diligence lasts from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation until the same are delivered, actually or
Loadmaster vs. Glodel
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court assailing the August 24, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 82822.
On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001
in favor of Columbia to insure the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes
against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes were shipped on board the vessel
"Richard Rey" from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They arrived on
the same date.
Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the
cargoes from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in
turn, engaged the services of Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport
the cargoes to Columbia’s warehouses/plants in Bulacan and Valenzuela City.
The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters,
driven by its employed drivers and accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Of the
six (6) trucks route to Balagtas, Bulacan, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1)
truck, loaded with 11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its
cargo.
Later on, the said truck, was recovered but without the copper cathodes.
Because of this incident, Columbia filed with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance
indemnity in the amount ofP1,903,335.39. After the investigation, R&B Insurance
paid Columbia the amount ofP1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.
R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both
Loadmasters and Glodel before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Manila (RTC), It
sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject
cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated "to the right of the consignee to recover
from the party/parties who may be held legally liable for the loss."
On November 19, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for
damages for the loss of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters’ counterclaim
for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B Insurance.
Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA.
On August 24, 2007, the CA rendered that the appellee is an agent of
appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance
Corporation as insurance indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by
appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the present petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Loadmasters and Glodel are common carriers to determine their
liability for the loss of the subject cargo.
RULING:
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Judgment is rendered declaring petitioner
Loadmasters Customs Services, Inc. and respondent Glodel Brokerage Corporation
jointly and severally liable to respondent
Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms, or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or
goods, or both by land, water or air for compensation, offering their services to the
public. Loadmasters is a common carrier because it is engaged in the business of
transporting goods by land, through its trucking service. It is a common carrier as
distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by
special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public.
Glodel is also considered a common carrier within the context of Article 1732. For as
stated and well provided in the case of Schmitz Transport & Brokerage Corporation v.
Transport Venture, Inc., a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the
transportation of goods being an integral part of its business.
Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature
of their business and for reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by them according to all the
circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the
Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution
which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection observe for securing and
preserving their own property or rights. With respect to the time frame of this
extraordinary responsibility, the Civil Code provides that the exercise of extraordinary
constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to
receive them.
The Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally
liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Loadmasters’ claim that it
was never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or
R&B Insurance as subrogee, is not a valid defense.
For under ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
It is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters
whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or
robbery of the shipment. As employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for
the damages caused by its employees who acted within the scope of their assigned
task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse.
Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed
to ensure that Loadmasters would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport
the subject cargo to the designated destination. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable
with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.
For the consequence, Glodel has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to
its aid on equitable grounds. "Equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice
outside legality,’ is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or
judicial rules of procedure." The Court cannot be a lawyer and take the cudgels for a
party who has been at fault or negligent.
People vs. Velasco (full text only)
Navida vs. Dizon
FACTS:
 2 petitions, G.R. 125078 & 125598, assailed the perceived lack of jurisdiction
of RTC over the matter
 Proceedings before the texas courts:
 Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in
different texas state courts by citizens of 12 foreign countries,
including the Philippines;
 Thousands of plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly
sustained from their exposure to a chemical used to kill nematodes
while working on farms in 23 foreign countries;
 Respondents want the case be dismissed under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens
 The federal district court granted the motion to dismiss subject to
certain conditions;
 Proceedings in the RTC of General Santos City
 336 plaintiffs from GenSan filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of
GenSan.
