Title: Theories of Truth

Course Title: Introduction to Philosophy

Course Code: PHI101
Section: 15

Semester: Fall 2018

Submitted By:

SN. Name ID#

1. SAFIUL AZAM BHUIYAN 1320206030

2. MD. FOUAD HASAN 1320158030

3. MOHAMMAD RAHIM 1420435030

4. MEHEDI HASAN SAZEEB 1520289630

5. CHANDRA KAMOL DAS 1520390031

6. SAMIHA AHMED 1612061615

7. HABIBA TU JUYENA 1612746615

Submitted to
Dr. Mohammad Kamrul Ahsan
Department of History & Philosophy
North South University

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21st December, 2018

Mohammad Kamrul Ahsan,

Professor
Department of History & Philosophy,
North South University,
Dhaka-1229
Course: PHI101 (Sec: 15)

Subject: Submitting Group Assignment on “Theories of Truth”

Dear Sir,
It gives us immense pleasure to inform you that we have successfully completed our report
which you authorized us to undertake as a part of our PHI101. We have tried our level best to
fulfill the requirement of this report by engaging ourselves seriously and giving our best effort to
prepare this report. Working hard for this report makes us able to understand the Theories of
Truth which we think will be very useful in our professional life and also for the social life.

Under this circumstance, we would be greatly happy if you kindly accept the assignment of our
hard work and appreciate us for the future purposes.

Therefore, we would like to provide you additional information if you have any enquires after
reading the report.

Thanking You,
SAFIUL AZAM BHUIYAN
MD FUAD HASAN
MOHAMMAD RAHIM
MEHEDI HASAN SAZEEB
CHANDRA KAMOL DAS
SAMIHA AHMED
HABIBA TU JUYENA

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 Acknowledgement
We start by saying thanks to the Almighty for the fruitful finishing of this examination task. May
Allah broaden our insight and favor us to push ahead with progress.

It was difficult to enlarge our insight in this part since we don't have a place with this office. In
any case, the method for instructing was not just finished whelming, rather it was sufficiently
educative which can be combination with the genuine living. The execution of the discovering
that we had learnt would be our essential objective in our down to earth life.

With due regard, we might want to offer our thanks and gratefulness to Mr. Dr. Mohammad
Kamrul Ahsan sir, for his motivating direction all through the semester, without which it
would've been difficult to finish this report. The appreciation won't get the job done what Sir had
improved the situation us. The tolerance to keep us on the up and up of basic intuition astounded
us and showed us to think basically either. The verbosity and the expert articulation can
extraordinarily be valued.

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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 5
What is Truth?................................................................................................................................. 5
Types of Truth ............................................................................................................................. 6
Formal Truth ............................................................................................................................ 6
Material Truth .......................................................................................................................... 6
Self- Evidence Theory of Truth ...................................................................................................... 7
Criticism ...................................................................................................................................... 8
Coherence Theory of Truth ............................................................................................................. 8
Criticism ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Correspondence Theory ................................................................................................................ 11
Criticisms .................................................................................................................................. 12
The Pragmatic Theory................................................................................................................... 13
Criticism .................................................................................................................................... 14
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 15
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 16

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Introduction
The nature of truth is critical to an effective Christian apologetics. If we are to have a workable
apologetics, it is not enough that we simply think or say that a given statement is true, for it is
also essential that we have some notion of what we mean when we say that something is true,
that is, what kind of thing truth is. Equally significant is that we offer good objective reasons for
what we mean by truth, and that others can see for themselves why truth must be understood in
these terms. It only stands to reason, for example, that if religious statements are true in a way
that is different from our ordinary meaning when we say something is true, we then have the
tough task of determining, if at all possible, in what way religious truth differs from our normal
understanding of truth. On the other hand, it seems common-sense expectation to accept the
notion that truth can mean different things to different people, in spite of various disagreements
as to what truth is. If this were the case, we could hardly expect to arrive at any kind of
agreement (except by accident or coincidence) about any kind of claim, religious or otherwise.
And equally crucial is the idea that we cannot simply say that truth is indefinable, or that we are
incapable of knowing and determining truth, due to our human inadequacies, prior commitments
or subjective preferences. This view seems to go against our best intuitions about the kind of
thing truth is. The way we approach truth in our everyday lives, especially when we think there
is no personal, intellectual or moral issue at stake, argues against this notion. We regularly think
that what we believe matches up with the way the world actually works. All the same, we cannot
expect others to accept the claims of Christian apologetics unless they have some sense that the
notion of truth we are using gives us common ground for doing apologetics. We can build some
inroads into common ground by investigating the various major theories of truth with a view
toward clarifying the reasons we have for holding a specific theory of truth and why the concept
of truth we ultimately offer up is a valid one.

