Dividing and Ruling The World

Dividing and Ruling the World?
A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on

Postcolonial Civil Violence
Author(s): Matthew Lange and Andrew Dawson
Source: Social Forces, Vol. 88, No. 2 (December 2009), pp. 785-817
Published by: Oxford University Press
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Dividing and Ruling the World? A Statistical Test of the
Effects of Colonialism on Postcolonial Civil Violence
Matthew Lange, McGill University

Andrew Dawson, McGill University
To test claims that postcolonial civil violence is a common legacy of colonialism, we

create a dataset on the colonial heritage of 160 countries and explore whether a history
of colonialism is related to indicators of inter-communal conflict, political rebellion
and civil war in the years 1960-1999. The analysis provides evidence against sweeping
claims that colonialism is a universal cause of civil violence but finds that some forms
of colonialism increase the risk of some forms of civil violence. Specifically, the findings
support claims that inter-communal violence is a common legacy of colonialism- espe-
cially of British colonialism and colonialism by minor colonial powers -but suggest that
a history of colonialism has only a limited impact on political rebellion and civil war.
In September 2006, two ethnic associations publicly attacked the French dictionary
Le Petit Robert and demanded that it recall all 170,000 copies of its 2007 edition.
Their criticism was over one of its long-standing definitions of "colonization" -"to
enhance the value of, exploit territory that has been colonized."1 The groups claimed
that colonialism was a destructive system of control that hundreds of millions of
non-Europeans suffered under, that the dictionary's definition justifies such horror,
and that Le Petit Robert therefore disseminates a racist colonial discourse.
If academic experts were chosen to resolve this conflict, Le Petit Robert would
probably lose because most scholars hold strong and very negative moral senti-
ments about colonialism. Such anti-colonialism is so powerful that an entire
discipline -postcolonial studies -has been organized in an attempt to highlight
all of the negative effects colonialism had on colonized peoples and all the ways
that it continues to subjugate, exploit and demoralize individuals living in former
colonies. A popular handbook that reviews basic concepts of postcolonial stud-
ies, for example, defines colonialism as "cultural exploitation" and gives several
examples to show the multiple and nefarious ways in which it occurs (Ashcroft,
Griffiths and Tiffin 2000:45). In one section, the authors equate colonialism with
violent sexual domination, claiming that the "idea of colonialism itself is grounded
in a sexualized discourse of rape, penetration and impregnation." (40) So much for
Le Petit Robert's definition of colonialism as value enhancement!
The authors thank members of the Montreal Research Group on Ethnic Conflict for their feedback, John
Sandbergfor his valuable methodological insight, and the reviewers for their constructive recommenda-
tions. They also thank Shirin Shahrokni for the supporting research she completed while working as a
research assistant for Lange. Langes research was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council of Canada. Direct correspondence to Matthew Lange, Department of Sociology, McGill Uni-
versity, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, Montreal, QC Canada H3A 2T7. E-mail: matthew. lange @mcgill.ca.
© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces 88(2) 785-81 8, December 2009
786 • Social Forces mi)
While academic anti-colonialism might be justifiable on moral grounds, it

can pose a threat to empirical investigation. Analyses of the effects of colonialism
on civil violence provide a specific example. This research is quite prolific and
includes many insightful qualitative analyses. These works pay close attention
to the historical processes and contexts of particular cases, highlight potential
causal mechanisms, and provide consistent evidence that colonialism caused di-
verse types of civil violence both before and after independence. Because of the
powerful anti-colonial discourse, however, researchers might make overly strong
conclusions about the impact of colonialism on civil violence. Moreover, because
of a general willingness to accept that colonialism promotes violence, present
works fail to systematically compare both former colonies and countries without
modern histories of colonization; thus, they lack an important basis of inference
from which one can make general claims about colonialism. Such a comparison is
important because non-colonies also experience civil violence, and the comparison
of former colonies with non-colonies provides insight into whether or not former
colonies have higher risks of civil violence relative to non-colonies, a situation one
would predict if colonialism is a general cause of postcolonial violence.
In this article, we test the common belief that civil violence is a common legacy
of colonialism by using cross-national statistical methods to investigate whether or
not former colonies have higher levels of civil violence than non-colonies. Notably,
cross-national statistical analysis is not a substitute for qualitative analysis, as it
has difficulty highlighting causal mechanisms and cannot prove or disprove the
findings of individual case studies. Yet, statistical methods are advantaged in that
they provide insight into relationships and thereby inference into whether or not
colonialism is a common cause of civil violence.
Colonialism and Civil Violence: A Review of Potential Mechanisms
Numerous scholars within anthropology, economics, geography, history, literary

theory, political science and sociology all claim that civil violence is a common legacy
of colonialism. Although these works investigate the historic roots of civil violence
and suggest that colonialism is an ultimate cause, they focus on multiple, yet often
inter-related, aspects of colonial rule. A review of the literature highlights at least
eight ways in which colonialism supposedly promotes postcolonial violence: (1. by
constructing oppositional identities, (2. institutionalizing an ethnic-based division
of labor, (3. creating ethnic-based hierarchies, (4. introducing foreign populations,
(5. imposing arbitrary political borders, (6. promoting despotic forms of rule, (7. in-
stitutionalizing ineffective states, and (8. opening a power vacuum at independence.
Constructing Oppositional Identities
Many scholars of identity politics investigate how ideas of community are con-
structed. Within this literature, numerous works focus on colonialism, providing
Dividing and Ruling the World? • 787
evidence that colonial officials orchestrated the construction and reification of

identities (Berman 1998; King 1999; Leroy 1991; Nanday 1983; Mamdani 2001).
Even more, many suggest that colonial era-constructed identities ultimately caused
divisive and violent ethnic politics after independence.
According to some, colonial officials institutionalized communal identities be-
cause they saw them as natural. The colonial mindset focused on racial difference
and hierarchy, and colonial officials and anthropologists therefore attempted to
categorize their subjects accordingly (Baber 2004; King 1999; Lentz and Nugent
2000; Mamdani 2001). Others focus less on the cognitive frameworks of the
colonizers and claim that the colonial construction of oppositional identities
was a purposive policy implemented in order to weaken opposition to colonial
domination. Through this "divide-and-rule" strategy, the colonial state supposedly
strengthened communal identities in order to pit indigenous groups against one
another and thereby prevent broad-based indigenous opposition to colonial rule.
Ethnic violence in India provides an example of how the colonial construction
of identities potentially promotes violence. Several scholars claim that Hinduism,
as a unified religion and basis for ethno-national identity, only emerged during
the colonial period and was promoted by the British (King 1999; Nanday 1983;
Pennington 2004). Others go further, suggesting that British colonialism reified
oppositional Hindu and Muslim identities through unequal treatment and the
construction of a system of communal representation, and that these oppositional
identities have been at the core of ethnic conflict within colonial and postcolonial
India (Baber 2004; Breuilly 1993).
Division of Labor
Instead of focusing on ideas of community, others recognize that civil violence is in-
fluenced by material divisions. Along these lines, many claim that colonialism institu-
tionalized an ethnic-based division of labor that promoted violence in one of two ways.
First, a division of labor can cause conflict when communities guard their
realms of influence and react violently when other communities attempt to break
the division of labor. Colonial Malaysia provides an example. Colonial policy
restricted the economic opportunities of ethnic Malays relative to Chinese Malays,
yet privileged ethnic Malays politically (Abraham 2004). The resulting division
of labor allowed ethnic Malays to dominate the administration and politics and
the Chinese to have a stronger position within the economy. Under these circum-
stances, ethnic Malays began to believe that politics was their personal realm. Thus,
when the Chinese gained seats in the 1969 elections and began to intrude into the
Malay-dominated political arena, the Malays reacted violently to what they saw as
Chinese intrusion into their realm of influence (Abraham 2004).
Second, a division of labor within the state can institutionalize ethnic com-
petition and thereby promote civil violence. In colonial Uganda, for example, a
division of labor was constructed whereby the northern ethnic groups dominated
788 • Social Forces 88(2)
the military while the southern groups dominated the administration. This divi-
sion was maintained and even strengthened after independence and promoted
competition between the military and the administration and between the north
and the south. According to Horowitz (1985), this competition intensified and
was an influential cause of violence in postcolonial Uganda.
Discrimination and Stratification
While a division of labor might simply suggest horizontal segmentation, hierarchy is

