed   by   a   hermeneutic     approach,   seeking   to   understand   the  
mechanisms   of   transnational   NGO   networking   ‘from   within’,   i.e.,   as   seen   through  
the  eyes  of  the  individuals  personally  involved  in  the  processes  studied.  In-­‐depth  
interviews,   internal   documents   of   the   networks,   and   on-­‐site   observations   of  
network   meetings   are   the   main   materials   analysed   here.   Altogether  
representatives   of   24   non-­‐governmental   organizations   from   Sweden,   Germany,  
Poland   and   Estonia   involved   in   regional   cooperation   networks   were  
interviewed;   the   respondents   were   promised   anonymity,   and   their   initials   are  
therefore   coded   in   the   text   so   that   they   cannot   be   recognized   as   authors   of   the  
quotations.   The   materials   were   gathered   between   2001   and   2005,   and   the  
analysis  is  based  on  the  situation  in  the  networks  in  the  mid-­‐2000s.  
 
The   five   NGO   networks   studied   here   vary   significantly   as   to   the   field   and   scope   of  
their  activity  and  the  degree  of  the  formalization  of  the  cooperation.  
 
The  Coalition  Clean  Baltic  (CCB),  which  is  probably  the  most  institutionalized  and  
consolidated   of   all   the   NGO   networks   active   in   the   Baltic   Sea   region,   was  
established   in   1990.   Today   the   network   consists   of   27   environmental  
organizations  of  different  sizes  from  all  the  countries  bordering  on  the  Baltic  Sea.  
The   CCB’s   mission,   as   stated   most   recently   in   the   CCB   Action   Plan   for   2005   and  
2006   (Coalition   Clean   Baltic   2004),   is   the   preservation,   protection   and  

                                                                                                               
4
This section is largely based on chapter 8 in Reuter 2007.

  14  
improvement   of   the   Baltic   Sea   environment,   with   emphasis   on   a   few   priority  
areas,  which  currently  are  water  status,  transports  and  fisheries.    
 
The  Baltic  Youth  Forum  (BYF)  was  created  in  1994  as  a  cooperation  network  for  
the   national   youth   councils   (i.e.,   national   umbrella   organizations   for   youth  
groups)   from   the   region’s   countries.   Its   overall   aim   is   to   promote   youth  
cooperation   and   mobility   in   the   Baltic   Sea   area,   and   the   practical   work   towards  
this   goal   is   carried   out   primarily   within   the   framework   of   the   Baltic   Sea   Youth  
Project  (BSYP),  which  organizes  activities  such  as  international  youth  leadership  
training  courses  and  conferences.    
 
The  third  network  included  in  this  study,  Social  Hansa,  was  originally  established  
in   1992   by   social   welfare   organizations   from   Germany,   Denmark,   Sweden,  
Norway  and  Finland,  and  expanded  in  1993  to  include  organizations  from  Poland,  
Russia  and  the  Baltic  countries.  During  most  of  the  1990s  the  network’s  activity  
was  rather  limited,  but  a  revival  has  been  attempted  since  the  early  2000s  when  a  
new  secretariat  was  established  in  the  North  German  town  of  Lübeck.  The  original  
purpose  of  Social  Hansa  was  to  serve  as  a  platform  for  organizations  interested  in  
creation   of   a   common   social   policy   for   the   Baltic   Sea   region;   today   however   the  
network   is   more   focused   on   practical   cooperation   projects   than   on   political  
lobbying  work.  Its  official  aim,  according  to  the  new  constitution  adopted  in  2004,  
is   to   promote   social   welfare   in   the   Baltic   Sea   region   and   generally   to   support  
cooperation  between  the  member  organizations.    
 
The   now   defunct   Trans-­‐Baltic   Network   (TBN)   was   founded   on   the   initiative   of  
Swedish   and   Finnish   peace   organizations   at   a   peace   conference   in   Riga   in   1994,  
and   included,   at   the   height   of   its   activity,  some   40   member   organizations   from   all  
over   the   region.   The   purpose   of   the   network   was   to   support   organizations   and  
individuals   working   towards   the   establishment   of   a   security   community   in   the  
Baltic   Sea   Region   and   to   coordinate   cooperation   projects   between   the   member  
organizations.  The  TBN’s  long-­‐term  objective  was  to  bring  security-­‐related  issues  
to   the   agenda   of   such   regional   bodies   as   the   CBSS   and   to   influence   the   political  
security-­‐related   discourse   in   the   region.   As   the   security   situation   improved,   the  

  15  
network’s   activity   gradually   faded   during   the   late   1990s   and   the   network   has  
since  ceased  to  exist.  
 
The   fifth   network   studied   here   is   a   more   recent   structure   consisting   of   the   so-­‐
called   ‘national   Focal   Points’   of   the   annual   Baltic   Sea   NGO   Forum.   The   Forum,  
which   is   a   cross-­‐sectoral   gathering   of   non-­‐governmental   organizations   from   the  
Baltic   Sea   countries,   takes   place   every   spring   in   the   country   that   hosts   the   CBSS  
presidency  that  year.  Although  the  first  Forum  in  2001  (in  Lübeck)  was  organized  
on   the   initiative   of   the   German   Foreign   Ministry,   the   subsequent   Forums   have  
been   managed   by   the   non-­‐governmental   Focal   Points,   i.e.,   organizations   from  
various   fields   that   have   assumed   the   role   of   national   delegation   coordinators   in  
each   country.   For   clarity’s   sake   this   network   will   be   referred   to   as   the   Forum  
Network.  
 
The  NGOs  and  the  regional  governance  environment  
 
a)  Participation  in  regional  governance    
For   all   five   of   the   networks   studied,   participation   in   the   regional   governance  
structures  and  in  the  political  decision-­‐making  processes  at  the  regional  level  in  
their   fields   of   activity   is   an   explicit   priority,   and   the   networks   all   attempt   in  
different   ways   to   influence   the   governmental   actors   in   the   region.   For   example,  
the  Coalition  Clean  Baltic  acts  as  a  lobby  organization  towards  such  bodies  as  the  
Baltic   Marine   Environment   Commission   (HELCOM),   the   International   Baltic   Sea  
Fisheries  Commission,  and  the  Agenda  21  for  the  Baltic  Sea  Region,  and,  according  
to  the  interviewed  participants,  has  developed  a  satisfactory  working  relationship  
with   these   agencies,   which   treat   the   network   as   a   serious   cooperation   partner.  
Another   similar   example   is   the   work   of   the   Baltic   Youth   Forum,   specifically   its  
efforts  to  monitor  and  influence  the  agenda  of  governmental  regional  cooperation  
structures   in   the   field   of   youth   affairs     by   observing   the   meetings   of   the   youth  
ministers   from   the   region,   and   cooperating   closely   with   a   regional   coordination  
centre   for   the   youth   ministries   known   as   the   Baltic   Sea   Secretariat   for   Youth  
Affairs.  
 

