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CONCEPT OF DELIVERY OF A THING he subsequently acquired ownership of the land in accordance with Article 1434

#18 of the Civil Code. Therefore, we need to resolve the issue of the authenticity and
DAUS vs Sps De Leon GR 149750 the due execution of the Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim in his favor.

FACTS: Respondent Hermoso de Leon inherited from his father Marcelino de Without the corroborative testimony of the attesting witnesses, the lone
Leon the subject parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition. account of the notary regarding the due execution of the Deed is insufficient to
Sometime in the early 1960s, respondents engaged the services of a certain sustain the authenticity of this document.
Atty. Florencio Juan to take care of the documents of the properties of his
parents. Atty. Juan let them sign voluminous documents. After the death of Atty. #19
Juan, some documents surfaced and most revealed that their properties had SAMPAGUITA PICTURES, INC vs. JALWINDOR MANUFACTURERS, INC.
been conveyed by sale or quitclaim to respondent Hermoso's brothers and
sisters, and to Atty. Juan and his sisters, when in truth and in fact, no such Facts: Sampaguita Pictures (Sampaguita) is the owner of the Sampaguita
conveyances were ever intended by them. Respondent's signature in the Deed Pictures Building located in Quezon City. The roofdeck of the building and all
of Extra-judicial Partition with Quitclaim made in favor of Rodolfo de Leon was existing improvements thereon were leased by Sampaguita to Capitol; Inc.
forged and later discovered that the land in question was sold by Rodolfo to (Capitol for short), and it was agreed, among other things, that the premises
petitioner Aurora Alcantara. The trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, holding shall be used by said club for social purposes exclusively for its members and
that respondent's claim was barred by laches, because more than 18 years had guests; that all permanent improvements made by the lessee on the leased
passed since the land was sold. In reversing the RTC, the Court of Appeals held premises shall belong to the lessor without any obligation on the part of the
that laches did not bar respondents from pursuing their claim. Hence, the lessor to reimburse the lessee for the sum spent for said improvements; that the
present petition. Petitioner argues that, having been perfected, the Contract of improvements made by lessee have been considered as part of the
Sale executed on December 6, 1975 was thus binding upon the parties thereto. consideration of the monthly rental and said improvements belong to the lessor;
that any remodelling, alterations and/or addition to the premises shall be at the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Perfected Sale brings about delivery (and ownership) expense of the lessee and such improvements belong to the lessor, without any
to Petitioner obligation to reimburse the lessee of any sum spent for said improvements.
Capitol purchased on credit from Jalwindor Manufacturers Inc (Jalwindor) glass
HELD: A contract of sale is consensual. It is perfected by mere consent, upon a and wooden jalousies which were delivered and installed in the leased premises
meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on subject by Jalwindor, replacing the existing windows. On June 1, 1964, Jalwindor filed
matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, the seller's ownership of the with the CFI of Rizal, Quezon City, an action for collection of a sum of money
thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the contract of sale. with a petition for preliminary attachment against Capitol for its failure to pay its
purchases. The parties submitted to the trial court a Compromise Agreement
The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to transfer wherein Capitol acknowledged its indebtedness to Jalwindor and pending
ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract. It is during the liquidation of the said obligation, all the materials purchased by Capitol will be
delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to transfer ownership considered as security for such undertaking. Subsequently, Capitol was not able
of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale cannot be challenged to pay rentals, water, electric, and telephone service to Sampaguita. Likewise,
on the ground of the seller's non-ownership of the thing sold at the time of the Capitol failed to comply with the terms of the Compromise Agreement. On July
perfection of the contract. 1965, Sheriff of Quezon City made levy on the glass and wooden jalousies in
question. Sampaguita filed a third-party claim alleging that it is the owner of said
Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the parties, materials and not Capitol. Jalwindor, however, filed an indemnity bond in favor
its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through tradition or of the Sheriff and the items were sold at public auction on August 30, 1965 with
delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over the thing sold. Jalwindor as the highest bidder. Sampaguita filed with CFI of Rizal, an action to
nullify the Sheriff;s Sale and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
Undisputed is the fact that at the time of the sale, Rodolfo de Leon was not the against Jalwindor from detaching the glass and wooden jalousies.