an additional type of social division that can cause civil violence. And, many scholars
believe that colonial powers commonly established hierarchic stratification systems
based on communal grounds (Adas 1998; Mamdani 2001; Newbury 1983; Wimmer
1997). They suggest that colonial officials systematically granted preferential treat-
ment to the members of those groups deemed intellectually superior or more coopera-
tive while others were relegated to the lower stratum of the social hierarchy.
In a comparative study of Zanzibar and Rwanda, Newbury (1983) provides
evidence for this view. She finds that colonial officials granted socio-economic
and political privileges to Arabs in Zanzibar and to Tutsis in Rwanda in order
to facilitate colonial domination. Alternatively, Africans in Zanzibar and Hutus
in Rwanda faced discrimination and exploitation at the hands of both colonial
officials and their privileged indigenous collaborators, thereby promoting ethnic
violence between Africans and Arabs in Zanzibar and Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda.
Similarly, Adas (1998) argues that the presence of South Asians in several British
colonies caused strong resentment towards this colonially privileged minority and
thereby bloody ethnic clashes.
Introduction of Foreign Peoples
As the anti-Indian violence described by Adas demonstrates, ethnic-based strati-

fication systems often occur in countries with both indigenous and immigrant
populations. Indeed, resentment over inequality can be heightened by claims
that non-natives are interlopers who steal jobs and resources from the indigenous
population. In Assam (India), Burma, Fiji and Uganda, for example, indigenous
groups excluded, attacked, forcibly expelled, and at the extreme, killed Indian
immigrants. In all four of these cases, the Indians immigrated during colonialism,
and their migrations were both encouraged and subsidized by the colonial powers.
In this way, the colonial introduction of non-native populations is a fourth factor
potentially linking colonialism to civil violence (Weiner 1978).
Although the examples above involve indigenous people committing collective
acts of violence against non-indigenous peoples, colonial-induced immigration can
also lead to non-indigenous violence against indigenous peoples. This is especially the
case in former colonies that experienced white settlement. Angola, Bolivia, Canada,
Guatemala, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, the United States and Zimbabwe provide
poignant examples, with white settler domination causing political repression and
discrimination against indigenous peoples and the institutionalization of extreme
racial inequalities. Such acts, in turn, have the potential to spark violent confrontation.
Arbitrary Boundaries
Many scholars of colonial legacies focus on the enduring effects of arbitrary

boundary-making. According to this view, colonial officials created political bor-
ders based on the claims of rival European powers and the whims of colonial
administrators. This arbitrary boundary-making failed to take previous settlement
patterns into consideration and therefore created political systems that lumped
and split diverse pre-colonial communities. The lack of social homogeneity, in
turn, supposedly promoted civil violence in a number of post-colonial settings.
Colonial Nigeria, for example, combined some 300 linguistic groups into a
single national state. The Biafran Civil War of 1967-1970, in turn, was instigated
when the Igbo peoples of southeastern Nigeria attempted to secede from Nigeria.
Similarly, Lentz and Nugent (2000) describe how regional administrative bound-
aries were the ultimate cause of post-colonial violence in northern Ghana, as a
number of individuals fought to separate their regions from the chiefdoms that
were constructed during colonialism.
Despotic Rule
In tracing the historic roots of contemporary civil conflict, a few analyses highlight
the impact of exploitative and despotic political institutions. These works usually
focus on intra-community conflict over economic and political resources instead
of conflict between communities with distinct ethnic or national identities. They
find that intra-community fighting pits powerful elites against their subjects, and
several point to colonialism as an ultimate cause.
According to this argument, some of today's rural rebellions in sub-Saharan
Africa have been caused by the institutionalization of regional despotism, some-
thing that supposedly emerged during colonialism (Mamdani 1996; Migdal 1988).
In order to construct an inexpensive system of domination, colonial officials chose
chiefs to serve as regional authorities and gave them extensive political power in
exchange for their collaboration with the colonial government. An unprecedented
centralization of the chief's power was thereby institutionalized, allowing the new
ruler to stand out as "the petty legislator, administrator, judge, and policeman all
in one." (Mamdani 1996:43) This newly gained authority ultimately led to the
abuse of chiefly powers and local revolts against chiefly exploitation.
Weak States
Several scholars of contemporary civil violence claim that the strength of a state
affects its ability to quell civil violence (Fearon and Lai tin 2003; Goodwin 2001;
Jackson 1990). Specifically, some states lack the administrative, political and coer-
cive capabilities needed to foresee, prevent or repress violence. In fact, the state is
often absent at the local level, and local communities frequently compete with and
fight against the central state. In delineating the historical roots of contemporary
weak states, several analyses single out colonialism as the main cause of ineffective
states (Berman 1998; Mamdani 1996; Migdal 1988; Zartman 1995).
The ineffective state argument is often applied to several former colonies in
sub-Saharan Africa, where colonial rule institutionalized tiny and ineffective states
that had very limited control over large parts of the territory, lhe state also lacked
institutional mechanisms linking it to society, thus the state was unable to either
engage or penetrate society, forcing it to rely on brute coercion and collaboration
with regional elites as the main means of political domination (Berman 1998;
Mamdani 1996; Migdal 1988; Young 1994). The end result was a state that was
despotically strong, infrastructurally weak and hardly integrated. Since colonial
independence, these state characteristics have remained and sometimes worsened.
As a consequence, state officials and politicians have been unable to control pe-
ripheral regions, thereby promoting violent regional rebellion and civil war in the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia and elsewhere.
Power Vacuum
Besides the effects of colonial rule, some claim that the departure of the colonial pow-
ers opened a political vacuum that promoted instability and civil violence. According
to this view, the transfer of power from colonial to local hands caused conflict and
competition over the control of the state. When unresolved at independence, political
competition could escalate into sustained competition, violence and even civil war.
In British Guiana, for example, both South Asian and African communities ac-
tively mobilized their populations to fight for political power during the indepen-
dence process (Premdas 1995). Instead of restraining ethnic mobilization, British
colonial officials did nothing to placate communal tensions and appear to have
actually encouraged them, resulting in ethnic riots, acts of terrorism, hundreds of
deaths and the internal displacement of tens of thousands of people (Rabe 2005).
Similarly, competition and violence between Muslims and Hindus exploded in
colonial India during the independence process, as both sides fought for their
share of power in anticipation of the British withdrawal. Analyzing sub-Saharan
Africa, Wimmer (1997) finds that incidents of rebellion, coups and violent and
peaceful protests ballooned during the independence process and claims that it
was the result of competition and insecurity caused by colonial independence.
Methodological Design
In order to test whether these or other colonial mechanisms cause civil violence,
we perform cross-national time series analyses using random-effects models. We
create a panel dataset of 1 60 countries comprised of both former colonies and

non-colonies. The data cover the period 1960-1999, are decennially coded, and
use decennial averages for all time-variant variables.2 Consequently, each country
has four observations for each variable, and each observation represents the score
of a variable for a particular country during a particular decade (either the 1 960s,
1970s, 1980s or 1990s). We use decennial data because two of our dependent
variables are only measured decennially.
Although there are a total of 160 countries in the dataset, some countries are
missing data for at least one variable during all four time periods and are therefore
excluded from the analysis.3 As a result, our final analysis includes data for 1 14-132
countries, representing 71 to 83 percent of the worlds countries with more than
500,000 people. Of these remaining countries, some are missing data for at least
one decade, rendering the dataset unbalanced. In addition, we only include observa-
tions for countries if they attained independence sometime during the decade. For
example, we exclude the observation for Angola in the 1960s, but include it in the
1970s and thereafter, because the country gained its independence during the 1970s.
Dependent Variables
We employ three different indicators of civil violence as dependent variables:

inter-communal conflict, political rebellion and civil war. Inter-communal con-
flict occurs when a communal, or ethnic, group is involved in open conflict with
another communal group living within the same country, in the absence of any
direct conflict with the state. The severity of inter-communal conflict is measured
on a seven-point scale: 0 = no conflict evident, 1 = individual acts of harassment,
2 = political agitation, 3 = sporadic violent attacks, 4 = anti-group demonstrations,
5 = communal rioting, and 6 = communal warfare.4 Thus, when violence between
Hutus and Tutsis escalated into communal warfare during the 1990s, Rwanda
had a score of 6 for the decade. Alternatively, Canada had a score of 0 for the
1980s because there was no known communal conflict, but there were incidents
of communal harassment between First Nation and European Canadians dur-
ing the 1990s, giving the country a score of 1 during the 1990s. The data for
inter-communal conflict are taken from the Minorities at Risk Project (Bennett
and Davenport 2003). Because the MAR data are coded at the communal level
and because some countries have more than one communal group experiencing
inter-communal conflict in any given decade, we score each country by using
the maximum score of all communal groups within a country for a given decade.
Political rebellion differs from inter-communal conflict in that it involves the
state. Specifically, it occurs when a communal group is in direct conflict with

