Code of Conduct of Public Officials Cases
Carabeo v. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Carabeo was charges with failing to disclose personal properties,
misdeclaring the acquisition cost, and falsely declaring his net worth.
Carabeo argued that his head of office should have alerted him on the
deficiency in his SALN.
Issue: Is Carabeo guilty?
Ruling: Yes. The review of the SALN by the head of office is irrelevant and
cannot bar the Ombudsman from conducting an independent investigation
for criminal violations of public officials/employees. The Ombudsman can
motu proprio investigate and prosecute any act/omission of any public
officer/employee. The review by the head office is an internal matter only
and refers to formal defects only.
Ombudsman vs. Madriaga GR164316 Sept. 27, 2006
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Office of
the Ombudsman charging the respondents with violation of Sec 1 of Rule IV
and Sec 1 of Rule VI of the Rules Implementing RA6713 the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. After the
respondents replied, the Graft Investigation Officer found respondents
guilty of Section 5 (a) of RA 6713 reading: all public officials and emplouyees
shall, w/in 15 working days from receipt herof, respond to letters, telegrams
or other means of communications sent by the public.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman has the authority to impose
administrative sanctions over public officials.
Ruling: Yes. Art XI, Sec 13 of the 1987 Constitution provides grants the
petitioner administrative disciplinary power to
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, [and]
xxxx
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 6770 echoes the constitutional grant to petitioner
of the power to "recommend" the imposition of penalty on erring public
officials and employees and ensure compliance therewith.
In fine, petitioner’s authority to impose administrative penalty and enforce
compliance therewith is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory
within the bounds of the law.
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act Cases
People vs Partoza
Facts: PO3 Tougan, together with PO2 Pontilla and the civilian informant
conducted a buy-bust operation against the accused.
At the police station, the two (2) plastic sachets confiscated from Parto
were marked. After marking, the police immediately prepared the request
for laboratory examination. Chemistry Report confirmed that the two (2)
plastic sachets seized from appellant were positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.
Appellant denied the charges against him. RTC convicted him, CA confirmed.
Here, he questions the integrity of the evidence used against him on the
grounds of failure to mark the items seized from him immediately and
failure to observe the chain of custody as required under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165.
Issue: Was the non-compliance of Sec 21 acquit the accused?
Ruling: Yes. In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of
drugs, the prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1)
identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale or had actually taken place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the
evidence of the corpus delicti must be established beyond doubt.
Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates that the apprehending team having
initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and
disposition of confiscated dangerous drugs in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
were not complied with. PO3 Tougan did not mark the seized drugs
immediately after he arrested appellant in the latter's presence. Neither did
he make an inventory and take a photograph of the confiscated items in the
presence of appellant. There was no representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official who participated in the
operation and who were supposed to sign an inventory of seized items and
be given copies thereof. None of these statutory safeguards were observed.
Non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as
there is a justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending team, yet these conditions were not met in the case at
bar. No explanation was offered by PO3 Tougan for his failure to observe
the rule.
All told, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
People v Padua
Facts:
Sonny Padua was alleged to be guilty of illegal sale and possession of shabu,
in violation of RA 9165. A buy-bust operation was conducted by the Drug
Enforcement Group of the Southern Police District of Taguig City. In their
buy bust operation, one of the police officers pretended to be a delivery
truck driver who had just arrived from a provincial trip and in dire need of
shabu for his personal consumption. Padua testified that therewas no buy-
bust operation. On direct examination, accused-appellant asserted that he
was awakened by the operatives who went to his housein Barangay
Napindan, Taguig City. When he opened his eyes, a gun was poked at him.
He was handcuffed by the police officers and was brought to DDEU at Fort
Bonifacio, where he was detained. While inside the vehicle on their way to
Fort Bonifacio, accused-appellant alleged that the police officers asked him
to give them money otherwise a case will be filed against him. RTC declared
Padua guilty. CA affirmed. Now Padua is contending that the CA erred in
convicting him despite the non-presentation as witness: (i) the forensic
chemist, (ii) the alleged investigator, and (iii) the informant.
Issue:
W/N CA erred in its decision in convicting Padua?
Ruling:
No. The fact that the persons who had possession or custody of the subject
drugs, such as Forensic Chemist Rivera-Dagasdas and the alleged
investigator, were not presented as witnesses to corroborate SPO2Aguilars
testimony is of no moment. The non-presentation as witnesses of other
persons such as the investigator and the forensic chemist, is nota crucial
point against the prosecution. The matter of presentation of witnesses by
the prosecution is not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the
discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right to choose whom
it wishes to present as witnesses. Anent the failure of the prosecution to
present the testimony of the informant, it is well-settled that the testimony
of an informant in drug-pushing cases is not essential for conviction and
may be dispensed with if the poseur-buyer testified on the same.
Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the need
to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Further, not all people
who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court.
There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165or in any rule implementing the
same that imposes such requirement. As long as the chain of custody of the
seized drug was clearly established not to have been broken and that the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not
indispensable that each and every person who came into possession of the
drugs should take the witness stand.
People vs Habana
Facts: The prosecution evidence shows that members of the Anti-Illegal
Drug Task Force Unit of the Caloocan City Police Station met with an
informant who told them that the accused Habana was selling shabu on
Salmon Street. Acting on this, the group proceeded to the place and staked
it out. After locating accused Habana, they decided to undertake a buy-bust
operation with PO1 Paras as poseur-buyer. After PO1 Paras got the plastic
sachet, he arrested Habana. The arresting officers handed over the custody
of his person and the items seized from him to PO3 Fernando Moran, the
investigator on duty, who placed this marking on them and submitted the
same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for forensic examination. Forensic
Chemist Police Inspector Erickson Calabocal submitted a report that the
substance contained in the plastic sachets tested positive for shabu.
Accused Habana presented a different version. According to him, he was on
his way home when five to seven men in civilian clothes blocked his way and
tried to search him. He resisted because he was not doing anything illegal.
Still, the men frisked him and took P500 from his pocket. They then
detained him in the police station. When his wife and sister failed toP20,000
for his freedom, they charged him with illegal possession and sale of shabu.
Amelia Sevilla corroborated the testimony of Habana. The trial court found
Habana guilty for violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165,
otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Since
one of the penalties was life imprisonment, the case was elevated to the CA
which affirms the decision of the trial court.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not the prosecution’s failure to present the forensic
chemist and the police investigator assigned to the case is fatal to
its case against accused Habana?
2.) Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the integrity of
the seized substance taken from Habana along the chain of custody.
Rulings:
1.) No rule requires the prosecution to present as witness in a drugs
case every person who had something to do with the arrest of the
accused and the seizure of prohibited drugs from him. The
discretion on which witness to present in every case belongs to the
prosecutor.It is rarely that the prosecutor would present the
informant because of the need to hide his identity and preserve his
invaluable service to the police Also, the parties agreed at the pre-
trial to dispense with such testimony and just stipulate that the
police submitted the drug specimens involved in the case to the
crime laboratory for analysis; that forensic chemist Calabocal
examined it; that the result was positive for shabu; and that this fact
 was as stated in Calabocal’s report. It is too late for Habana to now
impugn the veracity of such report.
