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OFA
TFIEOFY
OF
PRACTICE
PierreBourdieu
Cambridge Studies in Social
and Cultural Anthropology
ED ITO RS: ER N EST G EL LN ER , JACK GOODY,
ST E PH E N G U D EM A N . M IC H A E L HERZFEI.D,
JO N A T H A N PARRY
16
O U T L I N E OF
A T H E O R Y OF P R A C T I C E
r
O U T L I N E OF
A T H E O R Y OF P R A C T I C E
P IE R R E B O U R D IE U
T r a n s la t e d b y
RICHARD NICE
ffiS C a m b r i d g e
U N IV E R S IT Y P R E S S
P u b lis h e d b y th e P r e s s S y n d ic a t e o f th e U n iv e r s it y o f C a m b r id g e
T h e P it t B u ild in g , T r u m p in g t o n S tr e e t, C a m b r id g e C B 2 1R P
4 0 W e s t 2 0 th S tr e e t, N e w Y o r k , N Y 1 0 0 1 1 - 4 2 1 1 , U S A
1 0 S ta m fo r d R o a d , O a k le ig h , M e lb o u r n e 3 1 6 6 , A u str a lia
© In t h e E n g lis h la n g u a g e e d it io n C a m b r id g e U n iv e r s it y P r e s s 1 9 7 7
T h e o r ig in a l e d it io n , e n t it le d E sq u isse d 'u n e th e o rie d e la p r a ti q u e , p re c e d e d e tr o is
e tu d e s d ’e th n o lo g ie k a b y le , w a s p u b lis h e d b y L ib r a ir ie D r o z S .A . in S w itz e r la n d
© L ib r a ir ie D r o z , 1 9 7 2
P r in t e d in G r e a t B r ita in at th e
U n iv e r s it y P r e s s , C a m b r id g e
L ib r a r y o f C o n g re ss C a ta lo g u in g in P u b lic a tio n D a t a
B o u r d ie u , P ie r r e .
O u tlin e o f a th e o r y o f p r a c tic e .
(C a m b r id g e s t u d ie s in so c ia l a n th ro p o lo g y '; 16)
T r a n s la tio n w ith r e v is io n s o f E s q u is s e d ’u n e
th e o r ie d e la p r a tiq u e .
I n c lu d e s b ib lio g r a p h ic a l r e fe r e n c e s an d in d e x .
1. K a b y le s - A d d r e s s e s , e s sa y s, le c tu r e s.
2. E t h n o lo g y . I. T i t le .
D T 2 9 8 .K 2 B 6 9 1 3 3 0 1 .2 7 6 -1 1 0 7 3
I S B N 0 521 2 9 1 6 4 X
Contents
Section i: A n alyses i
From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies 3
From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour 10
Practice and discourse about practice 16
The fallacies of the rule 22
Section 1 1 : Case stu d y: parallel-cousin m arriage 30
The state o f the question 32
The functions o f kinship: official kin and practical kin 33
Officializing strategies 38
Collective beliefs and white lies 43
The ordinary and the extra-ordinary 52
M atrimonial strategies and social reproduction 58
T H E O R Y OF S Y M B O L I C PO W E R 159
D oxa, orthodoxy, heterodoxy 159
Symbolic capital 171
Modes of domination 183
N otes 198
In d ex 240
" T h e principal defect of all m aterialism up to now - including
that of Feuerbach - is that the external object, reality, the
sensible w orld, is grasped in the form of an object or an intuition;
but not as concrete human activity, as practice, in a subjective way.
T h is is why the active aspect was developed by idealism , in
opposition to materialism - but only in an abstract w ay, since
idealism naturally does not know real concrete activity as su ch .”
K . M arx, Theses on Feuerbach
T ranslator’s foreword
be the last to regret the shedding of all that the text was immediately and
tacitly granted, inasmuch as it bore the social marks which signal a product
conforming to the local standards: the signs of recognition eliciting the
recognition of already converted readers, the dignifyingreferences, theoretical
allusions, stylistic effects, have indeed every likelihood of remaining dead
letters once outside the magic circle of belief.
But much more besides the value set on the text is at stake when it
circulates beyond its field of production. The most autonomous work contains
implicit reference to an intellectual universe whose cardinal points are
scientific (and political) positions symbolized, in a given state of the field,
by the names of authors or schools of thought or by " is m s ” which may cover
totally different realities in different national traditions. These are the
structures of the field of production, its divisions into antagonistic groups and
rival schools, which, internalized, function as unexamined principles of
perception and appreciation. When these bearings are removed the text
becomes open to misreading.
T h u s nothing guarantees that, for some readers, this work, written against
the currents at present dominant in France, "structuralism ” or "structural-
M arxism ” , will not be merged with the very tendencies it combats. Less
pessimistically, there is still reason to fear that the frequent references made
to the Anglo-American philosophical tradition - a heaven-sent weapon against
the theoreticism which so strongly characterizes French social science, from
Durkheim to Levi-Strauss - may, when returned to their original universe,
take on a significance very different from the one they were given in a context
in which that tradition is disdained or unknown, and be seen as a sign of
allegiance to positivism (if not as an ingratiating gesture towards the intellec-
tual establishment).
The fact remains that a text which seeks to break out of a scheme of
thought as deeply embedded as the opposition between subjectivism and
objectivism is fated to be perceived through the categories which it seeks to
transcend, and to appear contradictory or eclectic (except when forcibly
reduced to one or the other alternative). T he provisional eclecticism which
can juxtapose Wittgenstein with the young M arx finds its justification in the
fact that all the resources of a tradition which from the beginning has made
practice the negative obverse of theory are needed in order to think the
unthinkable.
R. N.
I
The objective limits of objectivism
SECTION I: ANALYSES
T h e practical privilege in which all scientific activity arises never more subtly
governs that activity (insofar as science presupposes not only an epistemolo-
gical break but also a social separation) than when, unrecognised as privilege,
it leads to an implicit theory of practice which is the corollary of neglect of
the social conditions in which science is possible. T h e anthropologist’s
particular relation to the object o f his study contains the makings of a
theoretical distortion inasmuch as his situation as an observer, excluded from
the real play of social activities by the fact that he has no place (except by
choice or by way of a game) in the system observed and has no need to make
a place for him self there, inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of
practices, leading him to reduce all social relations to communicative relations
and, more precisely, to decoding operations. Charles Bally remarked that
linguistic research takes different directions according to whether it deals with
the researcher’s mother tongue or with a foreign language, emphasizing in
particular the tendency to intellectualism implied in observing language from
the standpoint of the listening subject rather than that of the speaking
subject, that is, as a "m ean s of action and expression” : "th e listener is on
the side of the language, it is with the language that he interprets sp eech ” .1
And exaltation of the virtues of the distance secured by externality sim ply
transmutes into an epistemological choice the anthropologist’s objective
situation, that of the "im partial spectator” , as H usserl puts it, condemned
to see all practice as a spectacle.
It is instructive to glance at the case of art history, which, never having really broken
with the tradition of the amateur, gives free rein to celebratory contemplation and finds
in the sacred character of its object every pretext for a hagiographic hermeneutics
superbly indifferent to the question of the social conditions in which works are
produced and circulate. Panofsky, for example, w T i t i n g on Abbot Suger and the
invention” of Gothic architecture, only exceptionally and almost accidentally aban-
dons the point of view o f the interpreter who, more concerned with the opus
operatum than the modus operandi, represses the question of artistic production under
the concept of the "objective intention” o f the work and reduces immediate com pre-
hension to a decoding that is unaware that it ii a d e c o d i n g . T o treat a work of plastic
art as a discourse intended to be interpreted, decoded, by reference to a transcendent
code analogous to the Saussurian " langue” is to forget that artistic production is always
also - to different degrees d e p e n d i n g on the art a n d on t h e historically variable styles
[ i]
2 T he objective lim its of objectivism
of practising it - the product of an " art ”," pure practice without theory ”, as Durkheim
says,2 or to put it another way, a mimesis, a sort of sym bolic gym nastics, like the rite
or the d ance; and it is also to forget that the work of art always contains som ething
ineffable, not by excess, as hagiography would have it, but by default, som ething which
com m unicates, so to speak, from body to body, i.e. on the hither side of words or
concepts, and w hich pleases (or displeases) without concepts.
S o lon g as h e rem ains unaware of the lim its inherent in his point of view
on the object, the anthropologist is con d em ned to adopt unw ittingly for his
ow n u se the representation of action w hich is forced on agents or groups w hen
th ey lack practical m astery of a h ighly valued com p eten ce and have to provide
th em selves w ith an exp licit and at least sem i-form alized su bstitute for it in
the form of a repertoire of rules, or of what sociologists con sid er, at best, as
a " r o le ”, i.e. a predeterm ined set of discourses and actions appropriate to a
particular Mstage-part ” .3 It is significant t h a t" culture ” is som etim es described
as a m a p ; it is the analogy w h ich occurs to an outsider w ho has to find his
w ay around in a foreign landscape and w ho com p en sates for his lack of
practical m astery, the prerogative o f the native, by the use o f a m odel of all
p ossible routes. T h e gulf b etw een this potential, abstract space, devoid of
landm arks or any privileged centre - like gen ealogies, in w h ich the ego is as
unreal as th e starting-point in a Cartesian sp ace - and the practical space of
journeys actually m ade, or rather of journeys actually b ein g m ade, can be seen
from the difficulty w e have in recogn izin g fam iliar routes on a m ap or tow n-plan
u ntil w e are able to bring together the axes of th e field of potentialities and
the "system o f axes linked unalterably to our b odies, and carried about w ith
u s w herever w e g o ”, as Poincare puts it, w hich structures practical space into
right and left, up and d ow n , in front and b eh in d .
H ence it is not sufficient for anth rop ology to break w ith native experience
and the native representation of that ex p er ie n c e: it has to m ake a second break
and question the p resup position s inherent in the p osition of an outside
observer, w ho, in his preoccupation w ith interpreting practices, is inclined to
introduce in to th e object th e p rinciples o f h is relation to the object, as is
attested by the special im portance he assigns to com m un icative functions
(w hether in language, m yth, or m arriage). K n o w led g e does not m erely
d ep en d, as an elem entary relativism teaches, on th e particular standpoint an
observer "situated in space and tim e ” takes u p on the object. T h e "know ing
su b jec t”, as the idealist tradition rightly calls h im , inflicts on practice a m uch
m ore fundam ental and p ernicious alteration w h ich , b ein g a constituent
con d ition of th e cognitive operation, is b oun d to pass u n n oticed : in taking
up a point of view on the action, w ithdraw ing from it in order to observe
it from above and from a d istance, he co n stitu tes practical activity as an object
o f observation an d analysis, a representation.
T he objective lim its o f objectivism 3
T h e social w orld may be the object o f three m odes of theoretical k now ledge,
each o f w hich im plies a set of (usually tacit) anthropological theses. A lthough
these m odes of know ledge are strictly speaking in no way exclu sive, and may
be described as m om ents in a dialectical advance tow ards adequate k now ledge,
they have o n ly one th in g in com m on , the fact that they are op posed to
practical k now ledge. T h e know ledge w e shall call phenomenological (or, to
speak in term s of currently active sch ools, " eth nom ethod ological ”) sets out
to m ake exp licit the truth of prim ary exp erience of th e social w orld , i.e . all
that is inscribed in th e relationship of fa m ilia rity w ith the familiar environ
m en t, the u n q u estion in g apprehension o f th e social w orld w hich , by defini
tion, d oes not reflect on itself and exclu d es the question of the co n d itio n s of
its ow n possibility. T h e k now ledge w e shall term objectivist (of w hich
structuralist herm eneutics is a particular case) con stru cts the objective rela
tion s (e .g . econ om ic or lin gu istic) w h ich structure practice and representa
tion s of practice, i.e ., in particular, prim ary k now ledge, practical and tacit,
o f th e fam iliar w orld. T h is con stru ction presup poses a break w ith prim ary
k now ledge, w h o se tacitly assum ed p resup position s give the social w orld its
self-ev id en t, natural character .4 It is only on condition that it poses the
q u estion w hich th e doxic exp erience of th e social w orld excludes by definition
- th e q u estion of the (particular) co n d ition s m aking that experience p ossible
- that ob jectivist k now ledge can establish b oth th e structures of the social
w orld and the objective truth of prim ary experience as experience denied
explicit k now ledge of those structures.
F in ally, it is only by m eans of a secon d break, w h ich is needed in order
to grasp the lim its of ob jectivist k now ledge - an inevitable m om ent in scientific
k now ledge - and to brin g to light the theory of theory and the theory of
practice inscribed (in its practical state) in th is m ode of know ledge, that w e
can integrate th e gains from it into an adequate scien ce of practices. T h e
critical break w ith ob jectivist abstraction en su in g from inquiry in to the
con d ition s o f p ossib ility, and thereby, into th e lim its o f th e objective and
ob jectifying standpoint w hich grasps practices from ou tside, as a fa it accom-
p li, instead o f constructing th eir generative principle by situating itself
w ithin the very m ovem ent of their accom p lish m en t, has no other aim than
to make p ossib le a scien ce of th e dialectical relations b etw een th e objective
structures to w h ich th e ob jectivist m od e of k now ledge gives access and the
structured d ispositions w ith in w h ich those structures are actualized and w hich
tend to reproduce them .
T h is q u estion in g of ob jectivism is liable to be understood at first as a
rehabilitation of subjectivism and to be m erged w ith the critique that naive
4 T he objective lim its o f objectivism
hum anism levels at scientific objectification in the nam e o f " lived exp erience ”
and the rights o f " su b je ctiv ity ” . In reality, the theory of practice and o f the
practical m ode of know ledge inherent in all practice w hich is the precondition
for a rigorous scien ce o f p ractices carries out a new reversal o f the p roblem atic
w hich objectivism has to con stru ct in order to con stitu te the social w orld as
a system of objective relations in depend en t o f individual con sciousnesses and
w ills. Just as ob jectivist k n ow led ge p oses the question of the con d ition s of
the p ossib ility of prim ary exp erience, thereby revealing that th is experience
(or the phenom enological analysis of it) is fundam entally defined as not posing
this q uestion, so the theory of practice puts objectivist know ledge back on
its feet by p osin g the q u estion of the (theoretical and also social) conditions
w hich m ake su ch know ledge p o ssib le. Because it produces its scien ce o f the
social w orld against the im p licit presup position s o f practical know ledge of the
social w orld, objectivist k now ledge is diverted from construction of the theory
o f practical know ledge of the social w orld, of w hich it at least produces the
lack.
O bjective analysis of practical apprehension of the fam iliar w orld is not a
n ew form o f sacrificial offering to the m ysteries of su bjectivity, but a m eans
o f exploring the lim its of all ob jective exploration. It teaches us that we shall
escape from the ritual eith er/or ch oice b etw een objectivism and su bjectivism
in w hich the social scien ces have so far allow ed them selves to be trapped only
if w e are prepared to inquire into the m ode o f production and fu n ction in g
of the practical m astery w h ich m akes possib le both an objectively intelligible
practice and also an ob jectively enchanted experience o f that practice; m ore
precisely, that w e shall do so o n ly if we subordinate all operations of scientific
practice to a theory of practice and of practical know ledge (w hich has n oth ing
to do w ith p henom en ological reconstitution of lived exp erience), and
inseparably from this, to a theory o f the theoretical and social con d ition s of
the possibility o f objective apprehension - and thereby to a theory o f the lim its
o f this m ode of know ledge.
A sin gle exam ple w ill suffice to sh ow how this sort o f third-order know ledge
d oes not cancel out the gains from objectivist know ledge but conserves and
transcends them by integrating the truth o f practical experience and o f the
practical m ode of k now ledge w hich this learned know ledge had to be
constructed against, that is to say, inseparably, the truth o f all learned
know ledge. It will b e rem em bered that L evi-S trau ss, criticizing M au ss’s
" p h en o m en o lo g ica l” approach to gift exchange, makes a com p lete break w ith
native experience and the native theory of that experience, p ositing that it
is the exchange as a con stru cted object w hich " constitu tes the primary
p henom en on, and not the in dividu al operations into w hich social life breaks
it d o w n ”,5 or, in other w ords, that the "m echanical la w s” o f the cycle of
From the mechanics o f the model to the dialectic o f strategies 5
couscous (with a piece of cheese, when they mark a cow ’s first milk) and follow the
course of minor family celebrations - the third or seventh day after a birth, a baby’s
first tooth or first steps, a b oy’s first haircut, first visit to the market, or first fast;
linked to events in the life-cycle of men or the earth, they involve those wishing to impart
their joy, and those invited to take part in that joy, in what is nothing less than a
fertility rite: when the dish which contained the present is taken back, it always
contains, "for good lu ck ” ( el fa l), what is som etim es called thiririth (from er, to give
back), that is to say, a little corn, a little sem olina (never barley, a female plant and
symbol of fragility), or, preferably, som e dried vegetables, chick peas, lentils, etc.,
called ajedjig "flower”, given "so that the boy [the reason for the exchange] will
flourish ”, so that he will grow tall and be fruitful. T hese ordinary gifts (which include
som e of those they call tharzefth, which are visiting-presents) are sharply opposed to
extraordinary gifts, Ikhir or lehna, given for the major festivals called thimeghrivnn
(sing, thameghra) - w eddings, births, and circum cisions - and a fortiori to Iw'ada, the
obligatory gift to a saint. A nd indeed, the little gifts between relatives and friends are
opposed to the present of m oney and eggs which is given by affines remote both in
space and in the genealogy, and also in time - since they are seen only intermittently,
on the "great occasions” - and whose importance and solem nity make them a sort of
controlled challenge in the same way that marriages within the lineage or neighbour
hood, so frequent and so closely w oven into the fabric of ordinary exchanges that they
pass unnoticed, are opposed to the more prestigious but infinitely more hazardous
extraordinary marriages between different villages or tribes, som etim es intended to
set the seal on alliances or reconciliations and always marked by solemn ceremonies.
T h ere are w ays of avoiding ethnocentrism w hich are perhaps no m ore than
so m any d ev ices for keep in g one s distance and, at all ev en ts, for m aking a virtue
ou t of n ecessity by con verting a de facto exclu sion into a ch oice of m eth od .
T h u s, there w ould be less danger of locking the exchan ge of honour or the
seem in gly m ost ritualized g ift exchange in reified, reifying m odels, if one were
able to procure a theoretical m astery of social practices of the sam e class as
those o f w hich one may have a practical m astery. T h ere is n oth ing, for
exam ple, m ore likely to inspire in an outside observer the illusion of m echan
ical necessity than “fo rc e d ” conversation, w hich , to perpetuate itself, m ust
en d lessly create and recreate, often ex nihilo, the relationship b etw een the
interlocutors, m oving them apart and bringing them together, constraining
them to seek out points of agreem ent and disagreem ent, w ith the sam e
earnestness at once sincere and feign ed , m aking them by turns trium ph and
retreat, arousing m ock quarrels that are always on the verge of b eco m in g real
on es, but q uickly settled by a com prom ise or a return to the safe ground of
shared con victions. B ut, by a radical change in p oint of view , o n e can equally
apprehend th is m echanical sequ en ce o f gestures and w ords "from a subjective
point o f v ie w ” , as th e M arx of the Theses on Feuerbach som ew hat rashly puts
it, or, preferably, from the stand point of an adequate theory of practice: the
u nceasing v igilance one n eed s to exert so as to be " carried along ” by th e gam e,
w ithou t b ein g " carried away ” beyond the gam e, as happens w hen a m ock fight
gets the better of the fighters, is evidence that practices as visibly constrained
as these rest on the sam e principle as conduct m ore likely to g iv e an equally
m isleadin g im pression o f free im provisation, such as bluff or seduction, w hich
play on th e eq u ivocation s, in n u en d os, and unspoken im plication s of verbal
or gestural sym bolism to produce am biguous con d uct that can be d isow ned
at th e slightest sign o f w ithdraw al or refusal, and to m aintain uncertainty about
in ten tion s that alw ays hesitate b etw een playfulness and seriou sn ess, abandon
and reserve, eagerness and indifference.
T h e language of rules and m od els, w hich seem s tolerable w hen applied to
" a lie n ” practices, ceases to con vin ce as soon as one considers th e practical
m astery of th e sym b olism of social interaction - tact, d exterity, or savoir-faire
- p resupposed by th e m ost everyday gam es o f sociability and accom panied
by the application of a sp ontaneous sem iology, i.e . a m ass of precepts,
form ulae, and codified cu es. T h is practical know ledge, based on the con
tin u ou s d eco d in g o f the perceived - b u t not con sciously noticed - in dices of
th e w elco m e g iven to actions already accom plished, con tin u ou sly carries out
the checks and corrections intended to ensure the adjustm ent o f practices and
exp ression s to the reactions and expectations of the other agents. It fu n ction s
From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour ii
oclaim ing that revenge was accom plished, so that all m ig h t see h ow a fam ily
of honour prom ptly restores its prestige and so that the o p p o sin g fam ily sh ould
be left in no d ou b t as to th e source o f its m isfortune.
C hoosing th e other alternative m ay take on different and even op posed
m eanings. T h e offender m ay, in term s o f h is p hysical stren g th , h is prestige,
or the im portance and authority of the group to w h ich he b elo n g s, be superior,
equal, or inferior to the person offend ed . W hile the logic o f honour presupposes
the recognition of an ideal equality in h onou r, the popular con sciou sn ess is
nonetheless aware o f actual in eq ualities. T h e m an w h o declares " I ’ve got a
m oustache, t o o ” is answ ered w ith the proverb " T h e m oustache o f the hare
is not that o f the l i o n . . . ” T h is is the basis o f a w h ole sp ontaneous casuistry.
Let us take the case w here the offended party has, at least ideally, the m eans
to riposte; if h e proves incapable of taking u p the challenge (w hether a gift
or an offence), if from pusillanim ity or w eakness he sid estep s it and renounces
the chance o f ripostin g, he is in a sen se ch oosin g to be the author o f h is ow n
dishonour, w hich is then irrem ediable. H e con fesses h im self d efeated in the
gam e that he ou gh t to have played d esp ite everyth ing. But n on-reply can also
express the refusal to reply: the m an w h o has suffered an offence refuses to
regard it as su ch , and through his d isd ain , w hich he m ay m anifest by calling
in a hired killer, he cau ses the offence to recoil on its perpetrator, w h o is
thereby d ishon ou red . Sim ilarly in the case of the gift, th e recipient may
indicate that he ch o o ses to refuse the exch an ge, either by rejecting the gift
or by p resen tin g an im m ediate or su b seq u en t cou n ter-gift identical to the
original g ift. H ere, to o , the exchange sto p s. In sh ort, w ithin th is logic, only
escalation, ch allenge an sw ering challenge, can sign ify the op tion o f playing
the gam e.
In th e case w here the offender is clearly superior to the offend ed , only the
fact o f avoiding the ch allenge is held to be blam ew orthy, and the offended
party is not required to trium ph over th e offender in order to be rehabilitated
in the eyes of p ub lic op in ion : the d efeated m an w h o has d on e his duty incurs
no blam e. T h e offend ed party is even able to throw back elbahadla on his
offender w ithou t resorting to a riposte. H e on ly has to adopt an attitude of
h um ility w h ich , by em p h asizin g his w eakness, h igh ligh ts the arbitrary and
im m oderate character of the offence. T h is strategy is, o f cou rse, only ad m is
sib le so lon g as, in the eyes of the grou p , th e disparity b etw een th e tw o
antagonists is u nequ ivocal; it is a natural course for those individuals socially
recognized as weak, clien ts (ya d h itsumuthen, those w h o lean o n ), or m em bers
o f a sm all fam ily.
F in ally, in the case w here the offender is inferior to the offend ed , the latter
m ay riposte (th u s transgressing the third corollary) b u t if he unfairly exp loits
his advantage, he exp oses him self to th e d ishon ou r w hich w ould otherw ise
14 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
have rebounded on to the p resum ptuou s offend er. W isdom advises him rather
to abstain from any reply and to play the " c o n te m p t” gam bit: sin ce failure
to riposte cannot be im pu ted to cow ardice or w eakness, th e d ishon ou r recoils
on to the attacker. A lth ou gh each of th ese " th eo retica l” cases cou ld be
illustrated w ith a host of observations and stories, th e fact rem ains that the
differences b etw een the tw o parties are never clear-cut, so that each can play
on the am bigu ities and eq u ivocation s w hich this indeterm inacy len d s to the
co n d u ct. T h e distance b etw een failure to riposte o w in g to fear and non-reply
b espeaking con tem p t is often infinitesim al, w ith the resu lt that d isdain can
alw ays serve as a mask for pusillanim ity.
Every exchange con tains a m ore or less dissim ulated ch allenge, and th e logic
o f ch allenge and riposte is b ut the lim it tow ards w h ich every act of
com m un ication ten d s. G en erou s exchan ge tends tow ards overw h elm in g
g en er o sity ; the greatest gift is at the sam e tim e the gift m ost likely to throw
its recipient into d ishon ou r b y p roh ibitin g any cou n ter-gift. T o redu ce to the
fun ction o f com m un ication - albeit by th e transfer of borrow ed co n cep ts -
p henom en a such as the d ialectic o f ch allenge and riposte and, m ore generally,
th e exchange of gifts, w ord s, or w o m en , is to ignore th e structural am bivalen ce
w hich predisposes them to fulfil a political function of d om in ation in and
through perform ance o f th e com m u n ication fun ction .
If th e offence d oes not necessarily bear w ith in it d ishon ou r, the reason is
that it allow s the p ossib ility of riposte, w h ich is recognized b y the very act
o f g iv in g offen ce .14 But p otential d ishon ou r becom es m ore and m ore real the
longer vengeance is d elayed. T h erefore th e tim e-lag b etw een the offence and
the reparation m ust be as sh ort as p ossib le; a large fam ily has in deed
sufficient fightin g m en not to have to w ait lon g. T h e reputation o f its nif, its
sen sitivity and d eterm in ation, lead it to appear as capable of rip ostin g the very
instant an offence is com m itted . T h e respect inspired b y a good fam ily is
exp ressed in the saying that it can "sleep and leave th e door o p e n ”. T h e m an
o f honour, o f w h om p eop le say that he fulfils " h is role as a m a n ” ( thirugza),
is alw ays on his g u a rd ; h en ce h e is im m u n e from even th e m ost reckless attack,
and "even w hen he is aw ay, there is som eon e in his h o u s e ”. But th in g s are
n ot so sim p le. It is said that D jeh a, a legendary figure, asked w h en h e had
aven ged his father, replied , "A fter a hundred years had g o n e b y .” T h e story
is also told o f th e lion w ho alw ays walks w ith m easured p a ces: " I d o n ’t know
w here m y prey i s ”, he said. " I f it’s in fron t o f m e, on e day I ’ll reach it; if
it’s b eh ind m e, it’ll catch up w ith m e .”
H ow ever close it m ay com e to the logic o f practices (and to the extent that
it d o es), the abstract diagram w h ich has to be constructed in order to account
for that logic is liable to ob scu re the fact that the drivin g force of the w hole
m echanism is not som e abstract principle (th e principle of iso tim y , eq u ality
From the "rules ” o f honour to the sense o f honour *5
in h onou r), still less the set o f rules w hich can be d erived from it, but the
sense o f h onou r, a d isp osition inculcated in the earliest years of life and
constantly reinforced b y calls to order from th e grou p , that is to say, from
the aggregate of the in dividu als en d ow ed w ith the sam e d isp o sitio n s, to w hom
each is linked b y h is d isp osition s and in terests. N if, literally the n o se, is very
closely associated w ith virility and with all the d isp o sitio n s, incorporated in
the form o f bodily sch em es, w hich are held to m anifest v ir ility ; th e verb qabel,
com m only used to design ate the fundam ental virtu es of the m an o f honour,
the m an w h o faces, ou tfaces, stand s up to others, looks th em in the ey es, knows
how to receive as a host and to d o his gu est h on ou r, also m eans to face the
east (elqibla) and the future (qabel), th e m ale orientation par ex cellen ce. T h is
is sufficient to rem ind us that the point o f honour is a perm anent d isp osition ,
em bedded in the agen ts’ very bodies in the form o f m ental d ispositions,
schem es of p ercep tion and th ou gh t, extrem ely general in their application,
such as those w h ich d ivid e up th e w orld in accordance w ith th e op position s
betw een the m ale and th e fem ale, east and w est, future and past, top and
bottom , right and left, e tc ., and also, at a d eep er lev el, in th e form o f bodily
postures and stances, w ays o f standing, sittin g , look in g, sp eak ing, or w alking.
What is called the sense o f honour is n oth in g other than the cultivated
disposition, inscribed in the b ody schem a and in th e sch em es of thou ght,
w hich enables each agent to en gen d er all the practices co n sisten t w ith the
logic o f ch allenge and riposte, and on ly su ch p ractices, by m eans o f cou n t
less in ven tion s, w h ich th e stereotyped u n fold in g o f a ritual w ould in no w ay
dem and. T h e fact that there is n o " c h o ic e ” that cannot be accounted for,
retrospectively at least, d oes not im ply that su ch practice is perfectly predic
table, like the acts inserted in the rigorously stereotyped seq u en ces of a rite;
and this is true not o n ly for the observer b ut also for the agen ts, w ho find
in the relative predictability and u np redictab ility o f the p ossib le ripostes the
op portu nity to put their strategies to work. But even the m ost strictly
ritualized exchan ges, in w h ich all th e m om ents o f th e action , and their
u n fold in g, are rigorously foreseen, have room for strategies: th e agents rem ain
in com m and of the interval b etw een th e ob ligatory m om ents and can therefore
act on their o p p o n en ts b y p layin g w ith th e tempo o f the exch an ge. W e know
that returning a gift at o n ce, i.e . d oing away w ith the interval, am ounts to
breaking off the exch an ge. L ikew ise th e lesson con tained in the parables of
D jeha and the lion m ust be taken seriou sly; the m astery w h ich defines
ex cellen ce finds exp ression in th e play m ade w ith tim e w h ich transform s ritual
ized exchan ge in to a confrontation of strategies. T h e skilled strategist can turn
a capital of provocations received or con flicts su sp en d ed , w ith the potential
ripostes, ven gean ces, or con flicts it con tains, into an in stru m ent o f power,
b y reserving the capacity to reopen or cease h ostilities in his ow n good tim e.
i6 T h e objective limits o f objectivism
tions o f th is im plicit axiom atics w ere sp elled out m ore com p letely than
Pr here (e .g . a crim e is alw ays m ore seriou s com m itted by n ig h t than
1S
co^ A hv
m m itted „ d av). together w ith the law s by
- w h ich th ev are com b ined
ding on the case, tw o p rop osition s m ay either be added togeth er or
ncel each other ou t, w h ich , w ith in the logic of th e rule, can on ly be
d e scrib ed as an ex c ep tio n ), it w ould be p ossib le to reproduce all th e provisions
of all the custom ary law s w h ich have b een collected and even to produce the
co m p lete universe of all the acts of jurisprudence con form in g to th e "sen se
of ju stice ” in its K ab yle form .
T h u s the p recepts o f cu sto m , very close in this resp ect to sayin gs and
proverbs (such as th ose w h ich govern th e tem poral d istrib u tion of activities),
have noth ing in com m on w ith the tran scend en t rules of a juridical code:
everyone is able, not so m uch to cite and recite them from m em o ry , as to repro
duce them (fairly accurately). It is because each agent has the m eans of acting
as a judge of others and of h im self that cu stom has a hold on h im : in d eed , in
social form ations w here, as in K abvlia, there exists no judicial apparatus
endow ed w ith a m on op oly of physical or even sy m b o lic v io len ce and w here
clan assem b lies fu n ction as sim p le arbitration tribunals, that is, as m ore or
less expanded fam ily co u n cils, the ru les of cu stom ary law have som e practical
efficacy on ly to the ex te n t that, sk ilfully m anip ulated b y the h olders of
authority w ithin the clan (th e " gu aran tors”), th ey "aw a k en ” , so to speak, the
schem es of perception and appreciation d ep osited , in their incorporated state,
in every m em ber of the grou p , i.e . the d isp o sitio n s o f the h abitus. T h e y are
therefore separated on ly b y d ifferen ces o f degree from th e partial and often
fictitious exp licit statem en ts of the g ro u p ’s im p licit axiom atics through w hich
individual m ore-or-less " a u th o r ize d ” agen ts seek to cou n ter the failures or
hesitations of th e h abitus by stating th e so lu tio n s appropriate to difficult cases.
Talk of rules, a eu p h em ized form of legalism , is n ever m ore fallacious than
w hen applied to the m ost h om o g en eo u s societies (or the least codified areas
of differentiated so cieties) w here m ost p ractices, in clu d in g th o se seem in g ly
m ost ritualized, can b e abandoned to the orchestrated im provisation of
com m on d isp o sitio n s: the rule is never, in th is case, m ore than a secon d -b est
in tend ed to m ake g o o d the occasional m isfirings o f the collective enterprise
of in cu lcation ten d in g to p rod uce h abitus that are capable o f gen erating
practices regulated w ith ou t exp ress regulation or any in stitu tion alized call to
ord er .18
It go es w ith o u t sayin g that th e im p licit p h ilo so p h y o f practice w hich
pervades the anthropological tradition w ould n ot have su rvived all th e d en u n
ciations of legalist form alism if it had not had an affinity w ith the p resu p p osi
tions in scrib ed in th e relation ship b etw een the ob server and th e o b ject of his
stu d y, w h ich im p ose th em selv es in the very con stru ction o f his ob ject so lon g
i8 T h e objective limits o f objectivism
as they are not exp licitly taken as an ob ject. N ative exp erience o f the social
w orld never ap preh en ds th e system o f ob jective relations other than in
profiles, i.e . in th e form o f relations w h ich present th em selves on ly on e by
on e, and h en ce su cc essiv ely , in the em ergen cy situ ation s of everyday life. If
agents are p ossessed by th eir h abitus m ore than th ey p ossess it, this is
because it acts w ith in th em as the organ izing p rin cip le of their action s, and
because th is modus operan di in form in g all th ou gh t and action (including
th o u g h t o f action ) reveals itself only in th e opus operatum . In vited b y the
a n th rop ologist’s q u e stio n in g to effect a reflexive and quasi-theoretical return
on to h is ow n practice, th e b est-in form ed in form an t p rod uces a discourse which
compounds tw o opposing system s o f lacunae. Insofar as it is a discourse of
fa m ilia rity , it leaves u n said all that g o es w ith o u t sayin g: the inform ant’s
remarks - like the narratives or com m en taries o f those w h o m H eg el calls
‘'original h isto ria n s” (H ero d o tu s, T h u c y d id e s, X en o p h o n , or Caesar) who,
liv in g "in the sp irit o f the e v e n t ” ,19 take for granted the p resu p p o sitio n s taken
for granted b y the historical agen ts - are in evitab ly subject to the censorship
inherent in their h abitus, a sy ste m o f sch em es of p erception and th o u g h t w hich
cannot g iv e w hat it d oes g iv e to b e th o u g h t and perceived w ith ou t ipso facto
p rod ucing an unthin k able and an u nn am eable. Insofar as it is an outsider-
oriented discourse it ten ds to ex c lu d e all direct reference to particular cases (that
is, virtually all in form ation d irectly attached to p ro p er names ev o k in g and
su m m arizin g a w h ole sy stem of previous in form ation ). B ecau se th e native is
that m uch less in clin ed to slip in to the language o f fam iliarity to th e extent
that his q u estion er strikes him as unfam iliar w ith th e u n iverse of reference
im plied b y his discou rse (a fact apparent in the form of the q u estio n s asked,
particular or general, ign oran t or in fo rm ed ), it is u nderstandable that
an th rop ologists sh ould so o fte n forget the distance b etw een learned recon
stru ction of the native w orld and the native exp erience of that w orld, an
exp erience w hich finds ex p ressio n on ly in the silen ce s, ellip ses, and lacunae
of the language o f fam iliarity.
F in ally, th e in form an t’s discou rse ow es its b est-h id d en properties to the
fact that it is the p rod uct o f a sem i-theoretical d isp o sitio n , inevitab ly induced
b y any learned q u estio n in g . T h e rationalizations prod uced from this stan d
p oin t, w h ich is no longer that of action, w ith ou t b ein g that of scien ce, m eet
and confirm the ex p ecta tio n s of th e juridical, ethical, or gram m atical
form alism to w hich his o w n situ ation in clin es the observer. T h e relationship
b etw een inform ant and an th rop ologist is som ew h at an alogous to a p edagogical
relation ship , in w hich the m aster m u st b rin g to th e state of ex p licitn ess, for
the p urposes of tran sm ission , the u n con sciou s sch em es o f h is practice. Just
as the tea ch in g o f ten n is, th e vio lin , ch ess, d an cin g , or b o x in g breaks dow n
into in dividu al p ositio n s, ste p s, or m oves, p ractices w h ich in tegrate all these
Practice an d discourse about practice 19
t on of the p rin cip les g o v er n in g th em . B etw een the areas that are
C° rently " fr e e st” b ecau se g iv e n over in reality to th e regulated im provisa-
a.PPa ^ {he h abitus (such as th e d istrib u tion of a ctivities and ob jects w ith in
the^internal space o f th e h o u se) and th e areas m ost strictly regulated by
ustom ary norm s and u p h eld b y social san ction s (su ch as the great agrarian
rites) there lies the w h ole field o f practices su b jected to traditional p recep ts,
custom ary recom m en dation s, ritual p rescrip tion s, fu n ctio n in g as a regulatory
device w hich orien ts practice w ith o u t p rod u cin g it. T h e ab sen ce o f a g en u in e
law - the product of th e w ork of a b od y of sp ecialists exp ressly m andated to
produce a coh eren t corp u s of juridical norm s and ensure resp ect for its
application, and fu rn ish ed to th is en d w ith a co ercive p ow er - m ust not lead
us to forget that any socially recogn ized form ulation con tain s w ith in it an
intrinsic pow er to rein force d isp o sitio n s sym b olically.
Our approach is th u s radically o p p o sed , on tw o essen tial p oin ts, to th e
interactionism w h ich redu ces th e con stru ctio n s of social sc ien ce to " c o n s
tructs of the secon d d egree, that is, con stru cts o f th e con stru cts m ade by th e
actors on the social s c e n e ”, as S ch u tz d o e s ,23 or, like G arfinkel, to accoun ts
of the accounts w hich ag en ts p rod uce and through w hich they p rod uce the
m eaning of th eir w o rld .24 O ne is en titled to undertake to g iv e an "accou n t
of accounts ”, so lo n g as on e d o es not p ut forw ard o n e ’s co n trib u tio n to th e
scien ce of pre-scien tific representation o f the social w orld as if it w ere a
science o f the social w orld . But th is is still too gen ero u s, b ecau se th e pre
requisite for a scien ce o f co m m o n se n se represen tation s w h ich seek s to b e m ore
than a co m p licito u s d escrip tion is a sc ien ce o f th e stru ctu res w h ich govern
both practices and th e co n co m ita n t rep resen tation s, th e latter b ein g the
principal obstacle to th e con stru ction o f su ch a sc ie n c e .25 O n ly by co n stru ctin g
the objective stru ctu res (price cu rves, ch an ces o f access to h igh er ed u ca tio n ,
law s of th e m atrim onial m arket, e tc .) is on e able to p ose the q u estion of the
m echanism s through w hich th e relation ship is esta b lish ed b etw een the
structures and th e practices or th e rep resen tation s w h ich accom pan y th em ,
instead of treating th ese " th o u g h t o b je c ts” as " r e a so n s” or " m o tiv e s ” and
m aking them th e d eterm in in g cau se o f the practices. M oreover, th e co n stitu
tive pow er w hich is granted to ordinary lan guage lies not in th e lan guage itself
but in the grou p w h ich au th orizes it and in vests it w ith au th ority. Official
language, particularly th e sy stem of co n cep ts b y m ean s o f w hich th e m em bers
of a given group p rovid e th e m se lv e s w ith a representation o f th eir social
relations (e.g . th e lin eage m odel or the vocabulary of h on o u r), san ctio n s and
im p oses what it states, tacitly layin g d ow n th e d iv id in g lin e b etw een the
thinkable and th e u n th in k ab le, th ereb y con trib u tin g tow ard s the m ainten an ce
of the sym b o lic order from w h ich it draw s its au th ority. T h u s officialization
is on ly one asp ect o f th e ob jectify in g p rocess through w h ich th e group
22 T h e objective limits o f objectivism
teaches itself and con ceals from itself its ow n tru th , in scrib ing in o b jectivity
its representation o f w hat it is and thu s b in d in g itself b y th is p u b lic
d eclaration .26
T h e agent w h o " reg u la rizes” his situ ation or puts h im self in the right is
sim p ly b eating the group at its ow n gam e; in abiding by th e ru les, fallin g
in to line w ith good form , he w in s the group over to h is sid e b y o sten tatiou sly
h onou rin g the values the grou p h on ou rs. In social form ations in w h ich the
exp ression o f m aterial in terests is heavily censored and political au th ority
relatively u n in stitu tion alized , political strategies for m obilization can be effec
tive only if the values they pursue or propose are presented in the m isrecog-
nizable gu ise o f th e valu es in w hich the grou p recogn izes itself. It is therefore
not sufficient to say that th e rule d eterm in es practice w h en there is m ore to
-b e gained b y ob ey in g it than b y d isob eyin g it. T h e ru le’s last trick is to cause
it to be forgotten that agents have an interest in o b eyin g th e rule, or m ore
precisely, in being in a regular situation. Brutally m aterialist redu ction enables
on e to break w ith th e n aiveties o f th e sp on tan eou s theory of p ra ctice; b u t it
is liable to m ake on e forget the advantage that lies in ab iding b y the ru les,
w h ich is the principle of the secon d-ord er strategies through w hich the agent
seeks to p u t him self in the right.27 T h u s, q u ite apart from the d irect profit
derived from d o in g w hat the rule prescribes, perfect con form ity to the rule
can bring secondary benefits su ch as the prestige and respect w hich alm ost
invariably reward an action apparently m otivated b y n oth in g other than p u re,
disinterested resp ect for the rule. It follo w s that strategies d irectly orien ted
tow ards th e prim ary profit o f practice (e .g . th e prestige accruing from a
m arriage) are alm ost alw ays accom pan ied b y secon d-ord er strategies w h o se
purpose is to give apparent satisfaction to th e d em an d s of the official ru le,
and th u s to com p oun d th e satisfaction s o f en ligh ten ed self-in terest w ith the
advantage of ethical im peccability.
T h e place w h ich a notion as visibly a m b igu ou s as that o f the rule o ccu p ies
in anthropological or lin gu istic theory cannot be fully u n d erstood u n less it
is seen that th is notion p rovid es a solu tion to the con trad iction s and d ifficulties
to w hich the researcher is con d em n ed b y an inadequate or - w hich am oun ts
to th e sam e th in g - an im p licit theory o f practice. E veryth in g takes place as
if, fulfillin g the role o f a refuge for ignorance, th is hospitab le n otion , w h ich
can su ggest at on ce the law con stru cted b y scien ce, th e tran scend en t social
norm and th e im m anent regularity of p ractices, enabled its user to escape from
the d ilem m a of m echanism or finalism w ithou t falling in to th e m ost flagrant
naiveties o f the legalism w hich m akes o b ed ien ce to the rule the d eterm in in g
T he fallacies o f the rule 23
Saussure first m akes the p oin t that sp eech appears as th e precondition for
language, as m uch from the in dividu al as from the collectiv e p oin t o f view ,
because language cannot be ap prehended ou tsid e o f sp eech , because language
is learnt through sp eech , and because sp eech is the so u rce of in novation s in
and transform ations o f language. T h is is so even th o u g h on e m ight invoke
the ex isten ce o f dead languages or d u m b n ess in old age as provin g the
p ossib ility o f lo sin g sp eech w h ile con servin g language, and even thou gh
language m istakes reveal the language as the ob jective norm o f sp eech (w ere
!t otherw ise, every language m istake w ould m od ify th e language and there
24 T he objective lim its o f objectivism
w ould be no m istakes any m ore). But h e then ob serves that the priority of
sp eech over language is p urely ch ron ological and that the relationship is
inverted as soon as on e leaves the d o m a in o f individual or collective history
in order to in qu ire into the logical conditions for d ecip h erin g. F rom this p oin t
o f view , w hich is that of ob jectivism , language is the precond ition for th e
in telligibility o f sp eech , b ein g th e m ed iation w h ich en su res the id en tity o f the
so u n d -co n cep t associations m ade b y th e speakers and so guarantees m utual
com p reh en sio n . T h u s, in th e logical order o f in telligibility, sp eech is th e
p rod u ct o f lan gu age .28 It follo w s that, because it is con stru cted from th e
strictly intellectualist stan d p oin t of d ecip h erin g , Saussurian lin g u istics privi
leges the structure of sign s, that is, th e relation s b etw een th em , at the ex p en se
of th eir practical functions, w hich are never redu cible, as structuralism tacitly
assu m es, to fu n ction s of com m u n ication or k now ledge.
T h e lim its o f Saussurian ob jectivism are never m ore clearly visib le than
in its in ability to con ceive o f sp eech and m ore generally o f practice other than
as execution ,29 w ith in a logic w h ich , th o u g h it d oes not use th e w ord , is that
of th e rule to b e ap plied . O b jectivism con stru cts a theory of practice (as
ex ecu tio n ) b ut on ly as a negative b y-p rod u ct or, on e m ig h t say, w aste
p rod u ct, im m ediately discarded, o f the con stru ction o f the system s of o b je c
tive relations. T h u s, w ith th e aim of d elim itin g , w ithin th e b ody o f lin gu istic
data, the "terrain o f th e la n g u a g e” and o f extracting a " w ell-d efin ed o b je c t” ,
"an ob ject that can be stu d ied se p a r a te ly ”, " o f h om o g en eo u s n a tu re” ,
Saussu re sets aside " th e physical part of co m m u n ica tio n ”, that is, sp eech
as a preconstructed ob ject, liable to stan d in the w ay o f con stru ctin g th e
lan guage; he then isolates w ithin the " sp eech c ir c u it” w hat he calls th e
"ex ecu tiv e s id e ”, that is, sp eech as a con stru cted ob ject defined by th e
actualization of a certain sen se in a particular com b ination of so u n d s, w hich
he finally elim inates on the grou n ds that " execu tion is never the w ork of th e
m a ss ”, b ut "alw ays in d iv id u a l” . T h u s the sam e con cep t, sp eech , is d iv id ed
by theoretical con stru ction into an im m ed iately observable preconstructed
datu m , p recisely that against w hich th e operation of theoretical con stru ction
is carried ou t, and a constructed object, the negative p rod uct o f the operation
w h ich co n stitu tes the language as su c h , or rather, wrhich produces b oth
ob jects by p rod ucing th e relation o f o p p o sitio n w ith in w h ich and b y wrh ich
th ey are d efined. It w ou ld not be difficult to sh ow that th e con stru ction o f
th e co n cep t of culture (in the cultural an th rop ology sense) or social structure
(in RadclifTe-Brown’s sen se and that o f social anthropology) sim ilarly im p lies
th e con stru ction of a n otion o f co n d u ct as execu tion w'hich coexists w ith th e
prim ary notion of con d u ct as sim p le behaviour taken at face value. T h e
extrem e con fu sion of debates on the relation ship b etw een " cu ltu re” (or " social
stru ctu r es”) and con d u ct generally arises from the fact that the con stru cted
T h e fallacies o f the rule 25
As soon as one m oves from the structure of language to the functions it fulfils, that
is, to the uses agents actually make of it, one sees that mere know ledge of the code
gives only very im perfect m astery of the linguistic interactions really taking place. As
Luis Prieto observes, the m eaning of a linguistic elem ent depends at least as much
on extra-linguistic as on linguistic factors, that is to say, on the context and situation
in which it is used. E verything takes place as if, from am ong the class of "sign ified s”
abstractly corresponding to a speech sound, the receiver " selected ” the one which
seems to him to be com patible with the circum stances as he perceives th em .31 T h u s
reception depends to a large degree on the objective structure of the relations betw een
the interacting agents’ objective positions in the social structure (e .g . relations of
com petition or objective antagonism , or relations of power and authority, e tc .), which
governs the form and content of the interactions observed in a particular conjuncture.
Bally show s how the very content of the com m unication, the nature of the language
and all the forms of expression used (posture, gesture, mimickrv, e tc .) and above
all, perhaps, their style, are affected by the structure of the social relation betw een
the agents involved and, m ore precisely, by the structure of their relative positions
*n the hierarchies of age, pow er, prestige, and culture: "W hen I talk to som eone, or
talk about him , I cannot help visualizing the particular type of relationship (casual,
formal, obligatory, official) betw een that person and m yself ; involuntarily 1 think not
°nly of his possible action towards m yself, but also of his age, sex, rank, and social
2 BOT
26 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
background; all these considerations may affect my choice of expressions and lead me
to avoid what might discourage, offend, or hurt. If need be, my language becomes
reserved an d prudent; it becom es indirect and euphem istic, it slides over the surface
instead of in sistin g.’*32 Hence com m unication is possible in practice only when accom
panied by a practical spotting of cues w hich, in enabling speakers to situate others
in the hierarchies of age, wealth, power, or culture, guides them unw ittingly towards
the type of exchange best suited in form and content to the objective situation between
the interacting individuals. T h is is seen clearly in bilingual situations, in w hich the
speakers adopt cne or the other of the two available languages according to the
circum stances, the subject of conversation, the social status of their interlocuter (and
thus his degree of culture and bilingualism ), etc. T h e whole content of the
com m unication (and not just the language used) is unconsciously modified by the
structure of the relationship between the speakers. T he pressure of the socially
qualified objective situation is such that, through the mediation of bodily mim esis,
a whole way of speaking, a type of joke, a particular tone, som etim es even an accent,
seem to be objectively called for by certain situations, and, conversely, quite excluded
from others, whatever efforts are made to introduce them .
But the linguists and anthropologists w ho appeal to " co n tex t” n r " situ ation ” in
order, as it were, to "correct” what strikes them as unreal and abstract in the
structuralist model are in fact still trapped in the logic of the theoretical model which
they are rightly trying to supersede. T he m ethod known as “situational analysis”,33
which consists of "observing people in a variety of social situ ation s” in order to
determ ine "the way in which individuals are able to exercise choices within the lim its
of a specified social structure”,34 remains locked within the framework of the rule and
the exception, which Leach (often invoked by the exponents of "situational analysis”)
spells out clearly: "I postulate that structural system s in which all avenues of social
action are narrowly institutionalized are im possible. In all viable system s, there must
be an area where the individual is free to make choices so as to manipulate the system
to his advantage.”35 In accepting as obligatory alternatives the m odel and the situation,
the structure and the individual variations, one condem ns oneself simply to take
the diametrically opposite course to the structuralist abstraction which subsum es
variations - regarded as sim ple variants - into the structure. T h e desire to "integrate
variations, exceptions and accidents into descriptions of regularities ” and to show " how
individuals in a particular structure handle the choices with which they are faced -
as individuals are in all so cieties”36 - leads one to regress to the pre-structuralist stage
of the individual and his choices, and to miss the very principle of the structuralist
error.37
N o t the least of C hom sky's m erits is to have reopened d iscu ssion on the
d istinction betw een syntax and sem an tics (and secondarily, b etw een syntax
and pragm atics) and, m ore p recisely, on the dep en dence or in d ep en d en ce of
th ese different levels o f discou rse relative to the situ ation , by affirm ing the
in d ep en d en ce of th e structural properties o f linguistic exp ression s relative to
their uses and fu n ction s and the im p ossib ility of m aking any inference from
analysis of their form al structure - a p osition w hich has sim p ly adopted
exp licitly the p ostu lates im plied in th e Saussurian lan guage/sp eech
distinction.