  16  
Policy-­‐oriented  work  was  also  one  of  the  priorities  of  the  Social  Hansa  when  the  
network   was   founded   in   the   early   1990s.   Although   the   political   vision   of   Social  
Hansa  seems  to  have  remained  just  a  principled  position  rather  than  the  base  for  
a   legitimate,   coordinated   lobbying   effort,   the   original   vision   is,   according   to   the  
interviewed  network  participants,  still  a  vital  force  in  the  effort  to  influence    social  
policy  in  the  region.  
 
Also,   for   the   now-­‐extinct   Trans-­‐Baltic   Network,   one   of   the   most   important   aims  
was   to   convey   the   ideas   and   standpoints   of   the   region’s   NGOs   to   the   political  
decision-­‐makers   regarding   the   issue   of   sustainable   security.   Here   the   Council   of  
the  Baltic  Sea  States  (CBSS)  had  been  selected  as  the  most  interesting  target  of  the  
lobbying  efforts.  Although  the  Council  did  not  have  any  supra-­‐national  authority  
and   was   not   concerned   with   high-­‐politics   issues   such   as   security,   the   network’s  
member  organizations  hoped  to  draw  attention  to  the  potential  role  of  the  CBSS  
as  a  form  of  inter-­‐state  cooperation  where  ‘soft’  policy  areas  such  as  environment,  
sustainable   development,   and   social   inclusion   could   be   given   a   security  
dimension,  and  where  civil  society  would  be  seen  as  an  important  partner  in  the    
promotion   of   sustainable   security.   Influencing   the   CBSS’s   agenda   was   thus  
regarded  as  an  important  task  by  several  of  the  network’s  key  members.  
 
Similarly,  cooperation  with  the  CBSS  is  seen  as  a  priority  by  the  Forum  Network.  
The   annual   Baltic   Sea   NGO   Forum   is   organized   under   the   auspices   of   the   CBSS,  
and  the  network  tends  to  regard  the  Council  as  its  main  governmental  partner  in  
the  region.  
 
Despite   the   explicit   wish   of   the   networks   to   be   included   in   the   regional  
governance   structures   and   to   have   constructive   working   relations   with   the  
region’s  governments,  the  character  and  scope  of  these  relations  remains  a  source  
of   continuous   heated   discussions   among   the   member   organizations.   As   a   result   of  
the   belief   that   the   networks   should   (and   might   be   able   to)   participate   to   some  
degree  in  the  regional  decision-­‐making  processes,  NGOs  have  put  a  lot  of  energy  
and  time  into  negotiating  among  themselves  how  to  best  position  their  networks  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  governmental  actors  in  the  region.  

  17  
  
In   the   case   of   the   Forum   Network,   for   example,   the   official   recognition   of   the  
Forum   and   the   Focal   Points   network   as   ‘regional   stakeholders’   by   the   CBSS   has  
been  a  very  important  point  for  some  of  the  network’s  members,  and  a  lot  of  time  
has  been  spent  on  discussions  about  the  ways  in  which  this  importance  should  be  
expressed  in  the  final  documents  of  the  annual  Forum  conference.  The  paragraphs  
of  the  ‘Forum  Conclusions’  dealing  with  the  relationship  with  the  CBSS  were  the  
subject  of  an  impassioned  debate  during  the  Forum  in  Pärnu  in  2004,  with  some  
organizations  pushing  strongly  for  the  Forum  to  apply  to  the  CBSS  for  the  status  
of  ‘Special  Participant’  that  would  give  the  network  a  possibility  to  participate  in  
some   of   the   CBSS’s   meetings.   These   organizations   identified   two   priorities   in  
dealing   with   the   CBSS:   (1)   closely   monitoring   CBSS   activities,   and   (2)   establishing  
an  intimate  and  consultative  working  relationship  with  it.    
 
At   the   same   time,   other   network   members   clearly   prefer   to   observe   a   more  
cautious   and   independent   approach   to   cooperation   with   regional   governmental  
bodies.   While   the   former   emphasise   the   advantages   of   close   relations   with   the  
CBSS,  including  the  influence  over  regional  policies  that  such  relations  could  give  
the   network   (and   the   Forum   as   a   whole),   the   latter   focuse   more   on   the  
importance   of   retaining   a   high   degree   of   independence   and   integrity   in  working  
with   the   authorities.   As   one   network   participant   writes   to   his   colleagues   in    
reaction  to  the  list,  developed  by  one  of  the  more  policy-­‐oriented  Focal  Points,  of  
possible  tasks  for  the  network:  
 
It  seems  even  as  CBSS  itself  could  be  the  author  (of  this  list)  –  ‘to  help  
the   CBSS’,   ‘to   have   NGOs   give   input   to   what   CBSS   does’,   ‘to   monitor  
certain  topics  CBSS  is  working  on’,  ‘to  read  CBSS  papers  and  comment  
on  them’  (…)  Sorry,  but  one  important  topic  is  missing  in  this  list,  and  
it  is  at  least  one  of  the  main  reasons  why  I  personally  am  engaged  in  
NGO-­‐work   at   all:   to   help   people   to   run,   to   finance   and   to   strengthen  
their   own   NGOs.   To   help   them   in   international   cooperation   and  
exchange,   to   discuss   our   own   interests   in   a   democratic   way,   and   to  

  18  
 show   the   use   of   networking   (Forum   Network,   internal  
correspondence,  12.11.04,  original  italics)  
 
Other   Focal   Points   as   well   express   exasperation   at   the   endless   internal  
discussions   about   how   to   best   present   the   network   to   the   CBSS.   As   one   of   them  
remarks,   the   issue   of   the   Council’s   official   recognition   of   the   network   has   come   to  
obscure  other,  more  pressing  dimensions  of  the  NGO  cooperation.  In  choosing  to  
focus   their   limited   resources,   especially   time,   on   the   official   status   of   the   network  
and   on   its   recognition   by   the   CBSS,   network   member   organizations   have  
overlooked  and  failed  to  realize  the  more  practical  potential  of  the  cooperation.  At  
the   Pärnu   Forum   in   2004,   critical   voices   within   the   network   were   thus   raised  
suggesting  that  the  network  members  should  focus  primarily  on  consolidating  the  
cooperation  between  them,  identifying  what  they  had  in  common,  defining  what  
interests  united  them,  and  determining  what  issues  they  wanted  to  work  on.  Only  
after  establishing  a  foundation  of  internal  cooperation,  network  members  would  
be  able  to  address  the  question  of  establishing  a  closer  relationship  with  the  CBSS  
or  other  regional  governmental  structures.  
 
Similarly,   within   the   Baltic   Youth   Forum   there   seems   to   exist   a   divide   between  
those   national   youth   councils   that   wish   for   a   stronger   political   profile   for   the  
network   and   those   who   oppose   the   ‘politicization’   of   the   cooperation.   In   this  
case,   certain   national   preferences   are   visible;   while   the   German   and   the   Baltic  
councils  are  generally  in  favour  of  allowing  the  network  to  assume  a  more  active  
political   role,   the   Nordic   youth   councils   have   adopted   a   much   more   cautious  
attitude   on   these   questions   and   resist   the   pressure   towards   further  
institutionalization  of  the  cooperation.    
 