owner of the land he delivered to petitioner. Thus, the consummation of the
contract and the consequent transfer of ownership would depend on whether
Issue: Whether or not Capitol is deemed as the owner of the glass and wooden could not deliver, he filed an action for specific performance with damages
jalousies against Norkis in the RTC. He alleged that Norkis failed to deliver the motorcycle
which he purchased, thereby causing him damages. Norkis answered that the
Held: YES. When the glass and wooden jalousies in question were delivered and motorcycle had already been delivered to private respondent before the
installed in the leased premises, Capitol became the owner thereof. Ownership accident, hence, the risk of loss or damage had to be borne by him as owner of
is not transferred by perfection of the contract but by delivery, either actual or the unit. RTC ruled in favor of Nepales, ordering Norkis to deliver a new
constructive. This is true even if the purchase has been made on credit, as in the motorcycle of the same, brand, kind, and quality. The Court of appeals affirmed
case at bar. Payment of the purchase price is not essential to the transfer of the ruling of the RTC.
ownership as long as the property sold has been delivered. Ownership is
acquired from the moment the thing sold was delivered to vendee, as when it is Issue: Whether or not there had already been a transfer of ownership of the
placed in his control and possession. (Arts. 1477, 1496 and 1497, Civil Code of motorcycle to Nepales at the time it was destroyed.
the Phil.) Capitol entered into a lease contract with Sampaguita in 1964, and the
latter became the owner of the items in question by virtue of the agreement in Held: NO. The issuance of a sales invoice does not prove transfer of ownership
said contract "that all permanent improvements made by lessee shall of the thing sold to the buyer. An invoice is nothing more than a detailed
belong to the lessor and that said improvements have been considered as part statement of the nature, quantity and cost of the thing sold and has been
of the monthly rentals." When levy or said items was made on July 31, considered not a bill of sale. In all forms of delivery, it is necessary that the act of
1965, Capitol, the judgment debtor, was no longer the owner thereof. delivery whether constructive or actual, be coupled with the intention of
delivering the thing. The act, without the intention, is insufficient. When the
#20 motorcycle was registered by Norkis in the name of Nepales, Norkis did not
NORKIS DISTRIBUTORS, INC. v. CA ; ALBERTO NEPALES intend yet to transfer the title or ownership to him, but only to facilitate the
execution of a chattel mortgage in favor of the DBP for the release of the
Facts: Norkis Distributors, Inc. is the distributor of Yamaha motorcycles in buyer's motorcycle loan. The Letter of Guarantee issued by the DBP,
Negros Occidental. Avelino Labajo is the Branch Manager of its Bacolod office. reveals that the execution in its favor of a chattel mortgage over the purchased
On September 20, 1979, Alberto Nepales bought from the Norkis- Bacolod vehicle is a pre-requisite for the approval of the buyer's loan. If Norkis
branch a brand new Yamaha Wonderbike motorcycle, then displayed in the would not accede to that arrangement, DBP would not approve private
Norkis showroom. The price of P7,500.00 was payable by means of a Letter of respondent's loan application and, consequently, there would be no sale.
Guaranty from DBP-Kabankalan Branch, which Labajo agreed to accept. Credit The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery, which gives legal
was then extended to Nepales for the price of the motorcycle payable by DBP effect to the act, is the actual intention of the vendor to deliver, and its
upon release of his motorcycle loan. As security for the loan, Nepales would acceptance by the vendee. Without that intention, there is no tradition. The
execute a chattel mortgage on the motorcycle in favor of DBP. Labajo issued a Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing sold. The thing
Sales Invoice showing that the contract of sale of the motorcycle had been is considered to be delivered when it is placed in the hands and possession of
perfected. Nepales signed the sales invoice to signify his conformity with the the vendee. (Civil Code, Art. 1462). It is true that the same article declares that
terms of the sale. In the meantime, however, the motorcycle remained in the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing
Norkis' possession. The motorcycle was thereafter registered in the Land which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may
Transportation Commission in the name of Alberto Nepales. A registration produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had
certificate was subsequently issued by the Land Transportation Commission such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material
which registration fees were paid by him, as evidenced by an official receipt. The delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser
motorcycle subsequently met an accident. An investigation conducted by the the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be placed in his
DBP revealed that the unit was being driven by a certain Zacarias Payba at the control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the thing sold
time. The unit was a total wreck, but it was returned and stored inside passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the vendor,
Norkis' warehouse. On March 20, 1980, DBP released the proceeds of symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is sufficient. But
Nepales' motorcycle loan to Norkis in the total sum of P7,500. As the price if notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have
of the motorcycle later increased to P7,828 in March, 1980, Nepales paid the the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it himself or
difference of P328 and demanded the delivery of the motorcycle. When Norkis through another in his name, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed
by the interposition of another will, then fiction yields to reality-- the delivery plaintiff failed to deliver the lands and in accordance to their stipulation that ". .