In short, failing to con stru ct practice other than n egatively, ob jectivism is
con d em ned either to ignore the w h ole question o f th e principle u nd erlyin g
T h e fallacies o f the rule 27
the p ro d u ctio n o f the r e g u la r itie s w hich it then con ten ts itself w ith recording;
to reify abstractions, by th e fallacy of treating the ob jects constructed by
s c i e n c e , w hether " c u ltu r e ”, " structures ” , or "m od es of production ”, as
realities en d ow ed w ith a social efficacy, capable o f actin g as agents responsible
for historical actions or as a power capable of con strain in g p ra ctices; or to
save appearances by m eans of con cep ts as am bigu ous as the notions of the
ruie or the u n con sciou s, w h ich make it p ossib le to avoid ch oosin g betw een
incom patible theories o f practice. T h u s L evi-S trau ss s use o f the notion of
the unconscious m asks th e contradictions generated b y the im plicit theory o f
practice w hich "structural a n th rop ology” accep ts at least by d efau lt, restoring
the old en telech ies of the m etaphysics o f nature in th e apparently secularized
form of a structure structured in the absence of any stru cturin g p rin cip le .38
When one is reluctant to follow D urkh eim in p ositin g that none of the rules
constraining su bjects "can b e found en tirely reproduced in the applications
made o f them b y in dividu als, since they can exist even w ithou t b ein g
actually a p p lied ” ,39 and u n w illin g to ascribe to th ese rules th e tran scend en t,
perm anent existen ce h e ascribes (as S aussu re d oes to language) to all collective
" realities”, the only w ay to escape the crudest naivities o f the legalism w hich
sees practices as the p rod uct of o b ed ien ce to the rules is to play on the
p olysem ous nature of the w ord rule: m ost often u sed in th e sen se of a social
norm expressly stated and explicitly recogn ized , like m oral or juridical law ,
som etim es in the sen se o f a theoretical model, a con stru ct d ev ised b y scien ce
in order to accoun t for practices, the w ord is also, m ore rarely, used in the
sense o f a scheme (or p rin cip le) im m anent in practice, w h ich sh ou ld be called
im plicit rather than u n co n sciou s, sim p ly to indicate that it exists in a practical
state in agents' practice and not in their con sciou sn ess, or rather, their
discou rse .40
Clearly a case in point is C hom sky, w h o h old s, sim u ltan eou sly, that the
rules of gram m ar are in scrib ed in n euro-physiological m ech a n ism s ,41 that they
are system s o f norm s of w hich agents have a certain aw areness, and lastly that
they are in stru m en ts for description o f language. But it is also instructive to
reread a paragraph from L evi-Strau ss’s preface to th e secon d edition of L es
structures elementaires de la parente (E lem entary Structures o f K in sh ip) , in w h ich
one m ay assu m e that particular care has b een taken w ith the vocabulary of
norm s, m od els, or rules, sin ce th e passage deals w ith the d istin ction b etw een
preferential sy s te m s ” and "prescriptive sy s te m s ” : " C on versely, a system
which recommends m arriage w ith the m oth er’s brother’s daughter m ay be called
p rescriptive even if the rule is seld om ob served , sin ce w hat it says m ust be
d one. T h e q u estion of h ow far and in w hat proportion the m em bers of a given
so ciety respect the norm is very interesting, but a d ifferen t q u estion to that
of w here th is society sh ou ld properly be placed in a typ o lo g y . It is sufficient
28 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
to ack n ow led ge the lik elih ood that awareness of the rule in flects choices ever
so little in the prescribed d irection , and that the percentage of conventional
m arriages is higher than w ou ld be the case if m arriages w ere m ade at random,
to be able to recogn ize w hat m igh t be called a m atrilateral *operator’ at work
in th is so c iety and actin g as a p ilot: certain alliances at least fo llo w th e path
w h ich it charts out for th e m , and th is suffices to im print a sp ecific curve in
the gen ealogical space. N o d ou b t there w ill be not just on e cu rve but a great
n um ber o f local cu rves, m erely in cip ien t for th e m ost part, h ow ever, and
form in g closed cycles o n ly in rare and excep tion al cases. But the structural
ou tlin es w h ich em erge h ere and there w ill be en ou gh for the system to b t
used in m aking a p rob abilistic version o f m ore rigid sy stem s the notion o f w hich
is co m p letely theoretical and in w hich m arriage w ou ld con form rigorously to
a n y rule the social group pleases to enunciate ”42
T h e d om in an t ton ality in th is passage, as in the w h ole p reface, is that of
th e norm, w hereas S tructu ral A nthropology is w ritten in the language of the
model or, if you like, th e structure; n ot that su ch term s are en tirely ab sen t here,
sin ce th e m ath em atical-p hysical m etaph ors organ izin g th e central passage
(" o p erator” , " c u r v e ” in "genealogical s p a c e ” , " str u c tu re s”) evok e the logic
o f th e th eoretical m od el and of the eq u ivalen ce, at on ce declared and repudia
ted , o f th e model and the norm : " A preferential sy stem is p rescriptive w hen
en visaged at th e m odel lev el, a p rescriptive system m ust b e preferential w hen
en visaged on th e level of reality .”43 B ut for the reader w h o rem em bers the
passages in S tructu ral A n thropology on th e relation ship b etw een language and
kinship (e .g . '" K in sh ip sy s te m s ’, like 'p h o n em ic sy s te m s ’, are b uilt up by
the m ind on the level o f u n c o n scio u s th o u g h t ”)44 and th e im perious way in
w hich "cultural n o rm s” and all the " ration aliza tio n s” or "secon d ary argu
m e n ts ” p roduced b y the n atives w ere rejected in favour of th e " u n co n scio u s
stru ctu r es” , not to m en tio n passages a ssertin g th e u niversality o f th e fun da
m ental rule of exogam y, th e co n cession s m ade here to "aw areness o f the r u le ”
and the d issociation from rigid sy stem s " th e n otion of w hich is entirely
th e o re tic a l’' m ay com e as a surprise, as m ay th is further passage from the sam e
preface: " I t is n on eth eless true that th e em pirical reality o f so-called
p rescriptive system s o n ly takes on its full m ean in g w hen related to a theoretical
m odel w orked out b y the natives themselves prior to e th n o lo g ists ” ,45 or again:
" T h o se w h o practise th em know fu lly that th e spirit of su ch system s cannot
be redu ced to the tautological prop osition that each grou p ob tain s its w om en
from 'g iv e r s ’ and gives its daughters to 'ta k e rs’. T h ey are also a w a re that
m arriage w ith th e m atrilateral cross co u sin (m oth er’s b roth er’s daughter)
p rovid es th e sim p lest illustration of th e rate, th e form m o st likely to guarantee
its su rv iv a l. O n the other h and , m arriage w ith the patrilateral cross cou sin
(father’s sister’s daughter) w ould violate it irrevocab ly .”46
T h e fallacies o f the rule 29
an th rop ology w h ich o b jectivism en gen d ers w h en , w ith the aid of w ords that
obscure the d istin ction b etw een " th e th in g s of logic and the logic o f th in g s!)
it p resen ts th e ob jective m ean in g o f p ractices or w orks as the subjective
p urpose o f th e action of the producers o f th ose practices or w orks, w ith \\^
im p ossib le homo economicus su b jectin g h is d ecisio n -m a k in g to ration*;
calcu lation, its actors p erform in g roles or actin g in co n fo rm ity w ith m odels
or its sp eak ers " s e le c tin g ” from a m on g p h on em es.
of m arriage as th e excep tion (or the " a b erra tio n ”) w h ich proves
|ile or to rearrange th e categories o f th ou gh t w h ich m ake it p ossib le in
^ " t o ’ find a place ( i.e . a nam e) for it? Or sh o u ld w e radically q u estion
°h c a te g o r ie s of th ou gh t w h ich have p ro d u ced this " u n th in k a b le”
legal are assu m ed to con trol b eh aviour in the sam e w ay as legal ru les?**
F in a lly , can w e m ake th e gen ealogical d efin ition of gro u p s th e o n ly means
o f d ifferen tiatin g b etw een social u n its and o f assign in g agen ts to th e se group 8
w ith o u t im p licitly p ostu la tin g that th e agen ts are d efined in every respect
and for all tim e by their b elo n g in g to the g rou p , and th a t, in sh o rt, die group
d efin es th e a g en ts and th eir in terests m ore th an th e agen ts d efine groups
in term s o f their interests?
It is not su fficien t to fo llo w the exam p le o f the m ore circu m sp ect fieldw orkers,
p ru dently slip from the n otion of preferential m arriage w ith a parallel
cousin to the n otion o f " lin eage en d ogam y ”, tru stin g that th is va g u e, h igh -
sounding lan guage w ill offer a w ay ou t o f th e problem s raised b y th e n otion
° f en d ogam y and con cealed b y the all-too-fam iliar co n cep t of th e group. It
first n ecessary to ask w hat is im plied in d efining a grou p by th e genealogical
relationship lin k in g its m em b ers, and in thereby im p licitly treatin g kinship
34 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
Marriage provides a good opportunity for observing what in practice separates official
kinship, single and im m utable, defined once and for all by the norm s o f genealogical
protocol, from practical kinship, w hose boundaries and definitions are as many and
as varied as its users and the occasions on w hich it is used. It is practical kin who
make marriages; it is official kin w ho celebrate them . In ordinary marriages the
contacts preceding the official proposal (akhiab) and the least avowable negotiations
relating to areas w hich the official ideology tends to ignore, such as the economic
conditions of the marriage, the status offered to the wife in her husband’s home,
relations with the husband’s m other, and similar m atters, are left to the persons least
qualified to represent the group and to speak for it (w ho can therefore be disowned
if need b e), such as an old w om an, usually a sort of professional in these secret
m eetings, a m idw ife, or som e other woman used to m oving from village to village.
In the difficult negotiations betw een distant groups a w ell-know n, prestigious man from
a group sufficiently distant and distinct from the "w ife-takers’ to appear neutral and
to be in a position to act in com plicity with another man occupying approximately
the sam e position in relation to the w ife-givers (a friend or ally rather than a kinsman)
w ill be entrusted w ith the delivery of the declaration of intent (assiw at w a w a l). He
will avoid com ing straight to the point, but w ill try to find an opportunity to meet
som eone from "the girl’s s id e ” and to disclose to him the " in ten tio n s” of the
interested fam ily. T h e official marriage proposal (akhtab) is presented by the least
responsible of those responsible, i.e. the elder brother and not the father, the paternal
uncle and not the grandfather, etc., accom panied, especially if he is young, by a
kinsman from another line. T h e m en w h o present the request may be, for example,
on the first occasion, an elder brother and a maternal uncle, then on the second
occasion a paternal uncle and one of the notables o f the group, then the third time
the sam e people accom panied by several group and village notables such as the taleb,
to be joined later by the village marabouts, and the fourth tim e the father together
with notables from the neighbouring village and even the next tribe, etc. So progressi
vely closer and more distinguished relatives of the bridegroom com e to present their
request ( ahallal) to m en in the bride’s family w h o genealogically and spatially are
increasingly distant. In the end it is the most im portant and m ost distant of the girl's
kin w ho com e to intercede w ith the girl’s father and mother on behalf of the closest
and m ost prestigious of the young m an’s kin, having been asked to do so by this latter
group. Finally, acceptance (aqbal) is proclaimed before the largest possible number
T h e functions o f k in sh ip : official km and practical kin 35
ved to the most em inent kinsman of the young man by the most
0f men and conv ^ kinsm en, w ho has been asked to support the proposal. As
eminent of t ^ an(j begin to look successful, official kin may w ell take the place
negotiations pr ^ hierarchy with respect to utility being alm ost the exact opposite
0f practica * reSpect to genealogical legitim acy. T here are various reasons
of the hierarL ^ ^ ^ advisable to " c o m m it” in the early stages kin w h o because of
for this, r i » social position m ight com prom ise their principals too dpeplv -
the^ gene2 ^ sjtuation of conjunctural inferiority, w hich is often associated w ith
particu^j s^perjorjty (because the man is marrying beneath h im ). Secondly, not
structur ^ asked to put him self in the position of a supplicant liable to receive
eVe?usa^ and a fortiori to take part in negotiations w hich w ill bring no glory, w hich
3 ^often*painful, and som etim es bring dishonour on the tw o parties (like the practice
thaj'alts which consists of paying m oney to secure the intervention of som e of the
° *soective bride’s kin). Finally, the search for maximum efficiency in the practical
hase of negotiations directs the choice towards persons know n to com m and great skill,
to enjoy particular authority over the fam ily in question, or to be on good term s with
someone in a position to influence the d ecision . And it is natural that, in the official
phase, those who have actually " m a d e” the marriage should have to make do with
the place assigned to them not by their usefulness but by their position in the
genealogy; having played their parts as "utility m e n ”, they m ust make way for the
"leading actors”.
T h u s, to schem atize, official kinship is op p osed to practical k insh ip in term s
of the official as op p osed to th e non-official (w h ich in clu d es the unofficial and
the scand alous); the co llectiv e as o p p o sed to th e in d ivid u al; th e p u b lic,
explicitly codified in a m agical or quasi-juridical form alism , as o p p o sed to the
private, kept in an im p licit, ev en h id d en state; co llectiv e ritual, su b jectless
practice, am enable to perform an ce b y agen ts interchangeable b ecau se co llec
tively m andated, as op p osed to strategy, directed tow ards the sa tisfa ctio n o f
the practical in terests o f an in d ivid u al or grou p of in d ivid u a ls. A bstract u nits
produced by sim p le theoretical d iv isio n , su ch as, here, th e u nilineal d escen t
group (or elsew h ere, age-group s) are available for all fu n ctio n s, that is, for
no sin gle on e in particular, and have practical ex isten ce o n ly for th e m ost
official uses of k in sh ip ; representational kinship is n o th in g other than the
group s self-rep resen tation and th e alm ost theatrical p resen tation it g iv e s of
itself w h en actin g in accord ance w ith that self-im age. B y con trast, practical
groups exist o n ly through and for th e particular fu n ctio n s in p ursuan ce of
v^hich they have b een effectively m ob ilized ; and th e y con tin u e to exist only
because th ey have b een kept in w ork in g order b y th eir very u se an d by
M aintenance w ork (in c lu d in g th e m atrim onial exch an ges th ey m ake p o ssib le)
and b ecause they rest on a co m m u n ity o f d isp o sitio n s (h a b itu s) and interests
u-hich is also th e b asis o f u n d ivid ed o w n ersh ip o f th e m aterial and sym b olic
patrim ony.
T o treat kin relation sh ip s as so m eth in g people make, and w ith w h ich they
do so m eth in g, is not m erely to su b stitu te a " fu n ction alist ” for a " stru cturalist ”
interpretation, as current ta xon om ies m ig h t lead on e to b eliev e; it is radically
3^ T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
T h e com petition and conflicts provoked by the transmission of first names provide
an opportunity to observe the practical and political functions of these genealogical
markers: to appropriate these indices of genealogical position (so-and-so, son of
so-and-so, son of so-and-so etc.) w hich are also emblems, sym bolizing the whole
sym bolic capital accum ulated by a lineage, is in a sense to take possession o f a title
giving special rights over the group’s patrimony. T h e state of the relations of force
and authority between contem porary kin determ ines what the collective history will
be; but this sym bolic projection of the power relations between com peting individuals
and groups also plays a part in reinforcing the initial state of affairs by giving those
w ho are in a dom inant position the right to profess the veneration of the past which
is best suited to legitim ate their present interests. T o give a new-born child the name
o f a great forefather is not sim ply to perform an act o f filial piety, but also in a sense
to predestine the child thus named to bring the eponym ous ancestor "back to life ”
( isakrad djedi-s "he has brought his grandfather 'back to life ’”), i.e. to succeed him
in his responsibilities and pow ers.70
Prestigious first nam es, like the noblest lands, are the object of regulated com peti
tion, and the " righ t” to appropriate the first name which is most coveted, because
it continuously proclaims the genealogical connection w ith the ancestor w hose name
is preserved by the group and outside the group, is distributed in accordance with
a hierarchy analogous to that governing the obligations of honour in the case of
revenge, or of the rights to land belonging to the patrimony in the case of sale. T h u s,
since first names are transmitted in direct patrilineal line, the father cannot give a child
the name of his own 'amm or his own brother (the ch ild ’s 'amm) if either of the latter
has left any sons w ho are already married and hence in a position to reuse their father’s
name for one of their son s or grandsons. Here as elsew here, the convenient language
of norms and obligations (m u st. . . c a n n o t. . .e tc .) m ust not be allowed to m islead us:
thus, a younger brother has been known to take advantage of a favourable balance
of power in order to give his children the first name of a prestigious brother who had
died leaving only very young children; the children subsequently set their point of
honour on retaking possession of the first name of which they considered them selves
the legitimate bearers - even at risk of confusion. T h e com petition is particularly
evident w hen several brothers wish to give their children their father’s first name:
whereas the need to rescue it from neglect and fill up the gap that has appeared requires
that the name should be given to the first boy born after the death of its bearer, the
T he functions o f kinship: official kin an d practical kin 37
may Put t^ie attribution of the name in order to give it to one of his
eldest |nSteacj 0f leaving it for the son of one of his younger brothers, thus
Sran - a genealogical level. But it may also happen, on the other hand, that for lack
^ male descendants, a name threatens to escheat, at which point the responsibility
° reviving” it falls first on the collaterals, and then on the group as a w hole, which
bv demonstrates that its integration and its wealth o f men enable it to reuse the
a m e s of all direct ancestors and, m oreover, to make good any gaps that may appear
elsewhere (one of the functions of marriage with the daughter of the 'amm w hen the
latter dies w ithout male heirs, being to allow the daughter to see to it that her father's
name does not disappear).
op posed to the network of b eaten tracks, of paths m ade ever m ore practicable
by con stant u se. T h e gen ealogical tree con stru cted b y th e an th rop ologist, a
spatial diagram that can be taken in at a gla n ce, uno intuitu, and scanned
indifferently from any p oint in any d irection , causes the co m p lete network
of kinship relations over several gen erations to exist as on ly theoretical objects
exist, that is, tota sim ul, as a totality p resen t in sim u lta n eity .71 Official
relationships w h ich d o not receive con tin u ou s m aintenance ten d to becom e
w hat th ey are for the gen ealogist: theoretical relationships, like abandoned
roads on an old m ap. In sh ort, the logical relations of kinship to w hich the
structuralist tradition ascribes a m ore or less com p lete au ton om y w ith respect
to econ om ic d eterm in ants, and correlatively a near-perfect internal co
herence, exist in practice on ly through and for the official and unofficial uses
m ade o f th em b y agents w hose attachm ent to keeping them in w orking order
and to m aking th em work in ten sively - h en ce, through constant u se, ever
m ore easily - rises w ith the degree to w h ich they actually or p otentially fulfil
fu n ction s in dispensab le to th em or, to put it less a m b ig u o u sly , the exten t to
w hich th ey do or can satisfy vital m aterial and sym bolic interests.72
O fficializing strategies
ivjjeged arena for th e d ia lec tic of th e official and th e u sefu l: in their efforts
^ draw th e g ro u p ’s d eleg a tio n upon th e m se lv e s and w ith d raw it from their
rivals, the ag en ts in co m p etitio n for p olitical p ow er are lim ited to ritual
s tr a te g ie s and strategic ritu als, p ro d u cts o f th e c o lle c tiv iz in g of private
in te r e sts and th e sy m b o lic ap propriation o f official in terests.
But th e stru g g le to m o n o p o liz e th e leg itim a te exercise o f v io le n c e - that is
to say, ^ e ab sen ce o f ec o n o m ic a cc u m u la tio n , th e stru g g le to a ccu m u late
sym bolic capital in th e form of c o llec tiv ely reco g n ized credit - m u st n ot lead
us to forget th e n ecessarily h id d en o p p o sitio n b etw een th e official and th e
unofficial. C o m p etitio n for official p ow er can be se t up o n ly b etw een m en ,
while the w o m e n m ay en ter in to com p etitio n for a p ow er wrh ich is b y d efin itio n
condem ned to rem ain unofficial or ev en cla n d estin e and o cc u lt. W e find in
fact in the p olitical sp h ere th e sam e d iv isio n o f lab ou r w h ich en tru sts relig io n
- p u b lic , official, so le m n , and co llec tiv e - to th e m en , and m agic - secret,
clandestine, and private - to th e w o m e n . In th is co m p e titio n th e m en have
the w hole official in stitu tio n o n their sid e , startin g w ith th e m vth ico-ritu al
representations and th e rep resen tation s o f k in sh ip w h ic h , b y red u cin g the
opposition b etw e en th e official and th e private to the o p p o sitio n b etw een the
outside and th e in sid e, h en ce th e m ale and th e fem a le, esta b lish a sy stem a tic
hierarchization c o n d e m n in g w o m e n ’s in te rv e n tio n s to a sh a m e fu l, secret, or,
at b est, unofficial ex iste n c e . Even w h en w o m e n d o w ield th e real p ow er, as
is often th e case in m atrim onial m atters, th e y can ex ercise it fu lly o n ly on
condition that th e y leave th e appearance o f powrer, that is, its official
m anifestation, to th e m e n ; to have any p ow er at all, w o m e n m ust m ake do
with th e unofficial p ow er o f th e eminence grise, a dom in ated p o w e r w h ich is
opposed to official p ow er in that it can op erate o n ly b y p ro x y , u n d er th e cover
of an official a u th o rity , as w ell as to th e su b v ersiv e refusal o f th e rule-breaker,
in that it still serves th e au th ority it u ses.
T h e true sta tu s o f kin relatio n sh ip s, p rin cip les of stru ctu ration of th e social
world w h ich , as su c h , alw ays fulfil a p olitical fu n ctio n , is m o st clearly seen
in the d ifferen t u ses wrh ich m en and w o m e n can m ake o f th e sam e field of
genealogical rela tio n sh ip s, and in particular in th eir d ifferen t " r ea d in g s” and
u s e s ” o f gen ea lo g ica lly am b ig u o u s k in sh ip ties (w h ich are relatively freq u en t
on accou n t of the narrow area of m atrim onial c h o ic e ).
In all cases o f genealogically am biguous relationship, one can always bring closer
the most distant relative, or m ove closer to him , by em phasizing what unites, w hile
one can hold the closest relative at a distance by em phasizing wrhat separates. What
ls at stake in these m anipulations, w hich it w ould be naive to consider fictitious on
the grounds that no one is taken in, is in all cases nothing other than the definition
of the practical lim its of the group, w hich can be redrawn by this m eans so as to go
beyond or fall short of an individual one w ants to annex or ex clu d e. An idea of these
subtleties m ay be got from considering the uses of the term khal (strictly, m other’s
42 T h e objective limits o f objectivism
Moussa A A,«aA
Koula (
Ahccne
± Ahmed
Ardjab
i
k.- Mohand A thm an
I
/
K hedoudja
“ Ahmed
Case i Case 2
F ig . i.
b roth er): used by a m arabout to a com m on, lay peasant, it expresses the desire to
distinguish oneself, w ithin the lim its of courtesy, by indicating the absence of any
legitim ate kin relationship; whereas between peasants, it m anifests the intention of
setting up a minimal relationship of familiarity by invoking a distant, hypothetical
affinal relationship.
It is the official reading that the an th rop ologist is accep tin g w h en , w ith his
in form an ts’ b lessin g , he assim ilates to parallel-cousin m arriage the relation
sh ip w h ich u nites, for exam p le, secon d -d egree patrilateral parallel cou sin s
w hen on e o f them is h im self th e ch ild o f a parallel-cousin m arriage, and a
fo rtio ri w h en b oth are ch ild ren of su ch m arriages (as in th e case o f an
exchan ge o f w o m en b etw een the son s of tw o b rothers). T h e m ale, that is to
say, the d om in an t reading, w h ich im p oses itself w ith particular in sisten ce in
all p u b lic, official situ a tio n s - in sh ort, in all honou r relation ship s in w hich
one m an of h onou r is sp eak in g to another - p rivileges th e n oblest asp ect,
the aspect m ost w o rth y o f p u b lic p roclam ation, of a m ulti-faceted relation ship ,
lin k ing each of th e in d ivid u als w h o are to be situated to his patrilineal
forebears and, th rou gh th e latter, to the patrilineal forebears th ey have in
co m m o n . It represses the other p ossib le pathw ay, alb eit so m etim es m ore
direct and often m ore co n v en ien t p ractically, w h ich w ou ld reckon through
the w om en . T h u s , gen ealogical prop riety requires on e to con sid er Z oubir as
having m arried in A ldja his fath er’s fath er’s b rother’s so n ’s d augh ter, or his
fath er’s b roth er’s d a u gh ter’s daughter, rather than h is m o th er’s b roth er’s
daughter, even if, as h app en s to be the case, th is latter relation ship lies at
the origin o f the m arriage (see fig. i, case i) ; or again, to cite another case
from the sam e g en ea lo g y , that K h ed oud ja sh ould b e seen as her husband
C ollective beliefs an d w hite lies 43
m arriage in native accoun ts and, co n seq u en tly , in eth nograph ic accoun ts, is
d u e to the fact that it is the m arriage m ost p erfectly co n sisten t w ith the
m yth ico-ritu al representation of th e sexual d iv isio n of labour, and m ore parti*
cularly o f th e fu n ction s assigned to the m en and the w o m en in inter-group
relations. F irst, it con stitu tes the m ost ab solute affirm ation of the refusal to
recogn ize the relation ship of affinity for w hat it is, i.e. w hen it does not appear
as a sim p le duplication of the relationship o f filiation: there is praise for the
result peculiar to a m arriage b etw een parallel co u sin s, the fact that the
resu lting ch ild ren (" th ose w h ose extraction is u n m ix ed , w h o se b lood is p u r e ”)
can be attached to th e sam e lineage through their father or their m oth er ("he
took his m aternal u n cles from the place w here he has his r o o ts’*- ichathel,
ikh aw el, or in A rabic, " h is m aternal u n cle is h is paternal u n c le ” - khalu
ram m u). O n the other hand w e know that the husband is free (in theory) to
repudiate his w ife, and that a w ife co m in g from ou tsid e is a virtual stranger
until sh e has p roduced a m ale d escen dan t and so m etim es even b eyon d that
tim e. W e know too the am bivalen ce of the relationship b etw een n ep h ew and
m aternal uncle ( khal): " h e w h o has no en em ies need on ly await his sister's
s o n ” (that is, the person w h o , in con tem p t o f h onou r, can alw ays claim his
m oth er’s in heritan ce p o rtio n ).
But the refusal to recogn ize the affinity relationship (" th e w om an neither
u n ites or se p a r a te s”, tham attuth u r th a zed d i ur theferreq) finds reinforcem ent,
if not a basis, in the m yth ical representation of w om an as the sou rce from
w hich im pu rity and d ishon ou r threaten to en ter the lin eage. N o th in g entirely
g ood can com e fom a w om an : sh e can bring n o th in g but evil or, at b est, the
lesser of tw o ev ils, her w ick ed n ess on ly b ein g com p en sated for by her weakness
(" G od knew what he w as creating in the d on k ey; he d id n ’t g ive him any
h o rn s”) . T h is lesser ev il, th is g o o d in evil, alw ays arises in w om en through
the corrective and p rotective action o f a m an. "S h am e is th e m a id e n ” - aVar
thaqchichth - the proverb says, and th e son -in -law is so m etim es called setter
la y u b " th e veil cast over sh a m e ” .76 It fo llo w s that a w om an is n ever w orth
m ore than the w orth o f the m en of her lin eage. It follow s too that the best,
or least bad, of w om en is the on e w h o is sp ru n g from the m en o f th e lineage,
the patrilateral parallel cou sin , the m ost m ascu lin e of w om en - th e extrem e
in stance o f w h ich , the im p ossib le figm en t of a patriarchal im agin ation , is
A th en e, born o f Z e u s’ head. "M arry the daughter o f you r 'amm; even if she
ch ew s y o u , sh e w o n ’t sw allow y o u .” T h e patrilateral parallel co u sin , a cu l
tivated, straightened w om an , is op posed to th e m atrilateral parallel cou sin ,
a natural, tw isted , m aleficen t, im pu re w om an , as the m ale-fem ale is op posed
to the fem ale-fem ale, i.e . in accordance w ith the stru cture (o f the ty p e
a :b : : b j : b 2) w h ich also organ izes the m y th ic space o f the h ouse and o f the
agrarian calen dar .77 M arriage to the father’s brother’s daughter is the m ost
C ollective beliefs an d w h ite lies 45
j 0 f ail m arriages, and the on e m ost likely to call d ow n b lessin gs on
roup- I 1 usec*t0 r^ e ° f the o p en in g rite of the m arriage season ,
nded, like the h o m o lo g o u s rite in the case of p lou gh in g, to exorcize the
threat contained in the co m in g togeth er of m ale and fem ale, fire and w ater,
kv and earth, plough sh are and furrow , in acts o f in evitab le sa crileg e .78
T h e projection of the categories of m yth ic th o u g h t on to kin relation ship s
duces op p osition s w h ich w ould rem ain relatively unreal if th e d ivision s
thev engender d id not corresp ond to a fun dam en tal d ivision in d om estic
politics: the interests of the m other, seek in g to reinforce her p osition in her
adoptive hom e by b rin gin g into the fam ily a w om an sp ru n g from her ow n
lineage, are ob jectively op p osed to the in terests of the father, wrh o, in arranging
his son ’s m arriage, as befits a m an, by an agreem en t w ith h is ow n kin, his
own brother, or som e other patrilineal kinsm an, rein forces the agnatic unit
and, thereby, his ow n p osition in the d om estic u n it.
strengthen the hold of a brother already dom inant (by age or prestige), by agreeing
to take his daughter (patrilateral parallel cousin).
( akham irgazen if akham izgaren). T h e pre-em inent position of this line is shown by
the fact that it has been able to take over the first nam es of the rem ote ancestors of
the family and that it includes A hcene, who represents the group in all major external
encounters, w hether conflict or cerem onies, and A hm ed, the "wise m a n ” who by his
mediation and counsel ensures the unity of the group. T h e girl’s father (Y oucef) js
totally excluded from power, not so m uch on account of the difference in age separating
him from his uncles (A hcene and A hm ed), since A h m ed ’s sons, although much
younger than he, are associated w ith the decisions, but above all because he has cut
him self off from com petition betw een m en, from all exceptional contributions, and
even to a certain extent from work on the land. (A n only son, and, moreover, "son
of the w id o w ”, coddled by a w hole set o f w om en (m other, aunts, etc.) as the only
hope of the lineage, kept away from the gam es and work of the other children in order
to go to school, he has kept in a marginal position all his life. After a period of army
service and then agricultural labour abroad, he takes advantage, now that he is back
in the village, of his favourable position as possessor of a large share of the patrimony
with only a few m ouths to feed, restricting him self to the work of overseeing,
gardening, and tending (m ills, gardens, and fig-driers) - those tasks w hich require the
least initiative and entail the few est responsibilities, in short, the least male of male
jobs.) T h ese are som e of the elem ents which m ust be taken into account in order to
understand the internal and external political function of the marriage betw een Belaid
- t h e last son of Amar, him self the son of A hm ed, the uncle of Y oucef - and Y ou cefs
daughter Yasmina, his classificatorv parallel cousin (father’s father’s brother’s son’s
daughter). T h is marriage, arranged by A hm ed and A hcene, the holders of p o w er-
as usual w ithout consulting Y oucef, and leaving his w ife to protest in vain against a
union bringing little profit - reinforces the position of the dom inant line, strengthening
its links w ith the line rich in land, w ithout in any way com prom ising its external
prestige, since the structure of dom estic power is never declared outwardly, and
because even its m ost im poverished mem ber nevertheless shares in the brilliance of
the lineage. T h u s the com plete truth about this marriage resides in its tw ofold truth.
T he official im age, that of a marriage betw een parallel cousins in a large family
anxious to demonstrate its unity by a marriage able to reinforce it at the sam e time
as displaying its adherence to the m ost sacred of the ancestral traditions, coexists
without contradiction, even am ong strangers to the group, w ho are always sufficiently
well inform ed never to be taken in by the representations they are given, with
knowledge of the objective truth about a union w hich sanctions the forced alliance
between tw o social units sufficiently attached to one another negatively, for better or
for w orse, i.e. genealogically, to be forced to unite their com plem entary riches.
Endless exam ples could be given of this sort of collective bad faith.
It is u nd erstan dab le that, faced w ith su ch accom plished p rod ucts o f the
art of m asking con strain ts and in terests u nd er exp ressio n s capable o f sidetrack
ing sp on tan eou s h erm en eu tics tow ards the less real but m ore presentable
m otives o f m orality and d u ty , the collectiv e ju d gem en t should h esitate. But
there is n o case in w hich th e ob jective m ean in g o f a m arriage is so strongly
marked as to leave n o room for sy m b o lic transfiguration. T h u s th e marriage
of the so-called mechrut, by w h ich a m an w h o has no male d escen d an ts gives
his d augh ter in m arriage to an " h e ir ” (aw rith ) on con d ition that he com es
to live in his fath er-in -law ’s h ou se, is en cou n tered on ly in tales or anthropology'
books in the form o f th e sort of purchase of a son -in -law , recruited for his
Collective beliefs a n d w h ite lies
er§ 0f p rod uction and reprodu ction , that m echan ical application o f the
Official p r in c ip le K abyle w orld -view w ould lead u s to see in i t .84 T h e
° n f o r m a n t s w ho m en tion it, in w hatever region , are right in saying that this
But the genealogies also contain cases about w hich it is hard to understand how
they can benefit from similar com plicity. For exam ple, in the history of one prestigious
lineage one finds a series of acquisitions of sons-in-law who are neither seen as nor
declared mechrut, although their annexation was im posed not by necessity, but as part
of a quasi-systematic effort to increase the capital o f m en, a fact w hich one m ight expect
to double the sense of scandal. In one such case, the fact that the " ill-gotten ” son-in-law
was a marabout no doubt lent credibility to the status of "adopted son ” which he was
supposed to have received, although he had put him self in the position of an awrith
by coming to live with his w ife’s family (a sign that the latter were in a stronger
position) after spending a few m onths with his own fam ily (w hich he was made to
do for the sake of appearances). N evertheless, various subterfuges were resorted to
in order to get over the problem of his presence in the h o u se : he was given the job
of miller, which made it possible to keep him at a distance; as is customary in such
c^ses, his food was brought to him at the m ill. T h en the heads o f the lineage discreetly
suggested that he should take outside work, an ingenious solution w hich kept the profits
of his labour w hile rem oving the em barrassing situation created by his presence in
ls l i f e ’s fam ily. After the death of her husband, the woman remarried and had a
son, whom she took back into her ow n lineage w hen her second husband died; this
son was not regarded as an aw ritn, either, w hen his maternal uncles married him to
j*n orphan under their protection, so as to bind him to her. T h e reason was that in
nnging up their quasi-son as "their ow n s o n ” (though he still calls them khal and
not dadda, and is called A hm ed u A gouni, after his father’s village) and marrying him
o one of their quasi-daughters, they had given sufficient proof of their adherence to
e official image of the aw rith as " h eir ” and "adopted s o n ” to im pose a collective
52 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
recognition of it. T h is is how the second-order strategies - w hich all tend to transform
useful relationships into official ones and hence to ensure that practices which in fact
obey altogether different principles appear to be deduced fom the genealogical
definition - achieve in addition an unexpected result, in giving a representation of
practice seem ingly designed to confirm the representation the structuralist anthro
pologist has of practice.
Thus, the tale, a sem i-ritualized didactic narrative, a sim ple paraphrase in parabolic
form of the proverb or saying w hich serves as its moral, only ever relates marked,
marking marriages. First, there are the different types of parallel-cousin marriage,
whether intended to preserve a political heritage or to prevent the extinction of a
lineage (in the case of an only daughter). T h en there are the most flagrant misalliances,
like the marriage of the tawny ow l and the eagle’s daughter - a pure m odel of upward
marriage (upward socially, but also m ythically, up being opposed to dow n as day,
light, happiness, purity, honour are opposed to night, darkness, m isfortune, im purity,
and dishonour) between a man at the bottom of the social ladder, an aw rith and a
woman of a fam ily of higher rank, in w hich the traditional relationship o f assistance
is inverted by the discrepancy betw een the partner’s positions in the social and sexual
hierarchies. It is the one w ho g iv es, in this case the higher, w ho must g o to the aid
of the one who has taken his son-in-law, the tawny ow l, on his back, to spare him
a humiliating defeat in com petition with the young eagles - a scandalous situation
denounced in the proverb " giving him your daughter and corn to o ’*.
Contrary to th ese official represen tation s, observation and sta tistics estab
lish that, in all the groups ob served , the m ajority of the m arriages b elo n g to
the class of ordinary m arriages, generally arranged by th e w o m e n , w ithin the
area of the practical k insh ip or practical relation ship s w hich m ake them
possible and w hich they help to stren g th en .85 T h e m arriages contracted w ithin
this area, b etw een fam ilies u n ited by frequ en t and ancient ex ch an ges along
age-old b eaten paths con tin u o u sly kept op en for gen eration after gen era tio n ,
are those about w hich n o th in g is said, as w ith everyth in g wfhich can be taken
for granted because it has ahvays been as it is - th ose w hich have no other
function, apart from b iological rep rod u ction , than the reprodu ction of those
social relationships w hich m ake them p o ssib le .86 T h e se m arriages, w hich are
generally celebrated w ith o u t cerem on y, stand in the sam e relation ship to
extra-ordinary m arriages, wTh ich are con clu d ed b y the m en b etw een different
villages or tribes, or m ore sim p ly , ou tsid e practical k insh ip , and for th is
reason alw ays sealed by solem n cerem on ies, as th e exchan ges o f everyday
life, th e little presen ts (thuntichin) exchan ged by w om en to " b in d them in
friendship ”, stand to th e extra-ordinary exchan ges on special o ccasion s, the
solemn gifts solem n ly p roclaim ed (Ikhir) w h ich are exp ected b etw een official
kin .87
Extra-ordinary m arriages ex clu d e the w om en , as d o es parallel-cousin mar-
nag e, wrhich differs in th is respect - alone 88 - from ordinary m arriages, w hich
54 T he objective lim its o f objectivism
abundant meat (on the hoof) - w hich the senders know will not all be eaten - honev
(twenty litres) and butter (tw enty litres). T h e case was mentioned of a marriage in
which the girl’s family was taken a calf and five live and one slaughtered sheep. The
delegation of iqafafen consisted, it is true, of forty rifle-bearing m en, together with
all the kinsmen and notables exem pted by their age from shooting - fifty men in all.
T h e bride’s trousseau w hich may in such cases consist of up to thirty item s, is
matched by a similar number of item s given to the various other w om en of the family.
And if one often hears it said that betw een great fam ilies there are no chrut (conditions
laid dow n by the father for his daughter before he grants her hand), it is because the
status of the fam ilies is in itself a guarantee that the "con d ition s” explicitly stated
elsewhere will here be surpassed. Although the value of the bridewealth is always
subject to strict social supervision, exceptional marriages may ignore the lim its tacitly
set by the group. T he proof may be seen in phrases nowadays used as challenges:
" Who do you think you are? T h e woman of fourteen [am arba'tach] ? ” - an allusion
to the fourteen reals paid for the most expensively bought w ife w ho became the
mistress of the house of the family which was richest and the most endow ed with men.
For w om en married around 1900-1910, the same expression speaks of a payment of
forty duros, w hich, according to the popular notion of equivalence ("W e got her for
’the equivalent of two pairs of oxen*”, elhaq nasnath natsazwijin) , must have
corresponded to the price paid for two pairs of oxen; just before the Second World
War, a typical bridewealth was worth around tw o thousand old francs (£20). A
prestigious marriage celebrated with great cerem ony in 1936, to w hich virtually all the
m en of the tribe were invited (together with a troupe of tbal who performed for three
days and nights) cost the organizer in addition to all his liquid assets, the value of
one of his best pieces of land (four days’ ploughing for one m an). T o feed his guests
he had to slaughter tw o oxen, a calf, and six sheep.
In fact the econom ic cost is probably insignificant in comparison with the symbolic
cost of imensi. T h e ritual of the cerem ony of presenting the bridewealth is the
occasion for a total confrontation betw een the tw o groups, in w hich the econom ic stakes
are no more than an index and pretext. T o dem and a large paym ent for one’s
daughter, or to pay a large sum to marry off one’s son, is in either case to assert one’s
prestige, and thereby to acquire prestige: each side intends to prove its own "worth ”,
either by show ing what price men of honour, w ho know how to appreciate it, set on
alliance w ith them , or by making a brilliant dem onstration of their estim ation of their
ow n value through the price they are prepared to pay in order to have partners worthy
of them . By a sort of inverted haggling, disguised under the appearance of ordinary
bargaining, the two groups tacitly agree to step up the amount of the payment by
successive bids, because they have a com m on interest in raising this indisputable index
of the sym bolic value of their products on the matrimonial exchange market. And no
feat is more highly praised than the prowess of the bride’s father w ho, after vigorous
bargaining has been concluded, solem nly returns a large share of the sum received.
T h e greater the proportion returned, the greater the honour accruing from it, as it-
in crow ning the transaction w ith an act of generosity, the intention was to make an
exchange of honour out of bargaining which could be so overtly keen only because
the pursuit of maximum material profit was masked under the contests of honour and
the pursuit of maxim um sym bolic profit.91
T h e m ost distant m arriages are p erfectly u nequ ivocal sin ce, at least until
recent tim es, it w as im possible to marry at a d istance for negative reasons, for
lack of anyone to marry near at hand. L ik e all close m arriages, p a rallel-co u sin
m arriage, the on ly type o f ordinary m arriage to b e p ositively and officially
T h e ordin ary and the extra-ordin ary 57
marked, often occurs in the poorest lin eages or the poorest lin es o f the
dominant lineages (th e clien ts), w h o , in resorting to th is, th e m ost econom ical
type of u nion, release the group in the m ost satisfactory wray (if only by
avoiding m isalliances) from the obligation to marry off tw o of its particularly
disadvantaged m em bers. B ut at the sam e tim e, because it alw ays has the
objective effect of rein forcin g the integration of th e m inim al unit and,
consequently, its d istin ctiven ess vis-a-vis other u n its, it is likely to b e th e tactic
of groups characterized by a strong desire to assert their distinction. T h u s its
am biguity p redisposes it to play the role of th e poor m an ’s p restige m arriage:
it offers an elegant w ay ou t for all those w h o, like the ruined n oblem an unable
to indicate other than sym b olically his refusal to derogate, seek in the
affectation o f rigour the m eans o f affirm ing their d istin ctio n , su ch as a lineage
cut off from its original group and an xious to m aintain its originality, a fam ily
aiming to affirm th e d istin ctive features of its lineage b y g o in g on e better in
purism (alm ost alw ays the case w ith on e fam ily in a m arabout co m m u n ity ),
a clan seeking to mark its d istin ction from the o p p o sin g clan b y stricter
observance of the traditions (like th e A it \la d h i at Ait H ich em ), and so on.
Because it can appear as the m ost sacred and, under certain co n d ition s, the
most " d istingu ish ed ” m arriage, it is the ch eap est form of extra-ordinary
marriage, obviating exp en d itu re on the cerem on y, hazardous negotiations,
and a costly b ridew ealth. A nd thu s there is no m ore accom plished w ay of
making a virtue of n ecessity and of p u ttin g o n eself in lin e w ith the rule.
H ow ever, any particular marriage is m ean ingfu l o n ly in relation to the
totality of sim u ltan eou sly p ossib le m arriages (or, m ore con cretely, in relation
to the range o f potential p artners); in other w ords, it is situated som ew h ere
on a con tinu um ru n nin g from parallel-cousin m arriage to m arriage b etw een
members of different trib es, the m ost risky b ut m ost p restigious ty p e, and
is therefore necessarily characterized from both stan d p oin ts, by the extent
to which it rein forces integration and by th e exten t to w h ich it exp an ds
alliances. T h ese tw o typ es o f m arriage represent the p oints of m axim um
intensity of the tw o valu es w hich all m arriages seek to m axim ize: on the one
hand the integration of the m inim al unit and its secu rity, on th e other hand
alliance and prestige, that is, op en in g up to th e ou tsid e w orld, tow ards
strangers. T h e ch oice b etw een fission and fusion, the in sid e and the ou tside,
security and adventure, is posed anew w ith each m arriage. If it en su res the
Maximum of integration for the m inim al group, parallel-cousin m arriage
duplicates the relation ship o f filiation w ith a relationship of alliance, sq uan
dering by th is redundancy the op p ortu n ity of creating new alliances w hich
n^arriage represents. D istant m arriage, on the other hand, sccu res p restigious
aHiances at the cost of lineage integration and the bond b etw een brothers,
* e foun dation of the agnatic u n it. N ative discou rse repeats th is o b sessively.
3 BO T
58 T he objective lim its o f objectivism
T h e centripetal thrust - exaltation of the in tern al, of secu rity , autarky, the
ex cellen ce o f th e b lo o d , agnate solidarity - alw ays calls forth, if o n ly to oppose
it, the centrifugal thrust, exaltation of th e p restigiou s alliance. T h e categorical
im perative alw ays m asks calcu lation of the m axim u m and the m in im u m , the
search for th e m axim u m of alliance com p atib le w ith the m ainten an ce or
rein forcem ent o f in tegration b etw een brothers. T h is can be seen from the
in form an ts’ syn tax, w h ich is alw ays that of preference: " I t is b etter to protect
your p oint o f honou r [nif\ than reveal it to o th e r s.” " I d o n ’t sacrifice adhrum
[th e lineage] to aghrum [ w h e a t c a k e ] " T h e in sid e is b etter than the o u tsid e .’1
"F irst m ad n ess [daring, risky ste p ]: to g iv e the daughter of 'amm to other
m en . S econ d m adness to g o p en n iless to m arket. T h ird m ad n ess: to vie with
the lions on th e m oun tain to p s .” T h is last sayin g is the m ost significant,
because u n d er the gu ise o f ab solute con d em n a tio n of d istant m arriage, it
expressly recogn izes the logic in w h ich it b elon gs, that o f th e ex p lo it, prow ess,
prestige. It takes great p restige and w ild audacity to go to m arket w ithout
any m oney in ten d in g to b u y th in g s, just as it takes en orm ou s cou rage to take
on lion s, th e cou rageous strangers from w h om the foun ders of the villages
had to w in back their w iv es, accord in g to m any leg en d s o f origin.
If one insists on seein g thinnzi as a corvee (the better, for exam ple, to force reality
into the framework of a realist, reified definition of m odes of production) one must
at least take into account the fact that this corvee is disguised under the appearance
of mutual aid. In fact th iw izi mainly profits the richer farmers and also the taleb (whose
land is ploughed and sow n co llectiv ely ): the poor have no need o f assistance with the
harvest; but th iw izi may also benefit the poor man in the case of the building of a
house (the transporting o f stones and beam s). Ostracism is a terrible sanction which
is not only sym bolic: ow in g to the lim ited technical resources, m any activities would
be im possible w ithout the help of the group (e .g . the building of a house, with the
transporting of stones, or the transporting of m ill-w heels, which used to m obilize forty
men in non-stop shifts for several days). M oreover, in this econom y of insecurity, a
capital of services rendered and gifts bestowed is the best and indeed the only
safeguard against the "thousand con tin gen cies’*on w hich, as Marx observes, depends
the maintenance or loss of working conditions, from the accident which causes the
loss of an animal to the bad weather w hich destroys the crops.
ped agogic action) p rod uces a h om ogen ization of d isp o sitio n s and in terests
w h ich , far from exclu d in g com p etition , m ay in so m e cases en g en d er it by
in clin in g th ose w h o are the product of th e sam e co n d itio n s of production to
recogn ize and pursue the sam e g o o d s, w h ose rarity m ay arise en tirely from
this co m p etition . T h e d om estic u n it, a m o n o p o listic grou p ing defined, as
W eber said, b y the exclu sive appropriation o f a determ in ate type o f goods
(land , nam es, e tc .) is the locus o f a co m p etitio n for th is capital, or rather,
for con trol over th is capital, w hich co n tin u o u sly threatens to d estroy the
capital b y d estroyin g th e fundam ental con d ition of its p erp etu ation .
T h e relationship b etw een brothers, k eystone o f the fam ily structure, is also
its w eakest p oint, w hich a w h ole series o f m echan ism s are d esign ed to
su pp ort and stren gth en ,100 startin g w ith parallel-cousin m arriage, the ideolo
gical resolu tion, som etim es realized in practice, o f the specific contradiction
o f this mode o f reproduction. If p arallel-cou sin marriage is a m atter for m e n ,101
con sisten t w ith the m en ’s in terests, that is, the h igher interests of th e lineage,
o ften arranged w ith o u t the w om en b ein g in form ed , and against their w ill (w hen
th e tw o b rothers’ w iv es are on bad term s, on e not w anting to a d m it the other’s
d augh ter to her h ou se and th e other n o t w ish in g to place her daughter under
her sister-in -law ’s au th ority), the reason is that it is in tend ed to counteract,
p ractically, d ivision b etw een the m en . T h is is taken so m uch for granted that
th e father’s ritual advice to h is son (" D o n ’t listen to your w iv es, stay united
am ongst y o u r se lv e s!”) is naturally taken to m ean "M arry you r ch ild ren to
o n e a n oth er.”
E verything takes places as if th is social form ation had had to grant itself
officially a p ossib ility rejected as in cestu o u s by m ost so cieties, in order to
resolve id eologically the ten sion w h ich is at its very centre. P erhaps the
exaltation of m arriage w ith the ben'amm (parallel cou sin ) w ould have been
better u nd erstood if it had been realized that ben amm has co m e to designate
th e en em y , or at least, the in tim ate en em y , and that en m ity is called
thaben'ammts "that of th e ch ildren of the paternal u n c le ”. In fact, the forces
o f ideological coh esion are em b od ied in the elder, djedd, w h ose authority based
o n the pow er to d isin h erit, on the threat of m aled iction , and above all on
adherence to the values sym b olized b y th adjadith, can secu re equilibrium
b etw een th e b rothers o n ly by m aintain in g th e strictest eq u ality b etw een them
(and their w iv es) both in w ork (th e w o m e n , for exam p le, taking turns to do
th e h ousew ork, prepare the m eals, carry w ater, etc .) and in co n su m p tio n . It
is no accid en t that crisis so often coin cid es w ith the disappearance of this
p ositive coh esive factor, arising w h e n the father d ies leaving adult so n s n on e
o f w h om w ield s a clear estab lish ed au th ority (b y virtue o f th e age gap or any
o ther p rin c ip le ). But the extrem ely variable relative strength of the te n d e n c ie s
to fu sion or fission d ep en d s fu n d am en tally, at th e level o f the d o m estic u n it
M atrim on ial strategies and social reproduction 65
m uch as at th e level o f larger u n its like the clan or th e trib e, on the
elationship b etw een the grou p and the external u n its: in secu rity provides a
negative principle of coh esio n capable of m aking up for the d eficien cy of
o sitive p rin cip les.102" I hate m y brother, but I hate the m an w h o hates h im .”
T h e n eg a tiv e, fo r c e d solid arity created by a shared vu ln era b ility , w hich is
reinforced every tim e th ere is a threat to the jointly ow ned m aterial and
svm b olic p atrim ony, rests o n the sam e prin cip le as the d ivisive ten d e n c y w hich
it tem p ora rily thw arts, that o f th e rivalry b etw een agnates. S o , from the
u n d ivid ed fam ily up to th e largest political units., the co h esio n en d lessly
exalted b y the m yth ological and genealogical ideology lasts no lon ger than the
pow er r ela tio n s capable o f h o ld in g in dividu al in terests togeth er.