What is Truth?
Truth, in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, the property of sentences, assertions,
beliefs, thoughts, or propositions that are said, in ordinary discourse, to agree with the facts or to
state what is the matter. Truth is the aim of belief; falsity is a fault. People need the truth about
the world in order to thrive. Truth is important. Believing what is not true is apt to spoil a
person‘s plans and may even cost him his life. Telling what is not true may result in legal and

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social penalties. Conversely, a dedicated pursuit of truth characterizes the good scientist, the
good historian, and the good detective.

Types of Truth
There are 2 main types of truth:

• Formal Truth
• Material Truth

Formal Truth
A judgment is formally genuine when it encapsulates amicability, with no essential reference to
the actualities. For instance: Mr. Salam is a nun is formally false, for there is an undeniable
logical inconsistency between its subject and predicate. The judgment of 'Mr. Salam lives in
Mars' formally genuine despite the fact that we are aware of none like him. Consequently a
judgment needs formal truth when its subject and originate before can't be acknowledged
together. A contention needs formal truth when it is commence and conclusion can't be
acknowledged together or have no connection. It is just formally genuine just when it introduces
and conclusion can be and should be acknowledged together.

Material Truth
A judgment is substantially genuine when, other than being formally valid, it is reliable with the
realities. For instance: Mr. Alom is Bangladeshi. Formal truth is for the most part called
"legitimacy" and material truth is essentially called 'truth'. In this talk we are associated with
truth not legitimacy.

The issue of legitimacy is the topic of formal rationale, at give we are concerned the issue of
truth. The inquiry is: what are the signs of a genuine judgment which recognize it from a false
one? What is the test or foundation of truth? Rationally, there have been distinctive answers;
albeit, prominently, every one of them has joined to constitute a functional guide.

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Self- Evidence Theory of Truth
The concept of evidence is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of science. Of
course, ‗evidence‘ is hardly a philosopher's term of art: it is not only, or even primarily,
philosophers who routinely speak of evidence, but also lawyers and judges, historians and
scientists, investigative journalists and reporters, as well as the members of numerous other
professions and ordinary folk in the course of everyday life. The concept of evidence would thus
seem to be on firmer pre-theoretical ground than many other concepts which enjoy similarly
central standing within philosophy.

The first general argument against doubting self-evident truths is that any doubt would beg the
question against the truth that is to be doubted. An argument begs the question when the
premises are less certain than the conclusion. So trying to convince an atheist that God exists by
quoting the Bible is a prime example of question begging. Question begging is always irrational
and unreasonable. Any argument against a self-evident truth will begin with premises that are
less certain than the self-evident truth that they are questioning. Therefore, no argument against a
self-evident truth is ever reasonable.

The second general argument against doubting self-evident truths is that any attempt to disprove
a self-evident truth suffers from practical contradiction. Just as some truths are practically self-
evident, their contradictories are practical contradictions. Stating ―I am not talking‖ is a practical
contradiction because anyone who says this says something false. In a similar way, any argument
attempting to diminish trust in self-evident truths will depend on logical reasoning. But logical
reasoning is a form of self-evident truth. Each step in the argument is logically self-evident given
the prior steps (excluding the premises). So any attempt to undercut or rebut self-evident truths
will require the use of those truths to do so. Therefore, any such argument is practically
contradictory.

These arguments are sufficient to remove any remaining doubt regarding the usefulness and
certainty of self-evident truths. The remaining questions involve recognizing which truths are
self-evident and resolving arguments over that.

