Republic of the Philippines
They carried no banners,
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1582 March 28, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
vs.
DALMACIO LAGNASON, defendant-appellant.
Juan Medina Cue for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of
treason, was convicted and sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from
the evidence. From the time of the occupation of the Province of Occidental Negros
by the American troops, there had existed therein a band of men in arms against
the Government of the United States, which band was led by the defendant and
which in October was campaigning through the northern part of the province. In the
southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio Papa. These two parties,
though in communication with each other, had formerly operated independently,
but in each month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed himself and his
forces under the orders of said Dionisio Papa. His band was constantly armed and
kept together, and its object was to establish an independent government.
On October 29, 1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo
of Murcia in said province, but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there
stationed. During that night two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with
additional forces and early in the morning they left the pueblo in search of the
defendant. He was encountered with his party about three kilometers from the
pueblo and was attacked by the Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a half.
The defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty of his men were killed.
On the side of the Constabulary were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were
acting as guides. The defendant's band consisted of between seventy and eighty
men. They had for arms five or ten rifles, bolos, daggers, and one small cannon. The
defendant when captured was armed with a rifle, a revolver, and a bolo. Most of his
1
men wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps.
but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured, together with the
cannon.
Article 3, section, of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows:
Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or
in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act or on confession in open court.
The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat. L., 112), contained the following
provision:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to
the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States of elsewhere, and
shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act of the treason whereof he or they shall stand
indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the
United States, and shall suffer death.
The statute law of the United States stood in that form, so far as we are informed,
until the act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second
sections of that were as follows:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That every person who shall hereafter commit the
crime of treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof,
shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or at
the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and
fined not less than ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared
and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all of the property,
real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the
owner at the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the
contrary notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on
foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the
United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall
engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection,
and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and
by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at
the discretion of the court."
In the Revised Statutes of the United States these provisions appear in section 5331,
5332, and 5334, which are as follows:
SEC. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies
war against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within
the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.
SEC. 5332. Every person guilty of treason suffer death; or at the discretion of the
court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined not
less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of his
property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of committing
such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding; and every
person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office
under the United States.
SEC. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws
thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be punished by imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both
of such punishments; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under
the United States.
Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission are as follows:
SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the
United States, or the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall
2
suffer death or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for
not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars.
SEC. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States, or of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or comfort to anyone so
engaging in such rebellion or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for
not more than ten years and he fined not more than ten thousands dollars.
The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes of treason, rebellion, and
sedition. Article 236 of that code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of Act
No. 292, but that act, as to treason and rebellion, is practically a reproduction of the
sections quoted from the Revised Statutes.
Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of the country, the question
as to what constituted, a "levying of war" within the constitutional definition of
treason had been before the Federal courts on several different occasions.
In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted
the definitions of the phrase "levying war" which had been given by different judges
of the United States, and declared through the Chief Justice what the latter
afterwards said in Burr's case (25 Fed. Cases, 13), to wit:
That part of his disposition which bears upon this charge is the plan disclosed by the
prisoner for seizing upon New Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States. That
this plan if consummated by overt acts would amount to treason no man will
controvert.
Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether
an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5, 1)
constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not treason, yet they were all
unanimous in holding that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men
with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was "levying war against the
United States," and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten
thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)
No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or
insurgent so far as the act of "levying war" is concerned. All of the cases tried before
the United States courts have grown out of insurrection. The case of Mitchell grew
out of the "whisky rebellion" in western Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of the
Northampton Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of Burr's attempts; the case of
Hanway out of resistance to the fugitive slave law; and the case of Greathouse out
of the civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made under the second
clause of the Constitutional provision, namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It
has been said that the word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy and does not
include a rebel.
If it were not for the provisions of the second section of the act of July 17, 1862,
now section 5334 of the Revised Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission, the case at bar would present no difficulty. The defendant would be
clearly guilty of treason and punishable under the first section of Act No. 292. He
was engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was captured after
an armed contest. It matters not how vain and futile his attempt was and how
impossible of accomplishment. The acts performed by him constituted a levying of
war. Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall be punished by
death, or imprisonment for not less than five years. Section 5334 declares that one
engaging in a rebellion or insurrection against the United States shall be punished
by imprisonment for not more than ten years. As the act of engaging in a rebellion
is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by both
sections and in different ways.
This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case of United States vs.
Greathouse (4 Sawy., 457 S. C.; 26 Fed. Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting
in the circuit court. The defendants in that case were indicted under the second
section of the act of July 17, 1862 (New Revised Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No. 292,
sec. 3), for fitting out in the harbor of San Francisco a privateer to aid the then
existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in charging the jury:
But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in the second section which
would not constitute treason, except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of
inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the Senate, and read the
several sections of the acts together, the apparent inconsistency disappears.
Looking at the act alone, we conclude that Congress intended (1) to preserve the
3
cat of 1790, which prescribes the penalty of death, in force for the prosecution and
punishment of offenses committed previous to July 17, 1862, unless the parties
accused are convicted under the act of the latter date for subsequent offenses; (2)
to punish treason thereafter committed with death, or fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court, unless the treason consist in engaging in or assisting a
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws
thereof, in which event the death penalty is to be abandoned and a less penalty
inflicted. By this construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions of the
different sections is avoided and effect given to each clause of the act. The
defendants are, therefore, in fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the
protection and privileges allowed to parties accused of treason, without being
liable, in case of conviction, to the penalty which all other civilized nations have
awarded to this, the highest of crimes known to the law.
Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said:
If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the present rebellion constitutes
a levying of war, it follows that in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress
has denounced the same crime; and that a party amenable to the second section
for having "engaged in the rebellion and given it aid and comfort," must also be
guilty of treason by levying war against the United States.
As, then, the offenses described are substantially the same, though a different
penalty is attached to their commission by the sections referred to, it was held by
the court, under the first indictment, which was in terms for treason, that the
smaller penalty could alone be inflicted, that the prisoners could not be capitally
punished, and could therefore be admitted to bail. On the same grounds it was
considered that under the present indictment, which pursues the language of the
second section, the offense charged was treason; that both the offense as
described and the overt acts charged amounted to that crime, and that the accused
were entitled to all the privileges secured by the Constitution or allowed by law to
parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding, that in consequence of the
legislation referred to, penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In determining,
therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted under this indictment, it will be
proper to consider whether their acts constitute in law "a levying of war," for an
engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort amounts to a levying of war;
while at the same time we may also inquire whether their; acts are such as would, if
done with regard to a public enemy, constitute an adherence to him, "giving him aid
and comfort."
As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, "treason against the United States is
defined by the Constitution itself. Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain,
construe, or define the offense. Its construction is entrusted to the court alone."
Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for
this crime and the construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of
Greathouse was that under both sections the offense was treason, but when the
treason consisted of engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it could be punished
only by imprisonment for not more than ten years, in other cases it could be
punished under section 1 by death, or imprisonment for not less than five years.
That the Commission when it used the phrase "levies war," in the first section of Act
No. 292, intended to give to it the meaning which it then had in the United States,
can not be doubted.
It Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following language in speaking of the
phrase "levying war:"
But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the
United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country
whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws.
It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our
Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we
borrowed it.
In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of the same phrase, said:
At the time the Constitution was framed, the language incorporated into it from the
English statute had received judicial construction and acquired a definite meaning,
and that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts of the United States.
No one can believe that the Commission intended to abandoned the well-
recognized meaning which the phrase then had and give to it a meaning entirely
different. If that had been their intention they would certainly have used other
language, so that their intent not to adopt the recognized meaning would have
been manifest.
4
That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that
phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed, can not
be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion
or insurrection" within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two
sections can only be reconciled in the manner employed in the case against
Greathouse, and that decision should be followed.
However, in respect to the penalty, it makes no difference whether the offense
called rebellion in section 3 of Act No. 292 in considered an offense different from
that of treason defined in section 1, or whether the decision in the case of
Greathouse be allowed and the acts punished by section 3 considered as of the
same character as those punished by section 1. In either case the punishment can
not exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.
There would be difference in respect to evidence to prove the two crimes. If
rebellion and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be convicted under
section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by
confession in open court. (Act of Congress, March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not
treason he could be convicted upon the testimony required in ordinary cases. In
United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the constitutional provisions as to
two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of the act of 1862
(our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as the
overt act of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary to
decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase "owing allegiance to the
United States," which is found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of
the act, makes a difference between the two sections in the case at bar the
defendant was a native of Cebu and is therefore covered both by section 1 and
section 3.
This court has decided two cases in which treason was charged. In the case of
United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes, February 23, 1904,1 the defendant was
acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved. In the case of United States
vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 9322) the defendant was acquitted because there were
not two witnesses to the same overt act.
The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty however, from death to ten
years and a fine of $10,000, money of the United States, with the costs of this
instance against the defendant.
G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner,
vs.
ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.
Claro M. Recto and Querube C. Makalintal for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Hernandez, Jr., for respondent.
RESOLUTION
In G.R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the
petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a theory that a
Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and
penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the
sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the
Philippine Republic:
5
(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an
absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and
obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance
which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he
resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he receives, and
which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign.
(Carlisle vs. Unite States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster Report to the
President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works, 526);
Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a
territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113)
and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred to the
occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government; that the
sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power which
governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be distinguished
from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be destroyed, or severed
and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended because the existence of
sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting
the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of suspension; that what
may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the
occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a
territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy during the war, "although the
former is in fact prevented from exercising the supremacy over them" is one of the
"rules of international law of our times"; (II Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944,
p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague
Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is
not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the
inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore
there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole
fabric of the petitioner's contention rests;
Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United State was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice,
4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of Co
Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra, in
connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the existence of a
government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and laws in the
occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an
enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first
case, the word "sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the
exercise of the rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the
legitimate government and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said government thereof;
and that in the second case, that is, if the said conclusion or doctrine refers to the
suspension of the sovereignty itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of
the Hague Regulations in 1907, and therefore it can not be applied to the present
case;
Considering that even adopting the words "temporarily allegiance," repudiated by
Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which
the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted for
and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to
its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso facto
acquire the citizenship thereof since he has enforce public order and regulate the
social and commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on
the other hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to
6
obey most of the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive,
while in a foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed
into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear
relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable
to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage; inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order, such
as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are of
political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our Revised
Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also suspended or
become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed
against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the
offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were
inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above stated, unless
adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted government for the
latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public order in the occupied
territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was applicable to treason
committed against the national security of the legitimate government, because the
inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during the enemy occupation;
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue
in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce
public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either
change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the military
service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier to do so
for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages established
by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of public conscience
(Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules of Land Warfare 76,
77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant dictated within these
limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory, who are bound to
obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which have not been
adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in conflict with
such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended or not in
force and binding upon said inhabitants;
Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of fidelity
and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does not
demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance from
adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has no
power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;
Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would
lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter
incurring the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are
not aid them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order
to completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of
their own independence or sovereignty — such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to commit
a political suicide;
7
(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the Philippines
defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally intended to
be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of the sovereign
people of the United States, exercised through their authorized representative, the
Congress and the President of the United States, was made, upon the establishment
of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against the Government of the
Philippines established by authority of the people of the Philippines, in whom the
sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article XVI thereof, which
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands . . . shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution . . . and all references in such laws to the
Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be construed, in so far as
applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
constitution;
Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign
government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution,
was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United
States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of
the Philippines, which contains the declaration that "Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them" (section 1, Article II),
but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, "As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having now
the status as a government of other independent nations — in fact all the attributes
of complete and respected nationhood" (Congressional Record, Vol. 29, part 6, page
8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in
many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States (137 U.S., 202; 34
Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is "a purely political question,
the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments of any
government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and
subjects of the country.
Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which
provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States "All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States", was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of
the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United
States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the same
way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation against the
sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of the Philippine
Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
our Constitution provides that "The government established by this constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
be known as the Republic of the Philippines";
This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion, to
deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set forth
and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion.
G.R. No. 1434 February 23, 1904
THE UNITED STATES,Complainant-Appellee, vs. ANTONIO DE LOS REYES,Defendant-
Appellant.
Claudio Gabriel for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
MCDONOUGH, J.:
8
The defendant is charged with the crime of treason, committed as
follows: chanrobles virtual law library
That on November 21, 1902, in Manila, he did feloniously, treasonably, etc., levy
war against, adhere to and give aid and comfort to the enemies of, the United
States and of the Philippine Islands, in that on or about August 30, 1902, he
accepted a commission in the regular army of the "Filipinos Republic" and served as
a captain and carried arms in such army and continued in such office and continued
to carry arms as aforesaid between the said dates of August 30, 1902, and
November 21, 1902, the said "Filipinos Republic" being as attempted government
organized by various persons against the authority of the United States Government
and that of the Philippine Islands and having for its object the overthrow by armed
insurrection of the regularly constituted government in said Islands.chanrobles
virtual law library
The defendant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced
to imprisonment for a term of twenty years and to pay a fine of $5,000.chanrobles
virtual law library
The evidence upon which the court below based this conviction is substantially as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library
A Constabulary detective testified that he met the defendant in Bacord, city of
Manila, November 21, 1902; that a companion of the witness told him that the
defendant was a captain in the Katipunan Society; that thereupon they detained the
defendant and took him aside into a clump of trees where they talked to him and
got him to admit that he was an officer of the Katipunan. The officers took the
defendant to his house, where they searched his trunk and found in it and took
away a revolver and a captain's commission under seals. The following is a copy of
its commission:
SUPREME PRESIDENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.chanrobles virtual law library
By reason of the qualifications of Antonio de los Reyes and the good service
rendered by him to the fatherland, the supreme president has been fit to appoint
him captain in the regular army of these Islands.chanrobles virtual law library
It is therefore ordered that all persons render him the corresponding honors and
obey all orders which he may issue for the good of the service.chanrobles virtual
law library
K. K., the 30th of August, 1902.chanrobles virtual law library
CENON NIGDAO, chanrobles virtual law library
S. K., Minister of War. chanrobles virtual law library
A. G. DEL ROSARIO, chanrobles virtual law library
S. K., Supreme President. chanrobles virtual law library
TO DON ANTONIO DE LOS REYES, chanrobles virtual law library
Appointed Captain in the Regular Army of these Philippine Islands.
This Constabulary detective further testified that one Cenon Nigdao was a
lieutenant-colonel in command of the whole Katipunan forces, but at that time had
been captured and was a prisoner at Pasig.chanrobles virtual law library
The witness was asked what this Katipunan Society is, and in reply stated that it is
an organization for forming an independent government for the Philippines, not
letting their headquarters or whereabouts be known to the American Government,
and to gain forces and arms by any means they can; sometimes they use force in
securing members.chanrobles virtual law library
When asked if he knew any of the armed forces of the society, he said that they
made an attacked on May 30 upon a Government force of the United States Army.
He said he had not seen the defendant with the insurgent forces.chanrobles virtual
law library
Another witness for the prosecution testified that he had been informed of this so-
called government known as the Tagalog Republic, or Katipunan, through captured
documents, and that he knew their seals and recognized the seals on Exhibit A, the
commission of the defendant, as those of the organization.chanrobles virtual law
library
The next witness called by the prosecution was Cenon Nigdao, who stated that he
was a tailor, 28 years of age, and secretary of war of the Katipunan. He identified
the signatures on Exhibit A. He stated that the Katipunan is the national party. Its
purpose is to defend the rights of the country and to ask of the American
Government the freedom of this country.chanrobles virtual law library
He further stated that when he gave this commission to the defendant to told him
to keep it, and when the time came for them to ask for liberty the people could not
do him any harm.chanrobles virtual law library
9
The witness named the secretary of the National party, the minister of the interior,
the minister of state, minister of war, and minister of justice of the
association.chanrobles virtual law library
On cross-examination this "secretary of war," who had held office only for one
week, testified that he commanded no forces; did not know that defendant made
any use of his commission; that they did not take up arms because they were here
in Manila; and that he was living in the same house with the defendant and gave
him the commission there.chanrobles virtual law library
Another witness sworn for the prosecution stated that he was not a member of the
Katipunan, but was a member of the National party ever since he left Bilibid Prison;
that the "secretary of war" appointed him a lieutenant-colonel and he held the
commission three months but had no soldiers to command; and that there was no
army when Cenon Nigdao was living at Bacord.chanrobles virtual law library
He said he was sent out to Baliuag by one Santiago and stayed there about three
months, and when he found out that there was nothing doing he surrendered
himself and one revolver to the president.chanrobles virtual law library
If we reject, as we must, the confession of the defendant made to the Constabulary
officer, because it was not made in open court as required by law (sec. 9, act of
Congress passed March 8, 1902), we have but very little in the case upon which to
base a charge of treason. Even what there is in contradictory. The charge is that the
defendant took arms against the Government in the regular army of the "Philippine
Republic," whereas one witness for the prosecution swears that the Katipunan is
the treasonable organization, another says that body is known as the "Tagalog
Republic," and another, the so-called secretary of war, who commanded no troops,
but to whom the Government presumably gave credit because he testified for the
prosecution, stated that the Katipunan was the "National party" and the object of
that party was to obtain from the United States, by peaceable means, the
independence of the Philippine Islands.chanrobles virtual law library
The confession of the accused being disposed of the only other question to be
considered is whether the testimony of one witness that he issued to the defendant
the captain's commission above-mentioned, and the testimony of another witness
that he found this commission in the defendant's trunk, is sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the statute that "no person in the Philippine Islands shall under the
authority of the United States be convicted of treason . . . unless on the testimony
of two witnesses to the same overt act . . . ." chanrobles virtual law library
There is no proof whatever that the accused did any other act in connection with
this charge than to receive this commission. On the contrary the "secretary of war"
testified that they did not take up arms because they remained here in
Manila.chanrobles virtual law library
I am of the opinion that the mere acceptance of the commission by the defendant,
nothing else being done, was not an overt act of treason within the meaning of the
law. Blackstone says that "as treason is the highest civil crime which (considered as
a member of the community) any man can possibly commit, it ought, therefore, to
be the most freely ascertained." chanrobles virtual law library
The state of affairs disclosed by the evidence - the playing of the game of
government, like children, the secretaries and colonels and captains, the pictures of
flags and seals and commissions all on paper, for the purpose of duping and
misleading the ignorant and the vicious - should be not dignified by the name of
treason.chanrobles virtual law library
Those engaged in this plotting and scheming in the pretense of establishing an
independent government in these Islands, with nothing behind them, without arms
or soldiers or money, and without the possibility of success, are simply engaged in
deluding themselves and perhaps innocent followers and in filling the cell of Bilibid
Prison.chanrobles virtual law library
Even though not guilty of treason, they may be tried for other lesser
crimes.chanrobles virtual law library
The case of the United States vs. Magtibay, 1 recently decided by this court,
involved much the same question as this, and is followed.chanrobles virtual law
library
The judgement below is therefore reversed and the defendant acquitted, but
without prejudice to the prosecuting authorities to proceed against the defendant
for such other crime or crimes as the evidence discloses. The costs are adjudge de
oficio.chanrobles virtual law library
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., disqualified.
10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-985 January 23, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIONISIO AGONCILLO, defendant-appellant.
Macario Nicolas for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Federico V. Sian
for appellee.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the People's Court finding the appellant,
Dionisio Agoncillo, guilty of treason and sentencing him to suffer fifteen years
of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of two thousand pesos and the costs.
According to the information, from February, 1944, to March, 1945, in Cebu
City and its environs, the appellant (1) "did consistently and continuously traffic
in war materials and sold them to the enemy," and (2) "did join and serve the
enemy as informer, agent, and spy." The People's Court held that the second
count was not proven, and the appealed judgment of conviction is predicated
solely on the first count.
Under the theory of the prosecution, appellant's adherence to the enemy is
inferable from the following alleged facts: (a) In the afternoon of September 20,
1944, while the appellant was taking a bath in the house of his neighbor Rufina
Cepeda, the latter's cousin (Olimpio Do), who knew how to read Chinese,
examined appellant's clothes and found therein appellant's identification card
written in Japanese and Chinese characters tending to show that the appellant
was a Japanese undercover. (b) In January 1945, after a trip to Bohol, Rufina
Cepeda told the appellant that there were guerrillas in Bohol and that Japanese
notes were no longer accepted in said place. In the evening of the next day,
Rufina Cepeda was arrested by the Japanese and their undercovers and asked
about things she saw in Bohol. Rufina was detained for three days. After her
release, the appellant came to her house and got some chickens for the
consumption of the Japanese who arrested her. A Japanese also used to sleep
once in a while in appellant's house.
Upon the other hand, appellant's alleged overt acts of giving aid and comfort to
the enemy are summarized in the brief for Government as follows: In the
middle of April, 1944, the appellant sold about 300 kilos of alum crystals, at
three pesos a kilo, to the Keribo, a construction company operated by the
Japanese Army. Two or three weeks thereafter, he sold to the same entity some
100 pieces of water pipes, the price of which was not known. About the third
week of December, 1944, the appellant was seen on Jones Avenue helping push
a handcart full of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts into the
intermediate and high school premises then used by the Japanese Army as a
motor pool.
the other proven acts showing appellant's adherence to the enemy. It appears,
however, that the alleged acts of adherence performed by the appellant took
place after the overt act in question. It is not unlikely that at the time the
appellant made the sale, his motive was purely personal gain, uninfluenced by
any benefit inuring to the enemy. Where two probabilities arise from the
evidence, the one compatible with the presumption of innocence will be
adopted. (People vs. Agpangan, G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947.)
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with
costs de oficio. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.

