India’s Opposition to SEATO:

A Case Study in Neutralist

Diplomacy R y ROSEMARY BRISSENDEN

India’s opposition to SEATO, though it was not unexpected, was more

vehement than her opposition to any previous regional a1liance.l Furthermore? i t
snowballed. When he was first informed of the London-Washington communiquC2
in April 1954, Mr. Nehru simply told the Indian Parliament:
It is not the intention of the Government to depart from the
firm and well considered principles of their policy, which is
calculated to promote peace and resolve conflicts by a peaceful
approach, and by methods of negotiation and agreement, rather
than by accentuation and threats or display of force intended
to condition the course of negotiations.3
By the time the Manila conference was over in September, Mr. Nehru was
calling the approach of the South-East Asian Collective Defence Treaty not
only a wrong approach, but a dangerous one from the point of view of any Asian
country.
Our hon. members may remember the old days-they appear
to be old days [he said1 . . . when Great Powers had spheres
of influence in Asia and elsewhere-of course the countries of
Asia were too weak to do anything. The quarrel was between
the Big Powers, and they, therefore, sometimes came to an
agreement about dividing the countries in spheres of influence.
I t seems to me this particuIar Manila Treaty is hoking danger-
ously in this direction of bpheres of influence to be exercised
by powerful countries? because ultimately, it is the big and
powerful countries that will decide and not the two or three
weak and small Asian countries that may be allied t o them.4

10f NATO Mr. Nehru said: “There was thc Atlantic Pact of certain Western Atlantic
countries. It is not my concern 2s to what celtain countrics do for their defence. We cannot as a
Government come into the picture or object to anything that they do . . , it began-this community
of Atlantic nations-as a defence against aggression. Well, no-one can object to that.” (Speech on
the Demand for Grants for the External Affairs Ministry, Government of India, Purfiumrntary
Dtbutes, House of the People, vol. 11, part 2, 1952, col. 1670.) It was only after NATO was
thought to have been extended to the defence of Portuguese &a that the Indian government
became really concerned with it.
*Joint Statement issued by Mr. Eden and Mr. Dullcs, London, 13 Ap. 1954, Royal Institute of
International Affairs: Documents on International Atairs (Hereafter R.I.I.A. Documents) London,
.
1954, p. 145. The rclevant section of the communiquk states: “. . Accordingly we are ready t o
take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of
establishing a collective defence, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to
assure the peace, security, and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.”
3Statement on Collective Defence Arrangements for South-East Asia and the Western Pacific.
Government of India, ParZiumcntary Debates, Lok Sabha, vol. IV, part 2, 17 Aug. 1954, col. 4921.
4Speech on the Motion cn the International Situation. Government of India, Purliummtury
Debates, Lok Sabha, vol. VII, part 2, 29 Sept. 1954, cols. 3679, 3680.
219
220 The Australbn Journal of Politics aftd History

H e claimed that positively the treaty had little contribution to make to the
problem of maintaining peace in the area, and that negatively it had itself added
to tensions in the area, He attributed reactionary motives to the western
countries that were members of SEATO, and made it clear that he was not in
sympathy with the Asian members who were prepared to ally themselves with
the organization.
And yet it is certain that he did not underestimate the fears for their
security which existed in these Asian countries, nor did he fail to name China
as their source.5 But the story of Indian diplomacy from the first suggestion of
a SEATO to the Bandung conference suggests that Indian leaders felt there
were very good reasons why India itself should cope with these problems outside
SEATO, and should try to minimize the potency of SEATO as an organ of
western military and political influence in South and South-East Asia. It reveals
that India was active in opposition to SEATO.
Indian diplomacy during this period falls naturally into three phases:
the first in which the appearance of unanimity amongst the Colombo powers in
apposition to SEATO was forced; the second when India attempted to
accommodate China during the Geneva discussions and the subsequent settlement,
a n d encouraged her by this means to adopt a conciliatory attitude in South-East
Asia; the third when China was enabled to reveal her good intentions, if she
really had them, to as large an audience as possible through the public declara-
tion of Panch Shila and a t the Bandung cofiference.
Colombo to Manilla
With the exception of Pakistan, the Colombo powers (India, Burma,
Indonesia, and Ceylon) presented a unanimous front in opposition to SEATO
in 1954 which was in some ways misleading. It became apparent that India
was determined to battle to maintain the appearance of undisturbed unity of
these countries in opposition to SEATO during July and August, when Mr.
Nehru stalled every effort of Sir John Kotelawala to provide a discussion of the
matter among them.
It was Sir John who had proposed the original meeting of South-East Asian
Prime Ministers in Colombo held in April 1954. He had made the suggestion
some time before such a meeting acquired immediate significance in the light
of developments in Indo-China and the exclusion of any South-East Asian
representation at the Geneva conference.
It seems Sir John saw himself as one of the more important lcaders in the
new Asia,6 and wanted to meet and discuss world developments with his colleagues

sibid. cols. 3678, 3691-3.