H a v in g restated the p rin cip les w hich define the system s of in terests of the
different ca te g o r ie s of a g en ts in the d om estic pow er relations w h ich result in
the d efin itio n o f a co llectiv e m atrim onial strategy, if w e now p o sit that the
more th e w orking o f th e sy stem serves the a gen ts’ in terests, the m ore they are
inclined to serve the w orking of the system , w e are able to u nd erstan d the
fundam ental p rin cip les o f th e strategies w h ich are con fron ted on the occasion
of a m a rr ia g e.103 T h o u g h it is true that marriage is on e of th e principal
o p p ortu n ities to con serve, in crease, or (b y m isalliance) d im in ish the capital
of au th ority conferred b y stron g integration and th e cap ital of p restige
stem m in g from an ex ten siv e netw ork o f affines ( nesba), the fact rem ains that
the m em b ers of the d o m estic u nit w h o take part in arranging th e marriage
do not all id e n tify their o w n interests to the sam e degree w ith th e collective
interest o f the lineage.
As the products of elaborate strategies, of which more is expected than sim ple
biological reproduction, i.e. external or internal alliances intended to reproduce the
domestic and political power relations, marriages are a sort of short-term and long-term
investment in, am ong other th in gs, the quality of the "maternal u n cles” they procure.
It is understandable that they cannot be lightly dissolved, the most long-standing and
prestigious relationships naturally being best protected against an ill-considered break.
If repudiation becom es inevitable, then all sorts of subterfuges are resorted to so as
to prevent the total loss of the capital of alliances. T h e husband’s relatives may go and
heg the w ife’s relatives to give her back, attributing the divorce to the youth,
recklessness, thoughtless ch oice of w ords, and irresponsibility of a husband too young
to appreciate the value of alliances; it is pointed out that he did not pronounce the
ormula three tim es, but only once, im petuously, and without w itnesses. T h e divorce
ecomes a case of thutchha (the wife w ho lost her temper and w ent home to her
relatives); there may even be th e offer of a new w edding (w ith imensiand a trousseau).
the repudiation proves to be final, there are several ways of "separating” : the
greater the importance and solem nity of the marriage, the more one has " in v ested ”
*n, *he more one has therefore an interest in preserving relations w ith those from
Whorn one is separating (either out of kinship or neighbourhood solidarity, or out
tK Se^ ‘*nterested calculation), and the greater the discretion of the break; return of
e bridewealth is not dem anded im m ediately, nor is the return refused (" free”
66 T h e objective lim its o f objectivism
repudiation - battal - being a grave in su lt); it m ay not even be expected until the
woman remarries; not too m uch attention is paid to the precise am ount, and witnesses
especially outsiders, are kept away from the divorce settlem ent.
0ver each in ten d ed m arriage. T h e lin ea g e’s in terest, i.e . the m ale in terest,
requires that a m an sh o u ld n ot b e placed in a su b ord in ate p o sitio n in th e fam ily
bv b e in g m arried to a girl of m arkedly h igh er statu s (a m an, they say, can
raise a w om an , b u t n ot th e o p p o site; y o u give - a d augh ter - to a su perior
or an e q u a l, yo u take - a d au gh ter - from an in ferior). It has m ore chance
of assertin g itself if th e m an w h o has th e resp o n sib ility (at least th e official
responsibility) for th e m arriage has not h im self b een m arried ab ove h is sta tu s.
In fact, a w h o le set o f m ech an ism s, in clu d in g th e b rid ew ealth and th e
w ed d in g exp en ses, w h ich rise in p rop ortion to the p restige o f th e m arriage,
tend to exclu d e alliances b etw een grou p s too u nequ ally m atched in term s of
econ om ic and sy m b o lic capital (th e freq u en t cases in w h ich the fam ily o f on e
sp ou se is rich in on e form o f capital - e .g . in m en - w hereas th e other
p o ssesses rather th e other form of w ealth - e .g . land - are n o ex c ep tio n s to
this): " M en ally w ith their e q u a ls” , th e sa y in g g o es ( " tsnassaben (naseb)
medden widh m'adhalen”).
In short, th e stru cture o f ob jective relation s b etw een th e kin w h o m ake th e
matrimonial d ecisio n , as m an or w om an or as m em ber o f th is or that lin eage,
helps to d efine th e stru ctu re o f relation sh ip s b etw een th e lin eages u n ited by
the proposed m arriage .106 In fact it w ou ld be m ore accurate to say that the
determ inant relation ship , b etw een th e lin eage o f th e person to b e m arried and
the lineage offerin g a p ossib le partner, is alw ays m ed iated by th e d o m estic
power structure. In d eed , in o rd er to d e scr ib e co m p letely th e m u lti-d im en sio n a l
and m u lti-fu n ction al relation ship (irred u cib le to k insh ip ties) b etw een th e tw o
groups, it is n ot sufficient to take in to accou n t o n ly th e spatial, eco n o m ic,
and social d ista n ce b etw een th em at th e m om en t of m arriage in term s of
econom ic and sy m b o lic capital (m easured b y th e n u m b er of m en and o f m en
of honour, b y th e d egree of in tegration of th e fa m ily , e t c .) . W e m u st also
take into con sid eration th e state, at that particular tim e, o f th e b alan ce-sh eet
of their m aterial and sy m b o lic ex ch an ges, i.e . th e w h o le h istory of th e official,
extra-ordinary ex ch an ges su ch as m arriages b rou ght ab out or at least co n se
crated b y the m en , and also th e u nofficial, ordinary exch a n g es con tin u ou sly
carried o n b y th e w o m en w ith th e co m p lic ity o f th e m en and som etim es
w ithout th eir k n o w led g e, a m ed iation through w h ich th e o b jectiv e relations
predisposing tw o grou p s to com e tog eth er are prepared for and realized.
Whereas econom ic capital is relatively stable, sym bolic capital is relatively pre
v i o u s : the death of a prestigious head of the fam ily is som etim es enough to dim inish
severely. Fluctuations in the group’s sym bolic fortunes are follow ed by
corresponding changes in the w hole im age of itself w hich the group aim s to present,
afld in the objectives - alliance or integration - w hich it sets for its marriages. T h u s
the space of tw o generations, a great fam ily, w hose econom ic situation was in fact
^•proving, declined from male marriages - marriages w ithin the close kin or extra-
urt»nary marriages (arranged by m en, outside the usual area, for purposes of alliance)
68 T he objective limits o f objectivism
- to ordinary marriages, generally set up by the w om en, w ithin their own network
of relationships. T h is change in m atrimonial policy coincided w ith the deaths of the
two eldest brothers (H ocine and L aid ), the long absence of the oldest men (w ho had
gone to France), and the weakening of the authority o f thamgarth, who had become
blind, with real power passing into the hands of Boudjemaa and, intermittently,
A thm an. Because it is not clear w ho is to succeed thamgarth, the wom an who imposes
order and silence ( ta'a n thamgarth, da susm i"obedience to the old wom an is silen ce’ )
the structure of relations betw een the wives reflects the structure of relations between
the husbands, leaving vacant the position of m istress of the house; in such c ir c u it
stances, marriages tend to go tow ards the w om en’s respective lin eages.107
T h is is only one aspect of the dyssvm m etry betw een the situation of the man and
the woman before marriage: " T h e m an ”, runs the saying, "is always a man, whatever
his state [unlike the wom an, w ho can disqualify herself, and cast herself into shame,
<dr]; it is up to him to ch o o se.” H aving the strategic initiative, he can afford to wait:
he is sure to find a w ife, even if h e has to pay the price of his delay by marrying a
woman w ho has already been m arried, or is of lower social status, or has some
disability. T h e girl being the one traditionally "asked fo r ” and " g iv e n ” in marriage,
it w ould be the height of absurdity for a father to solicit a husband for his daughter.
A nother difference is that "the man can wait for the woman [to be of age] but the
woman cannot wait for the m a n ”: the father with daughters to marrv can play with
tim e so as to prolong the conjunctural advantage he derives from his position as the
receiver of offers, but only up to a certain point, or he will see his products d e v a l u e d
because they are thought to be unsaleable, or sim ply because they are past their prime.
One of the most im portant constraints on matrimonial strategies is the urgency ot
marriage, w hich obviously weakens the agents’ position. A m ong the reasons for
hurrying the marriage, there m ay be the great age of the parents, w ho hope to see
their son married and to have a daughter-in-law to look after them , or the fear of seeing
a girl they had counted on g ettin g being given to som eone else (to avoid this
happening, the parents "present a slip p er”, thus "m arking” the girl at a very early
age, and som etim es even have the fatxha recited). An only son is also married young*
so that he can continue the lineage as quickly as possible. T h e sym bolic profit
accruing from remarrying after a divorce before the ex-spouse does so often leads both
M a tiim o n ia l strategies an d social reproduction 69
seS to arrange hasty marriages (such marriages are unlikely to remain stable, which
plains why som e men seem " con d em n ed ” to marry many tim es). But there is great
avssymmetry on this point too: a man, divorced or w idow ed, is expected to remarry,
'hereas a divorced wom an is devalued by the failure of her marriage, and a w idow ,
even a very young on e, is excluded from the m atrimonial market by her status as a
pother expected to bring up her husband’s ch ild , especially if it is a boy ("a woman
c a n n o t remain - a w idow - for the sake of another woman ” is the saying applied to
a w id o w w ho, only having daughters, is encouraged to remarry, whereas a mother
0f 50ns is praised for her sacrifice, which is all the more meritorious if she is young
a n d thus liable to have to live as an outsider am ong her husband’s sisters and her
h u s b a n d ’s brothers’ w ives). But her situation varies further depending on whether she
h a s "left” her children with her deceased husband’s fam ily or gone back to her own
family with her children (in which case she is less free and hence harder to marry
o f f ) - A n interesting option arises: she may either be taken to w ife by som eone in her
h u s b a n d ’s fam ily (the official practice, particularly recom m ended if she has sons) or
be found a new husband by her father’s fam ily (w hich happens more often w hen she
is childless) or by her husband's fam ily. It is difficult to establish the universe of
v a r ia b le s (doubtless including local traditions) determ ining the " ch o ice” of one or
the other of these strategies.
T h e stru ctu res con stitu tiv e o f a particular typ e o f en v iro n m en t (e.g . the
m aterial co n d itio n s of ex isten ce characteristic of a class co n d itio n ) produce
habitus, sy stem s o f d urable, transposable dispositions/ stru ctured structures
p red isp osed to fu n ctio n as stru cturin g stru ctu res, that is, as p rin cip les o f the
generation an d stru ctu rin g o f practices and represen tation s w h ich can be
ob jectively " re g u la ted ” &nd " regu lar” w ith ou t in any w ay b ein g th e product
o f o b ed ien ce to ru les, o b jectiv ely adapted to th eir g o a ls w ith o u t presupposing
a co n scio u s a im in g at en d s or an exp ress m astery of th e op eration s necessary
to attain th e m and, b ein g all th is, co llectiv ely orchestrated w ith o u t being the
product of th e orchestratin g action o f a con d u ctor.
E ven w h e n th ey appear as the realization of the ex p lic it, an d explicitly
stated, p u rp oses of a project or p lan, th e p ractices p rod u ced b y the habitus,
as the strategy-gen eratin g p rin cip le en ab lin g agen ts to cop e w ith unforeseen
and ev er-ch an g in g situ ation s, are on ly apparently d eterm in ed b y th e future.
If th ey se e m d eterm in ed b y an ticip ation of their ow n co n seq u en ces, thereby
en cou raging the finalist illu sio n , th e fact is that, alw ays ten d in g to reproduce
th e o b jective structures of w h ich th ey are th e p ro d u ct, they are determined
b y the past co n d itio n s w h ich have p rod uced the p rin cip le of th eir prod uction ,
[ 72 1
A fa lse dilem m a: mechanism an d finalism 73
It is, o f cou rse, never ruled ou t that the resp onses o f the h abitus m ay be
accom pan ied b y a strategic calculation ten d in g to carry on quasi-consciously
th e operation th e habitus carries on in a q u ite d ifferen t w ay, nam ely an
estim ation o f ch an ces w h ich assu m es the transform ation o f the past effect into
the exp ected o b jectiv e. But the fact rem ains that these resp on ses are defined
first in relation to a system o f ob jective p oten tialities, im m ed iately inscribed
in the presen t, th in g s to d o or not to d o , to say or not to say, in relation to
a forthcom ing reality w hich - in contrast to th e future co n ceiv ed as " absolute
p o ssib ility ” ( absolute M oglich keit), in H e g e l’s sen se, projected by the pure
project o f a " n egative fr e e d o m ” - p u ts itself forw ard w ith an u rg en cy and a
claim to ex isten ce exclu d in g all d elib eration . T o elim in a te the n eed to resort
to ‘'r u le s” , it w o u ld b e necessary to estab lish in each case a com plete
d escrip tion (w h ich invocation o f rules allow s one to d isp en se w ith ) of the
relation b etw een th e h abitus, as a socially con stitu ted sy stem of co g n itiv e and
m otivatin g stru ctu res, and th e socially stru ctured situ a tio n in w h ich the
a g en ts’ interests are d efin ed , and w ith th em the o b jective fu n ctio n s and
su bjective m otivation s o f their p ractices. It w ould th en b ecom e clear that,
as W eber in d ica ted , the juridical or custom ary rule is never m ore than a
secondary p rin cip le o f the d eterm in ation of p ractices, in terv en in g w hen the
prim ary p rin cip le, in terest, fa ils .19
S y m b o lic - that is, conventional and conditional - stim u la tio n s, w h ich act
on ly on co n d itio n th ey en cou n ter agen ts co n d ition ed to perceive th em , tend
to im pose th e m se lv e s u n con d ition ally and n ecessarily w h en in cu lcation of the
arbitrary a b olish es the arbitrariness of b oth the in cu lcation and th e sign ifica
tio n s in cu lca ted . T h e w orld of u rgen cies and of goals already ach ieved , of
u ses to b e m ade and path s to be taken, o f ob jects en d o w e d w ith a "permanent
teleological ch a ra cter”, in H u sse rl’s phrase, tools, in stru m en ts and institu*
tion s, the w orld o f practicality, can grant on ly a co n d itio n a l freedom - liberet
si liceret - rather like that of the m agnetic n eed le w h ich L eib n iz im agined
A false dilem m a: mechanism an d finalism
77
tid ily en joyed tu rn in g northw ards. If one regularly ob serves a very close
rrelation betw een the scien tifically co n stru cted objective probabilities (e .g .
the chances of access to a particular g o o d ) and subjective aspirations (" m o tiv a
tions” or " n e e d s”) or, in other term s, b etw een the a posteriori or ex post
probability know n from past exp erien ce and the a p rio ri ox ex ante probability
attributed to it, this is not becau se agen ts co n sc io u sly adjust their aspirations
t0 an exact evaluation o f their ch an ces o f su c c e ss, like a player regulating his
bets as a function of perfect inform ation as to h is ch an ces o f w in n in g, as one
im plicitly p resup poses w h en ever, forgettin g th e "everyth in g takes place as
if”, one proceeds as if gam e theory or the calcu lation of p rob abilities, each
constructed against sp on tan eou s d isp o sitio n s, am ou n ted to anthropological
descriptions of practice.
C om pletely reversin g the ten d en cy of ob jectiv ism , w'e can, on th e contrary,
seek in th e scien tific theory of p rob abilities (or strategies) not an an th rop olo
gical m odel of practice, but the elem en ts o f a negative description o f the im p licit
logic of th e spontaneous interpretation o f statistics (e .g . the p rosp en sity to p rivilege
early exp erien ces) w h ich th e scien tific theory necessarily con tain s becau se it is
explicitly con stru cted against that log ic. U n lik e th e estim a tio n o f p rob abili
ties w hich scien ce con stru cts m eth od ically on th e basis of con trolled ex p eri
ments from data estab lish ed according to precise rules, practical evaluation
of the lik elihood o f the su ccess o f a given action in a g iv en situ ation brings
into play a w'hole b ody of w isd om , sayin g s, com m o n p la ces, ethical p recepts
("that’s not for th e likes of u s ”) and, at a d eep er lev el, the u n co n scio u s
principles of the ethos w h ich , b ein g the p rod u ct of a learn ing p rocess d o m i
nated by a d eterm inate typ e of ob jective regularities, d eterm in es" reason ab le ”
and ''u n reason ab le” con d u ct for every agen t su b jected to th o se regu larities .20
"We are n o soon er acquainted w ith the im p o ssib ility o f sa tisfy in g any d esire ”,
says H u m e in A T reatise o f H um an N a tu re, " th an the d esire itself v a n ish e s.”
And Marx in the Economic and Philosophical M anuscripts: " If I have n o m oney
for travel, I have no need, i.e . no real and self-realizin g n eed , to travel. If
I have a vocation to stu d y , b u t n o m on ey for it, I have no vocation to
study, i.e . no real, true v o ca tio n .”
Because th e d isp o sitio n s durably in cu lcated b y ob jective co n d itio n s (w h ich
science ap preh en ds through statistical regularities as the p rob abilities ob jec
tively attached to a grou p or class) en gen d er asp iration s and practices ob jec
tively com p atib le w ith th ose ob jective req u irem en ts, the m ost im probable
practices are ex clu d ed , eith er totally w ith o u t exam in ation , as unthinkable, or
at the co st o f the double negation w hich in clin e s agen ts to m ake a virtu e of
necessity, that is, to refuse wrhat is an yw ay refu sed and to love th e in evitab le.
T h e very co n d itio n s of p rod uction o f the e th o s, necessity m ade into a virtu e,
^ e su ch that the ex p ectation s to w hich it g ives rise ten d to ignore the
78 Structures and the habitus
restriction to w h ich the valid ity of any calcu lu s o f p rob ab ilities is sub
ordinated, n am ely that the co n d ition s o f th e ex p erim en ts sh ou ld not have
b een m od ified . U n lik e scien tific estim ation s, w h ich are corrected after each
exp erim en t in accordance w ith rigorous rules o f ca lcu lation , practical esti
m ates g iv e d isp rop ortion ate w eigh t to early e x p e r ie n c e s: th e stru ctu res charac
teristic of a d eterm in ate ty p e of co n d ition s o f ex iste n c e, through the
eco n o m ic and social n ecessity w h ich th ey b rin g to bear on th e relatively
a u to n om ou s u n iverse o f fam ily relation ship s, or m ore p recisely , through the
m ediation of th e specifically fam ilial m an ifestation s of th is external necessity
(sexual d iv isio n of labour, d om estic m orality, cares, strife, ta stes, etc.),
p rod uce the stru ctu res of the h abitus w h ich b ecom e in turn th e basis of
p erception and ap preciation of all su b seq u en t ex p erien ce. T h u s , as a result
o f th e hysteresis effect necessarily im plied in the logic o f th e co n stitu tio n of
habitus, p ractices are alw ays liable to incur n egative san ction s w h en the
en viron m en t w ith w h ich th e y are actually con fron ted is to o distant from that
to w hich they are ob jectively fitted . T h is is w h y gen eration con flicts oppose
not age-classes separated by natural p rop erties, but h ab itu s w h ich have been
p roduced by d ifferen t modes o f generation, that is, b y co n d itio n s of existence
w h ich , in im p o sin g different d efin ition s of th e im p o ssib le, the p o ssib le, and
the probable, cau se on e grou p to exp erien ce as natural or reasonable practices
or aspirations w h ich another grou p finds unthin k able or scand alous, and vice
versa.
are m ore and b etter h arm onized than th e agen ts know or w ish , it is becau se,
Leibniz puts it, " fo llo w in g on ly [his] ow n la w s”, each " n o n e th e less agrees
%vith the o th e r ”.27 T h e h ab itu s is p recisely th is im m an en t law , lex in sita, laid
j 0wn in each agent by h is earliest u p b rin gin g , w hich is th e p recon d ition not
onlv for the co-ord in ation of p ractices b u t also for practices o f co-ord in ation ,
«ince th e correction s and ad ju stm en ts the agen ts th em selv es co n scio u sly carry
out presuppose their m astery o f a co m m o n code and sin ce u nd ertak ings o f
collective m ob ilization cannot su cceed w ith o u t a m in im u m o f con cordan ce
between the h ab itu s o f th e m o b ilizin g agen ts (e .g . p rop h et, party leader, e tc .)
and the d isp o sitio n s o f th o se w h o se aspirations and w o rld -v iew th ey exp ress.
So it is becau se th ey are th e p rod u ct o f d isp o sitio n s w h ich , b ein g th e
internalization o f th e sam e ob jective stru ctu res, are ob jectively con certed that
(he practices o f the m em b ers o f th e sam e grou p or, in a differen tiated so c iety ,
the sam e class are en d ow ed w ith an ob jective m ean in g that is at on ce unitary
and system atic, tran scen d in g su b jectiv e in ten tio n s and co n sc io u s projects
whether in d ivid u al or c o lle c tiv e .28 T o d escrib e th e p rocess o f ob jectification
and orchestration in th e lan guage o f interaction and m utual a d ju stm ent is to
forget that the in teraction itself ow es its form to th e o b jectiv e stru ctures
which have p rod uced th e d isp o sitio n s of th e in teracting agen ts and w h ich allot
them their relative p o sitio n s in the in teraction and elsew h ere. E very co n fro n
tation b etw een agen ts in fact b rin gs togeth er, in an interaction d efined by the
objective structure o f th e relation b etw een th e groups th e y b elon g to ( e .g . a
boss g iv in g orders to a su b ord in ate, colleagu es d iscu ssin g th eir p u p ils,
academics taking part in a sy m p o siu m ), system s of d isp o sitio n s (carried by
'natural p e r so n s”) su ch as a lin g u istic com p eten ce and a cultural com p eten ce
and, through th ese h ab itu s, all th e ob jective stru ctures o f w h ich they are the
product, stru ctures w h ich are active on ly w hen em bodied in a co m p eten ce
acquired in th e cou rse of a particular h istory (w ith th e d ifferen t ty p es of
bilingualism or p ron u n ciation , for exam p le, stem m in g from d ifferen t m o d es
of acq u isition ).29
T h u s, w h en w e speak o f class h abitus, w e are in sistin g , against all form s
of the occasion alist illu sion w h ich co n sists in d irectly relating p ractices to
properties in scrib ed in th e situ ation , that " in terp erso n a l” relations are never,
except in appearance, in d ivid u a l-to -in d ivid u a l relation ship s and that th e truth
°f the in teraction is never en tirely con tain ed in the in teraction . T h is is w hat
social p sy ch o lo g y and in teraction ism or eth n o m eth o d o lo g y forget w h en ,
reducing the o b jective stru cture of th e relation ship b etw een th e assem b led
tfidividuals to the con jun ctural stru cture of their in teraction in a particular
situation and g rou p , they seek to explain everyth in g that occu rs in an ex p eri
m ental or ob served in teraction in term s of the exp erim en tally con trolled
characteristics o f the situ ation , su ch as the relative spatial p osition s of the
82 Structures an d the habitus
If the debate on the relationship between " cu ltu re” and " p erson ality” which
dom inated a w hole era of Am erican anthropology now seem s so artificial and sterile,
it is because, am idst a host o f logical and epistem ological fallacies, it was organized
around the relation betw een tw o com plem entary products of the sam e realist, substan-
tialist representation of the scientific object. In its m ost exaggerated form s, the theory
of "basic p ersonality” tends to define personality as a miniature replica (obtained
by " m o u ld in g ”) of the " cu ltu re”, to be found in all m em bers of the sam e society,
except deviants. Cora D u B ois’s celebrated analyses on the Alor Island natives provide
a very typical exam ple of th e con fu sion s and contradictions resulting from the theory
that " cu ltu re” and personality can each be deduced from the other: determ ined to
reconcile the anthropologist’s con clu sion s, based on the postulate that the same
influences produce the sam e basic personality, with her ow n clinical observations of
four subjects w ho seem to her to be "highly individual characters”, each "moulded
by the specific factors in his individual fa te ”, the psychoanalyst w ho struggles to find
individual incarnations of the basic personality is condem ned to recantations and
contradictions.30 T h u s, she can see M angm a as "the m ost ty p ica l” of the four ("his
personality corresponds to the basic personality stru ctu re”) after having written: " ll
is difficult to decide how typical M angm a is. I w ould venture to say that if he were
typical, the society could not con tin u e to ex ist.” Ripalda, w ho is passive and has
S tructu res , habitus a n d practices
S 5
techniques used to test the validity o f a theoretical construct am ounts in fact to the
- u b s t i t u t i o n of one object for another: a system o f h ypotheses as to the structure of
personality, conceived as a hom eostatic system w hich changes by reinterpreting
external pressures in accordance with its ow n logic, is replaced by a sim ple description
of the central tendency in the distribution of the values of a variable, or rather a
c o m b i n a t i o n of variables. Wallace thus com es to the tautological conclusion that in
a population of Tuscarora Indians, the m odal personality type defined by reference
to twenty-seven variables is to be found in only 37 per cen t of the subjects stu d ied .
The construction of a class ethos m ay, for exam ple, make use of a reading of statistical
regularities treated as indices, w ithout the principle w hich unifies and explains these
regularities being reducible to the regularities in w hich it m anifests itself. In short,
failing to see in the notion of "basic p erson ality’* anything other than a way of
pointing to a directly observable " d a tu m ”, i.e . the "personality type*’ shared by the
greatest number o f m em bers of a given society, the advocates o f th is notion cannot,
in all logic, take issue w ith those w ho subm it th is theory to the test of statistical
critique, in the name of the sam e realist representation of the scientific object.
The h abitus is the p rod uct o f the w ork of in cu lca tion and appropriation
necessary in order for th o se p rod u cts of co llec tiv e h istory, th e ob jective
structures (e .g . o f lan gu age, e c o n o m y , e tc .) to su cceed in rep rod u cin g th e m
selves m ore or less co m p letely , in th e form o f d urable d isp o sitio n s, in the
organisms (w h ich on e can, if o n e w ish es, call in d ivid u als) lastingly su b jected
to the sam e co n d itio n in g s, and h en ce placed in th e sam e m aterial co n d itio n s
° f existence. T h er efo re so c io lo g y treats as id en tical all th e b io lo g ica l in d iv i
duals w h o , b ein g the p rod uct o f th e sam e o b jectiv e co n d itio n s, are the
supports o f th e sam e h ab itu s: social class, u n d ersto o d as a sy stem o f o b jective
determ inations, m u st be b ro u g h t in to relation not w ith th e in d iv id u a l or w ith
" c la ss” as a popu lation , i.e . as an aggregate of en u m erab le, m easurable
biological in d ivid u als, b u t w ith th e class h a b itu s, th e sy stem of d isp o sitio n s
^partially) co m m o n to all p ro d u cts o f th e sa m e stru ctu res. T h o u g h it is
^ p o s s ib le for a ll m em b ers o f th e sam e class (or even tw o o f th em ) to have
h&d the sam e ex p erien ces, in th e sam e ord er, it is certain that each m em b er
the sam e class is m ore likely than any m em b er o f another class to have
een con fron ted w ith th e situ ation s m ost freq u en t for the m em b ers o f that
C,ass- T h e ob jectiv e stru ctu res w h ich sc ien ce ap p reh en d s in the form of
86 Structures a n d the habitus
Experimental analyses of learning w hich establish that " neither the form ation nor
the application of a concept requires conscious recognition of the com m on elements
or relationship involved in the specific i n s t a n c e s e n a b l e us to understand the
dialectic o f objectification and incorporation w hereby the systematic objectifications
of system atic dispositions tend in their turn to give rise to systematic dispositions:
when faced w ith series of sym bols - C hinese characters (H u ll) or pictures varying
sim ultaneously the colour, nature, and num ber of the objects represented (Heid-
breder) - distributed into classes w ith arbitrary but objectively based names, subjects
who are unable to state the principle of classification nonetheless attain higher scores
than they w ould if they were guessing at random, thereby dem onstrating that they
achieve a practical mastery of the classificatory schem es which in no way implies
sym bolic mastery - i.e . conscious recognition and verbal expression - of the processes
practically applied. Albert B. Lord's analysis o f the acquiring of structured material
in a natural environm ent, based on his study of the training of the guslar, the Y u g o s l a v
bard, entirely confirm s the experim ental findings: the practical mastery of what Lord
calls "the form ula”, that is, the capacity to im provise by com bining "form ulae”,
sequences of words "regularly em ployed under the sam e metrical conditions to
express a given id ea”,34 is acquired through sheer familiarization, "by hearing the
poem s”,35 w ithout the learner’s having any sense o f learning and subsequently mani
pulating this or that form ula or any set of form ulae:36 the constraints of rhythm are
internalized at the same tim e as m elody and m eaning, w ithout being attended to for
their own sake.
etc ) which require the b oys to set to w ork, in th e m ode o f " le t’s p retend ”, the
chetfies gen erating the strategies of h on ou r .37 T h e n there is daily participation
in gift exchan ges and all their su b tleties, w h ich the b o y s derive from their
role as m essengers an d, m ore especially, as interm ediaries b etw een th e fem ale
xvofld and the m ale w orld . T h ere is silen t ob servation o f th e d iscu ssio n s in
the men’s assem b ly, w ith their effects o f elo q u en ce, their rituals, their
s t r a t e g ie s , their ritual strategies and strategic u ses o f ritual. T h ere are the
interactions w ith their relatives, w h ich lead them to ex p lo re th e structured
space of ob jective kin relationships in all d irection s b y m ean s o f reversals
requiring the person w h o saw him self and b ehaved as a n ep h ew o f his fath er’s
brother to see h im self and behave as a paternal uncle tow ards h is b rother’s
son, and th u s to acquire m astery o f the transform ational sch em es w h ich p erm it
the passage from th e sy stem of d isp o sitio n s attached to on e p o sition to the
system appropriate to the sym m etrically op p o site p o sitio n . T h ere are the
lexical and gram m atical com m u tation s ( " I ” and " y o u ” d esig n a tin g the sam e
person accord in g to the relation to the speaker) w h ich in stil the sen se o f the
interchangeability o f p osition s and of reciprocity as w ell as a sen se of the lim its
of each. A n d , at a d eep er level, there are th e relation ship s w ith the m oth er
and the father, w h ich , b y their d yssym m etry in an tagon istic co m p lem en tarity,
constitute one of th e op p ortu n ities to in tern alize, inseparably, the sch em es
of the sexual division o f labour and of the division o f sexual labour.
But it is in th e dialectical relation ship b etw een the b o d y and a space
structured accord in g to the m yth ico-ritu al o p p osition s that on e finds the form
par ex cellen ce o f the structural ap pren ticesh ip w hich leads to the em -b o d y in g
of the structures of th e w orld, that is, the appropriating b y the w orld o f a
body th u s enabled to appropriate the w orld. In a social form ation in w h ich
the absence o f th e svm b olic-p rod u ct-con servin g tech n iq u es associated w ith
literacy retards the ob jectification o f sy m b o lic and particularly cultural capital,
inhabited space - and above all the h ou se - is the principal lo cu s for the
objectification o f the gen erative sc h e m e s; and, through th e interm ediary of the
divisions and hierarchies it sets up b etw een th in gs, p ersons, and practices,
this tangible cla ssify in g system con tin u o u sly in cu lcates and reinforces the
taxonom ic p rin cip les u nd erlyin g all th e arbitrary p rovision s of this cu ltu re .38
T h us, as we have seen , the op position b etw een the sacred o f the right hand
and th e sacred of th e left hand, b etw een n if and h aram , b etw een m an,
^ v ested w ith p rotective, fecun datin g virtu es, and w om an , at on ce sacred and
charged w ith m aleficen t forces, and, correlatively, b etw een religion (m ale)
and m agic (fem a le), is reproduced in the spatial d ivision b etw een m ale space,
Wlth the place of a ssem b ly, the m arket, or th e fields, and fem ale sp ace, the
house and its gard en , the retreats of haram . T o d iscover h ow this spatial
organization (m atch ed b y a tem poral organization o b ey in g the sam e logic)
90 Structures an d the habitus
gov ern s practices and represen tation s - far b eyon d the frequ en tly described
rough d ivision s b etw een the m ale w orld and the fem ale w orld , th e assembly
and the fou n tain , p ub lic life and in tim acy - and thereby con trib utes to the
durable im p osition of th e sc h e m e s o f p ercep tion , th o u g h t, and action, it j8
necessary to grasp the dialectic o f objectification and em b o d im en t in the
p rivileged lo cu s o f th e sp ace of th e h ouse and the earliest learn ing processes.
T h is analysis of the relation sh ip b etw een the ob jectified sch em es and the
sch em es incorporated or b ein g incorporated p resu p p o ses a structural analysis
of the social organization of th e in tern al sp ace of the h ouse and th e relation
of th is internal space to external sp ace, an analysis w h ich is not an end in
itself but w h ich , p recisely on accou n t of the (dan gerous) affinity betw een
ob jectivism and all that is already objectified, is the on ly m eans o f fully
grasping the stru cturin g stru ctu res w h ich , rem aining ob scu re to them selves,
are revealed o n ly in the ob jects th e y stru cture. T h e house, an opus operatum,
len d s itself as su ch to a d ecip h erin g , b u t on ly to a d eciph ering w h ich does
not forget that the " b o o k ” from w h ich th e ch ild ren learn their v isio n of the
w orld is read w ith the b o d y , in and through the m o v em en ts and displacem ents
w h ich make the space w ith in wrh ich th ey are enacted as m uch as they are
m ade by it.
T h e interior of the Kabyle house, rectangular in shape, is divided into two parts
by a low w all: the larger of these tw o parts, slightly higher than the other, is reserved
for human use; the other side, occupied by the anim als, has a loft above it. A door
w ith tw o w ings gives access to both room s. In the upper part is the hearth and, facing
the door, the w eaving loom . T h e low er, dark, nocturnal part of the house, the place
of damp, green, or raw objects - water jars set on the benches on either side of the
entrance to the stable or against the "wall of darkness ”, w ood, green fodder - the place
too of natural beings - oxen and co w s, donkeys and m ules - and natural activities -
sleep, sex, birth - and also of death, is opposed to the high, light-filled, noble place of
humans and in particular of the guest, fire and fire-made objects, the lam p, kitchen
utensils, the rifle - the attribute of the manly point of honour ( tiif) w hich protects
fem ale honour ( hurma) - the loom , th e sym bol of all protection, the place also of
the tw o specifically cultural activities performed w ithin the house, cooking and
weaving. T he m eaning objectified in things or places is fully revealed only in the
practices structured according to the sam e schem es which are organized in relation
to them (and vice versa). T h e guest to be honoured (qabel, a verb also m eaning "to
stand up t o ”, and "to face the east ”) is invited to sit in front of the loom . T h e opposite
wall is called the wall of darkness, or the wall of the invalid: a sick person’s bed is
placed next to it. T h e washing of the dead takes place at the entrance to the stable.
T h e low dark part is opposed to the upper part as the fem ale to the m ale: it is the
m ost intim ate place w ithin the world o f intim acy (sexuality, fertility). T h e opposition
betw een the male and the female also reappears in the opposition betw een the " master
beam and the main pillar, a fork op en skywards.
T h u s, the house is organized according to a set of hom ologous oppositions -
fire: water :: cook ed : raw :: h ig h : low :: lig h t: shade :: d a y : night :: m a le: fem ale ♦«
nif: hurma:: fertilizing: able to be fertilized. But in fact the same oppositions are
established between the house as a w hole and the rest of the universe, that is, the
T h e dialectic o f objectification an d embodiment 91
w o r l d , the place of assem bly, the fields, and the market. It follow s that each
^ th e s e two parts of the house (and, by the sam e token, each of the objects placed
it a n d each of the activities carried out in it) is in a sense qualified at two degrees,
If t as female (nocturnal, dark, etc.) insofar as it partakes of the universe of the
U Se an<! secondarily as male or fem ale insofar as it belongs to one or the other
0 f the divisions of that universe. T h u s, for exam ple, the proverb "M an is the lamp
o f the outside, wom an the lamp o f the in sid e 99 m ust be taken to mean that man is
the true light, that of the day, and wom an th e light of darkness, dark brightness;
and we a*s0 knowr that she is to the m oon as man is to the sun. But one or the other
o f the two system s of oppositions which define the house, either in its internal
o r g a n i z a t i o n or in its relationship w ith the external w orld, is brought to the fore
g r o u n d , depending on whether the house is considered from the male point of viewr
o r the female point of view : whereas for th e man, the house is not so m uch a
nlace he enters as a place he com es out of, m ovem ent inwards properly befits the
30
woman.
All the actions p erform ed in a space con stru cted in this way are im m ediately
qualified sym b olically and fu n ctio n as so m a n y structural ex ercises through
which is b u ilt up practical m astery of th e fun dam en tal sch e m e s, w h ich
organize m agical practices and rep resen tation s: g o in g in and co m in g ou t,
filling and em p ty in g , o p en in g and sh u ttin g , g o in g leftw ards and g o in g righ t
wards, g oin g w estw ard s and g o in g eastw ard s, etc. T h ro u g h the m agic of a
world of ob jects w hich is th e p rod u ct o f th e ap plication o f th e sam e sch em es
to the m ost d iverse d om ain s, a w orld in w h ich each th in g speaks m etaph ori
cally of all th e others, each practice co m e s to be in vested w ith an ob jective
m eaning, a m ean in g w ith w h ich practices - and particularly rites - have to
reckon at all tim es, w h eth er to evoke or revoke it. T h e con stru ction of the
world of ob jects is clearly not the so vereign operation o f c o n scio u sn ess w h ich
the n eo-K antian tradition co n ce iv e s of; the m ental stru ctures w h ich con stru ct
the world o f ob jects are con stru cted in th e practice of a w orld o f ob jects
constructed accord in g to th e sam e stru ctu r es .40 T h e m ind born o f th e w orld
of objects d oes not rise as a su b jectiv ity co n fro n tin g an o b jectiv ity : the
objective u niverse is m ade u p of ob jects w h ich are the p rod u ct o f ob jectifyin g
operations structured according to th e very stru ctures w h ich th e m in d applies
t0 it. T h e m ind is a m etaphor of the w o rld of ob jects w h ich is itself b u t an
endless circle of m utually reflecting m etap h ors.
All the sym b olic m anip ulations o f b od y exp erien ce, starting w ith d isp lace
m ents w ith in a m yth ically structured sp a ce , e .g . the m ov em en ts of g o in g in
and com in g o u t, ten d to im p ose th e integration o f the b od y sp ace w ith co sm ic
space by graspin g in term s of th e sam e c o n c e p ts (and naturally at the price
great laxity in logic) th e relation ship b etw e en m an and th e natural w orld
and the com p lem en tarity and op p osed sta tes and action s o f th e tw o sex es in
the d iv ision of sexual w ork and sexual d iv isio n o f w ork, and h en ce in th e work
° f biological and social rep rod u ction . F or exam p le, the o p p o sitio n b etw een
92 Structures an d the habitus
thinking. T h e oppositions w hich m ythico-ritual logic makes betw een the male ancj
the fem ale and w hich organize the w hole system o f values reappear, for exam p le ^
the gestures and m ovem ents of the b od y, in the form of the opposition between the
straight and the bent, or betw een assurance and restraint. " T h e Kabyle is like th
heather, he w ould rather break than b e n d .” T h e man of honour’s pace is steady and
determ ined. H is way of walking, that of a man w h o know s w here he is goin g and knovv8
he will arrive in tim e, w hatever the obstacles, expresses strength and resolution, 35
opposed to the hesitant gait (th ikli thamahmahth) announcing indecision, half-hearted
prom ises ( a v a l amahmah), the fear of com m itm ents and the incapacity to fulfil them
At the sam e tim e it is a measured p a ce: it contrasts as m uch with the haste of the man
w ho "throw s his feet up as high as his h ea d ”, "walks along w ith great strides”
" dances ” - running being weak and frivolous conduct - as it does w ith the sluggishness
of the man w ho "trails alo n g ”. T h e m anly man stands up straight and honours the
person he approaches or w ishes to w elcom e by looking him right in the eves; ever
on the alert, because ever threatened, he lets nothing that happens around him escape
him , whereas a gaze that is up in the clouds or fixed on the ground is the mark of
an irresponsible m an, w ho has nothing to fear because he has no responsibilities in
his group. C onversely, a w om an is expected to walk with a slight stoop, looking down,
keeping her eyes on the spot where she w ill next put her foot, especially if she happens
to have to walk past the thajma'th; her gait m ust avoid the excessive sw in g of the hips
which com es from a heavy stride; she m ust always be girdled with the thimehremth,
a rectangular piece of cloth w ith yellow , red, and black stripes worn over her
dress, and take care that her headscarf does not com e unknotted, revealing her hair.
In short, the specifically fem inine virtue, lahia, m odesty, restraint, reserve, orients
the w hole fem ale body dow nwards, tow ards the ground, the inside, the house,
w’hereas male excellence, nif, is asserted in m ovem ent upwards, outw’ards, towards
other m en.
If all so c ietie s and, sign ifican tly, all the "totalitarian in stitu tio n s ”, in
G off m an ’s p hrase, that seek to produce a n ew m an through a process of
" d ec u ltu ra tio n ” and " r ec u ltu ra tio n ” set su ch store on the se em in g ly most
in sign ifican t d etails of dress, bearing, p hysical and verbal manners, th e reason
is th at, treatin g th e b ody as a m em ory, they en tru st to it in ab breviated and
practical, i.e . m n em o n ic, form th e fu n d a m en tal p rin cip les o f th e arbitrary
co n ten t of th e cu ltu re. T h e p rin cip les em -b o d ied in th is w ay are p laced beyond
th e grasp of co n sc io u sn e ss, and h en ce cannot b e tou ch ed b y voluntary,
d elib erate tran sform ation , can n ot even be m ade ex p licit; n o th in g se em s more
in effab le, m ore in co m m u n ica b le, m ore in im itab le, and, th erefore, more
p recio u s, than th e v alu es g iv en b o d y , m ade b o d y b y th e transubstantiation
ach ieved b y th e h id d en p ersuasion of an im p licit p ed agogy, capable of
in stillin g a w h o le co sm o lo g y , an eth ic, a m etap h y sic, a p olitical p h ilosop h y,
through in ju n ction s as in sign ifican t as " stand u p straigh t ” or " d o n ’t hold your
knife in you r left h a n d ”.44 T h e lo g ic o f sc h e m e transfer w h ich m akes each
tech n iq u e o f th e b ody a sort o f pa rs totalis, p red isp osed to fu n ctio n in
accordance w ith th e fallacy p a rs p ro totot and h en ce to evok e th e w h o le system
o f w h ich it is a part, gives a very general sco p e to the se em in g ly m ost
circu m scrib ed and circu m stan tial ob servan ces. T h e w h o le trick o f p edagogic
The dialectic o f objectification and em bodiment 95
reason I*68 precisely in the w ay it extorts th e essen tial w h ile se em in g to dem and
the in sign ifican t: in o b ta in in g th e respect for form and form s o f resp ect w h ich
constitute th e m ost v isib le and at th e sam e tim e th e b est-h id d en (b ecau se
most * n a tu ra l”) m an ifestation o f su b m issio n to th e esta b lish ed order, th e
in c o r p o r a t io n o f th e arbitrary ab olish es w hat R aym on d R uyer calls " lateral
possibilities” , that is, all th e eccen tricities and d evia tio n s w h ich are th e sm all
change o f m ad n ess. T h e co n cessio n s o f politeness alw ays con tain p o litica l
c o n c e s s io n s . T h e term obsequium u sed by S p in o za to d en o te th e " con stan t
*iH" produced by th e co n d itio n in g through w h ich " th e S ta te fash ion s u s for
its own use and w hich en ab les it to s u r v iv e ”45 co u ld be reserved to d esign ate
the public testim o n ies o f recogn ition w h ich every grou p ex p ec ts o f its members
(especially at m o m en ts of co -o p tio n ), that is, th e sy m b o lic taxes d ue from
individuals in the ex ch an ges w h ich are set up in every grou p b etw een th e
individuals and th e grou p . B ecau se, as in g ift ex ch a n g e, th e ex ch a n g e is an
end in itself, the trib u te d em a n d ed b y th e gro u p gen erally co m es d o w n to
a matter o f trifles, that is, to sy m b o lic rituals (rites of passage, th e cerem on ials
o f etiquette, e t c .) , form alities and form alism s w h ich " cost n o th in g ” to perform
and seem su ch n atu ra l” th in g s to d em and (" It's th e least on e can d o . . . ” :
“ It w ou ld n ’t cost h im an yth in g t o . . . ”) that ab sten tio n a m o u n ts to a refusal
or a ch a llen g e.4*
T hrou gh th e habitus, th e stru ctu re w h ich has p rod uced it g o v ern s practice,
not by th e p rocesses of a m ech an ical d eterm in ism , b ut th ro u g h th e m ed iation
of the orien tation s and lim its it assign s to th e habitus's op eration s of
invention.47 A s an acquired system o f gen erative sch em es o b jectiv ely adjusted
to the particular co n d itio n s in w h ich it is co n stitu ted , th e h ab itu s en gen d ers
all the th o u g h ts, all th e p ercep tio n s, and all th e action s co n siste n t w ith th ose
conditions, and no oth ers. T h is paradoxical product is difficult to co n ceiv e,
even in con ceivab le, o n ly so lo n g as on e rem ains locked in th e d ilem m a o f
determinism and freed om , co n d itio n in g and creativity (lik e C h om sk y, for
example, w h o th o u g h t th e on ly escap e from B loom fieldian b eh aviou rism lay
in seek ing " fre ed o m ” and '‘ cr ea tiv ity ” in th e " str u c tu re” - i.e . th e " n a tu r e”
“ of th e hum an m in d ). B ecause the h abitus is an en d less cap acity to en gen d er
products - th ou gh ts, p ercep tio n s, ex p ressio n s, action s - w h o se lim its are set
bV the h istorically and socially situated co n d itio n s of its p rod u ction , the
conditioned and con d ition al freed om it secu res is as rem ote from a creation
u npredictable n ovelty as it is from a sim p le m ech an ical reprodu ction of
the initial c o n d itio n in g s .48
3
G e n e ra tiv e sch em es an d p ractical lo g ic :
in ve n tio n w ith in lim its
M an differs from other anim als in that he is the one m ost given to mim icry
( mimetikotaton) and learns his first lessons through m im esis (d ia mimeseos).
Aristotle, Poetics, 1448b
O b jectivism co n stitu tes the social w orld as a sp ectacle p resen ted to an observer
w h o takes up a " p o in t of v ie w ” on th e action , w h o sta n d s back so as to
ob serve it an d, tran sferrin g in to th e ob ject th e p rin cip les o f h is relation to
th e o b ject, c o n ce iv e s of it as a to ta lity in te n d ed for co g n itio n alo n e, in which
a ll in teraction s are red u ced to sy m b o lic ex ch a n g es. T h is p o in t o f v iew is the
on e afforded b y h ig h p o sitio n s in th e social stru ctu re, from w h ich the social
w orld appears as a rep resen tation (in the sen se of idealist p h ilo so p h y b u t also
as u sed in p ain tin g or the th eatre) and p ractices are n o m ore than " e x e c u tio n s’ ,
stage parts, perform an ces of sco res, or the im p lem en tin g of p lans. W ith the
M arx o f the Theses on Feuerbach, th e th eory of practice as p ractice insists,
against p o sitiv ist m aterialism , that th e ob jects o f k n o w led g e are constructed,
and against idealist in tellectu a lism , that th e p rin cip le o f th is co n stru ctio n is
practical a ctiv ity orien ted tow ards practical fu n ctio n s. It is p o ssib le to a b a n d o n
th e so vereign p oin t o f v iew from w h ich o b jectiv ist id ealism ord ers th e w orld,
w ith o u t b ein g forced to relin q u ish th e "active asp ect ” of ap p reh en sion o f the
w orld by red u cin g co g n itio n to a m ere record in g: it suffices to situ ate on eself
w ithin "real activity as s u c h ”, i.e . in th e practical relation to th e w o rld , the
q u a si-b o d ilv " a im in g ” w h ich en tails no rep resen ta tio n o f eith er th e b o d y or
th e w orld , still less o f their rela tio n sh ip , that a ctive p resen ce in th e w orld
th ro u g h w h ich th e w orld im p o ses its p resen ce, w ith its u rg en cies, its th in gs
to b e d o n e or sa id , th in g s " m a d e ” to be said and said "to be d o n e ”, w hich
[ 961
T h e calen dar an d the synoptic illusion 97
ransition from w in ter to sp rin g (essba't or essubu', the " s e v e n s ”); and from
et a n o t h e r point of v iew , th e se are th e "great n ig h ts ” (ly a li kbira) as op posed
^ t h e l e s s er n ig h ts ” (ly a li esghira) o f February and M arch, to th e " sh ep h erd ’s
nights” a n d to the " n igh ts o f H a y a n ” . T h e first day of ennayer (January),
in the depth o f w in ter, is m arked by a w h ole set o f renew al rites and taboos
(in particular on sw eep in g an d w ea v in g ), w h ich som e inform an ts extend to
the w hole period of issemaden (th e cold d ays) ru n n in g from late D ecem b er
to early January.
T h e end of ly a li is m arked by the ritual celebration of el'a zla gennayer,
s e p a r a t io n from ennayer: life has em erged on the face of the earth, th e first
shoots are appearing on th e trees, it is "th e o p e n in g ” (el ftuh ). T h e farm er
goes out into th e fields and se ts up oleander b ranches, w h ich have th e pow er
to drive away m aras, the cockchafer g r u b ; as h e d oes so , he savs, " C om e o u t,
maras! T h e khammes is g o in g to kill y o u ! ” O n the sam e day, it is said, the
peasants g o to their stables b efore sunrise and sh ou t in th e ears of the oxen :
"G ood new s! E n n ayer is over! ” S om e in form an ts say 'a zri} the bachelor, for
'azla ("because from that day on , sp rin g is co m in g , and m arriages start to
be celebrated ”), w ith a sort o f play on w ords w hich is no d ou b t also a play
on m ythic roots. T h is is b eg in n in g of a lo n g transitional p eriod, a tim e of
waiting, covered by a term in o lo g y as rich as it is con fu sed : w hereas autu m n
is "a w h o le ”, as on e in form an t p u t it, th e passage from w inter to spring is
a patchwork of m o m en ts w h ich are ill d efin ed , alm ost all m a lig n , and variously
named.
Thus, the term thimgharine, the old w om en, or thamgharth, the old w om an,8 also
known as amerdil (the loan) in Great Kabvlia, denotes either the m om ent of transition
from one m onth to another (from D ecem ber to January, or January to February, or
February to March, and even, at Ain A ghbel, from March to A pril), or the m om ent
of transition from winter to spring. Husum, a learned term of Arabic origin, referring
to a sura of the Koran, coexists w ith hayan (or ahgan) to denote the passage from
furar to maghres. 9 But the logic o f m agic insists that it is never possible to know exactly
which is the most unpropitious m om ent in a period which is uncertain as a w h o le,10
so that the terms thimgharine or husum, relating to highly unpropitious periods, are
som etim es used to denote the w hole transitional period from late January to m id-M arch:
*n this case, they are made to include the four " w eek s” which divide up the m onth
of February, known collectively as essba't ("the se v e n s”) , i.e. el mivalah (som etim es
called \mirghane), the salt days; el quarah, the pungent days; elsw a la h , the benign days;
€l fyjatah, the open d ays.11 As the nam es of this series them selves testify, we find here,
as in the case of the nights of January, one o f the sem i-explicit dichotom ies which
always involve an attempt at rationalization: the first two periods are m align and come
the end of winter; the last tw o are benign and com e at the beginning of spring,
n the sam e way, inform ants w ho identify husum w ith the fortnight straddling the end
°f January and the beginning o f February, concentrating within it all the features
characteristic of the period as a w h ole, distinguish a first, dangerous week and a second,
j^ore favourable week. And sim ilarly, num erous inform ants (especially in the
jurdjura region) distinguish tw o ahgans (or hayans) - ahgan bu akii, the hayan of
10 2 G en era tive schemes a n d p ra ctica l logic
the N egro, seven intensely cold days during w hich work is su sp en d ed , and ahgQtl
hari, the hayan of the freem an, seven days in w hich “ everything on earth comesK u
to life ”.