Regardless of the writer's view on suspension of political laws and change of

sovereignty as heretofore expressed, the Court is of the opinion that the overt
acts imputed to the appellant have not been duly proven. With respect to the
sale of 300 kilos of alum crystals, the testimony of the prosecution witness
Lorenzo Barria to the effect that the price was P3 a kilo, is not corroborated by
any other witness. With respect to the alleged sale of 100 pieces of water pipes,
counsel for the appellee admits that the price thereof was not known. An
essential part of the overt act charged in the information was therefore lacking.
No pretense was made that the appellant donated the articles in question. The
alleged delivery of truck and auto tires, batteries and spare parts can be
disregarded. The only detail that may at most be considered established by the
prosecution refers to the fact that the appellant helped in pushing a handcart
loaded with such articles, and the evidence is even uncertain in one respect,
namely that the cart was brought either to the intermediate school premises or
the high school building. Indeed it was acknowledged by the lower court that
the witnesses for the Government did not know how the appellant disposed of
the articles loaded in the cart.

Even supposing, however, that the appellant had really sold for a definite price
alum crystals and water pipes, the same did not per se constitute treason. As
said articles or materials were not exclusively for war purposes, their sale did
not necessarily carry an intention on the part of the vendor to adhere to the
enemy. The theory of the prosecution is that the sale was treasonable in view of

11

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-856 April 18, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali
for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th
Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to death by
electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered
evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court,
were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1 —
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos,
recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and
women against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they
were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel
Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta
12
Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana
Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims
of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony
of Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused
came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the
house of her aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the
Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned
to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told her
that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did
not accept the job; that a week later the accused came to Baclayon to
get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor
Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor Hontanosas told her that Colonel
Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel
Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel Mini
threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following
night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped;
that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks
and only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2 —
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in
company with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her
sister Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet
and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet
Governor, Agapito Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel
might select those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal
appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the
Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where
Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts
alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta Ramo
her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once
more their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this
Court is fully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were
fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4 —
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls
named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their
homes in Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named
Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas
to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez
and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said
Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez
raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the
other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that
while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and
intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she resisted with
all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that
upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer
named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on
July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her
house to take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the
house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses
to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that
while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car,
and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay);
that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter;
Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that later, she and Eduarda were
taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the presence of
the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor exclaimed: "I did not
call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked
bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested them"; that the
said Governor Hontañosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese ";
that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese
headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese
Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to
another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was
raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but
of no avail.
In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S.
Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
13
"As regards count No. 5 —
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused
commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on
the pretext that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese
Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik
Eping), and uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the
aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the
Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and
intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse
with Flaviana Bonalos; that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini
and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with her against her will; that two days, later, upon
the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said
accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos to a secluded place in
Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence
had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused
came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a
case affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her
younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused;
they were brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana
was conducted into a room and after remaining in the same for about
an hour, she came out with her hair and her dress in disorder; that
Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her will by
Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Jap
officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by
threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in raping her; that
when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the
following day while conducting the two girls back to their hometown,
she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house,
against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified
as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that
the Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly,
he daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that
later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found
 them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both
daughters wept and told her that they were turned over to the
Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the
witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the accused also raped
her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit
her two daughter to return home on the pretext that the Puppet
Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the
house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her
house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that
both daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than
to have gone to Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that
the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence
as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed
between the occurrence and the time of the information. In the
manner these two witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt
that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that
these girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone
through if they were not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the
allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the
testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6 —
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino
companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and
Teotima Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having
attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in
honor of Colonel Mini and other Japanese high ranking officers, which
was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being
brought the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the
latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend
another banquet and dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and
Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit best their
fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations was to
lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral
purposes.
14
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She
declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the
accused coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car
to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely
reprimanded by the latter for not attending the dance held on June and
receptions was to select from among them the best girl that would suit
the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral purposes that she and her
companions were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he
came to said hospital; that on one occasion, one of the nurses on
perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid
down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not satisfied,
went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the
blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext
that she was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of
Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned,
but it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute
treason. The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to
maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will
always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests
not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers"
(citing the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because
women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining
them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be
treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general
result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy
and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.
In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social,
business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the
invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a
country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the
invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must
depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between
treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of
adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate as
was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal
necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically traitorous. On the
other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or
ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country enhance his
strength and by same count injures the interest of the government of the giver.
That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error
is correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese
officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not
treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to make life
more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any
more than the women themselves would have been if they voluntarily and
willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual
and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to
improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts
herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated to strengthen the
Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the
other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's collaboration with the
Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the crime of
treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature
and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda
Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct
participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes
could not have been committed.
15
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in
section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not
sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court
may, nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime
included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the
evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated
by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of
section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an
accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in requires that
the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be
averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this
enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded
guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity
to prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly
involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure convicted for
crime different from that designated in the complaint or information is allowed
and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or described in the
body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during
the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but
these assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled out. The crime
of coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of
the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him
for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision
mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of
law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay
the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall
not exceed forty years.
Moran, C.J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes, JJ., concur. crime of Murder (Crim. Case No. 13160-07) for the killing of Danilo
Paras, J., reserves his vote. Cabiedes (Cabiedes) in "People of the Philippines v. Rolly Adriano y
Montemayor, J., concurs in the result. Sales."

Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. The two (2) sets of
Information read:

Crim. Case No. 13159-07

On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with
assorted firearms Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the different parts of her
body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs.3

Crim. Case No. 13160-07

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT On or about March 13, 2007, around 8:00 o'clock (sic) in the morning, in
Manila Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conniving together, with intent to kill,
FIRST DIVISION treachery and abuse of superior strength, willfully shot several times with
assorted firearms Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him on the different parts of his
G.R. No. 205228 July 15, 2015 body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.4

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, Version of the Prosecution:

vs.
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, LEAN ADRIANO @ DENDEN, ABBA
SANTIAGO y ADRIANO, JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, Accused,
ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 30 May
2011 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028, which affirmed the Decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court dated 7 April 2009, convicting accused-appellant
Rolly Adriano y Santos (Adriano) for the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case
No. 13159-07) for the killing of Ofelia Bulanan (Bulanan) and for the
16
On 13 March 2007, at around 8:00 a.m., Police Officer 1 Matthew
Garabiles (POI Garabiles) and P02 Alejandro Santos (P02 Santos), in
civilian clothes, were on their way to Camp Olivas, Pampanga, riding a
motorcycle along Olongapo-Gapan National Road.5
While they were at Barangay Malapit San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, a speeding
blue Toyota Corolla (Corolla) with plate no. WHK 635, heading towards
the same direction, overtook them and the car in front of them, a maroon
Honda CRV (CRY) with plate no. CTL 957.6
When the Corolla reached alongside the CRV, the passenger on the front
seat of the Corolla shot the CRV and caused the CRV to swerve and fall
in the canal in the road embankment. Four (4) armed men then suddenly
alighted the Corolla and started shooting at the driver of the CRV, who
was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander,
Bulanan, who was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a
stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the Corolla and
immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos
followed the Corolla but lost track of the latter.7
Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds:
Cabiedes was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan
General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds on the left side of his
chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head.
During the investigation, the police learned that the Corolla was
registered under the name of Antonio V. Rivera (Rivera). Upon inquiry,
Rivera admitted that he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the
Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental business,
which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's
shop with the Corolla, where he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1
Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the passenger's
seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes. He was
immediately arrested and brought to the Provincial Special Operations
Group (PSOG) headquarters in Cabanatuan City.8
In examining the crime scene, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office recovered one (1) deformed fired bullet from a .45
caliber firearm and five (5) cartridges from a .45 caliber firearm.9
Version of the Defense
Adriano testified that on 13 March 2007, at about 6:00 a.m., at the time of
the incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga,
washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his
motorcycle to a repair shop and left it there.10
At about 8:00 a.m., Adriano went to the house of his friend, Ruben Mallari
(Mallari), to ask for a lighter spring needed to repair his motorcycle. After
having coffee in Mallari' s house, Adriano went home and brought his
child to his mother. On his way to his mother's house, he met his brother-
in-law, Felix Aguilar Sunga (Sunga). After leaving his child at his mother's
house, Adriano went to the cockpit arena to watch cockfights, where he
saw his friend, Danilo Dizon (Dizon). After the fights, he left the cockpit at
about 2:00 p.m. and went home and took a rest.11
17
After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store
and stayed there. At around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a
while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia), who
borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented from Rivera.12
At 8:00 p.m., he met with Garcia to get the Corolla back. After dropping
Garcia off, Adriano went to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was
arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk, and brought
to a place where he was tortured.13
The other defense's witnesses, Lucita Tapnio (Tapnio), Mallari, Sunga,
and Dizon corroborated Adriano's testimony.14
When arraigned, Adriano pleaded not guilty. The other accused, Lean
Adriano alias "Denden," Abba Santiago y Adriano, John Doe, and Peter
Doe remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses: (1) PO1
Garabiles, (2) P02 Santos, (3) Police Senior Inspector Roger V.
Sebastian, (4) SP02 Alejandro Eduardo, (5) P02 Jay Cabrera, (6) P03
Antonio dela Cruz, (7) Adelaida Cabiedes, widow of Cabiedes, and (8)
Ricky Flores.
On the other hand, the defense presented Adriano, Tapnio, Sunga,
Mallari, and Dizon as witnesses.
Ruling of the Lower Courts
After trial, the RTC convicted Adriano. The RTC rejected Adriano's
defense of alibi on the ground that it was not supported by clear and
convincing evidence. According to the RTC, Adriano's alibi cannot prevail
over the testimonies of credible witnesses, who positively identified
Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Also, contrary to the
allegations of the defense, the RTC gave full credence to the testimony of
prosecution witnesses, POI Garabiles and P02 Santos. The RTC
determined that the defense failed to show proof that will show or indicate
that PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos were impelled by improper motives
to testify against Adriano. The RTC found as proven the assessment of
damages against the accused. Thus did the RTC order Adriano to pay
the heirs of Cabiedes the amount of ₱222,482.00 based on the following:
(1) One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Pl00,000.00) as funeral expenses; (2)
Sixty Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) as expenses for the food served
during the burial; (3) Twelve Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
(1!12,482.00) as groceries used and served during the wake; and Sixty
Thousand Pesos (₱60,000.00) for the parts and service repair of the
CRV.15
The dispositive portion of the R TC Decision dated 7 April 2009 reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused ROLLY ADRIANO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder, as charged, for the death of Danilo
Cabiedes, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that
attended the commission of the crime, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused Rolly Adriano is also ordered
to indemnify the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes in the amount of Php 50,000.00
and to pay the sum of Php 222,482.00 as actual damages.
And finding ROLLY ADRIANO also guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide, as charged, for the death of Ofelia Bulanan, likewise, there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the offense, he is further sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Eight (8) years and One (1)
day of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and
Four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to
indemnify the heirs of Ofelia Bulanan in the amount of Php 50,000.00.16
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Adriano alleged that the R TC erred
when it failed to appreciate his defense of alibi, as well as the testimonies
of the other defense's witnesses. Adriano contended that the RTC erred
when it gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses
which are inconsistent and contradictory. In detail, Adriano referred to the
following particulars: 1) whether the culprits started shooting when the
victim's vehicle was still in motion; 2) which side of the vehicle did the
shooters alight from; 3) the identity of the culprit who triggered the fatal
shot; 4) whether the trip of PO1 Garabiles and P02 Santos going to
Camp Olivas, Pampanga was official business; 5) the precise distance of
the assailants' vehicle from that of the two (2) eyewitnesses; and 6) the
precise minutes of the shooting incident.
The Court of Appeals rejected Adriano's attempt to becloud the testimony
of the prosecution witnesses. According to the Court of Appeals, the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of Adriano as one of the
18
perpetrators of the crime cannot be overcome by minor inconsistencies in
their testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that these trivial differences in
fact constitute signs of veracity.
On the defense of alibi, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the R
TC that Adriano's claim that he was in Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga at
the time of the incident does not convince because it was not impossible
for Adriano to be physically present at the crime scene, in Barangay
Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, which can be reached by car in less
than an hour.17 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Gapan City, Nueva Ecija, Br. 36, in Crim. Case Nos. 13159-07
and 13160-07 is AFFIRMED subject to the Modification that the award of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as civil indemnity to the heirs of
Danilo Cabiedes is INCREASED to Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos
(Php75,000.00). In addition, the Accused-Appellant is ORDERED to pay
the heirs of Danilo Cabiedes the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (Php75,000.00) as moral damages; and the heirs of Ofelia
Bulanan the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00) as moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.18
Our Ruling
In cases of murder, the prosecution must establish the presence of the
following elements:
1. That a person was killed.
2. That the accused killed him.
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248.
4. The killing is not parricide or infanticide.
In the case at bar, the prosecution has established the concurrence of the
elements of murder: (1) the fact of death of Cabiedes and Bulanan; (2)
the positive identification of Adriano as one of perpetrators of the crime;
and (3) the attendance of treachery as a qualifying aggravating
circumstance and use of firearms and abuse of superior strength as
generic aggravating circumstances.
Death of Cabiedes
The present case is a case of murder by ambush. In ambush, the crime is
carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same time, to
eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the
victim—19ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery.
Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines
treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be
properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods or forms of attack employed by him.20 The "essence of treachery
is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself
and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself."21
Clearly, treachery is present in the case at bar as the victims were indeed
defenseless at the time of the attack. Adriano, together with the other
accused, ambushed Cabiedes by following the unsuspecting victim along
the national highway and by surprise, fired multiple shots at Cabiedes
and then immediately fled the crime scene, causing Cabiedes to die of
multiple gunshot wounds. When the Corolla swerved into the CRV's lane,
Cabiedes was forced to swiftly turn to the right and on to the road
embankment, finally falling into the canal where his CRY was trapped,
precluding all possible means of defense. There is no other logical
conclusion, but that the orchestrated ambush committed by Adriano,
together with his co-accused, who are still on the loose, was in
conspiracy with each other to ensure the death of Cabiedes and their
safety. The means of execution employed was deliberately and
19
consciously adopted by Adriano so as to give Cabiedes no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate.22
All these circumstances indicate that the orchestrated crime was
committed with the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
treachery, which absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and use of firearms. Indeed, Cabiedes had no way of
escaping or defending himself.
Death of Bulanan
We refer back to the settled facts of the case. Bulanan, who was merely a
bystander, was killed by a stray bullet. He was at the wrong place at the
wrong time.
Stray bullets, obviously, kill indiscriminately and often without warning,
precluding the unknowing victim from repelling the attack or defending
himself. At the outset, Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan, much less,
employ any particular means of attack. Logically, Bulanan's death was
random and unintentional and the method used to kill her, as she was
killed by a stray a bullet, was, by no means, deliberate. Nonetheless,
Adriano is guilty of the death of Bulanan under Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code,23 pursuant to the doctrine of aberratio ictus, which imposes
criminal liability for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the
natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. While it may not
have been Adriano's intention to shoot Bulanan, this fact will not
exculpate him. Bulanan' s death caused by the bullet fired by Adriano
was the natural and direct consequence of Adriano's felonious deadly
assault against Cabiedes.
As we already held in People v. Herrera24 citing People v. Hilario,25 "[t]he
fact that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no
moment." Evidently, Adriano's original intent was to kill Cabiedes.
However, during the commission of the crime of murder, a stray bullet hit
and killed Bulanan. Adriano is responsible for the consequences of his
act of shooting Cabiedes. This is the import of Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code. As held in People v. Herrera citing People v. Ural:
Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. One who
commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences
which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or
intended or not. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine, 'el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado ', or he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.26
As regards the crime(s) committed, we reiterate our ruling in People v.
Nelmida.27 In the aforesaid case, we ruled that accused-appellants should
be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two counts
of murder and seven counts of attempted murder as the killing and
wounding of the victims were not the result of a single act but of several
acts.28 The doctrine in Nelmida here is apt and applicable.
In Nelmida, we distinguished the two kinds of complex crime: compound
crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction
that "when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes,"29 not a complex crime.
As borne by the records, the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office recovered six (6) cartridges of bullets from a .45 caliber firearm.
This does not indicate discharge by a single burst. Rather, separate shots
are evidenced. One or more of which, though fired to kill Cabiedes, killed
Bulanan instead. There is thus no complex crime. The felonious acts
resulted in two separate and distinct crimes.
Finally, we ask, may treachery be appreciated in aberratio ictus?
Although Bulanan's death was by no means deliberate, we shall adhere
to the prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in People v. Flora,30 where the
Court ruled that treachery may be appreciated in aberratio ictus. In Flora,
the accused was convicted of two separate counts of murder: for the
killing of two victims, Emerita, the intended victim, and Ireneo, the victim
killed by a stray bullet. The Court, due to the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of treachery, qualified both killings to murder. The material
facts in Flora are similar in the case at bar. Thus, we follow the Flora
doctrine.
Also, contrary to the defense's allegation that Bulanan' s death was not
established, a perusal of the records would reveal that Bulanan's fact of
20
death was duly established as the prosecution offered in evidence
Bulanan's death certificate.31
On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials,
are inherently weak and unreliable because they can easily be
fabricated.32 For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly prove
that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed
and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene.33 In
the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As
admitted, Dolores, Magalang, Pampanga was only less than an hour
away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.
Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime
scene at the time of the incident.
It is likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when
corroborated not by credible witnesses but by the accused's relatives and
friends. Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of
1âwphi1
Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's
positive identification of Adriano as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, as the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed
in the latter. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
present, the lower penalty should be imposed, which is reclusion
perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised
Penal Code.
To recover actual or compensatory damages, basic is the rule that the
claimant must establish with a reasonable degree of certainty, the actual
amount of loss by means of competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable.34Documentary evidence support the award of actual damages
in this case. The RTC computed the amount of actual damages as
₱222,482.00. However, a perusal of the records reveals that the amount
of award of actual damages should be ₱232,482.00 as duly supported by
official receipts.35 Therefore, we hereby increase the award of actual
damages from ₱222,482.00 to ₱232,482.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04028 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Appellant-appellant ROLL Y ADRIANO y SAMSON is Republic of the Philippines
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER (Criminal Case No. SUPREME COURT
13160-07) for the killing of DANILO CABIEDES and is hereby sentenced Manila
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of DANILO CABIEDES EN BANC
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral G.R. No. L-743 October 11, 1949
damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as exemplary damages,
and Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Two Pesos
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
{₱232,482.00) as actual damages.
vs.
POLICARPIO DUMAPIT, defendant-appellant.
Accused-appellant ROLLY ADRIANO y SAMSON is also found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER (Criminal Case No.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola and Jose V. Lesaca for appellant.
13159-07) for the killing of OFELIA BULANAN and is hereby sentenced
Assistant Solicitor General Carmelino G. Alvendia and Solicitor Guillermo
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant ROLLY
E. Torres for appellee.
ADRIANO y SAMSON is ordered to pay the heirs of OFELIA BULANAN
in the amount of the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
(₱75,000.00) as moral damages, Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) as
temperate damages in lieu of actual damages. PARAS, J.:

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court finding the
from the date of finality until fully paid. appellant, Policarpio Dumapit, guilty of treason and imposing upon him
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, a fine of ten thousand pesos, and the
SO ORDERED. costs.

The information charged six counts, but the People's Court based
appellant's conviction only on counts IV and VI. Under count IV, the
appellant alleged to have caused, with the aid of a group of Constabulary
soldiers, the arrest in barrio Balingahili, municipality of Botolan, province
of Zambales, in March, 1943, of eight guerrillas who were thereafter
investigated and tortured by the Constabulary and the Japanese and
finally confined in the provincial jail for about three months. Under count
VI, the appellant is accused of having issued on April 14, 1943, an order
to Andres Atanasio, then Chief of the Non-Christian Tribes of the East
Zambales Mountains in Macasan, Botolan, Zambales, enjoining Andres
Atanasio and his men to capture, dead or alive, all Americans roaming in
the forests of Zambales, and to report the result of his mission to Onofre
Dienzo, Superintendent of the Non-Christian Tribes of Zambales.

