MARI and PEOPLE VS GONZALES ET AL.

G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011

FACTS: Petitioner executed a sworn statement stating that she was raped by PO1
Rudyard Paloma (respondent) on October 10, 2004. Preliminary investigation
commenced before the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Sogod. A warrant of arrest was issued against respondent. He voluntarily surrendered
and was incarcerated. Respondent filed a Motion for Bail. espondent was allowed to
post bail and was released from confinement.

Pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26, divesting first-level courts of authority to conduct

preliminary investigation of criminal complaints cognizable by Regional Trial Courts
(RTC), records of the subject case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office
of Southern Leyte. A probable cause was found against respondent. An Information for
Rape was filed and a warrant of arrest was issued against respondent. On June 27,
2008, respondent was detained. Respondent filed a Motion to Admit Cash Bond so the
arraignment and hearing on said motion was reset on August 20, 2008. Nobody
appeared for the prosecution on said date so the arraignment was reset on October 31,
2008. On October 28, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion for Cancellation of
Hearing, manifesting that Atty. Pedro Felicen, Jr. had been granted the authority to
prosecute and praying that the scheduled arraignment be cancelled due to the
pendency of private complainant's petition for transfer of venue. Hearing on October 31,
2008 proceeded despite the private prosecutor's non-appearance. The respondent's
counsel invoked the latter's right to a speedy trial. Thus, respondent was arraigned. Pre-
trial was reset to November 24, 2008. On said date, the private prosecutor filed a
Motion for Cancellation of Hearing. The motion was denied and the pre-trial proper was
terminated. The initial hearing was set on December 12, 2008 but no one appeared for
the prosecution. Counsel for respondent moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of failure to prosecute. The motion was denied. On January 16, 2009 hearing,
private prosecutor filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Hearing, stating that it was
only on January 14, 2009 that he was furnished a copy of the notice of the hearing and
had to attend a previously scheduled hearing for another case, set for the same
date. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution to prosecute
or nolle prosequi. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied. Hence,
the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Did Respondent Judge Gonzales acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in precipitately dismissing the rape case
against respondent?

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that petitioners failed to observe the
doctrine on hierarchy of courts. On this point alone, the petition is already
dismissible. However, on several occasions, the SC found compelling reasons to relax
the rule on observance on hierarchy of courts. In Pacoy v. Cajigal, the SC opted not to
strictly apply said doctrine, since the issue involved is double jeopardy, considered to be
one of the most fundamental constitutional rights of an accused. Hence, the SC finds
sufficient reason to relax the rule in this case as it also involves the issue of double
jeopardy.

Petitioners insist that the RTC dismissed the case too hurriedly, despite the provision in
Section 10 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 (RA No. 8493), now incorporated in Section
3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The Rule provides that the only delays that may be
excluded from the time limit within which trial must commence are those resulting
from proceedings concerning the accused. The time involved in the proceedings in a
petition for transfer of venue can only be excluded from said time limit if it was the
accused who instituted the same. In this case, the time during which the petition for
transfer of venue filed by the petitioner is pending, cannot be excluded from the time
limit of thirty (30) days from receipt of the pre-trial order imposed in Section 1, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court. RA No. 8493 was enacted with Section 6 of said act limiting the
trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial. In determining whether the accused
has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial,
four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendant's assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Respondent was
deprived of his liberty when he was incarcerated from November 18, 2004 to March 16,
2005 and when he was imprisoned beginning June 27, 2008 until the case was
dismissed on January 16, 2009. Because of respondent's continued incarceration, any
delay in trying the case would cause him great prejudice.
The petition is DISMISSED.