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FISCAL AUTONOMY
CHREA VS.CHR
G.R. NO. 155336
NOVEMBER 25, 2004

FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.

By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the request.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended to the CSC-Central Office that the subject
appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees association (CHREA) in representation of the rank
and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversedthe recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
CSC-Central Office denied the same.

CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office
and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the justification
that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE: Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla
positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

HELD:
The petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the CA are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling CSC-
National Capital Region is REINSTATED. The 3 CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the DBM are
disallowed.

1. RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the
Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, provides that it is the DBM that shall
establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is
flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans
qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the execution, application
or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the government of the state.

2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v. Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances, and
other benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the requisite approval or authority of the DBM
are unauthorized and irregular

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In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national government.

In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the rules and regulations
of the Compensation and Position Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597, the
compensation system established by the PPC is, nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.

(It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any PPC resolution affecting the compensation
structure of its personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can dictate upon the PPC Board of
Directors and deprive the latter of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM’s function is merely to ensure
that the action taken by the Board of Directors complies with the requirements of the law, specifically, that
PPC’s compensation system “conforms as closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758.” )

3. As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must
first be sought prior to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of positions in government. This is
consonant to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987, Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:

SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President
in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control
of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations,
administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational
effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and
creation of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal
justification.

Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to deny or approve the proposed
reclassification of positions as evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval thereof. As such,
it is now estopped from now claiming that the nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a
superfluity.

4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a
constitutional commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.

Palpably, the CA’s Decision was based on the mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But the Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the COMELEC,
and the COA shall be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right to fiscal autonomy.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, on Distribution of Powers of Government, the constitutional
commissions shall include only the CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA, which are granted independence and
fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5, Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to the other
bodies including the CHR. Thus:

SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved
annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with the Constitution, an Office of the
Ombudsman, a Commission on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority, and a
national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may establish an
independent economic and planning agency.

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From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is abundantly clear that the CHR is not
among the class of Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, the express mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all others. Stated
otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum – what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.

Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence,
fiscal autonomy entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is
the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to the wisdom
and dispatch its needs may require from time to time. In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon, it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the CSC, the COA, the COMELEC, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
which enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG) ipso facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not a tag
obtainable by membership. We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act No. 8522, while
cited under the heading of the CHR, did not specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the
special provision to formulate and implement organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage
to include Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy.

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the
genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat. Even assuming en arguendo that
the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of fiscal autonomy
notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We are
of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus- Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does
not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create positions without approval of the
DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices and determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority is not
absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation
System established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.

5. The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent, however, is the provision of Rep. Act No.
8522 “that the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and other benefits
authorized under compensation standardization laws.”

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION (CHREA) VS.


COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
G.R. No. 155336, November 25, 2004, July 21, 2006.

DOCTRINE:
A proper party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman; CHR is not one of them.

FACTS:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No. 8522, otherwise known as the General
Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying
Fiscal Autonomy. The last portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.

On the strength of these special provisions, CHR promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04
September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions in the
Commission. Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten additional plantilla positions, namely:
one Director IV position, with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four Security Officer II with
Salary Grade 15, and five Process Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the Commissioners.

On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or raising of
salary grade of the several positions in the Commission. To support the implementation of such scheme, the
CHR, in the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a commensurate amount generated from savings
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under Personnel Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the CHR “collapsed”
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional source of funding for said staffing modification. Among
the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I,
one Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II.

The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading scheme to the Department of Budget and
Management [DBM] with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the
request on the following grounds:

 It involved the elevation of the field units from divisions to services.

 In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be used as a legal basis to
elevate the level of divisions to a bureau or regional office, and the services to
offices, such scheme should be denied.

 Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the General Appropriations


Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational unit or changes in key positions shall be
authorized unless provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation
of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office cannot be given
favorable recommendation.

Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation
Standardization Law, the Department of Budget and Management is directed to establish and administer a
unified compensation and position classification system in the government. The Supreme Court ruled in the
case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that DBM the sole power
and discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest the agency with the authority to reclassify,
upgrade, and create positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of the Group are authorized
to formulate and implement the organizational structures of their respective offices and determine the
compensation of their personnel, such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters
of the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System established under RA 6758 more popularly
known as the Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our previous stand on the matter.

In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National
Capital Region Office, through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended to the CSCCentral
Office that the subject appointments be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.

Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association [CHREA], in
representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central office to affirm the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the DBM is the only agency
with appropriate authority mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.

The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed
the recommendation of the CSCRegional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. Petitioner CHREA
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-
Central Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.

