JOURNAL OF RESEARCH IN PERSONALITY 31, 141–165 (1997)

ARTICLE NO. RP972178

Beliefs and the Big Five: Cognitive Bases of Broad Individual

Differences in Personality

Christopher A. Langston
Philadelphia Geriatric Center

and

W. Eric Sykes
Purdue University

Recently a consensus has developed that the Big Five traits of personality (Neu-
roticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness) are an ad-
equate taxonomy of individual difference traits. However, despite this consensus
and the often impressive predictive results of trait research, very little research has
been done on a key question—How do traits work at the level of proximal mental
processes to causally determine behavior? We argue that the constructs of the cogni-
tive approach to personality (e.g., beliefs, expectancies, and subjective values) can
be used to provide proximal, causal explanations of individual differences. Two
studies are reported demonstrating the initial steps in this effort. Study 1 (N 5 83)
used think-aloud assessment techniques to measure the beliefs of subjects. These
interviewer-assessed beliefs were then shown to be significantly correlated with
individual differences in standard self-report personality questionnaires. Study 2
assessed subjects’ (N 5 86) beliefs via a self-report measure and found beliefs to
be significantly correlated with scores on standard personality questionnaires. We
argue that individual differences along the broad trait dimensions of the Big Five
can be explained via individual differences in general beliefs people hold about
themselves and the social world. Future directions and limitations of this approach
are discussed.  1997 Academic Press

The authors thank their colleagues at Purdue University and the participants at the Nags
Head conference on Personality and Social Behavior for their helpful feedback. We especially
thank Sabrina Zirkel, Denise Driscoll, Julie Norem, and Karen Watson for their comments
on earlier versions of the manuscript. Many thanks are also due to the interview team Lara
Kamaruskas, Jennifer Wisneski, Kori Michealas, Elizabeth Austin, Al Bush, Steve Branson,
Paul Palwicki and Aaron Bass. Address correspondence and reprint requests to Christopher
A. Langston, Research Department, Philadelphia Geriatric Center, 5301 Old York Rd, Phila-
delphia, PA 19141. E-mail: calangst@mail.med.upenn.edu.
141
0092-6566/97 $25.00
Copyright  1997 by Academic Press
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
142 LANGSTON AND SYKES

Research in personality psychology for good or for ill has overwhelmingly

meant the investigation of trait constructs (Buss, 1989). Recently, some con-
sensus has emerged as to a taxonomic structure of the broadest traits of hu-
man personality, the so called Big Five of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Open-
ness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (N, E, O, A, and C) (McCrae &
John, 1992). Many researchers using a variety of populations and methods
have demonstrated the robust nature of these five dimensions of personality
in factor analytic research (John, 1990; cf. Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Joireman,
Teta, & Kraft, 1993). Of equal, if not greater importance, are the documented
relationships of these traits to important behaviors in areas of school (e.g.,
Dollinger & Orf, 1991), work (e. g., Hogan & Hogan, 1989; Barrick &
Mount, 1991; 1993), relationships (e. g., Buss, 1992), physical health (e. g.,
Friedman et al., 1993) and mental health (e. g., Widiger & Trull, 1992).
However, despite the important practical implications of documenting the
reliable and valid individual differences of human personality (as in person-
nel and selection contexts), there seems to be little understanding of what
traits are and how they influence behavior accumulating from this research.
We know that the Big Five is a reasonable representation of a minimum
number of individual difference dimensions taken at the broadest and most
abstract level of description. We know that these traits represent moderate
coherences of behavior. We know that these traits manifest strong stability
over time (Conely, 1984; Costa & McCrae, 1988). And we know that there is
moderate genetic influence in these traits such that 30–40% of the observed
variability in paper and pencil test scores seems to be attributable to geno-
typic variability (Plomin, Chipuer, & Loehlin, 1990). However, we know
very little about how traits produce, guide, create, or influence behavior. As
Cantor (1990) puts it, trait research has been overwhelmingly concerned with
the ‘‘having’’ side of personality, the static description, and less concerned
with the ‘‘doing’’ side of personality, the underlying processes. (Mischel
[1990] makes a similar argument.)
Early researchers in the Big Five tradition emphasized that the fruits of this
pursuit would be a taxonomy of personality which would stimulate further
research on questions central to the field of personality (Norman, 1963, see
also McCrae & John, 1992, who repeat this call). However, the trait area of
personality seems to have become stuck in the rut of investigating which
traits are fundamental to the exclusion of other important questions particu-
larly the question, how do traits work? Briggs (1985) citing Quine (1974),
points out that traits are an incomplete kind of explanation; ‘‘a promissory
note for an eventual description in mechanical terms.’’ Despite what we
know about traits, we have very little knowledge about the psychological
mechanisms involved in creating these patterns of behavior. Emphasizing
that traits constitute one kind of explanation for behavior and that they have
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 143

provided ‘‘a useful analytic rest stop,’’ Funder (1994) suggests that another
level of explanation ‘‘why’’ will be needed.
The current fixation of the field of trait research is due in part to the contro-
versial nature of even the statements in the paragraphs above. Mischel, in
his germinal 1968 book Personality and Assessment, pointed out empirical
weaknesses in trait oriented personality research which have since been
largely resolved (see Kenrick & Funder, 1988) but also produced a defen-
siveness and a theoretical overcautiousness which has not. Given the persis-
tent doubts of some psychologists about the reality of generalized individual
difference traits (or even about the existence of personality at all), it has
understandably been a lower priority to explain how traits might work than
to find evidence for their existence (Funder, 1991).
However, the time seems ripe, given at least some consensus on the exis-
tence of these five broad dimensions of individual difference, to look for
possible explanations of the coherences of behavior (cf. Briggs, 1985, &
McAdams, 1992, who think that the time is neither ripe nor that these are
the right traits with which to begin the attempt). Of course, efforts at explana-
tion of these individual difference traits have not been abandoned entirely.
Eysenck has tried to explain these differences in behavior with reference to
mechanisms in the neurological and endocrine systems (e.g., Eysenck, 1990).
And more recently Tooby and Cosmides (1990) have tried to explain the
existence of these behavioral and physiological differences with reference to
the ultimate level of causation, the history of natural selection of our species.
Nevertheless, efforts to explain the more proximal causal mechanisms of
individual differences in behavior along these trait dimensions have been
sparse. We believe a profitable direction in this search is towards an integra-
tion of the individual difference trait approach with the cognitive approach to
personality which emphasizes explaining behavior as the product of proximal
mental content (see Ball & Zuckerman’s (1990) concept of Generalized Re-
ward and Punishment Expectancy Scales [GRAPES] for an example of work
already underway). From this perspective, the operation of traits is to be
explained in terms of the operations of their constituent parts, beliefs.
A COGNITIVE BASIS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Perhaps the least cautious theorist of traits, Gordon, Allport, has already
suggested in his definition of traits a possible explanation of how traits work.
He suggested that traits are neuropsychic entities that produce meaningful
equivalencies of behavior via their rendering of the functional equivalence
of stimuli (Allport, 1961). One interpretation of this idea is that the coher-
ences of behavior which we call traits could at least proximally be attributed
to the construal or interpretation of situations which people characteristically
make (Allport, 1966). As an example, a person who would be classified as
144 LANGSTON AND SYKES