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Criticism
Russell lists three requisite features for the Self- Evidence Theory of Truth

1) The theory must take its opposite, falsehood, into account. 2) Since it is evident that if there
were no beliefs there could be no truth or falsehood, then in a world of mere matter, which
contained only fact and not belief, truth and falsehood would be impossible. Thus it seems clear
that "truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements." 3) "Truth or falsehood of a
belief always depends upon something which lies outside the belief itself." Believing that
Charles I died on the scaffold is a true belief because it is based on an actual event, not owing to
anything intrinsic to the thought. Believing that he died in bed would be a false belief as it
contradicts fact. Truth and falsehood are properties dependent on the relation of the belief to
something not contained in the belief.

The third of these is the least self-evident and leads to the view, common among other
philosophical systems, "that truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and
fact." Since an absolute form of such a correspondence with an outside factor has been hard to
discern, some philosophers have rejected the correspondence criterion in favor of the theory that
"truth consists in coherence."

Coherence Theory of Truth

A coherence theory of truth states that the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence
with some specified set of propositions. A statement is true if and only if it coheres (is
consistent) with all of the other statements of that system. The coherence theory differs from its
principal competitor, the correspondence theory of truth, in two essential respects. The
competing theories give conflicting accounts of the relation that propositions bear to their truth
conditions. Here ‗proposition‘ is not used in any technical sense. It simply refers to the bearers of
truth values, whatever they may be. According to one, the relation is coherence, according to the
other, it is correspondence. The two theories also give conflicting accounts of truth conditions.
According to the coherence theory, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other
propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of
propositions are not (in general) propositions, but rather objective features of the world.

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Although the coherence and correspondence theories are fundamentally opposed in this way,
they both present (in contrast to deflationary theories of truth) a substantive conception of truth.
That is, unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that
truth is a property of propositions that can be examined in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions
propositions have, and the relations propositions stand in to these conditions.

According to some early versions of the coherence theory, the coherence relation is simply
consistency. On this view, to say that a proposition coheres with a specified set of propositions is
to say that the proposition is consistent with the set. This account of coherence is unsatisfactory
for the following reason. Consider two propositions which do not belong to a specified set. These
propositions could both be consistent with a specified set and yet be inconsistent with each other.
If coherence is consistency, the coherence theorist would have to claim that both propositions are
true, but this is impossible.

A more plausible version of the coherence theory states that the coherence relation is some form
of entailment. Entailment can be understood here as strict logical entailment, or entailment in
some looser sense. According to this version, a proposition coheres with a set of propositions if
and only if it is entailed by members of the set. Another more plausible version of the theory,
held for example in (Bradley 1914), is that coherence is mutual explanatory support between
propositions.

Criticism

1. According to the specification objection, coherence theorists have no way to identify the
specified set of propositions without contradicting their position. This objection
originates in Russell (1907). Opponents of the coherence theory can argue as follows.
The proposition (1) ―Jane Austen was hanged for murder‖ coheres with some set of
propositions. (2) ―Jane Austen died in her bed‖ coheres with another set of propositions.
No one supposes that the first of these propositions is true, in spite of the fact that it
coheres with a set of propositions. The specification objection charge that coherence
theorists have no grounds for saying that (1) is false and (2) true.
Some responses to the specification problem are unsuccessful. One could say that we
have grounds for saying that (1) is false and (2) is true because the latter coheres with

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 propositions which correspond to the facts. Coherentists cannot, however, adopt this
response without contradicting their position. Sometimes coherence theorists maintain
that the specified system is the most comprehensive system, but this is not the basis of a
successful response to the specification problem. Coherentists can only, unless they are to
compromise their position, define comprehensiveness in terms of the size of a system.
Coherentists cannot, for example, talk about the most comprehensive system composed
of propositions which correspond to reality. There is no reason, however, why two or
more systems cannot be equally large. Other criteria of the specified system, to which
coherentists frequently appeal, are similarly unable to solve the specification problem.
These criteria include simplicity, empirical adequacy and others. Again, there seems to be
no reason why two or more systems cannot equally meet these criteria.