21
Upon a careful review of the evidence, we are convinced that a reversal
of the appealed judgment is in order. As to count IV, we note that only
three of the alleged victims testified for the prosecution. They were
Federico Decag, Emilio Trapse and Catalino Dumangas. These,
however, especially the last two, admitted that they were investigated for,
and suspected of, having burned the house of Pedro Daco. (Pages 115,
131, 132 and 133, t. s. n.) Aside from the fact that the appellant denied
having had any hand in the arrest in question, the circumstance remains
that said arrest was effected as a result of the common crime of arson.
That the matter had no treasonous significance is shown by the further
fact that those arrested were confined for almost the whole period of their
detention in the provincial jail, and not in the Japanese garrison. If the
Japanese in some way intervened, it was undoubtedly because they had
their own eyes and ears even in civil offices and they merely wanted to
be sure that any disorder was not directed against their authority and
safety. But said intervention, without more, cannot be attributed to the
voluntary invitation or denunciation on the part of the appellant or the
Constabulary. Appellants alleged authorship of the arrest is inconsistent,
moreover, with the affidavit of Federico Decag (Exhibit 1) to the effect
that the appellant helped in having him and his companions released.
Neither is the charged in count VI tenable. The lone witness for the
prosecution on this score is Andres Atanasio who had conspicuously
supplied what is sufficient to exculpate the appellant; for it is noteworthy
that this witness categorically testified that, as the appellant was handing
over the written order for the capture of all Americans, the appellant told
him to disregard the same. (P. 36, t.s.n.) The appellant admits having
written the order, but corroborates witness Andres Atanasio in the latter's
exculpatory testimony.
The immediate background of the appellant is further refutation of the
likelihood that he had any treasonable intent. The appellant was before
the outbreak of the last war a corporal of the Manila Harbor Police and,
upon order of his chief Alejo Valdes, was even the one who was
entrusted with the task of taking the personal properties of the family of
President Quezon to the motorship Edil. If the appellant had undergone
police training and become a member of the Constabulary during the
Japanese occupation, it was at the behest of the then mayor of Botolan
(Juan M. Corom) and provincial governor (Dantes), and with the
knowledge and acquiescence of the guerilla unit to which the appellant
belonged. Indeed, the appellant was known to the underground men as
"Ave Maria."
22
The appealed judgment is therefore reversed and the appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor and Torres,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
I am of the firm conviction that the appellant is guilty and that the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. The findings of the court
below deserve our respect not only because the trial judges were in the
best of position to gauge the relative credibility of the witnesses but
because, independent of all that, the said findings are supported by an
overwhelming preponderance of evidence.
The lower court found the defendant guilty of counts No. 4 and No. 6
upon a careful and thorough analysis of the proofs. It says:
Cargo No. 4.
4. That in or about March, 1943, or thereabouts, the accused
Policarpio Dumapit, intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy,
traitorously led a group of Bureau of Constabulary soldiers to
barrio Ballinggahilli, municipality of Botolan, Province of
Zambales, and then and there, acting in band and with the help of
armed men, caused the arrest of one Federico Decag and seven
others charging them with being guerrillas, as a result of which
they were all taken to the Japanese military garrison in Iba,
Zambales, where they were tortured and maltreated and
afterwards confined for about three months.
Se halla bien establecido por los testigos de la acusacion
Federico Decag. Emilio Trapse y Catalino Dumangas que en una
noche del mes de Marzo de 1943 se quemo la casa de Pedro
Daco en el barrio de Balangahili, municipio de Botolan, provincia
de Zambales; que el dia siguiente el acusado, en compañia de
algunos policias y soldados constabularios, arresto a Pedro
Dumangas, Federico Decag, Alberto Diego, Isaias Decag,
Catalino Dumangas, Emilio Trapse, Domingo Baluyot y Primitivo
Ferrer; que estos fueron llevados a la casa del acusado
Policarpio Dumapit en el municipio de Botolan donde fueron
castigados sobre el incendio dela casa de Daco y preguntados si
eran guerrilleros; que fueron llevados al Cuartel de la
Constabularia en Iba, don de fueron maniatados, y despues
conducidos al cuartel de los Japoneses donde otra vez fueron
investigados, y, de resultas de dicha investigacion enviados a la
carcel, donde estuvieron confinados tres meses. Elmotivo del
arresto de estos individuos fue la sos pecha de que, siendo
guerrilleros, que maron por venganza la casa de Pedro Daco
quien era considerado pro-japones y Presidente de la
Neighborhood Association.
La defensa del acusado consiste en que el no fue quien arresta
Pedro Dumangas y compañeros sino que fueron los soldados del
Cabo Datuga, y que la causa del arresto no era porque dichos
individuos eran sospechosos de pertenecer a las guerrillas, sino
porque eran los autores del incendio de la casa de Pedro Daco.
Pedro Dumangas, uno de los arrestados, declarando como
testigo de la defensa, dijo que el acusado no estaban entre los
que learrestaron; que el no fue llevado a la casa de dicho
acusado, y que fue en el Cuartel de la Constabularia de Iba
donde le investigaron por primera vez. Pero por otra parte dice
tambien este testigo que el fue arrestado antes que los demas, y
el vio aestos por primera vez aquel dia en el Cuartel de la
Constabularia en Iba. Este testimonio no desvirtua el de los
testigos de la acusacion que, unanimes y de una manera
categorica, manifestaron que el acusado estaba entre los policias
y constabularios que practicaron el arresto.
lawphi1.nêt
Nos confirma en esta conviccion el hecho de que al tiempo de
este suceso el acusado era miembro de la Constabularia y
Supervisor de las fuerzas de la policia en la provincia de
Zambales, y como tal era el leader de aquel grupo de policias y
constabularios que verifico el arresto.
Para robustecer su defensa, el acusado declaro que el advirtioa
Pedro Dumangas que no dijera en la investigacion que el era
guerrillero y que el trabajo por la libertad de este y de sus
23
compañeros, testimonio que fue confirmado por dicho testigo
Dumangas.
Pero esta Corte se resiste a creer este testimonio; porque entre
todos los arrestados solamente a Pedro Dumangas es a quien
hizo tal advertencia el acusado; y segundo, porque si el acusado
real y verdaderamente hubiera trabajado por la libertad de
Dumangas y sus compañeros, no hubiesen estos confinados en
lacarcel de Iba por un periodo de tres meses.
Referente a la causa del arresto, aun su poniendo que este
sedebio al incendio de la casa de Pedro Daco, como nos hace
creerla defensa, es evidente que los que llevaron a cabo dicho
arresto estaban en la creencia de que el incendio fue tramado y
perpetrado por guerrilleros, impulsados por el deseo de vengarse
contrael propietario de la casa que, poseyendo sentimientos
japonofilos y siendo Presidente de la Neighborhood Association,
una organizacion civica creada por la administracion militar
japonesa, era inflexible y duro en el cumplimiento de los deberes
de sus miembros conrespecto a las patrulla contra los guerrilleros
y celoso de su autoridad para que no llegaran a estos, y en
particular a su jefe, el Capitan Ralph McGuire, los alimentos que
necesitaban. Esto lo declara elmismo Pedro Dumangas, testigo
de la defensa, quien tambien añade que en la investigacion a que
el fue sometido en el Cuartel de la Constabularia en Iba le
preguntaron si el era guerrillero.
Cargo No. 6.
"6. That on or about April 14, 1943, the accused Policarpio
Dumapit, for the purpose and with the intent of giving aid and
comfort to the enemy, issued an order addressed to Andres
Atanacio, then Chief of the Non-Christian Tribes of the East
Zambales Mountains at Marazo, Botolan, Zambales, enjoining
said Andres Atanacio and all men under the latter's command to
capture, dead or alive, all Americans who were then reported
roaming in the forests of the Zambales mountains, and, to insure
compliance with said order, the accused Policarpio Dumapit
instructed agent Andres Atanacio to report of his achievements in
connection with the said order, to the accused through Atanacio's
superior, Onofre Dienzo, Superintendent of the Non-Christian
Tribes of Zambales."
El acusado corroborando la declaracion del testigo del Gobierno
Andres Atanacio, admitio que el Exhibit A fue real y