Here,   as   in   the   case   of   many   other   networks,   the   lack   of   agreement   about   the  
proper   attitude   towards   governmental   structures   is   in   part   a   question   of   the  
different   domestic   contexts   of   civil   society   development   in   the   Western   and  
Eastern   parts   of   the   region.   While   the   Nordic   organizations   operate   within   a  
corporatist  political  system  and  are  often  included  in  policy-­‐making  processes  by  
governmental   agencies,   the   Russian,   Baltic,   and   Polish   NGOs   work   in   an  

  19  
indifferent,   if   not   hostile,   political   environment,   and   are   often   seen   by   the  
authorities   as   nuisances   at   best,   and   as   adversaries   at   worst.   German  
organizations,   also   experience   a   rather   confrontational   relationship   with  
authorities,   though   the   governance   system   in   place   is   otherwise   inclusive   and  
corporatist.  
 
In   the   case   of   BYF,   the   wish   of   the   German   and   Baltic   youth   councils   to   further  
institutionalise   the   network   and   give   it   a   stronger   political   profile   can   thus   be  
partly  explained  by  the  relatively  weak  position  of  these  organization  in  their  own  
countries  and  their  wish  to  enhance  that  position  by  participation  in  a  high-­‐level  
transnational   cooperation   structure.   The   Nordic   network   members   operate   as  
national-­‐level  youth  councils;  they  are  used  to  being  treated  as  partners  by  their  
governments   and   often   participated   as   stakeholders   in   the   process     of  
determining   policy   regarding   youth   affairs   in   their   countries.   The   situation   is  
however   quite   different   for   other   BYF   members.   The   two   regional   youth   councils,  
one   from   Schleswig-­‐Holstein   and   one   from   Mecklenburg-­‐Vorpommern   that  
represent  Germany  in  the  network,  are  relatively  minor  players  in  the  context  of  
establishing  German  national  youth  policy,  and  they  have  to  compete  with  youth  
councils   from   Germany’s   other   regions   for   influence   over   the   national   youth  
agenda.   Their   participation   in   BYF   gives   them   an   opportunity   to   increase   their  
status   in   the   domestic   arena   as   a   consequence   of   the   network’s   higher   political  
profile.  
 
The   situation   of   the   Eastern   (Baltic,   Polish   and   Russian)   youth   councils   is     even  
more   precarious.   The   councils   themselves   were   young   and   inexperienced,   and  
their  position  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  authorities  is  quite  weak.  The  NGOs  in  these  countries  
are   not   included   in   policy-­‐making   processes   to   the   same   degree   that   NGOs   are  
included   in   Scandinavian   policy-­‐making   processes,   and   so   the   influence   of   the  
national   youth   councils   in   determining   youth   policy   is   minor.   So,   just   as   in   the  
case   of   the   German   regional   youth   councils,   participation   of   Eastern   youth  
councils  in  a  high-­‐profile  international  network,  a  network  that  is  working  closely  
with   regional   governmental   bodies,   certainly   improves   their   status   and  

  20  
bargaining   power   at   home,   in   a   sort   of   ‘boomerang   effect’     (cf.   Keck   and   Sikkink  
1998).  
 
 
Such   differences   have   a   strong   impact   on   the   way   the   network   participants  
perceive  themselves  and  their  partners  in  the  context  of  network  cooperation.  In  
the  words  of  a  Swedish  Baltic  Youth  Forum  participant:  
 
There   is   a   big   difference   between   the   popular   movement   tradition  
that   we   have   had   in   Scandinavia   for   a   hundred   years   (...)   and  
organizations   in   the   East   that   have   ten   years   of   experience.   A   small  
youth   organization   in   Sweden   has   3000   members,   but   try   to   find  
many  organizations  in  the  Baltic  countries  that  have  as  many  as  that.  
(…)   We   have   completely   different   frames   of   reference,   in   form   of  
financial   support   and   the   dialogue   with   the   state;   we   can   invite   the  
minister   of   youth   affairs   to   our   meetings;   we   meet   the   minister   of  
foreign   affairs   every   six   months;   we   have   had   meetings   with   the  
international  aid  minister;  and  that  would  never  happen  in  Germany  
or   in   Russia.   We   have   basically   different   status   and   working  
conditions  at  home,  and  thus  also  different  interests  (A.A.).  
 
 
b)  A  matter  of  expectations  
 
The   effort   to   define   the   “proper   relationship”   between   NGOs   and   the  
governmental   actors   in   the   region   is   constant,   and   inspires   continuous   debate  
and   disagreement   within   the   networks.   Equally   unvarying   in   the   responses   of  
the   interviewed   network   representatives   is   a   strong   sense   of   unfulfilled   or  
frustrated   expectations   when   discussing   the   performance   of   GOs.     All  
interviewees,   those   who   favour   close   network   cooperation   with   governmental  
bodies   and   those   who   prefer   a   higher   degree   of   network   independence   from  
them,   all   express   the   view   that   the   regional   governments   and   inter-­‐state  
agencies   should   be   doing   much   more   to   assist   and   facilitate   the   work   and  
cooperation   of   NGOs   in   the   region.   The   expectations   that   are   most   often  

  21  
mentioned   by   the   interviewees   are   that   the   GOs   would     (1)   provide   general  
political   support   for   the   ‘regional   civil   society’,   (2)   offer   inclusion   of   the   NGO  
networks   in   all   policy   and   decision-­‐making   processes,   and   (3)   serve   as   a   reliable  
source  of  funding  for  regional  NGO  cooperation  projects.  
 
As   discussed   above,   being   accepted   as   partners   in   policy-­‐making   by   the  
governmental   institutions   is   a   key   issue   for   the   NGO   networks.   The   prevailing  
belief   among   the   participating   organizations   is   that   network   activities   should  
result  in  tangible  policy  results  at  the  political  level  in  the  region.  The  conclusions  
of  the  annual  Baltic  Sea  NGO  Forum,  for  example,  are  often  formulated  as  a  list  of  
suggestions  and  demands  that  are  directed  to  the  region’s  national  governments  
and   GOs   including   the   Council   of   the   Baltic   Sea   States.   Thus,   the   Forum   ‘invites’,  
‘encourages’,  ‘appeals  to’  or  ‘demands’  the  CBSS  to  do  this  and  that  in  fields  such  
as   the   environment,   social   inclusion,   women’s   rights,   and   overall   support   and  
funding  of  the  NGO  sector  in  the  region.    Members  of  the  Forum  Network  see  these  
as  specific  demands  that  should  be  considered  and  implemented  by  the  relevant  
decision-­‐making   structures   both   at   national   and   regional   level,   and   they   regard  
governmental   inaction   as   an   obstruction   to   successful   cooperation   between   GOs  
and  NGOs.  For  example,  one  of  the  conclusions  reached  at  the  end  of  the  4th  Baltic  
Sea  NGO  Forum  in  Pärnu  in  2004  expressed    
 
disappointment   about   the   relatively   low   level   of   implementation   of  
proposals   from   previous   NGO   Forums.   Governments   are  
recommended  to  discuss  the  reasons  for  such  situation  with  the  civil  
society  organizations  and  groups  and  to  speed  up  the  implementation  
of  the  according  recommendations.  
 