 They prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and
injuries suffered from DBCP, claiming that they were exposed to the
said chemical even though the defendants knew it was harmful;
 Defendant filed their motion for bill of particulars
 The RTC dismissed the complaints on the following grounds:
 The activity took outside the Philippines territory, hence,
outside Philippine jurisdiction;
 The tort in the complaint, which is “product liability tort” is not
the tor category within the purview of Philippine Law
  That Petitioners coerced into submitting their case in the
Philippines
 The voluntary appearance of defendants has little
significance;
 Petioners violated the rules on forum shopping and litis
pendencia
 The case is barred by “litis pendencia” – SINCE THE CASE
IS PENDING IN THE US COURTS, THE PRESENT
COMPLAINT MUST BE DISMISSED
 The petitioners filed a Petition for Review
 Proceedings in the RTC of Davao City
 155 plaintiffs from Davao filed a complaint in the RTC of
Davao, similar to the complaint of Navida etal (GenSan)
 However, the RTC likewise junked the case for the following
reasons:
 That Petitioners would have this court dismiss the
case to pave the way for their getting an affirmance
by the supreme court
 It shares the opinion of legal experts, to wit:
 The Philippines should be an inconvenient
forum to file this kind of damage suit against
foreign companies since the causes of action
alleged in the petition do not exist under
Philippine laws (Former Justice Secretary
Demetria);
 While a class suit is allowed in the
Philippines, the device has been employed
strictly. Mass sterility will not qualify as a
class suit injury within the contemplation of
Philippine statute (Retired Supreme Court
Justice Sarmiento);
 Absence of doctrine in the Philippines
regarding product liability
 Petitioners (Davao) contends that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case since Articles 2176 and
2187 of the Civil Code are broad enough to cover the
acts complained of; and that the opinions of the legal
experts are bereft of basis;
 Motion to withdraw was filed by Respondents
asserting that the Petition for review is moot and
academic since they already entered into an
amicable settlement with petitioners
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the Court is correct in dismissing the petition due to lack of
jurisdiction?
2. Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the matter?
1. That the acts complained of occurred within the Philippines;
2. That Article 2176 of the Civil Code is broad enough to cover the act;
3. That assumption by the US District Court did not divest jurisdiction of
the Philippine courts; and,
4. That the compromise agreement does not justifiably prejudice
remaining respondents.
RULING/S:
ISSUE ON JURISDICTION
1. The court erred in dismissing the case on the ground of jurisdiction.
1. The jurisdiction of court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses
set by defendants. What determines jurisdiction of the court is the
nature of action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint.
2. None of the parties actually move for the case based on the RTC jurisdiction
but more on the prayer for damages.
3. The trial court has clearly jurisdiction over the matter.
1. THE RULE IS SETTLED THAT JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF A CASE IS CONFERRED BY LAW AND IS
DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND
THE CHARACTER OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT. Once vested by law,
on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other that the legislature
thru enactment of a law.
4. On whether the act occurred in the Philippines, the Court held YES. Thus, civil
code article 2176 which provides that “whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done..xxx” is applicable in the case at bar and therefore, RTC
obviously has jurisdiction over the matter.
1. Also, the case at bar is a personal case, not a criminal, hence, lex
situs theory is not necessarily applicable.
5. The facts clearly shows that the claim for damages is the cause of action and
that the RTC unmistakably has jurisdiction over the matter.
6. Moreover, the RTC of GenSan and Davao validly acquired jurisdiction over the
persons of all the defendant companies.
1. In the case Meat Packing Corp. of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan,
the court held that “jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in
civil cases is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and
his submission to its authority or by service of
summons..xxx…active participation of a party in the proceedings
is tantamount to an invocation of court’s jurisdiction and
willingness to abide in the resolution of the case”.
2. Jurisdiction is different from “exercise of jurisdiction”. Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein.
3. Where a court has jurisdiction over persons of the defendants and the
subject matter, the decision on all questions arising therefrom is the
exercise of jurisdiction.
Libi vs. IAC
ACTS:
Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were a sweetheart until the former broke up with
the latter after she found out the Wendell was irresponsible and sadistic. Wendell
wanted reconciliation but was not granted by Julie so it prompted him to resort to
threats. One day, there were found dead from a single gunshot wound each coming
from the same gun. The parents of Julie herein private respondents filed a civil case
against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court dismissed the
complaint for insufficiency of evidence but was set aside by CA.
ISSUE: WON the parents should be held liable for such damages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed
under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of Revised Penal Code covered
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The court held that
the civil liability of the parents for quasi-delict of their minor children is primary and not
subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can prove that they
observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. However,
Wendell’s mother testified that her husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety
deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of the spouses had their own
key. She likewise admitted that during the incident, the gun was no longer in the
safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun unless the key was
left negligently lying around and that he has free access of the mother’s bag where the
key was kept. The spouses failed to observe and exercise the required diligence of a
good father to prevent such damage.
