Page 1 of 13
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements
are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another,
thereby distributing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the
economic and social progress of the people;
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from
perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
social, educational and community progress of the people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to
proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January
17, 1973 and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order
and decree as part of the law of the land the following:
Section 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
a. Philippine Waters. It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but
not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting
each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its
depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to
the Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the
sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which
the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers
and cargo from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It
shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. It shall refer to any road, street, passage,
highway and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad
within the Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or
trains for the movement or circulation of persons or transportation of
goods, articles, or property or both.
d. Piracy. Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of
the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation
of person or force upon things of other unlawful means, committed by
any person on any Philippine Highway.
Section 3. Penalties. Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competents
court be punished by:
a. Piracy. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or
boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The penalty of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the commission of
robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for
ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape is committed as a
result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of death shall be
imposed.
Section 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or
highway robbery/brigandage. Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids
or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner
derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as
an accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the
Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise
known as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or
instructions, or parts thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.
Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and seventy-four.
G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were
charged with violation of PD No. 532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy
and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993, while armed
with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another,
by means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked,
assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil
Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized
their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano
Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only Emiliano
Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting
him of piracy as the facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art.
286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June
1993, the Pilapil brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea
some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another
boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano
Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene.
With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him
and Juan Jr. to "dapa."3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat
of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom
of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and
ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other
pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one
of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan
that they were now off-course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he
would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed to row
the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he
was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into
the open sea the engine stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist
 Page 2 of 13

his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to the outrigger. Q: When you said the passengers
At the point of a tres cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat. of that pumpboat boarded your
pumpboat, how did they do that?
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked
whose boat that was and the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain A: They approached somewhat
Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this, Catantan ordered the suddenly and came aboard the
Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say pumpboat (emphasis supplied).
anything.
Q: How many suddenly came
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. aboard your pumpboat?
Once aboard he ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another
town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he would still pull up
A: Only one.
his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose
between the two, or I will kill you."5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately
obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan. Q: What did that person do when
he came aboard your pumpboat?
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the
front part of the pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The A: When he boarded our
jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. pumpboat he aimed his revolver at
then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. us (emphasis supplied).
Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Q: By the way, when he aimed his
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure revolver to you, did he say
of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, anything to you?
equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
xxx xxx xxx
persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or
member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be
considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished A: He said, "dapa," which means
as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the lie down (emphasis supplied).
same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and
cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all
COURT:
kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).

Q: To whom did he aim that

On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal
revolver?
Code is committed by "any person who, without authority of law, shall, by means
of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong." A: He aimed the revolver on me.

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and
his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil brothers by Q: What else did he do?
using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when
they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take
them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no A: Then he ordered his companion
intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their to come aboard the pumpboat.
boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the
brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind Q: What did he do with his
in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion revolver?
and not piracy.

A: He struck my face with the

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave revolver, hitting the lower portion
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls of my left eye.
squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene and Juan
Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such
compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Q: Now, after you were struck with
Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel the revolver, what did these
through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant and persons do?
enlightening —
A: We were ordered to take them
Q: Now, while you and your to a certain place.
younger brother were fishing at
the seawaters of Tabogon at that Q: To what place did he order you
time, was there anything unusual to go?
that happened?

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6
A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court
what that was?
A: While we were fishing at
Tabogon another pumpboat
arrived and the passengers of that
pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine
waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and
boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered
complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards,
and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye,
after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you
said approached you, how many
were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of
another pumpboat with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated
the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in complete surrender to the
marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full
control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to
submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like

