SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE VS.

CA
GR NO. 122191, OCTOBER 08, 1998

FACTS:

Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia Arabian Airlines. In 1990,
while she and some co-workers were in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker
tried to rape her in a hotel room. While working in Manila, Saudia Airlines advised her to meet
with a Saudia Airlines officer in Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi
court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to 5 months imprisonment and 289
lashes. The Prince of Makkah got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she
was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and sent her back to the Philippines.
Saudia Airlines later on dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for damages under
Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law should be the law of Saudi
Arabia.

ISSUE:

Whether the applicable law is the law of the Philippines and that the RTC has
jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

Yes. Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the
"connecting factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct
or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct
took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private
respondent, a Filipina residing and working here.
For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of the
alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without
basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most
significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the
factual context of this case.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the
place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution
of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint. The RTC has
acquired jurisdiction over Saudia Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition
for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked the court to make a determination
of Saudia Airlines’s rights hence a submission to the court’s jurisdiction. The RTC also has
acquired jurisdiction over the case because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is
bringing the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and not of the Arabian Law.
Morada then has the right to file it in the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff
may elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the place where she resides or
where the defendant resides. Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here because
if she’ll file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very disadvantageous for her (and of course, again,
Philippine Civil Law is the law invoked).
HASEGAWA VS. KITAMARU
GR NO. 149177, NOVEMBER 23, 2007

FACTS:

Nippon Engineering Consultants (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm entered into an

agreement with Kitamaru providing for the latter to extend professional services to Nippon for a
year. However, Hasegawa, Nippon’s general manager for its International Division, informed
Kitamaru that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR
Project.

Kitamaru demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that
Kitamaru’s contract was for a fixed term that had expired. Kitamaru then filed for specific
performance & damages w/ the RTC of Lipa City. Nippon filed a MTD.

Nippon’s contention: The ICA had been perfected in Japan & executed by & between
Japanese nationals. Thus, the RTC of Lipa City has no jurisdiction. The claim for improper pre-
termination of Kitamaru’s ICA could only be heard & ventilated in the proper courts of Japan
following the principles of lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.

ISSUE:

Whether the jurisdiction of the Philippine court may be assailed on the ground of forum
non conveniens?

RULING:

NO. The principles or point of contract alleged by the petitioners is not applicable in this
case. The court ruled that the trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of the case.In
the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint for specific performance and damages.
Such case is incapable of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those provided for by the Rules as a ground
for dismissing a civil case.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINE VS. REBESENCIO
GR NO. 198587, JANUARY 14, 2015

FACTS:

Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines is a foreign corporation established and existing under
the Royal Decree of Jeddah which hired respondents as flight attendants. They entered into the
necessary Cabin Attendant Contracts with Saudi. Respondents were released from service on
separate dates in 2006 and they claimed that such release was illegal since the basis of
termination of contract was solely because they were pregnant. Consequently, respondents filed
a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal, but
petitioner Airlines contested the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction as the contract’s points referred to
foreign law and that Respondents had no cause of action since they already voluntarily
resigned. Executive Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but on appeal the NLRC reversed
the Labor Arbiter’s decision and denied Petitioner Airlines’ Motion for Reconsideration, hence the
current appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC has jurisdiction over Saudi Arabian Airlines and
apply Philippine jurisdiction over the dispute?

RULING:

YES. Summons were validly served on Saudia and jurisdiction over it validly acquired. No
doubt that the pleadings were served to Petitioner Airlines through their counsel, however they
claim that the NLRC and Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction since summons were served to Saudi
Airlines Manila and not to them, Saudi Airlines Jeddah. Saudi Airlines Manila was neither a party
to the Cabin attendant contracts nor funded the Respondents, and it was to Saudi Jeddah that
they filed their resignations. Court ruled however that b y its own admission, Saudia, while a
foreign corporation, has a Philippine office, and that under the Foreign Investments act of 1991,
they are a foreign corporation doing business in the Phils and therefore are subject to Philippine
jurisdiction.
NOVERAS VS. NOVERAS
733 SCRA 528, AUGUST 20, 2014

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent were validly married in the US. During their marriage, the
couple acquired several properties including a property in the Philippines which the petitioner
was tasked to manage. However, after several years of staying in the Philippines, the petitioner
eventually lived with another woman other than his wife. Upon learning that David had an
extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce. The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the
USA.

Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his obligation
under the same. She prayed for among others the administration of all their conjugal
properties. In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage
was entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He
demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be
liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be
charged against the conjugal partnership. The court a quo granted the liquidation of their
properties both in the Philippines and in the US, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same
can be included in the judicial separation prayed for?

RULING:

No. We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire
jurisdiction over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil
Code clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.
DEL SOCCORO VS. VAN WILSEN
744 SCRA 516, DECEMBER 10, 2014

FACTS:

Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were
blessed with a son. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son.
However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support
to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resided again the Philippines particulary
in Cebu where the petitioner also resided. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of
R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial
court dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, him being an alien.

ISSUE:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the
Philippine law?
2. Whether a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child?

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we
agree with the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as
to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged to support
Norma’s son altogether. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law
applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present
case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by
such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his
son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to
support their child. Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our
courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice
 is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the
foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

2. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living
here in the Philippines and committed the offense here.
REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
G.R. NO. 154380October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Responent married Lady Myro Villanueva in Ozamis City. In 1986, respondent discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, he learned
through his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an American.
Consequently, respondent filed before the trial court a petition for “Authority to Remarry”
invoking Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code which was granted, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the divorce decree allegedly acquired by respondent’s wife was proved.

RULING:

No. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign
law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicialnotice of
foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore,
respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife toremarry as
specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare
that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. However, in the present petition there is
no sufficient evidence submitted and onrecord, we are unable to declare, based on respondent’s
bare allegations that his wife,who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a
divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry.
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited
evidence inhis favor.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MARELYN TANEDO MANALO
GR NO. 221029, APRIL 18, 2018

FACTS:

Respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a Japanese court. The petition was later amended and captioned as a petition for
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.

The trial court (RTC) denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the
New Civil Code, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipino family rights
and duties, together with determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into
contracts and civil relations, including marriages”. On appeal, the court held that Article 26 of
the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed
for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter
no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. It would be the height of injustice
to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married
to her, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether a Filipino citizen, who initiated a divorce proceeding abroad and obtained a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry, has the
capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 (2) of the Family Code?

RULING:

YES. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorc validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry”. Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not
demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the
divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner
or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.

The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is
effective in the country where it is rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to
the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to remarry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding.
Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended
as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose
marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law.
REPUBLIC VS. ALBIOS
707 SCRA 584, OCTOBER 16, 2013

FACTS:

Respondent Libert Albios married Daniel Lee Fringer, an American citizen. She later on
filed a petition to nullify their marriage. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
said that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship. Such petition was granted by the trial court in her favor on the ground of lack of
consent which decision was later on upheld by the appellate court, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage of Albios and Fringer be declared null and void.

RULING:

NO. “Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability
to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly
and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and
valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship.
There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between
them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.”

The court also explained that “There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is
entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the
acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law,
it shall be declared valid.”
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT VS. VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT
GR NO. 155635, NOVEMBER 07, 2008

FACTS:

Parties were married in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its
face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. Thereafter, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra
or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the
latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the
Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally
appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by counsel.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic.

(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal
effects.

RULING:

1) Yes. Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case. When Divorce Was
Granted Rebecca, She was not a Filipino Citizen and was not yet recognized as one.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status
of, or at least was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen when she secured the
February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.

(2) Yes. The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband
and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced, "That the marriage
between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved
leaving them free to remarry after completing the legal requirements." The Court has taken
stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of the
alien spouse. Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when
she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996.

In determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at
the time a valid divorce is obtained.

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's
motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached
therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which
presupposes the existence of a marriage.
MINORU FUJIKI VS. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, ET AL.
700 SCRA 69, JUNE 26, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara got married in the Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtained a judgment from a family
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground
of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition
of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marrige), hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the Regional Trial Court could recognize the foreign judgement under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

Yes. Since the recognition of a foreign judgement only requires proof of the fact of the
judgement, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court precisely because Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that, a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a right, status, or a particular fact. To be sure, a petition for correction and
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgement annuling a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
 REPUBLIC VS BATUIGAS
706 SCRA 746, OCTOBER 07, 2013

FACTS:

Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. She
stated that she intended in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside continuously in the Philippines
from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.