6In his 1954 Independence Day Anniversary broadcast to the nation (quoted Hindu IVeelrly
Review, 8 Feb. 1954) Sir John said of the April Colombo conference: “I myself tried to give a
new urge to the lives of the people in our part of the world by proposing a convention of South
Asian Prime Ministers. The way n y suggestion was rcceived in all responsible quarters and the
potentialities of such a convention io the light of substantial results achieved a t my recent meeting
with the Prime Minister of India regarding the problems that concerned our two cauntries give me
confidence that we have as important part as m y t o play in the conduct of Asian affairs.”
India's Opposition to SEATO-A Case Study in Neut~alistDiplomacy 22 1

as often as they might bear on the affairs of the region. This new proposal
could well have been prompted by an attitude of this kind. However, it was
also rumoured amongst dissident cabinet ministers and opposition groups in
Ceylon' at the time that the move might be not unconnected with Sir John's
forthcoming trip to the United States to seek economic aid, and it was pointed
out in this connection that the United States hoped Ceylon and Burma might
join SEATO. These groups believed that in order to gain United States economic
support, Sir John might be prepared to provoke an open rift amongst the Colombo
powers by raising the issue of a communist threat and a t this time such a rift
would have been more serious than the tentative disagreements of the April
meeting.
It is clear that Kotelawala was willing to entertain the idea of joining SEATO?
for some time after the treaty was signed. It seems too, that whatever other
motives he may have had, he was genuinely concerned with the problem of
defence against communism. One aspect of his desire for a second Colombo
powers conference appears to have sprung from this concern: he was trying to
force Mr. Nehru to articulate an alternative security scheme for the region.
He told the Ceylon House of Representatives in August that he had had
some intimation from Mr. Nehru that the Indian leader had an alternative
proposal to SEATO;s but Mr. Nehru later claimed that Sir John had
misunderstood him.9
Sir John called for a meeting to be held in Rangoon before the proposed
meeting of countries interested in establishing SEATO, and both the Pakistan
Prime Minister and the Burmese Government said they were willing to attend
such a con€erence.1° Mr. Nehru informed him that he was coo busy with domestic
matters to leave New Delhi.'l Sir John then suggested a change of venue to
New Delhi in order to accommodate the Indian Prime Minister. Mr. Nehru
replied that in his view any meeting of the Colombo powers a t this time would
be construed as amounting to a reconsideration of views already expressed by
the countries individually, and would cause the kind of misunderstanding it was
important in his view to avoid.12 The meeting was not held.
R y discouraging the meeting that Sir John was pressing for, Mr. Nehru
had avoided the possibility of displaying cracks which had already formed in
the facade of Colombo power unity. I n fact, in spite of the success of the
original Colombo conference in its main aim-that of presenting some Asian
unanimity on what kind of solution should be found to the Indo-China problem
-already quite considerable differences of opinion had been shown to exist
between the countries concerned, differences which the rest of the world, and
also it seems Mr. Nehru, had not previously been aware of.

7Hindu (Madras), 4, 5 Aug. 1954. STimes of India (Delhi), 4 Aug. 1954.

Wtatement ta members of the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) reported Times of India,
27 Aua. 1954.
lOHimiu, I1 Aug. 1954. W ; d . , 10 Aug. 1954.
'2ibid., 13 Aug. 1954.
222 l‘he Australian Jourual of Politics and History

For a t Colombo the Prime Ministers of Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma had
set out to impress upon Mr. Nehru the havoc which rhey feared could be
created by the overt or subversive activities of international c o m m ~ n i s m And
.~~
one observer believed that the changes to previous Indian suggestions which the
Cdombo powers made in their recommendations regarding a settlement in
Indo-China,14 were determined by their view that a dangerous vacuum would
be created in the region if the major powers were suddenly to withdraw from
In,Jo-China.’s
The impression made on Mr. Nehru a t Colombo must have been all the
more profound because of U Nu’s attitude. While there had been differences
before between India and Ceylon and India and Pakistan, U Nu was generally
regarded before he came to Colombo as being entirely in agreement with Mr.
Nehru on questions of foreign policy. At Colombo, however, he revealed himself
as an independent thinker.I6 He did not adhere to the expressed Indian view that
the threat of international communism was exaggerated. He made it quite clear
that Burma lived too close to Communist China to accept this point of view,
and Mr. Nehru had to realize that public underestimation of the communist
danger was harmless only within limits.
I t had become important then, if India was to have the world believe
there was a solid core of opposition in Asia to the S E A T 0 arrangement, to avoid
further discussions. Ceylon governments have felt themselves bound by what
India does to the extent, more or less, that they fear the disruptive power of
the Ceylon Tamils and the Indian immigrant labourers. The question which has
dominared Indo-Ceylon relations since independence has been the future of
these people whom Ceylon does not want to admit indiscriminately to citizenship
and whom India feels belong to the country they have lived in for generations.
XPfact that India disclaims any responsibility for people of Indian descent
in Ceylon once they are granted citizenship, and takes the view that all resident
Indians should apply for and be granted Ceylonese citizenship, does not reduce
the fear of them which pervades Ceylonese politics. It is feared that if the
Taniils could be and were to be pressured by the Indian government, Ceylon
would lose its independence.
Sir 3 ohn Kotelawala, like other Ceylonese Prime Ministers before and after
him, recognized the political and economic significance of Ceylon’s Tamil
population.” Moreover, Sir John was having some difficulty within his own