has riot been effects . Article 1496 of the Civil Code which provides that in the . within one year from the date of the certificate of title in favor of Marciana
absence of an express assumption of risk by the buyer, the things sold remain at Felix, this latter may rescind the present contract of purchase and sale . . . ."
seller's risk until the ownership thereof is transferred to the buyer, is Appellate Court disagreed, alleging that the right to elect to rescind the contract
applicable to this case, for there was neither an actual nor constructive delivery was subject to a condition, namely, the issuance of the title, which in this case
of the thing sold, hence, the risk of loss should be borne by the seller, Norkis, has not yet been fulfilled.
which was still the owner and possessor of the motorcycle when it was wrecked. Issue: Whether or not delivery of a Public Instrument is equivalent to the
This is in accordance with the well-known doctrine of res perit domino. delivery of the subject matter of the sale.
Held: No. The Code imposes upon the vendor the obligation to deliver the thing
WAYS OF COLLECTING DELIVERY: CONSTRUCTIVE OR LEGAL *PUBLIC sold. The thing is considered to be delivered when it is placed "in the hands and
INSTRUMENT possession of the vendee." (Civ. Code, art. 1462.) It is true that the same article
declares that the execution of a public instruments is equivalent to the delivery
Addison vs. Felix of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic
delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall
Facts: Four parcels of land as describe in a public instrument was subject of a have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its
contract of sale between the petitioner and the defendant. Defendant paid 3000 material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the
upon the execution of deeds and promised to pay 2000 on July 15, 1914 and purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. The thing sold must be
another 5000 (30) days after the issuance of her certificate of title. The contract placed in his control. When there is no impediment whatever to prevent the
was stipulated as follows: thing sold passing into the tenancy of the purchaser by the sole will of the
vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of a public instrument is
That the defendant is to pay P10 within ten years for trees in bearing and P5 for sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the
trees not in bearing with the condition that it will not exceed the amount of purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and
P85,000. make use of it himself or through another in his name, because such tenancy
and enjoyment are opposed by the interposition of another will, then fiction
That the purchaser shall deliver 25% of the value of the products "from the yields to reality — the delivery has not been effected.
moment she takes possession of them until the Torrens certificate of title be The execution of a public instrument is sufficient for the purposes of the
issued in her favor." abandonment made by the vendor; but it is not always sufficient to permit of
the apprehension of the thing by the purchaser.
Further stipulated was that "within one year from the date of the certificate of
title in favor of Marciana Felix, this latter may rescind the present contract of It is evident, then, in the case at bar, that the mere execution of the instrument
purchase and sale, in which case Marciana Felix shall be obliged to return to me, was not a fulfillment of the vendors' obligation to deliver the thing sold, and that
A. A. Addison, the net value of all the products of the four parcels sold, and I from such non-fulfillment arises the purchaser's right to demand, as she has
shall obliged to return to her, Marciana Felix, all the sums that she may have demanded, the rescission of the sale and the return of the price. (Civ. Code, arts.
paid me, together with interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum." 1506 and 1124.)