disagreeable (low in A) by an observer or by a questionnaire may display that

pattern of behavior because he or she interprets other people and situations as
offering a threat to the self and thus may quite rationally respond by ‘‘doing
it to them before they do it to me.’’ George Kelly’s personal construct theory
of personality made a similar point (Kelly, 1970). Kelly argued that personal
constructs are the prior mental entities with which the human perceiver inter-
prets the world and that constructs ‘‘channelize behavior’’ through their ef-
fects on the individual’s anticipations of events.
These ideas have generally been incorporated into the currently popular
cognitive–social learning models of personality of Bandura (1986), Mischel
(1973) and Mischel and Shoda (1995). These theorists argue that the interpre-
tation of a situation based on the personal or vicarious experiences people
have had with that situation or with very similar situations will determine
behavior in that situation. For example, efficacy beliefs for enacting a behav-
ior in a situation, perceived likelihood of the behavior leading to outcomes,
and subjective values placed on outcomes jointly determine which behaviors
will be enacted in a situation. However, Bandura and Mischel both empha-
size the situation-specific nature of these various mental entities and deem-
phasize the importance of generalized dispositions which operate over a wide
variety of situations. Within their frameworks, this situation specificity is
regarded as a reflection of the adaptive nature of human personality whereby
careful distinctions are made among situations and humans maximize their
outcomes with great sensitivity. The rationality of the human actor is empha-
sized as she or he weighs behavioral options. This view of human rationality
offers an important insight into the nature of behavior, suggesting that given
a sufficient understanding of the individual’s beliefs, his or her behavior will
be comprehensible.
However, there are reasons to question this situation-specific emphasis of
the social–cognitive approach. First, it is widely recognized that the human
actor frequently fails to apply his or her full attention to the world around
him or her. Frequently, people act without careful thought and sometimes
can even be described as cognitive misers in reference to our aversion to
thought (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). The frequency of mindless action (Langer,
1989) and our reliance upon heuristics in everyday mental life (Nisbett &
Ross, 1980) also suggests that humans will fail to make use of all information
available. Given this human tendency (or limitation), can we really expect
every situation to be rigorously evaluated? The exquisite sensitivity sug-
gested by the cognitive–social learning view no doubt exists under some
conditions, but may not characterize all or even much of daily life.
A second reason to doubt the optimal sensitivity position, is the observed
moderate coherences of behavior described by the Big Five traits of personal-
ity themselves. For example, using act frequency self reports, Botwin and
Buss (1989), showed high coefficient alpha internal consistency values for
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 145

trait assessments from both self-report and observer ratings. This finding
suggests that an important portion of the variance in the matrix of persons
assessed by individual behavioral act items is accounted for by persons,
rather than by items (i.e., situations) or by person 3 item interactions. Simi-
larly, Epstein and O’Brien (1985) show that many of the classic behavioral
observational studies of personality of demonstrate evidence of substantial
between-person variance in performance of behaviors in various trait do-
mains. Thus, there is reason to believe that there is, at least, some degree of
cross-situational consistency of behavior which of itself requires explanation.
While people’s actions seem likely to be sometimes guided by their con-
siderations of situationally specific efficacy, outcome, and value beliefs, their
mental processing seems likely to regularly fall into lazy patterns of thought,
default assumptions, and overpracticed patterns of action. An emerging posi-
tion in psychology emphasizes the bounded rationality of the human mind
and the inaccessibility to consciousness of many mental operations (Epstein,
1994). Thus, we may expect to find that people have generalized beliefs and
expectancies which operate across a variety of situations. A person’s unique
and situationally specific cognitions may determine more of his or her behav-
ior, but individual differences in such generalized belief units may determine
that portion of behavior that corresponds to individual differences along the
Big Five trait dimensions.
Even within the cognitive-social learning tradition not all theorists have
emphasized the situation-specific nature of behavior and the need for micro
analysis. Rotter (1954) described a series of ‘‘generalized expectancies’’
which were individual differences in beliefs which influenced behavior
across situations in a general fashion. The most widely investigated general-
ized expectancy is locus of control belief (e.g. Lefcourt, 1972), but Rotter
also proposed other beliefs such as interpersonal trust (Rotter, 1980). These
kinds of beliefs seem plausible as the habits of thought which would lead
individuals to cross-situationally consistent patterns of interpretation and ex-
pectation which would produce cross-situationally consistent patterns of be-
havior.
PREDICTIONS OF BOUNDED RATIONALISM
This analysis is not meant to overstate the case for generalized patterns
of thought or behavior. Even the strongest proponents of the individual dif-
ference trait approach recognize the importance of situation specific factors
and the difficulty in predicting a particular person’s behavior in a particular
situation (e.g. Buss, 1989). However, this analysis does suggest that the dom-
inant descriptive work in personality psychology, the Big Five, can be inte-
grated into the general framework of the cognitive–social learning approach
to personality. Taxonomic descriptions of personality have usually been ag-
nostic as to the mechanisms which produce consistencies of behavior, and
146 LANGSTON AND SYKES