state actors. Political rebellion is measured on an eight-point scale: 0 = no conflict
reported, 1 = political banditry/sporadic terrorism, 2 = campaigns of terrorism, 3
= local rebellion, 4 = small-scale guerrilla activity, 5 = intermediate guerrilla activity,
6 = large-scale guerrilla activity, and 7 = protracted civil war.5 During the 1990s,
for example, Sweden had a score of 0 because it lacked any conflict between com-
munal groups and the state, the small-scale guerrilla activity of Zapatista rebels
gave Mexico a score of 5, and Russia had a score of 7 because of open warfare
between the state and Chechen rebels. As with inter-communal conflict, the data
are taken from the Minorities at Risk Project (Bennett and Davenport 2003), and
we score political rebellion for each country by taking the maximum decennial
value of political rebellion for all communal groups within the country.
Following Fearon and Lai tin (2003), we operationalize civil war as a large-scale
violent conflict between agents of the state and one or more non-state groups. To
be categorized as a civil war, the conflict must have resulted in a minimum of 1 ,000
deaths, with an annual average of at least 100 fatalities and a minimum of 100
deaths on each side of the conflict. Using this definition and data from Fearon and
Lai tin, we measure the number of years of civil war that countries experienced dur-
ing a given decade. Our dependent variable of civil war is therefore continuous and
ranges from 0 years (no civil war during the decade) to 10 years (civil war throughout
the decade).6 Although a political rebellion can flare into a civil war, the civil war
variable differs from the rebellion indicator in two basic ways. First, the rebellion
variable measures different levels of violence, but civil war simply measures the pres-
ence and number of years of civil war. Next, rebellion measures conflict between
a communal group and the state whereas the civil war variable measures violence
between any domestic group -be it communal or strictly political -and the state.
Focal Independent Variables
In order to test whether or not a history of colonialism increases the probability

of these three types of postcolonial civil violence, we construct a dataset on the
colonial heritage of 160 countries. The data are from scholarly works, country
handbooks and histories, and the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Any dataset on colonial heritage must first define a colony. We define it most
basically as a territory that is controlled by a foreign power and recognized by that
foreign power as a non-integral component of its own national state. In addition,
we add four clauses to the definition in order to help classify countries as former
colonies or non-colonies. First, we only categorize territories that were formally
dominated by foreign powers as colonies. For example, Honduras was greatly
influenced by the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries, but Honduras was
never formally controlled by the United States, and therefore is not categorized
as a former American colony. Second, we consider countries as colonies only if
they were controlled by foreign powers for at least 10 consecutive years. Notably,
it is possible that 10 years is not enough time for colonialism to institutionalize
structures promoting civil violence, and we test whether the results change when
using a 25-year threshold instead. Because the results of the models using both
thresholds are substantively identical, we simply present the results of the 10-year
threshold in this article. Third, our definition of colonialism is only applied to
countries in which the majority of the territory and population were under formal
colonial rule. Thus, parts of China were colonized by different foreign powers,
yet we categorize it as a non-colony because the majority of its population and
territory were not formally colonized. Finally, recognizing that colonialism has
occurred throughout human history, we limit our analysis to the modern era of
European imperialism. We chose 1648 -the year of the Treaty of Westphalia -as
the beginning of the modern era of European colonialism; the treaty contributed
to the emergence of the international state system and thereby to the dramatic
expansion of formal colonial domination.
Using this definition of colonialism, we construct several variables measuring
colonial heritage. Our first indicator simply measures whether or not a country
was a colony at any time from 1648 through 1999. As such, "Colony Status" is
a dichotomous variable, with 1 signifying that a country is a former colony and
0 signifying that it is not a former colony. In order to explore whether the first
generation of colonies differed from the latter generation, we also operationalize
the colonial status variable based on countries that were colonies in 1900-1999.
Because the results using the shorter interval are very similar to those using the
1648-1999 interval, we only include the latter in our models.7
While the first focal variable simply categorizes countries as former colonies
or non-colonies, colonialism took different forms, and the remaining variables
measure differences among colonies. The second focal variable measures the num-
ber of years of colonization that countries experienced in 1648 through 1999, a
factor that likely affects the overall impact of colonial rule on social relations.
Recognizing claims that settler colonialism was analytically distinct from other
forms of colonialism (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Strang 1990),
we also include variables measuring the percentage of the population of former
colonies that was comprised of European settlers at independence. In particular,
we follow Strangs (1990) example and employ two mutually exclusive nominal
variables measuring the percentage of the population that was of European descent
at colonial independence. The first measures whether 50-100 percent of the popu-
lation was European at independence (1 = yes, 0 = no), and the second measures
whether 1 0-49 percent of the population was European at independence. While
the settler variables undoubtedly measure a characteristic of colonialism, some
suggest that settler colonialism occurred in regions with certain environmental
and pre-colonial social conditions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001).
Instead of viewing the variables as measures of colonialism, some might therefore
perceive them more as controls for pre-colonial conditions affecting the vulner-
ability of regions to colonial conquest.
The next group of focal variables measures the identity of the colonial power.
This polychotomous nominal variable represents four mutually exclusive catego-
ries of colonizers: British Colonies, French Colonies, Spanish Colonies and Other
Colonies.8 Each category is included as a separate dummy variable, where a value
of 1 indicates that a country was colonized by a particular colonizer and a value of

0 indicates otherwise. Countries that where not colonized are the reference group
and therefore are not included as a regressor in the models. We choose to measure
the identity of the colonizer because several qualitative and quantitative analyses
find that colonial powers ruled in very different ways and therefore potentially
left different legacies (Grier 1999; Landes 1998; Lange, Mahoney and vom Hau
2006; Young 1994).9
The final focal colonial variable is a time-sensitive indicator that measures
the number of years that have passed since a country gained independence. The
variable is decade-initial and is calculated using the years 1960, 1970, 1980 or
1990. Notably, decennial observations of former colonies are included as long as
independence was attained during the decade. In this way, negative values are per-
mitted if independence occurred later during the decade. For example, Botswana
received its independence in 1966, and its score for years since independence is
therefore -6 in I960 but 4 in 1970. Previous work by Laitin and Fearon (2003)
found that colonial independence is exponentially related to civil war, with greater
risk of war in the first couple of years after independence. We compared the
predictive capabilities of the natural log of the Years Since Independence variable
to its untransformed values. Because the logged and untransformed values had
nearly identical correlation coefficients with the dependent variables, we use the
latter for ease of interpretation.
Unlike the previous variables that include scores for both former colonies and
non-colonies, models including the independence variable use a more restricted
set that excludes non-colonies. We remove the latter for two reasons: there are
high levels of collinearity between the independence variable and the remainder
of the colonial variables, and we believe it is illogical to give a country that was
not colonized a date of colonial independence.10 Thus, instead of offering insight
into whether former colonies experienced higher levels of civil violence than non-
colonies, the independence variable is a temporal measurement that sheds light
on whether any colonial effect transforms over time. See Appendix A for a list of
the 1 60 countries with data on their colonial heritage.
Table 1 lists the average dependent variable scores for all colonial categories.
The table shows that, on average, countries with an overseas colonial heritage had
higher levels of communal conflict and political rebellion and more years of civil
war per decade from 1960 through 1999. It also shows variation within the set
of former overseas colonies, with former British colonies and colonies of minor
colonial powers having higher average dependent variable scores than former
French and Spanish colonies. In addition, former colonies with high levels of
European settlement had the lowest levels of communal conflict and political
rebellion, while former colonies with low levels of settlement had the highest levels.
This relationship does not hold for years of civil war, however, as former colonies
with mid-levels of settlement had the highest average years of civil war per decade.
Table 1: Means of Dependent Variables by Category of Colonial History