D u rin g " hayan w eek ” (th e first w eek of M arch), life com p letes its work. Man m
not disturb it by goin g into the fields or orch ard s.12 T h e anim als too seem to ^
com pleted their grow th: w eaning (el h iya z) is carried out at the end of hayan weej.'
on the day of the spring eq u in ox (a d h w a l gitij, the len gth en in g o f the su n ). A tin ca^
is struck to make a noise w hich w ill prevent the oxen - w ho can understand human
speech on that day - from hearing what is said about " th e len gth en in g of t h e davg”
for if they heard it, they w ould take fright at having to work harder. By virtue o f
position , husum (or hayan) is endow ed w ith an inaugural - and augural - character very
sim ilar to that conferred on the m orning, in th e cycle of the day (for e x a m p l e , if
does not rain, the wells w ill not be full all year; if it rains, that is a sign o f p le n ty -
if there is snow at the b egin n in g, there will be m any partridge e g g s ); it is th e r e f o r e
an occasion for acts of propitiation (alm sgiving) and divination.
April-
The passage from th e w et season to th e dry season is effected ritually and
collectively, d u rin g n atah, o n th e day o f tharurith v ia z a l (th e return o f a z a l ),15
on a date wTh ich varies from region to region b ecau se o f clim a tic differen ces,
coming eith er in M arch, after w ea n in g , el h iy a z , or in A p ril, at sh ea rin g tim e
or just after, or, at th e v ery latest, at th e b e g in n in g of M ay: fro m th at day
on, the flock, w h ich up to th en w en t o u t late in th e m o rn in g and cam e back
relatively early, leaves early in th e m o rn in g , co m e s back and g o es o u t again
in the early a ftern o o n , and retu rn s at su n se t.
T he bad w ea th er is o ver for g o o d ; th e green fields an d th e ga rd en s are now
ready to receive th e rays o f th e su n . T h is is th e start o f th e cy c le of d ryn ess
and ripenin g; w ith ibril, a p articu larly b en eficen t m on th (" A p ril is a dow'nw'ard
slope”), a trou b le-free p eriod o f relative p len ty b eg in s. W ork o f all sorts starts
up again: in th e field s, wThere th e critical p eriod o f grow th is over, th e m en
can start th e h o ein g , the o n ly im p ortan t activ ity (w h ich u sed to b e in augu rated
by the a b d u ction of M ata, th e " brid e ” o f th e field , a rite in te n d ed to call dow n
the rain n eed ed for th e ears of th e corn to d e v e lo p ) ; in th e gard en s, th e first
beans are p ick ed . D u r in g th e p eriod o f nisany w h o se b en eficen t rain, b rin gin g
fertility and p rosp erity to every liv in g th in g , is in v o k ed writh all sorts o f rites,
the sh eep are sh orn and th e n ew lam b s are b ran d ed . T h e fact that nisan, like
all transitional p erio d s (n atah , for e x a m p le ), is an a m b ig u o u s p erio d , ill
defined in relation to th e o p p o sitio n b etw e en th e dry and th e w e t, is here
expressed not in a d iv isio n in to tw o p eriod s, o n e a u sp icio u s an d the other
inauspicious, b u t b y th e ex iste n c e o f in a u sp icio u s m o m e n ts ( eddbagh , th e 1 st
of M ay, at a m y sterio u s h our k n ow n to n o n e ), m arked b y various taboos
(pruning or g ra ftin g , celeb ra tin g w e d d in g s, w h ite w a sh in g h o u se s, settin g up
*he loom , se ttin g eg g s to b e h atch ed , e t c .) .
A s th e p erio d k n o w n as ize g za w e n " th e g reen d a y s ” co m e s to an en d , th e
last traces o f g reen ery fade from th e la n d sc a p e ; th e cerea ls, wrh ich had b een
as 'te n d e r ” ( th aleqaqth ) as a n ew -b o rn b a b y , n ow b eg in to tu rn y e llo w . T h e
changing ap pearan ce o f th e corn field s is in d icated b y th e n a m es of th e ten
or seven -d ay p erio d s in to wTh ich th e m o n th o f magu (or m ayu) is d iv id e d . A fter
l*egzaw en co m e iw ragh en , th e yellow* d a y s, im ellalen, th e w h ite d ay s, and
tquranen, th e dry d ays. S u m m e r (anebdhu) has b eg u n . T h e ch aracteristic tasks
104 G en erative schemes an d practical logic
Proof that lyali, which every inform ant m entions, is not "a period of forty d a y s”
(all that is said is "W e are entering ly a li”) but a sim ple scansion of passing tim e, is
found in the fact that different inform ants ascribe to it different durations and
different d a te s: one of them even situates the first day of ennayer both in the m iddle
of w inter and in the m iddle o f ly a li, although he d oes not set lya li in the (geom etric)
middle of winter, thereby dem onstrating that the practical grasp of the structure w hich
leads him to think of lya li as the winter of winter overrides calculative reason. A num ber
°f ill-defined guide-m arks (e .g . the "old w o m e n ”) shift according to the region and
the inform ant, but never beyond the bounds o f w inter. T h e sam e logic is found in
*he belief that it is im possible to know exactly w hen a certain action should be
avoided, the " p erio d ” b ein g nothing other than the field of uncertainty betw een two
guide-marks. A question as innocuous in appearance as "And what com es n ex t? ”,
^ v itin g an inform ant to situate tw o " periods ” in relation to one another in a continuous
time (w hich does no more than state what the genealogical or chronological diagram
does im plicitly), has the effect of im posing an attitude to tem porality w hich is the exact
io 6 G en erative schemes an d practica l logic
opposite of the attitude involved practically in the ordinary use of tem poral terms
Q uite apart from the form w hich the questioning m ust take so as to elicit an ordered
sequ en ce of answ ers, everything about the inquiry relationship itself betrays the
interrogator's "theoretical ” (i.e . "non-practical ”) disposition and invites th e interro-
gatee to adopt a quasi-theoretical attitude: the situation in w hich the interrogation is
carried on rules out any reference to the use and conditions of use of th e temporal
guide-m arks; the interrogation itself tacitly substitutes for d iscontinuous marks
intended to be used for practical ends, the calendar as an object o f thought, predisposed
to becom e an object of discourse and to be unfolded as a totality ex istin g beyond
its "applications” and independently of the needs and interests o f its u sers. This
explains w hy inform ants w ho are invited to give the calendar often start by setting
out the scholarly series of successive units, such as mtvalah, rw alah, and fw atah , or
izegzazven, iwraghen, imellalen, and iquranen. A nd also w hy, w hen they do not send
the anthropologist (w hom they always see as a scholar) to other scholars w ith his
scholar’s questions, they endeavour to produce the form s o f learning w hich seem to
them w orthiest of being offered in reply to scholarly interrogation, su b stitu tin g for
the guides w hich really organize their practice as m uch as they can m obilize of the
series of the constructed calendar, the m onths of the M oslem calendar or the
" h o u ses”.20 In short, by tacitly excluding all reference to the practical interest which
a socially characterized agent - a man or a w om an, an adult or a shepherd, a farmer
or a sm ith, etc. - may have in dividing up the year in such-and-such a w ay, and in
using such-and-such a tem poral gu id e, one unw ittingly constructs an object which
exists only by virtue of this unconscious construction of both it and its operations.
D epending on the precision w ith w hich the event considered has to be localized,
on the nature of the event, and on the social status of the agent concerned, different
svstems of oppositions are seen to em erge: for exam ple, the period known as ly a li,
far from being defined - as in a perfectly ordinate series - in relation to the period
which preceded it and the period w hich follow s it, and only in relation to them , can
be opposed to smaim as well as to el husum or thimgharine\ as we have seen , it can
also be opposed, as " lya li of D ece m b e r”, to " lyali of January”, or, by a different logic,
be opposed as the "great n ig h ts” to the "lesser nights of fu ra r” and the "lesser nights
of maghres (the sam e com binative logic w hich leads to the oppositions betw een " essba't
of w inter” and "essba't of sp rin g ” ; betw een " es-ba't of late sp rin g ”, w ith the Mgreen
days” and the "yellow d a y s”, and " essba't of su m m er”, w ith the "w hite d a y s” and
the "dry d ays” ; and betw een smaim of sum m er and smaim of autum n). T h e same
informant may at one m om ent, thinking in term s of ritual practices, oppose lakhrif
taken as a w hole ("autum n is w ithout d iv isio n s”) to lahlal, the licit period for
ploughing; and the very next m om ent, thinking in term s of the cycle of the fig
harvest, oppose lahlal to achraw , w hich is the end of lakhrif and one o f the activities
of thaqachachth, through w hich it is im plicitly opposed to thissemtith (the first figs),
or achakh (the ripeness of the figs).
When one knows that m any other oppositions could be produced, one sees the
artificiality and indeed unreality of a calendar w hich assim ilates and aligns u nits of
different levels and of very unequal im portance. G iven that all the d ivisions and
sub-divisions w hich the observer may record and cum ulate are produced and used
ln different situations and on different occasions, the question of h ow each of them
relates to the unit at a higher level, or, a fortiori, to the divisions or sub-divisions of
the " p eriods” to w hich they are op p osed , never arises in practice. If another seem ingly
ethnocentric analogy' be perm itted, one m ight suggest that the relation betw een the
constructed series obeying the laws of succession, and the tem poral oppositions put
mto practice successively so that they cannot be telescoped into the sam e spot, is
hom ologous with the relation betw een the continuous, hom ogeneous, political space
of graduated scales of op in ion , and practical political positions, w hich are always taken
UP in response to a particular situation and particular interlocutors or opponents and
make d istinctions and divisions of greater or lesser refinem ent depending on the
Political distance betw een the interlocutors (le ft:r ig h t::left o f the left:righ t o f the
left:: left of the left of the le f t: right of the left o f the le ft: :e tc.) so that the sam e agent
io 8 G en erative schemes an d practica l logic
may find him self successively on his own right and on his ow n left in the " absolute ”
space of geom etry, contradicting the third law o f succession.
T h e same analysis applies to the term inologies serving to designate social units:
ignorance of the uncertainties and am biguities w hich these products of a practical lo g ic
ow e to their functions and to the conditions in w hich they are used leads to the
production of artefacts as im peccable as they are unreal. Perhaps no anthropologist
has been more sensitive than Edm und Leach to "the essential difference betw een the
ritual description of structural relations and the anthropologist’s scientific description ”,
or, in particular, to the opposition betw een the "com pletely unam biguous” termino-
logy of *he anthropologist, with his arbitrarily devised concepts, and the concepts
which agents use in ritual actions to express structural relations. Indeed, nothing is
more suspect than the ostentatious rigour o f the diagram s of the social organization o f
Berber societies offered by anthropologists. Jeanne Favret provides an exam ple in a
recent article in w hich she follow s Hanoteau on to a " field ” on which her general ideas
are most redolent of generals’ ideas, as Virginia W oolf would have put it. If her taste
for provocative paradox had not led her to rehabilitate the worthy brigadier-general’s
"wild [sauvage] ethnography” against professional ethnology (which happens to be
somewhat under-professionalized in this area), M s Favret w ould not have gone to the
"innocent and m eticulous ethnography of Hanoteau and L etourneux” for the basis
of the pure, perfect taxonom y of political organization which she opposes to the
anthropological tradition, accusing the latter both of being "m erely more sophisticated
and more ignorant of its lim its” than the general’s military anthropology and of failing
to observe the distinctions which his work makes it possible to draw.23 A more
penetrating reading of the texts in question, produced in the main by administrators
and soldiers (or law professors), w ould show that the vagueness of the social term inolo
gies they offer could only result from a certain familiarity with K abyle reality
com bined w ith ignorance of the theoretical traditions and of the corresponding pre
tensions to theoretical system aticitv. W ithout entering into detailed discussion of
M s Favret’s schem atic presentation o f the term inology collected by Hanoteau, one can
only restate certain basic points of the description of the structure of the village of
A lt H ichem 24 which perhaps erred only by excessive "rationalization” of native
categories. T hough the vocabulary of social divisions varies from place to place, the
fact remains that the hierarchy o f the basic social units, those designated by the words
thakharubth and adhrum, is alm ost always the opposite of what M s Favret, following
Hanoteau, says it is. A few cases can be found in w hich, as Hanoteau maintains,
thakharubth includes adhrum, probably because term inologies collected at particular
times and places designate the results of different histories, marked by the splitting
up, the (no doubt frequent) disappearance, and the annexation of lineages. It also
often happens that the words are used indifferently to refer to social divisions at the
same level; this is the case in the Sidi Alch region, in w hich the terms used, starting
with the m ost restricted and hence most real unit, are (a) el hara, the undivided family
(called akham, the house, akham n A it A li, at Ait H ichem ), (b) akham, the extended
fam ily, covering all the people bearing the name of the same ancestor (as far as the
third or fourth generation) - A li ou X , som etim es also designated by a terra probably
suggested by the topography, since the path bends as one passes from one akham to
another: thaghamurth, the elbow , (c) adhrum, akharub (or thakharubth), or aharumy
bringing together the people w hose com m on origin goes back beyond the fourth
generation, (d) the suff, or sim ply "those ab ove” or "those b elow ”, (e) the village,
a purely local unit, in this case including the tw o leagues. T h e synonym s, to which
must be added tha'rifth (from 'arf, to know one another), a group of acquaintances,
equivalent to akham or adhrum (elsew here, thakharubth) may not have been used
Econom y o f logic
Econom y o f logic
Sym bolic sy stem s ow e their practical coherence, that is, their regularities, and
also their irregularities and even in coh eren ces (b oth eq u ally necessary b ecause
inscribed in the logic of their gen esis and fu n ctio n in g ) to the fact that they
are the p rod uct o f practices w hich can n ot perform their practical fu n ctio n s
except insofar as th ey brin g into play, in th eir practical state, p rin cip les w hich
are not on ly coh eren t - i.e . capable of en gen d erin g in trin sically coh eren t
practices com p atib le w ith the ob jective co n d itio n s - b u t also practical, in the
sense o f co n v en ien t, i.e . im m ediately m astered and m anageable because
obeying a " p o o r ” and econom ical logic.
O ne th u s has to acknow ledge that practice has a logic w h ich is not that of
logic, if on e is to avoid asking of it m ore lo g ic than it can give, thereby
con d em n in g o n ese lf either to w rin g in coh eren ces out of it or to thrust upon
*t a forced c o h er en ce .25 A nalysis of the various b u t clo sely interrelated asp ects
° f the theorization effect (forced sy n ch ro n iza tio n of the su cc essiv e, fictitious
totalization , n eutralization o f fu n ction s, su b stitu tio n o f th e sy stem of products
1 10 G en erative schemes and p ractical logic
for the system of p rin cip les o f p rod u ction , e tc .) brings o u t, in negative form (
certain properties of th e logic o f practice w h ich by definition escape theoretical
ap p reh en sion , sin ce they are con stitu tive of that ap preh en sion. Practical logic
- practical in both sen ses o f the w ord - is ab le to organize the totality of an
agent's th ou gh ts, p ercep tions, and action s by m eans of a few generative
p rin cip les, th em selves redu cible in the last analysis to a fundam ental dicho
to m y , o n ly because its w hole econ om y, w h ich is based on th e principle of
the econ om y of logic, p resu p p oses a loss of rigour for th e sake o f greater
sim p licity and generality and because it finds in " p oly th esis ” the conditions
required for the correct use of p olysem y.
T h an k s to " p o ly th e sis”, the " con fu sion of sp h e r e s”, as the logician s call
it, resu lting from the highly econ om ical, b ut necessarily approxim ate,
application of the sam e sch em es to different logical u niverses, can pass
u nn oticed because it entails no practical co n seq u en ces. N o one takes the
trouble to system atically record and com pare th e su ccessiv e products o f the
application of the generative sch em es: th ese discrete, self-su fficien t u n its owe
their im m ed iate transparency not on ly to th e sch em es w hich are realized in
them , b u t also to the situation ap p reh en d ed through th ese schem es and to the
a gen t’s practical relation to that situ ation . T h e p rin cip le of the ec o n o m y of
lo g ic, w hereby no m ore logic is m ob ilized than is required by the n eed s of
p ractice, m eans that th e universe of d iscou rse in relation to w hich this or that
class (an d therefore the com p lem en tary class) is co n stitu ted , can rem ain
im p licit, because it is im plicitly defined in each case in and b y the practical
relation to th e situ ation . G iven that it is unlikely that tw o contradictory
ap p lication s of the sam e sch em es w ill be b rou ght face to face in w hat w e m ust
call a universe o f practice (rather than a universe of d isco u rse), the sam e thing
m ay, in different u niverses of practice, h ave d ifferent th in gs as its com p lem en t
and m ay, therefore, receive differen t, even o p p o sed , properties, according to
the u n iv e rse .26 T h e h ou se, for exam p le, is glob ally defined as fem ale, dam p,
e tc ., w h en con sid ered from o u tsid e , from th e m ale p oin t of v iew , i.e . in
o p p o sitio n to the external w orld , b ut it can be d ivid ed in to a m ale-fem ale part
and a fem ale-fem ale part w hen it ceases to be seen by reference to a universe
o f practice co exten sive w ith the u niverse, an d is treated instead as a universe
(of practice and d iscou rse) in its ow n righ t, w hich for the w o m en it indeed
is, especially in w in te r .27
T h e fact that sym b olic ob jects and practices can enter w ith ou t contradiction
in to su ccessiv e relation ship s set up from different p oin ts of v iew m eans that
they are subject to overdeterm ination through indetermination: the application
to the sam e ob jects or practices of different sch em es (such as o p en in g/closin g,
g o in g in /co m in g ou t, g o in g u p /g o in g d o w n , e tc .) w h ich , at the d egree of
p recision (i.e . o f im precision ) w ith w hich th e y are d efined, are all practically
Econom y o f logic iii
Ritual practice effects a fluid, "f u z z y ” abstraction, b rin gin g th e sam e sym bol
in to different relations through different aspects or b rin gin g d ifferen t aspects
o f the sam e referent in to th e sam e relation o f o p p o sitio n ; in other w ords, it
exclu d es th e S ocratic q u estion o f the respect in which th e referent is appre-
h en ded (shap e, colour, fu n ctio n , e t c .) , thereby ob viatin g the need to define
in each case th e prin cip le g overn in g the ch oice o f the aspect se lec te d , and,
a fo rtiori, the n eed to stick to that p rin cip le at all tim es. B ut in relating objects
and selectin g asp ects, this practical taxon om y ap plies, su ccessiv ely or
sim u ltan eou sly, prin cip les w h ich are all in directly redu cible to on e another,
and this en ab les it to classify the sam e " d a ta ” from several different stand
p o in ts w ith ou t classifyin g them in different w ays (w h ereas a m ore rigorous
sy stem w o u ld m ake as m any classification s as it fou n d p rop erties). The
u n iv erse th u s u n d ergoes a d ivision w h ich can be said to be logical, though
it seem s to break all the rules of logical d ivision (for ex a m p le, by making
d ivision s w hich are n eith er exclu sive nor ex h a u stiv e), for all its dichotom ies
are in d efin itely redu n dan t, b ein g in th e last analysis the product of a single
principium division is. B ecause the p rin cip le o p p o sin g the term s w h ich have
b een related (e .g . the su n and th e m oon ) is n ot d efined and u sually com es
d o w n to a sim p le contrariety (w hereas con trad iction im p lies a prelim inary
analysis) analogy (w h ic h , w h en it d oes not fu n ction purely in its practical state,
is alw ays exp ressed ellip tically - "w om an is the m o o n ”) estab lish es a
h om o lo g y b etw een o p p o sitio n s (m a n :w o m a n ::su n :m o o n ) set up in accor
dance w4th tw o in d eterm in ate, overd eterm in ed p rin cip les ( h o t : c o ld : : m ale:
fe m a le ::d a y :n ig h t::e tc .) w h ich differ from the p rin cip les gen eratin g other
h om o lo g ies in to wTh ich either o f the tw o term s in q u estion m igh t enter
(m a n :w o m a n ::e a st:w e st or s u n : m o o n : : d r y : w e t). In other w ords, fluid
abstraction is also false abstraction. B ecau se the properties d istin g u ish in g one
" d a tu m ” from another rem ain attached to n on -p ertin en t p rop erties, the
assim ilation is co m p reh en sive and com p lete even w hen fun dam en tally m oti
vated in on ly on e resp ect. T h e aspect o f each o f the term s w h ich is (im p licitly)
selected from a sin gle stan d p oin t in any particular con n ectio n m ade betw een
them rem ains attached to th e other asp ects through w h ich it can su b seq u en tly
be o p p osed to oth er asp ects of an oth er referent in other co n n ectio n s. T h e same
term cou ld th u s en ter in to an infinite n um ber o f con n ectio n s if the num ber
of w ays of relating to wrhat is not itself w ere not lim ited to a few fundamental
o p p o sitio n s. Ritual practice p roceed s n o differen tly from th e ch ild who
drove A ndre G id e to despair b y in sistin g that th e o p p o site o f "blanc
w as " b la n c h e ” and the fem in in e o f " g r a n d ” , " p e t it ”. In sh ort, the
"analogical s e n s e ” in cu lcated in th e earliest years o f life is, as W allon says of
th in k in g in cou p les, a sort o f " sen se o f th e con tra ry ” , w h ich g iv e s rise to the
co u n tless ap p lication s of a few basic contrasts capable o f p rovid in g a m in im u m
Econom y o f logic "3
It is by "practical sense ” that an agent know s, for exam ple, that a given act or object
requires a particular place inside the house; that a given task or rite corresponds to
a particular period of the year or is excluded from another. H e only needs to possess,
in their practical state, a set of schem es functioning in their im plicit state and in
the absence of any precise delim itation of the universe of discourse, to be able to
produce or understand a sym bolic series such as the follow ing: w hen a cat enters the
house with a feather or a wisp of w hite wool in its fur, if it heads for the hearth, this
presages the arrival of guests, w ho w ill be given a meal with m eat; if it goes towards
the stable, this m eans that a cow w ill be bought if the season is spring, an ox if it
autumn. T h e question-begging and the approxim ations in this series are obvious:
the cat, an intruder w hich enters by chance and is driven out again, is only there as
a bearer of sym bols, which realizes practically the m ovem ent of entering; the feather
is im plicitly treated as the equivalent of the w ool, no doubt because both substances
are called upon to function as the mere supports of a beneficent quality, "the w h ite” ;
the opposition betw een the hearth and the stable, the centre of the rite, is engendered
by the schem e w hich structures the internal space of the house, opposing the top and
the bottom , the dry and the w et, the male and the fem ale, the noble part where guests
are received and where meat is roasted (the dish served to guests par excellen ce), and
the lower part, the place reserved for the anim als. T h is schem e only has to be
com bined with the schem e generating the opposition betw een two seasons - autum n,
the tim e of the collective sacrifice of an ox follow ed by the ploughing, and spring,
the season of milk - to give the ox and the co w .30
ii4 G en erative schemes and p ra ctica l logic
A nother exam ple occurs in a w ell-known tale, the story of Heb-H eb-er-Rem m an.
A girl who has seven brothers falls foul of the jealousy of her sisters-in-law. T h ey make
her eat seven snake’s eggs, concealed in dum plings: her belly sw ells and people think
she is pregnant; she is driven from the house. A w ise man discovers the cause of h e r
ailm ent: to cure her, a sheep must be slaughtered and its meat roasted, with a lot
of salt. T h e girl m ust eat it and then be suspended by her feet with her m outh open
over a pan o f water. When this is done, the snakes com e out and they are killed. T h e
girl marries; she has a child whom she calls H eb-H eb-er-R em m an "pomegranate
se e d s”. She goes back to her brothers, who recognize her when she tells them h e r
story, show ing them the seven snakes which she has dried and salted. It can
im m ediately be seen that to produce this narrative, or to decode (at least in an
approxim ate form) its significance, it is sufficient to possess the set of schem es which
are at wrork in the production of any fertility rite. T o fecundate is to penetrate, to
introduce som ething which sw ells and/or causes sw elling: the ingestion of food, and
of food w hich sw ells ( ufthyen) is hom ologous with sexual intercourse and ploughing.31
But here there is a false fecundation: the snakes, a sym bol of the male life-principle,
of sem en, o f the ancestor w ho must die in order to be reborn, and thus of the dry,
are ingested in the form of eggs, i.e. in their fem ale state, and return to maleness
inopportunely, in the girl’s stom ach (in a fertility rite reported by Westermarck, it
is the heart - a male part of the snake - that is eaten ). T h e sw elling which results from
this inverted procreation is sterile and pernicious. T h e cure is logically self-evident.
T he dry m ust be made to move in the opposite direction, from the high to the low
- the girl sim p ly has to be turned upside dow n - and from the inside to the outside
- which cannot be done by a sim ple mechanical operation: the dry must be further
dried, parched, by adding to it what is pre-em inently dry, salt, and reinforcing its
propensity tow ards the moist, which in normal fecundation - procreation or sowing
- carries it towards the inside, towards the damp w om b of woman or of the earth opened
by the ploughshare. At the end of the story, the w om an’s fecundity is proved by the
birth of H eb-H eb-er-R em m an ‘'pom egranate se e d s ” (the sym bol par excellence of
female fecundity, identified with the w om b ), i.e. the many sons born (or to be born)
from the fertile wom b of a woman herself sprung from a wom b prolific of m en (her
seven brothers). And the seven snakes end up dried and salted, i.e . in the state to
w hich they are structurally assigned as sym bols o f male seed, capable of grow ing and
m ultiplying through the cycle of im m ersion in the wet follow ed by em ergence towards
the dry.
the m ystical participation of the great initiates of the g n o stic trad ition. T h e
objectivist reduction w h ich b rings to ligh t the so-called ob jective fu n ction s
0f m yth s and rites (for D u rk h eim , fu n ction s of m oral in tegration ; for L evi-
Strauss, fu n ction s o f logical integration) m akes it im p ossib le to understand
bow these fu n ction s are fu lfilled , b ecau se it brackets th e agents' ow n repre
sentation o f th e w orld and o f their practice. " P a rticip a n t” anth rop ology,
on the other hand - w h en it is not m erely inspired b y nostalgia for the
agrarian paradises, th e prin cip le of all con servative id eo lo g ies - regards the
human invariants and the u niversality o f th e m ost basic exp eriences as
sufficient justification for seek in g eternal answ ers to the eternal q u estio n s of
the cosm ogon ies and co sm o lo g ies in the practical answ ers w h ich the peasants
of K abylia or elsew h ere have given to th e practical, h istorically situated
problem s w h ich w ere forced on th em in a determ in ate state o f th eir in stru
m ents o f m aterial and sy m b o lic appropriation of th e w orld . Even w hen they
are asym ptotic w ith scien tific tru th , the inspired in terp retation s fostered by
such a d isp osition are never m ore than the in version o f th e false objectification
performed b y colonial an th rop ology. By cu ttin g practices off from their real
conditions o f ex iste n c e, in order to credit them w ith alien in ten tion s, by a
false g en erosity co n d u civ e to stylistic effects, the exaltation o f lost wrisd om
dispossesses th em , as su rely as its o p p osite, o f everyth in g that co n stitu tes their
reason and their raison d'etre, and locks th em in the etern al essen ce of a
" m en tality ”. T h e K ab yle w om an settin g up her loom is not perform ing an
act o f co sm ogon y; sh e is sim p ly settin g up her lo o m to w eave clo th in tend ed
to serve a techn ical fu n ctio n . It so happ en s that, given the sy m b o lic eq u ip m en t
available to her for th in k in g her ow n activity - and in particular her language,
which con stantly refers her back to the logic of p lou g h in g - sh e can on ly think
what sh e is d o in g in th e en ch an ted, that is to say, m ystified , form w hich
spiritualism , thirsty for eternal m ysteries, finds so en ch an tin g.
R ites take place b ecau se and o n ly b ecau se they find th eir raison d'etre in
the co n d itio n s of ex isten ce and the d isp o sitio n s o f agen ts w h o cannot afford
the luxury of logical sp ecu la tio n , m ystical effu sion s, or m etaph ysical anxiety.
It is not sufficient to rid icu le the m ore naive form s of fu n ction alism in order
to have d one w ith th e q u estion o f the practical fu n ctio n s o f p ractice. It is clear
that a universal d efinition of the fu n ction s of m arriage as an operation
intended to en su re th e b iological reproduction of the g ro u p , in accordance
with form s approved b y the grou p , in n o w ay ex p lain s K ab yle marriage ritual.
But, contrary to appearances, scarcely m ore u n d erstan d in g is d erived from
a structural analysis w h ich ign ores the sp ecific fu n ctio n s of ritual practices
and fails to inquire in to the eco n o m ic and social co n d itio n s o f the p roduction
° f the d isp o sitio n s gen eratin g both these practices and also th e collective
definition of th e practical fu n ctio n s in w h ose service th e y fu n ctio n . T h e
n6 G en erative schemes an d practical logic
K abyle peasan t d oes not react to " ob jective c o n d itio n s” but to th e practical
in terp retation w hich he prod uces of th o se con d itio n s, and the principle
of wfh ich is the socially con stitu ted sc h e m e s of his h abitus. It is th is inter
pretation w h ich has to be con stru cted in each case, if w e w ant to give an
account of ritual p ractices w h ich w ill d o justice b oth to their reason and
to their raison d'etre, that is, to their inseparably logical and practical
n ecessity .
T h u s , tech n ical or ritual practices are d eterm in ed b y the m aterial conditions
of ex isten ce (that is, in this particular case, by a certain relation ship between
the clim a tic and ecological con d ition s and th e available tech n iq u es) as treated
in p ractice b y agents endowred w ith sc h e m e s of p ercep tion of a determ inate
sort, wrh ich are th em selv es d eterm in ed , n egatively at least, b y th e material
con d itio n s of existen ce (th e relative au to n o m y o f ritual b ein g a ttested by the
invariant features fou n d th rou gh ou t the M agh reb, d esp ite the variations in
th e clim a tic and econ om ic co n d itio n s). It is in a particular relationship
b etw een a m ode of p rod uction and a m o d e of p ercep tion that th e specific
contradiction of agrarian a ctivity is defined as the hazardous or even sacrilegious
con fron tation of antagonistic p rin cip les, togeth er w ith th e ritual apparatus
w h ose fu n ctio n it is to resolve that con trad iction . It is through th e m ediation
o f th e fu n ctio n thereby assigned to tech n ica l or ritual p ractice that the
relation sh ip observed b etw een the eco n o m ic system and the m ythico-ritual
sy stem is estab lish ed p ractically .32
R ites, m ore than any other ty p e of practice, serve to u n d erlin e the mistake
of en clo sin g in co n cep ts a logic m ade to d isp en se w ith co n cep ts; of treating
m o v em en ts o f the body and practical m an ip u lation s as purely logical opera
tio n s; o f speaking of an alogies and h om o lo g ies (as on e so m etim es has to, in
order to understand and to con vey that u nd erstan ding) w h en all that is
in v o lved is th e practical transference of incorporated, quasi-postural
sc h e m e s .33 R ite is in d eed in som e cases n o m ore than a practical mimesis of
the natural p rocess w h ich n eed s to b e facilitated : u nlike m etaphor and
ex p licit analogy, mimetic representation (apom im em a) estab lish es a relationship
b etw een the sw ellin g of grain in th e cook in g-p ot, the sw ellin g o f a pregnant
w om an ’s belly, and th e germ ination of w h eat in the grou n d, w h ich entails
no ex p licit statem en t of th e properties of th e term s related or th e principles
of th eir relationship; the m ost characteristic operations of its " lo g ic ” -
in v ertin g, transferring, u n itin g, separatin g, etc. - take th e form of m o v e m e n t s
of the b o d y , turnin g to th e right or le ft, p u ttin g th in g s u p sid e d o w n , going
in, co m in g ou t, ty in g , cu ttin g, etc.
T o sp eak , as w e have h ere, of overall resem b lance and u ncertain abstraction,
is still to u se th e intellectualist language o f represen tation - the language w h i c h
an an a ly st’s relation to a corpus spread ou t before him in th e form of
The bo d y as geom eter: cosmogonic practice 117
another excep t in a forced and artificial w ay. A n d alm ost all prove to b e based
0n m ovem en ts or p ostu res o f the hum an b o d y , su ch as g o in g u p and com in g
down (or g o in g forw ards and g o in g b ackw ards), g o in g to the left an d g o in g
to the right, g o in g in and co m in g ou t (or filling and em p ty in g ), sittin g and
standing ( e tc .). T h e reason w h y th is practical g eo m etry , or geom etrical
practice (" geom etry in the tangib le w o r ld ”, as Jean N ico d p uts it ),35 m akes
so much u se o f in version is perhaps th at, like a m irror b rin gin g to lig h t the
paradoxes o f bilateral sym m etry, the hum an b od y fu n ctio n s as a practical
operator w h ich reaches to th e left to find the right hand it has to sh ake, puts
its right arm in the sleev e of th e garm ent w h ich had b een ly in g on th e left,
or reverses right and left, east and w est, b y th e m ere fact o f turnin g about
to " fa ce” som eon e or "turn its b a c k ” on h im , or again, turns " u p sid e d o w n ”
things w h ich w ere " the right w ay u p ” - so m any m o vem en ts w h ich the m yth ic
w orld-view charges w ith social sign ification s and w h ich rite m akes in ten sive
use of.
I catch m y self d efin in g th e threshold
A s the geom etric locu s
O f arrivals and departures
In th e H o u se of the F a th er .36
T h e poet goes straight to th e heart of th e relation ship b etw een the space
inside the h ouse and th e o u tsid e w o r ld : th e reversal of d irectio n s (sens) and
m eanings (sens) in g o in g in and c o m in g ou t. A s a b elated , sm all-scale producer
of private m yth o lo g ies, it is easier for him to sw eep aside dead m etaphors and
go straight to the prin cip le of m yth op oeic practice, that is, to the m ovem en ts
and gestu res w h ich , as in a sen ten ce o f A lb ert th e G reat’s p ick ed up b y R ene
Char, can reveal th e d u ality u n d erly in g the seem in g u n ity o f the ob ject: " In
Germ any there w as a pair o f tw in s, on e o f wTh o m op en ed doors w ith his right
arm, the other o f wrh o m sh u t th em w ith h is left arm .”37
If w e sim p ly fo llo w the o p p o sitio n d efined b y W ilh elm von H u m b o ld t, and
move from ergon to energeia, i.e . from ob jects or acts to the p rin cip les of their
production, or, m ore p recisely, from th e f a it accom pli and dead letter of the
already effected analogy (a : b : : c : d ) f w hich ob jectivist h erm en eu tics con sid ers,
to analogical practice as scheme transfer carried o u t b y the h abitus on the basis
° f acquired eq u ivalen ces facilitatin g th e in terch an geab ility of reaction s 38 and
enabling th e agen t to m aster by a sort o f practical gen eralization all sim ilar
Problem s lik ely to arise in newTsitu ation s, then at on ce w e break the sp ell of
the panlogism en cou raged b y the exoteric version of structuralism , in w'hich
the revelation of a n on -in ten tion al coh eren ce, often d escrib ed b y lin gu ists
(Sapir and T ru b etzk o y , for exam p le) and even an th rop ologists as an " u n
con scious fin a lity ”, serves as th e basis for a m etap h ysics o f nature dressed
12 0 G en erative schemes an d practical logic
BOT
122 G enerative schemes and p ra ctica l logic
as is evid en ced b y the n u m erou s sen ses recorded in the d iction aries, the
m ean ing o f each adjective, and of its relation ship w ith its an ton ym , is
sp ecified in each case in term s o f the logic of each of the fields in w hich it
is a p p lie d : fro id m ay be sy n on ym ou s w ith calm e or indifferent, b ut also with
frig id e or g ra v e, or again w ith austere and d istan t, d u r (hard) and sec (dry),
p la t (flat) and tem e (d u ll), d ep en d in g on w h eth er it is applied to a m an or
a w o m an , a head or a heart, a m elod y or a ton e of v o ice, a tin t or a work
of art, a calcu lation or a fit of anger, e t c .; and it w ill have as m any antonym s
as it has different sen ses: chaud (h ot) or cou rse, but also ardent or emporte
(ira scib le), sensuel or chaleureux (cord ial), brillan t or expressif, eclatant (dazz
lin g) or piq u a n t (p u n g en t), etc. It follow s th at, con sid ered in each of their
u ses, the pairs o f qualifiers w h ich as a sy stem con stitu te the eq u ipm en t of
-th e ju d g m en t of taste are extrem ely " p o o r ”, quasi-in determ in ate, and
extrem ely rich, their in d efin iten ess p red isp osin g th em to inspire or express
the sen se of th e indefinable: on the on e h an d , each use o f on e o f these pairs
is on ly m ean in gfu l in relation to a universe o f practice w hich is different each
tim e, u su ally im p licit, and alw ays self-su fficien t, ru lin g out the p ossib ility of
com p arison w ith other universes. O n the oth er hand, the m ean in g w h ic h these
pairs are giv en in a particular field has for h arm onics all the m ean ings w hich
they th e m selv es, or any o f the cou p les that are interchangeable w ith them
to w ith in a m atter of nuan ces, m ay be giv en in other fields, i.e . in slightly
different con texts.
This is true, for example, of the way in which the opposition between “ in front”
and " behind” functions in ritual practice: behind is where things one wants to get
rid of are sent44 (e.g. in one of the rites associated with the loom, these words are
uttered: "May the angels be before me and the devil behind me"; in another rite,
a child is rubbed behind the ear so that he will send evil "behind his ear”); behind
is where ill fortune comes from (a woman on her way to market to sell the products
of her industry, a blanket, yarn, etc., or the produce of her husbandry, hens, eggs,
etc., must not look behind her or the sale will go badly; the whirlwind - thim siw ray
-attacks from behind the man who faces the qibla to pray); "behind” is naturally
associated with "inside ”, with the female (the eastern, front door is male, the western,
back door is female), with all that is private, hidden, and secret; but it also is
associated with that which follows, trailing behind on the earth, the source of fertility,
ab ru \ the train of a garment, an amulet, happiness: the bride entering her new house
strews fruit, eggs, and wheat behind her, symbolizing prosperity. These meanings
interweave with all those associated with "in front”, going forward, confronting
(qabel ), going into the future, going eastward, toward the light, and it would not be
difficult to reconstruct the quasi-totality of Kabyle ritual practices from this one
scheme.
(or th e product o f a sc h e m e , a w ord for exam p le) and a sp ecific situ ation .
T h is is w h y it is n ot legitim ate to speak o f the different m ea n in g s o f a sym bol
UIje s s it is borne in m ind that th e assem b lin g o f th ese m ea n in g s in sim u ltan eity
(or o n th e sam e page o f a dictionary, in the case o f w ord s) is a scientific
artefact and that they n ev er exist sim u ltan eou sly in practice. O n the on e hand,
as V endryes p o in ted o u t, a w ord cannot alw ays appear w ith all its m eanings
at once, w ith o u t tu rn in g d iscou rse into an en d less play on w o r d s ; on the other
hand, if all the m ean in gs a w ord is capable of taking w ere perfectly
independent of the basic m ean in g, no play on w ord s w ould ever b e p ossib le.
T h is is eq u ally true o f th e sy m b o ls o f ritual. A m on g the fo rm s w h ich a basic
opp o sitio n m ay take, there are alw ays som e w h ich fu n ction as " sw itc h e rs”,
concretely esta b lish in g th e relation ship b etw een the u n iv erses of practice:
here, fo r ex a m p le, the relation sh ip b etw een " b e h in d ” and " in s id e ”, w hich
provides the passage from " b e h in d ” to fem ale p rosp erity, i.e . fe r tility -
male prosperity b ein g lin k ed to "in fr o n t” through the in term ed iary of the
bond b etw een "in fr o n t” , th e fu tu re, and ligh t. T h e ob jectified path of th ese
passages is so m etim es m arked o u t b y sayin gs w h ich state th e an alogies ("the
m aiden is th e wall of d a rk n ess” , or "w om an is the w e s t ”, or "w om an is the
m o o n ”) b etw een the d ifferen t series.
T h e universes of m ean in g corresp ond ing to different u n iv erses o f practice
are at on ce self-con tain ed - h en ce protected from logical con trol through
system atization - and objectively con sisten t w ith all the o th ers, insofar as they
are the loosely system atic prod ucts o f a system o f m ore or less com p letely
integrated gen erative p rin cip les fu n ction in g in a structurally invariant w ay in
the m ost d iverse fields o f practice. W ithin the " f u z z y ” logic o f approxim ation
which im m ed iately a ccep ts as eq u ivalen ts " fla t”, "dull*’, and " in sip id ”,
favourite valu e-ju d g m en t term s o f th e F rench aesth ete or teach er, or, in the
Kabvle trad ition, " f u ll”, " c lo se d ”, " in s id e ”, " u n d ern ea th ” , wTh ich on closer
inspection are p erfectly in com m en su rab le, the generative sc h e m e s are in ter
changeable p ractically; th is is w h y th ey can only generate products that are
indeed system atic but are so b y virtue o f a fu zzy sy stem aticity and an
approxim ate lo g ic wrh ich cannot w ithstand the test o f rational system atization
and logical criticism .45 L ack in g sym b olic m astery o f the sc h e m e s and their
products - sch em es w h ich th ey are, p rod u cts w h ich th ey d o - th e only w ay
m w hich agents can ad eq u ately m aster th e p rod uctive apparatus w hich
enables th em to gen erate correctly form ed ritual p ractices is b y m aking it
operate .46 T h is is wrhat the observer is likely to forget, b ecau se he cannot
recapture th e logic im m an en t in th e recorded prod ucts of th e apparatus excep t
by con stru ctin g a m odel w h ich is p recisely th e su b stitu te requ ired w hen one
does not have (or n o lon ger has) im m ed iate m astery of th e apparatus.
Every su ccessfu lly so cia lized agen t thu s p o ssesses, in th eir incorporated
5’2
124 G en erative schemes an d practica l logic
Union an d separation
n o site separate (tran s.) - separate (in tra n s.) - be separated (th e root f r q , or
« cUt - be sharp, and all the roots associated w ith them from the p oint of
riew of ritual m ean in g, close - b e clo sed , ex tin g u ish - be ex tin g u ish ed , kill,
laughter, harvest, e t c .) . T h e p rinciple o f d iv isio n can n ot easily be classified
among the th in g s that it m akes it p ossib le to classify. T h is d ifficulty w as
encountered b y E m p ed o cles, w h o set asid e p h ilia and neikos, love and strife,
as two ultim ate p rin cip les irreducible to th e op p o sitio n s w h ich thanks to them
can be dialecticallv c o m b in e d .48 W hen E m p ed o cles g iv e s as sy n o n y m s of
diakrisis and synkrisis - an op p osition w h ich seem s to b elo n g to the order of
logic, in w h ich u nion and d ivision do in deed figure, but in a v ery su blim ated
form - wrords as load ed as p h th ora, co rru p tio n , or genesis, gen eration, and for
the secon d, m ixis, w h ich can also be translated as u n io n , but th is tim e in the
sense of m arriage, he p o in ts to th e p rin cip le o f th e practical logic of rite, w'hose
operations are in sep arab ly logical and b io lo g ica l, as are th e natural p rocesses
which it reproduces, w'hen th ou gh t in accordance w ith the sch em es of
magical th o u g h t .49
It is th u s p ossib le to d escrib e th e w h ole system of ritual sy m b o ls and
actions by m ean s of a sm all n um ber of antagonistic sym bols (th e paradigm of
which is the op p o sitio n b etw een the sex es, and w h ich are p roduced from a
small num ber o f sch em es) and a sm all num ber o f (logical and b iological)
practical operators w h ich are n o th in g other than natural p rocesses culturally
constituted in and through ritual p ractice, su ch as m arriage and p lou gh in g
seen as the union o f contraries and m urder or h arvestin g seen as the separation
of contraries (p rocesses w h ich the logic of ritual mimesis, as su ch , rep rod u ces).
Because the u n ion of contraries d oes not d estroy th e op p o sitio n (wrhich it
p resupposes), th e reun ited contraries are just as m uch o p p o sed , but nowTin
a quite d ifferen t w ay, th ereb y m anifestin g th e d u ality of th e relationship
between th em , at on ce antagonism and com p lem en ta rity, neikos and p h ilia ,
which m igh t appear as th eir ow n tw ofold " n a tu r e ” if th ey w ere con ceived
outside that relation sh ip . T h u s the h o u se, wrh ich has all th e n egative charac
teristics o f the dark, n octurnal, fem ale w orld , and is in this respect the
equivalent o f th e tom b or the m aiden, ch an ges its d efinition w h en it becom es
what it equally is, the place par excellen ce o f coh ab itation and of the m arriage
of contraries, w h ich , like th e w ife, " th e lam p of th e in s id e ”, en clo ses its ow n
light. W hen the roof has b een put on a n ew h ou se, it is the m arriage lam p
that is called u p o n to bring the first ligh t. Each th in g th u s receives different
properties accord in g as it is apprehended in th e state o f u n io n or th e state
° f separation, but it is not p ossib le to con sid er eith er of th ese states as its
objective tru th , w ith the other b ein g regarded as an im p erfect, m utilated form
of that tru th . T h u s cu ltiv a ted nature, th e sacred of th e left h and, the
^ a le-fem a le, or m ale-d om in ated fem ale, for exam p le m arried w om an or
12 6 G en erative schemes an d p ra c tic a l logic
T h is opposition betw een a fem ale-fem ale and a m ale-fem ale is attested in countless
ways. T h e fem ale wom an par excellence is the wom an w ho d oes not depend on
any m an, who has escaped from the authority of her parents, her husband, and her
husband’s fam ily, and has no children. Such a wom an is w ithout hurm a: "she is bad
w o o d ”; " she is tw isted w o o d ”. S h e is akin to fallow land, the w ilderness; she has
affinities w ith the dark forces of uncontrolled nature. M agic is her b usiness (thamgarth
thazemnith, the old w itch; settuth, the w itch in the tales). A sterile -woman must not
plant in the garden or carry seed s. Every wom an partakes of the diabolic nature of
the fem ale w om an, especially during m enstruation, w hen she m ust not prepare meals,
work in the garden, plant, pray, or fast (elkhalethf the collective noun for
" w om anhood ” is also em p tin ess, the void, the desert, ruin). A n d conversely, the
unbridled, sterile old w om an w ho no longer has any " restraint ” brings the virtualities
inherent in every wom an to their full realization. Like the young sh o o t w hich, left
to itself, tends to the left and has to be brought back to the right (or the upright)
at the cost of a " k n o t”, "wom an is a knot in the w o o d ” (thamttuth d iriz). T h e "old
w om an ” is in league w ith all that is tw isted (a 'w a j, to tw ist) and all that is warped
or warping: she is credited w ith thi'iw ji, the m aleficent, suspect craftiness w hich also
defines the smith ; she specializes in the magic w hich uses the left hand, the cruel hand
(a "left-hander’s b lo w ” is a deadly b low ), and turns from right to left (as opposed to
m an, w ho uses the right hand, the hand used in sw earing an oath, and turns from
left to right); she is adept in the art of slyly "tw isting her g a z e ” (abran w alan) away
from the person to w hom she w ishes to express her disapproval or annoyance (abran,
to turn from right to left, to make a slip of the tongue, to turn back to front, in short,
to turn in the wrong direction, is opposed to geleb, to turn on e’s back, to overturn,
as a discreet, furtive, passive m ovem ent, a female sid estep p in g, a " tw iste d ” move,
a magical device, is to op en , honest, straightforward, male a g gression ).51
work of m o isten in g th e dry, sp rin g is an in term in able tran sition, con stantly
suspended and threaten ed , b etw een the w et and the dry, b eg in n in g im m edia-
telv after lyali; or, b etter, a stru ggle b etw een tw o p rin cip les w ith u n ceasin g
reversals and ch an ges in fortu n e. T h e role of m ankind in this stru ggle, w hich
resembles th e battle fo u gh t ou t every m orn in g b etw een darkness and light,
can only be that of an xious on lookers: h en ce perhaps, a m on g other sig n s, the
m ultitude o f calendar term s alm ost all d escrib in g the state of th e w eather
or the crops. In th is tim e of w aitin g, w hen the fate of the seed lin g s d ep en d s
on a fem ale, am b igu ou s nature, and m an can n ot in tervene w ith o u t danger,
the virtual cessation o f activity reflects his lim ited con trol over the processes
of germ ination and gestation ; it falls to w om an to play th e part of a m id w ife
and to offer nature a sort of ritual and tech n ical assistance (h o e in g , for
exam ple) in its lab o u r .66
T h is tim e o f rupture and separation has the sam e role in the cycle of the
grain as that played in the cycle of life b y th e rites in ten d ed to en su re the
progressive virilization o f the g row in g boy (initially a fem ale b e in g ), b eg in n in g
at birth and alw ays in volvin g fire or in stru m en ts m ade w ith fire .67 A ll the
characteristic features of this d ifficult transition are in a sense concentrated
in the series of critical moments, like husum and natah, tim es of crisis w h en
all the evil p ow ers o f w in ter seem to revive and to endanger g row th and life
one last tim e, or nisan, w h ich th ou gh regarded as b en ignan t is not exem p t
from threats - am b igu ou s p eriods w h ich , even at their w orst, con tain th e hope
of the b est and, even at their b est, the threat of the w orst. E veryth in g takes
place as if each of th em bore w ith in it th e conflict w h ich oversh ad ow s the
w hole season - and also th e u ncertain ty ab out the future w h ich cau ses th ese
inaugural p eriods (esp ecially husum or th e first day o f sp rin g ) to b e , like
m orning, tim es for the rites of progn ostication and inaugural p ractices.
T h e am bigu ity is in sp rin g it s e lf : sp rin gtim e m eans grow th and ch ild h o o d ,
to be celebrated w ith jo y , like the inaugural day o f the sea so n , b u t it also
m eans the vu lnerab ility and fragility o f all b eg in n in g s. S p rin g is to su m m er
as green and raw ( a z e g za w ) and ten der ( th alaqaqth ) th in gs - th e u n rip e corn
or the baby, and green p rod u ce, the eatin g of w h ich is seen as u n tim ely
destruction ( a d h a m ) - are to fu ll-grow n , y ello w (iw ragh en ), ripe, dry, har
dened p ro d u ce .68 T h e w om en are logically charged w ith all th e tasks in v o lv in g
the protection o f th in g s that grow and sh o o t, that are green and ten der; it
is the w o m e n ’s d u ty to w atch over th e grow th of the y o u n g h um ans and
anim als, the m orn in g of life. A s w ell as h o ein g , th e w o m en ’s w ork in clu d es
gathering herbs and vegetab les in the garden, look in g after the co w , m ilk ing
*t, and m aking b u tter, a fem ale p rod uct w h ich is op p osed to oil as th e inside
and the w et to th e ou tsid e and th e dry.
T h e precise locu s of the th resh old , w h ere th e order of th in g s turns u p sid e
I 32 G en erative schemes and practica l logic
S
i.'
Id
ca -s*.
s
fm O
iJ 4
brates the m arriage of the sky and the earth, the p lough sh are and the furrow
b y the co llectiv e en actm en t o f a w h ole range o f m im etic practices, including
hum an m arriage.
