Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 2

Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. Vs. The Quezon City Government, represented by Hon.

Mayor Herbert
Bautista, Quezon City Assessor's Office and Quezon City Treasurer's Office
G.R. No. 230651. September 18, 2018

Facts: In 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Department of Finance (DOF) issued Joint Memorandum
Circular No. 2010-01, directing all local government units to implement Section 219 of the LGC, which requires assessors to revise
the real property assessments in their respective jurisdictions every three (3) years. On December 5, 2016, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of QC enacted "An Ordinance Approving the Schedule of Fair Market Value of Lands and Basic Unit Construction Cost for
Buildings, and Other Structures for the Revision of Real Property Assessments in Quezon City, Pursuant to the Provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 [(LGC)] [Republic Act No. (RA) 7160], and it’s Implementing Rules and Regulations, and For Other
Purposes" (2016 Ordinance).

On April 7, 2017, petitioner Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. (Alliance), allegedly a non-stock, non-profit
corporation, 13 filed the present petition arguing that the 2016 Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for violating
substantive due process, unreasonable, arbitrary and has no factual basis and that there was no real consultation prior to the
enactment of the 2016 ordinance. In their Comment, respondents countered that the petition violated the hierarchy of courts when
it directly filed its petition before this Court and has no legal capacity to sue since its Certificate of Registration as a corporation was
revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an Order dated February 10, 2004. Alliance in its answer claimed that it
has legal capacity to sue because it is merely representing its trustees and members who filed the petition in their own personal
capacities as taxpayers and residents of QC. In fact, these trustees and members are the ones who will suffer personal and
substantial injury by the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is infirm for violations of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as well as Alliance's lack of legal
capacity to sue.

Ruling: As to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, no. The hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this
Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts. Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of
exceptions, such as when the case involves matters of transcendental importance. In this case, Alliance argues that the
implementation of the 2016 Ordinance will directly and adversely affect the property interests of around "3,085,786 million"
residents of QC.

Meanwhile, the hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained
before the lower courts. Nevertheless, this doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of exceptions, such as when the case
involves matters of transcendental importance. In this case, Alliance argues that the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance will
directly and adversely affect the property interests of around "3,085,786 million" residents of QC.

Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no separate juridical personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own
name. In this case, Alliance admitted that it has no juridical personality, considering the revocation of its SEC Certificate of
Registration and its failure to register with the HLURB as a homeowner's association. Nevertheless, Alliance insists that the petition
should not be dismissed because it was filed by the members of the Board of Trustees in their own personal capacities.

The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-
compliance with this requirement renders a case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue, which refers to "a
plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party."
The Court disagrees. A perusal of the petition readily shows that it was filed by Alliance, and not by the individual members of its
Board of Trustees in their personal capacities.

Moreover, the Authorization Letter above-adverted to clearly indicate that the signatories therein signed merely in their official
capacities as Alliance's trustees. In fact, even assuming that the trustees intended to file the case in their own behalf, Section 3, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court requires that their names as beneficiaries must be included in the title of the case, which was, however, not
done here. Thus, Alliance's claim that the petition was filed by the trustees in their personal capacities is bereft of merit.
Spouses Francisco and Delma Sanchez represented by Hilario Lomboy Vs. Esther Divinagracia Vda. De Aguilar, et al.
G.R. No. 228680. September 17, 2018

Facts: On July 11, 2000, Juanito Aguilar sold to petitioner Spouses Sanchez a 600-square-meter portion of his 33,600-
square meter lot located in the Municipality of Lake Sebu, South Cotabato. On October 23, 2004, the heirs of Juanito
Aguilar, namely, respondents Esther Divinagracia V da. de Aguilar, Juanito's spouse, and their children, fenced the
boundary line between the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses and the alleged alluvium on the northwest portion of
the land by the lake Sebu. The Spouses Sanchez protested the act of fencing by Esther before the barangay, but since no
settlement was reached, they filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry against the heirs of Aguilar before the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Surallah-Lake Sebu, Province of South Cotabato. They claimed that under the law, they are
the owners of the alluvium which enlarged their 600-square-meter lot. It cannot, therefore, be fenced by the heirs of
Aguilar. For their part, the heirs refute the existence of the alluvium. They assert that the "alluvium" referred to is the
800-square-meter area beyond the 600-square-meter lot of the spouses which has been in their actual possession but
was used, with their tolerance, by the spouses in connection with their operation of fish cages in that portion of Lake
Sebu abutting their lot.

On June 7, 2006, the MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint of the Spouses Sanchez. It held that the failed
to controvert the prior actual physical possession of the heirs which was manifested by the improvements found on the
property. Since the spouses purchased the 600-meter land adjacent to the land in question only on July 11, 2000, they
could not have been in possession thereof ahead of the heirs of Aguilar. Thus, the heirs are the ones in actual possession
of the subject property and cannot be held liable for forcible entry by stealth as alleged by the Spouses Sanchez. They
merely protected their interests in manifesting the metes and bounds of the area purchased from them by placing the
bamboo fence.

On May 22, 2010, the spouses filed a Complaint for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Damages before the RTC seeking to annul the June 7, 2006 Decision of
the MCTC for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for rendering judgment over a non-existent parcel of land
since there is no excess of the 600-square-meter portion to speak of.

Issue: Whether or not MCTC acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Ruling: Yes. The Court agrees that the MCTC had both jurisdictions over the person of the defendant or respondent and
over the subject matter of the claim. On the former, it is undisputed that the MCTC duly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of the spouses Sanchez as they are the ones who filed the Forcible Entry suit before it. On the latter, Republic
Act No. 7691 (R.A. No. 7691) clearly provides that the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases, which includes unlawful detainer and forcible
entry.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the tribunal to hear, try and decide a case and the lack thereof refers to either
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the action. Lack of jurisdiction or
absence of jurisdiction presupposes that the court should not have taken cognizance of the complaint because the law
or the Constitution does not vest it with jurisdiction over the subject matter. On the one hand, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant or respondent is acquired by voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant/respondent
to the court, or by coercive process issued by the court to such party through service of summons. On the other hand,
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the relief prayed for. Thus, whether the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims
prayed therein is not essential. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and not by
agreement or consent of the parties. Neither does it depend upon the defenses of the defendant in his/her answer or in
a motion to dismiss.