Inasmuch as the rescission is made by virtue of the provisions of law and not by
In 1915, Addison filed a suit to compel the defendant to pay him the P2000 with contractual agreement, it is not the conventional but the legal interest that is
interest as in the accordance of the terms of the contract. However, in a form of demandable.
special defense, Felix alleges that the petitioner failed to do his obligation of the
contract by failing to deliver the parcels of land. That out of the 4 parcels of land TEN FORTY REALTY V. CRUZ| Panganiban
only 2 of it where delivered and that 2/3 of the other half were in the possession G.R. No. 151212 | September 10, 2003
of a third person. She then filed for a declaration of the rescission of the • Petitioner filed an ejectment complaint against Marina
contract, whereby she prayed that petitioner return her P3000 plus interest and Cruz(respondent) before the MTC. Petitioner alleges that the land indispute was
indemnity Trial Court ruled in favor of defendants, on the grounds that the
purchased from Barbara Galino on December 1996, andthat said land was again
sold to respondent on April 1998; real estate. The execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie
presumption of delivery. Such presumption is destroyed when the delivery is not
• On the other hand, respondent answer with counterclaim that never effected, because of a legal impediment. Such constructive or symbolic delivery,
was there an occasion when petitioner occupied a portion of the premises. In being merely presumptive, was deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to
addition, respondent alleges that said land was a public land (respondent filed a take actual possession of the land sold. Disqualification from Ownership of
miscellaneous sales application with the Community Environment and Natural Alienable Public Land.
Resources Office) and the action for ejectment cannot succeed where it appears
that respondent had been in possession of the property prior to the petitioner; Private corporations are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain,
as provided under Section 3 of Article XII of the Constitution. While corporations
• On October 2000, MTC ordered respondent to vacate the land and cannot acquire land of the public domain, they can however acquire private
surrender to petitioner possession thereof. On appeal, the RTC reversed the land. However, petitioner has not presented proof that, at the time it purchased
decision. CA sustained the trial court’s decision. the property from Galino, the property had ceased to be of the public domain
and was already private land. The established rule is that alienable and
ISSUE/S: Whether or not petitioner should be declared the rightful owner of the disposable land of the public domain held and occupied by a possessor —
property. personally or through predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously, and
exclusively for 30 years — is ipso jure converted to private property by the mere
HELD: No. Respondent is the true owner of the land.1) The action filed by the lapse of time.
petitioner, which was an action for “unlawful detainer”, is improper. As the bare
allegation of petitioner’s tolerance of respondent’s occupation of the premises RULING:
has not been proven, the possession should be deemed illegal from the The Supreme Court DENIED the petition.
beginning. Thus, the CA correctly ruled that the ejectment case should have
been for forcible entry. However, the action had already prescribed because the WAYS OF EFFECTING DELIVERY
complaint was filed on May 12, 1999 – a month after the last day forfiling;2) The Heirs of Arturo Reyes v. Socco-Beltran, G.R. No. 176474
subject property had not been delivered to petitioner; hence, it did not acquire Facts: Elena Socco-Beltran (Socco) filed an application for Lot No. 6-B, alleging
possession either materially or symbolically. As between the two buyers, that it was adjudicated in her favor in the extra-judicial settlement of Constancia
therefore, respondent was first in actual possession of the property. Socco’s estate, before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). The heirs of
Arturo Reyes opposed the application on the ground that Lot No. 6-B was sold
As regards the question of whether there was good faith in the second buyer. by Miguel R. Socco, brother of Socco, in favor of their father, Atty. Arturo Reyes,
Petitioner has not proven that respondent was aware that her mode of as evidenced by the Contract to Sell.
acquiring the property was defective at the time she acquired it from Galino. At
the time, the property — which was public land –had not been registered in the Issue: Whether or not petitioners have a better right to the subject property
name of Galino; thus, respondent relied on the tax declarations thereon. As over the respondent’s?