T h e return to the ordinary order is also m arked b y the reassertion of the
prim acy of th e stren gth en in g of kin-group u n ity over the p ursuit of distant
alliances, w ith thimechret, th e sacrifice o f an ox at th e door of the year; its
throat is cu t, its b lood is sprinkled on the grou n d , callin g dow n rain, and the
consecrated m eat is shared ou t am ong all m em b ers o f th e com m u n ity. This
sacrifice, in ten d ed to sanction th e im p osition o f the hum an order on fecund
but w ild nature (sym b o lized b y the jackal, " w h o has n o h o u s e ” and feeds
on raw flesh - a z e g z a w - and b lo o d ), is a m eal o f alliance. In solem nly
reaffirm ing th e b on d s of real or official b lood k inship w h ich u n ite all living
m em bers of th e adhrum ( thaym ats) in and through th e original com m unity
(th a d ja d ith ), that is, the relation to com m on ancestors, the source of all
fecu n d ity , th is act of sacred com m en sality p roclaim s th e specifically human
(i.e . m ale) order o f the oath of loyalty, against nostalgia for the struggle of
all against all, again em b od ied in the jackal (or w om an , the source of division)
and his sacrilegiou s cu n n in g (th ah raym ith ). L ike th e natural w orld , within
w h o se d om esticated fertility lie the o n ly half-tam ed forces of a w ild nature
(th ose em b o d ied and exp loited b y th e old w itc h ), the social order sp ru ng from
the oath w h ich tears the assem b ly o f m en from the disorder of individual
interests rem ains haunted b y con scio u sly repressed nostalgia for the state of
nature.
ublic denial (as in all b elief), rite neutralizes the dangerou s forces con tained
jn the w ild , u n tam ed , natural nature of w om an or the earth, as w ell as those
that may be u n leash ed b y violation of its haram , tran sgression o f th e sacred
lim it -77 E nacted in this w ay. collectiv ely and p u b licly , th rou gh th e in ter
mediary o f an authorized d elegate, in accordance w ith the arbitrarily pre
scribed rules of a ritual, sacrilege is sym b olically d en ied in th e very act in
which it is p erform ed. A ctin g as a delegated representative of the grou p , and
also as a scapegoat d esignated to con fron t the cu rse of the earth, th e m an to
whom it falls to op en th e p lou gh in g, "th e m an of the w e d d in g ”78 as he is
som etim es k now n, solem n ly reprodu ces, w ith h is p lough sh are b o m of a
thunderbolt, th e m arriage o f sky and earth, th e archetypal fecun dation w hich
is the con d ition of the su ccess of all hum an acts o f fecu n d a tio n .79 M ale and
female, w et and dry, are in a sen se separated o n ly so as to be reu n ited , sin ce
only their u n ion - in p lou gh in g or m arriage - can free them from th e negative
properties (n egative o n ly in the respect in q u e stio n , that of fecu n d ity ) that
are associated w ith them so long as th ey rem ain in th e odd-num bered, imperfect
state of sep a raten ess .80 T h e ploughshare, an in stru m en t wrhich is forged in
another reunion o f contraries, the tempering of iron, and has th e sam e nam e
as the th u n d erb olt, thagursa, is in itself dry and sterile, like the seed it
introduces in to th e earth: it is a source o f fertility on ly through th e violen ce
it inflicts. A s for the earth, left to itself it returns to sterilitv or the w ild
fecundity of fallow land, w h ich , tw isted and m align ant like th e m aid en , cannot
produce all its b en efits u nless it is forced and violated , and also raised and
straightened.
T h e rites of p lo u g h in g ow e th eir com p lex ity to th e fact that th ey m ust not
only sanction the u nion of op p osites but also facilitate that state o f th e u n ion
of contraries in w h ich suprem acy tem porarily p asses to the fem ale p rin cip le:
the seed tem porarily con d em ned to d ryn ess and sterility returns to life only
through im m ersion in fem ale w e tn e s s ;81 b u t the future o f the grain (for the
earth, like the ew e, m ay fail to b rin g forth - tham azgults, from zgel, to m isfire)
depends on fem ale pow ers w hich the act o f fecu n d atio n has had to force. T h e
door of th e y e a r ” is not the m o m en t w hen th e year b eg in s (it has no
b egin ning, b ein g an everlasting b eg in n in g a n e w ); it is the m om en t w h en , like
the h ou se, w hich m ust rem ain op en to the fecu n d atin g ligh t of th e su n , the
year o p en s up to the m ale principle w h ich fecu n d ates and fills it. P lou ghin g
and so w in g mark the cu lm in ation of the m o v em en t of the o u tsid e in to the
m side, the em p ty in to th e full, th e dry in to th e w et, su n lig h t in to earthly
shadow s, the fecu n d atin g male in to the fertile fem ale.
M arriage rites and p lou gh in g rites ow e their n um erous sim ilarities to the
fact that their objective intention is to san ction the u n ion of contraries w hich
is th e co n d itio n of the resurrection of th e grain and th e reproduction of the
G en erative schemes and practical logic
grou p . T h is d ialectic of death and resurrection is exp ressed in the saying (often
u sed now adays in another sen se w h en sp eak ing o f gen eration conflicts):
" F rom life they draw death, from death th ey draw lif e ” (a sch em e which
reappears in th e riddle: " S o m eth in g dead ou t of som eth in g liv in g ” - an egg.
" S o m eth in g liv in g ou t o f som eth in g d e a d ” - a ch ick ). T h e sacrifice and
co llective eatin g of the ox is a m im etic representation of th e cycle of the grain,
w hich m ust d ie so as to feed the w hole com m u n ity, and wrh ose resurrection
is sym b olized by the solem n m eal b rin gin g together the w h o le com m un ity
in a recalling of the dead. A s is show n by th e status of the ou tsider, th e man
w h o cannot " c ite ” any ascendant and w ill not be " c ite d ” b y any descendant
( asker, to cite and also to resurrect) the grou p m em bersh ip that is affirmed
by gathering together in com m en sality im p lies the p ow er to recall ascendants
.and the certainty o f b ein g recalled b y d escen d an ts. T h e return of the dead,
that is, resurrection, is called for by every asp ect o f sy m b o lism , particularly
that of cook in g: thu s the broad bean, the m ale, dry seed par ex cellen ce, akin
to the b on es, the refuge of th e sou l wraitin g for resurrection, is served in the
cou scous offered to the dead at th e start th e p lou gh in g (and also on the eve
of feast d ays, especially th e eve o f A chu ra ) ; it is on e o f the articles thrown
into the first furrow'; it is u sed in the b o iled d ish es alw ays served on such
occasions: an alm ost transparent sy m b ol of the dead (" I put a bean in the
g r o u n d ”, runs a ridd le, "and it d id n ’t com e u p ” - a dead m a n ), w h ose food
it is (" I saw the dead n ib b lin g b e a n s” - I alm ost d ied ), it is predisposed
to carry the sym b olism of death and resurrection as a d esiccated seed
w h ich , after ritual burial in the dam p w om b of nature, sw ells and com es up
again, m ore n um erous, in sp rin g (w h en it is the first sign o f plant life to
appear ).82
A s acts o f procreation, that is, of re-creation, m arriage and p lou gh in g are
b oth con ceiv ed of as m ale acts o f op en in g and sow in g d estin ed to produce
a fem ale action o f sw ellin g , and it is logical that ritual en a ctm en t should
m ob ilize on the one hand everyth in g that op en s (keys, n a ils), ev eryth in g that
is open (u n tied hair and g ird les, trailing garm en ts), everyth ing that is sw eet,
so ft, and w hite (sugar, h o n ey , dates, m ilk ), and on the other hand everything
that sw ells and rises (pancakes, fritters, seed s w hich sw ell w h ile cooking -
ufthyen), everyth in g that is m u ltip le and tig h tly packed (grains o f seksu,
co u scou s, or berkukes, coarse cou scou s, pom egranate seed s, fig se ed s), every
th in g that is fu ll (eg g s, n uts, alm ond s, p om egranates, fig s), the m ost effective
• • • • 83
objects and actions b ein g th ose wrhich com p oun d the various properties.
S u ch are the egg, the sym b ol par excellen ce of that w hich is full and pregnant
w ith life, or th e pom egranate, w'hich is at on ce fu ll, sw o llen , and m ultip le,
and of w hich on e riddle says, " Granary upon granary, the corn in sid e is red ,
and another: " N o bigger than a p ou n d in g-ston e, and its ch ild ren are more
Reunion o f contraries an d denial *39
T he first tim e the yoke of oxen, the plough, and the seed corn set out for the fields
and the m om ent of the bride’s arrival in her new house are marked by the same rites.
Th e girl is w elcom ed on the threshold by the "old w om an ” who holds the “ sieve of
the traditions”, containing fritters, eggs, wheat, beans, dates, nuts, dried figs,
pomegranates, etc. T h e bride breaks the eggs on the head of the mule that bears her,
wipes her hands on its mane, and throws the sieve behind her, and the children who
have follow ed her scram ble (num ber = abundance) to pick up the titbits it contained.
Similarly, the “ ploughing siev e ” w hich, depending on the local traditions, may be
carried by various persons (the ploughm an, his w ife) at various tim es (in the morning,
when the ploughm an leaves the house, or on his arrival in the fields, when he yokes
the oxen, or at the tim e of the m idday m eal), always contains pancakes, dried beans,
wheat, and a pomegranate, w hich the ploughm an throws into the furrows over the
oxen and the plough, and which the children scram ble for (with countless variants,
such as th e s e : the ploughm an breaks tw o pomegram ates, a few wheatcakes, and som e
fritters on the ploughshare, and distributes the rest among those present; the offerings
are buried in the first furrow'). Endless exam ples could be given of features com m on
to the tw o rituals: the bride (and her procession) are sprinkled with milk and she
herself often sprinkles water and milk as she enters her new house, just as the mistress
of the house sprinkles the plough with water or milk as it leaves for the fields. T he
bride is presented with a key with which she strikes the lintel of the door (elsewhere
a key is put under her clothes as she is being d ressed ); a key is put in the bag of seed
corn and som etim es thrown into the furrow. T h e bridal procession is preceded by
a woman bearing a lamp ( mesbah) which represents sexual union, with the clay, the
oil and the flame of w hich it is com posed sym bolizing the constituent parts of the human
being - the body, the dam p, fem ale, vegetative soul, nefs (a word som etim es used as
a euphemism for the genitals, the seat of the "bad in stin cts” - thinefsith) and the dry,
male, subde soul, ruh (a euphem ism for the penis) ;M and on the first day of ploughing,
a lamp is taken to the fields and kept alight until the first delim ited plot of land
(thamtirth) has been sow n. T h e bride m ust not wear a girdle for seven days, and on
the seventh day her girdle m ust be tied by the m other of many sons; the woman w ho
carries the seed corn must avoid tying her girdle too tight and she m ust also wear
a long dress which trails behind in a lucky train ( abrur). T h e bride’s hair must remain
untied for the first seven days; the woman w ho carries the seed corn always lets her
hair hang loose. A lso com m on to both rituals are: rifle shots (in even num bers),
stone-throwing, and target-shooting, all of w hich frequently figure in the rain-making
rites as sym bols o f male sprinkling w hich have the power of untying that which is tied .85
T he bride’s life continues in this way under the sign of fertility: on the seventh day,
when she com es out of the house to go to the fountain for the first tim e, before
drawing water sh e throws into the spring the grains of corn and the beans which had
been placed under her bed; the first work she does is to sift the wheat, the noble task
Par excellence.
140 G en erative schemes an d practica l logic
practically only by taking all sorts of liberties w ith the m ost elem entary principles of
logical logic: thus the sam e sym bol can relate to realities that are opposed even frorri
the standpoint of the axiom atics of the system - or rather, w e m ust include in that
axiom atics the fact that the system does not exclude contradiction. If being able to
write out the algebra of practical logics is not a p rio n unthinkable, it can be seen that
the precondition of doing so w ould be the know ledge that logical logic, which only
ever speaks of them negatively in the very operations through which it constitutes itself
by denying them , is not prepared to describe them w ithout destroying them . It would
sim ply be a question of constructing the m odel of this pa rtia lly integrated system of
generative schem es w hich, p a rtia lly mobilized to deal with each particular situation,
in each case produces, w ithout acceding to discourse and the logical verifiablity which
it makes possible, a practical “ d efin ition ” of the situation and of the functions of the
action - alm ost always m ultiple and overlapping - and, in accordance w ith a combina
tive logic at once com plex and inexhaustible, generates the appropriate actions to fulfil
these functions given the m eans available. M ore precisely, one only has to compare
the diagrams corresponding to the different dom ains of practice - the agrarian year,
cooking, the w om en ’s work, the day - to see that these different series spring from
different schem es: the oppositions betw een the wret and the dry, the cold and the hot,
and the full and the em pty, in the case o f the agrarian year; betw een the w et and the
dry (in the form of the boiled and the roast, tw o form s o f the cooked), the bland and
the spiced, in the case of cooking; betw een the dark and the light, the cold and the
hot, the inside (or the closed) and the outside in the case of the day; betw een the
fem ale and the male, the tender (green) and the hard (dry), in the case of the cycle
of life. T h en one w ould only have to add other structured universes, such as the space
inside the house or the parts of body, to see other principles at w'ork: above and below,
east and w est, etc. T h ese different schem es are at once partially independent and more
or less closely interconnected: thus the opposition dry/w et (or drying/soaking) can
be used to generate practices or sym bols that cannot be produced directly from the
opposition inside/outside or darkness/light, and vice versa; on the other hand, there
is a direct passage from hot/cold to dry/w et, whereas hot/cold is connected with
inside/outside only through the intermediary of light/darkness, and the path to
oppositions like standing up/lying dow n, em pty/fu ll, or above/below is even longer.
In other w ords, each of the oppositions constituting the system can be linked with
all the others, but along paths o f varying length (w hich may or may not be reversible),
i.e. at the end of a series of equivalences which progressively em pty the relationship
of its content (e .g . w aking/sleeping ~ outside/inside ~ standing u p /lyin g down ~
east/w est ~ light/darkness ~ hot/cold ^ spiced/bland); m oreover, each opposition
can be linked with several others in different respects by relations of differing intensity
and m eaning (e.g . spiced/bland can be directly related to m ale/fem ale and less directly
to strong/w eak or em p ty/fu ll, through the intermediary, in the latter case, of
m ale/fem ale and dry/w et, them selves interconnected). It follow s that all the opposi
tions do not have the same role in the system ; it is possible to distinguish secondary
oppositions w hich specify the principal oppositions in a particular respect and have
a low yield on account of this (yellow /green, a sim ple specification of d ry/w et), and
central oppositions (such as m ale/fem ale or dry/w et) strongly interconnected w ith all
the others by logically very diverse relations w hich constitute arbitrary cultural
necessity (e .g . the relations betw een fem ale/m ale and inside/outside or left/right,
tw isted/straight, below /ab ove). G iven that, in practice, no more than one particular
sector of the system of schem es is m obilized at any one tim e (w ithout all the
connections with the other oppositions ever being entirely severed) and that the
T he habitus an d homologies *43
d iffe r e n t schem es m obilized in different situations are partially autonom ous and
rtially linked w ith all the others, it is natural that all the products of the application
of th e s e schem es, both individual rites and series of ritual actions such as the rites
0f p a s s a g e , should be partially congruent and should appear as roughly, that is,
p ra c tic a lly , equivalent to anyone possessing practical m astery of the system of
sc h e m e s .90
T h e habitus a n d homologies
gteam ed, or raised w ith leaven (fritters), op eration s w hich all m ake th e food
##//; and on th e other sid e there are th e raw, green , or fresh fo o d s (three
m eanings of th e w ord a z e g z a w , associated w ith sp rin g and u nripe corn) w hich
are eaten r a w (as ten d s to b e th e case in sp rin g) an d /or boiled or grilled (on
the griddle, bufrah) and h ea v ily sp iced (as in su m m er ).92 A nd th e variations
0bServed are fu lly accoun ted for w hen on e has n oted that the first com b in ation
is characteristic of late au tu m n and w in ter, the period w h en the dry is
m oistened and the fertilized earth and w om an are ex p ected to s w e ll, w hereas
the second is associated w ith sp rin g, a tran sitional season, and su m m er, the
period of d esicca tio n o f th e w et and separation from the fem ale, w hen
evervthing that has d ev elo p ed in w ard ly, like grains of w heat and beans
(ufthyen) m u st op en out and ripen in th e ligh t o f d a y .93
Without entering into a description - strictly speaking, an interm inable one, ow ing
to the innum erable variants - of the feast-day dishes w hich in a sense concentrate the
characteristic properties o f the cooking associated w ith the various periods, it is
nonetheless possible briefly to indicate their pertinent features, bearing in mind that
the dishes differ not so m uch in their ingredients as in the processes applied to them ,
which strictly define cooking (so that certain " polysem ous ” item s reappear at different
times of the year and in very different rites: for exam ple w heat, of course, but also
broad beans, which figure in the meals of p loughing tim e, the first day of January,
harvest tim e, funerals, e tc .). On ploughing days, the meal eaten outside in the fields
is, as always, m ore m ale, i.e. " d rier”, than the food of autum n and winter as a w hole,
which is boiled or steam ed, like th e food eaten at the tim e of w eddings or burials; but
the meal taken in the evening after the first day’s ploughing always consists of boiled
cereals, with num erous variants, or a coarse-grained, unspiced couscous, a dish
explicidy excluded from the m eal of the first day of spring (" because the ants would
multiply like the grains of sem o lin a ”) or ufthyen, made from grains of wheat and beans
cooked in wrater or steam , or abisar, a sort of thick bean puree, the food o f the dead
and of resurrection (these dishes are always associated w ith m anv-seeded fruit,
pomegranates, figs, grapes, nu ts, or sw eet foods, honey, dates, e tc., sym bols of
"easiness”). W heatcake, the dry, male food par excellence, m ust not be cooked during
the first three days of p lo u g h in g ; it is even said that if roast meat were eaten (the meat
of the thimechretox is eaten b oiled ), the oxen would before long be injured in the neck.
The couscous (berkukes) eaten on the first day of ennayer contains poultry, typically
female (am ong other reasons because the fowl are the w om en ’s personal property).
But it is no doubt on the eve of th is day (som etim es called the "old w o m e n ” of
ennayer) that the schem e generating w inter food, that of m oistening the dry, shows
through m ost clearly: on that day, people must eat nothing but boiled, dry grains
(som etim es with fritters), and m ust eat their fill; they must not eat m eat ("so as not
to break the b o n e s”) or dates (" so as not to expose the sto n e s”). T h e meal eaten on
the first day of ennayer (A chura) is very similar to that of the first day of ploughing:
it is always substantial (being an inaugural rite) and consists of abisar or berkukes and
fitte r s , or boiled cereal. From the first day of spring, as well as the traditional
elem ents of fertility-giving food (couscous cooked in the steam o f adhris, thapsia, which
causes sw elling, hard-boiled eg g s, which m ust be eaten to satiety), the diet includes
grilled cereals (w hich the children eat outdoors), raw, green produce (beans and other
146 G en erative schemes an d practical logic
vegetables) and milk (warmed or cooked). W ith the return of a za l, dry pancakes dipped
in hot milk, and sem olina with butter, announce the dry, male food of sum m er. The
com bination characterizing the feast-day m eals of the dry season is wheatcake and
grilled meat with or w ithout couscous (depending mainly on whether it is eaten in
the fields or in the h o u se ); more ordinary m eals consist of wheatcake dipped in oi7
(a dry, male food contrasting w ith wet, fem ale butter) and dried figs and also, f0r
indoor meals, grilled fresh vegetables.
W ool and potter)', natural products, have much the same cycle. Pottery, being
derived from the earth, partakes of the life of the field ; the clay is collected in autumn,
but it is never worked in that season, nor in w inter, when the earth is pregnant, but
in spring. T h e unfired (azegzaw ) pottery dries slowly in the sun (w et-dry) w hile the
ears o f corn are ripening (the wet-dry p eriod). S o long as the earth bears the ears,
it cannot be baked; it is only after the harvest, when the earth is bare and no longer
producing, and fire is no longer liable to dry up the ears (the drv-dry period) that
baking can be carried out, in the open air (dry-dry).
5 a.m . flo c k g o e s o u t
el fjar m en go o u t
6 a .m . (to fie ld s a n d m a r k e t)
7 a.m.
8 a.m .
9 a.m.
eddoha - flo c k r e t u r n s i s t t i m e - flo c k g o e s o u t
i o a.m. lm e k li (m e a l) ^ m e n go o u t
( to f ie ld s a n d m a r k e t)
azal re st
*•’ ( le m q il) •* A
thanalth (snack)
1 p .m . flo c k g o e s o u t 2 n d t i m e .
cddohor A
2 pm . d e c lin e o f a za l
L
3 P-m . t h a n a l t h (s n a c k )
4 p .m . flo c k returns
el ‘aser
tim e spent
resting outdoors
ansaf ass
(middle ot the day)
perform ed, and the break is m ade w ith darkness, ev il, and d eath, so that
0ne m ay "be in the m orn in g ”, i.e . op en to th e lig h t, the g o o d , and th e luck
that are associated w ith it (th is is, for exam p le, the m o m en t w h en the
semolina left overnight near the head o f a jealous baby, or on e afflicted by
transferred ev il - aqlab - is p ou red over h im ). E very m orn in g is a birth.
jylorning is the tim e for g o in g o u t, th e opening o f the day and an o p en in g up
to light (fa ta h , to o p en , b lo sso m , is sy n o n y m o u s w ith sebah} to be in the
m orning). It is an o p en in g first in the sen se that th is is the m om en t w h en
the day is born ( thallalith w a ss, the birth o f th e d ay), w h en " th e eye of the
light ” {th it antafath) o p en s an d th e h o u se and th e village, w h ich had clo sed
in upon th em selv es for th e n ig h t, pour out their m en and their flocks into
the fields. A n o p en in g too in the sen se of " b e g in n in g ” : m o rn in g is an
inaugural m om en t w h ich m en w orth y of the nam e feel it right to b e present
at and take part in ( esbah, to be p resen t, to b e alive in th e m o rn in g ).
" M orn in g”, it is said, " m ean s fa c ility .” T o get u p early is to place on iself
under favourable au spices ( leftah, o p en in g , good a u gu ry). T h e early riser is
safe from the en cou n ters w h ich b rin g m isfortu n e; w hereas the m an w h o is
last to set ou t on the road can have n o other com p an ion than th e on e-eyed
man (associated, like th e b lin d , w ith n igh t) w h o w aits for broad d ayligh t before
setting o u t, or th e lam e m an w h o lags b eh in d . T o rise at cockcrow is to put
one’s days in the p ro tectio n o f th e an gels of th e m o rn in g and to d o them
honour; it is, so to speak, to put o n eself in a state o f grace, to act in such
a way that " th e an gels d ecid e in o n e ’s s te a d ”. In fact the m orn in g, an
inaugural tim e b lessed by th e return of lig h t and life, is the best m o m en t for
making d ecisio n s and u n d ertak in g action : the inauguration rites w h ich mark
the days o f transition are p erform ed at daybreak, w h eth er it be the w aking
of the cattle at the w in ter so ls tic e , the renew al rites on the first day o f the
year (ennayer), th e sh ep h e rd s’ departure to gather p lants on the first day of
spring, the flock ’s g o in g ou t on the return o f a z a l, etc.
T h e m orn ing, like the h o m o lo g o u s period in th e agrarian year or hum an
life, sp rin g or ch ild h o o d , w o u ld be en tirely favourable - sin ce it m arks th e
victory of ligh t, life, and th e future over n ig h t, d eath, and the past - d id not
its p osition confer on it th e fearful pow er to d eterm in e th e future to w h ich
it b elon gs and w h ich it g overn s as th e inaugural term of the s e r ie s :100 thou gh
intrinsically b en eficent, it is frau ght w ith th e danger o f m isfortu n e, inasm uch
as it can d ecid e, for good or for ill, th e fate of the day. W e m ust take a closer
look at th is lo g ic , that of m agic, w h ich has perhaps never b een fully
und erstood , b ecau se it is all too easily half u nd ersto o d on th e basis o f the
quasi-m agical exp erien ce o f th e wrorld w h ich , u nd er th e effect o f em o tio n , for
exam p le, im p o ses itself even on th ose w h ose m aterial co n d itio n s of ex isten ce,
*52 G en erative schemes an d practical logic
and an in stitu tion al en viron m en t ten d in g to discourage it, best p rotect thein
against th is " regression W hen th e w orld is seen as " a fatal system ”101 whose
startin g-p oin t is its cau se, w hat h app en s in the w orld and w hat people do
govern w hat w ill happen and w hat w ill be d o n e. T h e future is already
inscribed in the p resen t in th e form of o m e n s .102 M en m ust d eciph er these
w arnings, not in order to su b m it to th em as a d estin y (like the em otion which
accepts th e future a n n ou n ced in th e p resen t) but in order to be able, if
n ecessary, to ch an ge th em : this is on ly an apparent con trad iction , since it is
in the nam e o f th e h yp o th esis o f the fatal system that a m an w ill try to remake
the future an n ou n ced in the p resen t by m aking a n ew present. M agic is fought
w ith m agic: th e m agical p oten cy o f the om en -p resen t is fought w ith conduct
aim ing to ch an ge th e startin g-p oin t, in th e nam e of the b elief, w hich was
the w h ole stren gth o f th e o m en , that th e sy ste m ’s starting-point is its cause.
M orning is the time w hen everything becom es a sign announcing good or ill to come.
A man who m eets som eone carrying milk sees a good om en in the encounter; a man
who hears the shouts of a quarrel w hile he is still in bed draws a bad om en from them.
Men anxiously watch for the signs (esbuh, the first encounter of the morning,
portending good or ill) through w hich evil forces may announce their im m inence, and
an effort is made to exorcize their effect: a man w ho m eets at dawn a blacksmith, a
lame man, a one-eyed m an, a wom an w ith an em pty goatskin bottle, or a black cat
must "remake his m orn in g”, return to the night by crossing the threshold in the
opposite direction, sleep again, and remake his "going o u t”. T h e w hole day (and
som etim es the wThole year or a m a n s w hole life, w hen it is the m orning of an inaugural
day) hangs on his know ing how to defeat the malignant tricks of chance. T h e magical
potency of words and things works w ith particular intensity here, and it is more than
ever necessary to use the euphem ism s which replace baleful words: of all the words
tabooed, the most dreadful are those expressing term inal acts or operations -
shutting, extinguishing, leaving, spreading - w hich m ight invoke an interruption, an
untim ely destruction, em ptiness (e.g . "T here are no dried figs left in the sto re”, or
the mere word "n o th in g ”) or sterility.103
dry a n d the sterile, sh o u ld be stron gly associated w ith the d esert (lakhla) of
the harvested field.
Eddohor, th e secon d prayer, roughly coin cid es w ith the en d of the a z a l rest:
this is the start of " th e d eclin e o f a z a l” , the en d o f th e fiercest heat (a zg h a l),
when for th e seco n d tim e the flocks set out for the fields and th e m en go
0ff to w ork. W ith the third prayer, eVasar, a z a l en d s and thameddith (or
thadugwalh) b e g in s : n ow " the m arkets have em p tied ” an d n ow too the taboos
of the ev en in g take effect. T h e d eclin e of th e sun ( agh aluy itij), w h ich " slop es
to the w e s t ”, is in a sen se the paradigm of all form s o f d eclin e, in particular
old age and all kind s of political d ecad en ce ( yeghli itij-is, his su n has fallen)
or physical decay (yegh li Iwerq-is): to g o w estw ard , tow ards the se ttin g sun
(ghereb, as o p p o sed to cherraq, to go tow ards the risin g su n ), is to go tow ards
darkness, n ight, d eath, like a h ouse w h ose w estw ard -facin g door can o n ly
receive sh adow s.
Pursuing the analysis o f the different fields o f application of the system
of generative sch em es, w e could b uild up a sort of sy n o p tic diagram of the
cycle o f life as stru ctured by the rites of passage: birth (w ith the practices
associated w ith th e cu ttin g o f th e um b ilical cord b y the qabla and th e rites
intended to p rotect the ch ild against evil s p e lls ) ; n am e-givin g on the third
or seven th day; the first tim e th e m oth er and ch ild co m e out of th e h ou se,
on the fortieth day (w ith , in the m ean tim e, all th e rites of "the breaking of
the link w ith the m o n th ”, thuksa an-tsucherka w a y u r , on th e third, sev en th ,
fourteenth, th irtieth , and fortieth d ays, to "break the association w ith the
month ” - to drive ou t evil and also to separate the ch ild p rogressively from
the fem ale w’o rld ); the "first v en tu r es” (in to th e courtyard, away from the
fam ily); the first haircut, a purificatory ritual o ften associated w ith the first
visit to th e m arket; circu m cision , m arriage, and burial. T h e cycle of th e rites
of passage is in fact subordinated to th e agrarian calendar w h ich , as w e have
seen, is itself n o th in g other than a su ccession o f rites o f passage.
This is primarily because in a number of cases the rites of passage are more or less
ex p lic itly associated with particular moments in the year, by virtue of the homology
betw een them a n d the moment in question; thus, for example, a birth is auspicious
*f it c o m e s at lahlal (or in the morning), ill omened if it comes at husum or in sla (or
th e afternoon betw een eVasar and el maghreb); early afternoon is the best time for
circum cision, but not w inter, and eVazla gennayer is the propitious m om ent for the
first haircut; autum n and spring (after eVazla) are the right tim es for marriage, which
ruled out on the last day of the year, at husum and nisan, and in May and June.
The springtim e rites (and in particular those of the first day of spring and the return
° f azal) set to work a sym bolism which applies as m uch to the unripe corn, s till,e bound,
fettered, k notted ” (igan), as to the lim bs of the baby w hich cannot yet walk ( aqnan
lfadnis) and remains in a sense attached to the earth .106 T h o se rites of passage that
are not linked to a particular period of the year always ow e som e of their properties
6 BO T
1 54 G en erative schemes and practica l logic
to the ritual characteristics of the period in w hich they are perform ed, a fact which
explains the essential features o f the variants observed. For exam ple, the beneficent
water of ntsan, a necessary com ponent in the rites specific to that period (like the
first milk in spring, the ears o f the last sheaf in sum m er, e tc .), also appears as
a supplem entary elem ent in the rites of passage w hich happen to take place at that
tim e.
B u t, at a d eep er level, it is the w h ole o f hum an ex isten ce that, b ein g the
p rod u ct o f th e sam e system of sch e m e s, is organized in a m anner hom ologous
to that o f th e agrarian year and the other great tem poral " series Thus
procreation (a k h la q y creation) is very clearly associated w ith ev e n in g , autumn,
and the d am p , nocturnal part of the h ouse. Sim ilarly, gesta tio n corresponds
to th e u nd ergrou nd life of th e grain, i.e . th e " n ig h ts ” ( l y a l i ) : the taboos of
p regnancy (o f fecu n d ity) are th e taboos o f ev e n in g and death (look in g in a
m irror at n igh tfall, e tc .); th e pregnant w om an , like the earth sw ollen in spring,
partakes o f the w orld o f the d ead (ju f, w h ich d en o tes the belly o f th e pregnant
w om an , also m eans north, the h om ologu e of n igh t and w in ter). G estation,
like germ in ation , is id en tified w ith cook in g in th e p o t: after ch ild b irth the
w om an is served th e b oiled food of w in ter, of the dead , and of ploughing,
in particular abisar (th e food of the dead and o f fun erals) w h ich , excep t on
th is occasion , is n ever eaten b y w o m en , coarse-grained cou sco u s b oiled in
water ( a b a zin ), pancakes, fritters, and eg g s. C hildb irth is associated w ith the
" o p en in g ” o f th e en d of w in ter, and all th e taboos on clo sin g that are
observed at that tim e reappear here (crossin g th e legs, fo ld in g th e arms,
clasping th e hands togeth er, w earing b racelets or rin g s). T h e hom ology
betw een sp rin g, ch ild h o o d , and m orn ing, inaugural p eriods o f uncertainty
and exp ectation , m an ifests itself in , a m on g other th in g s, the abundance of
p rogn ostication rites w h ich are practised th en . A lth ou gh d escrib ed as an
untim ely d estru ction (a n a d a m ), the harvest is not a death w ith o u t issue
( m a'dum, the bachelor, w h o d ies ch ild le ss), and m agic, w h ich allow s the profits
of contradictory action s to be co m p ou n d ed w ith ou t co n trad iction , is expected
to bring ab out resurrection in and through a n ew act of fecu n d a tio n . Sim ilarly,
old age, w h ich faces the w e st, the settin g su n , n ight and d eath, the dark
direction par ex cellen ce, is at the sam e tim e turned tow ards the east of
resurrection in a new b irth. T h e cycle en d s in death, that is, th e w est, only
for the ou tsid er (aghrib), the m an of the w est (elgharh) and o f exile (elghorba),
hence w ith o u t issu e (anger). H is grave is o ften u s e d - a s an exem plary
realization of u tter o b liv io n and annihilation - in th e rites for the expulsion
of evil: in a u niverse in w h ich a m an ’s social ex isten ce requires that he be
linked to h is ancestors through h is ascen dan ts and b e " c ite d ” and "resur
re c te d ” (asker) b y h is d escen d an ts, the death o f th e o u tsid er is the only
absolute form of d ea th .107
T he habitus an d homologies I 55
q'he different generations occupy different positions in th is cycle, diametrically
0osed for successive generations, those of father and son (since one conceives when
0ther is conceived, and enters old age w hen the other is in ch ild h ood ), and
dentical for alternate generations, those of grandfather and grandson (see fig. 8). Such
1 the logic w hich, making of birth a rebirth, leads the father w henever possible to
^ve his first-born son the name o f his own father (asker: to name and to resurrect).
And the fields go through a perfectly analogous cycle, that of tw o-year rotation: just
as the cycle o f generation is closed by A ’s death and resurrection, i.e . w hen B conceives
q so the cycle of the field is closed w hen field A, w hich has lain fallow , awaiting its
r e s u r r e c t i o n , for the duration of the life of the fecundated field B , is "raised from the
dead” by p loughing and sow ing, i.e . w hen field B is laid fallow.
fatherhood
B’s bi rth
s’ .
vV
. O'
A ’s b irth
6-2
156 G enerative schemes and pra ctica l logic
practice and b y ex p lo itin g th e m agic o f the w ritin g w hich tears practice and
discou rse o u t o f the flow' o f tim e .109 It is only w hen practical m etaphor,
schem e-tran sfer effected on the h ith er sid e of d iscou rse, b ecom es metaphor
or analogy that it is p ossib le, for exam p le, to w ond er like Plato w hether "it
was the earth that im itated w om an in b ecom in g pregnant and b rin gin g a being
in to the w orld , or w om an that im itated the e a r th ” (.Menexenus, 238a).
Ign oran ce o f the objective truth of practice as learned ignorance is the
source o f in nu m erab le theoretical errors, not least the error from which
W estern p h ilosop h y originated (and w hich an thropological scien ce endlessly
reprodu ces ).110 R ites and m yth s w h ich w ere " acted o u t ” in th e m ode of belief
and fulfilled a practical fu n ction as collective in stru m ents of sym b olic action
on the natural w orld and above all on th e grou p , receive from learned
reflection a fu n ctio n w hich is not their owrn b ut that w hich th ey have for
scholars. T h e slow evolu tion "from religion to p h ilo so p h y ”, as Cornford and
the C am bridge school p ut it, i.e . from analogy as a practical schem e o f ritual
action to an alogy as an ob ject o f reflection and a rational m eth o d o f thou ght,
is correlative w ith a transform ation o f the fu n ction w hich the grou p s concerned
confer on m yth and rite in their p ractice .111 M yth ten ds to cease to have any
fun ction o th er than the one it receives in the relations o f co m p etition betw een
the literate scholars w h o question and interpret its letter by reference to the
q u estio n s and readings of past and contem porary interpreters: on ly then does
it becom e ex p licitly w hat it alw ays w as, b ut on ly im p licitly or practically so,
i.e . a sy stem o f so lu tio n s to cosm ological or anthropological prob lem s w hich
scholarly reflection thinks it finds in them b u t w hich it in fact creates ex nihilo
by a mistaken reading that is im p lied in any reading ignorant o f its objective
truth as a literary read in g .112
T h e p rob lem s w hich n ascent p hilosop h y thin ks it raises in fact arise of their
ow n accord from its unanalysed relation ship to an object w h ich never raised
th em as su c h . A nd th is is no less true o f its m ost sp ecific m od es of thou ght:
th e pre-S ocratic thinkers w ou ld not h old su ch fascination for certain p h ilo
sop hers (w h o practically never p ossess the m eans o f really u nd erstan ding
th em ) w ere it not that they su p p ly its m ost accom plished m od els to the tradi
tion (m o st " e m in e n tly ” represented b y H eidegger) o f th e play on w ords of
com m on o rigin w hich estab lish es a doubly determ ined relationship b etw een the
lin g u istic root and the m yth ic root, or the (H eg elia n ) tradition of etym ology
seen as a m ean s of reappropriating th e treasures accum ulated b y th e historical
w ork of rea so n .113 It is in d eed the essen ce of learned reflection that it situates
the p rinciple o f relations con fu sed ly sensed in the order o f m ean in g (sens),
in relations wrh ich m anifest th em selv es at th e level of the letter (h om op h on v,
h om ograph y, p aronym y, etym ological kinsh ip , e tc .). T h e in anity o f m eta-
'57
^ ^ reU^ . p u blic)
h a rv e s t ( m j r d e r )
c u tt i n g w oven c lo th
old age
DRY
ft?
/5: A B O V E (m a s te r b eam )
*
- ¥-s
»<"
O U T S I D E (fields, asse m b ly , m ark e t)
*r?
o
between WET
d e a th = fec u n d a tio n O P E N IN G O U T - k
w
s p r in g
G O IN G O U T E T
> S TH RESH OLD N -
vail o f d o o r
c w all o f d a rk n e s s ^ / ' ’s Ns \vall o f w eav in g lo o m
N TH RESH OLD S I
E w
c*. O P E N IN G - F U L L (sw elling) g re e n , raw *
G
% E N T E R IN G
C L O S E D (d ifficu lt, e n c lo su re) co w . grass ^
z ^ ia m p , p lo u g h in g
h* in
m ilk, b u t te r
l ,CT
q
\ ^ b e a n , egg, snake I N S I D E (h o u se , g a rd e n , fo u n ta in , w o o d ) u n rip e corn
£ s ta r t o f w eaving
B E L O W (ly in g d o w n , m ain b e a m )
rfi ox , oil
S’,
W ET c h ild h o o d
o
■9
.^
w o m b , p o m e g ra n a te , p a rtrid g e , h en
th a m g h a rth , p a ra lle l c o u sin , sc cre t, b lac k
g e sta tio n co o k in g -p o t, b o ile d m e a t, g ru el, sw e e t, b la n d JO b irth
<J b lo o d , n e fs (liv e r), h u rm a
*V^i ~ sta b le , sle e p (d e a th ), e a rth
OjTfj to m b , d a rk n e s s , m o o n ^
c° tl o f ™ e '%<&*■
A o^ T H - n ig h t - v
( u n o f f ic i a l, m a g i c * 1’ oT^ ,^ £ 0
O D D -N L M B E R E D
n a k e d n e ss, m a id e n , s ta g n a n t w a te r
o g ress, w itch , tre a c h e ry , g u ile
N e g ro , s m ith , jac k a l (div isio n ), bo ar
D o rn , orthodoxy, heterodoxy
jar o f w ater from the sp rin g in the gard en , a bun ch o f herbs, v in e-lea v es, or
fliaize, for the d o m estic anim als. T h ere are also the you n g w ives w ho,
especially at the tim e of the fig-harvest, follow their h u sb an d s around the
orchard, picking up the fruit the m en have b eaten d o w n , so rtin g it and
setting it ou t on trays, and g o h om e in th e even in g , each a few p aces b ehind
her h usb and , alone or accom panied b y the "old w o m a n ”.
T h u s the d o u b le g o in g ou t d elim its a z a l, a sort of " d e a d ” tim e w hich
everyone feels he m ust respect: all is silen t, still, and austere; th e streets are
" d esertlik e” . M ost of th e m en are scattered far from the village, so m e living
in the a zib , others aw ay from h om e for lon g p eriods looking after th e garden
and the pair of oxen that are b ein g fatted , others w atch in g over th e fig-drying
shed (in this season every fam ily’s fear is that in an em ergen cy it w ould not
be able to assem b le its m en ). N o on e can say w heth er th e p u b lic space of
the village b elo n g s to m an or to w om an . S o each of th em takes care not to
occupy it: there is so m eth in g su sp iciou s about an yon e w h o v en tu res in to the
streets at that hour. T h e few m en w h o have not stayed in the field s to sleep
under a tree take their siesta in any sp ot that is to hand, in th e shade of a
porch or a h ed ge, in front o f the m osq u e, on th e flagstones or indoors, in
the courtyards o f their h ou ses, or in sid e room s if th e y have o n e. F urtive
shadows slip across the street from on e house to another: th e w o m e n , eq u ally
unoccupied, are taking advantage of the lim ited presence of the m en to m eet
together or visit on e another. O n ly th e sh ep h erd s 2 w h o have returned to the
village w ith their flocks bring life to th e outer crossroads and th e m inor
m eeting-places w ith their gam es - thigar, a kicking con test, thighuladthy stone-
throwing at targets, thim rith, a sort o f d rau ghts, etc.
D o in g o n e’s d u ty as a m an m eans co n fo rm in g to the social order, and this
is fun dam en tally a q uestion of resp ectin g rh ythm s, k eep in g p ace, not falling
out of lin e ." D o n ’t w e all eat the sam e w heatcake (or th e sam e b arley) ? ” " D o n ’t
we all get up at the sam e tim e? ” T h ese various w ays of reasserting solidarity
contain an im plicit d efinition of the fundam ental virtue of con fo rm ity , the
opposite of w h ich is the desire to stand apart from others. W orking w hile the
others are resting, stayin g in th e house w hile the others are w ork in g in the
fields, travelling on d eserted roads, w andering round the streets of th e village
while the others are asleep or at the m arket - these are all su sp icio u s form s
of b ehaviour. T h e eccentric w h o d oes everyth in g d ifferently from other people
is called am kh alef (from khalef, to stand o u t, to transgress) and th ere is often
a play on w ords to the effect that am kh alef is also th e m an w h o arrives late
(from khellef, to leave b eh in d ). T h u s , as w e have seen , a w orth y m an,
conscious o f h is resp on sib ilities, m u st get up early .3 " T h e m an w h o d oes not
settle h is b u sin ess early in the m orn ing w ill never settle i t ” ; " I t’s th e m orning
that giv es the hunters th eir g a m e ; bad luck for late sleep ers! ” and again " T h e
162 Structures , habitus , po w er
his field full of strange ears, d elicate and b rittle, like w om an . H e called this
plant (barley) ech'ir" w ea k ”. O n e of the effects o f the ritualization o f practices
js precisely that of assign in g them a tim e - i.e . a m o m en t, a tem p o , and a
duration - w hich is relatively in d ep en d en t o f external n ecessities, th ose of
climate, tech n iq u e, or econ om y, thereby conferring on th em th e sort of
arbitrary n ecessity w h ich sp ecifically d efines cultural arbitrariness.
T h e reason w h y su b m ission to the collective rh yth m s is so rigorously
dem anded is that the tem poral form s or the spatial structures structure not
only the g rou p ’s representation o f the w orld b ut the grou p itself, w hich orders
itself in accordance w ith th is representation: th is m ay be clearly seen , for
exam ple, in the fact that the organization of the ex isten ce of the m en and the
women in accordance w ith different tim es and different places co n stitu tes tw o
interchangeable w ays of secu rin g separation and hierarchization o f th e m ale
and fem ale w orld s, th e w om en g o in g to th e foun tain at an hour w h en the m en
are not in the streets, or b y a special path, or both at o n c e .6 T h e social
calendar ten ds to secure in tegration by co m p ou n d in g the synchronization of
identical p ractices w ith the orchestration of different but structurally h o m o lo
gous practices (su ch as p lou gh in g and w eavin g ).7A ll the d iv isio n s of the group
are projected at every m om en t in to the spatio-tem poral organization w hich
assigns each category its place and tim e: it is here that the fu zzy logic of
practice wTorks w ond ers in en ab lin g th e group to ach ieve as m uch social and
logical integration as is com p atib le w ith th e d iversity im p osed by the d ivision
of labour b etw een the sexes, the ages, and the " o c cu p a tio n s” (sm ith ,
butcher ).8 S yn ch ron ization , in the case o f rites or tasks, is that m u ch m ore
associated w ith spatial grou p ing the m ore there is co llectively at stake: rites
thus range in im portance from the great solem n rites (e .g . aw djeb) enacted
by everyone at the sam e tim e, through the rites perform ed at the sam e tim e
but by each fam ily separately (th e sacrifice o f a sh eep at the A id ), through
those w h ich m ay be practised at any tim e ( e .g . the rite to cure stie s), and
finally to th o se w hich m u st only take place in secret and at u nusual hours
(the rites of love m a g ic).
Practical taxonom ies, w h ich are a transform ed, m isrecogn izable form o f th e
real d iv ision s of the social order, con trib ute to th e reproduction o f that order
by p rod ucing ob jectively orchestrated p ractices adjusted to th ose d iv isio n s.
Social tim e as fo rm , in the m usical sen se, as su ccessio n organized b y the
application to p assin g tim e o f the principle w h ich organizes all d im en sio n s
°f practice, tends to fulfil, even m ore effectively than th e d ivision o f sp ace,
a function of integration in and through d ivisio n , that is, through hierarchiza
tion. But m ore p rofou n d ly, the organization of tim e and the g rou p in accor
dance w ith m ythical structures leads collective p ractice to appear as " realized
my t h ”, in the sen se in w hich for H e g el tradition is "realized m o ra lity ”
164 Structures, habitus, p o w e r
(S ittlic h k e it), the recon ciliation o f su b jective dem and and objective (i e
co llectiv e) n ecessity w hich grou n d s the belief of a w hole group in what the
group b elie v es, i.e . in th e group: a reflexive return to the prin cip les of the
op eration s o f ob jectification , practices or d iscou rses, is p revented by the
very rein forcem en t w hich these p rod u ction s co n tin u o u sly draw from a
w orld o f ob jectification s p roduced in accordance w ith the sam e subjective
p rin cip les.
E very estab lish ed order ten d s to p rod uce (to very different d egrees and with
very d ifferen t m eans) the naturalization of its owTn arbitrariness. O f all the
m ech an ism s ten d in g to p rod u ce this effect, the m ost im portant and the best
con cealed is u n d o u b ted ly the dialectic o f the ob jective ch an ces and the agents’
aspirations, out of w hich arises the sense o f lim its, com m on ly called the sense
o f re a lity , i.e . th e corresp ond en ce b etw een the ob jective classes and the
in tern alized classes, social structures and m en tal stru ctures, w hich is the
basis o f the m ost ineradicable adherence to th e estab lish ed order. S y stem s of
classification w hich reprodu ce, in their ow n specific lo g ic, the objective
cla sses, i.e . the d ivisio n s b y sex, age, or p osition in the relation s o f production,
m ake th eir sp ecific con trib u tion to the reproduction of the pow er relations
o f w h ich they are th e p rod u ct, by secu rin g the m isrecogn ition , and h en ce the
recogn ition , of th e arbitrariness on w hich they are b a se d : in th e extrem e case,
that is to say, w hen there is a q uasi-p erfect corresp ond en ce b etw een the
ob jective order and th e su b jective p rin cip les o f organization (as in ancient
so cieties) th e natural and social w orld appears as self-ev id en t. T h is experience
w e shall call doxa, so as to d istingu ish it from an orthodox or heterodox belief
im p ly in g aw areness and recogn ition o f th e p ossib ility of different or
an tagon istic b eliefs. S ch em es o f th ou gh t and p ercep tion can produce the
o b jectivity that th ey d o produce on ly by p rod u cin g m isrecogn ition o f the limits
o f th e co g n itio n that they m ake p ossib le, thereby fou n d in g immediate
a d h eren ce, in the d oxic m od e, to the wrorld o f tradition exp erienced as a
"natural w o r ld ” and taken for granted. T h e in stru m ents o f k now ledge o f the
social w orld are in this case (ob jectively) political in stru m en ts w hich
co n trib u te to the reprodu ction o f the social w orld by p rod u cin g immediate
ad heren ce to th e w orld, seen as self-evid en t and u n d isp u ted , of w hich they
are th e p rod uct and of w h ich they reproduce the structures in a transformed
form . T h e political fu n ctio n o f classifications is never m ore lik ely to pass
u n n o ticed than in the case o f relatively undifferentiated social form ation s, in
wThich the prevailing classificatory system en cou n ters n o rival or antagonistic
p rin cip le. As w e have seen in the case o f the d o m estic con flicts to wThich
m arriages often give rise, social categories disadvantaged by the symbolic
ord er, su ch as w o m en and th e y o u n g , cannot but recogn ize the legitimacy
o f th e d om in ant classification in th e very fact that th eir only ch an ce of
D o x a , orthodoxy , heterodoxy
greater the ex ten t of the field of d oxa, o f that w hich is taken for granted.
W h en , ow in g to the q uasi-p erfect fit b etw een th e ob jective stru ctures and the
in tern alized structures w hich results from the logic o f sim p le reproduction,
th e estab lish ed cosm ological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary,
i.e . as on e p ossib le order am on g o thers, but as a self-ev id en t and natural order
w h ich g o es w ith ou t sayin g and therefore goes u n q u estio n ed , the agents 5
aspirations have the sam e lim its as the ob jective co n d itio n s o f w hich th e y are
th e product.
It is not easy to evoke the subjective experience associated with this world o f the
realized ought-to-be, in which things that could scarcely be otherwise nonetheless are
w hat they are only because they are what they ought to be, in w hich an agent can
have at one and the same tim e the feeling that there is nothing to do except what he
is doing and also that he is only doing what he o u g h t.11 And so it is in all seriousness
that I juxtapose two particularly striking evocations of this experience, one by an old
K abyle w om an, underlining the fact that to be ill and dying was a social status, with
its attendant rights and duties, and the other by Marcel Proust, describing the
subjective effects of the ritualization of practices:
" In the old days, folk d id n ’t know what illness was. T h ey w ent to bed and they
died. It’s only nowadays that w e’re learning words like liver, lung [albumun; Fr. le
poum on\t intestines, stomach [listuma; Fr. Vestomac], and I d on ’t know what! People
only used to know [pain in] the belly [th'abut]; that’s what everyone w ho died died
o f, unless it was fever [thatcla] . . . In the old days sick people used to call for death,
but it w ouldn’t com e. When som eone was ill, the new s soon spread everyw here, not
just in the village, but all over the *arch. Besides, a sick m an’s house is never empty:
in the daytim e all his relatives, m en and w om en, com e for n e w s .. .A t nightfall, all
th e women relatives, even the youngest, would be taken to his bedside. And once a
week there was 'the sick m an’s m arket’ umutin]: they would send som eone to
buy him meat or fruit. All that’s forgotten nowadays; it’s true, there aren’t any sick
people now , not as there used to be. N ow everyone’s sick, everyone’s complaining
o f som ething. T hose w ho were dying used to suffer a lot; death came slow ly, it could
take a night and a day or two nights and a day. D eath 'always struck them through
their sp eech ’: first they became dum b. Everyone had time to see them one last time;
the relatives were given tim e to assem ble and to prepare the burial. T h ey w ould give
alm s to make the dying easier: they would give the com m unity a tree, generally a fig-tree
planted beside the road. Its fruit would not be picked, but left for passing travellers
and the poor [chajra usufagh, the tree of the outgoing; chajra n ’esadhaqa, the alms
tr e e ]. . .W h o’s ill nowadays? W ho’s well? Everyone com plains but no one stays in b ed ;
they all run to the doctor. Everyone knows w hat’s wrong w ith him now.*’12
"From the position of the bed, m y side recalled the place where the crucifix used
to be, the breath of the recess in the bedroom in my grandparents’ house, in the days
w hen there were still bedroom s and parents, a tim e for each thing, when you loved
your parents not because you found them intelligent but because they were your
parents, w hen you w ent to bed not because you w anted to but because it was time,
and when you marked the desire, the acceptance and the whole cerem ony of sleeping
by going up two steps to the big bed, where you closed the blue rep curtains with
their raised-velvet bands, and w here, w hen you were ill, the old rem edies kept you
for several days on end, with a nightlight on the Siena marble m antelpiece, w ithout
any of the immoral m edicines that allow you to get up and imagine you can lead the
D o x a , orthodoxy , heterodoxy 167
life of a healthy man when you are ill, sweating under the blankets thanks to perfectly
harmless infusions, which for two thousand years have contained the flowers of the
meadows and the w isdom of old w om en .”13
(o r a r g u m e n t)
T he theoretical con stru ction w hich retrosp ectively projects the cou n ter-gift
into the project of th e gift has th e effect o f transform ing in to m echanical
sequences o f ob ligatory acts the at on ce risky and necessary im provisation of
the everyday strategies w hich ow e their infinite com p lex ity to th e fact that
the g iv er’s undeclared calculation m ust reckon w ith the receiver’s undeclared
calculation, and hence satisfy his exp ectation s w ith ou t appearing to know^w'hat
they are. In the sam e operation, it rem oves the co n d itio n s m aking p ossib le
the institutionally organ ized and guaranteed misrecognition20 w hich is th e basis
of gift exchange and, perhaps, o f all the sym b olic labour in ten d ed to trans
m ute, b y the sincere fiction of a d isin terested exchan ge, the in evitab le, and
inevitably interested relations im posed by k inship, n eigh b ou rh ood , or work,
into elective relations of reciprocity: in the wrork o f reproducing estab lish ed
relations - through feasts, cerem on ies, exchan ges of g ifts, visits or courtesies,
and, above all, m arriages - w hich is no less vital to the ex isten ce o f the group
than th e reproduction o f the eco n o m ic bases of its existen ce, the labour
required to conceal the fun ction o f the exchan ges is as im portant an elem en t
as the labour need ed to carry ou t the fu n ctio n .21 If it is true th a t th e lapse
of tim e in terp osed is w hat en ab les the gift or cou n ter-gift to b e seen and
experienced as an inaugural act o f g en erosity, w ith ou t any past or future, i.e.
w ithout calculation, th en it is clear that in redu cing the p o ly th etic to the
nionothetic, ob jectivism destroys the sp ecificity o f all practices w h ich , like
gift exch an ge, tend or pretend to p ut the law o f self-in terest in to abeyance.
