Republic vs.

Tagle

Facts: Private respondent Helena Z. Benitez is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land
located in Barangay Salawag, Dasmariñas, Cavite containing an area of 483,331 square
meters more or less.
The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center
(PHRDC), negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey
Team on the technicalities of the establishment of the ASEAN Human Resources
Development Project in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the proposed
project was Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which involved the
establishment of a Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC). PHRDC and private
respondent Helena Z. Benitez, signed a Memorandum of Agreement which provides, among
others, that Benitez undertakes to lease within the period of twenty (20) years and/or sell a
portion of that property (which is no less than ten-hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise
agrees to lease within a period of twenty (20) years and/or buy said property site.
The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to occupy
and use the land in question and to undertake land development, electrical and road network
installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives. Pursuant thereto, the
CMDC took possession of the property and erected buildings and other related facilities
necessary for its operations. A deposit made by the plaintiff with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB) in the amount of P708,490.00 which is equivalent to the assessed value of the property
subject matter hereof based on defendant’s 1990 tax declaration, was made.
In view of the agreement on the sale of the land in question, PHRDC prepared a Deed of
Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly represented
by then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez. Benitez in her own
capacity did not sign the deed of absolute sale.
Failing to acquire the property involved through negotiated sale, petitioner, through the
Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint for
Eminent Domain, pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 1035, dated June 25,
1985.
A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it
subsequently.
Issue: Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground
that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be
expropriated.
Held: No. Under Section 7 of EO 1035, when the government or its authorized agent makes
the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession. The
expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land.
Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable
taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute
ownership. In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective
beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain.
In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also
the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical
entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights
that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.

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Didipio Earth-Savers' Multi-Purpose Association, Inc. (DESAMA) Et al.v Elisea gozun,
et al.G.R. No. 157882 March 30, 2006

Facts: A petition for mandamus and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of the Philippine
Mining Act of 1995, together with the IRR issued by the DENR Administrative Order No. 96-
40, s. 1996(DAO 96-40) and of the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA)
entered into on20 June 1994 by the Republic of the Philippines and Arimco Mining Corporation
(AMC), acorporation established under the laws of Australia and owned by its nationals. After
several unsuccessful actions to cancel the FTAA agreement with the government,
thepetitioners finally submitted a petition to the court. In their memorandum petitioners
posewhether or not Republic Act No. 7942 and the CAMC FTAA are void because they allow
theunjust and unlawful taking of property without payment of just compensation , in violation
of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution issues, among others issues.

Issue:Whether there has been an actual controversy or issue with respect to the unlawful and
unjusttaking of property without payment of just compensation.

Ratio Decidendi:Public respondents are of the view that petitioners¶ eminent domain claim is
not ripe for adjudication as they fail to allege that CAMC has actually taken their properties
nor do theyallege that their property rights have been endangered or are in danger on account
of CAMC¶sFTAA. In effect, public respondents insist that the issue of eminent domain is not
a justiciablecontroversy which this Court can take cognizance of. A question is considered ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individualchallenging it.However, the court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law
in order to consider thecontroversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention.

Actual eviction of the land owners andoccupants need not happen for this Court to intervene.
By the mere enactment of thequestioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed,
even a singular violation of theConstitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.Nevertheless, the petition was still dismissed due to the baseless contention of the
issuessubmitted. The FTAA was in full compliance with the necessary requirements of the law
andConstitution. The allegation of the lack of payment of just compensation was dismissed
sincethe court has had authority in eminent domain cases to make sure the proper amount
wasestablished regardless of the fact that there would be an intervention from an
executivedepartment or legislature to make any initial determination of the amount.

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CASE DIGEST: LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONEYCOMB FARMS
CORPORATION

FACTS: Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner of two
parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily offered
these parcels of land, with a total area of 495.1374 hectares, to the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) for coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). From
the entire area offered, the government chose to acquire only 486.0907 hectares.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the responsibility of
determining the land valuation and compensation for parcels of land acquired pursuant to the
CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of
1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of these parcels of land.
When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and the DARs valuation for being too low,
Honeycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
against the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying that it be compensated for its landholdings
in the amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages and attorneys fees.
The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners to aid the court in determining the just
compensation for the subject properties. Since the Board of Commissioners could not reach
a common valuation for the properties, the RTC made its own valuation. First, the RTC took
judicial notice of the fact that a portion of the land, measuring approximately 10 hectares, is
commercial land, since it is located a few kilometers away from Sitio Curvada, Pitago,
Cataingan, Masbate, which is a commercial district. The lower court thus priced the 10
hectares at P100,000.00 per hectare and the remaining 476 hectares at P32,000.00 per
hectare. Both parties appealed to the CA.
The LBP argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it disregarded the formula for
fixing just compensation embodied in DAR AO No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO
No. 11, series of 1994. The LBP also argued that the RTC erred in taking judicial notice that
10 hectares of the land in question is commercial land.
In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains that the DAR AOs were issued merely to serve as
guidelines for the DAR and the LBP in administratively fixing the valuation to be offered by the
DAR to the landowner for acceptance or rejection. However, it is not mandatory for courts to
use the DAR AOs to fix just compensation as this would amount to an administrative imposition
on an otherwise purely judicial function and prerogative of determination of just compensation
for expropriated lands specifically reserved by the Constitution to the courts.
The CA affirmed with modification the assailed RTC judgment with respect to the computation
of the amount fixed by the trial court and the award of attorneys fees is deleted.
ISSUES:
Did the CA commit a serious error of law when it failed to apply the mandatory formula for
determining just compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series of 1994?
Did the RTC correctly take judicial notice of the nature of the subject land?
HELD: It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation
for parcels of land acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, the DAR, as the administrative agency tasked with the

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implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine
just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.

In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply
the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
While [the RTC] is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just
compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula
by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the
government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the
DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR
[Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing
a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The [RTC]
was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision.

These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the
pertinent DAR administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and
the RTC acted with grievous error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR,
and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.

***

While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must
exercise this right within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.

The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property,
which is the very issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the
opportunity to present evidence on the nature of the property before the lower court took
judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the subject landholdings.

GRANTED.
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Osmeña vs. Orbos
OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993

" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax, there must be a standard which
implies that the legislature determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental policy."

FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as

amended by EO 137, empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve the
increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum products which proceeds
shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the reimbursement to
ailing oil companies in the event of sudden price increases. The petitioner avers that the
collection on oil products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of legislative
power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that since a 'special fund' consists of monies
collected through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the
use thereof is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears
that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the powers
granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power
of the State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of taxation?

HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they
are exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a
special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the
general fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied
that these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With
regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the
general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to
augment the resources of the Fund.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Digest

Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila
Packaging and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received
by Anita Reyes and ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually
convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for
delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and proprietor of the courier company, conducted an
inspection of the package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the substance he found
inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In
the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found dried-
marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and
was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that
his constitutional right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package
was inadmissible as evidence against him.

Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights
governs the relationship between the individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a
restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement
of the law. It is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled
that Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his
place of business. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.

The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged was AFFIRMED.