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Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation

Author(s): Joseph J. Walsh

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 45, H. 3 (3rd Qtr., 1996), pp. 344-363
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436431 .
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In the summer of 196 at the Isthmian games a herald proclaimed the following:
"The Roman senate and Titus Quinctius consul, having defeated King Philip
and the Macedonians, release as free, without garrisons, subject to no tribute
and in the enjoyment of their ancestral laws [the following peoples]: the
Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians,
Thessalians, and Perrhaebians."2This sensational proclamation,although brief,
is one of the most adept extant applications of Greek liberation propaganda-
and yet it is a Roman declaration.

I am indebtedto M. Gwyn Morgan,David ArnstrongandGaylaS. McGlameryfor their

help. They are not responsiblefor the errorsof thoughtand style which remain.I would
also like to thankthe AmericanAcademyin Romeandthe LoyolaCollege Centerfor the
Humanitiesfor supportin researchingandwritingthis paper.
2 H a1ycXVtTo;5 'NPOgaiMvKai Tito; Koiv.toq ctpaTo6; 6icato;, Kataxao41aavtE;
PamaXa lDikXtnov icai MaKES6va;, tiaimav 6eu0?pou; a0poVpitoTu, doopoxoyi-
Touq, v64oto Xpogivom Toti; naTpiot, KoptvOiou;, cocKEaa, AoKpo16;, E6ipoelt;,
AXcato-;To-6;0Ot&raq,Mdyvwjra;,OertaXoi);, Hleppatio-u;,Polyb. 18.46.5. Cf. Plut.
Flam. 10.4; Livy 33.32.5; abbreviatedversionsin Appian,Mac. 9.2; ValeriusMaximus
The following will be referredto by authorandshorttitle: E. Badian,Foreign Clientelae
(264-70 B.C.) (Oxford, 1958); J. Briscoe, "Flamininusand Roman Politics, 200-189
B.C.," Latomus 31 (1972) 22-53, A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXI-XXXIII (Oxford,
1973); E. Carawan,"Graecia Liberata and the Role of Flamininusin Livy's Fourth
Decade," TAPA 18 (1988) 209-52; G. Carratelli,"Supplementoepigraphicodi lasos,"
Annuario 45/46 (1967-8) 437-86; W. Dahlheim, Struktur und Entwicklung des romi-
schen Volkerrechts im dritten und zweiten Jahrhundert v. Chr. (Munich, 1968); A. M.
Eckstein, Senate and General. Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Rela-
tions, 264-194 B.C. (Berkeley, 1987); J.-L. Ferrary, Philhellenisme et imperialisme
(Rome, 1988); E. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome (Berkeley,
1984); M. Holleaux, Etudes dY'epigraphieet d'histoire grecques (Paris, 1938-68); J. A. 0.
Larsen,"TheTreatyof Peace at the Conclusionof the SecondMacedonianWar,"CP 31
(1936) 342-8; A. H. McDonald-F.W. Walbank,"TheOriginsof the SecondMacedonian
War,"JRS27 (1937) 180-207; A. Passerini,"Studidi storiaellenistico-romana,"
um 10 (1932) 105-15; R. Seager, "The Freedomof the Greeks of Asia Minor from
Alexanderto Antiochus,"CQ 31 (1981) 106-12; Z. Ta?liklioglu-P. Frisch, "New In-
scriptions from the Troad,"ZPE 17.2 (1975) 101-6; E. Taubler,ImperiumRomanum
(Leipzig, 1913); F. W. Walbank,Philip V of Macedon(Cambridge,1940), A Historical
Commentaryon Polybius II (Oxford, 1967); P. G. Walsh, "TheLiteraryTechniquesof
Livy," RhM 97 (1954) 97-114; Ed. Will, Histoire politique du monde hellenistique (323-
30 av. J.-C.), 2nd ed., 2 vols. (Nancy, 1979-1982).