Communal Political
Colonial Category
Non-Overseas Colonies .99 1.28 .97
Overseas Colony Status 1.29 1.67 1.82
Overseas British Colonies 1 .63 1 .86 2.72
Overseas French Colonies 1 .08 1 .73 1 .63
Overseas Spanish Colonies .40 .56 1 .58
Other (Overseas) 1.80 2.35 3.17
Settler Population > 50% .56 .50 1.13
Settler Population 1 0-49% .78 1 .25 1 .92
Settler Population < 10% 1.34
aCommunal conflict is m
Political rebellion is meas
cCivil war measures the n
Control Variables
While the results in Ta

impact on different s
controls to test more r
post-colonial violence.
analyses of civil violen
teristics that are partic
Similar to Fearon and
territory within each c
litical insurgencies by li
we employ the natural
derived from the conf
alization and cultural d
diversity, which is com
rebellion and civil war
and the total populatio
from Heston, Summer
Several previous studie
likelihood of civil viol
density promotes viole
resources. Next, we con
2003), which potentiall
pursue their political i
decade represented by
that the prevalence of
analysis, the 1960s is t
variables measuring wh
1980s or 1990s. Finally, we copy several past analyses and include a regional
dummy for sub-Saharan Africa.12 While the regional variable potentially measures
diverse characteristics that affect the prevalence and intensity of civil violence, it
is almost perfectly related to a dummy measuring industrializing horticultural
societies (r = .95). Nolan and Lenski (2004), in turn, claim that industrializing
horticulturalists have strong tribal loyalties and face severe social disruptions dur-
ing the transition to industrialization, factors that might affect rebellions, civil war
and, in particular, inter-communal conflict.13
Along with these standard variables, we include three additional controls that are
particularly important for an analysis of colonial legacies either because they control
for pre-colonial factors that potentially affect a country's colonial heritage as well as
its history of civil violence or because they control for additional types of political
domination that might have similar effects as colonialism. First, we include a measure
of a country's history of statehood because it might affect a country's risk of colonial
conquest and civil violence. The state history variable is taken from Putterman's
(2007b) State Antiquity Index, which provides a general proxy for the age of states.14
We also include a variable measuring the onset of settled agriculture and use it
as a proxy for historical technological development. According to Lenski 's (1966,
1970) and Diamond's (1997) evolutionary theories of social change, agricultural
technology evolves along a general path of increasing sophistication, and these
technologies have powerful effects on the organization of society. Of particular
interest to this analysis, simple agricultural technologies are associated with tribal
social structures, and the latter might increase the likelihood of ethnic violence
by impeding national integration; tribal social structures and limited technology
might also promote colonial conquest. In an attempt to control for these factors,
we include a variable gathered by Putterman (2007a) that measures the number
of centuries since settled agriculture began in a given country.
The final control variable measures a country's history of internal colonialism.
We use this variable in order to control for regions that do not fit our definition
of a colony but are viewed by some as former colonies. Based on our definition,
colonialism occurs when a group conquers and controls foreign peoples and lands.
Historically, some places do not fit this definition because the dominating power
is not clearly foreign. These regions are oftentimes referred to as internal colonies,
as they are conquered by a neighboring power and ruled as integral components
of the conquering power's national territory. Examples of former internal colonies
include regions formerly under the control of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman
Empires as well as the former Soviet Republics. We measure internal colonies using
a dichotomous variable, with one representing a country that had the majority of
its territory and population ruled as an internal colony for at least ten consecutive
years after 1648 and zero representing non-internal colonies.15 See Appendix A for
a list of internal colonies. Summary statistics for all dependent, focal and control
variables are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Summary Statistics

Standard
Dependent Variables
Communal Conflict3 505 1.21 2.00 .00 6.00
Political Rebellion0 543 1.56 2.43 .00 7.00
Civil War0 550 1.57 3.22 .00 10.00
Focal Independent Variables
Colony Status 550 .70 .46 .00 1.00

Internal Colony Status 550 .13 .34 .00 1.00
British Colonies 550 .29 .45 .00 1.00
French Colonies 550 .16 .37 .00 1.00
Spanish Colonies 550 .13 .34 .00 1.00
Other Colonies 550 .13 .33 .00 1.00
Years Since Independence 387 50.73 58.79 -8.00 207.00
Colonial Duration 550 97.93 111.86 .00 399.00
Settler Population 50-100% 550 .09 .29 .00 1.00
Settler Population 10-49% 550 .09 .28 .00 1.00
Control Variables
Population (log) 457 16.02 1.47 12.90 20.90

Fractionalization 533 -.29 .93 -1.84 1.47
% Mountainous (log) 547 1.15 2.92 -4.61 4.55
Democracy 547 .37 7.17 -10.00 10.00
GDP (log) 457 8.15 1.04 5.99 10.26
State History 487 .45 .25 .02 .96
Agricultural Onset 550 47.70 24.55 3.62 105.00
1970s 550 .25 .43 .00 1.00
1980s 550 .25 .43 .00 1.00
1990s 550 .29 .45 .00 1.00
Sub-Saharan Africa
aCommunal conflict is measured on a

Political rebellion is measured on a eig
cCivil war measures the number of ye
Methodology and Diagnostic Ex
Pooled ordinary least squares regre

panel dataseis as multiple observat
similar than observations betw
Lagrange Multiplier statistic tests
effects, or unobserved heterogen
served heterogeneity in all of o
regression may result in heteroge
result in inconsistent or meaning
(Hsiao 2003). Two common estim
unmeasured heterogeneity usin
effects model and the fixed-effec
variables are time-invariant and t
the between-country information from the data, the random-effects model is

the most appropriate for the current analysis.
An alternative estimation strategy that also draws upon between-country in-
formation is OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995).
However, we do not use this modeling strategy because we are unable to correct for
autocorrelation given our data structure.16 Accordingly, we employ random-effects
models throughout the analyses.
We conduct tests of influence and collinearity on the pooled OLS regressions
prior to running their corresponding random-effects models. Influential cases per-
taining to each colonial variable in the models are identified using the DFBETA
influence statistic. We identify a few influential cases, but their exclusion does not
substantively change the results of the models.17 As such, all available cases are
included in the results. With one exception, multicollinearity between the inde-
pendent variables is at tolerable levels, as all variance inflation factors are less than
5.5. The exception occurs when both the Spanish Colonies and Colonial Duration
variables are included in the same model, causing the VIF to increase to moderate
levels (7.6) that potentially produce inaccurate results. As a consequence, when
including measures of the colonizer, we run two models -one with the Colonial
Duration variable and one without it- and report differences between the two.
Results
Refer to Table 3 for the results of all models analyzing level of communal conflict.
In the five models with some measure of colonial heritage (models 2 to 6), at least
one of the colonial variables is strongly related to communal conflict, and the results
strongly support claims that communal conflict is a common legacy of colonial
rule. Model 2 shows that former colonies are more likely to have experienced higher
levels of communal conflict than non-colonies between 1960 and 1999 (1.4 points
higher on average based on the seven-point inter-communal conflict scale), and the
relationship is statistically significant at p < .01 . Considering that the average level of
communal conflict for all countries in our set is only 1.2, this gap separating former
colonies and non-colonies is very large. In Model 3, we add the control for internal
colonies, and the colonial status variable remains equally strong and significant.
In Model 4, we keep the colonial status variable but add variables measuring the
duration of colonialism and the presence of European settlers in former colonies.
The colonial status variable remains very strongly related to level of communal
conflict. In addition, the duration variable is positively and significantly related to
communal conflict, while the two settler variables are negatively and significantly
related to communal conflict. The table therefore provides evidence that the type
of colonialism mattered, with colonies that were colonized longer and without
settlers having higher levels of communal conflict from I960 through 1999.
To see if the identity of the colonizer affects the level of communal conflict
during the same time frame, we disaggregate the former colonies according to
Table 3: Random-Effects Models of Level of Inter-Communal Conflict
Regressors
Colony Status 1.401** 1.283** 1.304**

(3.44) (2.61) (3.05)
Internal Colony Status -.233
(-.43)
British Colonies 1.363**
(2.95)
French Colonies .681
(1.36)
Spanish Colonies .415
(.52)
Other Colonies 1.471**
(2.62)
Years Since Independence -.009*
(-2.05)
Colonial Duration .004* .005* .005**
(2.53) (2.50) (3.06)
Settler Population 50-100% -1.632** -.901 -.346
(-3.43) (-1.40) (-.52)
Settler Population 10-49% -1.647** -1.065 -.693
(-3.65) (-1.89) (-1.19)
Population (logged) .453** .434** .430** .506** .410** .497**
(4.25) (4.36) (4.28) (5.32) (3.83) (4.51)
Fractionalization .410** .270* .267 .225 .228 .112
(2.42) (1.66) (1.63) (1.45) (1.44) (.61)
% Mountainous (logged) .026 .025 .022 .069 .051 .088
(.54) (.56) (.49) (1.58) (1.12) (1.65)
Democracy -.003 .012 .012 .011 .003 .002
(-.14) (.68) (.64) (.62) (.15) (.10)
GDP (logged) .071 .204 .197 .405* .326* .002
(.44) (1.28) (1.22) (2.55) (2.00) (.012)
State History -1.128 .070 -.040 -.367 .071 -.766
(-1.50) (.089) (-.049) (-.48) (.089) (-.85)
Agricultural Onset .020** .027** .027** .024** .027** .032**
(2.60) (3.62) (3.63) (3.20) (3.41) (3.67)
1970s -.031 -.080 -.075 -.139 -.099 -.037
(-.14) (-.37) (-.35) (-.64) (-.46) (-.14)
1980s -.242 -.315 -.309 -.424 -.352 -.223
(-1.08) (-1.41) (-1.37) (-1.89) (-1.56) (-.80)
1990s 1.204** 1.109** 1.121** .975** 1.085** 1.412**
(5.22) (4.81) (4.82) (4.23) (4.64) (4.57)
Sub-Saharan Africa .524 .908* .877* .995* 1.055* .794
(1.17) (2.09) (1.99) (2.00) (2.11) (1.35)
Constant -7.231** -10.019** -9.738** -12.530** -10.695** -8.214**
(-3.34) (-4.53) (-4.21) (-5.79) (-4.57) (-3.15)
Observations 396 396 396 396 396 295
Number of Countries 114 114 114 114 114 83
R-sauared (Overall)
Notes: The table presents unstandardiz