verdaderamente escrito y firmado por el dirigido al mencionado
Andres Atanacio, quien, dicho sea de paso, era antes de la
guerra empleado en la Oficina de Tribus No Cristianas y una gran
influencia entrelos montañeses de Zambales, ordenando la
captura de "cualquier americano, muerto o vivo, que encontraran
en las montañas" (to capture, dead or alive, upon sight).
El acusado explico que esta carta fue escrita por el bajo orden
terminante de Major Murata, Comandante de la guarnacion
japonesaen Zambales, a sugestion de Onofre Dienzo; que el no
tuvo otromedio mas que cumplir dicha orden y que el dio
instrucciones a Andres Atanacio que no hiciera caso de ella,
testimonio que fue corroborado por este en repreguntas hechas
por el Abogado de la defensa.
Andres Atanacio es un detenido en la carcel de Munting Lupay
acusado del delito de traicion; el instinto comun de conservacion
y defensa entre los detenidos y acusados del mismo delito y el
compañerismo que engendra la vida de prision, asi como la
amistadantigua entre el acusado Dumapit y este testigo siendo
ambos de Botolan, es la explicacion de la ultima parte del
testimonio de este testigo que ha cogido de sorpresa al acusado
especial, a quien dicho testigo no hizo mencion del referido
hecho antes desentarse en el banquillo de los testigos.
Por otro lado, es dificil creer que Onofre Dienzo hiciera
talsugestion al Comandante Murata, toda vez que Dienzo mismo
hubierapodido dar dicha orden a Atanacio sin necesidad de
valerse del acusado, teniendo en cuenta que el trabajaba con los
japoneses y prestaba a estos una abierta y decidida cooperacion
en la rendicion y ecterminacion de las guerrillas.
Ahora examinemos la defensa general interpuesta por el
acusado de que el pertenecio a la guerrillas y ayudo a las
mismas, suministrandolas comida y armas y dandolas
informaciones secretasde los movimientos de las tropas
24
japonesas en Zambales, y portanto mal podia el acusado haber
cometido el delito de traicion. La defenda pretende, por el
testimonio de Antonio Decano y otros, que el acusado desde
1942 fue guerrillero y que uno de los servicios mas importantes y
utiles que el presto a las guerrillas fue la informacion
suministrada por el acusado al testigo Decano porconducto del
Alcalde Corum de la expedicion llevada a cabo porlos japoneses
hacia el Oeste de la provincia el mes de Septiembre de 1972,
que culmino en la refriega de Pastak y que resulto fatal a los
japoneses.
Y para reforzar su declaracion, Decado presento una seriede
notas o cartas, especialmente el Exhibit 3, que se supone
habersido escrito por el acusado con el pseudonimo de "Ave
Maria". Este testigo, sin embargo, dice que mientras recuerda a
quiencorresponde el pseudonimo de "Ave Maria", ignora quien
usabael nombre de "Jack", que aparece al pie de varias notas
escritas casi al mismo tiempo que el Exhibit 3. Esta y otras
incongruencias encontramos en la declaracion de este testigo, y
observamos en su manera de declarar cierta incertidumbre e
inseguridad, que no podemos dar credito a su testimonio. Entre
los testigos de la defensa, ademas de Antonio Decano, se debe
hacer mencion tambiende Juan Corum y Gerardo Dumlao, a
cuyas declaraciones la defensa parece conceder una gran
importancia.
El primero relata la inteligencia que tenia con el acusado para la
proteccion del pueblo y de sus habitantes cuando al tiempo de la
tanponderada refriega de Pastak el huyo a las montanas, y el
segundo se refiere a la ayuda que le presto el acusado,
advirtiendole que era buscado por los japoneses y
suministrandole despues balas de revolver, ropa y comida.
Mientras el testimonio delprimero se halla mancillado con el tinte
de la arcialidad habiendosido el que recomendo al acusado para
estudiar en la Constabulary Training School, notamos en la
declaracion del segundo contradicciones sobre hechos
importantes, pues mientras el dice que en losmeses de Agosto y
Septiembre de 1943, el vio cinco veces alacusado en el sitio de
Maguisguis, barrio de Pongbato, municipio de Botolan, el
acusado declara que en aquellos meses estabaprosiguiendo sus
estudios en la Academia de Oficiales de Manila, y mientras dicho
testigo relata que el vio al acuasdo en el monte de Mabubuyan,
 barrio de Pongbato, el mes de octubre de 1944,el acusado
Dumapit dijo que el se hallaba en dichos mes y año estacianado
en Alaminos, Pangasinan, como Junior Officer de la Septima
Compañia de la Constabularia.
Aparte de las muchas contradicciones en que han incurrido los
testigos de la defensa que declararon sobre este punto,
observamos que todos, o casi todos ellos, era guerrilleros que se
rindieron y despues ocuparon puestos mas o menos importantes
bajo el gobierno japones. Es evidente que estos ex-guerrilleros,
una vez al servicio de los japoneses, tenian mas o menos
contacto y sostenia con elacusado relaciones oficiales mas y
menos cordiales, que tenian queengendrar una fuerte
camaraderia y cierta afinidad de ideas. Si el acusado no se
hubiera identificado realmente con el enemigoprestandole
importantes y meritorios servicios, dignos de mejorcausa,
hubiese aprovechado la brillante oportunidad que se le presento
en las postrimerias de 1944 cuando los oficiales y soldados de la
Constabularia, destacados en Pangasinan, desertaron de las filas
y se remontaron para preparar el terreno y ayudar a lasfuerzas
libertadoras que dentro de poco iban a desembarcar en
Lingayen.
El acusado contiende que a fines de 1944, volvio a su pueblo y organizo
una unidad guerrillera, tanto es asi que fue detenido cuatro dias por los
japoneses por estas ctividades, pero de sudeclaracion (n.t. p. 5.) se
deduce que el, en vez de dedicarse actividades guerrilleras, simplemente
se quedo en su pueblo de Botolan cuando dijo:
Q. What did you do in Botolan? — A. I simply stayed there.
En vez de unirse a sus compañeros y seguir el ejemplo de estos prefirio
retirarse a su pueblo y es porque no solamente no poseiaaquella fuerza
interior que le compele al hombre a hacer sacrificios por su patria, sino
porque habia cambiado el ideario de su vida, que brantando su lealtad a
America y a su pais.
En la primera sentencia que este Tribunal dicto hemos dicho que la
defensa comun que los acusados suelen alegar de habersido guerrilleros
y de haber ayudado a las guerrillas, debe serrecibida con cautela, y aqui
25
tenemos un caso en que las pruebas de la defensa no han conseguido
convencer al Tribunal.
Respecto a la intencion (intent) del acusado de cometer el delito de
traicion, esta se infiere muy claramente de los mismos actos externos
(overt acts) y de otros hechos establecidos en el curso de la vista.
That the accused's collaboration with the Japanese was a token one
designed to fool the enemy does not square with the nature, intensity and
persistency of his activities and their consequences on the victims of his
betrayal and on the cause of his country. He was directly instrumental
and the moving spirit in the killing of the two Americans and the surrender
of guerrillas. A close reading of the record should convince any one
beyond doubt that it was the other way around; if he burnt candles for
both sides, his true longing was for the devil. He feigned connection and
sympathy with the guerrillas as a means of protection to himself if and
when the day of judgment arrived. Though the defendant was acquitted
of their following acts thanks to the severity of the requirement for
conviction in treason cases, they are nevertheless conclusive proofs of
the charge that he gave aid and comfort to the enemy with sincerity, with
no mental reservation.
Jose Otero, property owner, and Philippine citizen of Spanish descent,
testified that on April 3,1943, the accused, Onofre Dienzo, Andres
Pascua, Elpidio Gantang, and several other spies for the Japanese came
to his cattle ranch in Botolan, followed a few hours later by between 40
and 50 soldiers; that Dumapit and his companions dispatched letters to
the Dulandulan brothers, Negritos or Negrito mestizos who were
guerrillas under the command of Captain Ralph McGuire, urging them to
surrender; that the Dulandulan brothers were later prevailed upon to lay
down their arms and side with japanese; that Dumapit and his
companions held meetings with people in Botolan for the purpose of
killing Captain McGuirre; that on those occasions Policarpio Dumapit
publicly offered a P300 reward for the head of Captain McGuirre who
was, as a matter of fact, afterward beheaded and his head was brought
to town for exhibition; that Dumapit also offered a reward of P100 for the
head of any other American.
This testimony is corroborated by Marcos Dioyan and Juan Famulacano.
The latter stated in addition to Oteros testimony, that Dumapit and Dienzo
agreed to approach Gregorio Magno and Victorio Dulandulan "so that the
guards who were on the way leading to the place where Capt. McGuirre marched toward east although he could not tell the exact place of
was would be removed to facilitate his capture." destination.