Valenzuela vs. CA
FACTS:
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Araneta avenue
towards the direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a
flat tire so she parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her
emergency lights and seeked help
 She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she
was suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was
intoxicated and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was
amputated and was replaced with an artificial one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial
leg)]
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and
severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual
damages, P37,500 unrealized profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro
La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a
month as unrealized profits of Bistro La Conga restaurant, from August, 1990
until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a month, for unrealized profits in 2
Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral damages, P50,000, as exemplary
damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
 CA: there was ample evidence that the car was parked at the side but absolved
Li's employer
 Li: 55 kph - self serving and uncorraborated
 Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across
the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle
(NOT heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he
could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely
avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both
cars, since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila
and the on-coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing
as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to
which he is required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required
to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake
what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or
turn on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she
had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona
Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts
of the servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in
which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise
the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his
employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned
tasks would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large
companies with either their employees of managerial rank or their
representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the
accident because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in
Parañaque was a bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court
below. It was obviously self-serving. Assuming he really came from his
officemate’s place, the same could give rise to speculation that he and his
officemate had just been from a work-related function, or they were together to
discuss sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of
the opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in
greater accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and
psychological - suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent
driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also
be permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her
body would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes,
and adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational
therapy. All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
GAPITO FUELLAS v. ELPIDIO CADANO
Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant- appellant Agapito Fuellas, were
both 13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High
School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon of September 16, 1954, while Pepito was
studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok
and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to
return the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico,
who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher,
separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito
following. When Pepito had just gone down of the school- house, he was met by Rico,
still in angry mood. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito
extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting the proffer to shake hands, Rico held
Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and pushed him to
the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon,
Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out
"My arm is broken." Rico then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to
go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for
treatment Exh. 4). An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete fracture of the
radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting (Exhs. A, B and
D). On November 20, 1954, more than a month after Pepito's release from the
hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the last day of hearing of the case,
the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter than the left forearm, still in
bandage and could not be fully used.
Issue:
Ruling:
It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant
was ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said
court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in
connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act
of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being
no fault or negligence on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate
intent, the above mentioned articles are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate
intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its
commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him
liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
The above-mentioned provisions of the Civil Code states: —
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
 parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
chapter. (Article 2176)
The obligations imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
St Joseph College vs Miranda
Facts:
Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment
about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC.
Tabugo left her class. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson’s
classmates checked the result of the experiment by looking at the test tubes with a
magnifying glass. One of the group mates of Jayson held the tubes close to his eyes.
At that instance, the compound in the test spured out and several particles of which hit
Jayson in his left eye and some of the body parts of his group mates.
As a result of the incident, Jayson’s mother, who was working abroad had
to come home, spending money for her fares and had to forego her salary. Then, too,
[Jayson] and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded
feelings as a result of his injury due to fault and failure to exercise the degree of care
and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable for
moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of
his medical expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter
failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the complaint for damages.
[Petitioners], therefore, should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation expenses,
including attorney’s fees.
Petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her
students, including Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated
test tube before the compound had cooled off. Petitioners would allocate all liability
and place all blame for the accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein
respondent Jayson.
Issue:
W/N the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was due to his own
negligence making SJC not liable for damages.
Held:
No. As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury
was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by
failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the
school, its administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the
following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
“Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
“Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution.
“Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only
for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
“ Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.”
Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
and caution is demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and
injury to its students although it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students
who conduct experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices,
specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her
class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the accident involving Jayson
occurred. In any event, the size of the class of fifty (50) students conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
AQUINAS SCHOOL v SPS JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA INTON, on their
behalf and on behalf of thier minor child, JOSE LUIS INTON and SR.
MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP
January 26, 2011
Special parental authority
FACTS
Respondent Sister Margarita Yamyamin is a religion teacher at Aquinas school. She
taught in respondent Jose Luis' Inton's grade three religion class. One day, while
Yamyamin was writing on the blackboard, Jose Luis left his assigned seat and went
over to his classmate to surprise him (as a joke). Yamyamin sent Jose Luis back to his
seat. Jose Luis left his seat again and went over to the same classmate. Yamyamin
then approached Jose Luis and kicked him on the legs several times. She also pulled
and shoved his head on the classmate's seat. She told Jose Luis to stay on that spot
of the room and finish copying what was written on the board while seated on the floor.
Because of the incident, respondent Sps Inton filed an action for damages with the
RTC on behalf of their son Jose Luis, impleading Yamyamin and Aquinas. The Sps
Inton also filed a criminal action against Yamyamin.
(With respect to the civil action) The Intons sought to recover actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees. The RTC ruled in Jose Luis' favor,
holding Yamyamin liable for moral damages (P25,000), exemplary damages
(P25,000), and attorney's fees (P10,000) plus the costs of suit.
The Intons appealed to the CA to increase the award of damages and hold Aquinas
School solidarily liable with Yamyamin. The CA declined to increase the award of
damages, but held Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin, finding the existence of
employer-employee relations between them. Sps Inton did not appeal from the CA
decision. Aquinas, however, filed this present petition.
ISSUE
Whether Aquinas should be held solidarily liable with Yamyamin
RULING
No.
The CA held that Aquinas' liability was based on Article 2180 CC, upon the belief that
the school was Yamyamin's employer.

To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has
applied the four-fold test: the employer (a) selects and engages the employee; (b)
pays his wages; (c) has power to dismiss him; and (d) has control over his work. Of
these, the most crucial is the element of control. (Control: the right of the employer,
whether actually exercised or reserved, to control the work of the employee as well as
the means and methods by which he accomplishes the same).
In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas
insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her
for the task of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way
bishops designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. It is then
evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods.
Still, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper
conduct towards the students by their religion teacher, or was guilty of outright neglect,
based on the ff:
 Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she
was qualified to teach religion
 Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate religious
congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had
reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students
 the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the school’s Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling students and required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach
 the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure
that she was really catechizing the students.
 the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation;
unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year,
Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods; at any rate,
it acted promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned
of the incident
PETITION GRANTED
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos
GR No. 143363, 6 February 2002
FACTS:
Herein petitioner conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They
visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was
alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident. Spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Marys Academy
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable for the damages.
RULING:
No. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over
which petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control, and which was the proximate
cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
The CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the
Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for
petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must
have a causal connection to the accident. In order that there may be a recovery for an
injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery is sought must be
the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence
and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For, negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right
of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. And the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.
In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Also, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. Hence,
the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being
driven on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who
shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Wherefore, the case
was remanded to the trial court for determination of the liability of the defendants
excluding herein petitioner.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR.
and LUISA SO VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.
FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents
Vicente and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda)
but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's
Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation,
registered owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the
said company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda
he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to
General Maxilom St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD brought Vasquez to
CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL where he died.
A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for
failure to prosecute. An action for damages was then commenced by respondents
against ABAD and petitioner CASTILEX
Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly
and solidarily respondents
Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not
solidary" with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business
or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase "even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it
is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting
within the scope of his assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of
CC:
 Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
 paragraph, to employers in general, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry.
 The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent
acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task.
 The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included.
 Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the
employer is engaged in a business or industry,
are covered so long as they were acting within
the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches
nor on the occasion of their functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for
the torts committed by employees within the scope of his
assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to establish the employer-
employee relationship; once this is done, the
plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable,
that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed
Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-
issued vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then
leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his
friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued
vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the
time and circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a
service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient
to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle
unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted
by the negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor
vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's
vehicle in going from his work to a place where he intends to
eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting
within the scope of his employment in the absence of
evidence of some special business benefit to the employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is
ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee,
and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the
absence of some special benefit to the employer other than
the mere performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's
motor vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is
ordinarily a personal problem or concern of the employee,
and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the
absence of some special benefit to the employer other than
the mere performance of the services available at the place
where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's
motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting
within the scope of his employment in going to or from
work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable
for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the
employee has left the direct route to his work or back
home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee
for the latter's personal use outside of regular working
hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive
use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using
the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started
the return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally
kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for the
employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office. After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente
Osmeña, 7km away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the
private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente
Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's
Restaurant and Back Street were still open and people were drinking
thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug addicts littered the
place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with
friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in
question occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in
a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988,
way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for
prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it any relation to his
duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position
- Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with
a service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for
the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle
Amadora vs. CA
GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally hit by a gun by
Pablito Daffon resulting to the former’s death. Daffon was convicted of homicide
through reckless imprudence. The victim’s parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil
action for damages against Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rectors, high school
principal, dean of boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other
students. Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebu’s decision for the
following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic institution of learning and not
a school of arts and trades 2. That students were not in the custody of the school since
the semester has already ended 3. There was no clear identification of the fatal gun,
and 4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline. Petitioners on othe
other hand claimed their son was under school custody because he went to school to
comply with a requirement for graduation (submission of Physics reports).
ISSUE: WON Collegio de San Jose-Recoletos should be held liable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the authorities of the school
notwithstanding classes had formally ended when the incident happened. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What
was important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the
rector, high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none
of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined in the provision. Each was exercising
only a general authority over the students and not direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in-charge of particular classes.
In the absence of a teacher- in charge, dean of boys should probably be held liable
considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from a student and later
returned to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher
authorities. Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarily link this gun with the shooting incident.
Collegio San Jose-Recoletos cannot directly be held liable under the provision
because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and trade is made responsible
for the damage caused by the student. Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the
respondents were held liable for the injury inflicted with Alfredo resulting to his death.
Petition was denied.

PSBA v. CA (G.R. No. 84698)
Facts:
Private respondents sought to adjudge petitioner PSBA and its officers liable for the
death of Carlitos Bautista, a third year commerce student who was stabbed while on
the premises of PSBA by elements from outside the school. Private respondents are
suing under the law on quasi-delicts alleging the school and its officers’ negligence,
recklessness and lack of safety precautions before, during, and after the attack on the
victim. Petitioners moved to dismiss the suit but were denied by the trial court. CA
affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not PSBA may be held liable under quasi-delicts.
Ruling: NO.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between
the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. A
perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also
known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not otherwise
bound by contract, whether express or implied.
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a
contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an
education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and
skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school’s academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof. In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no
finding that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the
former’s negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial
court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give
rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only.
SAFEGUARD SECURITY VS. TANGCO (G.R No. 165732, December 14, 2006)
FACTS:
The victim Evangeline Tangco was depositor of Ecology Bank. She was also
a licensed-fire arm holder, thus during the incident, she was entering the bank to
renew her time deposit and along with her was her firearm. Suddenly, the security
guard of the bank, upon knowing that the victim carries a firearm, the security guard
shot the victim causing the latter’s instant death. The heirs of the victim filed a criminal
case against security guard and an action against Safeguard Security for failure to
observe diligence of a goof father implied upon the act of its agent.
ISSUE:
WON Safeguard Security can be held liable for the acts of its agent.
HELD:
Yes. The law presumes that any injury committed either by fault or omission
of an employee reflects the negligence of the employer. In quasi-delicts cases, in
order to overcome this presumption, the employer must prove that there was no
negligence on his part in the supervision of his employees.
It was declared that in the selection of employees and agents, employers are required
to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. Thus, due
diligence on the supervision and operation of employees includes the formulation of
suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of
proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the
employer has relations through his employees. Thus, in this case, Safeguard Security
committed negligence in identifying the qualifications and ability of its agents.
Delos Santos vs. CA (Full text only)
Vestil vs. IAC
FACTS:
On July 29, 1915, Theness was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of
the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F.
Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she
was treated for "multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead" 1 and administered an
anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after nine days but was
readmitted one week later due to "vomiting of saliva." 2 The following day, on August
15, 1975, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia. 3
Seven months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to
them as the possessors of "Andoy," the dog that bit and eventually killed their
daughter. The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the
deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had
witnessed it bite Theness. After trial, Judge Jose R. Ramolete of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sustained the defendants and dismissed the complaint. 4
ISSUE:
In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the
house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and
there are other heirs to the property.