2.) The prosecution failed to show how the seized items changed
hands, from when the police officers seized them from Habana to
the time they were presented in court as evidence. The prosecution
did not adduce evidence on what the investigator on duty did with
the seized articles, how these got to the laboratory technician, and
how they were kept before being adduced in evidence at the trial.
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized
up to the time it is offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution
must ensure that the substance presented in court is the same
substance seized from the accused.Since the failure in this case to
comply with the procedure in the custody of seized
drugs compromised the identity and integrity of the items seized,
which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against
Habana, his acquittal is in order.
People vs. Santiago, GR191061
Facts: PO1 Esguerra testified that they conducted a test buy and
received from appellant Roselle one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
that presumably contained shabu. When he returned to his office, Esguerra
marked the sachet with @ Tisay then sent it to the laboratory for testing.
Before receiving the results of the test buy, an asset told the police that
Roselle was going to leave her house, prompting Esguerras team to conduct
a buy-bust operation. During the buy bust operation, Roselle took
Esguerras’ marked money and entered the house. Subsequently, Roselle
returned with one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet presumably
containing shabu.Upon receipt of the sachet, Esguerra signaled his team.
They arrested Roselle and appraised her of her rights. Esguerra immediately
marked the sachet with RPS. After returning to the station, he turned over
Roselle and the seized sachet to the investigator. When the contents of the
first and second sachets (with @ Tisay and RPS markings) were examined,
these were confirmed to be Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). A
confirmatory test also found Roselle positive for the use of shabu.
For her defense, Roselle denies that she sold shabu to Esguerra. She
claims that the case was a product of a mistaken identity, as she was not
known as Tisay in the area but Roselle. She narrated how she was forcibly
taken from her house and into custody.
Issue: whether or not the prosecution established roselle’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for violating of Section 5 (drug-pushing) of
Republic Act (R.A.) 9165
Ruling: No. Although the prosecution established through Esguerra
the acts constituting the crime charged in the drug-pushing case (Section 5),
it failed to provide proper identity of the allegedly prohibited substance that
the police seized from Roselle. The request for laboratory exam reveals that
it was not Esguerra who delivered the specimen to the crime laboratory. It
appears that Esguerra gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn forwarded
it to a certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of the
specimen among these other persons.
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the
whereabouts of the seized specimen after the crime laboratory conducted
its tests. This omission is fatal since the chain of custody should be
established from the time the seized drugs were confiscated and eventually
marked until the same is presented during trial.
Taking into account the above reasons, the Court finds it difficult to
sustain the conviction of Roselle for violation of Section 5. The presumption
of her innocence of the charge must prevail.
People v. Watamama
Facts: Acting on a tip, an entrapment operation was conducted against
Watamama. The marked money, 2 P100 bills were marked with the initials
of one of the policemen. After the sale of shabu was completed, the other
members of the buy-bust team surfaced and arrested Watamama. The two
marked bills were recovered when SPO2 Nagera ordered appellant to empty
his pockets. Appellant was thereafter brought to the police station. At the
police station, PO1 Vargas marked the confiscated shabu and turned it over
to the station investigator Alex A. Jimenez. Jimenez prepared an inventory
receipt which P/Supt. Ratuita signed. Thereafter, PO2 Ortiz brought the
plastic sachet to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination.
Forensic chemist Leonard Jabonillo performed the examination and found
that the contents of the heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking
PV-09-25-05, weighed 0.18 grams and tested positive for
methylampethamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Issue:
Ruling:
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it is
offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the
substance presented in court is the same substance seized from the
accused. While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the
requirements of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations,
not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending to
drugs cases, still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their
imperfect conduct and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items had been preserved. Here, however, they failed to meet these
conditions.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized evidence changed hands
from the time PO1 Vargas turned it over to the investigator up to the time
they were presented in court as evidence. The prosecution did not adduce
evidence on how the evidence was handled or stored before its
presentation at the trial. It is not enough to rely merely on the testimony of
PO1 Vargas who stated that she turned the seized item over to the
investigator who then prepared the letter of request for examination. There
was no evidence on how PO2 Ortiz came into possession of the shabu and
how he delivered the seized item for examination to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Neither was there any evidence how it was secured from
tampering. Instructive is the case of People v. Kamad,11 where the Court
enumerated the different links that the prosecution must endeavor to
establish with respect to the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: first,
the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
as a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires
that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that everyone who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received when it was and what
happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it
was received, and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain
In this case, the over-reliance on PO1 Vargas’ testimony and the failure to
present the investigator and PO2 Ortiz are fatal to the prosecution’s case.
Since the failure to establish every link in the chain of custody of the drug
compromised its identity and integrity, which is the corpus delicti of the
crimes charged against appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order.
People vs. Lim
FACTS: Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), in violation of Section 11, Art.II of RA 9165. Lim,
together with his stepson Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres) was also indicted for
illegal sale of shabu in violation of Sec.5 Par. 1, Art. II of RA 9165.
The accused were apprehended in a buy-bust operation. IO1 Orrellan took
into custody the P500 bill, the plastic bocx with the plastic sachet of white
substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the
plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house of Lim, IO1
Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he
immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two
sachets of shabu. To ensure that they were not interchanged, he separately
marked the item sold by Lim to Carin and the one that he recovered from
his possession upon the body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-
10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/ signature. However, it was
evident that an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and
the media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized
items were absent. In fact, their signature do not appear on the inventory
receipt. RTC handed a guilty verdict against the accused. CA affirmed
ISSUE: Was the conviction proper?
RULING: NO. To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent need only to prove a rational basis from which to
conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to be. In other words,
in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which
the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what the
government claims it to be.
The links in the chain of custody that must be established are: 1. The the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; 2. The turnover of the sized illegal
drug by the apprehended officer to the investigating officer; 3. The turnover
of the illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and 4. The turnover and submission of the illegal
drug from the forensic chemist to the court.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized,
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
In this case, I01 Orellan testified that no members of the media and brgy
officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and it was
raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim’s house. IO2 Orcales
similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office
considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available
media representative and brgy officials despite their effort to contact them.
The SC is of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was
no genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law. The prosecution
likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
representative from the DOJ. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate with
and secure presence of the required witnesses.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory
requirements of Sec.21(1) of RA No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be
excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated
items are properly preserved applies not just on arrest or seizure by reason
of legitimate buy-bust operation but also on those lawfully made in air or
sea port, detention cell, checkpoint, moving vehicle, or those by virtue of a
consented search, stop and frisk, search incidental to a lawful arrest, or
application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the
arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
Anti-Hazing Law Case
Villareal vs People
Facts: In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de
Manila University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila
Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). During the initiation, of the seven
neophytes, Leonardo Lenny Villa died. Then, Of the 35 accused Aquilans, 26
were found guilty by the trial court of the crime of homicide. In the CA
level, some were acquitted others died pending appeal like de Leon and
Villareal. Villareal’s case here is closed and terminated due to his death.
Issue: Is Fidelito Dizon guilty of Homicide? Are the other accused guilty of
slight physical injuries only?