C FranzSteinerVerlagWiesbadenGmbH,Sitz Stuttgart

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 345

The originandevolutionof the Romaneleutheriapropaganda whichculmi-

natedin the Isthmiandeclarationhas been variouslyinterpretedby scholars.3I
will arguein this paperthatRomanpolicy andpropagandaof liberationwere
discoveredandinitiatedby Flamininusalone;thatthis discoverytook place on
the spot in Greece and that it was the resultof Flamininus'handson, crash
course in the politicalrhetoricof the Greekhomeland;thatFlamininusunited
his Greekallies underhis directionin the negotiationswith Philip and in the
manipulationof the Romansenate;thatFlamininus'understanding andimple-
mentationof liberationrhetoricwas thoroughlyGreek;thathe acknowledged,
at times to his frustration,the genuineobligationsof a liberator.I contendthat
Flamininuswas responsiblefor the languageof both the senatus consultum
broughtby the ten commissionersand the Isthmiandeclarationitself; thathe
alone of Romansfully understoodand felt responsiblefor Rome's liberation
propagandaand its ramifications;and that Philip's particularformulationof
liberationslogansinfluencedthe wordingof the Isthmiandeclaration,whichin
turnmay have influencedAntiochusIII's rhetoric.My discussionwill treatthe
evidencein chronologicalorder,analyzingpertinenteventsfromthe beginning
of the SecondMacedonianWarto the Isthmiandeclaration.

1. The Conferenceat the Aous Pass

The Romansdid not initiatethe Second MacedonianWarwith an eleutheria

programin hand. At first, they merely demandedthat Philip refrainfrom
warringagainstany Greekstate.4

3 For an analysis of its development,Badian, Clientelae 69-75; cf. Dahlheim, Struktur

248-9, who seems to believe that the Romanshad the liberationof Greece in mind all
along; Will, Histoire 11 164-72; McDonald/Walbank,JRS (1937) 203-7, who suggest
that from the very startthe Romansused 'autonomy'of the Greeks as a pretextfor war
with Philip; contra,Ferrary,Philhellenisme58-63. Eckstein's analysis (Senate 274-302
passim) illuminatesFlamininus'dominantrole. Carawan,TAPA(1988) 212-31, discus-
ses the influence of the annalistictraditionon Livy's and Plutarch'saccounts.
4 In 200 when Nicanor, Philip's general, was overrunningAttica, Roman legates who
happenedto be theretold him thatthe Romansdemandedr6v Pacna rCxvRev'EXXiAvov
1n&Ev!noXejEtv(Polyb. 16.27.2;Livy leaves the Romanambassadorsout of his account
of Nicanor's campaign[31.14.6-15.1 1], on which, u.a., Holleaux, ttudes V 24; McDo-
nald/Walbank,JRS [19371 190, n. 63; P. G. Walsh, Livy: His Historical Aims and
Methods[Cambridge,19611149; Briscoe, 31-33 46-7. The most comprehensivediscus-
sion with furtherbibliographyis in T. J. Luce, Livy: The Compositionof his History
[Princeton,1977] 67-73). Similarlyin the same yearMarcusAemilius' warningto Philip
himself at Abydusaior&vVAretv EXXAvcov gi8evi xoXegEtv(Polyb. 16.34.3; cf. Livy
3 1.18.1-5). See Badian,Clientelae69-70; Walbank,CommentaryII 537.

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In the springof 199the Aetoliansmetto discussthe conflictbetweenRome