Petitioner elevated its case to the Supreme Court and successfully obtained the favorable action in its
Decision dated 25 November 2004. Respondent then filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

CONTENTION:
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that there is no legal basis to support the contention that the
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
** Supreme Court erred in stating that the special provision of the RA No. 8522 did not specifically
mention CHR as among those offices to which the special provision to formulate and implement
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organizational structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include constitutional commissions
and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy;
** Supreme Court erred when it ruled that the CHR although admittedly a constitutional creation is
nonetheless not included in the genus of the offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or
legislative fiat.
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to reinstate the ruling dated 29 march 1999 of the civil service
commission – national capital region;
** Supreme Court erred in deciding to disallow the Commission On Human Rights Resolution No. A98-
047 dated September 04, 1998, Resolution No. A98-055 dated 19 october 1998 and Resolution No.
A98-062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the department of budget and
management.

ISSUES:
1. WON CHREA has the capacity to sue and/or the proper party
2. WON CHR is one of the constitutional bodies clothed wit fiscal autonomy
3. WON approval of DBM is a condition precedent to the approval of the scheme

HELD:

1. YES.
On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper party is one
who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. Here,
petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to
the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's
upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the Commission's savings or that portion
of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees,
including those in the rank and file, are derived. Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the
CSC-National Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the Court of
Appeals when it passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical
concern. Indeed, it is settled jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of
fair play, justice, and due process.

2. NO.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As already settled in the assailed Decision of
this Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a
constitutional commission. The creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not, in the
strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled “Constitutional
Commissions,” identifies only the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission
on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution on Human Rights. Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the 1987
Constitution on constitutional commissions for its benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or
statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of fiscal autonomy. The 1987 Constitution
extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations released automatically and regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy,
in its broad or extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the
Ombudsman.

The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3.
Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the 1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section
5, a provision applied in common to all constitutional commissions. The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal
autonomy by virtue of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution.

Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences stating that: (1) The government entity
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and regularly
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released. The respondent anchors its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article XIII, Section
17, which provides that the approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically and
regularly released.

As compared to Article VIII, Section 3; Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987
Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively,
Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain the first
sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the second sentence on the automatic
and regular release of its approved annual appropriations.

Fiscal Autonomy defined. It means independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside
control and is characterized by self-direction or self-determination. It does not mean mere automatic and
regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very real sense, the fiscal
autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons, after the release
of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy encompasses, among others, budget preparation and implementation,
flexibility in fund utilization of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts.

This Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal
autonomy through the privilege of having its approved annual appropriations released automatically and
regularly. However, it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or extensive sense, as granted
to the Judiciary, constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative herein is the rule of
statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person, thing,
or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or
in this case, the ConCom) would not have made specific enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution) had
the intention not been to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

3. YES.
This Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in
length in the assailed Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior to implementation of any
reclassification or upgrading of positions in government.

Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that
the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law.

The Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision of this Court dated 25
November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limited
fiscal autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations; nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law. Accordingly, its
entire reclassification scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM.

CSC VS. DBM


G.R. NO. 158791, JULY 22, 2005

That the no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is
not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without
violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution which provides: Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

FACTS:
The CSC herein petitioner, seeks to compel the DBM herein respondent, to release the balance of its
budget pursuant to the General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the fiscal year 2002. Verily, the balance in favor
of CSC was intentionally withheld by DBM on the basis of DBM’s no report, no release policy whereby
allocations for agencies are withheld pending their submission of certain documents which CSC allegedly failed
to undertake. On its part the CSC contends that the application of the no report, no release policy upon an

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independent constitutional body such as the CSC is a violation of its fiscal autonomy and is therefore void.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the DBM can validly withhold the appropriated balance of funds against the CSC

HELD:
NO. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no
condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. If respondent’s theory were adopted, then the constitutional
mandate to automatically and regularly release approved appropriations would be suspended every year, or
even every month that there is a short falling revenues, thereby emasculating to a significant degree, if not
rendering insignificant altogether, such mandate.

Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner may be
subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not
granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution. The
agencies which the Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be given priority in the release of
their approved appropriations over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a revenue shortfall.

RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING A.M. NO. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA


THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP OF THE PRESENT:
PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY

FACTS:
The instant administrative matter has its roots in the Resolution of the Court promulgated on February
24, 2004, clarifying and strengthening the organizational structure and administrative set-up of the Philippine
Judicial Academy (PHILJA). Pursuant to said resolution, the positions of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer with Salary Grades (SG) 25 and 23.