Ruling: Convictions were modified. Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that
serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization. In hazing, the
recruit, pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the
organization may refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing
or humiliating situations, like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or
other similar tasks or activities. It encompasses different forms of conduct
that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who desire
membership in the organization. These acts usually involve physical or
psychological suffering or injury.
The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites
does not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus
malus. If it is proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were
equipped with a guilty mind whether or not there is a contextual
background or factual premise they are still criminally liable for intentional
felony.
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that
with the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug did not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or
the other neophytes. We shall no longer disturb this finding.
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial
court and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent
to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its
finding of homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been
motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his
fathers parking space had been stolen by the victims father. As to Villareal,
the court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido
Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of
Villareals brother.
According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless, since the statements of the accused
were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the
part of the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by
Bienvenido Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and
Villareal are part of tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity
members during their initiation rites.
We agree with the Solicitor General.
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of
substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of
Dizon for those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially
because it was the CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the
intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional
felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony,
as reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both accusations against
Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific
threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on
[Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on Villas thighs
while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father. With
the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the
existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to
the entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully
appreciate and understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the
outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be subjected to
psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would
be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members
shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka, Asuncion, gulpi
ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin, or some
other words to that effect. While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused
Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then
blamed Lenny Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father.
According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the
accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the
Aquila Fraternity.
Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He
concocted the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the neophytes
harder blows, all in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even
one of the neophytes admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-
up.
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of
hazing.
Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny
Villa. Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys
psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was not even
established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity
with each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizons threats.
The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view.
According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon] was just
making it up.
Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the
existence of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be
inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such
intent. Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part,
insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific
intent to kill Lenny Villa.
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed
by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when
the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or
lack of skill.
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were
tantamount to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a
culpable felony. It must be remembered that organizations owe to their
initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury in the process. With the
foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the
victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal
responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused
Dizon and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the
initiation rites. Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in
the reopened initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in
fraternities the implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a
point of review in future legislation. We further note that some of the
fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys initiation rites. In this
light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative consideration, the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and
the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as
aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
Anti-Arson Law Cases
People v. Acosta
FACTS: Complainant’s grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, in the belief that
Acosta and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him,
stormed the house of appellant and burned their belonings.
In the afternoon of February 27, 1996, witness Aquino saw Acosta and
approached him. When she asked why he was carrying a stove and a knife,
he replied that he would burn the house of complainant.
In the morning of February 28, 1996, witness Videña, saw complainant's
house burning. She noticed the presence of appellant standing alone in
front of the burning house. Appellant was just watching the blaze and not
doing anything to contain it. When the fire truck arrived, the house was
already razed to the ground.
After the conduct of the investigation, the investigator did not find any
incendiary device; hence, the cause of fire remained
undetermined. However, trial court found appellant guilty with the crime of
arson.
ISSUE: Whether circumstantial evidences can justify appellant’s conviction
for the crime of arson.
RULING: YES. Appellant's conviction for the crime of arson rests on
circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence
is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the
combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt
in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.
Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, SC
agreed with the trial court holding him guilty thereof in the light of the
following circumstances duly proved and on record:
First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely
necessary, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or
non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the
witnesses. It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of
February 27, 1996, complainant's grandson, stormed the house of appellant
and his wife and burned their belongings. When appellant was informed of
the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant
threw a tantrum.
Second, appellant's intent to commit the arson was established by his
previous attempt to set on fire a bed inside the same house (private
complainant's) which was burned later in the night. Witness Aquino testified
that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she asked appellant
what he was going to do with the stove he was carrying that time, he
answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant.
When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house
of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed and then lighted a
fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant's wife rushed in and extinguished
the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house.
Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the
incident, he was seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height
of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, witness
Videña, through the holes of the GI sheets, saw appellant latter that day
standing alone inside private complainant's yard watching the house
burning. Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking
expression.
Fourth, appellant's actions subsequent to the incident further point to his
culpability. At around 12:00 noon of February 28, 1996, private complainant
went with witness Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about
to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he
burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your
house?"
Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "in the crime of arson,
the enormity of the offense is not measured by the value of the property
that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to
destruction."
People vs Soriano GR No. 152565, July 29, 2003
Facts: There was a disagreement between Soriano and Rosario regarding
their child. It stemmed from the fact that Honeys brother, Oscar Cimagala,
took their child out without the consent of accused-appellant who wanted
both Honey and Otoy instead to return with him to Manila. But Honey
refused. As their discussion wore on accused-appellant intimated to Honey
his desire to have sex with her, which he vigorously pursued the night
before with much success. This time Honey did not relent to the baser
instincts of Nestor; instead, she kicked him as her stern rebuke to his sexual
importuning. In the heated exchanges, Nestor struck Honey in the forehead.
You are hurting me, she snapped back, just like what you did to me in
Manila. Nestor then moved away as he muttered: It is better that I burn
this house, and then took a match from the top of a cabinet, lighted a
cigarette and set fire to the plastic partition that served as divider of Honeys
room. He also set on fire the clothes. As a result, the house occupied by
Honey was totally burned together with five (5) neighboring houses. RTC
ruled that the crime committed was destructive arson.
Issue: WON the defendant has committed the crime of destructive arson?
Ruling: Under Art. 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended, and PD
1613, Arson is classified into two kinds: (1) Destructive Arson (Art. 320) and
(2) other cases of arson (PD 1613). This classification is based on the kind,
character and location of the property burned, regardless of the value of the
damage caused. Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA
7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and
other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or
group of persons. The classification of this type of crime is known
as Destructive Arson, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
On the other hand, PD 1613 which repealed Arts. 321 to 326-B of The
Revised Penal Code remains the governing law for Simple Arson. This decree
contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size, not included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and
classified as other cases of arson.The nature of Destructive Arson is
distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness
of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The Revised
Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous
crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason
of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On
the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple
Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the
law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and
national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling
under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive
Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.
In the present case, the act committed by accused-appellant neither
appears to be heinous nor represents a greater degree of perversity and
viciousness as distinguished from those acts punishable under Art. 320
of The Revised Penal Code. No qualifying circumstance was established to
convert the offense to Destructive Arson. The special aggravating
circumstance that accused-appellant was motivated by spite or hatred
towards the owner or occupant of the property burned cannot be
appreciated in the present case where it appears that he was acting more
on impulse, heat of anger or risen temper rather than real spite or hatred
that impelled him to give vent to his wounded ego. Nothing can be worse
than a spurned lover or a disconsolate father under the prevailing
circumstances that surrounded the burning of the Cimagala house. Thus,
accused-appellant must be held guilty of Simple Arson penalized under Sec.
3, par. 2, of PD 1613 for the act of intentionally burning an inhabited house
or dwelling.
People v. Macabando (Arson)
FACTS: At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on
the road holding G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
(“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house.
At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He
got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric
Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the barangay headquarters to get a
fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the
appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to
interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant
also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire
would be killed.
Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of
his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. He appellant claimed that
he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that
the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a
threat to burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun.
He added that the gunshots came from the explosion of firecrackers
that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. The
prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson
under Article 320 of the RPC. The RTC found him guilty and sentence
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N he was guilty?