so poised for conjunction. The cognitive–social learning approach has been

less ready for such a marriage due to its emphasis upon the nuanced nature of
the thoughts determining our behavior (Mischel, 1984, 1990). For example,
Mischel (1984) writes, ‘‘I do, however, want to reiterate that while such
person variables as expectancies seem promising candidates [for reconceptu-
alizing personality], it would be a tempting mistake to transform them into
generalized trait-like dispositions by attributing broad cross-situational con-
sistency to them or by removing them from the specific contexts in which
they function’’ (p. 294). Cervone (1991) notes that researchers in the social–
cognitive tradition have not taken the big five as a descriptive fact and used
their principles to explain that fact. Nor have trait researchers seemed to find
social–cognitive analyses appealing in the interpretation of the Big Five (p.
374). As not all behavior is cross-situationally consistent, not all behavior
is going to be explainable in terms of cross-situationally generalized beliefs.
However, given the imperfections in the situation-specific conditionality of
human thought and the mounting evidence for these particular five consis-
tencies of trait behavior, at least a trial marriage would seem appropriate.
The bounded rationality position suggests that default beliefs such as Rot-
ter’s generalized expectancies ought to be determinative of some generalized
consistencies of behavior. The position also suggests that a similarly rational
individual should be able to generate plausible candidates for such beliefs.
These beliefs may be thought of as being of at least three types: efficacy
beliefs, outcome beliefs, and value beliefs. For example, a belief such as
‘‘I’m not capable of hiding my true opinions’’ would be an efficacy related
belief that would discourage attempts to be agreeably tactful. A belief such
as ‘‘People are against me’’ would be an outcome belief indicating that what-
ever behaviors might be enacted, they would be unlikely to lead to valuable
outcomes and so it would be a rationale for being disagreeable. And finally,
a belief such as ‘‘I don’t need anyone’s good will’’ would be a belief relating
to the value placed on likely outcomes of being agreeable, i.e., that people
would like you. However, many beliefs are likely to be of a mixed nature
such as ‘‘People take advantage of those who appear weak,’’ implying a
negative value for being taken advantage of and an outcome belief regarding
appearing weak. Thus the generalized beliefs which underlie personality
traits may be very complex.
An added source of complexity is the possibility of each person having
a unique, ideographic complex of beliefs that serves to determine his or her
behavior across situations. For example, my agreeableness might be ex-
plained by my belief that being liked is very important (an outcome value
belief ) whereas someone else’s agreeableness might be explained by her
belief that if she behaves agreeably there is a strong probability of positive
outcomes (an outcome probability belief). If this ideographic patterning hy-
pothesis were true, attempting a typical nomothetic analysis of the relation-
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 147

ship of agreeable behavior to the extent each person holds a particular belief
would be useless because different beliefs are relevant for different individu-
als. This kind of ideographic approach is, however, very difficult to investi-
gate empirically and, moreover, offers reasons against obtaining significant
nomothetic findings.
To investigate the hypothesis that individual differences in personality
traits can be directly related to individual differences in general beliefs, two
studies were conducted. In the first study, the relationship of trait measures
to a wide variety of theoretically generated beliefs is explored through a
think-aloud interview procedure. In the second study, the relationships are
replicated and extend through a different data source, explicit self-reports.

STUDY 1
Overview
The purpose of Study 1 was to explore the possibility that general beliefs
about the world may underlie the observable differences in behavior as re-
corded in the Big Five traits of personality. A large list of possible beliefs
were generated to account for high and low levels of each trait and a semi-
structured think-aloud interview protocol developed to encourage subjects
to reveal their typical thoughts and reasoning. Interviews were conducted,
and then interviewers, who were blind to the subjects trait scores, made rat-
ings of how characteristic each belief was of the subject. Ratings were made
on a 1 to 5 scale with the provision of making no judgment if there was no
relevant information available from the interview protocol. Interviewers and
interviewer ratings were used in this initial study for several reasons. Many
of the belief items seemed to have a relationship to socially desirable self-
presentations. It was thought that subjects would be too likely to make a
response to an item even if they had no previously held opinion on it. It was
also thought that subjects may not themselves be fully aware and articulate
about their fundamental beliefs without being subject to a probing interview.
Finally, interviewers could provide the means in this initial study of dis-
covering previously unconsidered, potentially causal beliefs.

Method
Subjects
Subjects were 83 undergraduate students from a Midwestern university (27 men and 56
women). Fifty-three of the subjects were recruited to participate as paid research subjects on
the basis of a mass administered pretest (N 5 149) which included a brief, 25-item bipolar
adjective measure of the Big Five traits of personality (taken from Goldberg, 1983, cited in
McCrae & Costa, 1987). This subject selection procedure was intended to give maximum
power to detect associations between beliefs and trait inventory scores. Of the 74 people scor-
ing 6 1.15 standard deviations around the group mean (the extreme 25%) on any of the five
traits and who indicated their willingness to be called for possible participation in a paid
148 LANGSTON AND SYKES

research project, these 53 were interviewed and rated. Subsequently, to increase the sample
size, an additional, unselected group of 30 students were recruited through advertisements for
paid research involving personality.