the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we
cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal
that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either
piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are among
the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredations
by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
in view of eliminating all obstacle to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing
in sea waters. They brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown
forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these small fishermen
that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would
be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within
the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance passing
of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a
floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine
in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils
permanently of their boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their
boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only because their
pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that
would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the
Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not
produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains,
and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized through
force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in
Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime
of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him accordingly
to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
MELO, J.:
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the
Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27,
2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of
kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with
a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay
Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly
boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by
Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The
pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed
with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the
Page 3 of 13
crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant
Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the name
"M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the
PNOC logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the
name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to
sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that
the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of
the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the
Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue
operations yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the
vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area presumably to await another
vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to
the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20,
1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10
to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called
"Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T
Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-
appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the
cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was
completed on March 30, 1991.
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed
the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in
three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would
be killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted
passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio
Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain
Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second
batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991
and were brought to different places in Metro Manila.
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the
crew, called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the
incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of
Investigation where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn
statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at
Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who
managed to evade arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at
the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against
accused-appellants, as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN,
VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C.
INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN
DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to
April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for sometime
prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a
motor launch and armed with high powered guns,
conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize
while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO
loaded with petroleum products, together with the
complement and crew members, employing violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,

then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the
cargoes were unloaded and thereafter returned to the
Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some
inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the
transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them
claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the
effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red
speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on
board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they
wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each
worker was to be paid P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they
worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going
experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran
errands for the officers. They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the
vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21,
1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and
were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was
neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he
was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger
brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced
evidence that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief
Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as
such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio
Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the
Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as
the radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount
to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of
the firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the
contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong,
upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a
ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to
be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and
quality of the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for
the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on
board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told
that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi
Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services,
Pte., Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General
Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew
list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration
falsely reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The
brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and
then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the
Captain of "M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be
Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco
nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the
"Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey
report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong
then handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at
Page 4 of 13
Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and
quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased
by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the
first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food
and drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T
Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul
Gan was paid in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four
vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act
as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to
the Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the
details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong
was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that
weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong
checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN
OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at
Alpha Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the
vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the
crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment
is hereby rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine
Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532 and
the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under
Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said
crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987
Constitution, the Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused
Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco
are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with
all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused Cheong San
Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return
to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said
accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said
corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00,
Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per
annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All the
accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to
the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the
accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all
the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to
the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of
P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount
is paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his
sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention
at the National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila
during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing
to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the
City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation. With
costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-
appellants may be summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that
the trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the
time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the
proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr.
Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas
had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
 Page 5 of 13

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly
contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.
Cheong San Hiong
In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated
the crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden
is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no
knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T
Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft
or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice
to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting
and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the
Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5)
the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to
prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during
trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4
of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do
not prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified
piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the
seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy,
and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the
information with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues
that he was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the
State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its
territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the
legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act
No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5)
can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not
charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid
waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it
was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with the full assistance
of a bona fidelawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process
cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made
(People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of
this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave
birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he
has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called
confessions of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic
reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph
[3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous
tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated
case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule,
once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained,
any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained
by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs.
Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled
extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right
to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever information is derived therefrom shall
be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record)
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is
was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on
sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree
February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when
with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits
they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
"U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire
representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be
and confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge,
valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial,
now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —
accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and . . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses,
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less,
contents when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who
attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about
6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers
himself in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse,
arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of
about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold
Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the
its cargo to the Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo
technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "[r]ights may be
was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the
waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law."
1991. . .
(Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115
adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his xxx xxx xxx
rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the
sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the
The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the
Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the Accused and their
appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record will show that

cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one
(1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court
that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify
the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the
Accused were taken into custody by the operatives of the National
Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian
Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit
"B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the
pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the
three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the
said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board
when the vessel sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off
the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of
denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater
weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of
the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-
appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that
they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon,
Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-
appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was
then anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as
cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying
goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of
their voyage, without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such
evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As
pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate
Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the
evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5)
cooks or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May
14 and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his
house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally
and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other
witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to
fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce
clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was
physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not
only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of
work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is
accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a
certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not
even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed
by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there
are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which
may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and
collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize
the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the
shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus,
Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their
fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-
coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time
of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view
of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.
Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco
(aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia
Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their
residences are approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other.
Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known
Page 6 of 13
Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers
by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a
seajacking case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates
off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted
of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be
convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d]
and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No.
7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised
Penal Code, has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons
out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters.
He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such
that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members
of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or
passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The
penalty of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who,
on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or
part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings
of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine
waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers.
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking
away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the
personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of
the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be
considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics
supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two
laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or
interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the
law, in keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring
states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the
"whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential
Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and
seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred,
and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act
of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code.
As such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime
against the whole world (People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the
ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group
in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act
was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation
was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of
pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting
piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly
and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway
robbers/brigands, such as giving them information about the
movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in
any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly
or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or
brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal
officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code.
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts
provided in this Section has performed them knowingly, unless the
contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack
of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not
as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in
favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People
vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts
provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is
proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the
legal presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of
piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing
of the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T
Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and
verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine
Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure
that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities,
and supplied, the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their
maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and
Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant
Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to
Page 7 of 13
avert detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant
Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily
discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his
arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo
from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail
accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods
summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy
Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to
rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the
vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of
Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its
voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely
stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the
evening), that there were no passengers on board, and the purpose of the
voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and transfer
1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with
Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the
surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record) stating
that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that
although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he
then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio
Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration"
upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening,
(Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the
"Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during said voyage
when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The
second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It
was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio
Changco supervised the transfer from his end.
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the
cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the
source and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T
Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should
have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious
circumstances under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of
deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the
purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and
documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of
Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the
source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off
Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not
ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan
involving a large sum of money without any receipt issued therefor; he was not
even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal with. It
should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly
more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at
that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its value.
Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in
his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for
transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale
involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that
accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his firm was
acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following
the orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in
obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful
purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is
lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the
alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation
not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was committed on
board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration
authorities, falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate
said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was
convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These
circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and the implications
of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the
"Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the
evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
 Page 8 of 13

G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993 Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig
came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it
vs.
stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y
boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of

REGALADO, J.:
the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was
seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants
committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew
Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree
announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from
No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by
you." She said she has money inside her bag and they
the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by
P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
the defense.

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of
more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would
Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants
they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati
were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following
where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa
manner:
area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and
prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private
individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway.
mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully,
There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro
unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one
to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied.
MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice
thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her
of the said offended party in such amount as may be
to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code.1

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later,

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned,2 appellants went to trial which ultimately
he changed his mind and turned the car again towards
resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of
Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of
robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential
the car then, crossed to the other side of the
Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo thereof:
superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she
was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she
accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO fell down on the ground and was injured when she
GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-
on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are 26).
both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M.
Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was
P3,000.00 as temperate damages.3
arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check
at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13)6
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at
Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense
North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even
proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily
slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten
included in the offense charged.4
a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running
across the highway.7
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following
counter-statement of facts in the People's brief5 which adopted the established
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores,
findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the
San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They
transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial
thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot.8 Much later, when he took the
divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by
explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers.9
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly
done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan.
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three
8, 1990, p. 7).
theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants.
The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the
does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those
instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his
accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable
Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at
the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or
Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency
essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a
(something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary
murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter
(sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own personal motives for
committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate
 Page 9 of 13

offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that
not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the motive of the offender when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun
assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with
performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping. These were merely
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11 amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery
or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code,
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any
we, however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the
motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of
threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any
other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in
his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also
me "Beloy, I know your family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad
clear from the allegation in the information that the victim
person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money
was carried away and extorted for more money. The
and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office
accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from
but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They
likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma.
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more
that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that cash, drew out three checks. . . .
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her
liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the
incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders.
crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-
Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under
thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the
which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by
victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary
extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua.18
and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their
lives or such other offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental
deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing
detention. clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any definitive
pronouncement has as yet been made.
Q At what point did Mrs.
Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532
containing the P7,000.00 to your
is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
nephew?
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is
evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway
A Santo Domingo Exit. robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our
previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers
Q And how about the checks,
(ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
where were you already when the
checks was (sic) being handed to
you? Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to
put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a
band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit
gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the
when she signed the checks.
early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery
Q If your intention was just to was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law
robbed (sic) her, why is it that you was passed. 21
still did not allow her to stay at Sto.
Domingo, after all you already
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
received the money and the
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
checks?