RULING: YES. The following circumstances constitute an unbroken
chain of circumstantial events that leads to a conclusion that the
appellant set fire to his house.
The court finds it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to
prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and
threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the
crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to
save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature,
reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent
any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and
firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination
to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact
that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our
mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to
flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was
asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was
already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent
attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people
who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee
his burning house, belied his claim of innocence.
ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of?
RULING: Arson under PD 1613.
PD 1613 governs simple arson.
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to
Reclusion Perpetua shall be
imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2. Any
inhabited house or dwelling;
P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and
private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the
RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple
arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a
lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson
contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political,
and national security implications than destructive arson.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned
is an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven. The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own
house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited houses. These
allegations were established during trial through the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses which the trial and appellate courts found
credible and convincing, and through the report of the Bureau of Fire
Protection which stated that damaged houses were residential, and
that the fire had been intentional. Moreover, the certification from
the City Social Welfare and Development Department likewise
indicated that the burned houses were used as dwellings. The
appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story house was used
as a residence. Under Section 3, paragraph 2, of P.D. No. 1613, the
imposable penalty for simple arson is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. The court also applied the ISL sentencing accused to I 0
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 16 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Buebos vs People
Facts: On January 1, 1994 around 3:00 oclock in the morning, Adelina B.
Borbe was in her house at Hacienda San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay watching
over her sick child. She was lying down when she heard some noise around
the house. She got up and looked through the window and saw the four
accused, Rolando Buela, Sarmelito Buebos, Dante Buebos and Antonio
Cornel, Jr. congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the
roof of her nipa hut already on fire. She shouted for help. Instead of coming
to her immediate succor, the four fled. At some distance away, Olipiano
Berjuela heard Adelina scream for help. Olipiano was then drinking with
Pepito Borbe to celebrate New Years Eve. Olipiano immediately ran to the
place and saw a number of people jumping over the fence. When he
focused his flashlight on them, he was able to identify Sarmelito Buebos,
Dante Buebos and Antonio Cornel, Jr. He also saw Rolando Buela running
away. On complaint of Adelina, petitioners Dante and Sarmelito Buebos,
together with Rolando Buela and Antonio Cornel, Jr., were indicted for
arson
Issue: Can the accused be convicted of arson?
Ruling: Simple arson only. The elements of this form of arson are: (a) there
is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling.[23] Admittedly, there is a confluence of the foregoing
elements here. However, the information failed to allege that what was
intentionally burned was an inhabited house or dwelling. That is fatal.
Perusing the information, there was no allegation that the house
intentionally burned by petitioners and their cohorts was inhabited. Rather,
the information merely recited that accused, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to cause damage, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously set on fire the nipa roof of
the house of ADELINA B. BORBE, to the latters damage and prejudice. In
fine, petitioners can be convicted only of simple arson, under Section 1,
paragraph 1 of P.D. No. 1613, punishable by prision mayor.
Amora vs. People GR. No. 154466, January 28, 2008 Facts:
FACTS: On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by
petitioner as residence and as a bakery and also gutted the nearby
houses. Petitioner and the lot owner Adelfa Maslof Tagaytay entered
into a contract of lease whereby the former was to use the lot and
erect a building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a period
of twenty (20) years. The lease contract provided that, upon the
expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993, ownership over the
building shall be transferred to the lessor but on January 4, 1993,
Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer renew the
contract of lease. On January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire
insurance coverage over the subject building from different Insurance
Company. It appears that the amounts of insurance coverage were
substantially higher than the building’s market value . As found by the
trial court, during the actual fire, petitioner was within the premises,
heard shouts from his neighbor, ignored the same at first, and only
later on did he finally stand up to see what was going on. The
authorities submitted an Investigation Report. Thus, petitioner was
charged with the crime of Destructive Arson, in Information to which
petitioner pleaded “not guilty.” The RTC found petitioner guilty as
charged, and was affirmed by the CA. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt?
RULING: YES. The applicability of P.D. 1613 is beyond cavil. The facts
show that the crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber
shops, tailoring shops and other commercial and residential buildings
were situated. In fact, other structures were razed by the fire that
originated from petitioner’s establishment. It is clear that the place of
the commission of the crime was a residential and commercial
building located in an urban and populated area. This qualifying
circumstance places the offense squarely within the ambit of Section
2(7) of P.D. 1613, and converts it to "destructive arson,":
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the
property burned is any of the following:
xxxx
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a
populated or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured against
fire for an amount substantially more than its market value, a fact
that has given rise to the unrebutted prima facie evidence of arson, as
provided in Section 6 of P.D. 1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the following
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of arson:
xxxx
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially more than its
actual value at the time of the issuance of the policy.
Petitioner’s only real challenge against the CA decision is the absence
of direct evidence to prove his culpability which ostensibly negates
the appellate court’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Direct evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Established facts that form a chain of
circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious
process of reasoning towards a conviction. Rules on evidence and
principles in jurisprudence have long recognized that the accused may
be convicted through circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence has been defined as such evidence which goes to prove a
fact or series of facts, other than the facts in issue, which, if proved,
may tend by inference to establish the fact in issue. Circumstantial
evidence may be resorted to when to insist on direct testimony would
ultimately lead to setting felons free. But for circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient for a conviction, the following requisites must be
present, namely: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances results in a moral
certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the one
who has committed the crime. The Court found that all these
circumstances, are consistent with the hypothesis that petitioner is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent.
People vs Baluntong
Facts: At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old
Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the house of her
grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay, Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating from the
walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll and together
they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw accused-appellant putting dry hay (dayami)
around the house near the terrace where the fire started, but
appellant ran away when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellants neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw appellant
near Celerinas house after it caught fire, following which, appellant
fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the house, as
other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the
flames. Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbors house
before the fire started, enter the burning house and resurface with
her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to
their death. Joshua sustained second degree burns.
Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi.
RTC convicted him of complex crime of Double Murder with
Frustrated Murder and sentenced him to death. CA affirmed and
modified penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Is accused-appellant guilty of murder?
Ruling: No. Only simple arson.
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set
on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for
double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with
respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that
appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged
desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was
outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered
the burning house to save her grandsons.
As it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the
occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide
being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. When
there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or
necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the
offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
People vs. Cedenio GR. No. 93485
Facts: On November 26, 1986, Dorio residence was gutted with fire. Five
members of the family, then occupying the house were burned to death.
The five bodies retrieved were those of Mario Hilario Dorio, with wounds on
the head and chest, Flora Dorio with a wound on the leg and head almost
severed, Mario Dorio with wounds on the leg and left nipple, Nicanora
Tabanao with a wound in the stomach and infant Dioscora with no wounds
at all but charred to the bone.
Two witnesses testified that the three appellants namely, Pedro
Cedenio, Jurito Amarga and Felipe Antipolo were seen running out of the
burning house, holding bolos stained with blood.