Materials
Belief items. A large list of belief items was generated by undergraduate and professional
members of the research team. The rule for generation was that each belief should serve to
‘‘explain why’’ on a rational basis, a person might characteristically behave in a manner
describable by being high or low on each of the Big Five traits of personality. The following
example served as the prototypical model in this generation phase: the belief that other people
might have ill intentions against you logically ‘‘explains why’’ you would be disagreeable.
Working together and independently, researchers generated heterogeneous items reflecting a
wide variety of intuitive theories regarding why people might behave differently along the
Big Five trait dimensions. A list of 19 to 44 beliefs was generated for each pole of each
dimension on the Big Five, creating a total of 294 items. The list of items was subsequently
edited for uniformity of grammar and pared of obvious repetitions.
Interview protocol. A written interview protocol was developed for use as the framework
for the semi-structured interviews. The protocol consisted of a series of situations frequently
encountered by undergraduates in which subjects were asked to imagine themselves. Subjects
were asked to describe what they would be thinking about in the situation and how they
would come to decisions about how to behave followed by probe questions regarding why
the respondent would have had a particular thought or performed a particular behavior. The
protocol attempted to avoid asking respondents for descriptions of ‘‘what’’ they did but rather
asked for explanations of ‘‘why’’ they did what they did and what was going through their
minds. For example, one situation for the domain of conscientiousness described a case where
the subject was working on a group project with other students who didn’t seem to be doing
their fair share of the work. Prompts asked the subject to think aloud about how he or she
would reason about the question of doing more than his or her fair share versus the alternative
of allowing the project to suffer. The interview was intended to induce subjects to show the
thought processes which guide their behavior in each of the five trait domains following from
the work of Ericsson and Simon on think-aloud protocols in reasoning and decision making
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980).1 Several situations relevant to each of the Big Five traits were
addressed in the protocol. (The complete list of beliefs and the protocol are available from
the authors.)
Personality trait measures. The 60-item version of the NEO-PI, the NEO-FFI (Costa and
McCrae, 1989) was used as a measure of subjects’ score on each of the Big Five traits. This
measure consists largely of behavioral items such as ‘‘I often feel inferior to others’’ and
‘‘Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at works of art, I feel a chill or wave of
excitement.’’ Subjects responded to each item on a 5-point ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to ‘‘strongly
agree’’ scale. The measure showed adequate internal consistency in this sample, αs .70 to
.80, intercorrelations of the scales 20.29 (N and E) to 0.50 (A and E). Additionally, a short
act-frequency measure of the Big Five based on that of Botwin and Buss (1989) was used in
the sample recruited from the pretest population to measure personality traits in an explicitly
behavioral manner. For each factor, the measure consisted of two items taken from Botwin
and Buss and four additional acts designed by the authors to be particularly relevant to this
population.

1
Interestingly, Andersen (1984) showed that such self-descriptions in terms of past thoughts
and feelings provided a better basis of personality judgment than descriptions of past behaviors.
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 149

Procedures
Subjects selected from the lists of volunteers were recruited by phone to participate in a
study which would ask them questions about themselves and which would pay $5 for an hour’s
time. Arriving at the lab room, subjects were told that the study was about personality and
that all information provided would be kept confidential. Subjects were asked to read and sign
an acknowledgment of informed consent.
Nine interviewers (four male, five female) conducted from 3 to 13 interviews each. Inter-
viewers took the participants through the semi-structured interview asking questions from the
protocol and following up with probes such as ‘‘Why?’’ and ‘‘What were you thinking about
at the time?’’ as necessary. After concluding the interview, which took from 30 to 50 min,
the subjects were asked to complete the self-report NEO-FFI personality test, were debriefed,
and were then thanked and paid. The interviewer then immediately rated the extent to which
the subject was characterized by each of the belief items using a scale of 1 5 Strongly Dis-
agrees (Holds the opposite belief ) to 5 5 Strongly Agrees (Holds the belief). Interviewers
also had the option of using a question mark to indicate that the respondent’s belief was
unratable on the basis of the interview.
Results
Belief Clusters
To produce reliable assessments of the beliefs hypothesized to be related
to personality trait behavior, the belief items were clustered conceptually by
the authors (of whom only one had been involved in the generation of the
belief items).2 The entire list of 294 beliefs was mixed and then sorted to
obtain maximum independence of the belief clusters. Items with similar con-
tent but opposite phrasing (e.g., ‘‘I believe I can control my emotions’’ and
‘‘I believe I can’t control my emotions’’) were placed in the same cluster
and scores reverse coded where necessary. Similar items which had origi-
nally been generated as possible explanations of different traits were placed
in a single cluster. For example, beliefs relating to the importance of being
liked had been suggested as relevant to both extraversion and agreeableness.
Disagreements as to the placement of items were resolved by consensus. The
effort was to produce a minimal number of homogeneous clusters of items.
The process produced from 4 to 10 clusters of items per trait of the Big Five
taxonomy with coefficient αs ranging from .48 to .88. A verbal description
of each cluster, sample items, and the α coefficient (for both studies 1 and
2) are displayed in Table 1.
Relationships of Beliefs to Behavior
In this study, the personality trait scores were intended as a proxy for the
behaviors they summarize. Although the behavior of questionnaire re-
2
Empirical methods of clustering the data were also explored but found to be generally
unprofitable due to the large number of items (294) as compared to subjects (83). Although
it is possible that alternative grouping of the belief items might produce slightly different
results, we argue it would not undermine our central point—that beliefs about the world are
related to individual difference traits.
150 LANGSTON AND SYKES

TABLE 1
Thirty-Four Belief Scales, Alphas, and Sample Items
Scale & sample items Interview α Self-report α
Neuroticism
Worrying is useful .83 .71
I believe little things are worth worrying about.
I believe there is no sense in worrying, it won’t
change anything.
I need help .59 .69
I believe I am dependent upon others for assistance
and support.
I don’t believe I need help from others, I am self-
reliant.
The world is dangerous .70 .36
I believe problems will often pile up and lead to fur-
ther problems.
I believe I am lucky.
I can control my thoughts .61 .65
I believe I can control my emotions.
I believe I can’t control my emotions.
There is a reason for things that happen .48 .71
I believe everything happens for a reason.
I believe bad things happen to people at random.
I am in control .77 .80
I believe I am in control of things in my life.
I believe that despite my best efforts things often will
go badly.
I blame myself .51 .42
I believe sometimes I am being punished for my fail-
ings.
I believe when things go wrong, it doesn’t mean that
I’m at fault.
Everything will be alright .77 .74
I believe everything will work out for the best in the
end.
I believe when bad things happen, it is best to take
them very seriously.
Extraversion
People are good .88 .80
I believe people are good.
I believe people aren’t trustworthy.
People will like me .77 .80
I believe that others will appreciate me.
I believe people won’t like me when they meet me.
People are important .86 .66
I believe other people are important.
I believe life is interesting even without other people
around.
It’s good to be wild .73 .61
I believe the way to enjoy life is to be happy and
wild.
I believe that one should be cautious and prudent in
making choices in life.
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 151