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the

A Because we had an agreement
formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense
with her that when she signed the
consists in the formation of a band by more than three
checks we will take her to her
armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such
house at Villa (sic) Verde.
formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306.
It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under
Q And why did you not bring her it, that a member or members of the band actually
back to her house at Valle Verde committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose
when she is (sic) already given attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when
you the checks? the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be
such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other hand,
if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were
A Because while we were on the
not primarily organized for the purpose of committing
way back I (sic) came to my mind
robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
that if we reach Balintawak or
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery
some other place along the way
was committed by a band of more than three armed
we might be apprehended by the
persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a
police. So when we reached Santa
band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is
Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we
required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse
will already stop and allow you to
a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
get out of the car." 16

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in
the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from
band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in
the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money,
creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a captured person or
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
 Page 10 of 13

presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary.
This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction,
since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under which the
decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction
is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies
reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of
depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent
and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to
another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and
tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and
social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . .
. highway robbery/brigandage which are among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries;
asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused,
should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the
explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural
course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation
envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we
have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by
appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery
defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as
shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of
abuse of confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no
mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation
having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the
maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be
appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with
discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions
kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is
by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end
necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged. 30 For the
in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic,
former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
social, educational and community progress of the
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof
people. (Emphasis supplied).
shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus
lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is charged that
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of
person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as the things subject of the robbery. 31
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one
place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable of
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed
"stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social,
allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly
educational and community progress of the people, " such that said isolated act
convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot
in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include
but could negate the presence of any of the elements of robbery through
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and intimidation of persons. 32
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y
decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band
Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of
of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if
Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING
they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this
on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months
we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of
of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific,
maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M.
intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
moral damages, with costs.
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in
the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and,
for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25 SO ORDERED.