Another witness testified that Pedro Cedenio borrowed from him a
bolo on the night of November 26, and the following morning, the bolo was
returned to him with a bloodstain on the handle. The accused Pedro
Cedinio, also told him “do not worry, if this incident reaches the court, I will
answer (for) everything”
The trial court found the accused-appelants guilty of Arson with
Multiple Murder as defined and penalized under Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be charged by a complex crime
of arson with murder?
Ruling:
No. The late Mr. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino cites Groizard-
…when the fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person who may be
in the house and that the objective is attained by burning the house, the
crime is murder only. When the Penal Code declares that killing committed
by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be purposely adopted
as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take
life. In other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by means of
fire, the offense is murder. But if the main objective is the burning of a
building, the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of arson.
From the evidence adduced, it is evident that after the victims were
hacked and stabbed to death, appellants set the house afire to hide their
gruesome act. Thus, the appellant are guilty of a separate crime of four
counts of murder and arson. And not the complex crime of arson with
murder.
Anti-Carnapping Law Cases
People v. Luisito Bustinera
G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004
FACTS: ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed
that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which
he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in
the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant
admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi
stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and
revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recovered. The
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bustinera Violated the anti car napping law?
HELD: YES. Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain
vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN
ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in
pari materia or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the
same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular
subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that
they should be construed together.
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2)
that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified when any
of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a
domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or
large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fish
pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines
"car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The
elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which
belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is
essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of
unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the
foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a
Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions of
qualified theft which would apply.
People vs. Lagat, GR 187044
FACTS: Accused-appellants Lagat and Palalay were charged with the crime
of Carnapping as defined under Section 2 and penalized under Section 14 3
of Republic Act No. 6539.
The victim Jose Biag was a farmer, a barangay tanod, and a tricycle driver.
Around two o'clock in the morning, he left to operate his tricycle for public
use. News reached his wife that their tricycle was with the PNP of the
Municipality of Alicia and that Jose Biag had figured in an accident.
The victim’s tricycle was used in stealing palay from a store in Angadanan,
Isabela that belonged to a certain Jimmy Esteban (Esteban). Jose Biag was
killed and dumped along the Angadanan and San Guillermo Road. The
Report showed that Biag was likely killed between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m.
of April 12, 2004, and that he had sustained three stab wounds, an incise
wound, two hack wounds and an "avulsion of the skin extending towards
the abdomen." The police received a report from Esteban that the cavans of
palay stolen from him were seen at Alice Palay Buying Station in Alicia,
Isabela, in a tricycle commandeered by two unidentified male persons. At
Alice Palay Buying Station, they saw the tricycle with the cavans of palay,
and the two accused, Lagat and Palalay. PO2 Salvador averred that he and
his team were about to approach the tricycle when the two accused
"scampered" to different directions. After "collaring" the two accused, they
brought them to the Alicia PNP Station together with the tricycle and its
contents. PO2 Ignacio admitted that while the police informed Lagat and
Palalay of their constitutional rights, the two were never assisted by counsel
at any time during the custodial investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-
appellants guilty of the crime OF carnapping
RULING: The two accused are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of QUALIFIED CARNAPPING. "Carnapping" is the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. The records of this case show that all the elements
of carnapping are present and were proven during trial. The elements of
carnapping as dened and penalized under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972
are the following:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
3. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things; and
4. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle.
Their unexplained possession raises the presumption that they were
responsible for the unlawful taking of the tricycle. In Litton Mills, Inc. v.
Sales, the SC said that for such presumption to arise, it must be proven that:
(a) the property was stolen; (b) it was committed recently; (c) that the
stolen property was found in the possession of the accused; and (d) the
accused is unable to explain his possession satisfactorily. All these were
proven by the prosecution during trial. Thus, it is presumed that Lagat and
Palalay had unlawfully taken Biag's tricycle. Lagat and Palalay's intent to
gain from the carnapped tricycle was also proven as they were caught in a
palay buying station, on board the stolen tricycle, which they obviously used
to transport the cavans of palay they had stolen and were going to sell at
the station. When a person is killed or raped in the course of or on the
occasion of the carnapping, the crime of carnapping is qualified and the
penalty is increased pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539.
People vs Nocum
Facts: On or about September 12, 1998 in Muntinlupa City, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to gain for themselves and without the consent of the
owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
carry away one motor vehicle valued at more or less Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of its owner,
Lourdes Eleccion, in the aforestated amount and in the course of the
commission thereof, Erico Medel, the driver of the said vehicle, was killed.
Issue: Whether or not there is special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide attended in the case.
Held: Yes. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide,
there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but
also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was
perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Thus, the prosecution in this case has the burden of
proving that: (1) Mallari took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal
design was carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the killing
was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof."
In fine, all the elements of the special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide, as well as the identity of Mallari as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, were all proved beyond reasonable doubt. The foregoing
circumstances inevitably lead to the lone, fair and reasonable conclusion
that Mallari participated in stealing the FX taxi driven by Medel and in killing
him.
Dimat vs. People GR 181184 Jan. 25, 2012
FACTS: Mel Dimat was accused with violation of the Anti Fencing Law before
the Manila RTC. Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police
officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familiara testified that on Dec. 2000,
Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari
bearing plate WAH569 for P850,000. The deed of sale gave the vehicles
engine number as TD42126134 and its chassis number as CRGY60YO3553
Ramirez and other officers of the Traffic Mgt. Group spotted the Nissan
Safari on E. Rodriguez Ave bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping
and inspecting the vehicle, they discovered that its engine number was
actually TD42119136 and its chassis number CRGY60Y03111. They also
found the particular vehicle on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it
to their Camp Crame office and there further learned that it had been stolen
from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla. Dimat claimed that he did not
know Mantequilla and that he bought the car in good faith from a certain
Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale. RTC convicted Dimat for violation of
the Anti Fencing Law. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Was Dimat guilty for violation of anti-fencing law?
RULING: YES. The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been
committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, "buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article or object taken" during that
robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing
derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for
himself or for another.
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998.
Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it to Delgado for
₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from
Tolentino and later sold to Delgado had engine number TD42-126134 and
chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering
those transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other
hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis number CRGY60-
YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from
him, when stopped on the road and inspected by the police, turned out to
have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from
Mantequilla. This means that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct
numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is
regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of
course, the prosecution must still prove that Dimat knew or should have
known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was
derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out
of his acts.
Anti-Fencing Law Case
Tan vs People
Facts:
Issue: Is the accused guilty of fencing?
Ruling: No. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have
participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise
involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.
Essential elements of the crime of fencing as follows:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any
article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the
proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item,
object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for
another.
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by
establishing the existence of all the elements of the crime charged.
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito
Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused.
However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She
admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to
the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute
him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a
private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant
Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was
committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is
absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property.
In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant Rosita Lim did
not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her
property. She sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who
confessed that he stole certain articles from the warehouse of the
complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti. There was no showing at all that
the accused knew or should have known that the very stolen articles were
the ones sold to him. Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen
articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.
Bouncing Checks Law Cases
“(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or
Lim vs People
for value;
Facts: On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth
“(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
P300,000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She wrote out a check with the
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
same amount, dated August 25, 1990, payable to “cash” drawn on
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
Metrobank and gave the check to Seguan.