13/ana (Columbia Association Newspnpcrs, Ceylon), v d . I, no. 2. June 1954. p.8.

144.“Communique Issued after the Conference of Asian Prime Ministers”, Colombo, 2 M a y
1954 in R.I.I.A. Documents, 1954, p.166; and “Proposals by t h e Indian Government for Bringing
about Peace in Indo-China, 24 April 1954”, ibid., pp. 123-4. Point (5) of the Indian recommen-
dation., that the Geneva conferencc should bring about a solid agreement on non-intervention,
denying military aid, direct or indirect, to the combatants in Indo-China, was deleted a t Colombo.
15s. L. Poplai, “The Colombo Conference of Southeast Asian Prime Ministers”, Forrign
Affairs Reports, New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs, July 1954.
1Weylon Daily NCWS (Colombo). 8 M a y 1954.
“Sir John Kotelamala, An Asian P r i m Ministrr’s Story, London. George Harrap & Co.,
1956, p.104.
India’s Opposition to SEATO-A Case Study in Neutralist Diplomacy 223

cabinet. over the SEATO issue a t the time, so it was not surprising that the day
after Mr. Nehru’s final refusal to consider a Colombo powers meeting, the
Ceylon government issued a communiquk stating that “Ceylon would not be
able to participate in the Conference which had been proposed to be held [at
Manila: regarding SEATO, and the authorities concerned have been informed
accordingly”.18 The feeling in some quarters that the decision had been taken
under pressure was expressed in the next sentence: “Ceylon, however, is prepared
to mairitain an open mind on the subject.”

Geneva and the Indo-China Settlements

Obviously, to avoid the expression of a doubt does not remove the doubt.
When i t had become clear after Colombo that there were serious fears of China
in South Asian countries, the second phase of Indian diplomacy came into
operation. India attempted to gain what assurances were possible from China
regarding its intentions in South-East Asia. This took the form of negotiating
with China during the Geneva discussions and making clear to her where the
operation of Indian policy would assist the implementation of the Geneva
Agreement to China’s satisfaction.
India had been concerned that Asian countries should be represented in
some way a t Geneva and it was no doubt this which prompted Mr. Nehru to
send Iirishna Menon there in May in an informal capacity. However, during
the course of the conference, Menon’s activity became important in other ways,lg
causing Mend4s-France to remark that the conference consisted of “Nine nations
a t the table-and India”.
Krishna Menon had frequent discussions with the leading participants a t
the conference, particularly Chou En-lai and Eden, and their length and frequency
increased during the critical period before 16 June when Chou announced a
Chinese concession over Laos and Cambodia which paved the way for an agree-
ment. Indian correspondents a t Geneva rccognized some Indian influence
over the Laos and Cambodia compromise, and a great deal over the course of
the conference. Until 16 June Chou En-lai had maintained that a settlement for
Laos and Cambodia couId not be separated from a settlement for Viet Nam. This
would have involved the partition of the whole country as had occurred in Korea,
and the prospect had brought the conference to a deadlock. Now, while
eniph; .king that the problems of the three Indo-China states were linked, Chou
conclded that conditions for a settlement in Laos and Cambodia were different
from those in Viet Nam, and he made a series of proposals that suggested the

IRRindu, 14 Aug. 1954.

