Journal of Contemporary China (2011), 20(70), June, 433–448

Religious Policy in the People’s

Republic of China: an alternative
perspective
HONG QU*

During the first 30 years of its existence, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) committed
itself to making atheist Marxism the fundamental ideology of the country, depriving the
Chinese people of their constitutional right of religious liberty. Since 1979, new policies,
regulations, and legislation impacting religious freedom have been created and implemented.
This paper proposes an unconventional framework for understanding China’s religious
policy. It attempts to explain the evolution of this policy through an analysis of the party’s
changing view of religion; the nature of its new religious policy and law; and the function of
its supervision of religion. It calls for the consideration of the validity of a distinctive Chinese
model in religious affairs similar to that which has evolved in economic development.

There appears to be a lack of understanding even among most scholars of religious

studies around the issue of religious freedom in the People’s Republic of China
(PRC). Although freedom of religious belief is guaranteed by the Chinese
Constitution, the PRC has nevertheless been accused of denying its citizens’ right of
religious liberty.1 Human rights proponents argue that religious liberty is not
bestowed by the state but rather is a natural right.2 Since religious activities are
closely supervised and monitored in the PRC, many scholars and human rights
activists claim that Chinese policies and laws violate people’s right of religious
freedom. They argue that its primary means of control of religion through these
policies and laws is an onerous burden on the practice of religion.3 The right to

* Hong Qu is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies,
Iowa State University in Ames, Iowa, USA. Trained as a historian and a religious studies scholar with a specialization
in Islamic studies, her research interests include Chinese Muslims, Islam in China, and Chinese religious policy. She
would like to thank John L. Esposito of Georgetown University, Hector Avalos and Aili Mu of Iowa State University,
and Gregory Parker for their valuable comments and suggestions on the draft and the paper. She can be reached by
email at: hqu@iastate.edu
1. The citations in this paper do not suggest that other scholars claim religion cannot be regulated by law at all.
Their claims may emphasize the lack of religious freedom and beliefs in religious views that are not state-endorsed.
2. Julia Ching, ‘Human rights, a valid Chinese concept?’, in Wm Theodore de Bary and Tu Weiming, eds,
Confucianism and Human Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 67– 82.
3. Human Rights Watch/Asia, China: State Control of Religion (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1997),
pp. 7 –23.

ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/11/700433–16 q 2011 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2011.565176
HONG QU

religious freedom is jeopardized if it is perceived as infringing on ‘the interests of the

state, of the society, and of the collective’.4 They highlight cases in which policies
and laws that support state welfare have taken priority over those that support
religious liberty. These arguments and concerns, while legitimate, are not well
contextualized within Chinese political and cultural traditions. This paper argues that
before making such claims, we should examine the rationale behind religious policy-
making in the PRC. A fuller understanding of the concept of religion in the Chinese
cultural tradition leads to a more productive discussion of the relationship between
the current PRC’s party– state policy and laws regarding religious affairs and
recognition. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the evolution of the party and
the state’s religious policies from a Chinese-centric perspective. The author hopes
that the viewpoint of this paper, which is in contrast to most points of view previously
published, will generate a new, constructive dialogue among scholars in religious
studies.

Introduction
China has been a nation of many religions for thousands of years. Religious pluralism
continues to characterize the PRC today. Throughout Chinese history, Buddhism,
Daoism, and popular folk religious practices or deity cults have dominated religious
practice. At different historical junctures, most of the world’s major religions have
been introduced into China. Additionally, as the ethnic mix of China has expanded,
many of the religions practiced by those groups have also become established.
Currently, there are five officially recognized religions in the PRC: Buddhism,
Daoism, Islam, Catholicism and Christianity (which only means Protestantism in
China).5 Catholicism is considered as a separate religion although in most parts of the
world it would be classified as a branch of Christianity. Catholicism is termed as
‘tian-zhu jiao’ in Chinese and Christianity (Protestantism) ‘ye-su jiao’.6 Buddhism
arrived from India to China during the first century. After a long process of cultural
accommodation, it branched into the three language families: Han-Chinese
Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, popularly referred to as ‘Lamaism’, and Pali
Buddhism. Daoism, as the native Chinese religion, originated in the second century.
It has two main sects—Quanzhen Daoism and Zhengyi Daoism.7 Islam entered China
in the seventh century. It is the ‘ethnic’ religion8 practiced by ten minority ethnic
groups. These groups live predominately in the Northwestern and Southwestern parts
of China. Catholicism was first introduced into China by missionaries in the
thirteenth century but faded out soon after. It again made inroads in the sixteenth
4. Carolyn Evans, ‘Chinese law and the international protection of religious freedom’, Journal of Church and
State 44(4), (2002), p. 757.
5. Confucianism in China is not considered to be a religion in the strictest sense, but rather embodies some
religious elements. It is viewed as a life philosophy as well as a political doctrine.
6. Julia Ching, Chinese Religions (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), p. 194.
7. Daoism has three categories. Philosophical Daoism, ‘Dao Xue’ in Chinese, was established by Master Lao-zi
in the sixth century BCE, centered on cultivating an immediate sense of personal connection with the Dao. Religious
Daoism, i.e. ‘Dao Jiao’, advocated the sages’ path to immortality. Applied Daoism, such as acupuncture, feng shui,
wu shu/martial arts, and all forms of prognostication developed to manage worldly life in China as well as in East
Asia.
8. Ching, Chinese Religions, p. 183.