“(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
The next day, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.”
jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner issued another check payable to
“cash” dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
P241,668.007 and sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia check or one that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. And
Nadera. the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make
arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of
Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned
dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public
with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account in the bank from which the
welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and
checks were drawn was closed. Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay
prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued,
Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but she never did.
and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, irrelevant in determining culpability.
Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations against petitioner for violations of
Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment
BP No. 22.
of an obligation, or that there was damage.

It was ruled in United States v. Go Chico, that in acts mala prohibita, the
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in
only inquiry is, “has the law been violated?” When dealing with acts mala
the two cases convicting petitioner. Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the
prohibita –“it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted
same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it
with criminal intent. In many crimes, the intention of the person who
affirmed in toto the RTC’s Decision.
commits the crime is entirely immaterial…”

ISSUE: Whether or not Lim violated B.P. No. 22? This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last
elements of the offense are admittedly present. B.P. No. 22, Section
Ruling: 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie
exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not
Yes. The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are: rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape liability, she must
prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this
presumption and she failed to pay the amount of the checks or make
arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of notice of
dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est
sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.
However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v.
Court of Appeals[298 SCRA 658 (1998)], it was held that in determining the
penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem
valuable human material, and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection
of the social order. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted,
and imposed on them only a fine double the amount of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. The
two fines imposed for each violation, each amounting to P200,000.00 are
appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay
attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.
PETER NIERRAS v. AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY
FACTS: Before Us is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction for
the annulment of the resolution dated September 17, 1981 of the
respondent Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in nine (9) criminal cases, entitled
"People of the Philippines v. Peter Nierras" for estafa under Article 315 (2-d)
of the Revised Penal Code which denied petitioner's motion to quash. Said
motion to quash was filed by petitioner on the ground of double jeopardy as
these offenses were already included in Criminal Cases entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Peter Nierras," for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, pending before the lower court.
It appears that petitioner, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with the delivery
of the products, he issued nine (9) checks in payment thereof. Upon
presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte,
said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already
closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly
demanded of petitioner either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the
oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either.
Petitioner argues that he would be placed in double jeopardy as all the
elements of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code are
also present in that crime punishable under Batas Pambansa Bilang 22
namely (1) "the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an
obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or
insufficiency of funds to cover the check and (3) damage to the payee
thereof."
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of estafa after being charged with violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for issuing the same bouncing checks will place
the accuse in double jeopardy.
RULING. NO. What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact
that deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised
Penal Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the
latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under
the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing
obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties
are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime
against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally a
crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system;
(4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while
those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by petitioner,
the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single
criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is
variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and
another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because
what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in
the two
offenses. Otherwise stated prosecution for the same act is not prohibited.
What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere
filing of the two (2) sets of information does not itself give rise to double
jeopardy.
In the instant petition, certiorari is not the proper remedy. We have held in
Acharon v. Purisima, et al. (13 SCRA 309) that "when a motion to quash a
criminal case is denied, remedy is not certiorari but to go to court without
prejudice to reiterating special defenses invoked in the motion, and if after
trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in
the manner authorized by law," invoking the rule laid down in People v.
Magdaluyo(1 SCRA 990). If the petitioner cannot appeal at this state of the
proceeding, it is because there is still a necessity for the trial on the merits
wherein the parties may present proofs in support of their contentions and
not because the remedy of appeal is unavailing.
Wong vs. CA, GR 117857
FACTS: Luis Wong is a collector of Limtong Press, Inc., a company which
prints calendars. Wong was assigned to collect check payments from LPI’
clients. One time, six of LPI’s clients were not able to give the check
payments to Wong. Wong then made arrangements with LPI so that for the
meantime, Wong can use his personal checks to guarantee the calendar
orders of the LPI’s clients. LPI however has a policy of not accepting
personal checks of its agents. LPI instead proposed that the personal checks
should be used to cover Wong’s debt with LPI which arose from unremitted
checks by Wong in the past. Wong agreed. So he issued 6 checks dated
December 30, 1985.
Before the maturity of the checks, Wong persuaded LPI not to deposit the
checks because he said he’ll be replacing them within 30 days. LPI complied
however Wong reneged on the payment. On June 5, 1986 or 157 days from
date of issue, LPI presented the check to RCBC but the checks were
dishonored (account closed). On June 20, 1986, LPI sent Wong a notice of
dishonor. Wong failed to make good the amount of the checks within five
banking days from his receipt of the notice. LPI then sued Wong for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Among others, Wong argued that he’s not guilty of the crime of charged
because one of the elements of the crime is missing, that is, prima
facie presumption of “knowledge of lack of funds” against the drawer.
According to Wong, this element is lost by reason of the belated deposit of
the checks by LPI which was 157 days after the checks were issued; that he
is not expected to keep his bank account active beyond the 90-day period –
90 days being the period required for the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of lack of fund to arise.
ISSUE: Whether or not Wong is guilty of the crime charged, BP 22
RULING: Yes. Wong is guilty of violating BP 22. The elements of violation of
BP 22 pertinent to this case are:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
Under the second element, the presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency arises if the check is presented within 90 days from the date of
issue of the check. This presumption is lost, as in the case at bar, by failure
of LPI to present it within 90 days. But this does not mean that the second
element was not attendant with respect to Wong. The presumption is lost
but lack of knowledge can still be proven, LPI did not deposit the checks
because of the reassurance of Wong that he would issue new checks. Upon
his failure to do so, LPI was constrained to deposit the said checks. After the
checks were dishonored, Wong was duly notified of such fact but failed to
make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days thereof.
There is, on record, sufficient evidence that Wong had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of
issuance of the checks.
The Supreme Court also noted that under Section 186 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, “a check must be presented for payment within a
reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.” By current banking
practice, a check becomes stale after more than six (6) months, or 180 days.
LPI deposited the checks 157 days after the date of the check. Hence said
checks cannot be considered stale.
People vs Grospe
FACTS: Parolan was an authorized wholesale dealer of SMC. He was
charged with violations of BP22 and estafa for allegedly issuing checks in
favor of SMC but when the check was presented, it was dishonored for
having insufficiency funds. This is even more aggravated by the
allegation that Paralan failed to make good the check to the prejudice of
SMC.
HELD: Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory
or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may
arise independently in separate places. In this case, it did and jurisdiction
may be conferred in any of the two places wherein the two elements arose.
For while the subject check was issued in Bulacan, it wasn't
completely drawn thereat, but in Pampanga. What is of decisive
importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the
final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. For although
the check was received by the SMC Supervisor in Bulacan, that
was not delivery in the contemplation of law. The rule is that the
issuancve as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes
it as a holder, which means the payee or indorser of a bill or note, who
is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. The said representative
had to forward the check to the SMC regional office, who thereafter
forwarded it to the Finance Officer and later on to the depository bank..