shown, the former’s name appeared on the tax declarations for the property
until its sale to the latter in 1998. Galino was in fact occupying the realty when Ruling: The Court ruled that the petitioner’s could not derive title of Lot No. 6-B
respondent took over possession. Thus, there was no circumstance that could because Miguel R. Socco was not yet the owner of the said lot and was only
have placed the latter upon inquiry or required her to further investigate expecting to inherit the same. The contract was a conditional sale, conditioned
petitioner’s right of ownership. upon the event Miguel Socco would actually inherit and become the owner of
the said property. The Court, relying on Article 1459 of the Civil Code on
DOCTRINE/S: Execution of Deed of Sale; Not sufficient as delivery. Ownership is contracts of sale, said that, “The thing must be licit and the vendor must have
transferred not by contract but by tradition or delivery. Nowhere in the Civil the right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time it is delivered.” The law
Code is it provided that the execution of a Deed of Sale is a conclusive specifically requires that the vendor must have ownership of the property at the
presumption of delivery of possession of a piece of time of it is delivered. Hence, there was no valid sale from which ownership of
the property could have transferred from Miguel Socco to Arturo Reyes, since,
at the time of the execution, the former was not yet the owner of the same and contract shall control over the area agreed upon in the contract. However, the
was only expecting to inherit it. Furthermore, Arturo Reyes, not having acquired discrepancy must not be substantial. A vendee of land, when sold in gross or
ownership of the property, could not have conveyed the same to his heirs. with the description “more or less” with reference to its area, does not thereby
ipso facto take all risk of quantity in the land. The use of such words in
1. RUDOLF LIETZ V. CA G.R. No. 122463 December 19, 2005 designating quantity covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency.
FACTS: Respondent Agapito Buriol previously owned a parcel of unregistered
land situated at San Vicente, Palawan. On August 15, 1986, respondent Buriol RAYMUNDO S. DE LEON, vs. BENITA T. ONG
entered into a lease agreement with Flavia Turatello and respondents Turatello
and Sani, all Italian citizens, involving one (1) hectare of Buriol’s property. The FACTS: On March 10, 1993, Raymundo S. De Leon (petitioner) sold 3 parcels of
lease agreement was for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. land to Benita T. Ong(respondent). The said properties were mortgaged to a
The lessees took possession of the land after paying respondent Buriol a down financial institution; Real Savings
payment of P10,000.00. The lease agreement, however, was reduced into
writing only in January 1987. On November 17, 1986, respondent Buriol sold to & Loan Association Inc. (RSLAI). The parties then executed a notarized
petitioner Rudolf Lietz, Inc. the same parcel of land for the amount of deed of absolute sale with
P30,000.00. Petitioner later discovered that respondent Buriol owned only four
(4) hectares, and with one more hectare covered by lease, only three (3) assumption of mortgage. As indicated in the deed of mortgage, the parties
hectares were actually delivered to petitioner. Thus, petitioner instituted a stipulated that the petitioner (de Leon) shall execute a deed of assumption of
complaint for Annulment of Lease with Recovery of Possession against mortgage in favor of Ong (respondent)after full payment of the P415,000. They
respondents and Flavia Turatello. The complaint alleged that with evident bad also agreed that the respondent (Ong) shall assume the mortgage. The
faith and malice, respondent Buriol sold to petitioner five (5) hectares of land respondent then subsequently gave petitioner P415,000 as partial payment. On
when respondent Buriol knew for a fact that he owned only four (4) hectares the other hand, de Leon handed the keys to Ong and de Leon wrote a letter to
and managed to lease one more hectare to respondents Tiziana Turatello and inform RSLAI that Ong will assume the mortgage. Thereafter, the respondent
Paola Sani. Respondents filed separate answers raising similar defenses of lack took repairs and made improvements in the properties. Subsequently,
of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the action for recovery of respondent learned that the same properties were sold to a certain Viloria after
possession. Respondents Turatello and Sani also prayed for the award of March 10, 1993 and changed the locks, rendering the keys given to her useless.
damages and attorneys fees. After trial, the court rendered judgment dismissing Respondent proceeded to RSLAI but she was informed that the mortgage has
both petitioners complaint and respondents counterclaim for damages. been fully paid and that the titles have been given to the said person.