RULING:
Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be
held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda's heirs.
However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the
dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership
of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for
the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. 'This responsibility
shall cease only in case the damages should come from force majeure from the fault
of the person who has suffered damage.
Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, 6 a person hired as caretaker of a carabao gored him to
death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The
complaint was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker's duty to prevent the
carabao from causing injury to any one, including himself.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of
Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its
possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only heir residing in
Cebu City and the most logical person to take care of the property, which was only six
kilometers from her own house. 13 Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and
her family regularly went to the house, once or twice weekly, according to at least one
witness, 14 and used it virtually as a second house. Interestingly, her own daughter
was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was bitten by the dog. 15 The
dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda in 1973 and
until 1975, when the incident in question occurred. It is also noteworthy that the
petitioners offered to assist the Uys with their hospitalization expenses although Purita
said she knew them only casually. 16
ISSUE:
The petitioners also argue that even assuming that they were the possessors of the
dog that bit Theness there was no clear showing that she died as a result thereof.
RULING:
On the contrary, the death certificate 17 declared that she died of broncho-pneumonia,
which had nothing to do with the dog bites for which she had been previously
hospitalized. The Court need not involve itself in an extended scientific discussion of
the causal connection between the dog bites and the certified cause of death except to
note that, first, Theness developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of
the dog bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused
her death, was a complication of rabies. That Theness became afraid of water after
she was bitten by the dog is established by the testimony of Dr. Tautjo.
On the strength of the testimony, the Court finds that the link between the dog bites
and the certified cause of death has beep satisfactorily established. We also reiterate
our ruling in Sison v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, 20 that the death
certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of death.
Indeed, the evidence of the child's hydrophobia is sufficient to convince us that she
died because she was bitten by the dog even if the death certificate stated a different
cause of death. The petitioner's contention that they could not be expected to exercise
remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds
the possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed
from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the
dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not
speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only
three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever
she might have done to the animal.
According to Manresa the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not
based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor
or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the
principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or
service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 21
We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and approve the monetary awards
except only as to the medical and hospitalization expenses, which are reduced to
P2,026.69, as prayed for in the complaint. While there is no recompense that can bring
back to the private respondents the child they have lost, their pain should at least be
assuaged by the civil damages to which they are entitled.
 Issue:
Coco Cola vs. CA
Whether or not the action for damages by the proprietess against the soft drinks
manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden
Facts: defects, which must be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold, or
one for quasi-delict, which can be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the
Civil Code.
Respondent Lydia Geronimo was the proprietess of Kindergarten Wonderland
Canteen, engaged in the sale of soft drinks and other goods to the students of
Kindergarten Wonderland and to the public. On August 12, 1989, some parents of the Held:
students complained that the Coke and Sprite soft drinks contained fiber-like matter
and other foreign substances. She discovered the presence of some fiber-like
The action in based on quasi-delict, therefore, it prescribes in four years. The
substances in the contents of some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the
allegations in the complaint makes a reference to the reckless and negligent
contents of an unopened Sprite bottle. The Department of Health informed her that the
manufacture of “adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption.”
samples she submitted are adulterated. Her sales of soft drinks plummeted, and not
The vendee’s remedies are not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil
long after that, she had to close shop. She became jobless and destitute. She
Code. The vendor could be liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176, and an action
demanded from the petitioner the payment of damages but was rebuffed by it. She
based thereon may be brought by the vendee.
then filed a complaint before the RTC of Dagupan City, which granted the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner, on the ground that the complaint is based on contract, and
not on quasi-delict, as there exists pre-existing contractual relation between the The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
parties. Thus, on the basis of Article 1571, in relation to Article 1562, the complaint by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
should have been filed within six months from the delivery of the thing sold. The CA Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
reversed the RTC decision and held that Geronimo’s complaint is one for quasi-delict
because of petitioner’s act of negligently manufacturing adulterated food items
intended to be sold for public consumption; and that the existence of contractual
relations between the parties does not absolutely preclude an action by one against
the other for quasi-delict arising from negligence in the performance of a contract.
Hence, this petition.