19More so, according to the Hindustan Tinus correspondent from Geneva than discretion a t
first had permitted to be revealed: Hindustan Times, 23 June, quoted Margaret W. Fisher and
Joan V. Bondurant, Indian Views of Sino-Indian Relations, Indian Press Digests-Monograph
Series, Number 1, Institute of Internatiocnl Stcdies, University of California at Berkeley, Feb.
1956, pp.49-50.
 The Australian Journal of Politics and History
communists might agree to the withdrawal of Vietminh forces from Laos and
Cambodia in preparation for a settlement along the lines originally suggested by
Mr. Nehru in April.20
The final terms of the settlements made at Geneva have been the subject of
Some dispute. It is clear that their ambiguity was meant to camouflage what had
been incomplete agreement at the conference about the future of the Indo-China
states. China, however, a t the end of the conference appears to have been satisfied
that she had received the kind of support which would guarantee that the Geneva
Agreements would involve the neutralization of Indo-China?’
It is to be noted that before the Geneva conference concluded in July Chou
En-lai had visited New Delhi. According to press surmise, when Chou was in
India he and Mr. Nehru were discussing, amongst other things, the Chinese
concession over Laos and Cambodia, and what arrangements were to be made
regarding the nature of a future settlement there.22 And an American
correspondent summed up the feeling a t the time when he is reported to have
said That Chou had taken with him from New Delhi an Indian guarantee that the
United States would withdraw irs military frontier from che southern flanks of
China.23 The exact nature of the settlement arrangements was important, for
in the face of plans being made a t this time for SEATO, China’s position had
become rather delicate. The United States, it seemed, would be humoured by her
western allies and the Indo-China states associated with such a treaty. Assuming
that China did not want an all-out war or U.N. intervention over Indo-China-
and if for this reason alone had to reach a settlement there-Chou’s best bet was
to try to negotiate one which would not leave arcas of China’s own border
open to possible da.nger from a solid western bloc reaching its edge. If Laos and
Cambodia were not to be areas of communist influence, which is what Chou’s
concession had implied, neither should they be areas of western influence. The
best kind of settlement for the communists would be neutralization.
Certainly, having the Indian representative as chairman of the International
Commissions for Supervision and Control in Indo-China achieved this result at
least for a time, and Chou seemed to have been satisfied that it would be so after
his New Delhi visit, for when he returned to Geneva in July after the recess the
communists led the way to final agreement by changing the suggested composition
of the proposed Commissions. They reduced thc number of communist members
of the commission to one from the two they had previously been insisting upon,

-““Hindustan Times, 18 June 1954, Special European Correspondent; also cf. “Proposals by the
Indian Government for Bringing about Peace in Indo-China, 24 April 1954”, in R.I.I.A. Documents,
1954, pp.123-4.
Z l S e e , for instance, Chou En-lays final statement on thc Geneva Conference: N.C.N.A.,
21 July 1954, in Survey of China Mainland Presx (Hongkong), No. 853, p.6.
22Economic Weekly (Bombay), 26 June 1954, p.706; K. Subbaroya.n, “New Epoch in Asia’s
History: Sinc-Indian Co-operation”, m Timcs of India, 4 July 1954.
23Joseph Harsch, reported in Times of India, 7 July 1454.
India’s Opposition to SEA TO-A Case Study in Neutralist Diplomacy 225

and enlarged the scope of matters the Commission could decide upon by a
majority vote.24 India was invited to fill the chairmanship of the Commissions
a s now constituted.
Here it is to be noted that there was never any !-?zitation on the Indian
government’s part that it understood the Geneva settlement to involve the
neutrakation of the Indo-China states, whether the agreements were verbally
certain on this point or not. I n the Indian view, if the agreements were not
verbally clear, their “spirit” was clear. Hence the constant reference made in
official documents to India’s task of implementing the Geneva Agreements “both
in their terms and their spirit’’.2B Hence also one of the common criticisms of
SEAT0 expressed in India during the latter part of 1954-that having
“designated” the Indo-China states it was likely to reverse the trend of the
Indo-China settlement and would be prejudicial to Indo-China’s neutrality.26
I n its work on the Commissions, India was continually interested to maintain
the neutrality of the Indo-China states.
After the military clauses of the Agreement for Cambodia had been
implemented, the Indian chairman of the Commissions for Supervision and
Control there stated that the remaining tasks of the Commission were (1) the
completion of the reintegration of demobilized Khmer Resistance Forces into
national life; and (2) the control of the supply of war materials and military
personnel to make sure that nothing was brought into Cambodia which would go
beyond the country’s requirements for effective defence.27 This view of the
Commission’s task remained unaltered in spite of some criticism within and outside
Cambodia a t the time that the commission mas impotent, and it had finished
its work, and that it should be dissolved.2s
T h e Commission with its Indian chairman was reluctant to admit that the
Military Aid Agreement contracted between Cambodia and the United States in
1955 was within the scope of the Geneva Agreement. Indeed, it was only after
receiving assurances from the Cambodian government that the Agreement would
be operated strictly according t o understandings given in exchanges between the
gcvernment and the Commission in June that the Commission eventually gave its
blessing to the Agrcement. The 3rd Interim Report of the Commission states:

24111 May the Chinese had conceded only that the function of supervision might be given
over to a neutral body which would act by “agreement”, and that its four members must include
Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as Pakistan arid India. As well they had wanted real
authority t o remain with the mixed commissions of the two sides of the dispute: Popiai, “The
Geneva Conference”, Foreign Affairs Reports, New Delhi, Indian Council of World Affairs,
Aug. 1954.
2jFor instance the joint communique issued after talks between Nehru and the Deputy
Prime Mnistcr of the Democratic Republic of I’ict Nam issued a t Ncw Delhi, 10 May 1955: “They
reaffirmed the full support of their respective governments to the agreements reached at Geneva
and. their ‘firm resolve to respect and seek t o implement them both in their terms and their
..
spirit. .” Government of India Press Information Bureau, Daily Press Releasr, 10 Ap. 1955.
2*Times of India, editorial, 6 Aug. 1954; Statesman (Delhi), editorial, 10 Sept. 1954.
27Statesman (Delhi), 25 Jan. 1955.
28N.C.N.A., 14 March 1955.
226 The Australiaii Journal of Politics and Hirtory

The International Commission welcomes the clarification

given by the Royal Government, and its assurances that it will
scrupulously and always respect the terms of the Geneva Agree-
ment. It takes note of the assurances of the Royal Government
that it will follow a policy of neutrality.
T h e International Commission is confident that the Royal
Government will honour all assurances it has given and will give
full co-operation to the International Commission in supervising
the implementation of the Military Aid Agreement in terms of
article 7 and article 13 (c) of the Geneva Agreement.
Although it may still be argued that some of the clauses of
the new Military Aid Agreement in terms go beyond rhe limita-
tions of the Geneva Agreement, the Commission accepts the
assurance given by the Cambodian Government and is confident
that in practice the receiving of aid under the new Military Aid
Agreement will be in conformity with the terms of the Geneva
acc0rd.~9
The work of the International Commission in Cambodia has not gone
unrecognized by the Chinese authorities. T h e People’s Daily printed many
expressions of appreciation, particularly of the part played by the Indian chairman,
during 1955-6.a0
I n Laos the recommendations which the Commission made as a body were
very often those supported by the Indian chairman and reflected the Indian view,
as Poland and Canada on this Commission tended to adopt the opposing Laotian
domestic points of view.
In the early days of its work, the Commission was satisfied simply to note
that the parties in the dispute there (the Royal Laotian government and the
Pathet Lao forces) were interpreting the clauses of the Geneva Agreement
differently. At first the Commission’s formal interpretations of the Geneva
Agreement aimed a t adopting a strictly neutral position, and gave no moral
support to either party, but in June 1955 it ruled on appeal from the Royal
Laotian government that the Agreement meanr what the government had
interpreted it to mean.s1 At the same time, it stressed the importance of the
political settlement desired by the Pathet Lao.
It was on the basis recommended by the Commission that a settlement in
principle was reached in August 1956. This would not have been possible without
the Commission’s help and the stand of the Indian as chairman of the Commission.
When a final agreement was reached between the Royal government and the
Pathet Lao in October 1957, and the two parties agreed t o form a unified govern-
ment, that government was pledged to follow a policy of “peace and neutrality”:

29Third lntrrim Report, 1:C.S.C. in Cambodia, Cmd. 9579, London, H.M.S.O., pp. 5,6.
Italics mine.
3(’0bserver in the Peoplc’s Daily (Peking), 24 Jan. 19.56, quoted N.C.N.A., 25 Jan. 1956;
Observer in Peoplc’s Daily, 11 Oct. 1955, quoted ibid., 12 Ikt. 1955.
31See Second Interim Report, I.C.S.C. in Laos, Crnd. 9630, London, H.M.S.O., lwrra. 70.
Illdia’s Oppositio?l to SEATO-A Case Stu.dy in Neutralist Diplomacy 227