 
The  lack  of  governmental  interest  for  and  responsiveness  to  the  Forum’s  demands  
appears   to   come   as   a   surprise   to   the   involved   NGOs,   even   though   little   or   no  
lobbying   activity   is   normally   undertaken   by   the   Forum   Network   between   the  
annual  conferences  to  ensure  that  the  various  relevant  state  agencies  in  the  region  
really  take  the  Forum’s  proposals  seriously  and  consider  them  in  their  work.    
 

  22  
  
The   most   pressing   sort   of   expectation   that   the   networks   harbour   towards   the  
regional   GOs   is   however   connected   to   the   issue   of   the   financing   of   the   NGO  
cooperation.  Previously,  network  operations  have  been  sponsored  by  state  funds  
from  the  Scandinavian  governments  and  the  EU,  funds  that  were  secured  by  and  
channelled   through   Western   (mainly   Scandinavian)   network   member  
organizations  acting  as  intermediaries    
 
The   often-­‐heard   claim   that   transnational   NGO   cooperation   is   donor-­‐driven   and  
prompted   by   the   ‘economic   opportunities’   created   by   a   favourable   political  
climate  in  the  West  is  clearly  confirmed  here.  It  can  be  illustrated  by  the  example  
of   the   Coalition   Clean   Baltic   (CCB)   whose   activities   have   been   to   a   high   degree  
financed   by   funds   from   the   Swedish   International   Development   Agency   (SIDA).  
SIDA’s   policy   has   been   to   direct   a   part   of   its   development   aid   funds   to   Swedish  
NGOs,   which   would   use   the   money   for   implementation   of   cooperation   projects  
with   civil   society   organizations   in   the   ‘global   South’   and/or   in   Eastern   Europe.  
Several  of  the  interviewed  CCB  member  representatives  express  concern  about  its  
excessive   dependence   on   SIDA.   The   negative   aspects   of   this   dependence   are  
becoming   especially   obvious   now   that   cooperation   projects   with   organizations  
from  the  new  EU  member  states  –  the  Baltic  countries  and  Poland  –  have  become  
illeligible  for  Nordic  aid  funding,  leaving  the  network  without  its  most  important  
funding  source5.    
 
As  several  respondents  observe,  the  future  of  the  CCB  will  depend  on  its  ability  
to  re-­‐orient  itself  towards  new  funding  sources;  interestingly  however,  it  is  still  
the   same   kind   of   governmental   development   aid   funding   that   is   coveted   here.  
Since   funds   for   cooperation   with   the   Eastern   Baltic   Sea   countries   will     andnot   be  
available  anymore,  the  idea  is  to  gradually  re-­‐direct  the  geographical  scope  of  the  
cooperation   further   east,   towards   countries   like   Ukraine   and   Belarus   which  
normally   are   not   considered   a   part   of   the   Baltic   Sea   region   but   still   are  

                                                                                                               
5
As this study was conducted around the time of the EU accession of the Baltic states
and Poland, the discussion in this section reflects the situation at that point in time.

  23  
interesting  to  the  Swedish  government  as  potential  development  aid  recipients.  
As  these  countries  are  not  members  of  the  European  Union,  financial  support  for  
cooperation   with   organizations   from   them   is   still   available   from   the   Swedish  
government  since  they  are  not  part  of  the  EU,  and  the  CCB  is  already  developing  
contacts   with   many   organizations   there.   The   geographical   scope   of   the  
cooperation   is   thus   not   only   donor-­‐driven   but,   at   least   to   some   extent,   clearly  
dependent  on  the  priorities  of  the  governmental  donor  agencies  rather  than  on  
the  priorities  of  the  network  itself.    
 
Notwithstanding   the   fact   that   much   of   the   networks’   activity   has   been   directly  
state-­‐funded,   the   complaint   that   the   region’s   governments   and   inter-­‐state  
structures   do   not   provide   sufficient   financial   support   for   NGO   cooperation   is   a  
frequent   theme   in   the   interviews   with   the   network   participants.   Several  
interviewees  remark  that  although  the  level  of  political  support  from  the  local  or  
national   authorities   or   from   the   CBSS   for   cross-­‐border   NGO   cooperation  
initiatives   and   projects   has   in   general   been   quite   satisfactory,   the   support   has  
seldom  translated  into  actual  funding  opportunities.  Some  describe  with  dismay  
how   the   political   support   for   the   civil   society   cooperation   has   turned   out   to   be  
‘lip   service’.   According   to   these   accounts,   the   decision-­‐makers   often   react  
positively  or  even  enthusiastically  to  the  proposals  and  ideas  that  come  from  the  
NGO   networks,   but   the   support   remains   purely   rhetorical.   In   the   words   of   a  
Social   Hansa   member,   “they   all   say   ‘good   idea’   (about   the   regional   NGO  
cooperation  projects  proposals),  but  that’s  all”  (A.C.).    
 
Interesting  in  this  context  is  the  fact  that  there  are  no  references  to  the  concept  
of   private   fundraising   or   other,   alternative   sources   of   financing   in   either   the  
interviews  or  in  the  internal  network  materials  studied  here.  Little,  if  anything,  is  
ever  mentioned  about  the  possibility  of  trying  to  involve  the  business  sector  as  a  
sponsor   of   the   regional   NGO   cooperation   activities,   or   about   the   option   of  
carrying  out  projects  on  a  consulting  basis,  where  the  network’s  expertise  in  its  
field   could   be   used   as   a   source   of   income.   Instead,   what   emerges   from   the  
studied  materials  is  a  sense  of  expectation  directed  at  the  national  and  Baltic  Sea  
regional   political   decision-­‐making   structures,   which   are   clearly   regarded   as  
being   responsible   for   making   sure   that   the   cross-­‐border   NGO   cooperation   is  

  24  
adequately  funded  –  and  a  disappointment  that  these  structures  are  not  living  up  
to  this  responsibility.    
 
This   dependence   on   state   financing   appears   to   be   connected   to   the   fact   that  
regional   NGO   networks   in   the   Baltic   Sea   area   are   often   initiated   and/or  
coordinated   by   Nordic   NGOs   which   are   themselves   traditionally   highly  
dependent  on  public  funding  and  resources;  in  the  case  of  the  networks  studied  
here,   the   driving   force   behind   three   of   them   –   the   Coalition   Clean   Baltic,   the  
Trans-­‐Baltic   Network   and   the   main   cooperation   project   of   Baltic   Youth   Forum,  
the   Baltic   Sea   Youth   Project   (BSYP)   –   are   or   have   been   Swedish   organizations  
with   access   to   project   funds   from   the   Swedish   government   (and   in   some   cases  
also   from   the   EU).   There   is   in   Scandinavia   very   little   tradition   of   the   kind   of  
private  fundraising  that  prevails  in  the  Anglo-­‐Saxon  countries.  Cooperation  with  
Eastern  European  NGOs  increases  the  dependency  on  the  state  even  further,  as  it  
gives   access   to   even   larger   amounts   of   money   due   to   the   effort’s   high   political  
profile.   Therefore,   according   to   some   interviewees,   Swedish   organizations   are  
often   keener   to   continue   the   regional   cooperation   projects   than   their   Eastern  
partners,   who   to   a   greater   extent   are   trying   to   find   alternative   funding   sources  
and  to  “stand  on  their  own  feet”  (A.N.).  
 