and Macedonia.At that time the Macedonianambassadorsattemptedto per-
suadethe Aetoliansto preservetheirneutralityin the impendingconflict,while
the Roman legate, L. Furius Purpurio,and the Athenians,allies of Rome,
pleadedfor Aetoliansupport.Livy's accountof thedebatecontainsa good deal
of eleutheria rhetoric,5but the speeches are hardlyevidence for a Roman
eleutheriapublicrelationscampaign.TheMacedonianspeaker,notthe Roman,
bringsup the whole issue of freedomanddomination,andit is theRomanswho
are under attack. The Romans themselves do not announcea programof
liberationfor Greece,but merelydefendthemselvesfromthe chargethatthey
intendedto enslaveher.6
After Flamininus'arrivalin Greece,he and Philipconferredat the Aous
gorge in 198 beforethe Romansforcedthe pass (Livy 32.10). They discussed
the conditionsfor peace.Livy gives the followingaccountof theirconference,
presumablyadaptinga Polybianversion. "The main points of the consul's
demandswereas follows:thatthe kingwithdrawhis garrisonsfromthe [Greek]
states;that he returnto those states whose fields and cities he had plundered
whathe hadtaken;thatan estimatebe madeforeverythingelse by an impartial
judge."7Philip offered to set free only those states he himself had captured.
Livy reports,"Thenwhentheywereaboutto discusswhichstateswereto be set
free, the consul namedthe Thessaliansfirstof all."8Uponhearingthis, Philip
lost his temperandleft the conference.Since the Thessalianswere the Greeks
most intimatelytied to Macedonia,withdrawalfromThessalyimpliedthe loss
of all Philip'sholdings.Liberationterminologyusualin the Hellenisticworldis

5 Livy 31.29-31 (in the Macedonianspeech: in libertatemeximerent... vectigalemque

provinciamsecuribuset fascibus subiecerunt...legibus vestrisper magistratusa vobis
creatos... libere... alium atquealiumdominum...officere libertativestrae... iugumacci-
pite in dominum;in the Romanspeech:urbemagros suaqueomniacumlibertatelegibus-
que Reginis reddidimus...servire tyrannis... captam iisdem armis et liberatamurbem
reddidimus...stipendiariasnobis ac vectigales... libertatem).
6 It has been suggestedthat the whole scenario,speeches and all, was Livy's creation(E.
Burck,"Einzelinterpretation von Reden"[Originalbeitrag1966] in Wegezu Livius,ed. E.
Burck [Darmstadt,1967]; contra,Briscoe, 31-33 18-9, n. 5). Rhetoricallythe speeches
are Livy's creation,as are all his speeches, and we do not know to whatextent they may
diverge from Polybian originals (see H. Nissen, Kritische Untersuchungenuber die
Quellender viertenundfunftenDekadedes Livius[Berlin, 1863] 126-8; R. Ullmann,La
techniquedes discours dans Salluste, Tite-Liveet Tacite. La matiWre et la composition
[Oslo, 1927] 135-6; P. PNdech, La methode historique de Polybe [Paris, 1964] 266;
Briscoe, 31-33 16-9, 129).
7 Summapostulatorumconsulis erat: praesidia ex civitatibusrex deduceret;iis, quorum
agros urbesquepopulatus esset, redderetres quae comparerent;ceterorumaequo ar-
bitrio aestimatiofieret, Livy 32.10.3.
8 Indecumageretur,quae civitatesliberandaeessent, Thessalosprimosomniumnominavit
consul, 32.10.7.

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Flamininus and the Propaganda of Liberation 347

conspicuously absent from the debate and, significantly for our purpose, absent
from Flamininus' pronouncements.
Livy seems to be giving an abbreviated version of the conference or of
Polybius' version of the conference: by his own assertion we get only a
summation ("summa")of Flamininus' demands. With the exception of Philip's
parting exclamation,9 Livy relates the conference in terse oratio obliqua. Per-
haps we should not expect an account of this natureto communicate the rhetoric
of a meeting. On the other hand, there is scarcely any eleutheria language in the
later conference at Nicaea and Thronium either. It is hard to see why Flamini-
nus would have employed liberation slogans at the Aous gorge, abandoned
them at Nicaea, and then picked them up again subsequently.'0 Rather, as our
sources indicate, his posturing at the gorge lacked the refined use of freedom
terminology we find in the IsthmianDeclaration."I Flamininus' education in the
political rhetoric of the Greek mainland was just beginning.
Diodorus Siculus gives an alternate version of the conference at the Aous
gorge, which has been assumed to reflect the Polybian original more accurate-
ly.'2 According to this account, Flamininus demanded that Philip withdraw
from all of Greece, "that it be ungarrisoned and autonomous."13When Philip
declared his willingness to withdraw from only those cities he himself had
captured, Flamininus told him that "he had the following order from the senate:
to liberate not just a part of Greece, but all of it."'14Here we find Flamininus
employing several of the standardterms of Hellenistic eleutheria propaganda:
"ungarrisoned,""autonomous," "liberation."If we accept Diodorus' version,
the Romans were indeed displaying considerable sophistication in the applica-
tion of Greek slogans. Yet, the specificity of the reference to the Thessalians in
Livy seems rather to suggest a Polybian original;'5 whereas aipov'pTlro; and