TABLE 1—Continued
Scale & sample items Interview α Self-report α
I’m a good person .79 .84
I believe I have something to be proud of.
I believe that I might be a failure.
Privacy is good .55 .74
I don’t believe it is proper to talk about myself.
I believe that revealing things about myself to others
is good.
Openness
I know all I need to know .54 .71
I believe I know all I need to know in order to get
by in life.
I believe I have a lot to learn about the world.
Openness will improve me .70 .59
I believe all kinds of knowledge are valuable and will
help me.
I believe that knowing about things doesn’t necessar-
ily make you a better person.
It’s good to be practical .69 .36
I believe that it’s good to be a down-to-earth, practi-
cal person.
I believe that sometimes being impractical and imagi-
native is very important.
It’s good to think for yourself .64 .75
I believe it’s good to question authority.
I believe it’s usually a waste of time to question
time-tested knowledge and wisdom.
Unconventionality is bad .73 .46
I believe being unconventional will make others think
that I am strange.
I believe making waves in life is good.
Things are good as they are now .82 .80
I believe change is often for the worse; things are
just fine now.
I believe the old ways and traditions can be im-
proved.
Fantasy is good .80 .73
I believe that need to learn about myself and spend
time on introspection.
I believe fantasy is usually a waste of time I cannot
afford to indulge in.
Agreeableness
It’s important to be liked .75 .69
I believe it’s very important to be liked by others.
I don’t care if people like me.
Arguing is good .71 .69
I believe it is always appropriate to argue my posi-
tion.
I believe arguing with people usually won’t change
their minds.
152 LANGSTON AND SYKES

TABLE 1—Continued
Scale & sample items Interview α Self-report α
Politeness is phony .83 .70
I believe pretending to agree or acting friendly just to
be polite is untrue and phony.
I believe I have a responsibility to other people to be
courteous.
Be agreeable to be liked .78 .69
I believe that if I am agreeable then people will like
me.
I believe that being true to your own opinions is in
the long run the best way to make friends.
It’s important to be right .62 .59
I believe being right is first and foremost.
I believe it is usually more important to be respectful
of others than to prove that I am right.
I am mistreated .80 .83
I believe I am mistreated by people.
I believe I am usually treated fairly by other people.
Other people aren’t worthy of my respect .73 .69
I don’t believe in showing respect to others unless
they have earned my respect.
I believe most people are worthy of my respect.
Do it to them before they do it to you .82 .39
I believe in the saying: ‘‘Do Unto Others or Be Done
Unto.’’
I believe in doing good for others because it makes
me feel good.
People are strange .55 .55
I believe most people are too easily offended.
I believe I understand people very well.
Conscientiousness
If I don’t do it, it won’t get done .72 .52
I believe if I don’t take care of various tasks, no one
will.
I believe things get done with or without me.
I am responsible to other people .85 .68
I believe people are depending on me.
I believe pleasing others is not as important as pleas-
ing myself.
Conscientiousness is good .81 .19
I believe good people are reliable and conscientious
in their lives.
I believe being too conscientious makes you look
silly, like you’re worried about everything.
Conscientiousness gets ahead .81 .72
I believe being conscientious and hard working will
get me ahead in life.
I believe people rarely notice when you work hard
and conscientiously.
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 153

sponding is directly measured, it is non-questionnaire behavior to which we

would like to generalize. We found that the belief clusters had significant
correlations with the hypothesized traits and usually not with unrelated traits.
The simple correlations are presented in Table 2. Interestingly, there is a
general lack of strong divergence between extraversion beliefs and agree-
ableness beliefs and between agreeableness beliefs and conscientiousness
beliefs. This lack of specificity may simply reflect the empirical relationship
in this sample between E and A (r 5 .50, p , .001), and between A and C
(r 5 .22, p , .05).
Joint factor analyses. One way of summarizing the relationship of two
kinds of measures such as the belief indices and trait scale scores is joint
factor analysis (McCrae, 1988). In this procedure, the intercorrelation matrix
of the scales is factored to reveal the joint underlying structure. A scree
plot of the eigenvalues following an initial principal components analysis
suggested that five factors be retained given a sharp inflection and drop of
over 1.0 between the fifth and sixth factors, although the sixth, seventh,
eighth, and ninth factors did have eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Using the
principal axis approach to common factors, five factors were extracted ac-
counting for 54% of the common variance and rotated according to the vari-
max criterion. The loading matrix is reproduced in Table 3 showing loadings
with absolute values above .3. Generally, simple structure is obtained and
in only four cases do belief indices have their largest loading on other than
the predicted factor.
Beliefs and acts. Although we argue on the available evidence that the
trait scales used here are valid predictors of well aggregated behavioral mea-
sures, we have available some more direct evidence of the relationship of
beliefs and behavior. For a subsample of 53 of these subjects we obtained
act-frequency data at the time of the initial screening questionnaire. These
two data sources are twice separated, first by a delay of over a month and
second by one relating only to acts and the other to beliefs as revealed to
interviewers. The same pattern of results were obtained. Despite the reduced
power due to sample size, 19/34 of the predicted correlations were significant
(as compared to 31/34 for the contemporaneous standard questionnaire data)
and in10/34 cases the predicted correlation was actually greater in magni-
tude. (See Table 4.)
Discussion
Study 1 set out to investigate the relationship between some fundamental
beliefs about how people and the world work and the Big Five traits of
personality. In general, we found that our think-aloud interview procedure
permitted interviewers to make ratings of peoples’ beliefs. After aggregation,
these ratings were then significantly associated with individual differences
 TABLE 2
Correlations of Interviewer Rated Beliefs with Self-Report Big Five Traits and Sex