parentheses). *p < .05 **p < .01
Inter-communal conflict is measured
aSample restricted to former colonies.
the identity of the colonizer in Model 5. The results suggest that former British
colonies and former colonies of minor colonial powers drive the relationship
between colonial status and communal conflict. Specifically, former British colo-
nies had levels of inter-communal conflict that were nearly 1.4 points higher
than non-colonies on average, and the former colonies of the minor colonial
powers had levels of inter-communal conflict that were, on average, 1.5 points
higher than non-colonies. Limited observations prevent the disaggregation of the
Other Colonies variable to see which former colonizers drive the relationship. A
manual inspection of the data shows that several former colonies of the minor
powers had relatively high levels of communal conflict, although former Belgian
colonies (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda) appear the most
influential. Former French and Spanish colonies are also positively related to inter-
communal conflict, although their coefficients are considerably smaller and lack
statistical significance. 18
Besides the variables measuring the identity of the colonizers, Model 5 also
includes variables measuring the duration of colonialism and the presence of
European settlers. Similar to Model 4, the duration variable remains positively and
significantly related to ethnic conflict. Alternatively, both of the settler variables
lose their significance, and their coefficients decrease considerably, suggesting
that the settler variables in Model 4 capture, in part, the identity of the colonizer.
Comparing the R-squared statistics of Model 5 with those of Model 1, one sees
that the various colonial variables strengthen the overall predictive power of the
model by more than 40 percent. Overall, our results therefore suggest that colo-
nialism is an important predictor of the level of post-colonial communal conflict.
Model 6 includes the variable measuring time since colonial independence but
limits its set to former colonies. Because of the latter, the model cannot show wheth-
er former colonies have higher levels of communal conflict than non-colonies but
highlights, instead, temporal effects related to colonial independence. The results
indicate that the number of years since independence influences the level of com-
munal conflict. Specifically, the variable is negatively and significantly related to
inter-communal violence, and the coefficients show that, on average, each additional
year of independence lessens the severity of inter-communal conflict by .01 (on
the seven-point scale). Besides time since colonial independence, Model 6 also in-
cludes the variables measuring the duration of colonialism and European settlement.
Similar to Model 5, the duration variable remains positively and significantly related
to level communal conflict, and the settler variables lack statistical significance.
Besides the focal colonial variables, three control variables are consistently and
significantly related to level inter-communal conflict, while two others have sig-
nificant relationships in at least two of the models. Consistent with the literature,
population size and the decennial control for the 1 990s are both positively and
significantly related to inter-communal conflict. The onset of settled agriculture
is also positively and significantly related to inter-communal conflict in all models,
Dividing and Ruling the World? «801
and its positive coefficient suggests that early agricultural development promotes
communal violence. This finding is new and rather unexpected and therefore
requires some consideration. One possibility is that sustained settled agriculture
in the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia and elsewhere has increased envi-
ronmental degradation and thereby competition over land, water, wood and other
resources. Alternatively, it is possible that a history of settled agriculture promotes
the rise of powerful cultural institutions that enforce rigid communal identities.
Finally, the African dummy and the variable measuring per capita GDP are posi-
tively and significantly related to communal conflict in four and two of the five
models respectively, suggesting that countries in sub-Saharan Africa and countries
with low national incomes have higher risks of communal violence.
Table 4 contains the results of the models using level of political rebellion as
the dependent variable. At first glance, one can see that very few of the colonial
variables have either large coefficients or statistical significance, and the results
therefore provide limited evidence in support of claims that a history of colonialism
promotes rebellion. Model 2 shows that former colonies have no substantive differ-
ence in level of political rebellion relative to non-colonies, and comparison of the
R-squared values of models 1 and 2 shows that the addition of the colonial status
variable does not improve the predictive power of the model. And, with the addi-
tion of the control for internal colonies in Model 3, the colonial status coefficient
switches signs but remains statistically insignificant. In Model 4, the addition of
the duration and settler variables only improves the predictive power of the model
slightly, neither the duration nor the settler variables are significant at the .05 level,
and the colonial status variable remains insignificantly related to level of political
rebellion. Breaking down former colonies by the identity of the colonizer, Model 5
shows that only one of the former colonial powers -Spain -is significantly related
to level of rebellion, and it is negatively related to it (although multicollinearity
might drive this finding).19 Along with the variables measuring the identity of the
colonizer, the model also includes the variable measuring the duration of colonial-
ism, and it is significantly related to level political rebellion. In this way, while
simply being a colony or being colonized by one colonial power does not appear
to increase the level of political rebellion, colonies that were colonized for longer
periods of time experienced higher levels of political rebellion than those that either
were not colonized or were colonized for fewer years. Finally, Model 6 indicates that
the number of years since independence has little effect on the level of rebellion,
although the duration of colonialism remains positively and significantly related
to rebellion in the model. In sum, the results in Table 4 lend only partial support
to the colonial hypothesis, showing that the length of colonialism is positively and
significantly related to the level of political rebellion in two of three models but
that colonial status, the identity of the colonizer, years since independence and the
presence of settlers are all weakly related to the level of political rebellion.
While colonialism is generally a poor predictor of level of political rebellion,
Table 4: Random-Effects Models of Level of Political Rebellion

Regressors
Colony Status .100 -.152 -.408

(.22) (-.25) (-.74)
(-.59)
British Colonies -.416
(-.69)
French Colonies -1.114
(-1.74)
Spanish Colonies -2.194*
(-1.99)
Other Colonies -.079
(-.10)
Years Since Independence -.009
(-1.64)
Colonial Duration .004 .006* .005*
(1.92) (2.28) (2.34)
Settler Population 50-100% -.246 1.113 .544
(-.35) (1.22) (.60)
Settler Population 10-49% -.623 .447 .099
(-.95) (.56) (.13)
Population (logged) .434** .432** .419** .430** .281 .490**
(3.40) (3.36) (3.21) (3.27) (1.96) (3.29)
Fractionalization .465* .461* .467* .424* .426* .250
(2.28) (2.25) (2.27) (2.02) (2.02) (1.01)
(1.42) (1.40) (1.30) (1.39) (1.02) (1.35)
Democracy .000 .001 -.001 -.003 -.009 -.001
(.016) (.041) (-.035) (-.15) (-.43) (-.040)
GDP (logged) -.502** -.493** -.513** -.433* -.538** -.463
(-2.71) (-2.61) (-2.67) (-2.22) (-2.72) (-1.83)
State History .570 .635 .400 .769 1.488 .504
(.62) (.66) (.38) (.76) (1.43) (.42)
Agricultural Onset .011 .011 .012 .016 .021 .020
(1.15) (1.16) (1.22) (1.51) (1.92) (1.70)
1970s .327 .325 .336 .309 .371 .427
(1.51) (1.49) (1.54) (1.41) (1.70) (1.54)
1980s .332 .329 .346 .308 .420 .478
(1.46) (1.44) (1.50) (1.33) (1.80) (1.52)
1990s .714** .714** .746** .703** .858** 1.008**
(3.03) (3.03) (3.08) (2.92) (3.49) (2.78)
Sub-Saharan Africa .658 .664 .581 1.180 1.305* 1.085
(1.25) (1.26) (1.06) (1.82) (2.02) (1.41)
Constant -2.629 -2.784 -2.089 -3.705 -1.169 -4.870
(-1.04) (-1.06) (-.73) (-1.38) (-.41) (-1.45)
Observations 427 427 427 427 427 308
R-sauared (Overall)
Note: The table presents unstandard