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 RELIGIOUS POLICY IN THE PRC

century in the wake of Western colonial expansion. During the eighteenth century, a
hundred-year-long ‘dispute on rituals and ceremonies’ emerged. When Roman
Catholic missionaries would not allow Chinese Catholics to show respect for
Confucius or to hold memorial ceremonies for their ancestors, the emperor banned
their activities in China.9 This slowed down the spread of Catholicism in China.
Protestant Christianity came to China at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a
result of the Opium War. Protestant missionaries obtained the privilege to spread
their faith in China. In the 1950s, Chinese Catholics and Protestants launched the
‘Three-Self Movement’—self-administration, self-support, and self-propagation—to
get rid of the imperialist influences upon the Chinese Christian churches.10
It is undeniable that in the first 30 years of the PRC, there was a lack of religious
development and religious liberty.11 Changes, however, have occurred since 1979.
New policies, laws, regulations, and legislation have been made and implemented to
address religious liberty concerns.

The party’s changing view of religion

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921. It focused on revolution
and class struggle for a long time before and after the founding of the PRC. In the first
30 years (1949– 1979) of the PRC, there were very few high-ranking party officials
who really understood religion and its role in society. The main idea for defining
religion and understanding its place in modernization came from Marxism—the
atheist official ideology, ‘which shared the assumptions of other forms of Western
Enlightenment thinking that religion was connected with feudal society and would be
eliminated in the course of secular modernization’.12 This assumption left the party
and government inadequately prepared to anticipate and evaluate the persistence of
religious traditions. Religion did not have the proper place it deserved: it was
generally viewed as the ‘opium of the people’ and a ‘contradiction against the
people’.13 Such a vision of religion led the CCP to often violently attempt to remove
religion from the lives of the Chinese people. Events such as the so-called ‘Anti-
Rightist Campaign’ in 1957 – 1958 and the Cultural Revolution period of 1966– 1976
eventually led to the denial of religious freedom, even though religious liberty is
defined as the right of every Chinese citizen by the first Constitution in 1954. During
the 20 years between 1957 and 1976, there were other harsh crack downs on religious
leaders and believers. As a result, ‘widespread torture and imprisonment’, Piediscalzi
pointed out, ‘deprived the state of assistance of many patriotic but religious citizens
who supported the formation of a modern socialist China’.14
9. Ibid., p. 194.
10. White Papers of the Chinese Government, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2000).
11. Dai Kangsheng and Peng Yao, Shehui zhuyi yu zhongguo zongjiao [Socialism and Chinese Religions], 2nd
edn (Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 1996), pp. 84–85. Also see the following papers and books: Tony Lambert,
‘The present religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party’, Religion, State & Society 29(2), (2001), pp. 121–129;
M. M. Francis Mi and Betty Ann Maheu, ‘China’s religious policy, 1981–1999’, Tripod 113, (1999), p. 6; and Human
Rights Watch/Asia, China; etc.
12. Richard Madsen, ‘China’s confounding religious revival’, Current History 106(701), (2007), p. 290.
13. Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Document 19 (1982).
14. Nicholas Piediscalzi, ‘China’s new policy on religion’, Christian Century 102(21), (19–26 June 1985), p. 612.

435
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The initial changes 1979– 1989

The party’s view of religion gradually changed after Deng Xiaoping regained the
political leadership in 1978 and launched economic reform and an ‘open door’ policy.
The party admitted there were some major errors in dealing with religious affairs in
the previous 30 years, especially during the ten-year-long ‘Cultural Revolution’
period. As stated in its Document:
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, there have been many twists and
turns in the Party’s work with regard to the religious question . . . they [Jiang Qing clique]
forcibly forbade normal religious activities by the mass of religious believers, they
treated patriotic religious personages, as well as the mass of ordinary religious believers,
as ‘targets of dictatorship’, and fabricated a host of wrongs and injustices which they
pinned upon these religious personages. They even misinterpreted some customs and
practices of ethnic minorities as religious superstition . . . They used violent measures
against religion which forced religious movements underground.15
Although the party’s effort to exonerate itself by way of a scapegoat is obvious, so
was the party’s realization of what went wrong. Gradually, the party came to see that
religion could neither be removed by force nor die out by itself: ‘those who expect to
rely upon administrative decrees or other coercive measures to wipe out religious
thinking and practices with a blow, are entirely wrong and will do no small harm’.16
Instead, religion was ‘an objective social phenomenon and develops according to
objective law’.17 President Jiang Zemin at the National United Front Work
conference in December 2000 further pointed out that as a social cultural
phenomenon, ‘Religion has a long history and will continue to exist for a long time
under socialism. The ultimate withering away of religion, to be certain, will be a long
historical process, perhaps longer than that of the class and state’. Despite the
inappropriate prediction of the death of religion, Jiang acknowledged the legitimacy
of religion beyond the existence of class and state. The current President, Hu Jintao,
has been reaching out to religious leaders in his campaign to create a ‘harmonious
society’ (hexie shehui). In December 2008, he led a study session in the Politburo on
the growing role of religion in China. He said: ‘We must strive to closely unite
religious figures and believers among the mass around the party and government and
struggle together with them to build an all-round moderately prosperous society
while quickening the pace toward the modernization of socialism’.18 The party also
understood that for an atheistic ruling party to handle religious affairs well is both an
historic task and a challenge to the party’s leadership and ability to govern:
If the Chinese Communist Party were to impose its atheism on everyone and persecute
religious believers, that would only serve to drive 100 million people [religious believers]
15. CCP Central Committee Document 19 (1982).
16. Ibid.
17. Ye Xiaowen, ‘China’s religions: retrospect and prospect’, Chinese Journal of International Law 4(2), (2005),
p. 445. It can also be found in China News and Report, special issue (7 October 2002).
18. David W. Hendon and Charles McDaniel, ‘Notes on church– state affairs’, Journal of Church & State 50(1),
(2008), p. 183.