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that G.R. No. 104461 February 23, 1996
the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements
vs.
which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
ROMEO MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA, defendants-
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal
appellants.
interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways
would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite DECISION
as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who
considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
PANGANIBAN, J.:
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the
milder form of liability in case of doubt.
The main question answered in this case is whether the accused should be
convicted of highway robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be
Decree No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised
the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not
Penal Code.
be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line
of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged on June 17, 1991
falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) of the crime
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a of "ROBBERY HOLD-UP (sic) with HOMICIDE (P.D. No. 532, Anti-Piracy and
highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused who happened to take a Anti-Highwat (sic) Robbery Law of 1974)" 1 in an Information which reads as
fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking follows:
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus
rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
That on or about the 29th day of May 1991, in the municipality of San
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful
Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court the above-named accused, armed with gun and
knives, conspiring and confederating together with one alias Jack
whose true identity and present whereabouts is still unknown, and
mutually helping and aiding one another with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of
cash money amounting to P30.00, while the said victim was aboard a
passenger jeep, cruising along Aurora Blvd., San Juan, Metro Manila,
which is a Philippine Highway, to the damage and prejudice of the
owner thereof, in the aforementioned amount of P30.00; that on the
occasion of said robbery (hold-up) and for the purpose of enabling
them to take, rob and carry away personal belongings of all
passengers in pursuance of their criminal act said accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the passengers (sic) of said
passenger jeep, one Ramilyn Zulueta by then and there hitting her
head with a gun and kicked (sic) her out of the passenger jeep which
caused her to fall in (sic) the pavement hitting her head on the
ground, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which directly
caused her death, while Ma. Grace Zulueta, punching her face and
hitting her head with a gun, as a result of which said Ma. Grace
Zulueta sustained physical injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated
her from performing her customary labor for the same period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The records show that both accused were assisted by their counsel de oficio,
Atty. Fernando Fernandez of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), when they
pleaded not guilty to the charge upon arraignment on August 9, 1991.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution thereafter established that on May 29, 1991, at about 9:00 in the
evening, 17-year-old Ma. Grace Zulueta and her elder sister, Ma. Ramilyn, were
on their way home from their grandparents' house in Altura Ext., Sta. Mesa,
Manila. They boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd.
The jeepney was fully loaded with the driver, his wife and two children on the
front seat and eight passengers on each of the two parallel back seats. 2
The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of the jeepney 3 with
accused Romeo Mendoza seated beside Grace. 4 It was through Mendoza that
Grace handed over their fare to the driver as the jeepney passed by the SM
complex. 5 Glory Oropeo (or Lory Europeo 6 ), who boarded the same jeepney
near the Stop and Shop Supermarket, was seated behind the driver. Accused
Jaime Rejali was beside Glory while their companion named Jack, who has
remained at large, was seated across her. 7
When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd. in San Juan, Metro
Manila, near St. Paul's College, just after the bridge and before Broadway
Centrum, someone announced a hold-up. 8 Both Mendoza and Rejali had guns
while Jack was armed with a knife. It was Rejali who fired his gun. 9 Jack told the
Zulueta sisters that they would "bring" the sisters along. As the accused
appeared drunk, the sisters ignored them. However, a male passenger jumped
off the jeepney and a commotion ensued. Perplexed ("naguluhan") by this turn of
events, the accused held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to extricate herself
from their grasp. This prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He
boxed and kicked her, causing Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street
where she rolled. 10
Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled, Grace shouted,
"bitawan mo ako, bitawan mo ako," in an attempt to call the attention of the
drivers of the other vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit Grace on the