Petitioner and respondents Turatello and Sani separately appealed, the CA Respondent then filed a complaint for specific performance and declaration of
affirmed the dismissal of petitioners complaint and awarded respondents nullity of the second sale and damages. The petitioner contended that
Turatello and Sani damages and attorneys fees. Petitioner contends that it is respondent does not have a cause of action against him because the sale was
entitled to the corresponding reduction of the purchase price because the subject to a condition, which requires the approval of RSLAI of the mortgage.
agreement was for the sale of five (5) hectares although respondent Buriol Petitioner reiterated that they only entered into a contract to sell. The RTC
owned only four (4) hectares. dismissed the case. On appeal, the CA upheld the sale to respondent and
nullified the sale to Viloria. Petitioner moved for reconsideration to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to reduction of the purchase price?

HELD: NO. As correctly noted by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the ISSUE: Whether or not the parties entered into a contract of sale or a contract to
sale between the petitioner and respondent Buriol involving the latter’s sell?
property is one made for a lump sum. The Deed of Absolute Sale shows that the
parties agreed on the purchase price on a predetermined area of five hectares HELD: In a contract of sale, the seller conveys ownership of the property to the
within the specified boundaries and not based on a particular rate per area. buyer upon the perfection of the contract. The non-payment of the price is a
In accordance with Article 1542, there shall be no reduction in the purchase negative resolutory condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive
price even if the area delivered to the petitioner is less than that stated in the condition. The buyer does not acquire ownership of the property until he fully
contract. In the instant case, the area within the boundaries as stated in the pays the purchase price. In the present case, the deed executed by the parties
did not show that the owner intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The to yield to the reality that the purchaser was not placed in possession and
terms and conditions affected only the manner of payment and not the control of the property.
immediate transfer of ownership. It was clear that the owner intended a sale Petitioner also claims that its failure to make actual delivery was
because he unqualifiedly delivered and transferred ownership of the properties beyond its control. It posits that the refusal of Creative Lines to allow the hauling
to the respondents. of the machinery and equipment was unforeseen and constituted a fortuitous
event. The matter of fortuitous events is governed by Art. 1174 of the Civil Code
Asset Privatization Trust vs. T.J. Enterprise which provides that except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
G.R. No. 167195 May 8, 2009 otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
Facts: assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
Petitioner was a government entity created for the purpose to not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, were inevitable. A fortuitous event
conserve, to provisionally manage and to dispose assets of government may either be an act of God, or natural occurrences such as floods or typhoons,
institutions. It had acquired assets consisting of machinery and refrigeration or an act of man such as riots, strikes or wars. However, when the loss is found
equipment stored at the Golden City compound which was leased to and in the to be partly the result of a person’s participation whether by active intervention,
physical possession of Creative Lines, Inc., (Creative Lines). These assets were neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from
being sold on an as-is-where-is basis. the rules applicable to a fortuitous event. Thus, the risk of loss or deterioration
Petitioner and respondent entered into an absolute deed of sale over certain of property is borne by petitioner. Thus, it should be liable for the damages that
machinery and refrigeration equipment wherein respondent paid the full may arise from the delay.
amount as evidenced by petitioner’s receipt. After two (2) days, respondent
demanded the delivery of the machinery it had purchased. Petitioner issued a SAN LORENZO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS. CA
Gate Pass to respondent to enable them to pull out from the compound the G.R. NO. 124242, January 21, 2005
properties designated ; however, during the hauling of Lot No. 2 consisting of
sixteen (16) items, only nine (9) items were pulled out by respondent. Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against On 20 August 1986, the Spouses Lu purportedly sold the two parcels of land to
petitioner and Creative Lines. Upon inspection of the remaining items, they respondent Pablo Babasanta. The latter made a downpayment of fifty thousand
found the machinery and equipment damaged and had missing parts. Petitioner pesos (P50,000.00) as evidenced by a memorandum receipt issued by Pacita Lu
claimed that there was already a constructive delivery of the machinery and of the same date. Several other payments totaling two hundred thousand pesos
equipment upon the execution of the deed of sale it had complied with its (P200,000.00) were made by Babasanta. He demanded the execution of a Final
obligation to deliver the object of the sale since there was no stipulation to the Deed of Sale in his favor so he may effect full payment of the purchase price;
contrary and it was the duty of respondent to take possession of the property. however, the spouses declined to push through with the sale. They claimed that
The RTC ruled that petitioner is liable for breach of contract and should pay for when he requested for a discount and they refused, he rescinded the
the actual damages suffered by respondent. It found that at the time of the sale, agreement. Thus, Babasanta filed a case for Specific Performance.