A rational contract w ould telescop e in to an instant a transaction w h ich gift
exchange d isg u ises b y stretch in g it ou t in tim e; and because o f th is, gift
exchange is, if not the only m ode of com m od ity circulation p ractised, at least
the only m ode to be fu lly recogn ized , in societies wrh ich , b ecau se they deny
the true soil o f their lif e ”, as Lukacs puts it, have an ec on om y in itself and
not for itself. E verything takes place as if the essen ce of th e " arch aic”
econom y lay in the fact that econ om ic activity cannot exp licitly acknow ledge
the eco n o m ic en d s in relation to w hich it is objectively orien ted: th e "idolatry
1 7 2 Structures , habitus , po w er
the word of w itnesses, which is enhanced if they are distant and influential; then there
is a sim ple paper drawn up by som eone not specialized in th e production of lega]
docum ents; then the contract signed before a taleb, providing a religious but not a
legal guarantee, w hich is less solem n w hen drawn up by the village taleb than bv a
w ell-known taleb; then the Cadi’s written docum ent; and finally the contract signed
in front of a law yer.) It w ould be insulting to presum e to authenticate a transaction
based on trust betw een trustworthy people, and still more so betw een relatives, before
a lawyer, a adi, or even w itnesses. Sim ilarly, the share of th e loss w hich partners
agree to accept w hen there is an accident to an animal m ay be entirely different
depending on th e assessm ent of their responsibilities w hich th ey com e to in accordance
w ith the relationship between them : a man w ho has lent an animal to a close relative
feels he m ust m inim ize his partner’s responsibility. By contrast, a regular contract,
signed before th e Cadi or before w itnesses, governed the arrangement by which the
K abyles handed over their oxen to the southern X om ads to be looked after for one,
tw o, or three w orking years (from autum n to autum n) in exchange for twenty-two
double decalitres of barley per ox per year, with costs to be shared in the case of loss
and profits shared in the case o f sale. Private arrangements betw een kin and affines
are to market transactions what ritual war is to total war. T h e "goods or beasts of
the fellah” are traditionally contrasted w ith the ‘’goods or beasts of the m arket”: old
inform ants will talk endlessly o f the tricks and frauds w hich are com m on practice in
the 'big m arkets”, that is to say, in exchanges betw een strangers. T here are countless
tales of m ules w h ich run off as soon as the purchaser has got them hom e, oxen made
to look fatter b y rubbing them with a plant w hich makes them sw ell (adhris), and
purchasers who band together to force prices dow n. T h e incarnation of econom ic war
is the shady dealer, the man w ho fears neither G od nor m an. Men avoid buying
animals from h im , just as they avoid buying from any com plete stranger: as one
informant said, for straightforward goods such as land, it is the choice o f the thing to
be purchased w h ich determ ines the buyer’s decision; for problem atic good s, such as
beasts of burden, especially m ules, it is the choice of seller w hich decides, and at least
an effort is m ade to substitute a personalized relationship ( “ on behalf o f . . . ”) for a
com pletely im personal, anonym ous one. Every intermediate stage can be found, from
transactions based on com plete distrust, such as that betw een th e peasant and the shady
dealer, who cannot dem and or obtain guarantees because he cannot guarantee the
quality of his product or find guarantors, to the exchange of honour which can
dispense w ith conditions and depend entirely on the good faith of the " contracting
p arties”. But in m ost transactions the notions o f buyer and seller tend to be dissolved
in the network of m iddlem en and guarantors designed to transform the purely
econom ic relationship betw een supply and dem and into a genealogically based and
genealogically guaranteed relationship. Marriage itself is no exception: quite apart
from parallel-cousin marriage, it alm ost always occurs b etw een fam ilies already linked
by a whole network of previous exchanges, underwriting th e specific new agree
m ent. It is significant that in the first phase of the highly com plex negotiations
leading up to the marriage agreem ent, the fam ilies bring in prestigious kinsmen
or affines as "guarantors”, the sym bolic capital thus displayed serving both to
strengthen their hand in the negotiations and to guarantee the deal once it has been
concluded.
S im ilarly, th e in dignan t co m m en ts provoked by the heretical b eh aviour of
peasants w h o have d eparted from traditional w ays draw a tten tio n to the
m echan ism s w h ich form erly in clin ed the peasant to m aintain a m agical
relationship w ith the land and m ade it im p ossib le for him to see h is toil as
S ym bolic capital *75
the w ord so m etim es receives, as lackin g con crete or m aterial effect, in sh ort,
gratuitous, i.e . d isin terested but also u sele ss.
T h o se w h o ap ply th e categories and m eth o d s o f eco n o m ics to archaic
econom ies w ith o u t taking in to accoun t the o n tological tran sm u tation they
im pose on their object are certainly not alone now ad ays in treating th is type
of eco n o m y "as th e F athers o f th e C hurch treated the religions w hich
preceded C h ristia n ity ” : M arx’s phrase cou ld also b e ap plied to th o se M arxists
w ho tend to lim it research on th e form ations th e y call " p re-ca p ita list” to
scholastic d iscu ssion ab out the ty p o lo g y o f m o d es o f p ro d u ction . T h e com m on
root of this eth n ocen trism is the u n con sciou s acceptance of a restricted definition
of economic interest, w h ich , in its exp licit form , is the historical p rod uct of
capitalism : th e co n stitu tio n o f relatively au ton om ou s areas o f practice is
accom panied by a process through w h ich sy m b o lic in terests (o ften describ ed
as " sp iritu a l” or " c u ltu ra l”) com e to b e set up in o p p o sitio n to strictly
econom ic in terests as defined in the field o f eco n o m ic tran saction s b y the
fundam ental tau tology " b u sin ess is b u s in e s s ” ; strictly " c u ltu ra l” or " aes
th e tic ” in terest, d isin terested in terest, is the paradoxical p rod u ct of the
ideological labour in w h ich w riters and artists, th o se m ost d irectly in terested ,
have played an im portant part and in th e cou rse o f w h ich sym b olic in terests
becom e au ton om ou s b y b ein g op p osed to m aterial in terests, i.e . b y b ein g
sym bolically nullified as in terests. E co n o m ism k now s no other in terest than
that w hich cap italism has p rod uced , through a sort of con crete application
of abstraction, by esta b lish in g a u n iverse o f relation s b etw een m an and m an
based, as M arx says, on "callou s cash p a y m e n t” . T h u s it can find no place
in its analyses, still less in its calcu lation s, for the strictly sy m b o lic interest
w hich is occasion ally recogn ized (w h en too ob v io u sly en terin g in to conflict
with " in te r e st” in the narrow sen se, as in certain form s o f nationalism or
regionalism ) on ly to be redu ced to the irrationality of feelin g or p assion . In
fact, in a u niverse ch aracterized by the m ore or less p erfect in tercon vertib ility
of eco n o m ic capital (in the narrow sen se) and sy m b o lic capital, the economic
calculation d irectin g the a g en ts’ strategies takes in d issociab ly in to accoun t
profits and lo sses w h ich the narrow d efin ition o f eco n o m y u n con sciou sly
rejects as unthinkable and unnameable, i.e . as econ om ically irrational. In sh ort,
contrary to n aively id y llic represen tation s of " p re-ca p ita list” so cieties (or of
the "cultural ” sp here of capitalist so c ie tie s), practice n ever ceases to con form
to econ om ic calcu lation even w h en it g ives every appearance of d isin terested
ness b y d ep artin g from the lo g ic of in terested calculation (in the narrow sense)
and p layin g for stakes that are non-m aterial and not easily quantified.
T h u s the theory o f strictly eco n o m ic practice is sim p ly a particular case
° f a general theory of the ec o n o m ic s o f practice. T h e on ly way to escap e from
the eth n o cen tric n aiveties o f ec o n o m ism , w ith ou t fallin g in to p op u list
1 7 8 Structures , habitus , p o w e r
farm work) requ iring th e unpaid assistan ce o f a m ore ex ten d ed grou p . If this
is so, it is b ecause, contrary to w hat M ax W eber su g g ests w h en he draw s a
crude contrast b etw een th e traditionalist typ e and th e charism atic type, the
ancient eco n o m y has its d isco n tin u ities, not o n ly in the p olitical sp here, w ith
conflicts w h ich m ay start w ith a ch an ce in cid en t and escalate in to tribal war
through th e interplay of the " le a g u e s” , b ut also in the ec o n o m ic sp here, w ith
the op p osition b etw een th e labour period, w hich in traditional cereal cu ltivation
is particularly sh ort, and the production p e r io d - an op p o sitio n giv in g rise to
one o f th e basic con trad iction s o f that social form ation an d also, in co n se
quence, to the strategies d esig n ed to overcom e it .27 T h e strategy o f a ccu m u
lating a capital of h onou r and p restige, w h ich p rod uces th e clien ts as m uch
as they produce it, provides the op tim al solu tion to th e p rob lem the group
would face if it had to maintain continuously (th rou gh ou t th e p rod uction period
as w ell) th e w h ole (hum an and anim al) w orkforce it n eed s d u rin g the labour
period: it allow s th e great fam ilies to m ake use of th e m a x im u m w orkforce
during the labour p eriod, and to reproduce con su m p tion to a m in im u m d uring
the u navoidably lon g p rod uction p eriod. Both hum an and anim al
consum ption are cu t, the form er b y th e redu ction of the g ro u p to the m inim al
unit, the fam ily; and th e latter through hire con tracts, su ch as th e charka o f
an ox, b y w hich the ow n er lend s h is anim al in exch an ge for n o th in g m ore
than com p en sation in cash or in kind for " d ep reciation of th e ca p ita l” . T h ese
services, p rovided at precise m om en ts and lim ited of p eriod s o f in tense
activity, su ch as harvest tim e, are repaid eith er in th e fo rm of labour, at other
tim es of the year, or w ith other services su ch as p ro tectio n , th e loan of
animals, etc.
T h u s w e see that sym b o lic capital, w h ich in the form o f the p restige and
renown attached to a fam ily and a nam e is readily co n v ertib le back into
econom ic capital, is perhaps the most valuable form o f accum ulation in a so ciety
in w h ich the severity of the clim ate (th e m ajor w ork - p lo u g h in g and
harvesting - h aving to b e d on e in a very short sp ace o f tim e ) and th e lim ited
technical resources (harvesting is d on e w ith the sickle) d em and collective
labour. S h ou ld on e se e in it a d isgu ised form of purchase o f labour pow er,
or a covert exaction o f corvees? B y all m eans, as lon g as the analysis h olds
together w hat h olds together in practice, the double rea lity of instrinsically
equivocal, ambiguous co n d u ct. T h is is the pitfall aw aiting all th ose w h o m a
naively d u alistic representation of th e relation ship b etw een practice and
ideology, b etw een th e " n a tiv e ” ec on om y and th e " n a tiv e ” representation of
that eco n o m y, leads into self-m y stify in g d em y stific a tio n s :28 th e com p lete
reality of th is appropriation of serv ices lies in the fact that it can only take
Place in the d isgu ise o f the th iw iz i, th e voluntary assistan ce w hich is also a
corvee and is th u s a voluntary corvee and forced assistan ce, and that, to use
i8 o Structures , habitus , p o w e r
In so cieties w h ich have n o " self-regu latin g m arket ” (in K arl P olyan i’s se n se ),
no ed u cational sy stem , n o juridical apparatus, and n o S tate, relation s o f
dom ination can be set up and m aintained o n ly at th e cost o f strategies w h ich
m ust be en d lessly ren ew ed , becau se the co n d ition s required for a m ediated,
losttng appropriation of other agents* labour, services, or h om age h ave not b een
brought togeth er. By con trast, d om in ation n o lo n ger n eed s to b e exerted in
a direct, personal w ay w h en it is en tailed in p ossession of th e m ean s (eco n o m ic
184 Structures , habitus , po w er
T he strategies of honour are not banished from the market: though a man may
enhance his prestige by tricking a stranger, he may also take pride in having bought
som ething at an exorbitant price, to satisfy his point of honour, just "to show he could
do it ”; or he may boast of having managed to strike a bargain w ithout laying out a
penny in cash, either by m obilizing a number of guarantors, or, better still, by
drawing on the credit and the capital o f trust which com e as much from a reputation
for honour as from a reputation for w ealth. It is said of such a man that "he could
come back with the whole market even if he left home with nothing in his pockets”.
Men whose reputation is known to all are predisposed to play the part of guarantors
- either for the seller, w ho vouches for the quality of his animal in their presence,
°r for the buyer, w ho, if he is not paying in cash, promises that he will repay his debt
prom ptly.38 T h e trust in which they are held, and the connections w hich they can
mobilize, enable them to "go to the market with only their faces, their names, and
their honour for m o n ey ” - in other words, the only things w hich can take the place
of money in this econom y - and even "to wager [to make an offer], whether they have
money on them or not". Strictly personal qualities, "which cannot be borrowed or le n t’*,
count at least as much as wealth or solvency. In reality, even in the market the degree
of mutual information is such as to leave little scope for overpricing, cheating, and
bluff. If, exceptionally, a man "w ho has not been brought up for the m arket” tries
BOT
Structures , habitus , pow er
to ''make a b id ”, he is soon put in his place. " T h e market will ju d g e ”, they sav
m eaning by "m arket” not the laws of the market, w hich in a very different univers
sanction reckless undertakings, but rather the collective judgm ent shaped and mani
fested in the market. Either a man is a "market m a n ” ( argaz nasuq) or he isn’t; a total
judgm ent is passed on the whole man, and like all such judgm ents in every society
it involves the ultim ate values laid dow n in the mythical taxonom ies. A "house mari”
(argaz ukhamis) w ho takes it upon him self to overstep his "natural” lim its is put in
his place with the w ords " Since you're only a fireside m an, remain a fireside man”
(thakwath, the alcove in the wall o f the house w hich is used to hide the sm all, typically
female objects which m ust not be seen in broad daylight - spoons, rags, weaving tools
etc.).
T h e village/m ark et d ich o to m y is no d ou b t a m eans of p reventin g the
im personal exch an ges of th e m arket from ob tru d in g the d isp o sitio n s of
calculation in to th e wrorld of reciprocity relation sh ip s. In fact, wrh ether a small
tribal m arket or a b ig regional m arket, the suq represents a transactional mode
interm ediate b etw een tw o extrem es, n either o f w h ich is ever fu lly actualized:
on the one hand there are th e exch an ges of th e fam iliar wrorld o f acquaintance,
based on the trust and good fa ith that are p o ssib le w h en the purchaser is well
inform ed about the prod ucts exch an ged and the se lle r’s strategies, and when
the relation ship b etw een the parties con cern ed exists before and after the
exchan ge; and on th e other hand there are the rational strategies o f the
self-regu latin g m arket, w h ich are m ade p ossib le b y th e standardization of its
products and th e quasi-m echan ical n ecessity o f its processes. T h e suq does
not p rovid e all the traditional in form ation , but n either does it create the
con d ition s for rational in form ation . T h is is wrhy all the strategies applied
by th e peasants aim to m in im ize the risk im p lied in the u np redictab ility of
the o u tc o m e , b y tran sform ing th e im personal relationships o f com m ercial
transactions, w h ich have n either past nor future, in to lasting relationships of
reciprocity: by callin g u p on guarantors, w itn esses, and m ediators th ey are able
to estab lish , or re-establish, the fu n ction al eq u iv alen t of a traditional network
of relation ship s b etw een th e con tractin g parties.
Just as eco n o m ic wrealth cannot fu n ction as capital u n til it is linked to an
econom ic apparatus, so cultural co m p eten ce in its various fo rm s cannot be
con stitu ted as cultural capital u ntil it is in serted in to the objective relations
betw een th e system o f eco n o m ic p rod uction and the system p rod ucing the
producers (wrhich is itself con stitu ted b y th e relation b etw een the school
system and th e fam ily ). W h en a so ciety lacks b oth the literacy w h ich would
enable it to preserve and accu m u late in ob jectified form th e cultural resources
it has in herited from the p ast, and also the ed u cational system w h ich would
give its agen ts the ap titu des and d isp o sitio n s required for th e symbolic
reappropriation o f those resou rces, it can on ly p reserve them in their incor
porated sta te ." C o n seq u en tly, to en su re the p erpetuation o f cultural resources
w hich wro u ld oth erw ise d isappear alon g w ith th e agen ts w h o bear th em , it has
M odes o f domination 18 7
7-2
1 88 Structures, habitus , po w er
social m echan ism s w h ich p rod uce and guarantee both the social value o f the
qualifications and th e p o sitio n s and also the distrib ution o f these social
attributes, am ong b iological in d iv id u a ls .43
L aw d oes no m ore than sym b olically con secrate - b y recording it in a form
w h ich renders it both eternal and universal - the structure of the power
relation b etw een groups and classes w hich is produced and guaranteed practi
cally by the fun ction in g o f these m ech an ism s. For exam p le, it records and
legitim ates th e d istinction b etw een the p osition and the person, the power
and its holder, together w ith the relationship obtaining at a particular m om ent
b etw een qualifications and jobs (reflecting the relative bargaining pow er of
the buyers and sellers o f qualified, i.e . scholastically guaranteed, labour
pow er) w hich appears con cretely in a particular distrib ution o f the material
'and sym b olic profits assigned to the holders (or non-holders) of qualifications.
T h e law thus contributes its o w n (specifically sym bolic) force to the action
o f th e various m echanism s w hich render it superfluous con stantly to reassert
pow er relations by overtly resorting to force.
T h u s the task of legitim atin g the estab lish ed order does not fall exclusively
to th e m echanism s traditionally regarded as b elon gin g to the order o f ideology,
su ch as law. T h e system o f sym b olic go o d s production and the system
p rod ucing th e producers fulfil in ad d ition , i.e . b y the very logic of their normal
fu n ction in g, ideological fu n ction s, by virtue o f th e fact that the m echanism s
through w hich they con trib ute to the reproduction o f the estab lish ed order
and to the perpetuation o f d om in ation rem ain hidden. T h e educational system
h elp s to p rovid e the d om in ant class w ith w hat M ax W eber term s "a theodicy
o f its ow n p riv ileg e”, not so m uch through the ideologies it produces or
in cu lcates (as those w ho speak o f "id eological ap paratu ses” w ould have it);
b ut rather through the practical justification of the established order which
it ach ieves b y u sing the overt con n ection b etw een qualifications and jobs as
a sm okescreen for th e con n ection - w hich it records surreptitiously, undercover
of form al equality - b etw een the qualifications people obtain and the cultural
capital they have inherited - in other w ord s, through the legitim acy it confers
on the transm ission o f th is form o f heritage. T h e m ost su ccessfu l ideological
effects are those w hich have n o need of w ords, and ask n o m ore than
com p licito u s silen ce. It fo llo w s, in cid en tally that any analysis of ideologies,
in the narrow sense of " legitim atin g d isc o u r se s”, w hich fails to in clu d e an
analysis of th e corresponding in stitu tional m echan ism s is liable to be n o more
than a contribution to the efficacy o f th ose ideologies: th is is true of all
internal (sem iological) analyses of political, educational, religious, or a e s t h e t i c
id eologies w h ich forget that the political fun ction o f these id eologies may m
som e cases be reduced to the effect of d isp lacem en t and d iversion , cam ouflage
and legitim ation, w hich they produce by reproducing - through their over
M odes o f domination 189
sights and om issio n s, and in their deliberately or in volu ntarily com p licitou s
silences - the effects of the objective m ech an ism s .44
It has b een necessary at least to sketch an analysis of the ob jective m echan
isms w h ich play a part both in se ttin g up and in con cealin g lasting
relations of d om in ation , in order to understand fully th e radical difference
betwreen the different m od es o f dom ination and th e different p olitical strategies
for conservation characteristic o f social form ations w h ose accum ulated social
energy is unequ ally objectified in m echan ism s. O n the o n e sid e there are
social relations w h ich , not containing w ithin th em selves th e principle o f their
own reprodu ction , m ust be kept up through n oth in g less than a process of
continuous creation; on the other side, a so cia l w orld w h ich , containing w ithin
itself the prin cip le of its o w n con tinu ation, frees agents from the endless work
of creating or restoring social relations. T h is op p osition finds expression in
the history or prehistory o f sociological th ou gh t. In order to "ground social
being in n a tu re”, as D u rk h eim puts it ,45 it has b een necessary to break w ith
the p rop en sity to see it as founded on the arbitrariness o f individual w ills,
or, w ith H o b b es, on the arbitrariness of a sovereign w ill: "F or H o b b e s ”,
writes D u rk h eim , " it is an act of w ill w hich giv es birth to the social order
and it is a perpetually renew ed act of w ill w hich u p h old s it .’*46 And there is
every reason to b elieve that the break w ith th is artificialist vision, w h ich is
the precond ition for scien tific ap prehension, could not be m ade before the
con stitution , in reality, of objective m ech an ism s like th e self-regulating
market, w h ich , as Polyani p oin ts ou t, was in trin sically co n d u civ e to b elief in
determ inism . But social reality had another trap in store for scien ce: the
existence o f m echan ism s capable of rep rod u cin g the political order, in d ep en
dently of any deliberate intervention, m akes it p ossib le to recognize as
political, am ongst the different types of co n d u ct directed tow ards gaining or
keeping p ow er, o n ly su ch practices as tacitly exclu d e control over the
reproduction m ech an ism s from the area o f legitim ate co m p etitio n . In th is w ay,
social scien ce, taking for its object the sphere o f legitim ate p o litics (as so-called
"political s c ie n c e ” d oes now adays) adopted th e p reconstructed object w hich
reality fo isted upon it.
T h e greater the ex ten t to w hich the task of reprodu cing the relations of
dom ination is taken over by objective m ech an ism s, w hich serve the interests
of the d om in ant group w ith ou t any co n sciou s effort on th e latter’s part, the
more in direct and, in a sen se, im personal, b ecom e th e strategies objectively
oriented tow ards reprodu ction : it is not by lavish in g gen erosity, kindness,
°r p oliten ess on his charw om an (or on any other " socially in ferior” a gen t),
but by ch oosin g th e b est in vestm en t for his m o n ey , or the best school for
bis so n , that the possessor of econ om ic or cultural capital perpetuates the
relationship of d om in ation w hich objectively links him w ith his charw om an
190 Structures , habitus , p o w e r
and ev e n her d escen d an ts. O n ce a system o f m echan ism s has b een constituted
cap ab le of ob jectively en su rin g the reprodu ction o f the established order by
its ow n m otion (apo tou autom atou, as th e G reeks p u t it), the d om in ant class
have o n ly to let the system they dom inate take its own course in order to exercise
their d o m in a tio n ; but u n til su ch a system exists, they have to w ork directly
d aily, p ersonally, to produce and reprodu ce con d ition s of d om in ation which
are ev e n then never en tirely tru stw orth y. B ecau se they cannot b e satisfied with
ap propriating the profits of a social m ach ine w h ich has not yet developed the
pow er o f self-p erp etu ation , they are o b lig ed to resort to the elem entary forms
o f dom ination , in other w ord s, th e d irect d om in ation o f on e person by
an oth er, the lim itin g case o f w hich is appropriation of persons, i.e. slavery.
T h ey can n ot appropriate the labour, services, g ood s, hom age, and respect
of o th ers w ith ou t " w in n in g ” them p ersonally, " ty in g ” th em - in short,
creatin g a bond betw een p ersons.
T h is is why a social relationship such as that between the master and his khammes
(a sort of m etayer who gets only a very small share of the crop, usually a fifth, with
local variations), which might at first sight seem very close to a sim ple capital-labour
relation, cannot in fact be kept up w ithout the direct application of material or
sym bolic violence to the person who is to be tied . T h e master may bind his khammes
by a debt w hich forces him to keep renewing h is contract until he finds a new master
willing to pay off the debt to the former em ployer - in other words, indefinitely. He
may also resort to brutal measures such as seizing the entire crop in order to recover
his loan. But each particular relationship is the product of com plex strategies whose
efficacy depends not only on the material and sym bolic strength of either party but
also on their skill in arousing sym pathy or indignation so as to m obilize the group.
T h e value of the relationship for the dom inator does not lie exclusively in the resultant
material profits, and many masters who are not m uch richer than their khammes and
would gain by cultivating their lands them selves refrain from doing so because they
prefer th e prestige of possessing a "clientele” . But a man who wants to be treated
as a '*m aster” m ust show he has the virtues corresponding to his status, and the first
of these is generosity and dignity in his relations with his “ clien ts”. T h e compact
uniting the master and his khammes is an arrangement betw een one man and another
guaranteed by nothing beyond the “ loy a lty ” w hich honour dem ands. It involves no
abstract discipline, no rigorous contracts, and no specific sanctions. But the “great ''
are expected to show that they are worthy o f their rank by affording material and
sym bolic “ protection” to those dependent upon them .
Here again, it is all a question of strategy, and the reason w hy the “ enchanted
relations of the pact of honour are so frequent is that, in this econom y, the strategies
of sym bolic violence are often ultim ately more econom ical than pure “economic
violence. Given that there is no real labour market, and that m oney is rare (and
therefore dear), the best way in which the master can serve his own interests is to
work away, day in, day out, with constant care and attention, weaving the ethical and
affective, as w ell as econom ic, bonds which durably tie his khammes to him.
reinforce the bonds of obligation, the master m ay arrange the marriage of his khammes
(or his son ) and instal him, with his fam ily, in the master's own house; the children,
brought up together, with the goods (the flock, fields, etc.) being ow ned in comm on,
often take a long tim e to discover what their position is. It is not uncom m on for one
M odes o f domination 19 1
0f the sons of a khammes to g o and work for wages in the tow n, together with one
0f the m aster’s sons, and like him , bring back his savings to the master. In short, if
the master wants to persuade the khammes to devote him self over a long period to
the pursuit of the master’s interests, he has to associate him com pletely w ith those
interests, m asking the d y s s y m m e t r y 0f the relationship by sym bolically denying it in
his behaviour. T h e khammes is the man to whom one entrusts one’s goods, o n e’s house,
and one’s honour (as is shown by the form ula used by a master leaving to go and work
in a town or in France: ’'A ssociate, I’m counting on you; I ’m g oin g off to be an
associate m y self’'). T h e khammes "treats the land as if he ow ned i t ” , because there
is nothing in his m aster’s conduct to belie his claim to have rights over the land on
which he works; and it is not unusual to hear a khammes saying, lon g after leaving
his "m aster”, that the sweat o f his brow entitles him to pick fruit or enter the estate.
And just as he never feels entirely freed from his obligations towards his former m aster,
so, after what he calls a "change of heart” he may accuse his master of "treachery*’
in abandoning som eone he had " ad op ted ”.
Gentle exploitation is m uch more costly - and not only in econom ic term s - for those
who practise it. " R espon sib ilities” such as those of the tamen, the " spokesm an” or
“guarantor” w ho represented his group ( thakharrubth or adhrum ) at the m eetings of
the m en’s assem bly and on all solem n occasions, gave rise to little com petition or envy,
and it w as n ot uncom m on for the m ost influential and m ost important m em bers of
a group to refuse the job or soon ask to be replaced: the tasks of representation and
mediation w h ich fell to the tamen did indeed demand a great deal of tim e and effort.
Those on w h om the group bestow s the title "w ise m e n ’* or "great m e n ”, and w ho,
in the absence of any official mandate, find them selves invested with a sort of tacit
delegation of the group’s authority, feel obliged (by a sense of duty towards them
selves resulting from considerable self-esteem ) constantly to recall the group to the
values it officially recognizes, both by their exem plary conduct and by their express
utterances; if they see two w om en of their group quarrelling they feel it incum bent
upon them to separate them and even to beat them (if they are w idow s or if the men
responsible for them are w ithout authority) or fine them ; in cases of serious conflict
between m em bers of their own clan, they feel required to recall both parties to w isdom ,
never an easy task and som etim es a dangerous one; in any situation liable to lead to
inter-clan conflict (in cases of crim e, for exam ple) they meet together in an assembly
with the m arabout so as to reconcile the antagonists; they feel it their duty to protect
the interests o f the clients and the poor, to give them presents when the traditional
collections are made (for the thimechret, for exam ple), to sen d them food at feast
times, to assist the w idow s, to arrange marriages for the orphans, etc.
sou rce of all sym b olic valu e. T h e con stitu tio n of in stitu tionalized m ech a n ist^
m akes it p ossib le for a sin g le agen t (a party leader or u n ion d elegate, a member
of a board o f directors, a m em b er of an acad em y, e tc .) to be entrusted with
the totality of th e cap ital w h ich is the basis of th e group, and to exert over
this capital, collectiv ely ow n ed b y all the " shareholders ”, a d elegated authority
not strictly related to h is personal co n tr ib u tio n ; b u t in pre-capitalist societies
each agent shares d irectly in the collective capital, sym b olized by the name
of the fam ily or lin eage, to an ex ten t directly proportionate to his own
con trib u tio n , i.e . exactly to the exten t that h is w ord s, d eed s, and person are
a credit to th e g ro u p .55 T h e sy stem is su ch that the d om in ant agen ts have a
v ested interest in virtu e; th ey can accum u late political pow er o n ly b y paying
a personal price, and n ot sim p ly b y red istrib u tin g their g o o d s and money;
th ey m ust have the " v ir tu e s ” o f their pow er because th e o n ly basis of their
pow er is " v ir tu e ”.
G en erou s co n d u ct, o f w hich the p otlatch (a curio for anthropologists) is
sim p ly the extrem e ca se, m igh t se em to su spend th e universal law of interest
and "fair e x c h a n g e ”, w h ereb y n o th in g is ever given for n o th in g , and to set
up instead relation ship s w h ich are their ow n en d - con versation for conversa
tion s sake (and not in order to say so m eth in g ), g iv in g for g iv in g ’s sake, and
so o n . But in reality su ch d en ials of interest are n ever m ore than practical
disclaim ers: like F reu d ’s Vem einung, the d iscou rse w hich says w hat it says only
in a form that ten d s to sh ow that it is not sayin g it, they satisfy interest in
a (d isin terested ) m ann er d esign ed to sh ow that th ey are not sa tisfy in g interest.
(A parenthesis of the benefit of th e m oralists: an ab solute, i.e . ethical,
justification of th e en ch an tm en t felt b y the ob server of en ch an ted social
relations m ay be fo u n d in the fact that, as w ith d esire, so w ith material
in terest: society cannot ask or ex p ect o f its m em bers an yth ing m ore or better
than d enial, a " liftin g o f r e p r essio n ” w h ich , as Freud says, d oes not am ount
to " an accep tance of w h at is repressed ”.)57 E veryon e know s th a t " it’s not what
you g iv e b u t the way you g ive i t ” that co u n ts, that w hat d istin gu ish es the
g ift from m ere "fair e x c h a n g e ” is th e labour d ev o ted to form : the presentation,
the m anner of g iv in g , m u st be su ch that the outw ard form s of th e act present
a practical d en ial of th e co n ten t of th e act, sy m b olically tran sm u ting an
in terested exchan ge or a sim p le pow er relation in to a relation ship set up in
d u e form for fo rm ’s sake, i.e . inspired b y pure resp ect for th e cu sto m s and
co n v en tio n s recogn ized by the grou p . (A p aren thesis for the b en efit o f the
aesth etes: archaic so c ietie s d ev o te m ore tim e and effort to the form s, because
in them the cen sorsh ip o f d irect exp ression of personal interest is stronger ;
th ey thu s offer co n n o isseu rs o f b eau tifu l form s the en ch an tin g sp ectacle of
an art o f liv in g raised to the level of an art for art’s sake foun ded on the refusal
to ack n ow led ge self-ev id en t realities su ch as th e " b u sin ess is b u s in e s s ” or
M odes o f dom ination *95
“■time is m o n e y ” on w h ich th e u n a esth etic life-sty le o f the harried leisure
classes?* in so-called advanced so cieties is b ased .)
G ood s are for g iv in g . T h e rich m an is " rich so as to be able to give to the
p o o r”, say the K a b y les .°9 T h is is an exem plary d isclaim er: becau se g iv in g
is also a w ay o f p o ssessin g (a gift w h ich is not m atched b y a cou n ter-gift
creates a lastin g b ond , restrictin g the d eb to r’s freedom and forcing him to
adopt a p eacefu l, co-o p erative, p ru dent attitu d e); b ecau se in th e ab sen ce of
any juridical guarantee, or an y coercive force, on e o f the few w ays of
“ h o ld in g ” so m eon e is to keep up a lastin g asym m etrical relationship su ch as
in d eb ted n ess; and becau se the on ly recogn ized , legitim ate form of p ossession
is that ach ieved b y d isp o ssessin g o n eself - i.e . ob ligation , g ratitu d e, p restige,
or personal loyalty. W ealth, th e ultim ate basis o f p ow er, can exert pow er, and
exert it durably, on ly in th e form o f sym b olic capital; in other w ord s,
econom ic capital can be accum u lated on ly in the form of sy m b o lic capital,
the u n recogn izab le, and h en ce socially recogn izab le, form of the other kinds
of capital. T h e ch ief is in d e ed , in M alinow sk i’s p hrase, a "tribal b a n k er”,
am assing food o n ly to lavish it on others, in order to b u ild up a capital of
obligations and d eb ts w h ich w ill be repaid in th e form o f h om age, resp ect,
loyalty, a n d , w hen th e o p p o rtu n ity arises, w ork and services, w h ich m ay be
the bases o f a n ew accu m u lation of m aterial g o o d s .60 P rocesses of circular
circulation, su ch as the le v y in g o f a tribute follow ed by hierarchical redistri
bution, w o u ld appear absurd b u t for th e effect they have of tran sm u ting the
nature of the social relation b etw een th e agents or grou p s in v o lv ed . W herever
they are ob served , these consecration cycles perform the fun dam en tal operation
of social a lch em y, the transform ation of arbitrary relations in to legitim ate
relations, de facto d ifferen ces in to officially recogn ized d istin ctio n s. D istin c
tions and lastin g associations are foun ded in th e circular circulation from
w hich the legitim ation o f p ow er arises as a sy m b o lic su rp lu s valu e. If, like
L evi-Strau ss, on e con sid ers o n ly the p a rticu la r case of exch an ges of m aterial
and/or sy m b o lic g o o d s in te n d ed to legitim ate relations of reciprocity, on e is
in danger of forgettin g that all stru ctures o f inseparably m aterial and
sym b o lic ex ch an ge (i.e . in v o lv in g both circulation and co m m u n ica tio n ) fu n c
tion as id eological m ach ines w h en ever the de facto state of affairs w hich th ey
tend to legitim ate by tran sform in g a co n tin g en t social relationship in to a
recognized relationship is an u n eq u al balance o f pow er.
T h e en d less recon version o f eco n o m ic capital in to sy m b o lic capital, at the
cost of a w astage o f social en ergy w h ich is the con d ition for the perm anence
of d om in ation , cannot su cc ee d w ith ou t th e com p licity o f th e w hole grou p :
the w ork o f denial w h ich is th e sou rce of social alchem y is, like m agic, a
co llectiv e u nd ertak ing. A s M a\iss puts it, th e w h ole so ciety pays itself in the
false coin of its dream . T h e co llectiv e m isrecogn ition w h ich is the basis of
196 Structures , habitus , p o w e r
C H A P T E R 1. T H E O B J E C T I V E L I M I T S O F O B J E C T I V I S M
1 C. Bally, L e langage et la vie (G eneva: D roz, 1965), pp. 58, 72, 102.
2 See E. D urkheim , Education et sociologie (Paris: P U F , 1968; 1st e d ., 1922), pp.
68-9; English trans. Education and Sociology (N ew York: Free Press, 1956), p. 101.
3 Consider, for exam ple, in very different fields, the petty bourgeoisie with its avid
consum ption of manuals of etiquette, and all academ icism s, with their treatises
on style.
4 Objectivism posits that im m ediate com m unication is possible if and only if the
agents are objectively harmonized so as to associate the same m eaning with the
same sign (utterance, practice, or work), or, to put it another way, so as to refer
in their coding and decoding operations, i.e. in their practices and interpretations,
to one and the same system of constant relations, independent of individual
consciousnesses and wills and irreducible to their execution in practices or works
(e.g. Saussurian "longue” as code or cipher). In so doing, objectivist analysis does
not, strictly speaking, contradict phenom enological analysis of primary experience
of the social world and of the im mediate com prehension of the utterances, acts,
or works of others. It merely defines the lim its of its validity by establishing the
particular conditions within which it is possible, conditions which phenomeno
logical analysis ignores.
5 See C. Levi-Strauss, " Introduction a 1'oeuvre de Marcel M au ss”, in Sociologie
et anthropologie (Paris: P U F , 1950), p. xxxviii.
6 Ibid. p. xxxvi.
7 Sayings w hich exalt generosity, the suprem e virtue of the man of honour, coexist
with proverbs betraying the tem ptation of the spirit of calculation: "A gift is a
m isfortu ne”, says one of them ; and another: "A present is a hen and the
recom pense is a camel." A nd, playing on the word lahna, which means both a
gift and peace, and the word lahdia, meaning a gift, they say: "Y ou w ho bring
us peace [a gift], leave us in p eace”, or "L eave us in peace [lahna] with your
gift [lahdia], o r ” T he best gift is p eace.” [T h ese exam ples, and those which follow,
draw on the au th ors fieldwork in Kabylia, Algeria. Translator.]
8 T he language of form , taken in the sense of " structure o f becoming” which it has
in musical theory (e.g . the suite, or sonata form ) w’ould no doubt be more
appropriate than the language of logical structure, to describe the logically but
also chronologically articulated sequences of a musical com position, a dance, or
any tem porally structured practice. It is significant that the only way which R
Jakobson and C. L^vi-Strauss (w*Les chats’ de Charles Baudelaire”, L ’Homm*>
2, 1 (Jan.-A p ril 1962), pp. 5-21) find to explain the m ovem ent from structure
to form, and the experience of form , that is to say, to poetic and musical pleasure,
is to invoke frustrated expectation, which objectivist analysis can describe only
by bringing together in sim ultaneity, in the form of a set of them es linked by
relations of logical transformation (e.g. the m ovem ent from the metaphorical
form, the scientist, the lover, the cat, to m etonym ic form , the cat), the essentially
[1 9 8 ]
N otes fo r pp . 9 - / 7 199
Etudes Islamiques, 1927, part 1, pp. 47-94) regards the qanun as a set of provision
in the form of rules, based on conventions and contractual agreem ents. In realitv
the assembly operates not as a court pronouncing judgem ent by reference to a
pre-existing code, but as a council which endeavours to reconcile the adversaries’
points of view and persuade them to accept a com prom ise. T h is means that the
functioning of the system presupposes the orchestration of habitus, since the
m ediator’s decision can be applied only w ith the consent of the "convicted ” partv
(w ithout w hich the plaintiff has no alternative to resorting to force) and will not
be accepted unless it is consistent with the "sense of ju sticc” and imposed in a
manner recognized by the "sense of h on ou r”.
19 G . W. F . H egel, Reason in H istory: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of
H istory, trans. with an introduction b y R . S. Hartmann (Indianapolis: B o b b s -
M errill, 1953), p. 3.
20 A s is suggested by a reading of the Meno, the em ergence of institutionalized
education is accompanied by a crisis in diffuse education, which goes directly from
practice to practice w ithout passing through discourse. Excellence has ceased to
exist once people start asking whether it can be taught, i.e. as soon as the
objective confrontation of different styles of excellence makes it necessary to say
what goes w ithout saying, justify what is taken for granted, make an ought-to-be
and an ought-to-do out of what had up to then been regarded as the only way
to be and do; hence to apprehend what had formerly seem ed to be part of the
nature of things (phusei) as in fact based on the arbitrary institution of law ( nomo).
T h e upholders of old-style education have no difficulty in devaluing a knowledge
w hich, like that of the mathontes, bears the marks of apprenticeship; but the new
masters can safely challenge the kaloi kagathoi, who are unable to bring to the
level of discourse what they learned apo tou automatou, no one knows how, and
possess only "insofar as they are what they are w ho, because they are what they
know, do not have what they know, nor what they are.
21 M . M erleau-Pontv, The Structure o f Behaviour, trans. Alden L . Fisher (London:
M ethuen, 196$), p. 124.
22 For exam ple, the meanings agents give to rites, m yths, or decorative motifs are
m uch less stable in space, and doubtless over tim e, than the structures of the
corresponding practices (see F . Boas, Anthropology and M odem L ife (N ew York:
N orton, 1962; 1st ed ., 1928), pp. 164-6).
23 S ee A . Schutz, Collected Papers. I: The Problem o f Social R eality, edited an d
introduced by Maurice Nathanson (T h e Hague: M artinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 59-
Schutz seeks to show that the contradiction which he him self observes between
what he calls the postulate of subjective interpretation and the method o f the
m ost advanced sciences, such as econom ics, is only an apparent c o n tr a d ic t io n
(see pp. 34-5).
24 H . Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology, Englewood Cliffs, X . J .: P r e n t i c e - Hall,
, 967 *
25 T h u s it is the objectivist construction of the structure of the statistical c h a n c e s
objectively attached to an econom ic or social condition (that of a simple*
reproduction econom y, or a sub-proletariat, for exam ple) which makes it p o ss ib le
to give a com plete explanation of the form of temporal experience w hich pheno*
m enological analysis brings to light.
26 T h e effect of sym bolic im position w hich official representation intrinsically p r 0 "
duces is overlaid by a more profound effect when sem i-learned grammar, a
normative description, is made the object of teaching (differentially) d i s p e n s e d
by a specific institution and becom es thereby the principle of a cultivated habitus.
N otes fo r pp . 2 2 - 2 5 201
nature - w ithin which the schem es of thought are formed and transformed, and
in particular the logical categories, principles of division which through the
intermediary of the principles of the division o f labour, correspond to the structure
of the social world and not the natural world.
39 E. D urkheim , Les regies de la methode sociologique, 18th ed. (Paris: P U F , 1973;
ist ed ., A lcan, 1895), P- 9'. English translation, The Rules of Sociological Method
(N ew York: Free Press, 1964), p. 7.
40 T he hypnotic power of the notion of the unconscious has the effect of blotting
out the question of the relationship between the practice-generating schem es and
the representations - them selves more or less sanctioned by the collectivity -
they give of their practice to them selves or others. It thereby discourages
analysis of the theoretical or practical alterations that the various forms of
discourse about practice impose on practice.
41 *' A person w h o knows a language has represented in his brain some very abstract
system of underlying structures along with an abstract system of rules that
determ ine, by free iteration, an infinite range of sound-m eaning correspon
d en ce” (see N . Chomsky, ’'General Properties of L anguage”, in I. L. Darley
(ed .) Brain iMechanism Underlying Speech and Language (N ew York and London:
Grune and Straton, 1967), pp. 73—88).
42 C. Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of K inship, rev. ed. (L ondon: Social
Science Paperbacks, 1969), p. 33 (m y italics).
43 Ibid.
44 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (L ondon: Allen Lane, 1968), p. 34.
45 Elementary Structures, p. 32.
46 Ibid.
47 It is an unwarranted transfer of the same type w hich, according to M erleau-Ponty,
engenders the intellectualist and empiricist errors in psychology (see The Struc
ture of Behaviour, esp. pp. 114 and 124).
48 L . W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (O xford: Blackwell, 1963), pp. 38-9.
49 If it is the case that making practice explicit subjects it to an essential alteration,
by speaking o f what goes without saying or by naming regularities by definition
unremarked, it follows that any scientific objectification ought to be preceded by
a sign indicating*'everything takes place as i f . . . ”, w hich, functioning in the same
way as quantifiers in logic, w ould constantly remind us of the epistem ological
status of the constructed concepts of objective science. Everything conspires to
encourage the reifying of concepts and of theoretical constructs, starting with the
logic of ordinary language, w hich inclines us to infer the substance from the
substantive or to confer on concepts the power to act in history as the words
designating them act in the sentences of historical discourse, i.e. as historical
subjects. It is clear what theoretical (and political) effects arise from the personifi
cation of collectives (in sentences like "the bourgeoisie thinks t h a t .. . ” or ’'th e
working class refuses to accept. . . ”), which leads, as surely as D urkheim ’s pro
fessions of faith, to postulating the existence of a group or class ''collective
consciou sness” : by crediting groups or institutions with dispositions which can
be constituted only in individual consciousnesses, even when they are the product
of collective conditions such as the awakening of awareness [prise de conscience)
of class interests, one gets out of having to analyse these conditions, in particular
those determi ning the degree of objective and subjective hom ogeneity of the group
in question and the degree of consciousness of its members.
50 P. Ziff, Semantic Analysis (N ew York: Cornell U niversity Press, i960), p. 38.
204 N otes f o r p p . 2 Q -31
;8 On the deductive relationship between kinship term inology and kinship attitudes,
see A . R. RadclifTe-Brown, Structure and Function in Prim itive Society (L ondon:
Cohen and W est, 1952), p. 62, and African Systems o f K inship and Marriage
(L ondon: Oxford U niversity Press, i960), introduction, p. 25; Levi-Slrauss,
Structural Anthropology, p . 38. On the term ju ral and the use which Radcliffe-
Brown makes of it, see D um ont, Introduction a deux theories, p. 41: "jural”
relationships are those "which are subject to precise, binding prescriptions,
w hether concerning people or th in gs”.
59 "Principles of Social Organization in Southern K urdistan”, Universitetets Ethno-
grafiske Museum Bulletin, no. 7, Oslo, 1953.
60 R. F . M urphy and L . Kasdan, "T he Structure of Parallel Cousin M arriage”,
American Anthropologist, 61 (February 1959), pp. 17-29.
61 T he majority of earlier investigators accepted the native explanation that endoga
m ous marriage had the function of keeping the property in the fam ily, advancing
as evidence - and w ith som e reason - the closeness of the relationship between
marriage and inheritance practices. Against this explanation Murphy and Kasdan
very rightly object that the Koranic law which gives to a woman half of a son ’s
share is rarely observed, and that the fam ily can in any case count on the
inheritance contributed by in-marrying w om en (H . G ranqvist, " Marriage Con
ditions in a Palestinian V illage”, Commentationes Humanarum, Societas Scien-
tiarium Fennica 3 (1931); H . Rosenfield, "An Analysis of Marriage Statistics for
a M oslem and Christian Arab V illage”, International Archives o f Ethnography, 48
( i 957)> PP- 32-62)-
62 Both these theories accept an undifferentiated definition of function, which
reduces it to the function for the group as a whole. For exam ple, Murphy and
Kasdan write, " Most explanations of patrilateral parallel cousin marriage are of
a causal-motivational kind, in which the institution is explained through reference
to the consciously felt goals of the individual role players. We have not attempted
to explain the origin of the custom in this paper but have taken it as a given factor
and then proceeded to analyze its function, i.e. its operation within Bedouin
social structure. It was found that parallel cousin marriage contributes to the
extrem e fission of agnatic lines in Arab society, and, through in-marriage, encysts
the patrilineal segm en ts” ("Structure of Parallel C ousin M arriage”, p. 27).
63 J. Cuisenier, "Endogam ie et exogamie dans le mariage arabe”, L ’Homme, 2, 2
(M av-A ugust 1962), pp. 80-105.
64 " It has long been knowrn that societies which advocate marriage betw een certain
types of kin adhere to the norm only in a small number of cases, as demonstrated
by Kunstadter and his team through the use of computer sim ulations. Fertility
and reproduction rates, the demographic balance of the sexes and the age
pyramid never show the perfect harmony necessary for every individual, when
the tim e com es for him to marry, to be assured of finding a suitable spouse in
the prescribed degree, even if the kinship nomenclature is broad enough to
confuse degrees of the same type but unequally distant, often so much so that
the notion of a com m on descent becom es m erely theoretical” (Levi-Strauss,
Elementary Structures o f Kinship, p. xxx).
65 T he calculation of "rates of endogam y” by genealogical level, an unreal intersec
tion of abstract "categories”, leads one to treat as identical, by a second-order
abstraction, individuals w ho, although on the same level of the genealogical tree,
may be of widely differing ages and w hose marriages for this very reason may
have been arranged in different circum stances corresponding to different states
of the matrimonial market. Or, conversely, it may lead one to treat genealogically
206 N o tes f o r p p . 3 3 - 3 6
associations of names w hich are very close to one another or derived from the
sam e name are much appreciated (Ahc&ne and E lhocine, A hm ed and M ohamed,
Seghir or Meziane and M oqrane, e tc .), especially if one of them is the name of
an ancestor. Sincc the more integrated the fam ily is, the greater the range of
unusable first-names, the choice of first names actually made gives an indication
of the "strength of feelin g ” in the lineage. T h e sam e nam e, or whole series
com posed of the same names, may coexist in a genealogy, running down parallel
lin e s: the more remote the com m on origin (or the weaker the unity between the
sub-groups), the more it seem s legitim ate to use the sam e names, thus
perpetuating the m em ory of the same ancestors in increasingly autonom ous
lineages.
71 T o make com pletely explicit the im plicit demand which lies behind genealogical
inquiry, as it lies behind all inquiries, one would first have to study the social
history of the genealogical tool, paying particular attention to the functions w hich,
in the traditions of w hich anthropologists are the product, have produced and
reproduced the need for this instrument, viz. the problem s of inheritance and
succession. T h is social genealogy of genealogy would have to extend into a social
history of the relationship between the " scientific” uses and the social uses of
the instrum ent. But the m ost im portant thing would be to carry ou t an
epistem ological study of the mode of investigation which is the precondition for
production of the genealogical diagram. T h is would aim to determ ine the full
significance of the ontological transmutation which learned inquiry brings about
sim ply by virtue of the fact that it dem ands a quasi-theoretical relation to kinship,
im plying a break with the practical relation directly oriented towards functions.
72 U nder the network of genealogical relationships is dissim ulated the network of
practical relationships, which are the product of the history of the econom ic and
sym bolic exchanges. It can be shown in a particular case (P . Bourdieu, Esquisse
d ’une theorie de la pratique, precede de trois etudes d ’ethnologie kabyle (Paris and
Geneva: Librairie D roz, 1972), pp. 85-8) that the agents organize their practice
in relation to the useful divisions, finding in the genealogical representation an
instrum ent of legitim ation.