It  does  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  it  is  mostly  Western  respondents  that  express  
high  expectations  –  and  correspondingly  also  disappointment  –  when  it  comes  to  
the   assistance   from   state   institutions   for   the   regional   NGO   cooperation   structures  
and  projects.  This  theme  is  nearly  absent  in  the  interviews  with  representatives  of  
the   Polish   and   Estonian   network   member   organizations.   While   the   Western  
respondents   talk   about   authorities   and   political   bodies   as   natural   partners   from  
whom   they   expect   cooperation,   respect,   support   and   funding,   the   role   of   the  
governmental  actors  is  rarely  mentioned  at  all  by  the  Eastern  interviewees  in  the  
context  of  NGO  networking,  and  they  do  not  express  any  expectations  with  regard  
to   funding   or   other   support   from   the   authorities.   The   internal   division   of   tasks  
within  the  networks,  which  makes  fund-­‐raising  the  task  of  the  more  established  
Western   NGOs,   means   that   the   Eastern   cooperation   partners   have   simply   less  
reasons   for   pre-­‐occupying   themselves   with   the   question   of   the   attitude   of  

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presumptive   donor   institutions   towards   their   networks   (for   a   more   in-­‐depth  
discussion  of  this  aspect,  see  Reuter  2007).  
 
 
c)  Blurring  borders,  mixing  logics  
 
What   already   looks   like   a   rather   ambiguous   relationship   between   the   NGO  
networks  and  the  GOs  in  the  region  is  further  complicated  by  a  certain  confusion  
regarding   the   institutional   affiliation   of   some   of   the   organizations   involved,   and  
the  emergence  of  what  increasingly  looks  like  hybrid  organizational  structures  in  
the  regional  governance  environment.  
 
First  of  all,  many  of  the  actors  that  have  emerged  in  the  regional  context  in  the  last  
fifteen   years   are   not   strictly   ‘governmental’   or   ‘non-­‐governmental’   but   have   a  
rather   undefined   status.   An   example   of   this   is   the   already-­‐mentioned   Baltic   Sea  
Secretariat  for  Youth  Affairs.  Although  it  is  an  institution  set  up  and  financed  by  
the   youth   ministries   of   the   region’s   countries,   its   representatives   participate   in  
many   non-­‐governmental   youth-­‐oriented   structures   and   activities,   most   notably  
those   of   the   Baltic   Youth   Forum.   The   Secretariat   staff   has   even   occasionally  
represented  the  BYF  at  the  annual  Baltic  Sea  NGO  Forum.    
 
The  ambiguous  role  of  the  Secretariat  has  drawn  criticism  from  some  members  of  
the   Forum   Network   in   whose   meetings   the   Secretariat   actively   participates   –
sometimes   in   the   capacity   of   an   NGO   representing   the   Baltic   Youth   Forum  
network,   as   noted   above,   and   sometimes   in   the   capacity   of   a   governmental  
observer.  This  dual  function  is  seen  as  somewhat  controversial,  especially  in  the  
light   of   the   fact   that   the   Secretariat’s   representative   has   been   one   of   the   voices  
most   vividly   opposed   to   the   deepening   of   the   cooperation   within   the   Forum  
Network.   The   lack   of   clarity   as   to   whether   she   did   that   in   her   capacity   as   the  
representative   of   the   (governmental)   Secretariat   or   as   a   representative   of   the  
(non-­‐governmental)   Baltic   Youth   Forum   has   made   her   opposition   appear   very  
provocative  to  some  of  the  Forum  Network’s  Focal  Points.  
 

  26  
Of   the   networks   studied,   the   Forum   Network   is   the   one   where   the   issue   of  
appropriate  distance  to  GOs  seems  to  be  most  sensitive,  and  where  the  boundary  
between   the   governmental   and   the   non-­‐governmental   is   most   blurred.   Since   its  
inception,   the   network   has   struggled   to   define   the   terms   of   its   relations   with  
bodies  such  as  the  CBSS,  but  also  with  the  national  governments  that  are  the  main  
sponsors  of  the  annual  Baltic  Sea  NGO  Forum.  The  ambivalence  in  the  relations  to  
governmental   organizations   dates   to   the   first   NGO   Forum   which   took   place   in  
2001   and   which   was,   as   mentioned   above,   a   clear   governmental   initiative.  
Together   with   the   CBSS,   the   German   Foreign   Ministry   that   organized   the  
conference   provided   an   institutional   and   financial   framework   as   well   as   the  
political  momentum  for  the  Forum;  although  this  was  not  the  first  time  that  such  
an  event  was  organized  in  the  region6,  this  kind  of  state-­‐sponsored  ‘push’  seems  
to  have  been  necessary  for  cross-­‐sectoral  NGO  cooperation  to  take  off  on  a  larger  
scale.   Still,   the   2001   Forum   drew   a   lot   of   criticism   for   being   a   top-­‐down   initiative,  
controlled  in  the  last  detail  by  the  German  Foreign  Ministry,  with  the  NGOs  that  
participated  in  the  preparatory  committee  having  been  selected  by  the  Ministry,  
and  with  Ministry  advisors  having  taken  part  in  the  Forum’s  workshops.  
 
Although   the   Forum   Network   has   become   formally   independent   from   the   regional  
GO  structures,  its  relations  with  governmental  actors  have  remained  ambiguous.  
On  the  one  hand  the  NGO  Forum  profits  from  having  an  institutional  framework  
to  lean  against  by  being  connected  to  the  CBSS  presidency,  but  on  the  other  hand  
the   continuing   participation   of   governmental   representatives   in   the   annual   NGO  
gathering   seems   to   make   some   members   of   the   Forum   Network   uneasy.   The  
Forum   often   opens   with   speeches   from   invited   representatives   of   the   CBSS,   the  
Nordic  Council,  and  other  regional  bodies,  as  well  as  the  heads  of  the  city  council  
of   the   town   that   hosts   the   event.   It   happens   also   that   Forum   workshops   are  
moderated   by   invited   guests   from   the   host   country’s   ministries.   Several  
interviewed  network  participants  express  a  certain  frustration  with  this  habit  of  
inviting   politicians   and   government   representatives   as   speakers   and/or  

                                                                                                               
6
Just a few months before the Lübeck Forum a similar regional NGO conference was organized in
Copenhagen.

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moderators,  seeing  it  as  inappropriate  at  a  supposedly  internal  and  independent  
civil  society  event.    
 