head with a gun causing her to lose consciousness. 11 (She finally came to at the
St. Luke's Hospital; she was confined there up to June 7, 1991. 12 ) While all this
was happening, Rejali poked his gun at the other passengers. 13
From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of P30.00. She handed it
to the holdupper seated in front of her. When the commotion took place, the
driver slowed down the jeepney but the holduppers told him to keep on moving.
One of them ordered the driver to proceed to J. Ruiz St. and make several turns
until, when they reached Paterno, the culprits alighted and made their escape. 14
Ramon Zulueta, the father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned about the incident from
his other daughter, Joralyn, who was informed that Grace was at the St. Luke's
Hospital. Grace, who was then a student employed at the Pizza Hut for
P3,000.00 a month, was confined in said hospital from May 30 to June 7, 1991
for head trauma; she had contusions and hematomas on the left temporal region
and on the right occipito-parietal and anterior temporal regions, and abrasions on
the supra orbital area as well as elbow. 15 Ramon Zulueta spent around
P19,000.00 for Grace's hospitalization. 16
Page 11 of 13
Upon learning from Grace that Ramilyn had been with her, Ramon Zulueta
surmised that she might have been brought to the hospital nearer the place of
the incident, the UERM hospital. When he got there, he learned that Ramilyn, 21
years old and a computer management student, had already died of severe,
traumatic head injuries. 17The Zulueta family spent around P15,000.00 for her
interment. 18
Two days after the incident, Ramon Zulueta was informed that the jeepney driver
and his wife had "surrendered" to the police station in San Juan. The following
day, he went there but the driver was not around. He gave a statement to the
police. 19
By fluke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about the apprehension of
Mendoza. On the morning of June 12, 1991, Grace saw Mendoza selling ice
cream along Altura St. She noticed Mendoza staring at her. When she stared
back, Mendoza lowered his gaze and left immediately. That same afternoon, she
saw him again. Considering her poor eyesight, she was instructed by her cousin
to buy ice cream from Mendoza so that she could get near enough to be sure if
he was indeed one of the holduppers. When she approached and asked
Mendoza, "Mama, kilala kita?", he could not look her in the eyes and seemed
confused. Certain now that he was one of the holduppers, Grace announced to
her brother and the other people present that Mendoza was one of the
holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for it, but the people gave chase and
overtook him. 20
Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was identified by Grace in a
line-up. 21 Rejali was apprehended that same night by police operatives.
According to SPO1 Dalmacio Luces, Lucia Salinas, the wife of Jeepney driver
Virgilio Salinas, described one of the suspects to the NBI cartographer who came
out with a sketch of his face. 22However, Luces failed to get a statement from
Lucia. 23
Evidence for the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi as defenses. Both of them admitted
knowing each other as they were working as ice cream vendors at the Ana Maria
Ice Cream Factory in 1045 Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila where they also lodged
in rooms provided by their employer. Mendoza, 28 years old, swore that on that
fateful day, he sold ice cream from 8:30 a.m. to about 4:00 p.m. From the factory,
he went as far as V. Mapa St., passing under the bridge near the Stop and Shop
Supermarket. By 5:30 in the afternoon, he was back at the factory. He spent the
night of May 29, 1991 in his living quarters at the factory taking care of his child
as his wife was pregnant. 24
For his part, 27-year-old Rejali testified that he also sold ice cream on the date in
question, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., along E. Tuazon St. near Balic-balic. He
claimed that he had not gone to San Juan as he did not even know where San
Juan was, being new in the vicinity. Once back in the factory, he prepared ice
cream for sale the next day. Then he rested in his room. 25
Myrna Balderama, who also stayed in the living quarters within the same ice
cream factory, corroborated the testimonies of the two accused. According to
her, she saw Mendoza enter the compound in the afternoon of May 29, 1991.
From outside her room, she could see Mendoza's room; on the night in question,
she saw him taking care of his child. As to Rejali, she knew that he did not leave
the premises that evening as she had a conversation with him up to 10:00 p.m.
while he was preparing ice cream. 26
On March 10, 1992, the trial court 27 rendered the Decision subject of this appeal.
Its dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused
ROMEO MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs of
Ramilyn Zulueta in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00), to pay the sum of P23,673.35 by way of reimbursement
of the hospitalization, burial and other related expenses for Ramilyn
Zulueta and the further sum of P30,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages; to pay Glory Oropeo the sum of P30.00 by way
of reparation of the stolen cash money; to pay Ma. Grace Zulueta the
sum of P6,400.00 by way of reimbursement of her hospitalization
expenses, all without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited in full
with the period of their preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.