Victorio Dulandulan testified that he was a guerilla and one of the Considered with Graciano Dullons testimony, the destination was the
bodyguards of Captain McGuirre; that McGuirre was killed by Dienzo, house where the American was located.
Dumapit's confederate and co-worker for the japs.
The veracity of these witnesses is unassailable. With the possible
Graciano Dullon testified that he was a municipal policeman in Botolan in exception of Otero, they testified with measured restraint.
January, 1943. One day in that month, Wenceslao Dumlao came to the
police station asking for a police detail during the town fiesta of The record is full of other revelations of defendant's perfidy, deeds
Poongbato, and he and other policeman proceeded to that barrio in the inconsistent with his pretended loyalty to his country. The above should
afternoon of January 23. As they were eating in Poongbato, someone suffice for illustration and to disprove the claim that defendant's letter to
came to tell Dumlao that there was an American south of the town. They Andres Atanacio, was written by order of a Japanese officer, a claim in
followed the informer to the place indicated and there saw an American. itself and on its face ridiculous.
Dumlao talked with the American and offered him rice cake. At midnight,
he and his police companions, Dumlao, several children and the Reyes, J., concurs in this dissent.
Americans started to go to town but rested in San Juan on the way. At 5
o'clock in the morning, one truck arrived loaded with japanese
accompanied by Policarpio Dumapit. The Japanese surrounded the
house where the American was while Policarpio Dumapit approached it
and ordered the American to come down. The American did as he was
ordered and surrendered his revolver to Dumapit. After the American
handed his revolver he was taken to the truck and they all left. This
American's name was Mann and he was afterwards killed by the
Japanese.