The   ambiguity   of   the   boundary   between   the   governmental   and   the   non-­‐
governmental   in   this   case   is   made   even   more   obvious   by   the   fact   that   the   CBSS  
quite   openly   gives   itself   credit   for   having   created   the  Forum   in   the   first   place,   and  
thus   having   played   an   active   part   in   the   development   of   cross-­‐border   NGO  
cooperation  in  the  region.  The  final  declaration  of  the  11th  ministerial  session  of  
the  CBSS  in  2002  points  out  for  example  that  the  Council  has    
 
contributed   to   the   creation   of   a   civil   society   network   around   the   Baltic   Sea  
and   has   helped   to   improve   people-­‐to-­‐people   contacts   significantly.  
Numerous   links   have   been   established   among   non-­‐governmental  
organizations,   and   Baltic   Sea   region–wide   NGO   fora   have   been   organized  
(Council  of  the  Baltic  Sea  States  2002).  
 
This  tendency  of  the  CBSS  to  publicize  its  involvement  in  the  NGO  cooperation  is  a  
source   of   irritation   for   some   of   the   NGOs,   which   see   it   as   compromising   the  
legitimacy  of  their  networks  as  ‘representatives  of  civil  society’.  
 
The   blurring   of   the   boundaries   between   the   different   institutional   spheres   is  
however   not   confined   only   to   the   character   of   the   relationship   between   the   NGO  
networks   and   their   governmental   partners.   Interestingly,   the   networks  
themselves   seem   to   be   showing   tendencies   towards   organizational  
transformation   (at   least   on   the   surface),   adopting   certain   features   that   are  
characteristic  of  high-­‐level  governmental  organizations.  It  is  primarily  the  trend  
towards   the   technocratization   and   professionalization   of   the   networks’   activities  
that  appears  to  have  such  an  effect  (cf.  Papakostas  in  this  volume).  It  is  reflected,  
among  others,  in  the  emphasis  that  some  of  the  network  member  organizations  
insist  on  putting  (above  all  in  the  networks’  external  communication  and  in  their  
official  documentation)  on  the  formal  act  of  founding  of  their  network,  on  formal  
attributes   such   as   a   constitution   and   other   founding   acts,   on   the   official  

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recognition  of  the  network  by  governmental  structures,  and  on  the  formal  right  
to  be  included  in  various  regional  policy-­‐making  processes.    
 
This  trend  is  also  to  a  great  extent  manifested  in  the  language  employed  within  
the  networks  and  in  the  formulations  used  to  express  their  aims  and  objectives.  
A  closer  look  at  the  official  documents  of  the  networks  shows  that  their  language  
in  many  ways  mirrors  that  employed  by  governmental  agencies.  Terms  such  as  
‘authorize’,   ‘formally   founded’,   ‘the   signed   agreement’   and   so   on   abound   in   the  
networks’  official  materials,  which  often,  as  for  example  the  Final  Statements  of  
the   Baltic   Sea   NGO   Forum,   seem   to   be   modelled   on   statements   of   high-­‐profile  
international  governmental  organizations.  This  kind  of  language  appears  also  in  
the  networks’  internal  documents  and  reports,  reflecting  clearly  the  wish  of  the  
network   member   organizations   to   be   seen   as   serious,   professional   institutions  
and  suitable  partners  for  the  political  decision-­‐makers.  
 
Occasionally,   this   wish   goes   even   further,   with   some   of   the   interviewed   NGO  
representatives   in   fact   calling   into   question   the   value   of   the   non-­‐governmental  
status   as   such.   For   example,   a   respondent   from   the   Coalition   Clean   Baltic   suggests  
in   an   interview   that   the   environmental   work   done   by   the   network   would   be  
carried  out  in  a  much  more  efficient  and  professional  way  if  it  were  possible  for  
the   CCB   to   re-­‐fashion   itself   and   become   an   environmental   state   agency   or  
institute,   instead   of   a   non-­‐governmental   alliance   of   organizations   (A.P.).   While  
this   attitude   (as   well   as   the   respondent’s   casual   openness   about   it)   has   to   be  
considered  as  rather  extreme,  it  can  still  be  taken  as  an  indication  of  the  degree  to  
which   the   border   between   the   governmental   and   the   non-­‐governmental   is  
becoming   fuzzy   –   or   obsolete   –   in   the   minds   of   at   least   some   NGO   network  
participants.  

 
A  further  aspect  that  may  be  contributing  to  this  increasing  fuzziness  is  the  issue  
of   the   public   image   of   the   networks,   which   is   yet   another   point   of   contention  
among   the   participating   organizations.   The   disagreements   over   the   political  
profiles  of  the  networks  discussed  in  the  previous  sections  are  clearly  connected  
to   conflicting   opinions   on   the   importance   of   the   network’s   public   visibility,   where  

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those  NGO  activists  who  are  interested  in  developing  the  institutional  structures  
of   their   networks   often   wish   to   capitalize   on   the   political   momentum   and   the  
prestige   connected   to   well-­‐organized   regional   NGO   events   that   receive   significant  
media  attention.  
 
Since   many   organizations   value   the   weight   that   the   network   membership   adds   to  
their   activities   on   the   national   level,   the   public   visibility   and   the   reputation   of   the  
network   become   an   important   strategic   asset   for   them.   For   some   interviewees,  
the   lack   of   public   visibility   of   their   network   is   thus   a   source   of   frustration.   A  
respondent  from  Coalition  Clean  Baltic  complains,  for  example,  that  the  network  
spends   money   on   publishing   press   articles   on   environmental   issues   without  
making   sure   that   the   articles   contain   the   CCB   logo   –   which   would   contribute   to  
spreading   information   about   the   network’s   existence   (A.I.).   Other   CCB   members  
also  complain  that  the  network  is  virtually  unknown,  not  only  among  the  general  
public   but   also   among   people   who   work   on   environmental   questions   in   the  
region’s  countries  (A.P.).  
   

There   are,   however,   also   voices   critical   to   this   attitude.   One   of   the  Forum   Network  
Focal   Points,   for   example,   speaks   forcefully   against   the   idea   of   ‘marketing’   the  
network;   its   name   should   not   have   to   brand   all   cooperation   projects   that   come   to  
life   through   its   efforts.   The   goal   of   networking   should   rather   be   to   support   the  
already  existing  structures  and  to  facilitate  meetings  between  people  that  need  to  
meet  (A.F.).  Here  the  network  is  thus  seen  not  so  much  as  an  actor  but  rather  as  
an  arena,  a  space  in  which  contacts  are  initiated  and  developed.    

If now during the Turku Forum the environmental organizations could agree on a new
strategy for the Baltic Agenda 21, then I would not regard it as the success of the
network. We only give (the others) the space to go ahead (A.F.).