In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving credence to the
"inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory testimonies" of prosecution witnesses
Grace Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the crime charged
"despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt." 28
Although not directly raised by the appellants, we find upon a thorough scrutiny
of the facts that there is yet another question which is of concern to the bar and
the bench: are the facts attendant to this case constitutive of the crime of
highway robbery with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 or of the felony of
robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?
The Court's Ruling
This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses. As this Court
has ruled in innumerable cases, the trial court is best equipped to make the
assessment on said issue and therefore, its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is perceived to have overlooked,
misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which,
if properly considered, would affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal
of the decision involved. 29 We do not find in the instant case any such reason to
depart from said general principle. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial
justice, we shall confront the issues raised herein by the appellants.
Appellants allege the following "inconsistent" testimonies of the prosecution
eyewitnesses: (a) Grace testified that it was Rejali who shouted "hold-up", pulled
out a gun and fired, in contradiction to Glory's testimony that the man in front of
her, referring to Jack, announced the hold-up, and (b) at the direct examination,
Grace pointed out that she was struck behind her right ear but during cross-
examination, she said that she was hit on the left ear.
The first inconsistency may be attributed to the difference in the relative positions
of Grace and Glory inside the jeepney. Grace was seated near the rear entrance
of the jeepney while Glory was behind the driver. Because Grace was far from
both Jack and Rejali who were seated near Glory, this could have affected her
perception of who announced the hold-up. At any rate, such disparity in their
testimonies does not at all derail the sufficiently established fact that both
appellants herein participated in the hold-up. As regards the injuries sustained by
Grace, the certificate issued by her attending physician, Dr. Sosepatro Aguila,
states that she sustained injuries on both sides of the head 30 , clearly showing no
"contradictions" in her testimony with respect to where she was hit.
Be that as it may, these "inconsistencies" or "contradictions" are minor ones
which do not have any material bearing on the culpability of the appellants as
they do not in any way refute their positive identification by the two eyewitnesses
as the perpetrators of the holdup. 31 On the contrary, they reflect the truthfulness
of the testimonies of Grace and Glory. As this Court said in People vs. Retuta 32 :
The discrepancy signifies that the two witnesses did not deliberately
pervert the truth in their narrations. The discordance; in their
testimonies on minor matters heightens their credibility and shows
that their testimonies were not coached or rehearsed (People v.
Doria, 55 SCRA 425). As this Honorable Court held in People v.
Agudu, 137 SCRA 516 to wit:
"However, the variance, if any, is on a minor detail which
would not destroy the effectiveness of their testimony. We
cannot expect absolute uniformity in every detail because
witnesses react differently to what they see and hear,
depending upon their situation and state of mind.
Complete uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness. The light contradictions, on the other
hand, strengthens the sincerity of the testimony of the
witnesses."
Thus, far from evidence of falsehood, the minor inconsistency
between the testimonies could justifiably be regarded as a
demonstration of their good faith.
The strongest part of the defense arguments concerns the identification of the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime considering the lighting condition
inside the jeepney. Appellants believed that they could not have been recognized
because both Grace and Glory admitted that the place was dark, and so
surmised that it would have been darker inside the jeepney because the
eyewitnesses failed to point out the source of light therein. 33 However, in trying to
prove their allegation, appellants unwittingly brought out details via Grace's
testimony which demolish their surmise. Thus:
Q. Despite the darkness, you were able to identify the gun?
Page 12 of 13
A. I did not say it was completely dark. I said in the jeepney it was
quite lighted. I said it was dark outside but in the jeepney, it was quite
lighted. 34 (Emphasis supplied.)
It seems, moreover, that appellants only quoted portions of the testimonies of
Grace and Glory to suit their purpose. Had the appellants been candid enough,
they would have retained portions of the same testimonies evidencing that it was
the place where the jeepney was passing through that was dark but, inside the
jeepney, it was "medium light". Grace had testified on cross-examination as
follows:
Q. Will you mention again the exact location of the alleged
incident?
A. I am not familiar with the streets, sir. It was after a bridge. After
UERM, sir.
Q. What was the condition of the place at that time?
A. It was moderately dark. Quite lighted. Medium.
Q. How about inside the passenger jeepney? Was it lighted?
A. Medium, sir. Since it was dark, you cannot have a complete
light there.
Q. It was quite dark?
A. Yes, sir. 35
For her part, Glory testified on cross-examination in this wise:
Q. Madam witness, will you mention again the exact
location where you said you were allegedly held up?
A. San Juan, H. Lozada and J. Ruiz St., sir.
Q. What was the condition of that place at that time?
A. It was dark because it was already nighttime.
Q. You mean the exact place where you were held-up is a dark
place?
A. Yes, sir. 36 (Emphasis supplied.)
Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender.
However, its relative weight and significance depends largely on the attending
circumstances and the discretion of the trial court. 37 Another overriding
consideration is the fact that the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to
see the appearance of the perpetrator of the crime and observe the manner in
which the crime was being committed. 38
In the case before us, Grace's unrebutted testimony is that the jeepney was
"quite lighted . . . medium". Even granting that the light was dim as most
jeepneys have colored or low-wattage bulbs for the passenger area, the added
illumination from the headlights of passing vehicles traveling the busy Aurora
Boulevard would have been sufficient to permit positive identification of the
appellants. 39 Moreover, identification of the appellants as the hold-uppers was
facilitated by their physical proximity to the said eyewitnesses. Grace was seated
beside appellant Mendoza while Glory was beside Rejali. That Grace had poor
eyesight does not affect her positive identification of Mendoza because she was
wearing her eyeglasses when the hold-up took place. 40 As stated above,
because they were victims of violence, both Grace and Glory must have had the
appellants' features indelibly imprinted in their minds.
In light of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime, their alibis are worthless. 41Moreover, the defense failed to meet the
requisites for alibi to be considered as a valid defense. It is not enough that the
appellants were somewhere else when the crime transpired. They must likewise
duly establish that they were so far away that it was not physically possible for
them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at or about the
time of its commission. 42 Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and Aurora Boulevard
in San Juan, Metro Manila are not very distant from each other considering the
numerous public transportation facilities plying between said places.
But, while there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability on the
appellants for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the physical injuries sustained