Political rebellion is measured on a e
aSample restricted to former coloni
four control variables are strongly related to it. Similar to the models of inter-
communal conflict, population size and the decennial control for the 1990s
are positively and significantly related to level rebellion, and per capita GDP is
negatively and significantly related to it. In addition, the ethnic fractionalization
variable is positively and significantly related to rebellion in five of the six models,
suggesting that greater levels of ethnic diversity promote rebellions.
We present the models of years of civil war per decade in Table 5. Similar to the
models of level of political rebellion, the findings in the table offer only partial sup-
port to the colonial hypothesis. In models 2 through 4, the colonial status variable
is never significantly related to the number of years of civil war per decade. Similarly,
none of the variables measuring the identity of the colonizer are significantly related
to years of civil war. Models 4 through 6, however, show that two aspects of colo-
nialism help predict the number of years of civil war per decade. First, the variable
measuring the duration of colonialism is positively and significantly related to years
of civil war in all three models.20 In addition, the results in Model 6 show that the
number of years since independence is negatively and significantly related to years
of civil war per decade. As such, on average each year of independence decreases
the number of years of civil war by .02 years per decade, and -similar to Fearon
and Lai tin (2003) -the results provide evidence that the independence transition
created instability and competition that promoted civil war.
Considering the control variables, population size, per capita GDP and the
decennial control for the 1 990s are significantly and consistently related to years of
civil war in all models. In addition, the decennial controls for the 1970s and 1980s
are positively and significantly related to civil war in all six models, suggesting that
civil wars became increasingly prevalent after the 1960s.21
Summary and Discussion
This article tests whether colonialism left a legacy of civil violence by comparing
former colonies and non-colonies. Through a cross-national time series analysis of
1 14-132 countries, we provide evidence against sweeping claims that colonialism
is a universal cause of civil violence but find that some forms of colonialism appear
to have increased the risk and intensity of some forms of civil violence.
Our models on level of communal conflict provide strong support for the
colonial hypothesis, as all but two of the variables measuring different aspects of
colonialism are strongly and consistently related to level of communal conflict
1960-1999. The lone exceptions are the measures of European settlement, which
are negatively and significantly related to communal conflict in one of three mod-
els and might be better measures of pre-colonial conditions than colonialism. Our
findings therefore support claims that communal violence is a common legacy of
colonialism, with settler colonialism being a potential exception.
Given these findings, it appears that a history of colonial rule promotes either
oppositional communal identities, communal divisions of labor, ethnic-based
Table 5: Random-Effects Models of Years of Civil War per Decade
Regressors
Colony Status .671 .594 -.820

(1.16) (.74) (-1.21)
(-.14)
British Colonies -1 .054
(-1.42)
French Colonies -1 .283
(-1.61)
Spanish Colonies -2.035
(-1.50)
Other Colonies .345
(.36)
Years Since Independence -.018*
(-2.16)
Colonial Duration .012** .012** .014**
(4.26) (3.84) (4.12)
Settler Population 50-100% -.481 .758 1.353
(-.57) (.68) (1.02)
Settler Population 10-49% -.908 .022 .504
(-1.13) (.023) (.44)
Population (logged) .671** .652** .648** .632** .480** .717**
(4.07) (3.95) (3.85) (3.90) (2.71) (3.27)
Fractionalization .410 .381 .383 .245 .313 .108
(1.56) (1.44) (1.44) (.95) (1.21) (.30)
(1.15) (1.07) (1.03) (1.00) (.47) (1.30)
Democracy -.004 -.000 -.001 -.012 -.011 -.010
(-.14) (-.017) (-.038) (-.44) (-.41) (-.29)
GDP (logged) -.629** -.568* -.573* -.422 -.509* -.671
(-2.58) (-2.28) (-2.26) (-1.69) (-2.00) (-1.90)
State History .472 .918 .847 1.304 1.765 .863
(.40) (.74) (.63) (1.05) (1.37) (.48)
Agricultural Onset -.016 -.011 -.011 .006 .012 .011
(-1.34) (-.90) (-.88) (.43) (.89) (.64)
1970s .704* .689* .692* .655* .706* .743*
(2.36) (2.30) (2.31) (2.19) (2.35) (2.03)
1980s 1.171** 1.148** 1.153** 1.108** 1.202** 1.315**
(3.75) (3.67) (3.66) (3.53) (3.79) (3.11)
1990s 1.372** 1.377** 1.387** 1.376** 1.500** 1.746**
(4.31) (4.32) (4.24) (4.30) (4.58) (3.51)
Sub-Saharan Africa -.247 -.201 -.226 1.389 1.392 1.088
(-.36) (-.30) (-.32) (1.74) (1.74) (.97)
Constant -4.428 -5.501 -5.294 -7.858* -5.295 -7.978
(-1.35) (-1.62) (-1.41) (-2.33) (-1.48) (-1.66)
Observations 430 430 430 430 430 309
R-sauared (Overall)
Note: The table presents unstandard

Civil war measures the number of
aSample restricted to former coloni
stratification, animosity between indigenous and non-indigenous populations, or

some combination of the four. Previous qualitative analyses frequently describe
these effects as a consequence of divide-and-rule policy. And, coinciding with our
statistical findings, many suggest that the latter was very prevalent among British
colonies. According to Carroll (2001:81-2), divide and rule "was the story of
the British Empire's success, and its legacy of nurtured local hatreds can be seen
wherever the Union Flag few, from Muslim-Hindu hatred in Pakistan and India,
to Catholic-Protestant hatred in Ireland, to. . . Jew- Arab hatred in Modern Israel."
Others dismiss claims of Britain's supposed use of divide-and-rule techniques
but recognize that the British -more than any other colonial power -"formally
acknowledged differences of religion, language, continental origin, culture, and
political tradition among its non-European subjects," a general policy that "re-
inforced diversity, as groups became more conscious of their separate identities
and interests." (Abernethy 2000: 160)
Another factor that might explain the strong relationship between British col-
onialism and communal violence is the colonial-induced transfer of large popu-
lations from Europe, Africa and Asia to diverse corners of the British Empire.
Indeed, if one adds the number of non-natives living in British colonies at their
respective dates of independence, nearly 27 million people of non-indigenous
origins lived in the British Empire. Of these, nearly 13 million were of European
origins, 3 million were descendants of African slaves, 4.5 million came from
China, and more than 4 million migrated from the Indian sub-continent. And,
communal violence between peoples of indigenous and non-indigenous origins
has afflicted several former British colonies. Our findings, however, provide evi-
dence that colonies with European settlement had levels of communal conflict
that were either the same as or lower than non-colonies, thereby suggesting that
European settlement does not explain relatively high levels of communal conflict
among former British colonies. Similarly, communal conflict was relatively low
in former British colonies with African migrants. It is possible, however, that
Chinese and Indian immigrants to British colonies heightened levels of communal
conflict by serving as ethnic intermediaries between the colonial officials and the
local population, remaining socially isolated from the indigenous population
and monopolizing particular sectors of the economy. Indeed, violence between
indigenous peoples, Chinese and Indians has occurred in several former British
colonies, including Burma, Fiji, India, Malaysia, South Africa and Sri Lanka.22
Colonialism by minor colonial powers is also strongly related to level of com-
munal violence. In particular, former Belgian colonies experienced very high levels
of inter-communal conflict. Similar to British colonialism, some recognize that
the Belgians also employed divide-and-rule techniques to dominate foreign lands
and peoples, and to strengthen ethnic differences. In Rwanda, for example, the
Belgians emphasized -some say created -the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis
and strongly backed the latter while formally discriminating against the former,
thereby promoting ethnic animosity that has plagued the country (Mamdani
2001; Newbury 1983; Uvin 1999). In addition, Abernethy (2000) claims that the
Belgians -as well as the Dutch and Portuguese -failed to prepare their colonies for
independence because of domestic unwillingness to accept the dissolution of em-
pire. This unwillingness to grant independence was caused by the relatively weak
positions of the minor powers within the international state system and, in turn,
sparked anti-colonial violence. In this way, the independence processes within
the colonies of the minor powers frequently left a legacy of violence and a power
vacuum, two conditions that potentially increased ethnic competition and conflict.
While British colonialism and colonialism by minor colonial powers are most
strongly related to communal violence, Spanish colonialism has the weakest re-
lationship. One potential explanation for the Spanish exception is the impact
of Spanish colonialism on ethnic divisions. Indeed, the Spanish differed from
the British in that they neither employed divide-and-rule tactics nor promoted
cultural pluralism, instead they treated a tremendously diverse indigenous popula-
tions as undifferentiated wholes (Silverblatt 1994). In addition, the post-colonial
governments of former Spanish colonies commonly popularized mestizaje, a na-
tional ideology suggesting that all citizens are racially mixed (Martinez-Echazabal
1998). This ideology potentially reduced ethnic divisions and thereby limited
violence. Finally, the time of independence might underlie Spanish colonialism's
much weaker relationship with inter-communal violence. We find that the risk
of communal conflict among former colonies decreased after independence, sug-
gesting that the effect of colonialism diminishes over time as the social setting
changes and opposing groups resolve their colonially instigated conflicts or that
the colonial withdrawal created a punctuated period of violence by leaving a power
vacuum. Given the relatively early independence of Spanish colonies, their lower
levels of communal conflict might simply be caused by the diminution of any
colonial effect over time.23
Whereas our findings provide evidence that a history of colonialism promotes