In  this  context,  several  Focal  Points  are  highly  critical  of  the  tendency  of  the  NGO  
Forum  to  develop  into  an  event  with  high  levels  of  media  attention,  many  invited  
guest   speakers   from   the   region’s   governments,   and   lavish   spending   on   hotels   and  
representation  that,  in  their  opinion,  suits  diplomatic  events  better  than  an  NGO  
gathering.  The  fact  that  the  initiative  to  organize  the  first  NGO  Forum  was  taken  

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by  a  Foreign  Ministry  and  not  by  NGOs  themselves  seems  to  have  influenced  the  
direction   in   which   the   Forum   has   developed   in   this   respect:   the   governmental  
endorsement   and   support   has   clearly   meant   that   the   Forum   has   been   given   a  
certain   high-­‐level   status   not   necessarily   available   to   other   NGO   events   in   the  
region   or   elsewhere,   a   status   that   the   Focal   Points   organizing   the   subsequent  
Forums   have   been   trying   to   maintain.   As   several   critical   respondents   point   out,  
the  organizers  of  the  first  Forum  set  a  certain  standard  by  spending  a  lot  of  money  
on  public  relations,  and  this  has  been  continued  by  the  organizing  committees  in  
the  subsequent  host  countries.  ‘It  is  lucky  that  most  people  here  are  not  aware  of  
how   much   money   was   spent   on   the   conference   facilities’,   remarked   one   of   the  
critical  Focal  Point  representatives  at  the  2003  Forum  in  Turku  (A.F.).  
 
Autonomy  or  policy-­‐making?  Summarizing  the  empirical  discussion  
The   above   selection   of   empirical   evidence   points   to   a   few   striking   features  
characterizing   the   regional   NGO   cooperation   in   the   Baltic   Sea   area,   especially  
when  it  comes  to  the  external  relations  of  the  NGO  networks  in  the  context  of  the  
regional   governance   arrangements.   The   attitude   of   the   NGO   networks   to   the  
governmental  actors  in  the  region  is  obviously  quite  a  complex  one  and  a  major  
source   of   disagreement   within   the   networks   themselves.   On   the   one   hand,   the  
involved  organizations  wish  to  guard  their  independence  and  their  self-­‐ascribed  
role  as  ‘representatives  of  civil  society’,  which  means  in  their  view   that  a  certain  
distance  to  governmental  actors  has  to  be  maintained.  On  the  other  hand,  many  
participants   would   clearly   like   to   see   the   networks   assume   the   role   of   active  
policy-­‐makers  in  their  area  of  work,  and  regard  close  cooperation  with  the  GOs  
as  one  of  the  networks’  main  tasks.    
 
The   tension   between   these   two   points   of   view   is   obvious,   and   it   affects   the  
cooperation   climate   within   the   networks   to   a   considerable   extent.   The  
disagreement   concerns   in   fact   not   only   the   practical   regulation   of   the  
relationship  with  authorities  and  the  political  scope  of  the  networks’  activity,  but  
the   very   self-­‐image   of   the   NGOs   involved   and   the   idea   of   the   role   that   they   see  
themselves  as  performing  on  the  regional  arena.  The  two  above-­‐contrasted  roles  
are   of   course   not   incompatible,   but   the   energy   and   time   invested   by   the   member  

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organizations  into  arguing  over  the  priorities  of  the  networks  suggest  that  they  
are  in  some  instances  difficult  to  reconcile.    
 
The   financial   dependence   of   the   networks   on   state   funding   introduces   an  
additional  tension  into  the  cooperation.  At  least  to  some  extent  it  demands  that  
the   networks   adjust   their   activities   to   the   preferences   of   the   governmental  
donors,   and   thus   at   least   to   some   extent   organize   the   cooperation   in   the   form  
that  corresponds  to  the  political  fashions  and  trends  of  the  day.  The  tendency  of  
the   geographical   scope   of   the   NGO   cooperation   to   follow   that   of   the   foreign  
policy  and  development  aid  interests  of  the  governments  that  finance  them  leads  
to  a  conclusion  that  the  ties  between  state  and  civil  society  at  the  regional  level  
are  much  more  intricate  than  the  rhetoric  of  ‘bottom-­‐up   regionalization’   would  
imply.  
 
Civil  society  in  transnational  governance  –  concluding  remarks  
Against   the   backdrop   of   the   regional   NGO   networking   in   the   Baltic   Sea   area  
sketched-­‐out   above,   the   process   of   transnationalization   emerges   as   a   powerful  
“driver”   of   change   with   potential   to   affect   civil   society   in   Northern   Europe.   It   not  
only  alters  the  geographical  scope  of  activity  of  civil  society  organizations.  It  also  
draws   them   into   a   relatively   new   setting   –   what   in   this   chapter   has   been   called   a  
“transnational  governance  environment”  –  where  they  are  expected  to  relate  to,  
and  intensely  interact  with,  state  actors  of  different  kinds.  The  above  discussion  
of   the   way   this   new   institutional   framework   for   activity   is   processed   and  
negotiated  within  the  civil  society  structures  themselves  reveals  patterns  which  
may  serve  here  as  a  basis  for  a  few  general  reflections  on  the  place  of  civil  society  
in  transnational  governance  and  its  relationship  to  the  other  actors.  

First  of  all,  the  domestic  context  seems  to  matter  significantly  in  determining  the  
over-­‐arching   attitude   of   the   individual   civil   society   organizations   towards   the  
state   structures   at   the   transnational   level   as   well,   influencing   the   position   the  
organizations   try   to   make   their   networks   adopt.   As   the   above   discussion  
illustrates,   the   general   character   of   the   institutional   structure   in   which   the  
organizations   are   embedded   in   their   home   countries,   as   well   as   their   own  
positions  in  their  domestic  political  arenas,  structure  to  a  great  extent  the  way  in  

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which  they  think  about  the  proper  relationship  to  the  state.  Here,  we  could  also  
imagine   that   the   type   of   civil   society   regime   (see   Salamon   and   Anheier   1998;  
Lundström  and  Wijkström  1997)  matters  significantly,  although  more  empirical  
studies  are  needed  to  confirm  that.  

At   the   same   time   one   should   also   remember   that   the   individual   organizations  
that   participate   in   the   transnational   networks   are   often   themselves   parts   of  
larger  organizational  fields  at  home  and/or  larger  organizational  structures,  for  
example   federations   (see   Einarsson’s   chapter   in   this   volume).   The   internal  
deliberative   push-­‐and-­‐pull   process   through   which   the   attitude   of   the   networks  
vis-­‐à-­‐vis   the   governmental   structures   is   negotiated   is   thus   also   constrained   by  
the  respective  culture  of  the  larger  domestic  organizational  spheres  to  which  the  
network  member  organizations  belong.  Such  cultures  –  with  regard  to  the  ideas  
surrounding   the   proper   relationship   to   the   state   –   may   vary   considerably   not  
only   between   the   different   countries   that   the   organizations   originate   in,   but   also  
within  them.    

It   is   also   prudent   in   this   context   to   consider   the   role   of   the   individual   NGO  
representatives   involved   in   the   transnational   cooperation   in   question.   The   task  
of   handling   an   organization’s   ‘foreign   relations’   in   a   particular   geographical   area  
(e.g.,   the   EU,   Norden   or   the   Baltic   Sea   region)   is   often   assigned   to   a   particular  
person   –   a   member   or   a   paid   employee   –   who   then,   depending   on   the   size,  
organizational   culture   and   general   orientation   of   the   organization,   may   wield  
considerable   personal   influence   over   his   or   her   organization’s   stand   in  
negotiations   with   the   partners   within   the   transnational   cooperation   structure    
(cf.   Ahrne   1994   and   his   concept   of   organizational   centaurs   -­‐   part   organization,  
part   human).   This   introduces   further   complexity   to   the   analysis   of   the   way   in  
which  the  relationship  to  the  state  is  negotiated  within  such  structures.    