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to an antagonistic position. Such hypothetical practice, which would virtually undermine

its very own foundation of governance, is unimaginable.19
Based upon the new understandings (1) that religion will exist objectively for the
long-term, and (2) that failure to consider people’s religious needs would jeopardize
the party’s rule, the party has corrected its guiding principles determining its policies
dealing with religion. These policies include:
(1) Reinstate the constitutional right of freedom of religious belief. Although the
purpose of the party ‘to consolidate and expand the patriotic political alliance in
each ethnic religious group . . . to complete the great task of unifying the country’
remains unchanged, the freedom of personal choice was highlighted in its
rhetoric:
Every citizen has the freedom to believe in religion and also has the freedom not to
believe in religion. Every citizen also has the freedom to believe in this religion or that
religion. Within a particular religion, s/he has the freedom to believe in this sect or that
sect. A person who was previously a nonbeliever has the freedom to become a religious
believer, and one who has been a religious believer has the freedom to become a
nonbeliever.20
(2) Train the religious professionals who work with religious believers. For its
religious policy to work well, the party must train the religious professionals of
the five recognized religions. In the early 1980s, there were only about 59,000
religious professionals affiliated to Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and
Protestantism.21 In the next 20 years, many new divinity schools, seminaries,
Buddhist and Daoist colleges, and Islamic academies have been established and
quite a number of young, well-educated religious professionals have graduated.
The number increased five times to over 300,000 in the mid-1990s.22 The
estimated number in the mid-2000s was over 550,000.23
(3) Restore churches, cathedrals, temples, mosques, and other religious facilities for
services and other religious-related activities. In the mid-1990s, registered
religious sites open to the public were 85,000 in number.24 This grew to
approximately 110,000 in the early 2000s.25

The significant changes, 1990– present

If religion was not among the party’s major concerns in the past, the 1990s saw a
change. A few factors contributed to this. First, the policy of the freedom of religious
belief led to a fast growth in the number of religious believers. There were 3 million
19. See Wang Zuoan, supra note 12, p. 2 in Kim-Kwong Chan and Eric R. Carlson, eds, Religious Freedom in
China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation: A Research Handbook (Institute for the Study of American Religion
at Santa Barbara, California and Institute for Culture, Commerce, and Religion at Hong Kong, 2005), p. ix.
20. CCP Central Committee Document 19 (1982).
21. Ibid.
22. White Papers of the Chinese Government.
23. Estimated numbers from Religious Affairs Bureau (2004).
24. Li Pingye and Yang Huilin, ‘Jiushi niandai zhongguo zongjiao fazhan baogao’ [‘China’s religious
developments in 1990s’], Da Dao (June–August 1998), p. 4.
25. Estimated numbers from Religious Affairs Bureau (2004).

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Christians in 1982, over 12 million in 1995,26 and 25 million in 2002, an eight-fold

increase within 20 years. Second, these were the years of rapid economic growth
associated with modernization, industrialization, urbanization, and the social
problems caused by them. A large number of laborers from inland and villages
migrated into coastal cities and metropolitan areas to work. Their life and living
conditions generated even greater need for religious faiths. They became the grass-
root masses to the traditionally established religions such as Buddhism, Daoism, and
Christianity. They were also major participants in many new religious movements,
including such cults as Falungong. The third factor was international. The roles that
Catholic and Protestant churches had played in overturning the communist powers in
the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries shocked the Chinese
Communist Party. It further adjusted its focus and became much more directly
involved in religious affairs because it could no longer afford to ignore religion when
formulating government policy. The party redefined its goals from making revolution
to creating steady and sustainable development. As a result, the ‘socialist theory of
religion’, which emphasizes the mutual adaptation of religion and socialism, has
become a part of the theoretical framework of the party. When working with the large
number of religious masses in society, the party facilitates the development of
religion as an agent of social harmony.27 The issue of religion has been one of the
major concerns of the party. It has occupied the center stage in the party’s routine
work since the1990s. One of the major indications of the party’s sincerity towards
religion during this time was to promote the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) from a
section under the United Front Work Department (UFWD) in the party system, where
it had been since the 1980s, to an independent department at the ministry level under
the State Council in the government system.
There has also been an evolution in the basic principles and attitudes toward
religious belief among party members and cadres.28 As mentioned above, atheism
is the official ideology and is in theory what a party member is supposed to follow.
As is stated in Document 19 ‘CCP members are atheists who should resolutely
and persistently propagate atheism’ (Section 4), and ‘they cannot be believers in any
religion’ (Section 9). In the past, it would have been a very serious offense if a party
member had been found to believe in or/and practice religion. Dismissal from the
party would have been the least of the consequences. Exceptions from dismissal were
made for the party members of ethnic minority groups such as Hui, Uyghur, Mongol,
Tibetan, etc. The attitude towards Han (the majority in China) party members with
religious beliefs has been changing towards one of greater tolerance and acceptance.
Chan and Carlson have observed that
It is widely known that some Han party members are religious believers. So long as these
members do not publicize their religiosity, such as openly denouncing atheism or
publicly receiving initiation rites involved in joining a religious group, many of the Party
branches tolerate such a situation.29
26. Li and Yang, ‘Jiushi niandai zhongguo zongjiao fazhan baogao’.
27. Dai and Peng, Shehui zhuyi yu zhongguo zongjiao, pp. 48 –60.
28. CCP Central Committee Document (12 August 2004).
29. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 3.