inter-communal conflict, our results for level political rebellion and years of civil
war per decade are much less conclusive. Most basically, there is no statistically
significant difference in level of rebellion or years of civil war between former
colonies and non-colonies. Moreover, when we divide former colonies according
to the identity of the colonizer, we find that there is no statistically significant dif-
ference in years of civil war and level of rebellion between non-colonies and former
colonies of Great Britain, France and minor colonial powers. In fact, the only col-
onial power with a significant relationship in any of the models is Spain. However,
its former colonies had lower levels of rebellion than non-colonies, a finding that
is contrary to the colonial hypothesis (but might be caused by multicollinearity).
Similar to communal conflict, however, we find that the duration of colonial rule
is positively and significantly related to both level of political rebellion and years
of civil war per decade, suggesting that countries with long histories of colonialism
were more susceptible to rebellion and civil war from 1960 through 1999.
While our statistical findings do not provide insight into potential mechan-
isms underlying the relationship between the duration variable and all three
dependent variables, the duration of colonialism likely measures the extent of
colonial transformation, a finding that supports the colonial hypothesis. For
example, the duration of colonialism might have affected the infrastructural
power of the colonial and postcolonial states, thereby increasing state interference
with local affairs and sparking rebellions and civil war. Yet, the coefficients of the
colonial duration variable are quite small for political rebellion and civil violence,
suggesting that 50 additional years of colonialism are, on average, associated with
seven more months of civil war per decade and an increase in the political rebel-
lion index by only .3 (out of a eight-point scale). All in all, our findings suggest
that the overall impact of colonialism on postcolonial rebellions and civil war
appears limited, or at best, moderate, and that general claims about the effects of
colonialism on both might be exaggerated.
Our findings on rebellion and civil war are somewhat surprising given the
multiple works describing how colonialism arbitrarily combined diverse popula-
tions into a single national community, reduced the autonomy of local political
communities, and thereby sparked autonomy movements and civil war. Notably,
our findings do not negate the possibility that these factors promote rebellion and
civil war (colonial duration is, after all, significantly related to each), but they do
open past claims to question. For example, our limited support of the colonial hy-
pothesis might show that both types of violence afflict colonies and non-colonies
alike, as arbitrary borders, mixed populations and movements for local autonomy
can be found in all corners of the world and appear to be linked to state-building
processes in general (Hechter 2000). Indeed, the Basque, Corsican and Irish sep-
aratist movements show that even former colonizers experience ethno-nationalist
rebellion and civil war.
These concluding remarks are preliminary interpretations and must be viewed

sceptically because our analysis provides only limited insight into causal mecha-
nisms. Similarly, our statistical findings only shed light on the possibility that
colonialism commonly left violent legacies. At the very least, however, we provide
an initial test of the popular belief that colonialism is a general cause of postcolo-
nial violence, and in doing so, offer statistical insight that can help guide future
analyses and revise past claims.
Notes
1. "Mise en valeur, exploitation des pays devenus colonies."
2. One exception is the variable measuring the years since colonial independence.
Instead of a decennial average, it measures the number of years since independence
using the first year of each decade.
3. The models of inter-communal conflict exclude the following cases because of
missing values: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia, Croatia,

Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Estonia, Georgia, Guinea-
Bissau, Iraq, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia,
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Myanmar, Namibia,
Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Somalia, Sweden,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's Republic and Yugoslavia. The models for
political rebellion and civil war exclude the following cases because of missing values:
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Bosnia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Djibouti, Eritrea,
Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Democratic Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia,
Libya, Myanmar, Namibia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sweden, Tanzania, United Arab Emirates, Yemen Arab Republic, Yemen People's
Republic and Yugoslavia.
4. Although organized along a continuous scale, the intervals between the scores are not
necessarily equivalent, and the use of the variable as a continuous measure of conflict
might not be appropriate. We therefore have also transformed MAR data on inter-
communal conflict into dicho tomous variables in order to see if the dichotomous and
continuous scorings produce similar results. We find that the results are substantively
identical and therefore include only the continuous-variable scorings in this article.
Another potential problem is that the MAR dataset only includes countries with
politically active ethnic communities at risk of violence, a situation that excludes
countries with limited potential for ethnic violence and results in a biased set of
cases. To limit this problem, we include countries that are excluded from the MAR
dataset when they meet all of the conditions for being included in the set except one:
they lack minority communities either facing discrimination or actively pursuing
community interests through collective mobilization. For these cases, we score their
level of inter-communal conflict as zero. We follow the same procedure for MAR data
on political rebellion.
5. Similar to inter-communal conflict, we transformed MAR data on political rebellion

into dichotomous variables. The results using the dichotomous variable scores are
substantively identical to those using the continuous-variable scorings, so we only
present the latter.
6. We also operationalize civil war dichotomously, with 1 representing the presence

of civil war during a decade and 0 representing its absence. Because the results are
substantively identical to models with the variable measuring the number of years of
civil war in a decade, we only present the latter.
7. The only significant difference between the two measures of Colonial Status is
that the sub-Saharan African control is positively and significantly related to inter-
communal violence when the 1648-1999 interval is employed, but the variable loses
its significance with the 1900-1999 interval.
8. The Other Colonies category includes Belgium, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, the
United States and countries that were simultaneously controlled by multiple colonial
powers. Former Italian and South African colonies are excluded because of missing data.
9. Recognizing that some former colonies changed hands from one colonial power
to another, we categorize countries according to their final colonizer. Because the
penultimate colonizer might be more influential than the final, we also categorize
countries with more than one colonizer according to their penultimate colonizer. For
the latter, we coded cases that changed colonial hands in one of two ways. First, we
categorized countries with histories of colonization by more than one colonial power
according to their penultimate colonizer instead of their final colonizer. Recognizing
that nearly all of the penultimate colonizers appear to have had only a minor impact
on colonized society relative to the final colonizers, we also employed a second strategy
that categorized the majority of countries with histories of more than one colonial
power according to the final colonizer but coded the two countries with arguably the
most influential penultimate colonizers -the Philippines and South Africa -according
to their penultimate colonizers. The results of both are substantively identical to the
results based on the identity of the final colonial power, so we only present the latter
in this analysis.
10. While recognizing the severe problems with such an analysis, we also ran models
using the time since independence variable for the entire set as a sensitivity check
by coding non-colonies as having gained independence in 1648. The results are
substantively identical to those presented in Model 6 of tables 3, 4 and 5. When
the time since independence variable is included with the colonial status variable,
however, the latter loses its significant relationship to inter-communal conflict while
the time since independence variable remains significantly and negatively related to
it. Given VIF scores greater than 9 for both colonial variables, however, one cannot
differentiate between the effects of both variables when they are included in the
same model and therefore cannot conclude that time since independence is more
influential than colonial status. Indeed, coded as such, the time since independence
variable captures both the number of years since independence and colonial status.
11. As measured by the "Polity2" variable in the Polity /Kdataset.
12. We also ran models with dummies for all world regions (the West, Eastern Europe,
Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan
Africa, and Southeast Asia). When all regional controls are included, the colonial
variable coefficients remain virtually identical to the models with only the Africa
regional control (although the sub-Saharan Africa control loses its significance for
the inter-communal conflict models when the other regional controls are included).
The only regional control that is significant in any of the models is Latin America
and the Caribbean, which is negatively related to inter-communal violence. Notably,
the models with all regional controls are problematic, because their inclusion causes
high levels of collineari ty among the independent variables, with VIF scores near 8.
Because of such high levels of collinearity, one cannot interpret these results with
much confidence, therefore we do not present models with all regional controls.
13. The data on industrializing horticultural societies is dichotomous and measures