9 "Whatmoregrievouscommandcould you give a defeatedenemy,TitusQuinctius?"Quid

victo gravius imperares, T. Quincti?, Livy 32.10.7.
10 See n. 17.
11 Nor is it clear thathe intendedto set free the cities and regionsfrom which Philip was to
withdraw.Ferrary,Philhellenisme 58-61, observesthatthe demandthatPhilip withdraw
from Greece was a typical Romanescalationof demandsafteractuallybeginninga war;
that, moreover,there was no hint that the Romansdid not intend to occupy the lands
yielded by Philip(theirrecordup to thatpoint indicatedthatthey normallyassumedsome
sort of controlover such lands [61]).
12 Walsh,RhM(1954) 107-8; Carawan,TAPA (1988) 212-4; morereservedly,Briscoe, 31-
33 186; furtherbibliographyin Eckstein,Senate 274-5, n. 21.
13 EKXOpev a adcTI;-5 'EXX68o; 6no.o d4povpopto; j icai aczroyvopo;,28.1 1.
14 Stoitapaz rs; PouAXlivroX&; EX& -tTavraq, 67tr gh ?ipo; Tig EXXd6o4dxaa ic&av
aibiv bxE-0epoi3v ..., 28.1 1.
15 Walsh, RhM (1954) 108, "Livy here appearsto have addedone significantsentence not
containedin Polybius- the referenceto the Thessaliansas the firstpeople to be freed...,"
begs the question.

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aVrovogo; in Diodorus'accountlook suspiciouslylike an anticipationof the

rhetoricof the Isthmiandeclaration,16as EicxXopiva'ndor; Ti; 'EXX68o;does
of thatof the conferenceat Nicaea.ClearlyLivy's versionseems to reproduce
the Polybianoriginalmoreclosely.'7
Fortunatelyboth historiansare in accordon the substanceof the Roman
demand:the completeevacuationof Greeceby Philip.Thisrepresentsa consid-
erable escalationover the demandof 200, that Philip not make war on the
Greeks.'8It is generallyassumedthatthe senateinitiatedthe change,Flamini-
nus being too young and too inexperiencedto take such an initiativeon his
own.19Diodorus'accountwouldsupportthis assumption,butas we haveseen,
his account is unreliable.It seems, rather,that beyond Philip's defeat and
humiliation,the senate had no clear notionof what the consequencesof his
defeatshouldbe. It is notoutof the questionthatFlamininus,left on his own to