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More extreme cases have been cited, such as the example of an elder of a local
Christian community serving as secretary of the local village party branch.30 Yao
calculated that there were 5.8% Buddhists, 9.1% Catholics, and 18.2% Protestants
among CCP members and 9.8%, 9.1%, and 3% among CYL (Communist Youth
League) members, respectively. The percentages were based on his 2005 survey data
from interviews of 3,196 randomly selected urban Han Chinese individuals.31 By
percentage, not a lot of Han party members are religious adherents because at first
they do not have formal religious affiliations (particularly Buddhists or Daoists); and
secondly they are not expected to openly admit to being religious (especially
Christians and Catholics even if they do have the affiliations), but in reality, quite a
few do practice religion.
Why would the party tolerate this situation? Then again, why not? Could this
tolerance mean the party’s acknowledgement of its members’ basic human right of
religious freedom? This question aside, the party’s practice achieved, in effect, the
harmony of loyalty to the party and the constitutional right of the individual. This
kind of practice of harmony has many precedents in Chinese cultural patterns or
tradition.
Being a Han Chinese means having been brought up in Confucian, Daoist, and
Buddhist traditions, as religion in China has been a cultural pattern. All three are
complementary and influence one another. A Han Chinese reveres gods and ghosts,
venerates ancestors, respects kinship and linage. An obvious example is the yearly
Qingming festival.32 Ancestral veneration, however, is a common stem for all East
Asian religions. When Buddhism came to China 2,000 years ago, it went through a
process of acculturation. Chinese monks composed rituals to provide Buddhist
services to venerate and assist the ancestors in as early as the fifth century. The
harmony of the Buddhist tradition with the Confucian and ancestral traditions led to
the blossoming of the Buddhist culture in China. Hence, Buddhism became one of the
three pillars of Chinese culture.
Although classical Confucianism was more of a social philosophy and political
teaching, Neo-Confucianism since the Song dynasty (960– 1279), underwent a
process of selective assimilation with Buddhism and Daoism. The process greatly
enhanced the Confucian tradition’s metaphysical interpretation of nature and
humanity. The new appropriation of gods (shen) and ghosts (gui) and increased
emphasis on sacrifice transformed the spiritual and intellectual classical
Confucianism into a much more religious tradition, especially with regard to the
practice of Confucian rituals and virtues.33
To some extent, being a Han Chinese is to be culturally ‘religious’. Therefore, CCP
members cannot be ‘pure atheists’ to start with. It may not be that unreasonable for
the party to have Han members with religious beliefs. Communism, an ideology
30. Ibid., note 12.
31. Yao Xinzhong, ‘Religious belief and practice in urban China 1995– 2005’, Journal of Contemporary Religion
22(2), (2007), p. 175.
32. Usually around 5 April, the Chinese visit and clean their family graves, make offerings to ancestors, show
respect to the lineage and reinforce the kinship.
33. John L. Esposito, Darrel J. Fasching and Todd Lewis, World Religions Today, 3rd edn (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 500.

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imported to China in the 1920s, never had a chance to replace the ‘Three Pillars’ of
Chinese culture rooted in a deep history.
The diffused nature of Chinese religions permits the Chinese people to embrace
more than one religion and to borrow from different religions. One can be Daoist,
Buddhist, and Confucian at the same time. As is agreed among them, in roles and
functions, Buddhism cultivates the mind, Daoism nurtures the body, and
Confucianism rules the state and society (yi fo zhi xin, yi dao zhi shen, and yi ru
zhi guo). This concept of diffusion may not dovetail with the Western notion of
‘being religious’. In China, choosing one religion does not mean the exclusion of
others (either/or versus both/and). This inclusive approach towards religions is the
corner stone of the Chinese formative thinking and patterns of cultural and political
behavior. It may appear to be less critical of others but has proven to be constructive
and creative in that it keeps doors open to foreign religions and cultures, new ideas
and thoughts. Can we also see the party’s attitude of tolerance towards its religious
members in the light of this inclusive approach?

Policy, regulation, and law on religious affairs

Is party– state control of religious activities unavoidable in contemporary China? The
Chinese legal system differs from that in the West. The inseparability of politics and
law in the PRC created what Chan and Carlson coined in English a ‘political– legal
system’.34 In this system, the party’s policy has sway over the provision and
regulation made by the State Council; the party always provides the guidelines and
principles for the provisions and regulations made by the state.
With regard to religious affairs, in the party system, the United Front Work
Department (UFWD) is one of most important divisions. The UFWD coordinates
different sectors of the population, including religious groups, in support of the party
and the unity of the country. Its prescribed functions are: (1) formulating the party’s
religious policy with the aim to bring together all the support from the religious
circle; (2) overseeing and implementing the party’s religious policy through the party
organs and the government administrative apparatus at the different local levels such
as provincial, municipal, and county; and (3) interpreting the policy. The local
UFWD units frequently assume the role of religious administrator, particularly in
those local areas without a specific governing office on religious affairs.35
In the state system, the main ministry of religious affairs is the one mentioned
earlier—the Religious Affairs Bureau of the State Council, renamed in 1998 as the
State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). It is the core office in charge of
everything on religion. Its functions include: (1) making and carrying out the party’s
policy, provisions and regulations; (2) coordinating the relationship between
religious circles and other social sectors, protecting the lawful right and interests of
religious organizations, monasteries, temples and churches; (3) managing religious
affairs and handling religion-related matters that come under the jurisdiction of the
government; and (4) directing religious activities and providing final approval to new
34. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 1.
35. Ibid., p. 3.