whether or not a society was primarily horticultural prior to the onset of
industrialization. Most data come from Lenski and Nolan (1984), who provide
data on horticultural heritage for 77 cases. Because their list does not include all
industrializing horticultural societies, we gather data for nearly all cases that are
missing from their list and estimate their score. When replacing the African dummy
with this variable, the results are nearly identical, with no significant changes in any
of our focal or control variables. Thus, we simply present the results using the African
regional control.
14. Putterman's State Antiquity Index measures the existence of a government above the
tribal level, the proportion of the territory of a present country that this government
controlled, and whether or not this government was indigenous or colonial. The
data are measured over 50-year periods, and the scores range from 0 to 50, with 0
suggesting that there was no government above the tribal level in a given country
during a given 50-year period and 50 suggesting the existence of an autonomous state
present throughout the country's present territory. The scores are averaged over the
entire period between 0 AD and 1950 AD using a 5 percent discount rate to weight
recent periods more heavily.
15. Some countries became overseas colonies after a history of internal colonialism, and
we code these cases as former colonies, not former internal colonies. One problem
with operationalizing internal colonialism is that a very fine line can separate an
internal colony from a region within an integrated national state. Within Spain,
for example, some suggest that the Basque region is an internal colony, but others
strongly disagree. Ultimately, we see the status of internal colonies as very subjective
unless independence has been attained. We therefore classify countries as internal
colonies only if they have gained independence. As such, we categorize Ireland as a
former internal colony of Great Britain, but Scotland and Northern Ireland, which
continue to be integral parts of the United Kingdom, are not. We also coded internal
colonies according to the identity of their colonizer: Internal Austro-Hungarian
Colonies, Internal Ottoman Colonies, Internal Soviet Colonies or Other. Because
none of the variables are significantly related to any of the dependent variables, we
do not present the results in this article.
1 6. We ran our models using panel-corrected standard errors, and the results were similar
to the random-effects models, with the exception of a few other colonial variables that
achieved statistical significance relative to the random-effects models. This difference,
however, is consistent with the presence of autocorrelation, which we are able to
confirm but not correct given our data structure (there are too few time periods to
statistically correct for autocorrelation, and we lose too many data points by including
a lagged dependent variable as a regressor). In addition to the models using panel-
corrected standard errors, we also ran OLS models using cluster-correlated robust
estimates of variance (Williams 2000) to verify the robustness of our results, which
produced substantively similar results as the random-effects models.
17. We removed influential cases from models 2 through 6 for each dependent variable.
For inter-communal conflict, we removed Cyprus (1970), and Republic of Korea
(1990) from Model 2; Republic of Korea (1990) from models 3 and 4; Republic of
Korea (1990) and Cambodia (1990) from Model 5; and Zimbabwe (1970) and the
United States of America (1960) from Model 6. For political rebellion, we removed
Russia (1990) from Model 3; Panama (1960) from Model 5; and Panama (1960) and
Zimbabwe (1970) from Model 6. For civil war, we removed Iran (1980) from Model
3; Morocco (1980) from Model 5; and Haiti (1990), Zimbabwe (1970) and Algeria
(1990) from Model 5.
1 8 . Because of moderate levels of multicollinearity caused by the inclusion of the Spanish

Colonies and Colonial Duration variables in the same models, we also ran Model
5 without the duration variable (results not shown) . The exclusion of the duration
variable causes the Spanish Colonies variable to become significant at the .05-level.
While this might suggest inaccurate results caused by multicollinearity, the results for
all other colonial identity variables also experienced significant changes, suggesting
that multicollinearity is not a problem.
19. The accuracy of our findings for Spanish Colonies must be questioned because of
potential problems caused by moderate levels of multicollinearity. When the Colonial
Duration variable is removed from Model 5 in order to reduce multicollinearity, the
coefficient of the Spanish Colonies variable changes from -2.194 to -.571 and loses
its significance (results not shown). While the coefficients of the remaining variables
Dividing and Ruling the World? • 81 1
measuring the identity of the colonizer also change considerably with the exclusion
of the Colonial Duration variable, none changes as much as the Spanish Colonies
variable, and none becomes significant.
20. When we run Model 5 without the Colonial Duration variable in order to reduce
moderately high levels of multicollinearity, the significance of the Spanish Colonies
variable does not change, providing evidence that moderate levels of multicollinearity
are not problematic.
21 . Two potential problems might affect our results, one would exaggerate the estimated
impact of colonialism and the other would underemphasize it. Considering the latter,
colonialism preceded and shaped several of our control variables. As a consequence,
our controls might be intervening variables that capture -at least partially- the impact
of colonialism. To test for this possibility, we run models that include only the colonial
variables and the control variables that were not shaped by colonialism (percent of
territory that is mountainous, state history, agricultural onset, the African dummy
and the decennial dummies) (results not shown). In comparing the coefficients of the
colonial variables of these models with the full models presented in this article, we
find that they are substantively identical, suggesting that the control variables do not
suppress the coefficients of the colonial variables in the models above. Second, it is
possible that pre-colonial conditions shaped both a country's history of colonialism
and postcolonial civil violence. If this were the case, our colonial variables might
measure pre-colonial conditions rather than colonial effects, thereby exaggerating the
true impact of colonialism. In order to test for this possibility, we run interactions
between our colonial variables and our control variables that measure pre-colonial
conditions (the African dummy, agricultural onset, state history and the percent of
territory that is mountainous) (results not shown). None of the interaction terms
have significant relations with any of the dependent variables, providing no evidence
that the colonial variables simply measure pre-colonial factors.
22. Although Afro-Guyanans are not indigenous to Guyana, they immigrated before
Indo-Guyanans, and severe ethnic conflict occurred between Afro-Guyanans and
Indo-Guyanans due to economic and political competition between the two.
23. We are unable to test whether time since independence drives the relatively weak
relationship between Spanish colonialism and communal conflict because of
multicollinearity.
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Table A1. List of Non-Coloniesa
1 Afghanistan
2 Austria
3 Bhutan
4 China
5 Denmark
6 Ethiopia
7 France
8 Germany
9 Iran
10 Italy
11 Japan
12 Mongolia
13 Nepal
14 Netherlands
15 Portugal
16 Russia
17 Saudi Arabia
18 Spain
19 Sweden
20 Switzerland
21 Thailand
22 Turkey
23 United Kingdom
Excludes internal colonies
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Dividing and Ruling the World?

A Statistical Test of the Effects of Colonialism on

Matthew Lange, McGill University

To test claims that postcolonial civil violence is a common legacy of colonialism, we

While academic anti-colonialism might be justifiable on moral grounds, it

Colonialism and Civil Violence: A Review of Potential Mechanisms

Numerous scholars within anthropology, economics, geography, history, literary

Constructing Oppositional Identities

evidence that colonial officials orchestrated the construction and reification of

Discrimination and Stratification

While a division of labor might simply suggest horizontal segmentation, hierarchy is

Introduction of Foreign Peoples

As the anti-Indian violence described by Adas demonstrates, ethnic-based strati-

Many scholars of colonial legacies focus on the enduring effects of arbitrary

create a panel dataset of 1 60 countries comprised of both former colonies and

We employ three different indicators of civil violence as dependent variables:

state. Specifically, it occurs when a communal group is in direct conflict with

Focal Independent Variables

In order to test whether or not a history of colonialism increases the probability

of 1 indicates that a country was colonized by a particular colonizer and a value of

Table 1: Means of Dependent Variables by Category of Colonial History

While the results in Ta

Table 2: Summary Statistics

Colony Status 550 .70 .46 .00 1.00

Population (log) 457 16.02 1.47 12.90 20.90

aCommunal conflict is measured on a

Methodology and Diagnostic Ex

Pooled ordinary least squares regre

the between-country information from the data, the random-effects model is

Table 3: Random-Effects Models of Level of Inter-Communal Conflict

Colony Status 1.401** 1.283** 1.304**

Notes: The table presents unstandardiz

Table 4: Random-Effects Models of Level of Political Rebellion

Colony Status .100 -.152 -.408

Note: The table presents unstandard

Summary and Discussion

Table 5: Random-Effects Models of Years of Civil War per Decade

Colony Status .671 .594 -.820

Note: The table presents unstandard

stratification, animosity between indigenous and non-indigenous populations, or

Whereas our findings provide evidence that a history of colonialism promotes

These concluding remarks are preliminary interpretations and must be viewed

1. "Mise en valeur, exploitation des pays devenus colonies."

3. The models of inter-communal conflict exclude the following cases because of

missing values: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia, Croatia,

5. Similar to inter-communal conflict, we transformed MAR data on political rebellion

6. We also operationalize civil war dichotomously, with 1 representing the presence

11. As measured by the "Polity2" variable in the Polity /Kdataset.

13. The data on industrializing horticultural societies is dichotomous and measures

1 8 . Because of moderate levels of multicollinearity caused by the inclusion of the Spanish

Conflict in India." Sociology 38(4):701-18.

Lenski, Gerhard, and Patrick Nolan. 1984. "Trajectories of Dev

Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2003. "Polity IV Dataset." C

Available at: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm version p4v2003d.

Table A1. List of Non-Coloniesa

Excludes internal colonies

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Colony Status 1.401 1.283 1.304**