However, in its Notice of Organization, Staffing, and Compensation Action (NOSCA) dated May 5, 2005,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) downgraded said positions and their corresponding salary
grades. The SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer’s title was downgraded and its SG reduced to 24. And Supervising
Judicial Staff Officer’s title was downgraded and its SG reduced to 22.

ISSUE: WON DBM may downgrade the said positions.

RULING:
No. The primary role of the DBM is to breathe life into the policy behind the Salary Standardization Law
of providing equal pay for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences
in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. Pursuant to its mandate, the
DBM is authorized to evaluate and determine whether a proposed reclassification and upgrading scheme is
consistent with applicable laws and regulations. The task of the DBM is simply to review the compensation
and benefits plan of the government agency or entity concerned and determine if it complies with the
prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. Thus, the role of the DBM is supervisorial in nature, its
main duty being to ascertain that the proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be given to
[government] officials and employees adhere to the policies and guidelines issued in accordance with
applicable laws.
As such, the authority of the DBM to review Supreme Court issuances relative to court personnel on matters
of compensation is limited by the provisions of the Constitution, specifically Article VIII, Section 3 on fiscal
autonomy and Article VIII, Section 6 on administrative supervision over court personnel. Fiscal autonomy
means freedom from outside control.
Clearly then, in downgrading the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer and SC
Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA, the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the
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Courts fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation
of the Constitution itself.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS/ DUE PROCESS

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. VICTORIO N. MEDRANO


569 SCRA 747 (2008), SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:
Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a sworn letter-
complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of Republic Act No. 7877
(Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and grave misconduct (administrative case). While the
administrative case was pending investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive
Suspension, and was granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six
months without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found Medrano guilty
of grave misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not only the factual
findings and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over the case.
With regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case
was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint order, the
Ombudsman affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in the administrative case.

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction
over the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s decision in the administrative case and dismissed
the complaint on the sole ground that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion
for reconsideration of the CA‘s decision but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against
Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog

HELD:
The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and the
dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it ignores the whale
of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan
and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the
distinct and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party against any impropriety or
wrongdoing committed by a public officer. It provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and
3.) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively.
Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and
reservation because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or
for monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the
dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint, Section 5,
Article XI of the Constitution “created the independent Office of the Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors
of the people,” the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers,
functions, and duties to act on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12
and 13.

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When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by an
investigating committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of the
division. Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner “may refer certain
complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees.”
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public
school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against Medrano
and referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had
rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of
estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative
complaint allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s acts
belatedly.

OMBUDSMAN VS MASING
G.R. NO. 165416

FACTS:
Respondents Florita A. Masing, former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School, and
Jocelyn A. Tayactac, an office clerk in the same school, were administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for
public funds.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a
committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the “The
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.”

The motion was denied. Ombudsman rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and
Tayactac guilty. Masing was dismissed from service while Tayactac was suspended for 6 months.

On appeal, CA reversed.

Meanwhile, Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Ombudsman for charges of
oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity
or disability due to immoral or vicious habits.

Ombudsman found Masing guilty as charged and ordered her suspension for six (6) months without
pay.

On appeal, CA also reversed.

Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus Motion to
Intervene and for Reconsideration. CA denied the on the grounds that (1) intervention is not proper because it
is sought by the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is
belated under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, appeal before SC. The 2 cases were consolidated.

ISSUE:
1. WON Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration?
2. WON Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees?
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HELD:
1. YES.
In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, we recognized the standing of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding Dacoycoy guilty.
Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the CA, it became the
party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which “seriously prejudices the civil service system.”

However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the CA for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsman’s
motions for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the interest of speedy justice.

2. YES.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is
explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution. Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution
delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman. The enumeration of these powers is non-
exclusive.

Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, giving the Office
such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution. In fine, the
manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.

Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making
findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who
may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in
cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a
more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed
by public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an “activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.
He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

We emphasize that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute
an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.” Implementation
of the order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and employees, it
is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19
of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints.

It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive
disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other
hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted
on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of
earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the
Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary.

Therefore, the statement in Fabella Case that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 “reflects the legislative intent
to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers” should be construed as referring only to the specific procedure
to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the DECS.

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GARCIA VS MOLINA
G.R. NO. 157383, 20 AUG 2010

FACTS:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two separate Memoranda
from the President & General Manager of GSIS charging them with grave misconduct. Considering the gravity
of the charges against them, petitioner ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days
without pay, effective immediately.

Respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order & a Petition to Transfer Investigation to This Commission. Despite their urgent motions, the
CSC failed to resolve respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to transfer the case from
the GSIS to the CSC.

Hence, respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The CA rendered a decision in favor respondents. The CA declared null
and void respondents formal charges for lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. In view thereof, the CA
disagreed with the CSC that the question on the propriety of the preventive suspension order had become
moot and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise void having emanated from the void formal
charges. Consequently, the CA found that respondents were entitled to back salaries during the time of their
illegal preventive suspension.

ISSUES: WON the respondents were fully accorded the requisite opportunity to be heard, were in fact heard
and being heard, and whether the conduct of preliminary investigation in administrative proceedings is an
essential requisite to the conduct of adjudication.

HELD:
NO. The respondents were not fully accorded the requisite opportunity to be heard. The SC held that
respondents were denied due process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are serious and
evidence of their guilt is in the opinion of their superior strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this case. The filing by petitioner of formal charges
against the respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the formal charges
are void ab initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.

Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and often applied more liberally,
administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the
right to due process in investigations and hearings.

It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is void ab initio and may be attacked at
anytime directly or collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such decision in any action or
proceeding where it is invoked. Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before the GSIS the lack of
preliminary investigation, records show that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and
the formal charges against them for lack of preliminary investigation. There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.

A.IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

FABELLA V. CA
G.R. NO. 110379, NOV. 28, 1997
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to all public school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to
October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and

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passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases against
respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School.

The charge sheets required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for
having taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws. Administrative hearings started on
December 1990. Respondents, through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due
process grounds:

1. first, they were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and denied access to evidence;

2. second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence;

3. third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment
violated Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the
validity of the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision
finding the respondents guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a
respondent’s legal rights;

(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person
charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and

(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected.

The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law
expressly provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the division.

In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against
private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were
deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private respondents.

The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in these committees was indispensable to


ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the
right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of
RA 4670 was complied with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We
disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’ organizations does not
ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA
4670. Under this section, the teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative
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to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the
secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of
its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’ organization as its representative
in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law
cannot repeal a previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to
harmonize them.

PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA VS.


POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA
GR 180146
FACTS:
Montoya, a member of the PNP, was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when
the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 on 9 September 1998 dropping
him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement
Course (LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong
Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days, from 23
January 1998 to 31 March 1998.

On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National Capital Region (NCR),
explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave
Form approved by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been
forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure
to attend the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of
severe body pain.

Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR Regional Director issued
on 11 June 1999 Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044. Montoya was also preventively
suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative
liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted from
his leave credits.

FINDINGS:
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by Hearing Officer Police
Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based
on his findings, the NCR Regional Director rendered a Decision on 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya from the
police service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a copy of
said Decision on 20 July 2000.

Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August 2000 with the CPD office a Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director, which he
addressed to the PNP Chief. In a Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for Personnel and
Records Management of the PNP Headquarters, Montoyas Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction,
since a disciplinary action involving demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director
may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).

RAB RULING:
Montoya’s appeal was granted. He was ordered to be reinstated in the police service without loss of
seniority rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period effective from the
time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement

Upon appeal of (P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere, he assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating
Montoya in the police service on the following grounds:
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a. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his appeal to the Appellate
Board, as provided by Sec. 2, Rule III, MC # 91-007;

b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the fact that the decision of the
NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had already become final and executory.

c. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the no work, no pay policy.

The appeal of the RAB-NCR decision exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and for
the reason that the said decision had already become final and executory. The dispositive portion of DILG
Secretary Linas decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack of merit. The assailed decisions of the
Regional Appellate Board National Capital Region, 4th Division, are hereby affirmed in toto.

The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed the Order dated 10 November 2003 of
DILG Secretary Lina to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The NCR Regional Director asserted its right to
appeal citing Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy.

On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et
al., without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the CSC.

Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200 which recognized the right of
the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG. The CSC set aside the 10
November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional Director
dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service. According to the CSC, Montoya, in particular, was guilty of
laches and abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11 December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on
Montoyas case, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, was based on mere affidavits which were not substantiated.

The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al., in Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23
August 2006 for lack of new evidence or any valid reason that warrants the setting aside or modification of its
Resolution No. 05-1200.

Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
96022.