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religious facilities. SARA also supervises its own officials and staffs and holds them
accountable for understanding of the party– state’s religious policy, law, provision,
and regulation and in administration of religious affairs. In contrast to the few trained
religious officials in the first 30 years of the PRC, an army of them now work in
offices at all levels all over the country.
Between1981 and 1999, there were more than 50 documents on religion published
and ‘they narrowed the meaning of freedom of religion’.36 Thirty more listed
documents were published in the next ten years.37 To use the number of provisions
and regulations made in a relatively short period of time to judge the Chinese
government38 in an unfavorable light is insufficient to say the least. Marsh, however,
visited China in the fall of 2008 and concluded: ‘policies and tone have changed even
more over the past twenty years’.39 Zhuo remarks that
China’s laws or regulations on religion are that there are four ‘layers’ within two
categories: first, articles in the Constitution and relating laws; second, administrative
decrees from the State Council; third, regulations from SARA; and fourth regulations
from the local people’s congress and government.40
Now, let’s take a close look at some of them.

The Constitution and other national laws

The Constitution is the primary legal protection of religious freedom. Article 36 of
the new Constitution adopted at the fifth National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1982
stipulates:
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state
organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe
in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not
believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make
use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of
citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and
religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.
The first line in the above quote shows that China values freedom of religious
belief and guarantees its citizens this right. Please note the term ‘freedom of religious
belief’ instead of ‘freedom of religion’ is used here. This Article makes a clear
distinction between freedom of belief and freedom of religious activity.41 Freedom of
religious belief is guaranteed but religious activities must be carried out in
accordance with laws and the interests of the public and the state.
Scholars and human right advocates have complained or questioned the
government practice of protecting ‘normal’ religious activities. They are bothered
36. Mi and Maheu, ‘China’s religious policy, 1981–1999’, p. 6.
37. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, pp. 27–62.
38. Ibid., p. 24.
39. Christopher Marsh, ‘Revisiting China’s “Great Wall” of separation: religious liberty in China today’, Journal
of Church & State 50(2), (2008), p. 206.
40. Zhuo Xinping, ‘Religion and rule of law in China today’, Brigham Young University Law Review no. 3,
(2009), p. 525.
41. John Tong, ‘The bottom line of China’s policy on religion during the last 10 years’, (translated by Norman
Walling), Tripod 60, (1990), p. 83.

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by the absence of a clear definition of ‘normal’.42 However, the ambiguity of

definition is what the Confucianism-based Chinese political practice regards as
necessary. Chinese rulers throughout the dynasty history did so to maintain a fair and
flexible exercise of power. The current party – state understands the necessity of this
ambiguity. Hence, it chooses to follow the Confucian political practice so as to
provide more room for its policy to function and grow.
The fact that China is a huge country makes it impossible for the government to
clearly define ‘normal’ religious activities. Unlike the United States, where each state
makes its own state laws that parallel federal laws, the policies and laws made by the
central government in China can be interpreted and implemented in very different
ways at the provincial, municipal, and county levels. This is especially true with
regard to religious policy. A clear standard of ‘normal’ would not effectively work
considering that autonomous regions and some provinces are characterized by very
unique religious and ethnic differences. The principle that the central government has
laid down allows the local government to interpret the policy and law according to
local situations. For example, Lambert saw governmental religious policy towards
the church in Sichuan province in the early 1990s appear to be very tight and ‘leftist’;
however, in neighboring Yunnan, the situation was much more open than in
Sichuan.43
Besides the Constitution, the statutory provisions enacted by the NPC regarding
freedom of religious beliefs include the following laws: Article 3 in the Election Law
of NPC and Local People’s Congress; Article 5 in the Organization Law of People’s
Courts (1979); Articles 11 and 53 in the National Regional Autonomy Law; Article 2
in the Law for Assembly and Demonstration; Article 12 in the Organization Law of
the Villagers Committee; Articles 32, 137, 141, 148, and 149 in the Basic Law of
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1990), etc. Additional civil,
administrative, social, economic, criminal, and other laws include: Article 3 in the
Military Service Law (1994); Article 4 in the Compulsory Educational Law (2006);
Article 12 in the Labor Law (1994); Article 77 in the General Provisions of the Civil
Law of 1986; and Article 4 in the Law for Promoting Private Education of 2002.44
Relevant governmental departments must exercise their administrative powers
according to the law and must not violate citizens’ right to freedom of religious
belief. Article 251 of the Criminal Law stipulates:
State personnel who unlawfully deprive citizens of their legitimate freedom of religious
belief and infringe upon the customs and habits of minority ethnic groups, when the
circumstances are serious, are to be sentenced to not more than two years of fixed-term
imprisonment or criminal detention.
Article 147 of the Penal Code also stipulates: ‘State officials who violate the freedom
of worship of citizens or the customs of national minorities are punishable in serious
42. See Ryan Dunch, ‘Religious freedom and Chinese law’, Christian History & Biography 98, (2008), p. 18;
Arvan Gordon, ‘Religion and the new Chinese Constitution’, Religion in the Communist Lands 11(2), (1983), p. 133.
43. Tony Lambert, ‘Post-Tiananmen Chinese Communist Party religious policy’, Religion, State & Society
20(3–4), (1992), p. 394.
44. Zhuo, ‘Religion and rule of law in China today’, pp. 523–524.