73 D um on t, Introduction a deux theories d ’anthropologie sociale, pp. 122-3.
74 T he ritualization of violence in fighting is doubtless one of the most typical
manifestations of the dialectic of strategy and ritual: although the battles were
alm ost always motivated by harm done to econom ic or sym bolic interests - the
theft of an animal or an insult to mem bers of the group, e.g . the shepherds -
their lim its were set by the ritualized m odel of the war of honour, which
applied even more strictly in the seasonal gam es, also endow ed with a ritual
function, such as the ball games played in autumn and spring (see Bourdieu,
Esquisse, pp. 21-3). It is possible to understand in term s of this logic, i.e. as the
sym bolic manipulation of violence aimed at resolving the tensions arising from
contact between alien and som etim es traditionally hostile groups, all the particu
larly strict rites to w hich marriage between distant groups gives rise. Rules and
ritual becom e increasingly necessary as it ceases to be possible to count on the
autom atic orchestration of practices that is ensured by hom ogeneity of habitus
and interests (w hich explains, in a general w ay, why the ritualization of inter
actions rises with the distance between the individuals or groups and hence
with the size of the groups).
75 T h u s, the seem ingly most ritualized acts in the marriage negotiation and in the
ceremonials accom panying the wedding - which by their degree of solem nity have
the secondary function of declaring the social significance of the marriage (the
208 N otes fo r p p . 4 4 -4 7
solem nity of the cerem ony tending to rise with the families' position in the social
hierarchy and with the genealogical distance betw een them ) - constitute so many
opportunities to deploy strategies aimed at manipulating the objective meaning
of a relationship which is never entirely unequivocal, whether by choosing the
inevitable and - making a virtue of necessity - scrupulously conform ing to the
proprieties, or by disguising the objective significance of the marriage under the
ritual intended to celebrate it.
76 T h is explains in part the early age of marriage; the unmarried girl is the very
incarnation of the group’s vulnerability; “ the straightest of them is twisted as a
sick le”, says the proverb. So the father’s ch ief concern is to get rid of this danger
as quickly as possible by putting her under the protection of another man.
77 J. Chelhod, who reports th a t“ in the low language of A leppo, prostitutes are called
'daughters of the maternal a u n t”’, also quotes a Syrian proverb which expresses
the same disapproval of marriage with the m other’s sister’s daughter: “ Because
of his impure character, he married his maternal aunt’s daughter” ( * Le mariage
avec la cousine parallele dans le system e arabe ” , L ’Homme, 4, 3-4 (July-D ecem ber
1964), pp. 113-73). Similarly, in Kabylia, to express the total lack of any genea
logical relationship, men will say, “ What are you to me? N ot even the son of the
daughter of my m other’s sister [mis Mis kh alti].”
78 An indirect confirmation of the meaning given to marriage betw een parallel
cousins may be seen in the fact that the person responsible for the solemn
opening of the ploughing, the action hom ologous with inaugural marriage, had
no political role to play and that his duties w ere purely honorary, or, one might
say, symbolic, i.e. at once undem anding and respected. T h is 6ara/ui-endowed
person is referred to by the names am ezw ar (the first), aneflus (the man of trust)
or aqdhim (the elder), amghar (the old m an), amas'ud (the man of luck), or, more
precisely, am ezw ar, aneflus, amghar nat-yuga (the first, the man of trust, the old
man of the team of oxen or of the plough). T he most significant term, because
it explicitly states the ploughing-m arriage homology manifested by countless
other indications, is unquestionably boula'ras (the man of the w edding). T h e same
connotation is found in another designation - mefthah n ss'ad (the key of good
luck, he who opens) (see E. Laoust, Mots et choses berberes: notes de linguistique
et d ’ethnographie, Paris: Challamel, 1920).
79 “ You must marry your paternal uncle's daughter, even if she has fallen into
neglect.” And various other proverbs point in the same direction: "Turn with
the road if it turns. Marry the daughter of your 'amm if she has been abandoned
[is lying fallow ]” ; " T h e daughter of your ramm even if she has been abandoned;
the road of peace even if it tw ists.” A s the metaphor show s (the twisted road as
opposed to the straight way), parallel-cousin marriage (like marriage to a brother’s
widow) is seen more than often not as a forced sacrifice which it is desirable to
turn into a voluntary subm ission to the call of honour. “ If you do not marry the
daughter of your amm, w ho will take her? You are the one who must take her,
whether you want to or n o t.” “ Even if she be ugly and worthless, her paternal
uncle is expected to take her for his son; if h e seeks a wife for his son elsewhere,
people will laugh at him , and say: *He has gon e and found a stranger for his son,
and left his brother’s daughter.’”
80 But here, too, every sort of com prom ise and, of course, strategy, is to be found:
although in the case of land, the best-placed relative may be aware that more
distant kin would willingly steal a march on him and win the sym bolic and
material advantage accruing from such a meritorious purchase, or, in the case
of the vengeance of honour, that a rival avenger is ready to step in and take over
N otes fo r p p . 4 9 -5 3 209
the revenge and the ensuing honour, nothing similar occurs in the case of
marriage, and there may be many ways of backing out: som etim es the son takes
flight, with his parents’ connivance, thereby providing them with the only
acceptable excuse that a brother can be given. Short of this extrem e solution,
it is not uncom m on for the obligation to marrv left-over daughters to devolve
upon the "poor relations’*, w ho are bound by all sorts of " obligations’* to the
richer m em bers of the group. And there is no better proof of the ideological
function of marriage to the parallel cousin (or to any female cousin in the paternal
lineage, however distant) than the use that may be made, in such cases, of the
exalted representation of this ideal marriage.
81 Physical and mental infirmity presents an extrem ely difficult problem for a group
which rigorously denies social status to a woman without a husband or even to
a man w ithout a wife (even a widower is obliged to rush into a new marriage).
All the more so when these infirmities are seen and interpreted through the
mythico-ritual categories: one can imagine the sacrifice it represents - in a u n i
verse in w hich a w ife can be repudiated because she has a reputation for bringing
bad luck - to marry a woman who is left-handed, half-blind, lame, or
hunchbacked (this deform ity representing an inversion of pregnancy) or who is
sim ply sick and weak, all om ens of barrenness and wickedness.
82 "You give w heat, but take barley.” "You give wheat to bad teeth. ” "Make your
offspring out o f clay ; if you d on ’t get a cooking pot you will get a couscous d ish .”
A m ong the eulogies of parallel-cousin marriage I have collected, the follow ing
are typical: "Sh e will not ask you for m uch for herself, and there will be no need
to spend a great deal on the w edding.” " H e may do what he will with his
brother’s daughter and no evil will com e from her. Thereafter he will live in
greater unity with his brother, doing as their father recomm ended for the sake
of brotherhood [thaymats]: 'D o not listen to your w om en! ’” " T h e woman who
is a stranger w ill despise you, she will be an insult to your ancestors, believing
that hers are more noble than yours. Whereas w ith the daughter of your 'amm,
your grandfather and hers are one; she will never say 'a curse on your father’s
father’. T h e daughter of your 'amm will not abandon you. If you have no tea
she will not dem and any from you, and even if she should die of hunger in your
house, she w ill bear it all and never complain about y o u .”
83 A . Hanoteau, Poesies populaires de la K abylie du D jurdjura (Paris: Imprimerie
Imperiale, 1867), p. 475.
84 Jurists’ fascination with what survives of matrilineal kinship has led them to take
an interest in the case of the aw rith, which they see, to use their own term inology,
as a "contract for the adoption of an adult m a le” (for Algeria, see G . H .
Bousquet, " N o te sur le mariage mechrouth dans la region de G ouraya”, Revue
Algerienne, January-Februarv 1934, pp. 9 -1 1, and L. Lefevre, Recherches sur la
condition de la femme kabyle, Algiers: Carbonel, 1939; for M orocco, G . M arcy,
"Le mariage en droit coutum ier zem m ou r”, Revue Algerienne, Tunisienne et
Marocaine de Legislation et Jurisprudence, July 1930, and "L es vestiges de la
parente maternelle en droit coutum ier berbere”, Revue Africaine, no. 85 (1941),
pp. 187-211: Capitaine Bendaoud, " L ’adoption des adultes par contrat mixte de
mariage et de travail chez les Beni M g u ild ”, Revue Marocaine de Legislation,
Doctrine, Jurisprudence Cherifiennes, no. 2 (1935), pp. 34-40; Capitaine T u rb et,
" L ’adoption des adultes chez les Ighezrane”, ibid. p. 40, and no. 3 (1935), p. 41).
85 For exam ple, in a large family in the village of Aghbala in Lesser Kabylia, of
218 male marriages (each man’s first) 34% were with fam ilies outside the lim its
of the tribe; only 8 % , those with the spatially and socially m ost distant groups,
2 10 N otes f o r p p . 5 5 -5 4
present all the features of prestige marriages: they are all the work of one family
which wants to distinguish itself from the other lineages by original matrimonial
practices. T he other distant marriages (26% ) merely renew established relation
ships (relationships "through the w o m en ” or "through the maternal uncles ”,
constantly maintained on the occasion of marriages, departures and returns,
funerals and som etim es even large work projects). T w o thirds of the marriages
(66% ) were made within the tribe (m ade up of nine villages): apart from
marriages with the opposing clan, which are very rare (4% ) and always have a
political significance (especially for the older generations) on account of the
traditional antagonism betw een the two groups, all the other unions fall within
the class of ordinary marriages. Only 6 % of the marriages were made w ithin the
lineage (as against 17% in the other lineages and 39% in the field of practical
relationships): 4% with the parallel cousin and 2% with another cousin (and it
must be added that in tw o-thirds of these cases the fam ilies w hich make this
marriage have abandoned undivided ow nership).
* 86 T h e follow ing testim ony is particularly significant: "As soon as her first son was
born, Fatima set about finding his future wife. She never missed an opportunity
- she kept her eyes open on all occasions, in her neighbour’s houses, among her
own fam ily, in the village, when visiting friends, at w eddings, on pilgrimages,
at the fountain, far from hom e, and even when she had to go and present her
condolences. In this way she married off all her children w ithout difficulty and
almost without noticing it ” (Yam ina Ait Amar Ou Said, Le manage en Kabyhe
(Fichier de D ocum entation Berbere), i960, p. 10).
87 As I have shown elsewhere (cf. Esquisse, pp. 110-12), the frequency and solemnity
of ritual acts increase as one m oves from marriages contracted within the un
divided family or practical kinship, through marriages within close and then
distant practical relationships, and finally to extra-ordinary marriages. Everything
takes place as if extra-ordinary marriages gave us the opportunity to grasp in its
achieved form a ceremonial which is reduced to its sim plest expression when the
marriage is situated in the ordinary universe.
88 If we leave aside the mythical idealization (blood, purity, the inside) and ethical
exaltation (honour, virtue, etc.) surrounding purely agnatic marriage, we find that
these ordinary' marriages are described no differently from parallel-cousin
marriage. For exam ple, marriage with the father’s sister’s daughter is regarded,
like marriage with the parallel cousin, as capable of securing agreement among
the w om en and the w ife’s respect for her husband’s relatives (her khal and her
khalt) at the lowest cost, since the tension resulting from the rivalry implicitly
triggered off by any marriage betw een different groups over the status and living
conditions offered to the young wife has no reason to occur at this degree of
familiarity.
89 T hese extra-ordinary marriages are not subject to the constraints and proprieties
which apply to ordinary marriages (partly because they have no " seq u el”) : apart
from the cases in which the defeated group (clan or tribe) w ould give the
victorious group a w om an, or, to show that there was neither winner nor loser,
the tw o groups exchanged w om en, it also som etim es happened that the victorious
group would give the other group a woman without taking anything in return,
but then the marriage took place not between the most powerful fam ilies, but
between families asymmetrically situated: a small family in the victorious group
gave a woman to a great family in the other group. T h e victorious group intended
to show , by the very inequality of the union, that the least of its ow n members
was superior to the greatest of its opponents.
Notes f o r p p . 5 4 -6 2 2 11
97 Here is just one typical testim ony relating to the breaking up of undivided
ownership: "You can’t find two brothers w ho live together (za d d i) now , still less
we w ho are not sprung from the same w om b. I swear that I can't even remember
what relation I am to dadda Braham. Sooner or later it’s bound to happen, and
everyone in his heart wants it to , everyone thinks he does too much for the others
*If I only had my w ife and children, I w ouldn’t have to work so hard or *I would
have reached the "divine throne" [the seventh h eaven ].’ O nce people start
thinking like that, there's nothing for it, it’s all over. It’s like a canker. T h e women
already thought that way, and when the men join in and start saying the same
things, it’s finished. T h a t’s what all the w om en want; they are the enem ies of
za d d i, because the devil is in them : they do all they can to contam inate the men.
With their determ ination, they never fail.”
98 T he weakening of the cohesive forces (correlative with the slum p in symbolic
values) and the strengthening of the disruptive forces (linked to the appearance
of sources of monetary incom e and to the ensuing crisis of the peasant economv)
lead to refusal of the elders’ authority and of the austere, frugal aspects of peasant
existence; the younger generation demand the right to dispose of the profit of
their labour, in order to spend it on consum er goods rather than on the svmbolic
goods which would increase the fam ily’s prestige and influence. "In the past, no
one dared to ask for the heritage to be broken up. T here was the authority of
the elders. If anyone had tried, h e’d have been beaten, cast out, and cursed: ‘He
is a cause of bankruptcy \lakhla ukham, the fallow of the h o u se].’ *He wants it
all shared out ’ [itsabib ibbatu] ’: the elders refuse to 'give him the share-out ’. Now
everybody insists on their rights. Once it was 'eat your piece of wheatcake and
keep q u iet’: once, being head of the fam ily, goin g to market, sitting in thajma'th,
meant som ething. N ow , everyone knows that w idow s’ houses are more prosperous
than those of men [of honour]. 'T h o se w ho were children only yesterday want
to run things n o w !”’
99 W ithout speculating as to the causal link between these facts, it may be noted
that " illnesses of acute jealousy ” (atan an-tsismin thissamamin, the sickness of bitter
jealousy) receive great attention from relatives, especially mothers, w ho wield a
whole arsenal of curative and prophylactic rites (to suggest an insurmountable
hatred, reference is made to the feeling of the little boy w ho, suddenly deprived
of his m other’s affection by the arrival of a new baby, grew thin and pale like
som eone moribund, am'ut, or " con stip ated ”, bubran).
100 It is significant that customary law, which only exceptionally intervenes in
dom estic life, explicitly favours undivided ownership ( thidukli bukham or z a d d i):
"People living in a family association pay no fine if they fight. If they separate,
they pay like other p eo p le” (Hanoteau and Letourneux, L a K abylie, vol. in , p-
423)-
101 A female informant gives a typical account of how this sort of marriage is
arranged: "Before he had leant to walk, his father found him a bride. One
evening, after supper, Arab went to call on his elder brother (dadda). They
chatted. His brother’s w ife had her daughter on her lap; the little girl s t r e t c h e d
out her arms towards her uncle, w ho picked her up, saying 'M ay G od make her
Idir’s wife! T h at’s so, isn ’t it, da d d a ? You w on ’t say no? *Arab’s brother replied:
‘What does a blind man want? Light! If you relieve me of the care she gives
m e, may God take your cares from you. I give her to you, with her grain and
her chaff, for n o th in g !” ’ (Y am ina Ait Amar Ou Said, L e m anage en K a b ylie,
p. 10).
102 A s J. Chelhod rightly points out, all observations confirm that the tendency to
N otes [or pp. 65-70
marry endogam ously, which is more marked in nomadic tribes in a constant state
of war than in settled tribes, tends to reappear or to be accentuated when there
are threats of war or conflict ("L e mariage avec la cousine parallele dans le
system e arabe”, pp. 113-73). T hose w ho perpetuate undivided ownership - or
the appearances of it - often invoke the danger of separating so long as rival
fam ilies remain united.
103 It follow s from this axiom that the dom inant are functionalists, because function
so defined - that is, in the sense of the structural-functionalist school - is simply
the interest of the dom inant, or more precisely, the interest the dominant have
in the perpetuation of a system consistent w ith their interests. T hose w ho explain
matrimonial strategies by their effects - for exam ple, the "fission and fu sion ” of
Murphy and Kasden are effects which one gains nothing by term ing functions
- are no less remote from the reality of practices than those who invoke the efficacy
of the rule. T o say that parallel-cousin marriage has the function of fission and/or
fusion w ithout inquiring for whom, for w hat, to what (m easurable) extent, and
under what conditions, is to resort, sham efacedly of course, to explanation by
final causes instead of inquiring how the econom ic and social conditions charac
teristic of a social formation im pose the pursuit of the satisfaction of a determinate
type of interests which itself leads to the production of a determ inate type of
collective effect.
104 By m eans of secret negotiations, lhamgharth som etim es manages to interfere in
a marriage being arranged entirely by the m en, and to make thislith promise to
leave her com plete authority in the house, warning her that otherwise she will
prevent the marriage. T he sons have som e justification in suspecting their
m others of giving them for wives girls they - the mothers - will be able to
dom inate w ithout difficulty.
105 T h e marriages of the poor (especially those poor in sym bolic capital) are to those
of the rich, mutatis mutandis, what female marriages are to male marriages. T he
poor cannot afford to be too dem anding in matters of honour. " T h e only thing
the poor man can do is show he is jealous.” T h is means that, like w om en, the
poor are less concerned with the sym bolic and political functions of a marriage
than w ith its practical functions, attaching, for exam ple, much more importance
to the personal qualities of the spouses.
106 T h e girl’s value on the marriage market is in a sense a direct projection of the
value socially attributed to the tw o lineages of which she is the product. T h is can
be seen clearly when the father has had children by several marriages: whereas
the boys’ value is unrelated to their m others’ value, the girl’s value depends on
the social status of their m others’ lineages and the strength of their m others’
positions in the fam ily.
107 T h e relevant genealogy is to be found in Bourdieu, Esquisse, p. 149.
108 "Spontaneous p sych ology” perfectly describes the "girls’ b o y ” (aqchich bu thaq-
chichin), coddled and cosseted by the w om en of the fam ily w ho are always
inclined to keep him with them longer than the other boys; he eventually
identifies with the social role created for him , and becom es a sickly, puny child,
"eaten up by his many long-haired sisters”. T h e same reasons which lead the
fam ily to lavish care on a product too rare and precious to be allowed to run the
slightest risk - to spare him agricultural work and to prolong his education, thus
settin g him apart from his friends by his more refined speech, cleaner clothes,
and more elaborate food - also lead them to arrange an early marriage for him .
109 A girl’s value rises with the number of her brothers, the guardians of her honour
(in particular of her virginity) and potential allies of her future husband. T ales
214 N otes f o r p p . 7 0 -7 3
express the jealousy inspired by the girl with seven brothers, protected sevenfold
like "a fig among the lea v es” : "A girl who was lucky enough to have seven
brothers could be proud, and there was no lack o f suitors. She was sure of being
sought after and appreciated. W hen she was married, her husband, her husband’s
parents, the whole fam ily, and even the neighbours and their w ives respected her-
had she not seven men on her side, was she not the sister of seven brothers, seven
protectors? If there was the slightest argument, they came and set things right
and if their sister com m itted a fault, or ever came to be repudiated, they would
have taken her back home with them, respected by everyone. N o dishonour could touch
them. N o one would dare to enter the lions’ d e n ”
n o Particularly skilful strategies can make the m ost of the lim ited capital available,
through bluff (difficult when one is operating in the area of familiar relationships)
or, more sim ply, through shrewd exploitation of the am biguities of the symbolic
patrimony or discrepancies betw een different com ponents of the patrimony.
Although it may be regarded as part of sym bolic capital, which is itself relatively
autonom ous of strictly econom ic capital, the skill w hich enables one to make the
best use of the patrimony through shrewd investm ents, such as successful
marriages, is relatively independent of it. T h u s the poor, w ho have nothing to
sell but their virtue, can take advantage of their daughter’s marriage to gain
prestigious allies or at least powerful protectors, by purveying honour to highly
placed buyers.
i n Inasmuch as they belong to the class of reproduction strategies, matrimonial
strategies differ in no way in their logic from those strategies designed to preserve
or increase sym bolic capital w hich conform to the dialectic of honour, whether
they involve the buying back of land or the paying back of insults, rape, or murder;
in each case, the same dialectical relationship can be observed between
vulnerability (through land, w om en, the house, in short, hurma) and the protec
tion (through men, rifles, the point of honour; in short, nif) which preserves or
increases sym bolic capital (prestige, honour; in short, hurma).
C H A P T E R 2. S T R U C T U R E S A N D T H E H A B IT U S
1 T h e word disposition seem s particularly suited to express what is covered by the
concept of habitus (defined as a system of dispositions). It expresses first the
result of an organizing action, w ith a m eaning close to that of words such as
structure; it also designates a w a y of being, a habitual state (especially of the
body) and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency, propensity, or inclination.
[T he sem antic cluster of " d isp osition ” is rather wider in French than in English,
but as this note - translated literally - show s, the equivalence is adequate.
Translator.]
2 T h e m ost profitable strategies are usually those produced, on the hither side
of all calculation and in the illusion of the m ost "authentic” sincerity, by a
habitus objectively fitted to the objective structures. T hese strategies w i t h o u t
strategic calculation procure an im portant secondary advantage for those w ho can
scarcely be called their authors - the social approval accruing from a p p a r e n t
disinterestedness.
3 "H ere w e confront the distressing fact that the sam ple episode chain under
analysis is a fragment of a larger segm ent of behavior which in the com plete r e c o r d
contains som e 480 separate episodes. M oreover, it took only tw enty m inutes for
these 480 behavior stream events to occur. If my w ife’s rate of behavior is
roughly representative of that of other actors, we must be prepared to deal with
N otes f o r p p . 7 3 - 7 7 2 15
things. All reasonable men have a confused notion of similar probabilities; this
then determ ines, or at least justifies, those unshakable beliefs we call common sense ”
(A . Cournot, Essai sur les fondements de la connaissance et sur les caracteres de la
critique philosophique (Paris: H achette, 1922; 1st ed ., 1851), p. 70).
21 E. Durkheim , devolu tion pedagogique en France (Paris: Alcan, 1938), p . 16.
22 R. Ruyer, Paradoxes de la conscience et limites de I'automatisme (Paris: Albin
M ichel, 1966), p. 136.
23 T h is universalization has the same lim its as the objective conditions of which the
principle generating practices and works is the product. T h e objective conditions
exercise simultaneously a universalizing effect and a particularizing effect, because
they cannot hom ogenize the agents whom they determ ine and w hom they consti
tute into an objective group, w ithout distinguishing them from all the agents
produced in different conditions.
24 O ne of the merits of subjectivism and moralism is that the analyses in which it
condem ns, as inauthentic, actions subject to the objective solicitations of the
world (e.g . Heidegger on everyday existence and "das M a n ” or Sartre on the
“ spirit of seriousness”) dem onstrate, per absurdum, the im possibility of the
authentic existence that would gather up all pregiven significations and objective
determ inations into a project of freedom . T he purely ethical pursuit of authenticity
is the privilege of the leisured thinker who can afford to dispense with the
econom y of thought which " inauthentic ” conduct allows.
25 G . W. Leibniz, “ Second eclaircissem ent du system e de la communication des
substances’* (1696), in Oeuvres philosophiques, ed. P. Janet (Paris: de Lagrange,
1866), vol. 11, p. 548.
26 T h u s, ignorance of the surest but best-hidden foundation of group or class
integration leads some (e.g . Aron, D ahl, etc.) to deny the unity of the dominant
class with no other proof than the im possibility of establishing empirically that
the mem bers of the dominant class have an explicit policy, expressly imposed by
explicit co-ordination, and others (Sartre, for example) to see the awakening of
class consciousness - a sort of revolutionary cogito bringing the class into existence
by constituting it as a “ class for itse lf” - as the only possible foundation of the
unity of the dominated class.
27 L eibniz, “ Second eclaircissem ent”, p. 548.
28 Were such language not dangerous in another way, one would be tempted to say,
against all forms of subjectivist voluntarism , that class unity rests fundamentally
on the “ class unconscious”. T h e awakening of "class consciousness” is not a
primal act constituting the class in a blaze of freedom ; its sole efficacy, as with
all actions of sym bolic reduplication, lies in the extent to which it brings to
consciousness all that is im plicitly assumed in the unconscious mode in the class
habitus.
29 T h is takes us beyond the false opposition in which the theories of acculturation
have allowed them selves to be trapped, w ith, on the one hand, the realism of
the structure which represents cultural or linguistic contacts as contacts between
cultures or languages, subject to generic laws (e.g . the law of the restructuring
of borrowings) and specific laws (those established by analysis of the s t r u c t u r e s
specific to the languages or cultures in contact) and on the other hand the realism
o f the element, which em phasizes the contacts betw een the societies (regarded as
populations) involved or, at best, the structures of the relations betw een those
societies (dom ination, etc.).
30 The People o f Alor, M inneapolis: U niversity of M innesota Press, 1944.
31 Culture and Personality (N ew York: Random H ouse, 1965), p. 86.
N otes f o r p p . 8 8-92 2 17
32 If iiliterate societies seem to have a particular bent for the structural games which
fascinate the anthropologist, their purpose is often quite simply m nem onic: the
remarkable homology to be observed in Kabvlia between the structure of the
distribution of the fam ilies in the village and the structure of the distribution of
graves in the cemetery (Ait Hichem , T izi Hibel) clearly makes it easier to locate
the traditionally anonymous graves (with expressly transmitted landmarks added
to the structural principles).
33 B. Berelson and G . A. Steiner, Human Behavior (N ew York: Harcourt, Brace
and World, 1964), p. 193.
34 The Singer o f the Tales (Cambridge, M a ss.: Harvard U niversity Press, i960), p. 30.
35 Ibid. p. 32.
36 Ibid. p. 24.
37 T hus, in the game of qochra, which the children play in early spring, the cork
ball (the qochra) which is fought for, passed and defended, is the practical
equivalent of woman. In the course of the game the players must both defend
them selves against it and, possessing it, defend it against those trying to take it
away. At the start of the match, the leader of the game repeatedly asks, "W hose
daughter is sh e ? ” but no one will volunteer to be her father and protect her: a
daughter is always a liability for men. And so lots have to be drawn for her, and
the unlucky player w ho gets her must accept his fate. He now has to protect the
ball against the attacks of all the others, while at the same time trying to pass
it on to another player; but he can only do so in an honourable, approved way.
A player whom the “ father” manages to touch with his stick, telling him “ S h e’s
your daughter”, has to acknowledge defeat, like a man temporarily obliged to
a socially inferior family from whom he has taken a w ife. For the suitors the
tem ptation is to take the prestigious course of abduction, whereas the father wants
a marriage that will free him from guardianship and allow him to re-enter the
gam e. T h e loser of the game is excluded from the world of men ; the ball is tied
under his shirt so that he looks like a girl who has been got pregnant.
38 It is said that formerly the wom en used to go to market alone; but they are so
talkative that the market w ent on until the market time of the follow ing week.
So the men turned up one day with sticks and put an end to their w ives’
gossip ing. . .I t can be seen that the “ m y th ” "exp lain s” the present division of
space and work by invoking the "evil nature” of w om en. When a man wants to
say that the world is topsy-turvy, he says that “ the w om en are going to market
39 A full presentation of the analysis of the internal structure of the Kabvle house,
of which it has only been possible to give the indispensable outline here, can be
found in P. Bourdieu, Esquisse d ’une theorie de la pratique (Paris and Geneva:
Libraine D roz, 1972), pp. 45-69.
40 T h is means to say that the “ learning by d o in g ” hypothesis, associated with the
name of Arrow (see K. J. Arrow, “ T he Econom ic Implications of Learning by
D o in g ”, Review of Economic Studies, 29, 3, no. 80 (June 1962), pp. 155-73) is a
particular case (whose particularity needs to be specified) of a very general law:
every made product - including sym bolic products such as works of art, gam es,
m yths, etc. - exerts by its very functioning, particularly by the use made of it,
an educative effect which helps to make it easier to acquire the dispositions
necessary for its adequate use.
41 Erikson’s analyses of the Yoruk might be interpreted in the same light (see
E. H. Erikson, "Observations on the Yoruk: Childhood and World Im age”
(U niversity of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology,
vol. 35, no. 10, Berkeley: U niversity of California Press, 1943), pp. 257-302).
8 BO T
2l8 N otes f o r pp. 92-97
C H A P T E R 3. G E N E R A T I V E S C H E M E S A N D P R A C T I C A L
L O G IC
1 T h e antigenetic prejudice leading to unconscious or overt refusal to seek the
genesis of objective structures and internalized structures in individual or collec
tive history com bines with the antifunctionalist prejudice, which refuses to take
account of the practical functions w hich symbolic system s may perform; and
together they reinforce the tendency of structuralist anthropology to credit
historical system s with more coherence than they have or need to have in order
to function. In reality these system s remain, like culture as described by Lowie,
"things of shreds and patches”,-even if these patches are constantly undergoing
unconscious and intentional restructurings and reworkings tending to integrate
them into the system .
2 T h e history of perspective offered by Panofsky (E . Panofsky, " D ie Perspektive
als 'sym bolische F orm ’”, Vortrage der Bibliothek Warburg, L eipzig and Berlin,
1924-5, pp. 258-330) is an exemplary contribution to a social history of conven
tional m odes of cognition and expression; doubtless, in order to make a radical
break with the idealist tradition of "symbolic forms*’ one would have to relate
N otes fo r p p . 9 7-9 8 219
8-2
220 N otes f o r p p . 10 0 -10 4
sequence (running from autum n to sum m er, i.e. from west to east, evening to
morning, etc.) or as the points on a circle w hich may be obtained by folding the
diagram along the axis X Y .
7 Other informants even say it is im possible to know which is the first day of winter.
8 T hese names refer to the legend of the borrowed days, which tells how winter
(or January', or February, etc.) borrowed a few days from the next period so as
to punish an old woman (or a goat, or a Negro) who had issued a challenge.
9 Although it m ust not be forgotten that to bring together, in the form of a s e r ie s ,
a set of features present in a particular region is itself an entirely artificial
syncretic operation, the three main series are indicated in the diagram, \[ z
imirghane, amerdil, thamgharth, ahgan or thiftirine, nisan; thimgharine, hayan,
nisan; el mwalah, el qw arah, el szcalah, e lfw a ta h . husum, natah, nisan. T hese s e r ie s
could (for the sake of sim plicity) be said to correspond to the Djurdjura r e g i o n ,
to Lesser Kabylia, and, in the last case, to the most Islamized areas or to li t e r a t e
informants.
10 T h is was how an informant spoke of la'didal, a period of dreadful cold w h o s e
com ing can never be predicted. It is m entioned in a song which the w om en s in g
w hile working at the flour mill: " If la'didal are like the nights of hayan for m e .
tell the shepherds to flee to the village.” And according to informants in th e
Djurdjura region, one night in the month of bujember (no one knows which o n e )
water turns to blood.
11 T h is sem i-scholarly series is som etim es called ma, qa, sa, fin, by a mnemonic
device used by the marabouts, in which each name is represented by its initial.
Sim ilarly, it is thanks to its m nem onic qualities that informants almost always
cite the series of the divisions of the beginning of sum m er ( izegzaw en , iwraghen,
imellalen, iquranen); the series is also som etim es designated by the first consonants
of the roots of the Berber names for the divisions: z a , ra, ma, qin.
12 Other taboos of hayan and husum: ploughing, w eddings, sex; working at night;
making and firing pottery; preparing w ool; w eaving. At Ain A ghbel, during
husum, all work on the land is forbidden - it is el faragh, em ptiness. It is
inauspicious "to start any building work, celebrate a marriage, hold a feast, or
buy an anim al”. In a general w ay, people refrain from any activity involving the
future.
13 Thafsuth, spring, is related to efsu, to undo, untie, to draw w ool, and in the
passive, to open out, burgeon, flower.
14 Marriages take place either in autum n, like the marriage of the earth and the sky,
or in spring, in m id-A pril, w hen, according to a scholarly tradition, all the beings
on the earth marry. Sterile w om en are recom m ended to eat boiled herbs picked
during natah.
15 A z a l denotes the daytim e, broad daylight (as opposed to night and m orning),
and more especially the hottest m om ent of the sum m er day, devoted to rest. The
"return of a z a l” is essentially marked by a change in the rhythm of daily a c t i v i t y ,
w’hich is analysed below.
16 Just as acts of fecundation are excluded from the month of M ay, so sleep is
excluded from the first day of sum m er: people take care not to sleep that day
for fear of falling ill or losing their courage or their sense of honour (the seat of
which is the liver, the place of ruh, the male sou l). D oubtless for the same reason,
earth dug up on that day is used in the magic rites intended to reveal the
weakening or disappearance of the point of honour (nif) in m en, and the stubborn
ness in anim als w hich makes them resist training.
17 Smoke is som etim es credited with fertilizing powers, w hich, at the tim e of in sfa,
N otes f o r p p . 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 221
mainly act on the fig-trees (w hose cycle is relatively independent of that of the
cereals, and accompanied by a relatively small num ber of rites, ow ing to the fact
that it involves no intervention ''against nature”). Sm oke, a synthesis of the moist
and the dry obtained by burning moist things (green plants, branches, and
vegetation gathered from damp spots, such as poplars or oleander), is believed
to have the power to “ fecund ate” the fig-trees; fum igation is identified with
caprification.
18 A number of proverbs explicitly link the tw o p eriod s: for exam ple, it is often said
that if there is a severe sirocco in smaim there will be cold weather and snow in
lyali.
19 T he word lakhrif is related to the verb kherref, m eaning “ to pick and eat fresh
fig s”, and also “ to joke, to tell funny and often obscene stories, in the style of
the wandering singers”, and som etim es “ to talk n on sen se” ( itskhernf "he’s
ram bling”; akherraf, joker, buffoon).
20 A similar effect may be observed in any social formation in which there coexist
unequally legitim ate practices and know ledges: when m em bers of the working
classes are questioned about their cultural practices and preferences, they select
those which they regard as closest to the dom inant definition of legitimate
practice.
21 E. H usserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce
G ibson (N ew York and L ondon: Collier, 1972), pp. 309-11.
22 In a sort of com m entary on Saussure’s second principle (“ the signifier unfolds
in tim e and has the characteristics it gets from tim e ”: F. de Saussure, Cours de
linguistique generale (Paris: Payot, i960), p. 103; trans. W. Baskin as Course in
General Linguistics (N ew York: Philosophical Library, 1959), p. 70), Cournot
contrasts the properties of spoken or written discourse, "an essentially linear
series” whose "mode of construction obliges us to use a successive, linear series
of signs to express relationships which the mind perceives, or ought to perceive,
sim ultaneously and in a different ord er”, with “ synoptic tables, family trees,
historical atlases, mathematical tables, in which the surface expanse is more or
less successfully exploited to represent system atic relations and links w hich it
would be difficult to make out in the flow of d iscou rse” (A . C ournot). Essai sur
les fondements de la connaissance et sur les caracteres de la critique philosophique
(Paris: H achette, 1922), p. 364).
23 See J. Favret, "La segm entarite au M aghreb”, L'Homme, 6, 2 (1966), pp. 105-11,
and “ Relations de dependance et manipulation de la violence en K a b v lie”,
L'H om m e, 8, 4 (1968), pp. 18-44.
24 Set out in greater detail in P. Bourdieu, The Algerians (B oston: Beacon Press,
1962), pp. 14-20.
25 T h e logic of rite and m yth belongs to the class of natural logics, which logic,
linguistics, and the philosophy of language are beginning to explore, with very
different assum ptions and m ethods. For exam ple, according to George Lakoff,
one of the founders of “ generative sem an tics”, the “ fuzzy lo g ic ” of ordinary
language is characterized by its use of “ fuzzy co n cep ts” and “ h ed g es”, such as
sort oft pretty much, rather, loosely speaking, etc., which subject truth-values to
a deform ation which classical logic cannot account for.
26 T h e logic of practice ow es a number of its properties to the fact that what logic
calls the “ universe of d iscou rse” there remains im plicit, in its practical state. One
must never lose sight of the conditions w hich have to be fulfilled for a genuine
universe of discourse to appear: the intellectual and material equipm ent needed
for the successive operations of methodical recording; the leisure required to carry
222 N otes f o r p p . 1 1 0 - 1 1 6
out these operations and analyse their products; an *' interest” in such activities
w hich, even if not experienced as such, cannot be dissociated from a reasonably
expectation of material and/or sym bolic profit, i.e . from the existence of a market
for discourse and metadiscourse, etc.
27 It can be seen, in passing, that the points of view adopted on the house are
opposed in accordance with the very logic (m ale/fem ale) which they a p p ly : this
sort of reduplication, founded on the correspondence betw een social divisions and
logical divisions, results in a circular reinforcem ent which no doubt makes an
important contribution towards confining agents in a closed, finite world and
a doxic experience of that world.
28 J. N icod , L a geometrie dans le mondc sensible, w ith a preface by Bertrand Russell
(Paris: P U F , 1962), pp. 43-4.
29 For similar observations, see M . Granet, L a civilisation chinoise (Paris: A . Colin,
1929), passim and esp. p. 332. Another m odulation technique is association by
assonance; it may lead to connections with no mythico-ritual significance (aman
d laman, water is trust) or, on the other hand, to connections which are sym boli
cally overdeterm ined (a zk a d a z q a , tom orrow is the grave). A s in poetry, the
practical logic of ritual exploits the duality of sound and sense (and, in other cases,
the plurality of m eanings of the same so u n d ); the double link, by sound and by
m eaning, offers a crossroads, a choice between two paths, either of which may
be taken, w ithout contradiction, at different tim es and in different contexts.
30 Certain inform ants proceed in just this way w hen, avoiding mere recitation of
the sem i-scholarly series, they reconstruct the calendar by means of successive
dichotom ies.
31 In another tale, the snake which a sterile woman had brought up as her son is
rejected by its first w ife: it draw s itself up, swells, and breathes out a jet of poisonous
flame (asqi, the tem pering of iron, also means poisoning) which reduces her to
ashes.
32 T h e agrarian calendar reproduces, in a transfigured form , the rhythm s of the
farming year, or more precisely, the clim atic rhythm s as seen w hen translated
into the alternation of labour periods and production periods w hich structures
the farming year. (T h e pattern of rainfall is characterized by the opposition
between the cold, wet season, from N ovem ber to April - with the m axim um rain
or snow com ing in N ovem ber and D ecem ber, followed by a drier period in
January and more rain in February and March - and the hot, dry season, from
May to October - the driest m onths being June, July, and A ugust. T h e farmers’
dependence on the climate was obviously exacerbated by the lim ited traction
power available - for ploughing - and the inefficiency of the techniques used -
sw ingplough and sickle - though som e are more dependent than others, since the
owners of the best land and the best oxen can plough im m ediately after the first
rains, even if the soil is sticky, whereas the poorest farmers often have to wait
until they can borrow or hire a yoke of oxen; and the same is true of reaping
- those richest in sym bolic capital can assem ble the labour force required for a
quick harvest.) In the same w ay, the sym bolic equipm ent the rites can use
naturally depends on what is in season (although in som e cases reserves are set
aside specially for ritual use); but the generative schem es make it possible to find
substitutes and to turn external necessities and constraints to good account within
the logic of the rite itself (and this explains the perfect harmony between
technical reason and mythic reason to be found in more than one case, e.g . in
the orientation of the house).
33 T hese schem es can be grasped only in the objective coherence of the ritual
N otes fo r p p . j 18-121 223
actions to w hich they give rise, although they can som etim es be almost directly
apprehended in discourse, w hen for no apparent reason an informant "associates”
two ritual practices which have nothing in com m on except a schem e (e.g . the
schem e of sw elling, in one case in which an informant "related ”, by describing
them one after the other, the meal eaten on the first day of spring - with adhris
- and the w edding meal - w ith ufthyen).
34 Workmen w ho use a w ooden roller and an iron bar to raise a stone are applying
the rule of the com position of parallel forces in the same direction ; they know
how to vary the position of the fulcrum depending on their exact purpose and
the w eight or volum e of the load, as if they were not unaware of the rule (which
they would not be capable of form ulating expressly) that the greater the ratio
betw een the two arms of the lever, the less force is needed to counterbalance a
resistance - or more generally, the rule that a loss in displacem ent is a gain in
force. T here is no reason to invoke the mysteries of an unconscious versed in
physics, or the arcana of a philosophy of nature postulating a mysterious harmony
betw een the structure of the human brain and the structure of the physical world.
It m ight be interesting to know w hy the fact that the manipulation of language
presupposes the acquisition of abstract structures and of rules for the carrying
out of those operations (such as, according to C hom sky, the non-recursive nature
of inversion) should arouse such w onderm ent.
35 T h is section owes much to Jean N icod. Cf. L a geometne dans le monde sensible.
36 Q uoted in G . Bachelard, L a poetique de I’espace (Paris: P U F , 1961), p. 201.
37 ^ id .
38 Cf. J. F. L e N y , Apprentissageetactivitespsychologiques(Paris: P U F , 1967), p. 137.
39 wModern sociologists and psychologists resolve such problem s by appealing to
the unconscious activity of the mind; but when Durkheim was w riting, psychology
and modern linguistics had not yet reached their main conclusions. T h is explains
w hy D urkheim foundered in what he regarded as an irreducible antinom y. . . :
the blindness of history and the purposiveness of consciousness. Between the tw o
obviously stands the unconscious finality of the m i n d . . . I t i s . . . a t these
interm ediate or lower levels - such as that of unconscious thought - that the
apparent opposition betw een the individual and society disappears, and it becomes
possible to m ove from one point of view to the other.” (C . Levi-Strauss, "La
sociologie fran^aise”, in L a sociologie au X X e siecle, ed. G . Gurvich and Wr. E.
Moore (Paris: P U F , 1947), vol. 11, p. 527).
40 T h is is why I cannot help feeling a certain unease at w riting and describing in
words what, after a learning process analogous (mutatis mutandis) to that of the
native agent, I first mastered practically: the concept of "resurrection” is what
the outsider, lacking practical mastery of the schem es of " opening ” and " sw ellin g”
and of the objective intent to which they are subordinate, needs in order to
"understand” rites generated practically from these schem es. But then he runs
the risk of giving a false "understanding” both of the "understanding” which
such a concept makes possible, and of the practical "understanding” which does
not need concepts.
41 T he most accom plished prov erbs are those which manage to com bine the necessity
of a linguistic connection (w hich may range from mere assonance to a comm on
root) with the necessity of a mythical connection (paronomasia, and in particular
the highest variety, the word-play of philosophy, has no other basis).
42 M ost of these meanings are expressed through euphem ism s: e.g . the sense
" extin g u ish ” is conveyed by ferrah, to gladden.
43 Basic senses: heavy/light, hot/cold, dull/brilliant.
224 N otes fo r p p . 1 2 2 - 1 2 7
44 T o cast behind is also, at a more superficial level, to neglect, despise (''to put
behind one’s ear”), or more sim ply, not to face up to, not to confront.
45 Even in ordinary language, it w ould not be difficult to find the elem ents of a
description of this approximate logic, w hich "gets b y ” in a “ rough and ready”
way, "playing it by ear” and "follow ing its nose all is grist that com es to this
mill. A few specim ens: I ’ll be back in a seco n d . . . just a t i c k .. . only a short ste p ..
any m om ent n o w . . . much the sa m e. . . som ething lik e. . . sort o f . . . once in a
blue m o o n . . . never in a thousand years. . . taking an etern ity . . . to some
e x te n t .. . all b u t. . . at a rough g u e ss. . . a stone’s th ro w . . . spitting d istan ce..
so to s p e a k .. . the average is in the region o f . *. a small minority of trouble
m a k e r s ... not to put too fine a point upon it. . . u m p t e e n ... w ithin a hair’s
bread th . . . most of the t i m e .. . not e n tir e ly .. . v ir tu a lly .. . tolerab ly. . . etc.
46 T his is exactly Plato’s complaint against the m ythologists and poets: that they
are incapable of re-producing a practice other than by " identifying them selves with
som eone e ls e ” dia mimeseos, through mime (cf. for exam ple, Republic 393d).
-47 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A 5, 986a-22sq.
48 It is significant that Em pedocles, w ho of all the pre-Socratic thinkers is the
closest to the objective truth of rite, and hence the furthest removed from rite,
uses terms as manifestly social as philia and neikos to name these tw o principles
of ritual action.
49 On the identification of the opposition between, on the one hand, synkrisis and
diakrisis, and on the other hand, genesis and phthora, see J. Bollack, Empedocle,
vol. 1 (Paris: Editions de M inuit, 1965), p. 19m and p. 25113.
50 T h e preponderance assigned to the male principle, which enables it to impose
its effects in every union, means that the opposition between the female-male (the
male tem pered by union) and the male-male, is never overtly recognized or
declared, despite the disapproval of certain form s of excess of the male virtues,
such as "the D e v il’s point of honour [nt/J But it is nonetheless possible to set
in this class the amengur, the man w ithout m ale descendants, the redhead
(azegw ay) w ho sow s discord everywhere, who has no m oustache, whom nobody
wants as a companion in the market, and w ho refuses indulgence at the last
judgm ent, when everyone forgives offences; etc.
51 T h e duality of woman is retranslated into the logic of kinship in the form of the
opposition betw een the patrilateral cross cousin and the matrilateral cross cousin.
52 T he path (abridh) and "com panionship” (elw am ) are opposed to emptiness
(lakhla), to "solitude, the w ild ern ess” (elwahch). Thajma'th is that which can be
em pty w ithin fullness; the path (and the crossroads) are fullness within
em ptiness.
53 T h e way to get abundant butter is to go unseen to a crossroads used by the flocks,
and there find a sm all stone and a few sticks; the stone is put in the dish in which
the milk is kept and the sticks are burnt so that the smoke impregnates it
(Westermarck).
54 Measuring operations, w hich im pose lim itation, finiteness, breakage, are h e d g e d
with euphem ism s and magical precautions: the master of the land refrains from
measuring his own crop and entrusts the task to a khammes or a neighbour ( w h o
does it in his ab sen ce); ritual expressions are used to avoid certain num bers; ritual
formulae are uttered (as they are every time anything is measured or w eighed),
such as "M ay G od not measure out his bounty to u s ! ” Praise of beauty, h e a l t h
(a child ’s, for exam ple), or wealth is an im plicit num bering, hence a cutting, a n d
so it must be avoided and replaced with euphem ism s or neutralized with ritual
formulae. Cutting operations (extinguishing, closin g, leaving, finishing, stopping,
N otes fo r p p . 1 2 7 - 1 3 0 22 5
breaking, overturning, etc.) are named by means of euphem ism s: for exam ple,
to say that the stores, the harvest, or the milk are all gone, an expression m eaning
“ T here is abundance” is used.
55 It is also known that the harvesters wear a leather apron similar to the sm ith ’s
(thabanda).
56 Circum cision ( khatna or thara - often replaced by euphem ism s based on dher, to
be clean, neat) is a purificatory cut which, as Durkheim suggests, is supposed
to confer the im m unity needed in order to confront the fearful forces enclosed
in the vagina (cf. the use of the cauris, a sym bol of the vulva, as a magical
protection; the destructive power attributed to menstrual blood; the sexual
abstinence im posed on important occasions) and especially those w hich sexual
intercourse unleashes by effecting the union of contraries (E . D urkheim , The
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (L ondon: Allen and U nw in, 1915), pp.
3I4-'S )-
57 D ivination practices are particularly frequent on the first day of ennayer (in the
middle of lya li, w hen the “ black” nights give way to the “ w h ite ’* nights) and
at the tim e o f the renewal rites which mark the start of the new year and are
centred on the house and the kanun (replacing the three hearthstones, w hitew ash
ing the houses); for example, at dawn, the sheep and goats are called ou t, and
it is regarded as unlucky if it is a goat that com es first, lucky if it is a sheep (cf.
the days of the goat - or of the old wom an); the hearthstones are coated with
a paste of w et clay, and it is reckoned that the year will be wet if the clay is wet
in the m orning, dry if the clay is dry. T his is explained not only by the inaugural
role of the first day of ennayer but also by the fact that it com es in a period of
waiting and uncertainty, when there is nothing to be done but try to anticipate
the future. T h is is why the prognostication rites concerning family life and
especially the com ing harvest are similar to those applied to pregnant w om en.
58 W inter, hom ologous with night, is the time w hen the oxen sleep in the stable (the
night and the north of the house); the time of sexual intercourse (the partridge,
whose eggs are sym bols of fecundity, mates during lya li).
59 " Chchetwa telsemlaqab netsat d yiwen w ergaz”, Fichier d A rchives Berberes, no.
19 (January 1947). WI shall kill your cattle, says winter. W hen I arise, the knives
will set to w ork.”
60 T h e return of bad weather is som etim es explicitly attributed to the m aleficent
action of the “ old women ” of this or that village of the tribe or the neighbouring
tribes, i.e. w itches, each of whom has her particular day of the week.
61 In the tale called "the jackal’s marriage”, the jackal marries outside his own
species; he marries the camel and, moreover, holds no w edding-feast. T he sky
shows its disapproval by sending hail and storms.
62 May marriages suffer every sort of calamity and will not last. “ T h e cursed broom
of M ay” is the exact opposite of the blessed broom of the "first day of sp rin g” :
it brings ruin, em ptiness, and sterility to the house or stable in which it is used.
63 T hese various instruments - especially the sickle - are used in the prophylactic
rites against the malignant powers of the w et, such as the djnun.
64 Salt has strong links with the dry and with sterility: the words m eaning to be
hot, scorching, also mean to be spiced, strong (virile), as opposed to insipid,
without bite, without intelligence (salt is sprinkled on babies so they w ill not be
insipid, stupid, w itless). T h e man who acts frivolously is said to “ think he is
scattering sa lt”; he thinks his acts are of no consequence. Oil shares these
connotations: "T he sun is as scorching as o il.”
65 T he schem e of turning round and turning over is set to work in all the rites
226 Notes f o r p p . 1 3 1 - 1 3 5
intended to bring about a radical change, particularly an abrupt passage from the
dry to the wet and especially from the wet to the dry: the threshold, which is
in itself a point of reversal, is one of the favourite spots for such rites. It is also
in terms of this schem e that any reversal or inversion of facts is con ceived : an
unabashed liar is said to have “ put the east in the w e st”.
66 H oeing, the only agrarian activity exclusively reserved for w om en, is opposed both
to ploughing and to harvesting, operations which may not be entrusted to a woman
except in case of absolute necessity, when they require a whole series of ritual
precautions: she wears a dagger at her girdle, puts arkasen on her feet, etc.
67 T h e corresponding period in the cycle of life, i.e. childhood, is also marked by
a whole series of ritual operations w hich aim to separate the boy from his mother
and the female world, causing him at the same tim e to be reborn in his father
and his male relatives - in particular all the cerem onies marking his first entry
into the male world, such as his first visit to the market, his first haircut, and
the culm inating cerem ony of circum cision.
68 A zegzaw denotes blue, green, and grey; it can qualify fruit (green), meat (raw),
corn (unripe), a rainy sky (grey, like the ox sacrificed in autum n). A zeg za w brings
good fortune: to make a present of som ething green, especially in the morning,
brings good luck. Spring is the season for asafruri, i.e. legum inous plants,
especially beans, a certain proportion of which are set aside to be eaten green.
T h e women gather wild herbs in the course of their hoeing in the cultivated fields,
and these are eaten raw (w a g h za z, a raw, green plant the leaves of w hich can
be nibbled, e.g. dandelions; th izazw ath, greenery). T h e cattle, fed on green
fodder in the stable or near the house, yield abundant milk, which is consumed
in every form (w hey, curd, butter, cheese).
69 K . Marx, C apital, ed. F. Engels (M oscow: Progress Publishers, 1956), vol. 11,
part 11, ch. x iii “ T h e time of p roduction”, pp. 242-51.
70 Circum cision and tree-pruning, like scarification and tattooing, partake of the
logic of purification, in which the instruments made with fire have a beneficent
function, like the in sla tires, rather than the logic of murder.