petitioner did not have control over the machinery and equipment and, thus, On the other hand, San Lorenzo Development Corporation (SLDC) alleged that
could not have transferred ownership by constructive delivery. The Court of on 3 May 1989, the two parcels of land involved, namely Lot 1764-A and 1764-B,
Appeals affirmed the judgment; hence, this petition. had been sold to it in a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage. It alleged that it
Issue: was a buyer in good faith and for value and therefore it had a better right over
Whether or not the petitioner had complied with its obligations to make delivery the property in litigation.
of the properties and failure to make actual delivery of the properties was not
attributable was beyond the control of petitioner? Issue:
Held: Who between SLDC and Babasanta has a better right over the two parcels of
No. There was no constructive delivery of the machinery and equipment upon land?
the execution of the deed of absolute sale or upon the issuance of the gate pass
since it was not the petitioner but Creative Lines which had actual possession of Ruling:
the property. The presumption of constructive delivery is not applicable as it has
An analysis of the facts obtaining in this case, as well as the evidence presented • Plaintiffs instituted the present action on March 4, 1960. Defendants
by the parties, irresistibly leads to the conclusion that the agreement between moved to dismiss, on the ground that plaintiffs' right of action was already
Babasanta and the Spouses Lu is a contract to sell and not a contract of sale. barred, because the five-year redemption period had already expired. Section
The receipt signed by Pacita Lu merely states that she accepted the sum of fifty 119 of the Public Land Law provides:
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) from Babasanta as partial payment of 3.6 hectares
of farm lot. While there is no stipulation that the seller reserves the ownership o Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patient or homestead
of the property until full payment of the price which is a distinguishing feature of provisions, when proper, shall be subject to re-purchase by the applicant, his
a contract to sell, the subsequent acts of the parties convince us that the widow, or legal heirs, for a period of five years from the date of conveyance.
Spouses Lu never intended to transfer ownership to Babasanta except upon full
payment of the purchase price. • Plaintiffs argue that the period should be counted from the date of full
Babasanta’s letter dated 22 May 1989 was quite telling. He stated therein that payment (May 1965) since it was on this date that the contract was
despite his repeated requests for the execution of the final deed of sale in his consummated.
favor so that he could effect full payment of the price, Pacita Lu allegedly • CFI Nueva Vizcaya dismissed the complaint, fixing the starting date as
refused to do so. In effect, Babasanta himself recognized that ownership of the February 28, 1955, when the Agreement was entered into. CA certified the case
property would not be transferred to him until such time as he shall have to SC.
effected full payment of the price. Doubtlessly, the receipt signed by Pacita Lu • SC: "Conveyance" means transfer of ownership; it means the date
should legally be considered as a perfected contract to sell. when the title to the land is transferred from one person to another. The 5-year
The perfected contract to sell imposed upon Babasanta the obligation to pay the period should, therefore, be reckoned with from the date that defendants
balance of the purchase price. There being an obligation to pay the price, acquired ownership.
Babasanta should have made the proper tender of payment and consignation of
the price in court as required by law. Glaringly absent from the records is any When did defendants legally acquire ownership of the land?
indication that Babasanta even attempted to make the proper consignation of
the amounts due, thus, the obligation on the part of the sellers to convey title ⇒ Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (August 7, 1953).
never acquired obligatory force. Dismissal affirmed.
There was no double sale in this case because the contract in favor of Babasanta
was a mere contract to sell; hence, Art. 1544 is not applicable. There was neither Under Art. 1498, When the sale is made through a public instrument, as in this
actual nor constructive delivery as his title is based on a mere receipt. Based on case, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
this alone, the right of SLDC must be preferred. is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot be clearly inferred. This manner of delivery is common to personal as
G.R. No. L-20091 July 30, 1965 Bengzon, C.J. well as real property. It is clear, therefore, that defendants acquired ownership
to the land in question upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute on August 7,
PERPETUA ABUAN, ET AL. v. EUSTAQUIO S. GARCIA, ET AL. 1953. The Agreement of February 28, 1955, only superseded the deed as to the
terms and conditions of payment. The Agreement did not operate to revest the
• On August 7, 1953, petitioners Perpetua Abuan et al. sold a parcel of ownership of the land in the plaintiffs.
rice land to defendants Eustaquio Garcia et al. through a Deed of Absolute Sale.
