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To cite this article: Ralf Emmers (2014) Indonesia's role in ASEAN: A case of
incomplete and sectorial leadership, The Pacific Review, 27:4, 543-562, DOI:
10.1080/09512748.2014.924230
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The Pacific Review, 2014
Vol. 27, No. 4, 543 562, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.924230
Ralf Emmers
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Introduction
The paper studies the exercise of leadership in the international relations
of Southeast Asia by discussing Indonesia’s foreign policy toward the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia’s foreign policy
has been defined by both a feeling of vulnerability, due to domestic weak-
nesses and fragmentation, and also one of regional entitlement that has
Security
The years that preceded the formation of ASEAN are critical to under-
stand Indonesia’s leadership style in the Association. As the first presi-
dent of Indonesia (1945 1967), Sukarno resisted the establishment of
the Federation of Malaysia in 1963, which he viewed as a British neo-
colonial design in Southeast Asia, by starting a campaign of Konfrontasi
(Confrontation) based on coercive diplomacy and small-scale armed
activities (see Hindley 1964; Mackie 1974). Sukarno’s gradual political
downfall followed an abortive coup in October 1965. General Suharto
was elected acting president in March 1967 and initiated a new era in
Indonesian politics known as the New Order. An initial process of recon-
ciliation between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur led to the creation of
ASEAN in August 1967.1
Suharto’s policy toward ASEAN was influenced by a desire to reassure
his partners. Jakarta was aware of the ongoing mistrust toward Indonesia
and it adopted an approach to regionalism characterized by self-restraint
(Jorgensen-Dahl 1982). Indonesia still felt that it was entitled to a position
of natural leadership in ASEAN, however. Djiwandono (1989, p. 160)
explains that Indonesia’s ‘membership in ASEAN may accord it, implicitly,
the status of first among equals without resort to an aggressive confronta-
tion policy’. Indonesia’s ambition to be recognized as a natural leader of
ASEAN was gradually realized through its exercise of benevolent power.
Indonesia became to be perceived as the backbone of regional security and
as first among equals within the Association. The other members were will-
ing to accept its position of leadership in the Association in exchange for its
adoption of a non-threatening and constrained foreign policy.
Indonesia did not succeed, however, in realizing as an international
public good its vision of a stable regional order based on the exclusive man-
agerial role of the Southeast Asian states. Unlike Indonesia’s regional
vision, Thailand, the Philippines and Singapore associated the quest for
order in Southeast Asia with the involvement of external parties. They con-
tinued therefore after the formation of ASEAN to rely on the availability
of external countervailing power, primarily through their tacit or formal
alliances with the United States, to ensure their security. Indonesia’s
548 The Pacific Review
preference for regional autonomy was therefore not favored by all the
other ASEAN states.
For example, in November 1971, the ASEAN members registered a call
for regional autonomy by signing in Kuala Lumpur the Zone of Peace,
Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). It repeated a determination, previ-
ously announced in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, to avoid external
intervention. However, while expressing a regional ambition to maintain
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its possible disintegration (see Huxley 2002). This has undermined its lead-
ership position within the Association and its attempt at offering an inter-
national public good in the security area. While Suharto’s commitment to
regional cooperation had been viewed regionally as a pillar for Southeast
Asian security from the early 1970s until the 1990s, Indonesia was included
in regional calculations as a source of instability following the Asian finan-
cial crisis of 19976 1998. Student demonstrations calling for Reformasi
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Economics
Domestic economic weakness has historically restrained Indonesia’s ability
to provide as an international public good sustained economic development
in Southeast Asia. President Suharto already acknowledged this in 1969
when he stated: ‘We shall only be able to play an effective role if we our-
selves are possessed of a great national vitality’ (Leifer 1983, p. 181).
Economic success was first achieved in the 1980s and early 1990s, encourag-
ing Suharto to adopt a more active foreign policy in an attempt at raising
the country’s profile internationally (Sukma 1995; Vatikiotis 1993). Yet, the
consequences of the Asian financial crisis severely weakened Indonesia’s
leadership role and influence. The country was severely affected by the
financial crisis that drastically worsened its socio-economic problems. It was
embarrassed by the International Monetary Fund’s imposition of strict con-
ditions on loans required to stabilize its domestic economy. It took years for
Indonesia to fully recover from the consequences of the crisis.