LLAMADO VS. CA
FACTS: Ricardo Llamado (Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corp) was
prosecuted for violation of BP Blg. 22. He had co-signed (with the President
of the corp.) a post-dated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in
theamount of P186,500, which was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment for a period of
1 year and to pay a fine of P200,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Petitioner alleges that the respondent court erred when it
convicted petitioner of violation of BP 22 when the check was only a
contingent payment for investment which had not been proven to be
successful, thus the check was not issued to apply on account or for value
within the contemplation of the batas. Petitioner argues further that
respondent court erred in disregarding the pronouncement in Dingle vs.
IAC, that absent knowledge by the maker or drawer of the issuance of a
check much less of the transaction and the fact of dishonor, the accused
should be acquitted.
ISSUE: Is Llamado guilty of violating BP. 22?
RULING: YES. The check was issued for an actual valuable consideration of
P186,500.00, which private complainant handed to Aida Tan, a secretary in
petitioners office. What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing
check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and
conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check
is malum prohibitum.
Petitioners argument that he should not be held personally liable for the
amount of the check because it was a check of the Pan Asia Finance
Corporation and he signed the same in his capacity as Treasurer of the
corporation, is also untenable. The third paragraph of Section 1 of BP Blg. 22
states: “Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the
person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.”
The respondent court did not err. In Dingle vs. IAC, the petitioner was
acquitted because: 1.) from the testimony of the sole prosecution witness, it
was established that he dealt exclusively with petitioners co-signatory; 2.)
nowhere in the prosecution witness testimony was the name of petitioner
ever mentioned in connection with the transaction and the issuance of the
check; and, 3.) the prosecution witness therein categorically stated that it
was Nestor Dingle, petitioners co-signatory who received his two letters of
demand. These lent credence to the testimony of petitioner that she signed
the questioned checks in blank together with her husband without any
knowledge of its issuance, much less of the transaction and the fact of
dishonor. Moreover, while Paz Dingle and her husband Nestor Dingle owned
the business, the business was managed by Nestor, petitioner Pazs co-
signatory.
The above circumstances in Dingle vs. IAC do not obtain in the case at bar.
Here, the private complainant testified that upon delivery of the money,
petitioner took it and placed it inside a deposit box; that Jacinto Pascual and
petitioner Ricardo Llamado signed the questioned check, postdated
November 4, 1983, in the amount of P186,500.00 in the presence of private
complainant; notice of the fact of dishonor of the check was made on
petitioner, who offered in writing to pay private complainant a portion of
the amount equivalent to 10% thereof on 14 or 15 November 1983, and the
balance to be rolled over for a period of 90 days.
Petitioner denies knowledge of the issuance of the check without sufficient
funds and involvement in the transaction with private complainant.
However, knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish. Thus, the
statute itself creates a prima facie presumption, i.e., that the drawer had
knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank at the
time of the issuance and on the checks presentment for payment. Petitioner
failed to rebut the presumption by paying the amount of the check within
five (5) banking days from notice of the dishonor. His claim that he signed
the check in blank which allegedly is common business practice, is hardly a
defense. If as he claims, he signed the check in blank, he made himself
prone to being charged with violation of BP 22. It became incumbent upon
him to prove his defenses. As Treasurer of the corporation who signed the
check in his capacity as an officer of the corporation, lack of involvement in
the negotiation for the transaction is not a defense.
Que vs People
Facts: Petitioner who was convicted in violation of BP 22 filed motion for
reconsideration before the SC on the following grounds: that the lower
court has no jurisdiction to try the case, and that appelate court erred in
considering one of the most important element in the offense against BP 22
which is place of issuance of check, which is absent in the instant case.
Issue: Is petitioner correct?
Ruling: No. The trial court revealed that the checks in question were issued
at Quezon City as admitted by petitioner himself in his answer when he was
sued by the complainant on his civil liability. It is of no moment whether the
said checks were deposited by the complainant in a bank located outside of
Quezon City. The determinative factor is the place of issuance which is in
Quezon City and thus within the court's jurisdiction.
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks
are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guarantee. The enactment in
question does not make any distinction as to whether the checks within its
contemplation are issued in payment of an obligation or merely to
guarantee the said obligation. BP 22 was introduced to discourage the
issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless
scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without
distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. It is clear that is
the intention of the framers of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to make the mere
act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum and thus punishable
under such law. On denial of resolution by minute resolution, court held
that these 'resolutions' are not 'decisions' within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be
entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is
not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no
need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law
are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
Cabrera v. People
Facts: The prosecution asserts the following:
Luis Go was the sole proprietor of the Davao Mindanao Pioneer Hardware &
Company (DMPH Co.), located at No. 63 Ramon Magsaysay Boulevard,
Davao City. One of his customers was Boni Co, a travelling salesman. The
two had agreed that Go would sell lumber materials and merchandise to Co
on a thirty to forty-day credit basis. Go, however, required Co to issue
postdated checks in payment for his purchases. Since Co had no checking
account with any bank, he offered to pay for his purchases with postdated
checks drawn and issued by the petitioner. Co assured Go that he and the
petitioner had a business arrangement. Go made inquiries at the bank and
was told that the petitioner handled her checks well. Since Go also believed
that Co was a good businessman, he finally agreed to accept the postdated
checks issued by the petitioner. Go and Co also agreed that on the due date
of the checks, Co would either pay the amount thereof in cash by way of
replacement for the same, or Go would negotiate, or deposit the checks in
his account and/or the account of DMPH Co.
Co purchased merchandise from Go and delivered postdated checks drawn
against the petitioner's checking account with the Davao City Branch of
Prudential Bank.
When Co failed to pay for his purchases, Go deposited the three postdated
checks in his account with the Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC) on
August 3, 1992. As of July 31, 1999, the petitioner had P700.00 in her
account. When the checks were deposited, the petitioner's account with the
bank had a balance of only P100.04. The bank had closed the petitioner's
account on August 4, 1992 after applying the said amount to the payment of
bank charges. The drawee bank thus dishonored the petitioner's postdated
checks, and duly stamped "Account Closed" on the front and dorsal portions
of each check. The drawee bank returned the checks to the FEBTC with the
corresponding check return slips. Nevertheless, Go continued selling
merchandise to Co, who likewise continued to draw and issue postdated
checks; this time drawn against his personal account. Go accepted Co's
personal checks, hoping that he would eventually be paid. Co's personal
checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank.
Go notified the petitioner that her three checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank. She saw Go in his office and confirmed that she and Co had a
business arrangement. She asked Go to give Co more time to redeem the
postdated checks with cash. Go agreed. However, Co again failed to redeem
the checks. The petitioner likewise failed to pay the amounts of the checks
despite Go's repeated demands.
Co, however, argues that the prosecution failed to prove that she
received any notice of dishonor of the subject checks. And that in fact under
the law, a drawer of a check is entitled to a notice of dishonor and only if
said drawer fails to make good the same within five (5) banking days from
receipt of said notice that bad faith or fraud is prima facie presumed to
exist. In the case at bar, no such notice of dishonor was afforded the
accused. Hence, for lack of bad faith or fraudulent intent, the accused may
not be convicted of the offense charged.
Issue: Whether or not Co violated BP 22?