2. The transcendence objection charges that a coherence theory of truth is unable to

account for the fact that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs.
According to this objection, truth transcends any set of beliefs. Someone might argue, for
example, that the proposition ―Jane Austen wrote ten sentences on November 17th, 1807‖
is either true or false. If it is false, some other proposition about how many sentences
Austen wrote that day is true. No proposition, however, about precisely how many
sentences Austen wrote coheres with any set of beliefs and we may safely assume that
none will ever cohere with a set of beliefs. Opponents of the coherence theory will
conclude that there is at least one true proposition which does not cohere with any set of
beliefs.

Some versions of the coherence theory are immune to the transcendence objection. A
version which holds that truth is coherence with the beliefs of an omniscient being is
proof against the objection. Every truth coheres with the set of beliefs of an omniscient
being. All other versions of the theory, however, have to cope with the objection,
including the view that truth is coherence with a set of propositions believed at the limit
of inquiry. Even at the limit of inquiry, finite creatures will not be able to decide every
question, and truth may transcend what coheres with their beliefs.

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 Coherence theorists can defend their position against the transcendence objection by
maintaining that the objection begs the question. Those who present the objection
assume, generally without argument, that it is possible that some proposition be true even
though it does not cohere with any set of beliefs. This is precisely what coherence
theorists deny. Coherence theorists have arguments for believing that truth cannot
transcend what coheres with some set of beliefs. Their opponents need to take issue with
these arguments rather than simply assert that truth can transcend what coheres with a
specified system.

Correspondence Theory
The correspondence theory of truth basically says that a statement is true when it corresponds to
some state of affairs. It‘s the state of affairs which makes a statement true or false depending on
whether that state obtains or not. So, if I claim that it is raining outside my house right now, that
sentence is true just in case it is actually raining outside my house now. If it is not raining outside
my house now, that statement is false. In the correspondence theory, truth is a relationship
between statements and the way the world really is, sometimes called ―facts‖.

Objections to the Correspondence Theory

The objection recognizes moral truths, but rejects the idea that reality contains moral facts for
moral truths to correspond to. Logic provides another example of a domain that has been
―flagged‖ in this way. The logical positivists recognized logical truths but rejected logical facts.
Their intellectual ancestor, Hume, had already given two definitions of ―true‖, one for logical
truths, broadly conceived, the other for non-logical truths: ―Truth or falsehood consists in an
agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of
fact

Correspondence as congruence

Bertrand Russell theorized that a statement, to be true, must have a structural isomorphism with
the state of affairs in the world that makes it true. For example, "A cat is on a mat" is true if, and
only if, there is in the world a cat and a mat and the cat is related to the mat by virtue of being on

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it. If any of the three pieces (the cat, the mat, and the relation between them which correspond
respectively to the subject, object, and verb of the statement) is missing, the statement is false.

Some sentences pose difficulties for this model, however. As just one example, adjectives such
as "counterfeit", "alleged", or "false" do not have the usual simple meaning of restricting the
meaning of the noun they modify: a "tall lawyer" is a kind of lawyer, but an "alleged lawyer"
may not be.

Correspondence as correlation:

J. L. Austin theorized that there need not be any structural parallelism between a true statement
and the state of affairs that makes it true. It is only necessary that the semantics of the language
in which the statement is expressed are such as to correlate whole-for-whole the statement with
the state of affairs. A false statement, for Austin, is one that is correlated by the language to a
state of affairs that does not exist.

Criticisms
First, the "correspondence theory of truth‖ is a very broad term that encompasses many theories.
Obviously, the intuition they share is that truth is somehow connected to the world and how it is.
However, the first thing you'll notice is that it is the world which "makes true" a proposition and
not the other way around. Thus, the relation is intuitively asymmetric but this asymmetry is not
mirrored by the predicate x correspondence to y which is symmetric. (However, Russell, if I'm
not mistaken, claims that the relation between the world and the propositions is symmetric which
is odd to me).

This being said, the main criticism that's addressed to correspondence theory of truth is that it
cannot be used to explain all truths although it is supposed to be a sound and complete theory of
truth. A classical argument is the failure of this theory to explain negative truths: The cat is not
on the carpet is true but there is nothing in the world (no cat to make the fact that the cat is on the
carpet obtains) that could make the proposition true. Maximalists or friends of correspondent
theory of truth have yet come up with interesting solutions.