Second,   the   results   of   the   study   illustrate   clearly   the   futility   of   regarding  
transnational  governance  as  a  zero-­‐sum  game  where  the  increase  in  the  visibility  
and  influence  of  non-­‐governmental  actors  supposedly  leads  to  the  decrease  of  the  
importance   of   the   state.   Indeed,   the   impression   we   get   from   observing   the   NGO  
networks  in  the  Baltic  Sea  area  is  one  of  a  constant  shadowy  presence  of  the  state,  

  33  
hovering  above  the  NGOs’  own  cooperation.  Even  before  the  networks  actually  get  
to   actively   participate   in   the   regional   governance   processes   in   their   respective  
fields,  they  put  considerable  effort  into  negotiating  internally  their  positions  vis-­‐à-­‐
vis   their   presumed   governmental   counterparts.   The   transnational   governance  
environment   –   with   its   consistent   rhetorical   stress   on   the   importance   of   civil  
society  –  has  created  a  situation  where  the  networks’  political  role  and  status  in  
relation   to   the   state   structures   are   perceived   by   the   members   themselves   as  
sometimes   overshadowing   the   original   purpose   of   the   networking,   i.e.,  
cooperation  and  closer  ties  between  the  NGOs.    
 
This   gives   naturally   considerable   food   for   thought.   Djelic   and   Sahlin-­‐Anderson  
(2006)   ask   how   the   interaction   between   the   different   kinds   of   actors   in   the  
framework   of   governance   arrangements   can   influence   and   transform   them.  
Interestingly,   however,   it   appears   that   not   only   the   interaction   itself   but   already  
the  mere  possibility  or  prospect  of  interaction  affects  the  way  in  which  such  actors  
perceive  themselves  and  their  role.  By  creating  an  official  image  of  the  region  as  
an   open,   inclusive   arena   where   civil   society   groups   are   regarded   as   serious  
partners   in   decision-­‐making   and   are   encouraged   to   participate   in   regional  
governance,   state   actors   have   in   this   case   influenced   in   a   subtle   (although   not  
necessarily  intentional)  manner  the  internal  dynamics  of  the  cooperation  within  
the   civil   society’s   own   transnational   structures,   and,   ultimately,   the   direction   in  
which   these   structures   develop.   Far   from   ‘governance   without   government’,   the  
regional   governance   environment   seems   thus   to   constitute   rather   an   excellent  
example   of   ‘governance   with   government’,   the   state   actors   pulling   not   so   few  
strings  behind  the  NGO  scenes.    
 
Third  and  finally,  there  seems  to  be  a  certain  contradiction  between,  on  the  one  
hand,   the   apparent   self-­‐image   of   the   civil   society   organizations   as   independent  
and   different   from   the   state   actors,   and,   on   the   other   hand,   the   tendency   of   their  
transnational   networks   not   only   to   become   organizationally   ‘entangled’   with  
such  actors  but  also  to  increasingly  mimic  their  outlook  and  behaviour.  Even  as  
the   regional   networks   struggle   to   preserve   their   autonomy   vis   à   vis   their  
governmental   counterparts   in   the   region,   expressing   clearly   the   idea   of   civil  

  34  
society   as   a   separate   sphere   in   society   with   missions   or   roles   of   its   own,   they  
seem   to   strive   for   the   status   and   the   influence   that   come   with   being   a   part   of   the  
state   apparatus,   and   behave   sometimes   in   a   way   that   makes   it   hard   for   the  
observer  to  tell  if  they  in  fact  are  a  part  of  it  or  not.    

In   other   words,   there   is   clearly   substance   to   the   claim   that   different   kinds   of  
actors   thrown   together   into   a   transnational   governance   setting   may   start  
growing   more   and   more   alike,   thus   adapting   their   identities   to   the   new   situation  
(Djelic   and   Sahlin-­‐Andersson   2006).   In   the   context   of   region-­‐building   and  
regional  governance,  this  corresponds  also  closely  to  what  certain  approaches  to  
transnational   regionalism   studies   within   the   field   of   international   political  
economy   sometimes   refer   to   as   ‘mixed   regionalism’   (Söderbaum   2002),   with  
complex   interactions,   alliances   and   mergers   between   actors   from   the   different  
spheres.    

Interestingly,  we  can  see  in  the  above-­‐presented  materials  that  the  increasingly  
blurred   border   between   state   and   civil   society   can   lead   to   considerable  
confusion   regarding   the   roles   and   relative   power   of   the   different   kinds   of   actors,  
confusion   that   some   of   these   actors   seem   to   suffer   from   themselves.   The  
frequent   assertions   on   the   part   of   bodies   such   as   the   Council   of   the   Baltic   Sea  
States   about   the   necessity   of   inclusion   and   engagement   of   civil   society  
organizations   in   various   areas   of   regional   policy-­‐making   and   their   political   as  
well   as   financial   support   for   regional   civil   society   cooperation   may   have   –  
intentionally  or  unintentionally  –  created  the  illusion  of  a  possibility  of  real  civil  
society   empowerment   at   the   transnational   level.   The   contrast   between   this  
illusion   and   a   much   more   prosaic   reality   –   where   the   states,   in   the   end,   still   have  
the   last   say   and   do   not   seem   to   care   too   much   about   the   opinions   of   CSOs   –  
appears  to  be  a  potential  source  for  disappointment  and  resentment  on  the  part  
of  the  organizations,  affecting  in  its  turn  their  already  ambiguous  –  if  not  outright  
schizophrenic  –  relationship  to  the  state  structures.  
 
To   conclude,   there   is   a   wider   aspect   to   the   changes   brought   on   by   the  
transnationalization   process   illustrated   here   by   the   case   of   Baltic   Sea   regional  
NGO   cooperation.   Evidently,   each   civil   society   organization   brings   into   the  

  35  
transnational  cooperation  arrangements  a  package  of  world-­‐views,  attitudes  and  
interests  historically  and  institutionally  embedded  in  their  respective  nation-­‐state  
enviroments,   that   need   to   be   accommodated   into   a   wider   common   framework.  
The   negotiation   of   a   common   “front”   towards   the   state   actors   at   the   transnational  
level,  which  has  been  discussed  here,  is  only  one  of  many  steps  in  this  process.  It  
does  not  seem  too  far-­‐fetched  to    hypothesise  that  the  transnational  cooperation  
and   participation   in   cross-­‐border   governance   structures   will   in   their   turn   affect  
the  way  in  which  the  organizations  perceive  their  own  roles  and  positions;  behave  
in   their   domestic   arenas;   and   relate   to   the   key   –   for   example   governmental   –  
actors  there.  In  this  sense  transnationalization  may  very  well  also  have  a  deeper,  
institutional  impact  on  the  internal,  domestic  structures  and  operational  modes  of  
the   Northern   European   civil   societies,   an   impact   that   needs   to   be   studied   in  
greater  detail.  
 
 
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