by her sister Grace and the asportation of Glory Oropeo's thirty pesos, we do not
agree with the trial court that the crime committed by appellants is covered by
P.D. No. 532.
In its Decision, the trial court curtly said:
The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged, namely,
intent to gain, unlawful taking of property of another, (the P30.00 of
Glory Oropeo) violence against or intimidation of any person, on a
Philippine Highway and death of Ramilyn Zulueta and physical
injuries upon Ma. Grace Zulueta, (Section 2, par. 3 and Section 3,
par. b, Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres.
Decree No. 532) have been duly proved in the instant case.
Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide?
Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the above elements mentioned
by the court a quo. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined by Section 2 of
said decree as follows:
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. The seizure of any person for
ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation
of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by
any person on any Philippine highway.
In People vs. Puno 43 , this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as follows:
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway
robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422 [1904].) . . .
. . . Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or
brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, . . .
Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There,
however, was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any
previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the
"indiscriminate" commission thereof.
Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number of perpetrators is no
longer an essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by P.D. No.
532. Mr. Justice Regalado explained this in Puno:
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to
Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the
penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability
for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require
that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers;
and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if
they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. . .
.44
Under the old doctrine, brigandage was committed by a "cuadrilla" 45 or by "more
than three armed persons" per the definition of brigands in Article 306 of the
Revised Penal Code. 46
Even before the Puno holding, however, there had been cases 47 where less than
four offenders were held guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532, which just
strengthens the view that the number of offenders is not an essential element in
the crime of highway robbery. 48
It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a high way within the purview of P.D.
No. 532, 49 the prosecutors deemed it proper to charge appellants with violation
of said decree. In this regard, the Puno ruling is enlightening. This Court held:
. . . (i)t would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be
covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that
the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter
thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the
elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an
instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental
Page 13 of 13
rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability
in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway
would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree
No. 532, it would not be far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not
absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While
we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we
apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to
avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either
stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the
accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of
the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the
offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 533, thus
rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972? And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of
the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being
herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively
set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 50
Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider
whether or not the very purpose for which the law was promulgated has been
transgressed. Citing the "whereas clauses" of P.D. No. 532 51 in Puno, the Court
said:
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a
particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could
be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single
act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and
social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the
economic, social, educational and community progress of the
people," such that said isolated act would constitute the highway
robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous. 52
Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and
death) committed against the middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed against the
economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to
bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that all doubts
are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused. As such, appellants may not
be held liable under P.D. No. 532 but only under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged. 53 Considering the allegations of the
aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the
asportation of thirty pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn
Zulueta's death was accidental because it was produced by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery. 54The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta
during the commission of the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with
homicide. 55
Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of the appellants and
their companion 56 of depriving Glory of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and
Grace which resulted in Ramilyn's accidental death. Since both appellants took
part in the robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime of robbery with
homicide in the absence of proof that they endeavored to prevent the accidental
killing of Ramilyn. 57 In view of the prohibition against the imposition of the death
penalty when the crime was committed, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was
then the single and indivisible penalty for robbery with homicide. It shall be
imposed on each of the appellants regardless of the mitigating and aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime. 58
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
(Branch 156) in Crim. Case No. 87218 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Romeo
Mendoza y Reyes and Jaime Rejali y Lina are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
accordingly, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The other portions of the trial court's decision, including the monetary
awards imposed against them, are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.