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The Pragmatic Theory
The Pragmatic Theory of Truth is, predictably enough, a product pragmatism, an American
philosophy developed during the early and mid-twentieth century. Pragmatists identified the
nature of truth with the principle of action. Put simply; truth does not exist in some abstract
realm of thought independent of social relationship or actions; instead, truth is a function of an
active process of engagement with the world and verification.

Pragmatism

Although most closely associated with the work of William James and John Dewey, the earliest
descriptions of a Pragmatic Theory of Truth can be found in the writings of Pragmatist Charles
S. Pierce, according to whom ―there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything
but a possible difference of practice.‖

The point of the above quote is to explain that one cannot conceive of the truth of a belief
without also being able to conceive of how, if true, that belief matters in the world. Thus, the
truth of the idea that water is wet cannot be understood or acknowledged without also
understanding what ―wetness‖ means in concert with other objects — a wet road, a wet hand,
etc.

William James

William James made a number of important changes to this Pragmatist understanding of truth.
The most important were probably the alteration of the public character of truth which Pierce
argued for. We must remember that Pierce focused first and foremost on scientific
experimentation — truth, then, depended upon practical consequences that would be observed by
a community of scientists.

James, however, moved this process of belief-formation, application, experimentation, and

observation to the very personal level of each individual. Thus, a belief became ―truth‖ when it
proved to have practical utility in the life of a single individual. He expected that a person would
take the time to ―act as if‖ a belief was true and then see what happened — if it proved useful,
helpful, and productive, then it should indeed be regarded as ―true‖ after all.

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Criticism
There are, of course, a number of obvious objections that can be raised against the Pragmatic
theory of truth. For one thing, the notion of ―what works‖ is very ambiguous. What happens
when a belief works in one sense, but fails in another? For example, a belief that one will
succeed may give a person the psychological strength needed to accomplish a great deal but, in
the end, they may fail in their ultimate goal. Was their belief ―true‖?

The Pragmatic Theory of Truth faces the following difficulties.

1. Pragmatists reject the concept of Absolute Truth. They make Truth subjective and relative.

2. Every belief or idea which works is not necessarily true. A cancer patient may live a better
life, if he does not know about his mysterious disease.

3. Many false or incorrect ideas lead to fruitful consequences in human life. Using unfair means
in examination may lead to success but it does not justify nor does prove the truth of unfair
means.

4. The ideas often work because they are basically true. Truth of our judgements leads to success
of our activities.

5. Pragmatism reduces Truth to a personal and private affair. What works for one man may not
work for another man. Even the idea which is useful at one time

6. There are many ideas whose truth can never be denied, though none of these ideas lead to
successful consequences e.g. knowledge of starvation on the part of a man of broken legs, cannot
lead him to any fruitful activity to fetch food.

7. The Pragmatic thinkers make truth to be a species of Good. For these thinker‘s truth is
valuable for a purpose. However, Truth is as fundamental as Good and Beauty. None of Truth,
Good or Beauty is subordinate to other.

Other objections to pragmatism include how we define what it means to say a belief "works", or
that it is "useful to believe". The vague usage of these terms, first popularized by James, has led
to much debate.

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A final objection is that pragmatism of James's variety entails relativism. What is useful for you
to believe might not be useful for me to believe. It follows that "truth" for you is different from
"truth" for me (and that the relevant facts don't matter).

Conclusion
Truth is one of the central subjects in philosophy. It is also one of the largest. Truth has been a
topic of discussion in its own right for thousands of years. Moreover, a huge variety of issues in
philosophy relate to truth, either by relying on theses about truth, or implying theses about truth.

It would be impossible to survey all there is to say about truth in any coherent way. Instead, this
essay will concentrate on the main themes in the study of truth in the contemporary philosophical
literature. It will attempt to survey the key problems and theories of current interest, and show
how they relate to one-another. A number of other entries investigate many of these topics in
greater depth. Generally, discussion of the principal arguments is left to them. The goal of this
essay is only to provide an overview of the current Theories.

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