71 In this way the Negro or the sm ith, who are known to be the very opposite of
the “ bringer of good fortune” ( elfal), may fulfil a beneficent function as “ takers-
away of ill fortune”. T he position of the family responsible for inaugurating the
ploughing is no less am biguous than that of the smith (elfal is never mentioned
in relation to him ), and their role as a lightning conductor does not entitle them
to a high place in the hierarchy of prestige and honour.
72 J. G . Frazer, The Golden Bough, 3rd ed. (L ondon: Macmillan, 1912), vol. 1, part
v, " T he Spirits of the Corn and the W ild ”, ch. v n , pp. 214-69.
73 T h e miraculous properties of the meat of the sacrificed animal are appropriated
in a comm unal meal. In several cases, the tail of the animal receives special
treatment (it is hung up in the m osque) as if, like the last sheaf, som etim es known
as “ the tail of the field ”, it concentrated the vital potency of the whole.
74 T h e frequency of large- and small-scale fighting in the fig season used to lead
som e observers, encouraged by native remarks (an overexcited person is said to
have “ eaten too many fig s”), to wonder if the source of the ebullience reigning
at that time of year did not lie in the figs them selves: “ There is one season in
particular w hen it really seem s that m en ’s minds are more heated than any other
tim e . . . when they speak of the fig season, which they call kherif, autum n, it seems
to be agreed that everyone shall be agitated at that tim e, just as it is customary
to be merry at carnival tim es” (C . D evaux, Les K ebailesde Djerdjera (M arseilles:
Carnion, and Paris: Challamel, 1859), pp. 85-6).
N otes fo r p p . 1 3 5 - 1 3 9 227
75 T he men who encircle the boy comprise all the male members of the clan and
sub-clan, together with the m other’s male kinsmen and their guests (the affines,
to w hom the boy has been presented the previous week, by a delegation of
rifle-bearing men from the sub-clan, in a rite called aghrum, wheatcake, the dry
and therefore male food par excellence, which also takes place before a marriage).
T h e sym bolism of the second, purely male birth, obeys the same logic as
marriage w ith the parallel cousin, the m ost m asculine of women.
76 Brahim Zellal, " L e roman de chacal, contes d ’anim aux”, Fichier d ’Archives
Berberes, no. 81 (Fort National, Algeria), 1964.
77 Breach of the taboo of lahlal is a haram act (sacrilege) which gives rise to a haram
product (c f. the legend of yum chendul - 18 Septem ber - the wise ploughman who,
despite the heavy rain on that day, refused to plough before lahlal). In what is
known as el haq (e.g. el haq lakhrif, the ban on fig-picking), the magical elem ent
is again present, since the assembly w hich pronounces the edict calls down a curse
on all who break it; at the same tim e, the social-convention aspect of the interdict
appears in the fact that the penalty for transgression is a fine (also called el haq).
Although in the case of marriage the terra lahlal is only used to denote the sura
of m oney which the bridegroom gives the bride (in addition to the bride
wealth and the presents) before the marriage is consum mated, the sanctioning
function of the marriage cerem ony is underlined by a number of features (e.g.
imensi lahlal). T h u s, as we have seen, the marriage season often used to open
with a parallel-cousin marriage, a union predisposed to play this inaugural role
by its conform ity to the principles of the mythical world-view.
78 Or "the key of good lu ck ”.
79 T h e primordial union is represented, in the very place of procreation, in the form
of the union of asalas, the central beam, and thigejdith, the pillar, a symbol of
the marriage of sky and earth.
80 T h e ploughing cerem ony, like the marriage cerem ony, being a reunion of the
divided and separate, syncrisis, is placed under the sign of the figure two:
everything which com es in pairs - starting with the yoke of oxen ( thayuga or
thazivijth, form ed from the Arabic zw idja ), the sym bol par excellence - is likely
to favour coupling (the man who opens the ploughing is som etim es called "the
old man of the yoke of o x en ” -a m g h a r m ay-yuga). In contrast, that which is
singular and solitary, the bachelor for exam ple, a symbol of division and separa
teness, is systematically excluded.
81 T h e seed corn, which always includes the grains of the last sheaf reaped (som e
tim es the grains of the last sheaf threshed or dust from the last plot of land
harvested, or taken from the threshing floor as the last sheaf was threshed; or
again, dust from the mausoleum of a saint, salt, e tc .), is kept in the house itself,
in sheepskins or chests stored in the damp part of the house and som etim es even
under the bed of the master of the field; it is prepared in accordance w ith rites
and taboos intended to preserve its properties.
82 T h e snake, a sym bol of resurrection (see above) is often represented on the
hand-made earthenware jars used to store grain for cooking or sow ing.
83 T h e interdicts surounding ploughing (or weaving, its female hom ologue) and
marriage all bear on acts of cutting (shaving, cutting the hair or n ails), closing (tying
up the hair), purifying (sweeping, whitewashing the house), and contact with
objects that are dry or associated with the dry (darkening the eyelids with kohl,
dying the hands with henna, or, in the order of food, the use of spices).
84 T h e sw ollen part of the lamp, which represents w om an’s belly, is called "the
pom egranate”.
228 N otes fo r pp. 139-14$
85 T h e action of tying is a typical exam ple of the ambiguities which give practical
logic its efficacy. T yin g is in a sense doubly forbidden because it is opposed both
to the male action of opening and to the female action of swelling. All forms of
tying (crossing the arms or the legs, wearing knots or girdles, rings, etc.) 0r
closing (of doors, chests, locks, etc.) are forbidden at the mom ent of childbirth
and the opposite actions recom m ended. T h e rites intended to render a man or
woman incapable of sexual intercourse apply the schem e of closing (or its
equivalent, cutting), again exploiting the coincidence (well expressed by the
am biguity of the verbs referring to state) of openmg and being opened. It is natural
that ritual, which always seeks to put all the odds on its own side, should in a
sense kill two birds with one stone in recom m ending actions likely to favour (or
not likely to hinder) opening, an operation male in its active form and female in
its passive form.
86 I say " treated practically a s ” to avoid putting into the consciousness of the agents
(with expressions like "seen a s ” or "conceived a s”) the representation which we
must construct in order to understand scientifically the practices objectively
oriented by the schem e of "resurrection” and in order to comm unicate that
understanding.
87 T h e m eaning of the rite is clearly show n in the rope game described by Laoust,
a sort of tug-of-war between the men and the women, in the course of which the
rope is suddenly cut and the women fall on their backs, inviting the sky to rain
its fecundating seed upon them .
88 T h e snake, a sym bol of the power of erection and resurrection which belongs to
the male principle, is undoubtedly the d ry which shoots out the dry: in the tale
related above (p. 222), the aggrieved snake rises, sw ells, and spits out a poisonous
flame.
89 All the evidence suggests that the usefulness of the almost empty notion of baraka
(which has occupied a disproportionate place in the writings of anthropologists
from Westermarck to the present day) lies in the fact that it makes it possible
to name both the male principle of fecundity and the female principle of fertility
without distinguishing between them . T h is also means that, though useful in
social practice, it does not play a very important part in the econom y of the
sym bolic system .
90 T h e familiarity with this mode of thought that is acquired in the course of
scientific practice gives one an idea (though still a very abstract one) of the
subjective feeling of necessity which it gives to those it possesses: there is no
way in w hich this laxist logic of overdetermined, fuzzy relations, protected as it
is by its very weakness against contradiction or error, could encounter w ithin itself
any obstacle or resistance capable of determ ining a reflexive return or a questioning
of it. History can therefore only com e to it from outside, through the contradic
tions generated by synchronization (favoured by literacy) and the system atizing
intent that synchronization expresses and makes possible.
91 T his function is som etim es explicitly formulated. It is said, for exam ple, that when
cereals, a soft food, are being sow n, one must "eat so ft”.
92 T h e opposition between the cooking-pot (achukth) and the griddle (bufrah) sums
up the series of oppositions between the two seasons and the tw o styles of
cooking: cooking indoors, boiling, evening meal, unspiced; cooking outdoors,
roasting, m orning meal, spiced. With rare exceptions (w hen an animal has been
slaughtered or when som eone is ill) meat is regarded as too precious to be c o o k e d
on the fire. In sum m er, sw eet peppers and tomatoes are cooked on the kanun.
However, meat is always boiled in autumn whereas it can be roasted in spring.
N otes f o r p p . 1 4 5 - 1 S t 229
93 Winter food is overall more fem ale, sum m er food more male. In every season,
female food, as one m ight expect, is a m oist form of the corresponding male fo o d :
the m en’s food is based on wheatcake (aghrum) and couscous; the guest one wants
to honour, the male par excellence, is offered at least one couscous, even if it
has to be made with barley, and if possible, a meat couscous; never soup, not
even wheat soup, or boiled sem olina. T he w om en’s food is liquid, less nourishing,
less highly spiced, based on boiled cereals, broths, and sauces (asqi, which also
denotes tem pering and p o ison in g); their couscous is made with barley or even
bran and flour (abulbul). In fact things are not so sim ple: sem olina dum plings,
which may appear as female because they are boiled in water, are also the most
male of female foods, hence som etim es eaten by men, because they can be
accompanied by meat; conversely, berkukes, a male food, can be eaten by women,
because it is boiled, unlike couscous, which is simply sprinkled. A boy eats with
the men as soon as he starts to walk and to go to the fields. Once he is old enough
to take the goats to pasture, he has a right to the afternoon snack (a handful of
figs, half a pint of milk).
94 Other direct indications of the hom ology: the weaving is done upwards, i.e from
w est to east. T h e weft is called thadrafth; the warp I'alam. 'Allam is to separate
the strands of the warp into tw o strips and to mark out the field with the first
furrow which divides it into plots, the even-numbered ones running eastward and
the odd ones westward.
95 T o tie a thread so that it cannot be untied is to "tie its so u l”.
96 For the same reason, w eaving begun elsewhere is not brought into the house
(unless a chicken is sacrificed first). T h is belief is also invoked at harvest time
to justifying sacrificing an animal.
97 T hese various tasks are only part of the w om en’s activities, which partake of all
the more or less abstract series that can be constructed, thereby underlining the
fact that practical unity lies not in the series (of farming tasks or the rites of
passage) but in practice generating similarly structured behaviour in all dom ains.
98 T he divisions of the year, particularly the m ost important one, "the return of
a z a l”, which marks the separation between the dry season and the wet season,
are (relatively) independent of climatic conditions: thus the characteristic rhythm
of the winter day is kept up both at the coldest m om ents and in the warmer and
already "springlike” days of the wet season. T he autonomy of the logic of ritual
with respect to objective conditions is even clearer in the case of clothing, which
as a sym bol of social status cannot vary according to the season: how could the
burnous be taken off in sum mer, if a man without a burnous is dishonoured ?
H ow could anyone fail to put on winter m occasins before reaping or undertaking
a long mountain journey, when everyone knows that they are the footwear which
characterizes the genuine peasant and the strong walker? H ow could the mistress
of the house give up the traditional pair of blankets, worn pinned in front, which
sym bolize her authority, her ascendancy over her daughters-in-law, and her power
over the running of the household, as does the belt on w hich she hangs the keys
to the household stores ?
99 For exam ple, a man who is late in the m orning is told, "All the shepherds are o u t.”
And to indicate a late hour in the afternoon: "All the shepherds have already
'given back’ a z a l.,t In fact the return to the village at the tim e of a za l is not abso
lutely obligatory, and som e shepherds spend a za l in the shade on the grazing land.
100 For example, a man who does not get up early on the first day of spring is likely
to die in the course of the year; a man who gets up early on the first day of sum mer
will get up early all through the year.
230 N otes f o r p p . 1 5 2 - 1 5 6
without any normative reference to logical logic, anthropology has becom e locked
in the insoluble antinomy of otherness and identity, the "prim itive mentality"
and the "savage m in d ”. T he principle of this antinomy was indicated by Kant
in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic: depending on the interests
which inspire it, "reason ” obeys either the " principle of specification ’’ which leads
it to seek and accentuate differences, or the "principle of aggregation” or
"hom ogeneity”, which leads it to observe similarities, and, through an illusion
w hich characterizes it, "reason” situates the principle of these judgm ents not in
itself but in the nature of its objects.
11 An internal analysis of the structure of a system of sym bolic relations is soundly
based only if it is subordinated to a sociological analysis of the structure of the
system of social relations of sym bolic production, circulation, and consum ption
in which these relations are set up and in which the social functions that they
objectively fulfil at any given m om ent are defined: the rites and m yths of the Greek
tradition tend to receive entirely different functions and meanings depending, for
exam ple, on whether they give rise to rationalizing, "routinizing” "readings”,
with corps of scholars, to inspired reinterpretations, with the magi and their
initiatory teachings, or to rhetorical exercises, with the first professional profes
sors, the Sophists. It follows that, asa point of method, any attempt to reconstruct
the original meaning of a mythical tradition must include analysis of the laws of
the deformation to which the various successive interpreters subject it on the basis
of their system s of interests.
12 As G . Bateson shows ( Naven (Stanford, C a l.: Stanford University Press, 1958;
ist ed ., 1936), mythological culture can become the tool, and in some cases the
object, of extremely com plex strategies (which explains, am ong other things, why
agents undertake the im mense mnem onic effort needed to acquire mastery of it)
even in societies which do not have a highly developed and differentiated religious
apparatus. It follows that it is im possible fully to account for the structure of the
mythical corpus and the transformations which affect it in the course of time,
by means of a strictly internal analysis ignoring the functions that the corpus fulfils
in the relations of com petition or conflict for econom ic or sym bolic power.
13 It goes without saying that the regressive use which Heidegger and the gnostic
tradition that he has introduced into university philosophy make of the most
"archaic” devices of language, out of a taste for the p n m al which is the recon
version of the conservative intent into the logic of the philosophical field, has
nothing in comm on with the practice of the pre-Socratic thinkers, who mobilize
all the resources of a language fraught with mythic resonances to reproduce in
their discourse the objective systematicity of mythic practice or resolve the logical
contradictions springing from that ambition.
14 R. Carnap, "t-berw indung derM etaphysikdurch logische Analyse derS p rach e”,
Erkenntnis, 4 (1931), pp. 219-41.
C H A P T E R 4 . S T R U C T U R E S , H A B IT U S , POW ER
1 T h e wet season is the time for oral instruction through which the group memory
is forged. In the dry season, that memory is acted out and enriched through
participation in the acts and ceremonies which set the seal on group unity: it is
in sum mer that the children undergo practical training in their future tasks as
peasants and their obligations as men of honour.
2 T h e "shepherds” are the small boys of the village. (Translator.)
3 A principle which, as we have seen, belongs as much to magic as to morality.
232 Notes fo r pp. 162-165
For example, there is a saying leftar n-esbah d-esbuh erbah, breakfast in the
morning is the first w ell-om ened encounter (erbah, to succeed, prosper).
4 Early rising to let out the animals, to go to Koran school, or sim ply to be outside
with the men, at the same tim e as the m en, is an elem ent of the conduct of honour
which boys are taught to respect from an early age. On the first day of spring,
the mistress of the house, who alone has a right to wake the daughters and
daughters-in-law, calls the children: "Wake up, children! T he longer you walk
before sunrise, the longer you will liv e !” T he w om en, for their part, set their
point of honour on getting up at the same tim e as the m en, if not earlier (the
only way they can get all the tim e they want to attend to their appearance without
being watched by the m en, who pretend to be ignorant of the w om en’s behaviour
on this point).
5 T h e young incur even greater disapproval when the)' try to set up a power
struggle between the generations, jeopardizing an order based on the maintenance
of temporal distance; the generations are separated only by time, which is as much
- as to say by nothing, for one only has to wait and the difference will disappear ;
but the gap m aintaining and maintained by the gerontocratic order is in fact
unbridgeable, since the only way to cross it, short of refusing the game, is to wait.
6 It follows that disorganization of its temporal rhythms and spatial framework is
one of the basic factors in the disorganization of the grou p ; thus the concentrations
of population im posed by the French Army during the war of liberation led to
a profound (and often lasting) change in the status of the w om en, w ho, when
deprived of the autonomy they derived from access to a separate place and time,
were condem ned either to be cloistered or to wear the veil, w hich, after the
concentration, made its appearance among Berber populations where it was
previously unknown.
7 It is understandable that collective dancing or singing, particularly spectacular
cases of the synchronization of the hom ogeneous and the orchestration of the
heterogeneous, are everywhere predisposed to sym bolize group integration and,
by sym bolizing it, to strengthen it.
8 It goes without saying that logical integration is never total, though always
sufficient to ensure the more-or-less-perfect predictability of all members of the
group (setting aside the amahbul who takes it upon him self to break with the
collective rhythm s).
9 Brutal reduction of this tw ofold, two-faced discourse to its objective (or at least,
objectivist) truth neglects the fact that it only produces its specifically sym bolic
effects inasmuch as it never directly imparts that truth; the enchanted relationship
w hich scientific objectification has to destroy in order to constitute itself is an
integral part of the full truth of practice. Science m ust integrate the objectivist
truth of practice and the equally objective m isrecognition of that truth into a higher
definition of objectivity.
10 Whether through the intermediary of their control over inheritance, which lends
itself to all sorts of strategic manipulation, from sheer delay in the effective
transmission of powers to the threat of disinheritance, or through the intermediary
of the various strategic uses to which they can put their officially recognized
monopoly of matrimonial negotiations, the elders have the means of taking
advantage of the socially recognized limits of youth. An analysis of the strategies
used by the heads of noble houses to keep their heirs in a subordinate position,
forcing them to go out on dangerous adventures far from home, is to be found
in G . D uby, Hommes et structuresdu Moyen-Age (Paris and T h e Hague: M outon,
' 973). PP- 2 »3~ 25> esp. p. 219.
N otes for pp. / 6 6 -1 7 3 233
ci Love, not im mune to such ritualization, also conforms to this logic, as is well
illustrated by the w ords of a young Kabyle woman: "A girl doesn’t know her
husband beforehand and she looks to him for everything. She loves him even
before they marry, because she m u st; she has to love him , there is no other 'door
12 T h e full text of this conversation can be found in P. Bourdieu and A. Sayad, Le
deracinement (Paris: M inuit, 1964), pp. 215-20.
13 M. Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve (Paris: Gallimard, 1965), pp. 74-5.
14 Cf. J. M. W. W hiting, Becoming a Kivom a (N ew Haven, C onn: Yale University
Press, 1941), p. 215.
15 T h e phenom enologists systematically forget to carry out an ultimate " reduction ”,
the one which would reveal to them the social conditions of the possibility of the
"reduction” and the epoche. What is radically excluded from phenomenological
analysis of the "general thesis of the natural standpoint” which is constitutive
of "primary experience” of the social world is the question of the econom ic and
social conditions of the belief which consists in "taking th e ' factworld ’ ( Wirklich-
keit) just as it gives itse lf” (E . Husserl, Ideas (N ew York: Collier-Macmillan,
1962), p. 96), a belief which the reduction subsequently causes to appear as a
" th esis”, or, more precisely, as an epoche of the epoche, a suspension of doubt
as to the possibility that the world of the natural standpoint could be otherwise.
16 If the emergence of a field of discussion is historically linked to the developm ent
of cities, this is because the concentration of different ethnic and/or professional
groups in the same space, with in particular the overthrow of spatial and
temporal frameworks, favours the confrontation of different cultural traditions,
which tends to expose their arbitrariness practically, through first-hand ex
perience, in the very heart of the routine of the everyday order, of the possibility
of doing the same things differently, or, no less important, of doing som ething
different at the same tim e; and also because it permits and requires the develop
ment of a body of specialists charged with raising to the level of discourse, so
as to rationalize and systematize them , the presuppositions of the traditional
world-viewr, hitherto mastered in their practical state.
17 A whole aspect of what is nowadays referred to as sociology (or anthropology)
partakes of this logic.
18 Formal Logic: Or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (London:
Taylor and Walton, 1847), p. 41.
19 J.-P . Sartre, L ’idiot de la fam ille (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), vol. 1, p. 783.
20 On belief as individual bad faith maintained and supported by collective bad faith,
see P. Bourdieu, "G enese et structure du champ religeux”, Revue Fran^aise de
Sociologie, 12, 3 (1971), p. 318.
21 T o convince oneself that this is so, one only has to remember the tradition of
"confraternity” within the medical profession. N o doctor ever pays a fellow doctor
a fee; instead he has to find him a present - without knowing what he wants or
needs - not costing too m uch more or too much less than the consultation, but
also not com ing too close, because that would amount to stating the price of the
consultation, thereby giving away the interested fiction that it was free.
22 "Y ou’ve saved me from having to sell ” is what is said in such cases to the lender
who prevents land falling into the hands of a stranger, by means of a sort of
fictitious sale (he gives the money while allowing the owner the continued use
of his property).
23 M . Mauss, "Essai sur le d o n ”, in Sociologie et anthropologic (Paris: P U F , 195c),
p. 239; trans. I. Cunnison as The G ift (L ondon, 1966), p. 52.
24 T he sacred character of the meal appears in the formulae used in swearing an
234 N otes fo r pp. 175-182
oa th : " By the food and the salt before us'” or " By the food and the salt we have
shared A pact sealed by eating together would becom e a curse for the man who
betrayed it: "I do not curse him, the broth and the salt curse him .” T o invite
one’s guest to take a second helping, one says: "T here’s no need to swear, the
food does it [for you] "T he food will settle its score with you [if you leave it].”
A shared meal is also a ceremony of reconciliation, leading to the abandonment
of vengeance. Similarly, an offering of food to a patron saint or the group’s
ancestor im plies a contract of alliance. T he th iw izi is inconceivable without the
final meal: and thus it usually only brings together people of the same adhrum
or the same thakharubth.
25 There is strong disapproval of individuals who are no use to their family or the
group, "dead men whom God has drawn from living m en ”, in the words of the
verse of the Koran often applied to them: they are incapable of "pulling any
w eigh t”. T o remain idle, especially when one belongs to a great fam ily, is to
shirk the duties and tasks which are an inseparable part of belonging to the group.
„ And so a man who has been out of farming for som e tim e, because he has been
away or been ill, is quickly found a place in the cycle of work and the circuit
of the exchange of services. T h e group has the right to demand of each of its
members that he should have an occupation, however unproductive, and it must
therefore make sure that everyone is found an occupation, even a purely sym bolic
one: the peasant who provides idlers with an opportunity to work on his land
is universally approved, because he is giving marginal individuals a chance to
integrate them selves into the group by doing their duty as men.
26 T he cost of tim e rises with rising productivity (i.e. the quantity of goods offered
for consum ption, and hence consum ption itself, which also takes tim e ); time thus
tends to become scarcer, while the scarcity of goods dim inishes. Squandering of
goods may even becom e the only way of saving tim e, which is now more valuable
than the products which could be saved if :ime were devoted to maintenance and
repair, etc. (cf. G. S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of T im e ”, Economic
Journal, 75, no. 289 (Septem ber 1965), pp. 493-517). T h is is no doubt the
objective basis of the contrast in attitudes to time which has often been described.
27 A variant of this contradiction is expressed in the saying "When the year is bad,
there are always too many bellies to be filled; when it is good, there are never
enough hands to do the w ork.”
28 It would not be difficult to show that debates about Berber (and more generally,
ancient) "democracy” similarly oppose first-degree naivety to second-degree
naivety; the latter is perhaps the more pernicious, because the satisfaction
derived from false lucidity makes it impossible to attain the adequate knowledge
which simultaneously transcends and conserves the two forms of n aivety:" ancient
democracy ” owes its specificity to the fact that it leaves im plicit and unquestioned
(doxa) the principles which liberal "dem ocracy” can and must profess (ortho
doxy) because they have ceased to govern conduct in the practical state.
29 T he man who "gives others no more than the time he ow es th em ” is reproached
in terms like these: "Y ou ’ve only just arrived, and now you’re off again.” "Are
you leaving us? We’ve only just sat d o w n .. .W e’ve hardly spoken.” T h e analogy
between a m an’s relationships with others and his relationship to the land leads
to condemnation of the man who thoughtlessly hurries in his work and, like the
guest who leaves almost as soon as he arrives, does not give it the care and time,
i.e. the respect, which are its due.
30 R. Maunier, Melanges de sociologie nord-africaine (Paris: Alcan, 1930), p. 68.
31 Such tactics are, as far as possible, kept out of transactions between kinsmen,
N otes fo r pp. 182-18 5 235
and there is disapproval of the man who takes advantage of the destitution of the
person forced to sell.
32 T h e trap is all the more infallible when, as in marriage, the circulation of
im mediately perceptible material goods, such as the bridewealth, the apparent
issue at stake in matrimonial negotiations, conceals the total circulation, actual
or potential, of goods that are indissociably material and sym bolic, of which they
are only the aspect most visible to the eye of the capitalist homo economicus. T he
amount of the payment, always of small value in relative and absolute terms, would
not justify the hard bargaining to which it gives rise, did it not take on a sym bolic
value of the highest importance as the unequivocal demonstration of the worth
of a fam ily’s products on the matrimonial exchange market, and of the capacity
of the heads of the family to obtain the best price for their products through their
negotiating skills. T he best proof of the irreducibility of the stakes of matrimonial
strategy to the amount of the bridewealth is provided by history, which here too
has dissociated the sym bolic and material aspects of transactions: once reduced
to its purely monetary value, the bridewealth lost its significance as a sym bolic
rating, and the bargains of honour, thus reduced to the level of mere haggling,
were from then on considered shameful.
33 Although he fails to draw any real conclusions from it, in a work which proves
disappointing, Bertrand Russell admirably expresses an insight into the analogy
between energy and power which could serve as the basis for a unification of social
science: "Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil
authority, influence or opinion. N o one of these can be regarded as subordinate
to any other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative. T h e
attempt to treat one form of power, say wealth, in isolation, can only be partially
successful, just as the study of one form of energy will be defective at certain
points, unless other forms are taken into account. Wealth may result from
military power or from influence over opinion, just as either of these may result
from w ealth ” (Power: A N ew Social Analysis (L ondon: Allen and U nw in, 1938),
pp. 12-13). he goes on to define the programme for this unified science of
social energy: "Power, like energy, must be regarded as continually passing from
any one of its forms into any other, and it should be the business of social science
to seek the laws of such transform ations” (pp. 13-14).
34 It has often been pointed out that the logic which makes the redistribution of
goods the sine qua non of the continuation of power tends to reduce or prevent
the primitive accumulation of econom ic capital and the developm ent of class
division (cf. for example E. Wolf, Sons of the Shaking Earth (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 216).
35 M. I. Finley, "Technical Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient
W orld”, Economic History Review, 18, 1 (August 1965), pp. 29-45, esp. p. 37;
and see "Land D ebt and the Man of Property in Classical A th en s”, Political
Science Quarterly, 68 (1953), pp. 249-68.
36 See P. Bohannan, "Som e Principles of Exchange and Investm ent among the
T iv ”, American Anthropologist, 57, 1 (1955), pp. 60-70.
37 K. Polyani, Primitive Archaic and M odem Economics, ed. George D alton, N ew
York: D oubleday, 1968, and The Great Transformation, New York: Rinehart,
1944. It is rather paradoxical that in his contribution to a collection of essays edited
by Karl Polyani, Francisco Benet pays so much attention to the contrast between
the market and the village and scarcely mentions the factors which keep the local
suq under the control of the values of the good-faith econom y (see F . Benet,
"Explosive Markets: T h e Berber H ighlands”, in K . Polyani, C. M. Arensberg,
236 N otes fo r p p . 185-189
and H. W. Pearson (eds.), Trade and M arket in the E arly Empires, X ew York:
Free Press, 1957).
38 T he shady dealer cannot find anyone to answer for him (or his wares) and so
he cannot demand guarantees from the buyer.
39 T h e belief, often held in gnostic religions, that knowledge may be transmitted
through various forms of magical contact - most typically, through a kiss - may
be seen as an attempt to transcend the lim its of this mode of preservation:
"Whatever it is that the practitioner learns, he learns from another dukun, who
is his guru (teacher); and whatever he learns, he and others call his ilmu
(science). Ilmu is generally considered to be a kind of abstract knowledge or
supernormal skill, but by the more concrete-minded and 'old-fashioned’, it is
som etim es viewed as a kind of substantive magical power, in which case its
transmission may be more direct than through teaching” (C. Geertz, The Religion
o f Java (L ondon: Collier-Macmillan, i960), p. 88).
40 See in particular J. G oody and I. Watt, "T h e Consequences of Literacy", Com
parative Studies in Society and History, 5, (1962-3), pp. 304ff., and J. G oody (ed .),
Literacy in Traditional Societies, Cambridge: University Press, 1968.
41 "T he poet is the incarnate book of the oral p eop le” (J. A. N otopoulos, " Mnemo-
sym e in Oral Literature ”, Transaclions and Proceedings o f the American Philological
Association, 69 (1938), pp. 465-93, esp. p. 469). In a very impressive article,
William C. Greene shows how a change in the mode of accumulation, circulation,
and reproduction of culture results in a change in the function it is made to
perform, together with a change in the structure of cultural products ("T he
Spoken and the Written W ord”, H arvard Studies in Classical Philology, 9 (1951),
pp. 24-58). And Eric A. Havelock similarly shows that even the content of
cultural resources is transformed by the transformation of "the technolog)' of
preserved com m unication”, and in particular, by the abandonment of mimesis,
a practical reactivation m obilizing all the resources of a "pattern of organized
actions” - m usic, rhythm, words - for m nem onic purposes in an act of affective
identification, in favour of written discourse, which, because it exists as a text,
is repeatable, reversible, detached from the situation, and predisposed by its
permanence to becom e the object of analysis, comparison, contrast, and reflexion
(Preface to Plato, Cambridge, M ass.: Harvard U niversity Press, 1963). U ntil
language is objectified in the written text, speech is inseparable from the speaker’s
whole person, and in his absence it can be manipulated only in the mode of
mimesis, which is not open to analysis or criticism.
42 A social history of all forms of distinction (of which the title is a particular case)
would have to show the social conditions and the consequences of the transition
from a personal authority which can neither be delegated nor inherited (e.g . the
gratia, esteem , influence, of the Romans) to the title - from honour to the jus
honorum. In Rome, for exam ple, the use of titles (e.g . eques Romanus) defining
a dignitas, an officially recognized position in the State (as distinct from a purely
personal quality), was, like the use of insignia, progressively subjected to detailed
control by custom or law (cf. C. N icolet, L ’ordre equestre a I’epoque republicaine,
vol. 1: Definitions juridiques et structures sociales (Paris, 1966), pp. 236-41).
43 On this point see P. Bourdieu and L. Boltanksi, "L e titre et le poste: rapports
entre le system e de production et le system e de reproduction”, Actes de la
Recherche en Sciences Sociales, no. 2, March 1975; trans. "Qualifications and
Job s”, C C C S Stencilled Paper 46 (U niversity of Birmingham, 1977).
44 T h is is true, for example, t>f the charismatic (or meritocratic) ideology which
explains the differential probability of access to academic qualifications by
reference to the inequality of innate talent, thus reproducing the effect of the
N otes fo r p p . iS g -ig i 237
mechanisms which dissimulate the relationship between academic attainment and
inherited cultural capital.
45 E. Durkheim, Montesquieu et Rousseau precurseurs de la sociologie (Paris: Riviere,
1953). P- 197-
46 Ibid. p. 195. T he analogy’ with the Cartesian theory' of continuous creation is
perfect. And when L eibniz criticized a conception of God condem ned to move
the world "as a carpenter moves his axe or as a miller drives his m illstone by
directing the water towards the w h e e l” (G . W. Leibniz, " D e ipsa natura”,
Opuscula philosophica selecta, ed. P. Shrecker (Paris: Boivin, 1939), p. 92), and
put forward in place of the Cartesian universe, which cannot exist without
unremitting divine attention, a physical universe endowed with a vis propria, he
was initiating the critique, which did not find expression until much later (i.e.
in Hegel’s introduction to the Philosophy of Right), of all form s of the
refusal to acknowledge that the social world has a nature, i.e . an immanent
necessity.
47 If acts of com m unication - exchanges of gifts, challenges, or words - always bear
within them a potential conflict, it is because they always contain the possibility
of domination. Symbolic violence is that form of domination w hich, transcending
the opposition usually drawn between sense relations and power relations, com
munication and dom ination, is only exerted through the comm unication in which
it is disguised.
48 It can be seen that if one is trying to account for the specific form in which
domination is realized in the pre-capitalist econom y, it is not sufficient to observe,
as Marshall D . Sahlins does, that the pre-capitalist econom y does not provide the
conditions necessary for an indirect, impersonal mode of domination, in which
the worker’s dependence on the em ployer is the quasi-automatic product of the
mechanisms of the labour market (cf. "Political Power and the Economy in
Primitive S ociety”, in G . E. D ole and R. L. Carneiro (ed s.). Essays in the Science
of Culture (N ew York: Crowell, i960), pp. 390-415; "Poor Man, Rich Man, Big
M an, Chief: Political T yp es in M elanesia and P olynesia”, Comparative Studies
in Society and H istory, 5 (1962-3), pp. 285-303; "On the Sociology of Primitive
E xchange”, in M. Banton (e d .), The Relevance o f Models fo r Social Anthropology
(London: Tavistock, 1965), pp. 139-236). T hese negative conditions (which one
is amply justified in pointing to when it is a question of countering any form of
idealism or idealization) do not account for the internal logic of sy'mbolic violence,
any more than the absence of the lightning rod and the electric telegraph, which
Marx refers to in a fam ous passage in the introduction to the Grundrisse, can be
used to explain Jupiter and H erm es, i.e. the internal logic of Greek mythology
and art.
49 T he interactionist "gaze”, which ignores the objective mechanism s and their
operation, in order to look into the direct interactions between agents, would
find an ideal terrain in this sort of society, i.e. precisely in the case in which,
because of the relationship normally existing between the anthropologist and his
object, it is least likely to be possible. Another paradox appears in the fact that
structuralism, in the strict sense of the word, i.e. the sciences of the objective
structures of the social world (and not simply of agents’ im ages of them ), is least
adequate and least fruitful when applied to societies in which relations of
domination and dependence are the product of continuous creation. (U nless one
chooses to posit, as the structuralism of Levi-Strauss im plicitly does, that in such
cases the structure lies in the ideology', and that power lies in the possession
of the instrument of appropriation of these structures, i.e. in a form of cultural
capital.)
238 N otes fo r p p . 191-194
[ 240 ]
Index 24 1
in f o r m a n t, 18-19, 37- +2- 52 ' 57~^i 9®. ,0 5 -6 ; ue la b o u r tim e , a n d p r o d u c tio n tim e , 132-3, 176,
also a n th r o p o lo g is t 179, 222 n .3 2
in s id e , see o u t(s id e ) lad le, 140-1
in te g ra tio n , lo g ic a l, 115, 163, 232 n .8 ; m o ra l, L a k o ff, G ., 221 n .2 5
115; s o c ia l, 163; see also lin e a g e la m p , 9 0 -1 , 125, 130, 139, 227 n .8 4 , 231 n.105
in te lle c tu a lis m , 1, 19, 24, 9 6 -7 , 116, 117, 203 la n d , 6 , 36, 208 n .8 o ; p r a c tic c s c o n c e r n in g , 162,
n .47 172, 174-5, 182, 191, 233 n .2 2 ; s y m b o lic v a lu e
in te r a c tio n , 10-11, 25, 73, 8 1 -2 , 9 6 ; see also o f, 6 0 -1 , 1 8 2 -3 ; see flk ° ea r t h , p lo u g h in g ,
h a b itu s w om an
in te ra c tio n is m , 21, 7 3 , 81, 237 n .4 9 ; see also la n g u a g e : o f th e b o d y , 120; a n d c la ssific a to ry
p h e n o m e n o lo g y s c h e m e s , 124; a n d e x p e r ie n c e , 170; o rd in a ry ,
in te r e s t, 76, 106, 194, and see r u le ; e c o n o m ic , a r.d a u th o r ity , 21, 1 70-1; a n d s p e e c h
172, 182; e c o n o m ic a n d s y m b o lic 38, 3 9-40, {Uingueiparole), 1, 2 3 -4 , 26, 84, 201 n .2 9
171, 177, 1 8 0-1; p a r tic u la r a n d g e n e r a l, 4 0 -1 ; L a o u s t, E ., 96, 140, 209 n .7 8 , 228 n.87
s c ie n tific , 222 n .2 6 ; a n d u p b r in g in g , 182 L a R o c h e fo u c a u ld , F . d e , 6
in te rv a l, 171; a n d s tr a te g y , 6 , 14, 15 L a s sw e ll, H . D ., 201 n .3 0
in v e rs io n , 130, 217 n .3 8 , 225 n .6 5 ; lo g ic a l, a n d law , 16, 21, 3 1 -2 , 46, 187-8, 215 n .1 9 ; see also
b o d y m o v e m e n t, 116, 119; see alsoth r e s h o ld c u s to m a r y law
is o tim y , p rin c ip le o f, n - 1 5 , 16 L e a c h , E . R ., 26, 108, 202 n n .3 0 & 35
le a rn , 88, 9 6 ; b y d o in g , 217 n .4 0 ; see also
ja c k a l, 126, 129, 136, 225 n.61 e d u c a tio n , in c u lc a tio n , p e d a g o g y
J a k o b s o n , R ., 11, 198 n .8 , 199 n . n le a rn e d ig n o ra n c e (docta ignorantia) , *«£ m a s
ju ra l ru le s , 31, 205 n .5 8 te ry : p ra c tic a l
ju s tic e , s e n s e o f, 17 le f t/r ig h t, 15, 61, 89, 91, 118-19, 121, 126, 169
le g a list fo rm a lis m (juridisme) , 17, 2 0 ,2 2 , 2 7 ,4 0 ,
K a d i-ju s tic e , 16 46, 201 n .2 7 , 219 n .3 ; see also ru le
kairos, 20 le g itim a tio n , 19,165, 168, 1 7 0 -1 ,1 8 8 , 196,1 9 6 -7
K a n t, I . , 86, 91, 124, 231 n .1 1 0 L e ib n iz , G W . , 7 6 , 8 0 - 1 ,8 6 ,2 i 6 n . 2 S , 2 3 7 n . 46
hanun ( h e a r th ) , i n , 113, 118, 132, 225 n . 5 7 ,2 2 8 L e N y , J . F . , 223 n .3 8
n .9 2 , 230 n.107 L e to u r n e u x , A ., see H a n o te a u , A .
K a s d a n , L . , see M u r p h y , R . L e v i- S tra u s s , C ., 4 -5 , 27, 30, 32, 115, 195, 198
K e lly , W . H ., 201 n-3p n 5, 202 n .3 8 , 203 n .4 2 , 204 n .5 5 , 205 n n .5 8 &
khammes, 190-1, 192, 196 64, 223 n .3 9 , 237 n -49
k in s h ip , 30-71 p a tsim ; c a te g o r ie s ,2 o 6 n .68, (a n d L e v y -B ru h l, L . , 117
m y th ic c a te g o rie s ) 45; b y m e n a n d b y w o m e n , lim it, 124, 129, 137, 164, 166; a g e , 165
4 1 -3 ; official a n d p ra c tic a l, 3 3 -8 , 39, 105, L in d e r , S . B ., 239 n .5 8
202 n .3 7 ; re la tio n s , m a n ip u la tio n o f, 4 1 -3 , lin e a g e, in te g r a tio n o f, 57—6 3 ; see also g r o u p ,
8 9; r e p r e s e n ta tio n a l, 35, 5 9 ,6 6 ; te r m s , 37,205 id eo lo g y , n a m e , official
n .5 8 , 206 n .6 8 ; see also c o u s in , f u n c tio n lin g u is tic s , 1 ,2 2 -3 , 25; S a u s s u ria n , 1 ,2 3 -5 , a n d
K le in , M ., 92 see S a u s s u re
K lu c k h o h n , C ., 201 n .3 0 lite ra c y , 89, 106, 156-7, 186-7, 2 I^ n -44. ZI9
k n o w le d g e (connaissance), 2 -3 , 96; p ra c tic a l n n .3 & 4 , 220 n .9 , 228 n .9 0 , 236 n .4 1 ; see also
( p r im a ry ) 3, 10, 19; p ra c tic a l, a n d d o x a , 164; m n e m o te c h n ic s
th e o re tic a l, m o d e s o f, 3 8 ; see also f u n c tio n , lo g ic, 125, 142, 158, 221 n .2 5 ; e c o n o m y o f,
o b je c tiv is m , p h e n o m e n o lo g y 109-14; n a tu r a l, 221 n .2 5 ; p ra c tic a l, 96-158
k n o w le d g e (savoir), 20, 98, 106, 200 n .2 0 , 219 passim, 163, 221 n n . 23 & 26, 222 n .2 9 , 224
n n .3 - 4 , 236 n .3 9 ; a n d b o d y , 218 n .4 4 n.4 5 , (la x ity o f) 91, 109, 228 n .g o , (a n d
K r o e b e r , A . L . , 202 n .3 0 " lo g ic a l lo g ic ” ) 142, 158, 231 n.110
lo g ic ism , 117, 119; see also in te lle c tu a lis m
la b o u r , 172-3, 174-6; o f c o n c e a lm e n t, 1 7 1-2; lo o m . 90, 115, 122, 146, 160
d iv is io n o f, 163, 219 n .4 , (b e tw e e n s e x e s) 41, L o r d , A . B ., 88
44, 4 5 ,6 2 ,8 7 ,8 9 , 9 0 ,9 3 , 160-1, 163, 217 n .3 8 , L o w ie , R . H ., z i8 n . i
219 n .4 ; o f e u p h e m iz a tio n , 196; o f o b je c tifi L u l i c s , G ., 171
c a tio n , 196; a n d p a in s , 1 7 4-5; p ro d u c tiv e a n d
u n p r o d u c tiv e , 1 75-6, 234 n .2 5 ; o f r e p r o d u c M a c K e a n , D ., 239 n.63
tio n , 171, 180, and see r e p r o d u c tio n ; s e x u a l, m a g ic , 43, 126, 151-2, 219 n .4 ; lo g ic o f, io i,
8 9 , 9 0 ; s y m b o lic , 171, 180; w o m e n ’s, c a le n d a r 151-2; a n d re lig io n , 41, 89, 93, 219 n .4
o f, 146-8 m a le , see fe m a le
Index 245
Malinowski, B., 195, 201 11.27, 202 n-}° nefs, 139, 141
manner, 86 negotiation, matrimonial, 34-5, 56, 59, 235
manners, 94 n.32; see also marriage
map, 2, 37, 105 Negro, 101-2, 129, 22c nn.8-9, 226 n.71
Marcy, G., 12, 199 n.13, 209 n.84 Nicod, J . , i n , 119, 222 n.28, 223 n.35
market,49, 58, i n , 122, 174,181,183, 184-6,217 Nicolet, C., 236 n.42
n.38, 235 n.37; cultural, 187; matrimonial, nif, see point of honour
47, 56, 68-9, 71, 162, 174, 213 n.106; self- norm, 19-21, 22, 27-8, 193; see also rule
regulating, 183, 189 Notopoulos, J . A ., 236 n.41
marriage, 6-7, 8, 30-71, 101, 103, 125, 129, 174,
220 n.14, 225 n.61; preferential, 3r, 33, 37; objectification, 20-2, 87-95passim, 98, 105, 164,
proposal of, 34-5; see also cousin, extra 170, 232 n.9; of social capital, 184, 186-7; see
ordinary, function, labour, market, negotia also calendar, diagram, formulation, labour,
tion, official, rite, strategy theory
Marx, K.., 10, 30, 36, 60, 77,83-4, 96, 170, 176, objectivism, 1-30 passim. 72, 77, 79, 83-4, 90,
177, 178, 226 n.69, 237 n.48 96, 115, 198 nn.3 & 8, 200 n.25, 232 n.g, 239
"master beam”, and main pillar, 90, 227 n.79 n.61
mastery, practical, 2,4, 15,19,79,87, 88-9, 111, obligation, 6, 70, 190, 192-3, 195-6, 209 n.8o
118, 123, 156, 223 n.40; symbolic obsequium, 95
(theoretical), 10, 18-19, 79. 88• "8, 231 observer, 1-2, 5, 17-18, 96, 123, 223 n.30; see
n n .in -12 also anthropologist
materialism, 22, 96, 182; see also economism odd, see even
Matheron, A., 218 n.45 offence, 61; and revenge, 7, 61, 199 n.14
Maunier, R. 234 n.30 official, and practical, 19, 34-5, 41,.52, 53, 59;
Mauss, M., 4, 97, 172, 195, 233 n.23 symbolic profits of, 22; and unofficial, 35,41,
Mead, G. H., 11 45; see also kinship, ideology
measuring, 127, 224 n.54 officialization, 21, 38-43, 171
m ech an ism , 22, 72-8 p a ssim (to) o pen, see (to ) close
Merleau-Ponty, M., 20, 200 n.21, 203 n.47 opinion, 167-71
metaphysics, 156-8 oppositions, mythico-ritual, 45, 94, 112, 113,
mimesis, 2, 26, 96, 116, 125, 138, 167, 218 n.44, 118, 124-7, *42> 157; see also contraries,
224 n.46, 236 n.41 magic, pairs of oppositions e.g. female/male
misrecognition (meconnaissance), 5, 21-2, 97, opus operatum, see modus operandi
133,163. 164, 168, 170,171,172-83,191,195-6 orchestration of practices, 163, 232 n.7; see also
mnemotechnics, 88, 94, 187, 217n.32, 22c n .n , habitus
231 n .i12, 236 n.41 orthodoxy/heterodoxy, 19, 164, 169; see also
model, 3-9, 10, 73, 123; lineage, see genealogy; opinion
and norm, 27-9, 32-3 out(side)/m(side), 41, 57-8, 61, 90-2, 94, 102,
modus operatidijopus operatum, 1, 18-19, 3&, 72' 103, n c, 118-19, I22> 137. 160-1
79, 87, 90, h i outsider (stranger), 46, 47, 135, 138, 154, 230
money, 172-3, 185; see also exchange n.107, see also awrith, centrifugal, observer,
monothesis and polythesis, 5, 107, 109, 171,199 outside
n.8
Morand, M., 199 n.18 Panofsky, E., 1, 23, 218 n.2
morning, 148-52, 161-2 Pariente, J. C., 202 n.31
Murphy, R., and Kasdan, L., 32, 205 nn.60-2, Parmenides, 124
206 n.66, 213 n.103 Parsons, T ., 83
mutual aid, see thiwizi passages, 128, i3off; see also rite
myth, 163; and philosophy, 158; and science of pedagogic action, 20, 64, 87, 94-5; see also
myth, 114-15, 117-18, 156-8, 231 n n.m -12; education, inculcation
see also rite pedagogic relationship, 18
mvthopoeia, 118, 124; see also ritual practice pedagogy, implicit, 94
performance, see execution
name, 60; first (transmission of), 36-7, 50, 206 personality, basic, 84-5; modal, 85
n.70; proper, 18; see also capital: symbolic, personification of collectives, 203 n.49; see also
title realism
nationalism, 177 Peters, E. L., 33
Needham, R., 31, 204 n.57 phenomenology, 3-5, 80, 168, 233 n. 15
246 Index
sacred (haram), 61, 89, 137, 199 n.14, 227 n.77 spiced/bland, 130, 143-5, 227 n.83; see also
Sahlins, M. D ., 237 n.48 cooking
Sapir, E., 23, 119 Spinoza, B., 83, 95
sar, 193, 211 n.95 spokesman, 37, 40, 59, 193
Sartre, J.-P., 73— 6, 170, 215 n.18, 216 n.24, 23! Steiner, G. A , 217 n.33
n.102, 233 n.19 straight, see crooked
Saussure, F. de, 1, 23-5, 26, 27, 198 n.4, 201 stranger, see outsider
nn.28-9, 221 n.22 strategy, 3-9,15, 36, 40,181, 182, 186, 190, 236;
scheme (scheme), apprehension of, 116,123, 222 collective, 59; domination, 183-4; educative,
n.33, 2230.40, 228n.86; and habitus, 8-9,15; 62; fertility, 62; and habitus, 214 n.2; hon
and jurisprudence, 16; and model, 6,8-9,11, our, 89, 185; matrimonial, 48, 58-71 passim,
20; and practice, 27, 91, 97, no, 112-13, 204 n.54, 214 n n .iio -n , and see negotiation;
122-3; and situation, 142-3 and ritual, 89, 207 n.74; second-order, 22,
scheme transfer, 116, 156 42-6, 52, and see officialization; successional,
scholars, 156, 231 nn.m -12; see also bureau 62-3, 232 n.io, and see succession; see also
cracy, literacy, specialists habitus, reproduction, rite
Schutz, A., 21, 200 n.23 structural functionalism, see functionalism
self-evidence, 53, 80, 164, 167-71, 182-3, 200 structural lag, 83
n.20, 203 n.49, 216 n.20; see also doxa structuralism, 3, 24, 26, 32, 82-4, 119, 237 n.49;
semiology, 23, 188; spontaneous, 10, 26 anthropological, 26-7. 32, 52, 115, 218 n.i;
sense, 79-80, 124; of analogy, 112; of honour, linguistic, 26; and Teilhardism, 120\ see also
10-15,165, 199 n. 15,20c n. 18. and see honour, functionalism, linguistics, Saussure
point of honour; of justice, see justice; of structure, and conjuncture, 78, 81; and func
limits, 124, 164; practical, 113, ami see know tion, 24-5; and individual, 84; and musical
ledge (connaissance): practical; of reality, 86, form, 198 n.8; objective, construction of, 21,
164; of roots, 98 200 n.25; realism of the, 72; social, 24; status
separation, 124-30, 135, 153 of, 84; type a:b: :b,:b2, 44
series, 154-5, 229 n.97 style, 1, 6, 25, 86; see also manner
Servier, J., 135 subjectivism, 3-4, 82, 84, 216 nn.24 & 28
sexes, opposition between, 87; see also female, succession, 36-7,62, 206-7 nn.70-1; crisis and,
labour, oppositions 64
sexuality, 225 n.56; male and female relations Suger, Abbot, 1
to, 92-3 swelling, 102, 114, 116, 138, 140, 143, 145, 222
shame, 44, 47, 48; see also honour, woman n.31, 223 nn.33 & 4c
sheaf, ritual of last, 134-5, 140, 226 n.73, 227 symbol, and situation, 141
n.81 symbolic activities, 176-7; see also technical
simultaneity, and succession, 9, 38, 107, 117, symbolic capital, see capital
198 n.8, 221 n.22 symbolic forms, see form
situation, 25-6, 76, 110, 123, 142-3; see also symbolic stimulation, 76
conjuncture symbolic system, 97, 218 n .i, 231 n .m -1 2 ;
situational analysis, 26 coherence of, 97, 109, 119-20, 218 n.i
smith, 104, 106, 126, 127, 133, 152, 163, 219 n.4, symbolic violence, see violence
226 n.71 symbolism, of body, 92-3; of circumcision, 227
snake, 114, 222 n.31, 227 n.82, 228 n.88 n.75; of cooking, 138; of honour, 92; of
sociology, 188-9, 233 n-!7 interaction, 10; see also space
soft, see hard synchronization, 163, 232 n.7
Sophists, 20, 231 n.i 11
sorcerer, 171 taken for granted, see self-evidence, doxa
space, body, and cosmic, 89-90, 91; directions taste, 124; categories of, 121-2, 123; see also
in, see east/west; divisions of, 91, 163, 185, body: socially informed
217 n.38; geographical, 117; geometrical, taxonomy, see classificatory system
105, 108, 117-18; house, 89-91, 113, 117, 160; teaching, see education, pedagogy
male and female, 91, 160, 163, 217 n.38; technical, and symbolic, 175-6, 181, 222 n.32
movements in, 90-1; village, 89-90, 160-1; Teilhard de Chardin, P., 120
village, and market, 185-6 tempering, 104, 127, 133, 137, 222n.31, 229
specialists, 21, 184, 231 nn. 111-12, 233 n.16 ” •93
speech, as constructed object and precon- tempo, 7, 15; see also delay, interval, prac
structed datum, 23 tice, strategy
248 Index
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