154
N E O A C Sex

Worrying is useful .46*** 2.09 2.08 2.06 .19 .11

I need help .27* .12 .13 .10 2.03 .30**
The world is dangerous .44*** 2.26* 2.10 2.35** 2.12 2.11
I can control my thoughts 2.20† 2.06 2.01 2.09 2.13 2.29**
There is a reason for things that happen 2.03 .24† 2.08 .14 .16 .01
I am in control 2.43*** .28* 2.10 .30** .29** .10
I blame myself .32** 2.05 2.03 2.10 .15 .12
Everything will be alright 2.40*** .40*** 2.10 .31** .28* .27*
People are good 2.23* .34** 2.05 .46*** .22† .34**
People will like me 2.35** .33** .02 .16 .11 .13
People are important 2.20† .64*** 2.04 .47*** .21† .30**
It’s good to be wild 2.31** .43*** .11 .11 .16 .05
I’m a good person 2.45*** .18 2.05 .17 .28* .00
Privacy is good .08 2.32** 2.04 2.04 .09 .01
I know all I need to 2.03 .27* 2.43*** .09 .23† .19†
Openness will improve me 2.04 .06 .26* .02 .12 .11
It’s good to be practical .15 .09 2.46*** .13 .23* .16
It’s good to think for yourself .01 2.16 .50*** 2.24† 2.40** .02
Unconventionality is bad .21† .07 2.43*** .16 .29* .07
Things are good as they are now .07 .14 2.44*** .05 .22* .17
Fantasy is good .03 2.28* .41*** .01 2.15 .09
LANGSTON AND SYKES

It’s important to be liked .17 .24* 2.02 .43*** .28* .37**

Arguing is good 2.13 .12 .08 2.27* 2.04 2.08
Politeness is phony 2.16 2.14 .16 2.58*** 2.11 2.23*
Be agreeable to be liked .37** 2.06 2.18 .17 .17 .06
It’s important to be right 2.26* .11 2.05 2.26* .21† 2.16
I am mistreated .36** 2.27* .20† 2.39*** 2.33** 2.18
Other people aren’t worthy of my respect 2.07 2.21† 2.03 2.54*** 2.22* 2.35**
Do it to them before they do it to you .14 2.11 2.01 2.52*** .09 2.21†
People are strange 2.07 2.24* .23* 2.24* 2.26* 2.23*
If I don’t do it, it won’t get done 2.11 .25* .09 .15 .31** .22†
I am responsible to other people .04 .35** .05 .54*** .32** .47***
Conscientiousness is good .08 .16 2.18 .13 .50*** .18
Conscientiousness gets ahead .09 .33** 2.16 .31** .42*** .30**

Note. Minimum N 5 83. Correlations between sex and beliefs: male 5 1, female 5 2. Predicted relationships are in bold.
† p , .10, * p , .05, ** p , .01, *** p , .001, two tailed.
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 155

TABLE 3
Co-Factor Analysis of Beliefs and Trait Measures
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5

Marker N .50
I am in control 2.77
The world is dangerous .68
Worrying is useful .66 .43
I blame myself .60
I can control my thoughts 2.59
Everything will be alright 2.50
I’m a good person 2.49
I need help .46 .39
Marker E .51
People are important .80
It’s good to be wild .74
People will like me 2.32 .66
Privacy is good 2.61
Be agreeable to be liked .36 2.46 .38
Marker O .61
I know all I need to know 2.82
It’s good to be practical 2.71 .32
Things are good as they are 2.67
now
Unconventionality is bad 2.66
Openness will improve me .59 .46
Fantasy is good .52
Marker A .65
Do it to them before they 2.77
do it to you
Politeness is phony 2.75
Other people aren’t worthy 2.72 2.34
of my respect
I am responsible to other .61 .57
people
It’s important to be liked .60
It’s important to be right 2.58
People are good .56
Arguing is good .43 2.51
Marker C .61
Conscientiousness gets .36 .74
ahead
If I don’t do it, it won’t get .68
done
Conscientiousness is good .66
People are strange 2.44
I am mistreated .38 2.36 2.40

Note. Salient loadings (..30) resulting from five factor, varimax solution.
 TABLE 4
Correlations of Interviewer Rated Beliefs with Act Frequency Self-Reports
on Big Five Traits

ACT-N ACT-E ACT-O ACT-A ACT-C

Worrying is useful .59*** 2.18 2.08 .33* .18

I need help .45** .14 2.03 2.01 2.05
The world is dangerous .44** 2.33* .02 .07 2.14
I can control my 2.45** .06 2.02 2.13 .10
thoughts
There is a reason for .01 .23 .26 .02 2.08
things that happen
I am in control 2.39** .12 2.03 2.12 .22
I blame myself .39** 2.07 2.06 .13 .03
Everything will be 2.35* .34* 2.14 2.19 .14
alright
People are good 2.20 .17 2.08 2.05 .21
People will like me 2.22 .46** 2.09 2.06 2.07
People are important 2.07 .40** 2.05 .05 2.12
It’s good to be wild 2.11 .48*** .04 2.05 2.10
I’m a good person 2.51*** .20 2.09 2.04 .08
Privacy is good .06 2.28* .10 .14 .04
I know all I need to .05 .04 2.37** .14 .04
know
Openness will improve 2.10 .13 .10 2.08 .25†
me
It’s good to be practical .14 2.03 2.38** .10 .04
It’s good to think for 2.03 .15 .50** 2.30† .04
yourself
Unconventionality is bad .31* 2.22 2.40** .36* 2.02
Things are good as they .20 2.06 2.49*** .17 .07
are now
Fantasy is good .11 2.12 .21 .06 .21
It’s important to be .41** .01 2.16 .29* .06
liked
Arguing is good 2.12 .18 2.11 2.34* .04
Politeness is phony 2.22 .14 .21 2.33* 2.06
Be agreeable to be liked .42** 2.24† 2.15 .33* .01
It’s important to be right 2.25† .28† 2.07 2.33* .18
I am mistreated .43** 2.27† .20 2.09 .12
Other people aren’t wor- 2.06 2.21 .01 2.06 2.18
thy of my respect
Do it to them before .18 2.04 .05 2.18 2.03
they do it to you
People are strange .09 2.04 .16 2.03 .16
If I don’t do it, it won’t 2.09 .36* .08 2.19 .24†
get done
I am responsible to .20 .23 2.09 .11 .11
other people
Conscientiousness is .23 2.08 2.32* .20 .20
good
Conscientiousness gets .13 .05 2.26† .09 .28†
ahead

Note. Minimum N 5 52. Predicted relationships are in bold.