to apply sincerely Pandit Nehru’s principles of peace and

co-existence ;
to keep good relations with all countries, in particular neigh-
bouring countries;
to desist from adhering t o any military alliance;
to allow n o country to establish military bases in Lao territory
apart from those foreseen in the Geneva Agreement.32
The settlement was one which favoured the Royal Government’s interpreta-
tion of the Geneva Agreement, but to gain the support of the Commission rhe
government had had to include Pathet Lao representation in its cabinet, and
could d o this only with the promise that it would follow a neutral foreign policy.
When in May 1958 the Canadians moved that the Commission in Laos
should wind up, the Indians joined the Poles in opposing the suggestion. I’ndia
officially took the view that under article 39 of the Geneva Agreement the future
of the International Commission there depended upon developments in the other
Indo-China states and that the Laos Commission could not wind up until the
others &d.33 I t is clear that India did not want to lose her influence in Laos nor
to lose the chance to influence the government to adhere to a neutral foreign
policy. However, in face of opposirion within the country itself to its continuation,
the Cornmission was adjourned in July 1958. India a t the time wanted it to
continue a t least in embryonic form so that the organization could be re-activized
“if and when necessary”.34 Characteristically, when the new Prime Minister
Sananikone after August 1958 reversed previous trends in Laos, excluded the
Pathet Lao representation from his government and claimed no longer to recognize
the Geneva Agreement, the Indian Government was keen to have rhe Commission
recailed.
The Commission has failed to implement very much of the Geneva Agree-
ment in Viet Nam because South Viet Nam does not admit responsibility under the
armistice agreement and both parties have failed t o co-operate with each other
and with the Commission. It has also been unable to prevent South V e t Nam
from participating in some SEATO activitie~,3~and, in face of the hostility of the
Vietnamese Republic, has been able only to remain in the area, observing its
formal comn~itment. It seems, however, that India has not shown concern to the
same degree in Wet Nam (where Chinese influence pervades part of the country)
as in Laos or Cambodia which, if they were to become absorbed into the wesrern
sphere, would provide a straight corridor to Chinese territory.
I n its work in Indo-China, particularly in Laos and Cambodia, India did for
some time providt: the kind of guarantee that China was looking for during the
Geneva conference. While it has been suggested up to this point, that Chou may
well have ascertained that this would be so when he was in New Delhi in June

“Quoted in Third Interim Report, I.C.S.C. in Laos, Cmd. 314, London, H.M.S.O. p. 55.
W 3 a t c s m a n (Delhi), 2.5 May 1958.
34ihid., 30 May 1958.
35See J. A. Modelski, “Indo-China and SF.AT0, AustraIian Outlook, March 1959, pp.41-2.
228 The Australian Journal of Politics and History
1954, the outcome of these discussions was no less satisfactory for Mr. Nehru’s
own purposes. On 28 June the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese Premier
issued a joint statement reaffirming their belief in the five principles of peaceful
co-existence which they had previously agreed should operate in relations between
them.36 This heralded the third phase of Indian diplomacy.

Panch Shila to Bandung

T h e Nehru-Chou joint statement further extended the five principles to apply
to their relatioas with other Asian countries and with the rest of the world. The
communiqui states :
Recently India and China have come to a n agreement in which
they have laid down certain principles which should
guide relations between the two countries. The principles are :-
(1) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty, (2) non-aggression, ( 3 ) non-interference in each
orher’s internal affairs, (4)equality and mutual benefit and ( 5 )
peaceful co-existence. The Prime Minister reaffirmed these
principles clncl felt that they should be applied in their relations
with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the
world. . . .37
Observers a t the time saw Chou’s enunciation of these principles as a reaI
political gain for Mr. N e h r ~ . And~ ~ events of the following months tend to
substantiate that this was what he had been hoping for. Mr. Nehru himself was
not prepared simply to rest with the reassuring words. What Burma and Ceylon
had been searching for a t Colombo was something more definite: some material
guarantee that China would undertake no aggressive expeditions into South-East
Asia. With regard to the joint statement Mr. Nehru had told the Lok Sabha:
“It is not a question of believing the other party’s word: it is a question of creating
ccnditiorls wherc the other party cannot break its word: or if I may say so,
where it finds it difficult to break its
His efforts during the next nine months were directed towards creating
conditions where China’s verbal guarantees would extend over as wide an area
as possible in Asia, and would be repeated on the most public platform that
could be found.
After he left Delhi a t the end of June, Chou En-lai visited Rangoon, theie
to sign a joint statement affirming the Panch Shila with U Nu. It was generally
believed, in both New Delhi and New Y ~ r k that , ~ ~Chou’s visit to Rangoon

s6The “5 Principles”, or Panch Shila as they canic LO be called, were first enumerated in
the preamble to the SineIndian Treaty on trade and comniunications with Tibet of 29 Ap. 1954.
37CommuniquC on Talks between Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai, 28 June 1954, R.1.f.A.
Docummts, 1954, p.3 13.
S K . Subbaroyan, Timer 01 India, op. cit.
39Speech on the Motion on the International Situation, Government of India, Parliamentary
Debates, Lok Sabha, vol. VII, part 2, 29 Sept. 1954, col. 3687.
4oHinJu Weekly Review (Madras), 5 July 1954; New York Times, 29 June 1954.
India’s Opposition to SEATO-A Case Study in Neutralist Diplomacy 229