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cases by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a short[er] term of
imprisonment’.

The state decrees, regulations from SARA and local governments

In spite of these powerful legal protections on freedom of religious belief, there are
also provisions and regulations that supervise and direct religious activities. In the
past 30 years, quite a number of provisions and regulations have been made to protect
and support normal religious activities. Among them, on the state level, two decrees
in 1994, Procedures for the Annual Inspection of Venues of Religious Activity in
1996, and Religious Affairs Provisions in 2005, are the more important ones in my
view.
The Two Decrees (No. 144 and 145) are: (1) Provisions on the Administration of
Religious Activities of Aliens within the Territory of PRC; and (2) Regulations on the
Administration of Sites for Religious Activities.
The Provisions are formulated to ensure the religious freedom of aliens within
China. Foreigners are allowed to participate in religious activities such as regular
Sunday service and fellowship activities, but prohibited from ‘establishing religious
organizations, liaison office, and venues for religious activities, or running religious
schools and institutions, recruiting believers, and appointing religious personnel
among Chinese citizens, or undertaking evangelic activities within China’ (Article 8).
Later in 2000, the government issued the ‘Specific Rules for Implementing the
Regulations on Management of Religious Activities of Foreigners in China’ as a
supplement. It requires aliens who conduct religious activities within Chinese
territory to abide by Chinese laws and regulations. An example would be a
prohibition against preaching scripture at sites of religious activities without
permission and expounding the scripture outside lawfully registered sites.45 This
prohibition does not apply at registered sites such as TSPM (the Three-self Patriotic
Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches) premises in major Chinese cities.
Recently, observers have reported that foreign Christians have held their own quite
large worship service at the TSPM sites such as in Shanghai, where there is a
significant number of foreigners, estimated to be 3 – 5% of the municipality’s total
population in 2005.46 The Chinese government has demonstrated non-interference
and respect for the religious freedom of foreigners on Chinese territory: ‘no matter
what religion they believe in, and regardless of whether there is such a religion in
China, the Chinese government will respect it’.47
The Regulations (Decree 145) protect normal religious activities and the lawful
rights and interests of the sites for such activities. This requires the sites for religious
activities be registered with the relevant government department (SARA) to obtain
legal status. The registration requirements include having a suitable building, regular
meetings, proper organization, professional leadership, governing rules, regular
income, and payment of a registration fee. The Regulations stipulate that sites for
45. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 27.
46. Ying Fuk-Tsang, ‘New wine in old wineskins: an appraisal of religious legislation in China and the
Regulations on Religious Affairs of 2005’, Religion, State & Society 34(4), (2006), p. 357.
47. The State Council, Explanation of Certain Items in the Decree 144, (2002).

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religious activities ‘shall be run independently by the management organizations

thereof, whose lawful rights and interests and normal religious activities at the sites
shall be protected by law. No organizations or individuals may violate or interfere
with them’ (Article 3). No religious activities are permitted if they harm ‘national
unity, ethnic unity or the social order, harm citizens’ health or destroy the national
educational system’ (Article 4). In 1996, ‘Procedures for the Annual Inspection of
Venues of Religious Activity’ from SARA further states, in detail, what would be
checked, how to check annually, and the consequences of failure to do so.48
Religious Affairs Provisions (RAP) replaced the above-mentioned Regulations
issued as Decree 426 of the State Council. RAP took effect nationwide on 1 March
2005. It is the most recent comprehensive document on religious affairs and serves as
national guidelines for religious administration. It comprises 48 articles in seven
chapters. Chapter One contains the general provisions and Articles 1 – 5. Chapters
Two– Six consist of Articles 6 – 46 and deal with religious bodies, sites for religious
activities, religious personnel, religious property, and legal liability. It lists the rights
and obligations of registered religious organizations, and codifies and standardizes
provisions found in local regulations. The significance of these provisions is that the
party– state has taken serious steps towards the improvement of the legal system and
towards a society ruled by law.
The examination of these state-level laws and provisions brings to light three key
points. (1) their nature is to be prepared for the worst ‘abnormal’ scenario which
includes religious radical gatherings, religious extremist activities and terrorist
violence. The focus is to prevent Chinese society and its people from being harmed.
They are not made to control regular or ordinary religious activities. (2) The core of
these provisions and regulations shows the spirit of Article 36 of the Constitution.
They actually flesh out the contents of the Article. Two things of paramount
importance—maintaining independence of the Chinese religious bodies and religious
affairs and upholding the principle of noninterference with the secular educational
system from religions—remain unchanged. These provisions and regulations display
the consistency of the party– state policy. (3) Social stability, public order, and values
of loyalty and unity also weigh heavily in policy and provision making. Chan and
Carlson have argued that the Chinese government regulates religious groups on the
basis of national security and national unity rather than on the basis of religion.49
These provisions and regulations support their conclusion, but isn’t it true that to
defend national unity, safeguard its public order, and maintain the solidarity and
stability of the community are the primary tasks of any government?50 The Chinese
government has been responsible in this respect. After all, the fundamental human
48. UCANews, ‘Religious inspection regulations’ (translation), Tripod 90, (1997), pp. 55–59.
49. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 23.
50. The West, in fact, clearly prefers religions that do not cause too much disruption to public order and state
security. France is attempting to ban burqas (www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/06/23/france.burkas); British
Muslim violence in September 2009 made dozens of riot police work to contain the disturbance and more than 20 men
were arrested (http://infidelsunite.typepad.com/counter_jihad/2009/09/muslims-riot-in-england.html). The West also
has had no problem suppressing religious beliefs and activities that threaten the national interest and state authority.
For example, most indigenous religions of the Americas were wiped out as they were seen to encourage resistance to a
centralized government. Please see W. T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2009).