In light of its recurrent economic weakness, Indonesia’s attempt at
exercising leadership has mostly been sectorial in its approach, focused
predominantly on the political and security spheres while leaving the eco-
nomic sector to neighboring states. Economic leadership in ASEAN has
primarily emanated from Singapore and to a lesser extent Malaysia and
Thailand, as for instance illustrated by Singaporean proposals to establish
an ASEAN Free Trade Area and an ASEAN Economic Community in
1992 and 2003, respectively.
While unable to contribute to economic leadership in ASEAN, Indone-
sia still used diplomatic pressure to block initiatives that might have under-
mined its own national interests and policy preferences. For example,
Indonesia rejected Malaysia’s proposal in 1990 for an East Asian
Economic Group, as it was concerned that its own influence would be
reduced in a larger grouping involving the larger East Asian economies.
Suharto therefore refused to endorse Dr Mahathir’s proposal, which the
Malaysian prime minister eventually modified into an East Asian Eco-
nomic Caucus in October 1991. This incident indicated that no major initia-
tive even in the economic sphere could be adopted without the prior
R. Emmers: Indonesia’s Role in ASEAN 551
consent of Jakarta. That said, Indonesia was not in a position to stop the
formation of the ASEAN C Three (China, Japan, South Korea) in 1997 in
the midst of the Asian financial crisis.
Indonesia’s inability to offer economic leadership may be about to
change, however, as the country is today an emerging economic power that
seeks to play a greater role in regional and global affairs (see Basri 2012).
The Indonesian economy escaped relatively unscathed the global financial
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Conflict management
Beyond its incomplete and sectorial provision of international public
goods, Indonesia has sought to exercise leadership in ASEAN by contrib-
uting to conflict management in Southeast Asia through sustained diplo-
matic efforts. Jakarta has focused on two particular conflicts, namely, the
Cambodian conflict and the territorial disputes in the South China Sea
involving China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
Cambodian conflict
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 represented a signifi-
cant challenge to ASEAN and its cardinal institutional principles of
national sovereignty, non-use of force, and non-interference in the affairs
of other states. ASEAN’s response assumed two major forms, which were
primarily determined by Thailand as a frontline state to the conflict. The
members followed a common diplomatic position that consisted of con-
demning Vietnam and calling for the national sovereignty of Cambodia to
be restored and respected. Furthermore, the Association developed a close
partnership with China to exert additional pressure on Vietnam (Emmers
2003). ASEAN also relied on the economic sanctions imposed on Vietnam
by the United States, Japan and other dialog partners.
Indonesia was distressed by the fact that the situation in Cambodia had
led to external interference in Southeast Asia, chiefly from China and the
Soviet Union that supported Vietnam militarily and economically. The
reliance on China and a deeper involvement in Cold War antagonism
552 The Pacific Review
Institution building
Indonesia’s attempt at exercising leadership in ASEAN has also included
efforts at promoting institution building in areas covering security and
554 The Pacific Review
from the fact that ASEAN has constantly reaffirmed the principles of
national sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other
states and has remained an arrangement with no supra-national power or
character.
Conclusion
Indonesia has felt entitled to a position of natural leadership in ASEAN
since its formation in August 1967. During the Suharto presidency
(1967 1998), Indonesia played a leading role in the Association and con-
tributed to stability and security in Southeast Asia. Indonesia’s status as a
de facto leader significantly diminished after the Asian financial crisis of
558 The Pacific Review
the importance of the 1976 and 2003 Bali Summits that led respectively to
the adoption of the TAC and the APSC proposal have also been discussed.
Moreover, as an extension of its domestic politics, Indonesia has in
recent years encouraged institution building in ASEAN to promote
democracy and the respect for human rights in Southeast Asia. The less
democratic member states have contested the Indonesian focus on domes-
tic governance, however. Its democratic system has been criticized in some
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Acknowledgements
This paper was first presented at the Workshop on ‘Regional leadership,
norms and diversity: Comparing the Asia-Pacific with Europe’, organized
by Waseda University and funded by the Global Re-ordering: Evolution
through European Networks (GR:EEN), Tokyo, January 2013.
Note
1. The original ASEAN members were Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand
and the Philippines. Brunei joined ASEAN in 1986, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.
References
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Ahmad, Z. H. and Ghoshal, B. (1999) ‘The political future of ASEAN after the
Asian crisis’, International Affairs 75: 759 78.
560 The Pacific Review