A TCT was issued to defendants. Assuming arguendo that the Deed is null and void as petitioners allege, we can
• Later, petitioners filed an action to recover the land, alleging the sale consider the date of the Agreement at the latest, as the time within which
was tainted with fraud and was without consideration. Reaching an amicable ownership is vested in the defendants. While it is a private instrument the
settlement, the parties entered into an "Agreement" dated February 28, 1955, execution of which could not be construed as constructive delivery under Art.
under which defendants paid P500 as partial payment of the purchase price of 1498, Art. 1496 explicitly provides that ownership of the thing sold is acquired
the land, and promised to pay the balance of P1,500 on or before April 30, 1955, by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him "in any other manner
with a grace period of 30 days. The Agreement also stated that it "shall signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to
supersede all previous agreements or contracts heretofore entered into..." the vendee." The intention to give possession (and ownership) is manifest in the
Agreement, especially considering the following circumstances: (1) the payment
of part of the purchase price, there being no stipulation in the agreement that Whether or not there was a consummated sale between Petitioner and LIBRA?
ownership will not vest in the vendees until full payment of the price; and (2)
the fact that the agreement was entered into in consideration of plaintiffs' HELD:
desistance, as in fact they did desist, in prosecuting their reivindicatory action,
thereby leaving the property in the hands of the then and now defendants — as NO.
owners thereof, necessarily. This was delivery brevi manu permissible under
Articles 1499 and 1501 of the New Civil Code. In the absence of an express The payment of the check was actually intended to extinguish the mortgage
stipulation to the contrary, the payment of the price is not a condition obligation so that the tractor could be released to the petitioner. It was never
precedent to the transfer of ownership, which passes by delivery of the thing to intended nor could it be considered as payment of the purchase price because
the buyer. the relationship between Libra and the petitioner is not one of sale but still a
mortgage. The clearing or encashment of the check which produced the effect
PERFECTO DY, JR. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, GELAC TRADING INC., of payment determined the full payment of the money obligation and the
and ANTONIO V. GONZALES, Respondents. release of the chattel mortgage. It was not determinative of the consummation
of the sale. The transaction between the brothers is distinct and apart from the
G.R. No. 92989 July 8, 1991 transaction between Libra and the petitioner. The contention, therefore, that
the consummation of the sale depended upon the encashment of the check is
FACTS: untenable.

Wilfredo Dy purchased a truck and a farm tractor through LIBRA which was also
mortgaged with the latter, as a security to the loan.

Petitioner, expresses his desire to purchased his brother’s tractor in a letter to

LIBRA which also includes his intention to shoulder its mortgaged. LIBRA
approved the request. At the time that Wilfredo Dy executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of petitioner, the tractor and truck were in the possession of LIBRA
for his failure to pay the amortization.

When petitioner finally fulfilled its obligation to pay the tractor, LIBRA would
only release the same only if he would also pay for the truck. In order to fulfill
LIBRA’s condition, petitioner convinced his sister to pay for the remaining truck,
to which she released a check amounting to P22,000. LIBRA however, insisted
that the check must be first cleared before it delivers the truck and tractor.

Meanwhile, another case penned “Gelac Trading Inc vs. Wilfredo Dy” was
pending in Cebu as a case to recover for a sum of money (P12,269.80). By a writ
of execution the court in Cebu ordered to seize and levy the tractor which was in
the premise of LIBRA, it was sold in a public auction to which it was purchased
by GELAC. The latter then sold the tractor to Antonio Gonzales.

RTC rendered in favor of petitioner.

CA dismissed the case, alleging that it still belongs to Wilfredo Dy.