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right to live is threatened in civil crisis or political instability. Strong evidence can be
found in many places, among which recently are the Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan.
Usually, China’s provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities carry out the
policy, law and regulation made by the central government. On religious affairs,
however, exceptions are made. Provincial, municipal and county governments can
construct their own regulations depending on the local situations, political climates,
and specific needs.51 In between 1991 and 2006, 28 provinces and municipalities,
including Guangdong, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guangxi, Inner-Mongolia, Shaanxi,
Guizhou, Yunan, Zhejiang, Hainan, Jiangsu, Heilongjiang, Fujian, Beijing, Shanghai,
and Tianjin, issued their own regulations on religious affairs. Hunan, Tibet, Anhui,
and Jiangxi finalized theirs in 2007.52
When I read through the articles and contents of those laws and regulations and
observe religious activities in China, I could not help a noted feature of flexibility.
First, the language used in religious policies and provisions can be understood either
in a liberal or a literal sense. There is a large gray area in between the black and the
white. For example, in the case of unregistered Christian house meetings, Document
19 states:
So far as Christians undertaking religious activities in home-meetings are concerned,
these should not, in principle, be permitted. But they should not be rigidly prohibited. The
religious masses should be persuaded through the work of patriotic religious workers to
make other suitable arrangements.
In the case of the distinction between popular religions and ‘feudal superstitions’, the
Beijing Religious Regulation (2002) dropped the section on banning ‘superstition
activities’. Activities such as fortune telling, palmistry, face-reading, or astrology are
put under the favorable category of cultural heritage.53 Thirteen other provincial,
municipal, and city regulations, including Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Liaoning,
Jilin, Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Hunan, Hubei, and Shenzhen, have made
similar provisions. Second, in practice, government officials usually come with one
eye closed, to unregistered sites, sometimes with foreign missionaries holding visitor
visas preaching, as long as no harm is being done to the state, society, and people.54
This applauding of the party –state for having taken serious steps towards the
improvement of the legal system and a society ruled by law invites the question of
whether there is a functional mechanism for meaningful implementation of these
regulations and laws, especially those in the 2005 Religious Affairs Provisions. It is
reasonable and understandable that scholars and human right activists have doubts on
the full implementation of these laws and regulations. How to bridge the gap between
law and practice? Why is being legalized so important? This perhaps should be
discussed in a separate paper. To be brief, it is necessary to emphasize that China, for
51. Mickey Spiegel, Richard Madsen and James Tong, Chinese Law and Government 33(2–3), (New York:
M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 2000).
52. Zhuo, ‘Religion and rule of law in China today’, p. 525.
53. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 15.
54. A talk in October 2009 given by a minister to Chinese Christians in a local Iowan Evangelical church about
her China trip and experience in the summer of 2009. The government office even helped her with her expired travel
document so that she could return to America in time. She is now in China preaching Christianity at various house-
churches.

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most of its history, did not have the Western concept of the rule by law. Rather, it has
been a society ruled by Confucian virtues of loyalty (zhong), filial piety (xiao), ethical
propriety (li), justice or duty (yi), benevolence (ren), wisdom (zhi), and
trustworthiness or good faith (xin) and by the Confucian five relationships, based
on these virtues, between father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger
brother, friend and friend, and ruler and citizen. As the source of China’s unity and
directive of social life, it is the Confucian morality and order that define an
individual’s identity and place in society. This source itself abounds with flexibility,
ambiguity, tolerance and, therefore, humanity. In terms of religion, unlike many
countries that are too specific in their legal definitions of religion, in China, even
traditional religions do not fit in with the Western definition of religion.55 They are
more religious practices and beliefs than a religious identity.56 Because of the nature
of religion in the Chinese cultural tradition and its de-emphasis of the rule by law in
the political system, China does not regard a sect or a religion without a legal status as
necessarily illegal, and accepts the gray status of being in between as common sense.
A sect or a religion can conduct its religious activities without interference as long as
no harm is done to the interest of the people and the harmony of the society. In this
sense, absolute regulation and law could make ‘the unregistered religious sects worse
off, as they give less room for maneuvering in gray areas’.57 Again, ambiguity or the
principle of flexibility in the regulations and laws is greatly desired in the Chinese
case and allows for more freedom.