Ruling: No. The law enumerates the elements of the offense penalized
under B.P. Blg. 22 as follows: (1) the drawing, making and issuance of any
check to apply to account or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker,
drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon
its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The barefaced fact that the petitioner was the signatory to the checks that
were subsequently dishonored merely gave rise to a prima
facie presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds; it did not
render her automatically liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22. The prosecution is
burdened to prove all the elements of the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
To prove the first and third elements of the crime, Section 3 of the law
provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid or dishonored
check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or
attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima
facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that
the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or
attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks. It is difficult for
the prosecution to prove the second element because knowledge involves a
state of mind.[15]Hence, Section 2 of the law provides that:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds.--The making, drawing
and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because
of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or
drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes
arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.
In this case, the prosecution failed to adduce in evidence any notice of
dishonor of the three postdated checks or any letter of demand sent to and
received by the petitioner. The bare testimony of Luis Go that he sent
letters of demand to the petitioner notifying her of the dishonor of her
checks is utterly insufficient.
AMES SVENDSEN VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175381, February 26, 2008 BP 22
Facts: Cristina Reyes (Cristina) extended a loan to petitioner in the amount
of P200,000, to bear interest at 10% a month. After petitioner had partially
paid his obligation, he failed to settle the balance thereof which had
reached P380,000 inclusive of interest. Cristina thus filed a collection suit
against petitioner, which was eventually settled when petitioner paid her
P200,000 and issued in her favor an International Exchange Bank check
postdated February 2, 1999 (the check) in the amount of P160,000
representing interest. The check was co-signed by one Wilhelm
Bolton. When the check was presented for payment on February 9, 1999, it
was dishonored for having been Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF).
Cristina, through counsel, thus sent a letter to petitioner by registered mail
informing him that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, and
demanding that he make it good within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
No settlement having been made by petitioner, an Information for violation
of BP 22 was filed against the two.
Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22?
Ruling: NO. For petitioner to be validly convicted of the crime under
B.P. Blg. 22, the following requisites must thus concur: (1) the making,
drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the
knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor
of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.
Petitioner admits having issued the postdated check to Cristina. The check,
however, was dishonored when deposited for payment in Banco de Oro due
to DAIF. Hence, the first and the third elements obtain in the case. The
evidence for the prosecution failed to prove the second element. While the
registry receipt,which is said to cover the letter-notice of dishonor and of
demand sent to petitioner, was presented, there is no proof that he or a
duly authorized agent received the same. Receipts for registered letters
including return receipts do not themselves prove receipt; they must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. Petitioner
is civilly liable, however. For in a criminal case, the social injury is sought to
be repaired through the imposition of the corresponding penalty, whereas
with respect to the personal injury of the victim, it is sought to be
compensated through indemnity, which is civil in nature.
Tan vs. Mendez, GR 138669
FACTS:
Petitioners Steve Tan and Marciano Tan, owner of Master Tours and
Travel Corporation and operators of Philippine Lawin Bus Co, Inc. entered
into an agreement with Fabian Mendez, Jr., a gasoline station owner,
whereby the buses of petitioners will purchase fuel and lubricants on gas
station owned by respondent. On the other hand, Fabian was designated as
the booking and ticketing agent of the Philippine Lawin Bus Co. in Iriga City.
Both the payment for fuel purchases and remittance of ticket sales were
made through issuance of checks.
One of the checks issued by petitioners to respondent was FEBTC
check no. 704227 dated June 4, 1991 in the amount of 58,237.75 as
payment for gasoline and oil products acquired. However, when it was
presented for payment, it was dishonored by Far East Bank and Trust
Company-Binondo for being drawn against insufficient funds. Despite of
repeated demand letters sent by Fabian, the obligations were remained
unpaid, hence respondent filed a case against the petitioner for violation of
B.P Blg. 22 The petitioners argued that they cannot be held liable for
violation of B.P.22 because the amount subject of the check had already
been extinguished by offset or compensation against the collection from
ticket sales from booking offices and that they communicated this through a
memorandum dated June 10 1991.
ISSUES : (1). Whether or not petitioners can be held liable for violation of
B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law; and (2) Whether or not payment
through compensation or offset can preclude prosecution for violation of
B.P. 22.
RULING: NO to both issues. Petitioners were found guilty because the
elements of B.P. 22 were present. (1) Petitioner Marciano admitted that he
drew the subject check as payment for the fuel and oil products acquired.
(2)He also knew at that time that there were no sufficient funds to cover the
check because he had uncollected receivables (3) The check was thus
dishonored upon presentment to the bank for payment. It was also said that
the respondent didn’t agree with the offset agreement and the trial court
said that the alleged compensation is not supported by clear and positive
evidence as it did not clearly specify which dishonored check is being offset.
Moreover, assuming that there was offsetting or payment through
compensation, the petitioners are still guilty because payment does not
preclude the crime of violation of B.P. 22. The law has made the mere act of
issuing a bum check is a malum prohibitum ,an act proscribed by legislature
for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Therefore, even
if there had been payment through compensation or some other means,
there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22.
Trust Receipts Law Cases
Allied Bank v. Ordonez
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its duly authorized
officer, private respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of
commercial letters of credit with petitioner’s Makati branch to finance the
purchase of 500 M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired
Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks. Allied Bank issued an irrevocable letter of
credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd. (Nikko) by virtue of which the
latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by PBM and duly honored
and paid by the petitioner bank. To secure payment of the amount covered
by the drafts, and in consideration of the transfer by petitioner of the
possession of the goods to PBM, the latter as entrustee, thru private
respondent, executed four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity
dates on acknowledging petitioner’s ownership of the goods and its (PBM’S)
obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to the action by monetary authorities, and the necessity of regulating the
return the same, if unsold within the stated period. enforcement of rights arising from default or violations of trust receipt
agreements. The legislative intent to meet a pressing need is clearly
PBM defaulted on the payment of the trust receipts.. Despite repeated expressed .
demands, PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the
sale of the goods or to return the same. Allied Bank filed a criminal
complaint against private respondent for violation of PD 115 before the
office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The Fiscal found a prima facie case for
violation of PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding
information in court. PBM contended that since it was under rehabilitation
receivership, no criminal liability can be imputed to Ching.

Issue: Whether or not rehabilitation bars the filing of the estafa case
against Ching

Held: It cannot be denied that the offense was consummated long before
the appointment of rehabilitation receivers. The filing of a criminal case
against respondent Ching is not only for the purpose of effectuating a
collection of a debt but primarily for the purpose of punishing an offender
for a crime committed not only against the complaining witness but also
against the state. The crime of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law
is a special offense or mala prohibita. It is a fundamental rule in criminal law
that when the crime is punished by a special law, the act alone, irrespective
of its motives, constitutes the offense. In the instant case the failure of the
entrustee to pay complainant the remaining balance of the value of the
goods covered by the trust receipt when the same became due constitutes
the offense penalized under Section 13 of P.D. No. 115; and on the basis of
this failure alone, the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case (Res. No. 671, s. 1981; Allied Banking Corporation vs.
Reinhard Sagemuller, et al., Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, September 18, 1981).

In examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing importance of trust receipts

in Philippine business, the need to provide for the rights and obligations of
parties to a trust receipt transaction, the study of the problems involved and