was made a t th- request of Mr. Nehru and that the presence of the Secretary-
General of the Indian External Affairs’ Ministry who travelled in Chou’s party a s
far as Canton was intended to facilitate closer understanding between Chou and
the Burmese Prime Minister.
It had been arranged that Mr. Nehru would visit Peking in September. I n
the meantime, however, Ali Sastroamidjojo, the Indonesian Prime Minister, came
to New Delhi to talk with Mr. Nehru. Spurred by the growing self-confidence of
the Colombo powers, he was known to be eager to press his earlier suggestion for
an Afro-Asian conference.
On the first occasion the suggestion regarding an Afro-Asian conference
had been made (at Colombo in April) Mr. Nehru had treated it brusquely.41 Now,
however, in September, he was enthusiastic. The talks took place on the eve of
his departure for China, and the possibility that China might be invited to Bandung
was not disc~unted.~‘
The real purpose in Mr. Nehru’s visit to China becomes evident within the con-
text in which it was undertaken. On his way to New Delhi, Ali Sastroamidjojo had
stopped in Rangoon for talks with U Nu. Mr. Nehru visited Rangoon on the
way to Peking. He also met Sir John Kotelawala before he left for China,43 and
there is very little doubt that he saw the fruits of his visit in the liaison it allowed
between China and the Colombo powers and its calming effect on the fears of the
latter, fears which without India’s active efforts might have led them to view
SEATO sympathetically.
Mr. Nehru was not, it is clear, visiting China to pay court to communist
ideology. For instance he tried to avoid misunderstanding about the purpose of
his visit by making a statement in the Lok Sabha before he left which was sur-
prisingly He attacked the Asian Communist Parties for the first time in
many months, and gave public notice that the countries of Asia would resist en-
croachment upon their integrity and sovereignty by international communism as
much as by SEATO.
In Peking, Mr. Nehru did not indulge in any diatribes against the west, but
settled for serious discussions with Chou En-lai. According to reports,45 the
subjects discussed were the scope of the proposed Afro-Asian conference, with
some reference to whether China was to be included or not; the problem of over-
seas Chinese in South-East Asia; the future of the Indo-Chinese states; and the
extent to which SEATO was likely to interfere with the implementation of the
Geneva Agreement.

4 1 The Times (London), 4 Sept. 1954.

4aTinies of India, 20 Sept. 1954.
4sAAlthough Sir John had come to New Delhi to discuss specific Indo-Ceylonese problems,
lie admitted to reporters that hc hod discussed larger international issues, including the proposed
Afro-Asian conference See Timrs of India. 12 Oct. 1954.
4*Speech on the Motion on the International Situation, Government of India, Parliamentary
I)e6ates, Lok Sabha, vol. VII. part 2, 29 Sept. 1954, cols. 3692-3.
45Peking dispatch by G. K. Rcddy, Timrs of fndia, 23 Oct. 1954.
230 The Australian journal of Politics and History

On his return to India, Mr. Nehru told reporters that the Chinese had assured
him they were very much opposed to communist interference in the governments
of Burma, Thailand and Indo-China. “But no one can guarantee the future-
obviously”, he said. Again he was careful to avoid allowing the enthusiasm his
visit had engendered to be misunderstood. He repeated his charges against
communism and attacked the Communist Party of India in a Delhi public
meeting as “anti-national and d i s r u ~ t i v e ” At
. ~ ~Lucknow in another public meeting
he again warned his audience of the dangers of international communism and
stressed that India was determined to find her own way of developing the country,
drawing lessons, but not inspiration, from abroad.
Perhaps the real reward for Nehru’s efforts during these months came when
the meeting of the Colombo powers at Bogor in December decided to invite China
to Bandung. This was seen as personally a signal political triumph for Mr. N e h r ~ . * ~
On t h e first day of the meeting, Mohammed Ali of Pakistan had objected to the
proposal, but he found that even Sir John Kotelawala was partly siding with Mr.
Nehru on this issue,l* and eventually submitted to the idea.
At Bandung, Chou En-lai could not have done more to satisfy Mr. Nehru,
to win friends and influence people, and to convince the delegates that China was
responsible to no one but herself in foreign relations. South-East Asian fears
burst into words very early in the conference. Prince Norodom of Cambodia
stated that it was his country’s desire t o remain neutral in international affairs,
but insisted that it would be the task of more powerful nations to provide proofs
and guarantees that this would be pos~ible.’~Prince Wan of Thailand referred
to the problem of people of dual nationality in his country, and the threat of
infiltration and subversion from North Viet Nam into North Thailand. It was
clear that the dual nationality problem worried Indonesia also.
Shortly after this, Chou delivered an off-the-cuff speech calculated to calm
these fears, in addition to his prepared speech which was circulated.5o I n it he
emphasized that the Chinese delegation had come to Bandung t o seek common
ground. For this reason, he claimed, China had not raised the questions of
concern to her which might have created controversy. He reasserted China’s
belief in the Panch Shila and stated that China was ready t o solve the problem

46Times of India, 29 NOV.1954.