After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she
is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that
Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade.
The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she owns real property because aliens are
precluded from owning lands in the country. Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG to be
evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.

Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents,
Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog,
Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in
Philippine schools. After earning a degree in education, she then practiced her teaching
profession in several different schools in Mindanao.

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born
Filipino citizen. They have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private
schools and are all professionals.

After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in
the retail business of and later on in milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their
income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002
and from 2004-2005. During their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in
Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner has validly complied the citizenship

RULING:

Yes.Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No.
9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative
naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:

“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”

Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess other
qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization.

Records, however, show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate
of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID granted her application.
However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient
evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage certificate was
presented to establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s
registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records.
TESTATE OF AMOS BELLIS, ET AL. VS. EDWARD BELLIS
GR NO. L-23678, JUNE 06, 1967

FACTS:

The deceased was a citizen and a resident of Texas at the time of his death. Before his
death, he had made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties, and the other disposing
his Philippine properties. In both wills, his recognized illegitimate children were not given
anything. Further, Texas law does not provide for compulsory heirs, therefore, there were no
legitimes. The children opposed on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes if
Phillipine law were to apply, hence, this case.

ISSUE:

Whether the illegtimate children were entitled to legitimes.

RULING:

No. Paragraph 2, of Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that, when it comes to
intestate and testamentary succession, the national law of the deceased shall apply. Under the
Texas law, the deceased being a national, therefore, said children are not entitled to legitimes.
TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., VS.
MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, ET AL.
GR NO. L-12105, JANUARY 30, 1960

FACTS:

Testator was a citizen of Nevada with properties in the Philippines who gave nothing in
his will to his Filipino wide and very little to his children. Under the Nevada Law, however, which
was duly proved, the wife and the children are not considered as compulsory heirs and are
terefore, not entitled to legitimes.

ISSUE:

Whether the wife and the children could justifiably complain.

RULING:

No. Under paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Civil Code, the order of succession, the
amount of succesional rights and the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions if the will
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration.
Since under the Nevada Law, there is no legitime, the wife and the children could not justifiably
complain.
MICIANO VS. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867

FACTS:
Joseph G. Brimos will provided that even if he was a Turk, still he wanted his estate in
the Philippines be disposed in accordance with Philippine laws and not in accordance with
Turkish law, and that should any of the legatees oppose the intention, his or her legacy would
be considered cancelled. However, one of the deceased’s brothers opposed because he did not
want the disposition be in accordance with Philippine laws ut rather with Turkish laws, hence,
this case.

ISSUE:
Whether Andre Brimo loses his legacy.

RULING:
No. Article 873 of the Civil Code says that, impossible conditions and those contrary to
law or good customs shall be considered as not imposed, and shall in no manner prejudice the
heir, even if the testator should otherwise provide. The condition being disregarded, the legacy
of Andre Brimo becomes unconditional and therefore, he is entitiled to his legacy.
ORION SAVINGS BANK VS. SUZUKI
GR NO. 205487, NOVEMBER 12, 2004

FACTS:

Respondent Shigekane Suzuki, a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja to
inquire about a condominium unit and a parking lot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City,
allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national.

Soneja informed Suzuki that said units] were for sale. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki
that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were clean. After payment of the price of the unit
and parking slot, Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez,
Orion’s Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to
deliver the documents.

Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties. He learned that the title to the Parking Slot contained no
annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. Despite the cancellation
of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.

Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. Orion, through Perez, however, refused
to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.

ISSUE:

Whether Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal property of spouses
Kang?

HELD:
No. In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal
principle that real or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or
state where it is located. Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of real property
are determined by what is known as the lex rei sitae which can alone prescribe the mode by
which title can pass from one person to another or by which an interest therein can be gained
or lost.
 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TAFT AVE., COR. MENLO ST., PASAY CITY

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CASE DIGESTS ON
CONFLICT OF LAWS

SUBMITTED BY:
ANTHONY B. SANDOVAL