On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96022,
since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No.
06-1500. The dispositive portion of said Decision states:

Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS Resolution No. 05-1200
dated August 24, 2005 and Resolution No. 06-1500 dated August 23, 2006 of the Civil Service
Commission. Accordingly, the Order dated November 10, 2003 of the DILG Secretary Jose D.
Lina, Jr. affirming the nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board reinstating
[Montoya, et al.] to the police service is SET ASIDE. The decisions of the NCRPO Regional
Director dismissing petitioners-police officers Enrique C. Paulino, Rebecca P. Fernandez, Donato
L. Geda, Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De Leon Nuqui, Ruel C. Montoya, Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto
S. Mendoza and Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED.

Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, but it was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 18 October 2007.

Hence, the present Petition in which Montoya raises the following issues:
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ISSUE: WON the right to due process of petitioner was violated.

HELD:
The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.

Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and often applied more
liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles, such
as the right to due process in investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due process
is applicable to administrative proceedings.

In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been recognized to include
the following:

(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondents legal rights;

(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to


present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend ones rights;

(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a


person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and

(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.

B.DUE NOTICE AND HEARING

EMIN VS. DE LEON


G.R. NO. 139794

FACTS:
Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change of status from provisional to permanent
under Republic Act No. 6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field Office-Cotabato at Amas,
Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of eligibility of
the teachers.

Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. He
called the Head Civil Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be authentic, the signature of Civil
Service Commission Director Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said certificates were
clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional Office No.
XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and for appropriate action through an indorsement letter
dated September 26, 1991. The appointment papers of the same nature subsequently submitted to the Field
Office were likewise forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.

Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found that said applications for civil service
eligibility under R.A. 6850 were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they submitted were
genuine as their control number belonged to the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office. But
the records showed that these certificates were never issued to any one.

Two separate investigations were conducted by Director Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of
the Civil Service Commission in Cotabato City:
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(1) on how the R.A. 6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and

(2) on how the teachers got said certificates. The teachers concerned were asked to report to the Office and
bring the original copies of their certificates of eligibility.

On several dates, the teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements pointing to petitioner as the
person who gave them the R.A. 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointments for a
fee. Upon finding a prima facie case, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC Regional Director, petitioner denied the accusation. He
filed a motion to dismiss, dated June 5, 1992,[4] but the motion was denied on July 8, 1992.

During the hearing, the six teachers cited in the charge sheet, namely: Eufrocina Sicam, Ma. Elisa Sarce,
Lilia Millondaga, Merla Entiero, Lourdes Limbaga and Florida P. Alforjas were presented as witnesses for the
prosecution. Felixberta Ocho and Araceli G. Delgado who were also holders of fake certificates of eligibility
were likewise presented as witnesses.

Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy Cruz as the persons who facilitated their
applications for R.A. 6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas and Delgados
testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the person who helped them obtain the fake certificates of
eligibility.

On June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report[5] to the Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission. The CSC found that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner. On May
14, 1996, the Civil Service Commission in its resolution decreed:

CSC RULING:
Martin S. Emin is found guilty of Grave Misconduct. The penalty of dismissal from the service including all
its accessory penalties is imposed upon him.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, but it was dismissed for failure to comply with Section 5,
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, the CA granted petitioners motion for reconsideration[9] and time to amend his petition. In his
amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin issues of

(1) Whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over the administrative cases against the
public school teachers; and

(2) Whether petitioner was accorded due process.

CA RULING:
Finding the petition unmeritorious, the appellate court ruled on by affirming public respondents assailed
appealed resolutions

ISSUE: WON petitioner was accorded due process

HELD:
NO.

Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-examination as most of the submissions were written. In our
view, petitioner cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination
took place. The rule is well established that due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
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reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the present case, the record clearly shows that
petitioner not only filed his Counter-Affidavit during the preliminary investigation, and later his Motion to
Dismiss. He also filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the October 19, 1993 Order of the Commission. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Neither is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that he was denied the right to due process when the CSC
Regional Office, according to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and executioner. He laments that
Director Buenaflor who formally filed the charge nominally was also the hearing officer, and that prosecutor
Atty. Anabelle Rosell was also the one who submitted the recommendation to the CSC for the dismissal of
petitioner. Recall, however, that it was ultimately the Civil Service Chairman who promulgated the
decision. The report submitted by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director Buenaflor sat as hearing
officer, was merely recommendatory in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such procedure is not
unusual in an administrative proceeding.

Petitioner claims that there was no valid case to dismiss him as Director Elmer Bartolata was not
presented to ascertain the alleged forged signature contained in the questioned certificates of eligibility. The
Court of Appeals and the Civil Service Commission made a finding on this fact of forgery. It is not this Courts
function now to evaluate factual questions all over again. This is particularly true in this case, where the
Commission and the appellate court agree on the facts.

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