47Bogor dispatch by G. K. Reddy, Times of India, 30 Dec. 1954.
4sDuring Mr. Nehru’s discussions with Chou En-iai in Peking, the Times of India corres-
pondent (23 Oct. 1954) reported that “Mr. Nehru apparently has not any definite views on
the subject” (of China’s being invited to Bandung). However, in view of Sir John Kotelawala’s
support a t Bogor, and remembering that MI. Nehru had consulted with Kotelawala but not
h4ohammed Ali before he went to China it seems likely that some discussion of whether China
should be included had in fact taken place among the Colombo powers (excluding Pakistan)
hefore Nehru went to Peking.
49George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference Bandung, Indonesia, A&, 1955, Ithaca,
Cornell University Press, 1956, p.13.
“Supplementary speech by Premicr Chou En-lai at the Asian-African conference, 19 Ap.
lY55. ibid., Appendix 2, p.52.
India’s Opposition to SEA TO-A Case Study in Neutralist Diplomacy 23 1

of dual nationality to the satisfaction of the governments concerned. He concluded

this speech by saying that “China has no intention whatever to subvert the
governments of its neighbouring countries”.
I n the closed meetings of committees, Chou again behaved extremely well.
When real controversy developed he stayed out of the larger part of it, and on
23 April, after the Political Committee had degenerated into wrangling between
the neutralists and those supporting collective defence,5I and the conference was
almost deadlocked, Chou stepped in and t m k over the role of star performer and
man of reason. Chou’s speech was an expression of willingness to compromise
and be adaptable on virtually everything, including the “five principles”. H e gave
verbal assurances on a lot of real problems and issues affecting China’s neighbours.
H e talked of China’s respect for Burma’s sovereignty, despite activites of
Kuomintang troops there; referred to private conversations with Romulo of the
Philippines and Prince Wan of Thailand, and the invitation he had extended to
them to visit China and inspect China’s frontiers to sce for themselves that China
did not intend to commit aggression; he told the delegates that assurances of non-
intervention had been given to Laos and Cambodia; claimed that China respected
the political and economic systems of Japan and the United States, and said that
China was willing to settle all problems of international relations by peaceful
means. As one delegate described it later: “He distributed gifts all round, a t least
one to each neighbour.” And the neighbours, even those who reacted warily, were
impressed.
As well, with some assistance from hlr. Nehru, Chou took every advantage
of opportunities to meet and talk with Asian leaders he had not previously
encountered. At some of these meetings he was purely social and charming, but
a t others he made assurances and promises, For instance, he assured the delega-
tions from Laos and Cambodia that China would not interfere in their internal
affairs. He arranged a meeting between representatives of North Viet Nam and
Laos, a t which North Viet Nam assured Laos that it would not intervene in the
domestic dispute between the Pathet Lao and the Royal Laotian government; he
assured Thailand that China would not use the Thai Autonomous Area or
Yunnan Province for activities against Thailand, and that national political figures
of Asian countries who had gone to China would not be allowed to broadcast
propaganda against their former countries again.
The negotiation of the Sino-Indonesian Treaty of Dual Nationality was also
timely. It had been under consideration for some time but the signing of the
treaty during the conference achieved maximum psychological effect and gave
the settlement a broad publicity.
Political observtrs a t Bandung agree that Chou’s achievement as diplomat
was perhaps its most dramatic product. According to Doak Barnett, Chou

ElAmerican Universities Field Staff, Asia and Africa in Stssion: Random Notcs on the
Asian-African Conference, A Report from A. Doak Barnett, Surabaja, 18 May 1955, p.24.
232 The Australiati Journal of Politics and History

“convinced many of the delegates that he is a reasonable and sincere man of

goodwill. H e attempted with considerable success to convince them also that
Communist China is pursuing a peaceful policy. And these were obviously his
major aims.”52
K a h i ~ Pclaims
~ that it was also one of Mr. Nehru’s major aims. He recalls
that Mr. Nehru, although he was in general convinced that China was honestly
disposed to follow a peaceful course, had expressed some margin of doubt in an
unpublished circular letter to Congress Party leaders just after Chou’s visit t o
Delhi. I n this he stated that the Peking government had to be given a chance to
prove whether or not it would honour the Five Principles. Later he developed
the thesis that China might more easily d o so if an environment could be created
which would nizke it awkward for her to flout these principles, and he endeavoured
to have China brought to Bandung where, if she was sincere, she would repeat
her Pledge before the alert audience of Afro-Asia.
Certainly on the evidence, it seems as if Mr. Nehru had some interest in
introducing China to Asia in a different light from the one cast by SEATO, and
was concerned to impress a n alternative upon the nations of South-East Asia
which, for reasons of their own, were interested in an alternative if it could be
made to look.feasible. The aim of Indian diplomacy, successfully executed during
this period, was to make the alternative do just this.

Australian National University

52American Universities Field Staff, Chou En-Zai nt Bandung: Chinese Communist Diplomacy
at the Asian-African Conference, A Report from A. Doak Barnett, Djakarta, 4 May 1955, p.15.
53Kahin, op. cit.