The five religions and perspective of religious freedom

We live in a world with religious favoritism and discrimination as stated by the US
State Department:
England supports one established church. Islam is the official religion of Saudi Arabia,
and all of its citizens must be Muslim. Austria recognizes only thirteen religious
organizations, which must meet specified religious criteria. The Orthodox church holds a
privileged position in Russia; other Christian groups are restricted, and more or less, the
same situation of virtual establishment prevails in Roman Catholic Poland. Some Islamic
countries tolerate indigenous Christian groups but prohibit their growth. Where they are
the majority population, Buddhists [e.g. Thailand and Cambodia] and Hindus [e.g. India
and Nepal] limit the activity of other traditions.58
With respect to religious freedom, the Chinese share the American perspective:
‘when Americans speak of religious freedom, they operate with the assumptions of
the First Amendment: in principle and in practice the government favors no particular
religion and is broadly tolerant of all’.59 Currently, in China, as mentioned in
the Introduction part of this paper, five established world religions—Buddhism,
Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—hold official recognition, other
Daoism-influenced folk forms of religious practices are respected as ‘spirituality’.
55. Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 3–32.
56. Yao, ‘Religious belief and practice in urban China 1995– 2005’, p. 178.
57. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 24.
58. US State Department, ‘Religious persecution’, Commonwealth Foundation 124(14), (1997), pp. 5– 6.
59. Ibid.

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Different sects, branches, and denominational groups within each religion are
protected as long as they abide by the state law, as Ye Xiaowen asserted in 2002: ‘the
state treats all religious equally and the law protects the equal rights of all
religions’.60 Religious groups, such as Orthodox Christianity, Ba’hai faith, Judaism,
etc., do not have official registration. Despite this uncertain legal status, they remain
functional with knowledge and tacit approval of local Religious Affairs Bureau.61
Some, like the Eastern Orthodox Church in Heilongjiang Province and Xinjiang
Autonomous Region, have gained legitimacy in their locality.62
Religious pluralism flourishes in China, very much like that in the Roman Empire
before the fourth century, i.e. before Christianity was promoted to the only legal
religion in 391. The protection and space provided by the Chinese government have
allowed all religions to continually develop and grow in China. The number of
Christians increased from 70,000 in 1950 to 25 million in 2002; Catholics from 2.3
million to 10 million, not including over 10 million underground Catholics who do
not belong to the officially-recognized Patriotic Association. The number of Muslims
also grew from 5 million to 25 million during the same time period.63 The number of
both Buddhist and Daoist believers is hard to calculate because there are no formal
conversion formalities to go through. The estimated number is more than a tenth of
the whole population of 1.3 billion. The growth and development of these religions in
China are evidence of current Chinese policies’ support of religious freedom.

Conclusion
In the 60 years of the PRC, the party and state have slowly evolved in the area of
religious affairs. It has made impressive progress in its understanding of religion and
has, over time, adjusted its religious policy to meet the spiritual needs of the Chinese
people. This is no small feat by any standard. The substantial changes and appropriate
adjustments made in the past 30 years have shown the government’s commitment to
make continuing progress in the area of religious liberty. The party – state exhibits
consistency and flexibility in its religious policy and law making, as well as in
practical dealings of religious affairs. Freedom of religious belief has been put into
practice to ensure Chinese people’s right to choose their individual beliefs. It
demonstrates a respect for personal choice. In China, religions are perceived as
agents for peace and harmony. Religious affairs and activities are handled to function
as such. The new policies and laws since the 1990s have come from and support
Chinese values of social cohesion and welfare. The balance between the right of
individual religious liberty and the right of social welfare varies from culture to
culture. Shouldn’t we allow the Chinese Confucianism-based culture to find its own
way of religious mediation and function in the contemporary world?
In the religious field, the Western idea that the separation of church and state is
better than the state supervision of religious activities still prevails, despite the fact of
China’s fast growing religious developments. Actually, the dynamics and the
60. See Ye, supra note 1, p. 9 in Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. x.
61. Chan and Carlson, Religious Freedom in China, p. 24.
62. Ying, ‘New wine in old wineskins’, p. 357.
63. Zhonguo zongjiao [Journal of China Religions ] no. 4, (2004).

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complementary relationship created by the Western democratic individualism/free

capitalism and the Eastern authoritarian collectivism/state capitalism form a new
framework. It allows us to look at religious freedom in two ways. It can be viewed
both as an absolute humanistic value and an unalienable right as well as negotiations
of seemingly opposing values (e.g. individual religious liberty versus social welfare
and cohesion). If these dynamics are accepted, ‘the religious freedom with Chinese
characteristics’ can be supported. It embodies the freedom of religious belief, the
state supervision of religious activities, as well as having religious clergymen work
within the legislation and consultative bodies (People’s Congress and People’s
Political Consultative Conference) and present their opinions and suggestions on
making and implementing religious policies and regulations. Much like the economic
policy that the PRC has changed in the past 30 years, it has impressively evolved its
policy on religious tolerance. It will be interesting to watch the continued progress of
religious freedom within the context of China’s emergence as a global economic and
political force.

Appendix 1. Statutes and laws in both Chinese and English translations

. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document 19 (1982)
. Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Document 6 (1991)
. Explanation of Certain Items in the Decree 144 (2002)
. Procedures for the Annual Inspection of Venues of Religious Activity (1996)
. Provisions on the Administration of Religious Activities of Aliens within the
Territory of the People’s Republic China (1994)
. Regulations on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities (1994)
. Religious Affairs Provisions (2005)
. White Papers of the Chinese Government, vol. 2 (Beijing: Foreign Languages
Press, 2000)
. The Constitution of the People’s Republic China (1982)
. The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic China (1997)

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