Arcadio Darosin testified that in January, 1943, he was awaken from his
sleep in his house by his wife who told him that somebody was
downstairs looking for him. He opened the windows and saw Wenceslao
Dumlao, who told him that he wanted to send the witness to some place.
Dumlao ordered him to go to town to see Policarpio Dumapit. He
hesitated but was told to "get moving" or else . . . Dumlao told him to tell
Dumapit that Dumlao told him tell Dumapit that Dumlao was, coming with
an American. He went to see Dumapit at about 3 o'clock in the morning
and transmitted to Dumapit Dumlao's message. Thereupon Dumapit left
but later came back and told him to come along. They went to the
municipal building. Later one truck came , and Dumapit drove to the
Japanese garrison. There, Japanese soldiers, about 10 in number,
boarded the truck after which they all went to San Juan. When the truck
arrived in that town it drew up in front of the witness's house and the
Japanese got off. The witness stayed home while the Japanese,
Dumapit, and Dumlao, who met them when they alighted from the truck
26
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-433 March 2, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GAUDENCIO ROBLE, defendant-appellant.
Gonzalo D. David for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los
Angeles for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Charged with treason on three counts, the defendant pleaded guilty and
was sentenced to death by the First Division of the People's Court sitting
in Tacloban, Leyte. The correctness of the penalty is the sole question
put in issue in this appeal.
The information alleges:
1. On or about March 20, 1944, in the municipality of Dalaguete,
province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of giving and with
the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military
forces said accused being a member of the Philippines
Constabulary did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead guide and accompany 10 other member of
the pro-Japanese constabulary all armed like the accused and did
apprehend and arrest Paulino Osorio for having helped the
guerrillas and of being the Father of two guerrilla men; that the
herein accused after maltreating said Paulino Osorio did detain
him in the municipal jail of Dalaguete; that in the same date the
accused and his companions did apprehend Melchor
Campomanes and 7 other person who were also tortured for
being guerrillas supporters and sympathizers and the accused
herein with his firearm did shoot Melchor Campomanes killing him
instantly;
27
2. Sometime during the month of March 1944 in the municipality
of Dalaguete Province of Cebu, Philippines with the purpose of
giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy
and her military forces said accused being a soldier of the
Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully, feloniously
and treasonably lead guide and accompany a patrol of 13
constabulary soldiers and did arrest and apprehend Fortunato
Linares for being guerrillas and or guerrilla supporters; that said
accused did tie and torture the aforesaid person and cut a portion
of their ears, the tortures being so severe especially with respect
to Antolin Rodriguez who effectively died as a result of said
tortures administered by the accused.
3. On or about May 18, 1944, in Cebu City Philippines with the
purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and comfort to
the enemy and her military forces, said accused being a soldier of
the Philippines Constabulary did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully feloniously and treasonable accompany a group of
Constabulary soldiers all armed, to Mambaling and other parts of
Cebu City and did apprehend Eleuterio Padilla, a former USAFFE
soldier for being a guerrilla, and there herein accused and his
companions did tie and torture said Eleuterio Padilla detain him at
the Constabulary Headquarters for several days after which he
was taken out and mercilessly killed on May 26, 1944 by said
accused.
The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex crime
of treason with murders with the result that the penalty provided for the
most serious offense was to be imposed on its maximum degree. Viewing
the case from the standpoint of modifying circumstances the court
believed that the same result obtained. It opined that the killing were
murders qualified by treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of
evident premeditation superior strength cruelty and an armed band.
We think this is error. The torture and murders set forth in the information
are merged in and formed part of treason. They were in this case the
overt acts which besides traitorous intention supplied a vital ingredient in
the crime. Emotional or intellectual attachment and sympathy with the foe
unaccompanied by the giving of aid and comfort is not treason. The
defendant would not be guilty of treason if he had not committed the
atrocities in question.
On the question of the applicability of the aggravating circumstances
which impelled the court against its sentiment to give the defendant the
extreme penalty we only have to refer to People vs. Racaza (82 Phil.,
623) in which this question was discussed and decided. There we said:
The trial court found the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation superior strength treachery and employment of
means for adding ignominy to the natural effects of the crime.
The first three circumstances are by their nature inherent in the
offense of treason and may not taken to aggravate the penalty.
Adherence and the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy is in
many cases as in this a long continued process requiring for the
successful consummation of the traitor's purpose, fixed, reflective
and persistent determination and planning.
So are superior strength and treachery included in the crime of
treason. Treachery is merged in superior strength; and to
overcome the opposition and wipe out resistance movements
which was Racaza's purpose in collaboration with the enemy the
use of a large force and equipment was necessary. The enemy to
whom the accused adhered was itself the personification of brute
superior force and it was this superior force which enabled him to
overrun the country and for a time subdue its inhabitants by his
brutal rule. The law does not expect the enemy and its adherents
to meet their foes only on even terms according to he romantic
traditions of chivalry.
But the law does abhor inhumanity and the abuse of strength to
commit acts unnecessary to the commission of treason. There is
no incompatibility between treason and decent, human treatment
of prisoners, Rapes, wanton robbery for personal grain and other
forms of cruelties are condemned and the perpetration of these
will be regarded as aggravating circumstances of ignominy and of
deliberately augmenting unnecessary wrong to the main criminal
objective under paragraphs 17 and 21 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code. The atrocities above mentioned of which the
appellant is beyond doubt guilty fall within the terms of the above
paragraphs.
28
For the very reason that premeditation treachery and use of
superior strength are absorbed inn treason characterized by
killings, the killing themselves and other accompanying crime
should be taken into consideration for measuring the degree and
gravity of criminal responsibility irrespective of the manner in
which they were committed. Were not this the rule treason the
highest crime known to law would confer on its perpetrator
advantage that are denied simple murderer. To avoid such
incongruity and injustice the penalty in treason will be adapted
within the range provided in the Revised Penal Code to the
danger and harm and to which the culprit has exposed his
country and his people and to the wrongs and injuries that
resulted from his deeds. The letter and pervading spirit of the
Revised Penal Code adjust penalties to the perversity of the mind
that conceived and carried the crime into execution. Where the
system of graduating penalties by the prescribed standards is
inapplicable as in the case of homicides connection with treason
the method of analogies to fit the punishment with the enormity of
the offense may be summoned to the service of justice and
consistency and in the furtherance of the law's aims.
Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case we believe that
the appellants spontaneous plea of guilty is sufficient to entitle him to a
penalty below the maximum. The appealed decision is therefore modified
and the sentence reduced to reclusion perpetua with the legal
accessories and costs.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones and Reyes,
JJ., concur.