† p , .10, * p , .05, ** p , .01, *** p , .001.
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 157

in standard trait personality measures. These findings suggest that beliefs

may be a possible candidate for the proximal mechanism whereby ‘‘traits’’
produce behavior.
More specifically, strong convergences were found between the beliefs
assessed in interviews and the predicted trait scales whereas divergences
were found between beliefs and theoretically unrelated trait scales. For exam-
ple, an outcome type belief that worrying is useful is strongly related to self-
reported N but not to E, O, A, or C. This is a surprising result if one imagined
that people high in neuroticism were merely bedeviled by their worrying. In
fact, people who do a lot of worrying also have a view of the world which
suggests this activity is useful. A broader analysis of these people and their
social environments might suggest whether or not these people are right.
(See Cantor & Kihlstrom (1987) for a social intelligence model which lays
out how one might assess the adaptive or maladaptive nature of such belief-
behavior patterns.)
There are, however, some specific failures of our predictions, which in
this correlational study are perhaps even more informative than our suc-
cesses. For example, the lack of a negative relationship between the belief
‘‘There is a reason for things that happen’’ to N undermines any argument
that this belief could cause a more serene or phlegmatic emotional style. The
belief that one is a good person is clearly far more related to emotional upsets
(N) than to E, undermining this world view as a prerequisite for the sociable,
active behavior pattern of high E people. Similarly, the belief that one should
‘‘Be agreeable to be liked’’ is more strongly characteristic of people high
in N than those high in A, suggesting that one need not believe in the practice
of currying the favor of others to be an agreeable person.
These results also suggest that the same pattern exists in the relationship
between beliefs and more directly behavioral act-frequency measures of the
Big Five traits. It is notable that in the case of the act-frequency measures,
not only were the instruments (interview vs act frequency report) different in
type but they were also separated by weeks of time. In summary, individual
differences in beliefs are related to individual differences in trait scales. Al-
though causal priority is impossible to determine from these data, they do
support the possibility of the causal relationship hypothesized.
Although Study 1 showed supportive results, a possible threat to its inter-
pretation exists in that the interviewers could have been influenced by their
experience of the subject’s behaviors rather than the uncovered beliefs. An
hour’s talk will easily give strong evidence regarding some personality traits
most especially, extraversion (Funder & Dobroth, 1987; Funder & Colvin,
1988). Despite their best efforts to rate how characteristic the beliefs were
of subjects’ thoughts, it is possible that the interviewers used their own theo-
ries of how beliefs should be related to behavior to infer the beliefs from
the behaviors. The fact that the results of the study are no worse for the more
158 LANGSTON AND SYKES

difficult-to-observe traits of O, A, and C than for E offers some reassurance

on this issue. However, it would be desirable to replicate the original findings
with a method not subject to this particular consideration.

STUDY 2
Overview
Study 2 was intended to serve as a general replication of Study 1 using
self-report instead of interview methods to assess beliefs related to the Big
Five traits.

Method
Subjects
Subjects were 86 students (23 men and 63 women) in an undergraduate psychology class
at a Midwestern University who volunteered to participate for extra credit.

Materials
Belief items. A self-report instrument of 204 belief statements was created based on the
original list of 294 belief items from Study 1. Six items were used to asses each of the 34
belief clusters found in Study 1. For each cluster, an equal number of items were phrased so
as to agree or disagree with a belief. For example, to assess the belief that worrying is useful
we used three items like ‘‘I believe little things are worth worrying about’’ and three items
like ‘‘I believe worrying never helps anything.’’ Items taken from the original list were revised,
where necessary, to reduce their social desirability implications.
Personality trait measures. The Big Five were measured using the brief form of the NEO-
PI (NEO-FFI) used in Study 1.

Procedures
At the beginning of a semester-long course subjects were given the NEO-FFI to complete
during the class period. Three months later, subjects were given the belief instrument listing
the beliefs in a random order. Subjects were assured of confidentiality. Following their partici-
pation the rationale and findings of the study were explained.

Results
The self-report form of the belief measure generally had satisfactory ho-
mogeneity coefficients for the 34 scales (median α 5 .69) with αs ranging
from .83 down to .19 (see Table 1).
The correlations between the belief indices and the five factors are pre-
sented in Table 5. All of the signs of the correlations are in the predicted
direction and 24 of the 34 predicted correlations are significantly different
from zero. Relatively few of the relationships observed between beliefs and
gender in Study 1 were replicated.
 TABLE 5
Correlations of Self-Reported Beliefs with NEO-PI Self-Reports on Big Five Traits
N E O A C Sex

Worrying is useful .20† .10 .06 2.06 .14 2.04

I need help .31** .30** .02 .16 2.01 .28**
The world is dangerous .23* 2.23* .04 2.16 2.08 2.19†
I can control my thoughts 2.46*** 2.12 2.01 2.07 .18† 2.41***
There is a reason for things that happen .03 .21† 2.22* .07 2.06 .26*
I am in control 2.42*** .23* .21† .16 .41*** 2.12
I blame myself .46*** 2.07 2.12 2.07 2.22* .06
Everything will be alright 2.34** .22* .02 .14 .15 .12
People are good 2.21* .28** .01 .27* .24* 2.06
People will like me 2.45*** .36* .22 .25* .27* .06
People are important 2.03 .45*** 2.02 .24* .02 2.11
It’s good to be wild .01 .28* .27* 2.08 2.03 2.08
I’m a good person 2.56*** .30** .11 .23* .33** 2.04
Privacy is good .13 2.35** 2.34** 2.15 2.14 2.17
I know all I need to know .09 2.25* 2.26* 2.27* 2.21* .01
Openness will improve me 2.04 .23* .27* .29** .05 .06
It’s good to be practical .03 2.04 2.38*** 2.10 .04 .05
It’s good to think for yourself 2.01 .05 .39*** .00 2.02 .10
Unconventionality is bad .25* 2.09 2.21† .25* 2.12 2.06
Things are good as they are now .10 2.07 2.48*** 2.11 2.19† 2.13
Fantasy is good 2.21† .04 .39*** .19† .16 .02
It’s important to be liked .14 .22* 2.05 .17 .02 .04
BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE

Arguing is good 2.16 .16 .13 2.01 .04 2.11

Politeness is phony .10 2.18 .03 2.24* 2.17 .09
Be agreeable to be liked .12 2.04 2.05 .20† 2.10 .04
It’s important to be right 2.24* .01 2.07 2.24* .14 2.17
I am mistreated .39*** 2.26* 2.10 2.13 2.20† .06
Other people aren’t worthy of my respect 2.13 2.28** .03 2.34** .05 2.10
Do it to them before they do it to you 2.01 2.17 .01 2.25* 2.05 2.09
People are strange .08 2.12 2.07 2.14 2.01 2.20†
If I don’t do it, it won’t get done .06 .30** .21† .05 .11 2.02
I am responsible to other people .05 .14 2.03 .04 .19 2.27**
Conscientiousness is good 2.15 .16 .04 .25* .39*** 2.17
Conscientiousness gets ahead 2.11 .44*** .13 .31** .23* .12
159

Note. Minimum N 5 84. Correlations between sex and beliefs: male 5 1, female 5 2. Predicted relationships are in bold.
† p , .10, * p , .05, ** p , .01, *** p , .001, two tailed.
160 LANGSTON AND SYKES

Discussion
The particular concern addressed in Study 2, that the initial results were
dependent upon the rater’s knowledge of the meanings of the belief items,
does not seem to threaten the interpretation of these findings. The effects
found in Study 1 are strongly replicated in Study 2 despite the change in
subject selection and data sources. Moreover, these results show that these
relationships are stable even over a considerable delay (3 months).

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Together, these two studies show that individual differences in some gen-
eral beliefs about people and the world are robustly related to the Big Five
traits of personality. In both think-aloud interview and explicit self-report
belief assessments, we recovered reliable individual differences in beliefs
which were then related to personality traits. This evidence lays the founda-
tion for further efforts to uncover the proximal, mental causes of individual
differences in behavior and suggests reason for optimism in the integration
of the general trait and cognitive approaches to personality.
Naturally, given the correlational methods used here (as in most personal-
ity research), the causal interpretation we would like to give to our data must
be held in abeyance. We can not, for example, conclude that it is beliefs that
‘‘others are not worthy of respect’’ that cause people to behave disagreeably
(despite the fact that, for this particular example, there is a great deal of
evidence suggesting that various negativistic beliefs about people are related
to disagreeable and aggressive behaviors [Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge &
Crick, 1990]). However, we feel it is essential to at least ask the question:
‘‘What causes people to behave disagreeably?’’ in a way that gets beyond
a circular conclusion that it is because they are disagreeable. Individual dif-
ferences in various beliefs (e.g., efficacy, outcome, or subjective value be-
liefs) is one plausible candidate for this kind of non-circular explanation.
This kind of explanation of individual differences in behavior along trait
dimensions is often implicit in scale construction when items assessing vari-
ous beliefs about behavior are included among items actually assessing past
behavior. However, we believe that making this practice explicit and locating
it in the context of social–cognitive theory is an important advance.
Obviously, there are many possible levels of explanation, and beliefs
themselves need some kind of explanation. Individual differences in beliefs
may develop through the social learning processes emphasized by Bandura
(1986) and Mischel (1990). Additionally, individual differences in beliefs
may arise from the interaction of genetically based physiological differences
and the social environments in which an individual develops (e.g., Eysenck,
1990; Scarr & McCartney, 1983). The joint operation of these two kinds of
processes could lead to beliefs which could create individual differences in
 BELIEFS AND THE BIG FIVE 161

behavior which are captured in trait descriptions. However, the argument

that beliefs are the substructure of traits does not imply that traits do not
exist anymore than the theory that protons are made up of quarks implies
that protons do not exist.
There are several advantages to pursuing the possibility of a causal rela-
tionship of general beliefs to the Big-Five personality traits. First, a great
deal of research on various kinds of beliefs has already been performed.
Recent additions to the catalog of individual differences in beliefs include
defensive pessimism (Norem & Cantor, 1986), generalized optimism
(Scheier & Carver, 1985), explanatory style (Peterson & Seligman, 1984),
social constraint (Langston & Cantor, 1989), generalized reward and punish-
ment expectancies (Ball & Zuckerman, 1990), and irrational beliefs (Wat-
son & Morris, 1990; Woods, 1983). This research typically attempts to ana-
lyze the mental processes which produce the coherences of social behavior.
Integrating these kinds of individual difference analyses with the Big Five
taxonomic structure offers a substantial groundwork to explain the proximal,
mental mechanisms producing individual differences along the trait dimen-
sions.
Moreover, several general models are available describing the cognitive
processes determining behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Bandura, 1986;
Rotter, 1954). For example, Ajzen & Fishbein’s (1980) theory of reasoned
action suggests that behavior is determined by four kinds of beliefs: beliefs
about the outcomes of the behavior, the subjective value of the outcome,
perceived social norms, and motivation to comply with norms. Fishbein
(1979) argues that individual differences in personality can be thought of as
having their effects through any of the four components of the model—
differences in beliefs about outcomes of behavior, values for outcomes, per-
ceived social norms, and or motivation to comply.
A second advantage of looking for the roots of trait dimensions in beliefs
is that the tradition of individual differences in cognitive beliefs has an ex-
plicit theory of behavior change. Although cognitive-personality variables
are known to be temporally stable, a theory and technology for changing
maladaptive beliefs and thereby behaviors has been advanced by theorists
of cognitive therapy (e.g., Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1987). One of the more dissatis-
fying aspects of the Big Five model of personality is that, due to its lack of
a theory of proximal causal mechanisms, it lacks any suggestion as to how
one might go about modifying one’s traits. Indeed the entire question of
change in traits is difficult to conceive because of the way they have been
conceptualized as explanations in and of themselves.
To test our strong causal hypothesis about the relation of beliefs and traits,
we will need to go beyond the usual correlational methods of personality
research. We conceive of our current research as only the first step in a
research program which will require us to incorporate methods from both
162 LANGSTON AND SYKES

experimental and developmental psychology. For example, cross-lagged

panel designs may be able to untangle the causal priority between beliefs
and traits especially if subjects are observed over critical periods of change.
Experimental techniques such as interfering with or heightening the accessi-
bility of beliefs can be used to show their causal impact upon behavior. Fi-
nally, belief-change interventions can be investigated as way of changing
behavior along the dimensions of the Big Five taxonomy. These kinds of
studies can provide the evidence about the utility of beliefs as causal explana-
tions for personality traits which we currently can only suggest.

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