16 M.-L. Heidemann, Die Freiheitsparole in der griechisch-romischen Auseinandersetzung

(200-188 v. Chr.) (Bonn, 1966) 105, n. 2; Briscoe, 31-33 186.
17 Seager, CQ (1981) 108, arguescogently for Livy, "First,the freedomof the Greeksdoes
not appearas a slogan in the detailedPolybianaccountsof negotiationsin the following
year at Nicaea andThronium.It wouldbe somewhatsurprisingif it hadbeen exploitedat
the Aous, only to be abandoned.Secondly, it is easier to understandwhy the elements
peculiar to Diodorus should have been added to the traditionas contributionsto the
hagiographyof Flamininusand to the eventualestablishmentof the Romanclaim to have
been fightingall along solely for the sake of the Greeks,whichmadebothFlamininusand
the senate eager to backdate their adhesion to the cause of Greek freedom, than to
discover a reasonwhy Livy, who criticizedAttalusandthe Rhodiansfor leavingto Rome
the egregius titulus of liberatorsof Greece, should have omitted an early appeal to the
slogan by Rome, if that appealstood in Polybius."Cf. Eckstein,Senate 274-5; Ferrary,
Philhelle'nisme58-9, n. 49.
18 Badian, Clientelae70; Ferrary,Philhellinisme58. Eckstein,Senate275, makesmuchof
the demanddeliveredby M. Aemilius Lepidusin 200 thatPhilip"withdrawfromterrito-
ries recentlyconquered- namely,the old Ptolemaicpossessions in Thrace."Actuallythe
demand is that he "not lay hands on Ptolemy's possessions" (gT?re rot; nTroXgaiou
rpayjaanv ?tkX4tv rdt; XCtpaS,Polyb. 16.34.3), which reflects a different intent
(though it surely applies to towns alreadyseized). The senate wantedto stifle Philip's
expansionistambitionsand to force the king to acknowledgeRome's superiority.This is
a far cry from demandingthe relinquishmentof Macedonia'straditionaldependencies
possessions.Nor is thereanyreasonto assumethatthe
and virtuallyall herextraterritorial
demand that Philip withdrawfrom his Ptolemaic acquisitions(accepting this slightly
inaccurateformulation)would as a matterof course lead to the demand that Philip
withdrawfrom all of Greece, a progressionfor which we have no evidence.
19 See, i.a., Badian,Clientelae70-1; Walbank,CommentaryII 550-1; R. M. Errington,The
Dawn of Empire(Ithaca,New York, 1972) 146; Ferrary,PhilhelWnisme58-9. Eckstein,
Senate 274-7, posits that, while the senate set the policy of freeingGreece, Flamininus
had considerableleeway in determiningthe particulars:"the 'Aous Declaration'was a
[harsh]interpretationof the generalwar aim of the senate"(277).

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 349

pursue the war as Roman generals so often were,20 upped the stakes. He was
young, it is true, but fiercely ambitious, clever and independent - and he was
consul. There was incentive for him to press Philip: demands which Philip
could not meet would ensure continuation of the war, something clearly in the
interest of Flamininus' career;2'and throughthis public relations ploy, he could
expect to win support among the Greeks.
Thus we see not a trace of eleutheria rhetoric in Flamininus' or any other
Roman's pronouncementsby the time of the conference at the Aous pass in 198.
Yet it may well be that Flamininus was already beginning to assume control of
the war's policy and propaganda- nothing suggests that the decision to escalate
demands on Philip was not Flamininus'.

2. The Conference at Nicaea and Thronium

After the Romans forced the pass at the Aous, Philip made a hasty retreat
through Thessaly to Macedonia, destroying many of his own cities as he fled,
lest they fall into the hands of the enemy. Although Philip had not yet been
defeated, his position had weakened, and he was willing to negotiate further.In
198 another peace conference was held, this one for 3 days, at Nicaea and
Thronium.22On the first day Flamininus and each of his allies presented their
terms for peace individually. Flamininus' principal condition was that Philip
"withdraw from the whole of Greece."23Except for the Aetolians, who like the
Romans demanded that Philip withdraw from the whole of Greece, all the allies
demanded only personal compensation.24Thus far Polybius' account is brief
and concise. He begins to put flesh on the bones of the debate when he describes
Alexander the Isian's rebuke of Philip for his madness in destroying his own
possessions and for his treachery to the Aetolians (18.3). Polybius reports that
Philip responded to Alexander with comparable vigor (18.4-6). Neither of them
spoke of liberty. Philip then posed the same question he had posed at the
conference at the Aous gorge: whether he was to withdraw only from those

20 See now especially Eckstein,Senate passim, esp. 268-317 on Flamininusin particular.

Ferrary'sobservationthatthis escalationwas typical(Philhellenisme59) does not neces-
sarily mean thatFlamininusdid not initiateit.
21 Eckstein, Senate 277, perceptivelyemphasizesthe role Flamininus'ambitionplayed in
formulatingthe Aous declaration.Still, the consul was not interestedin negotiatinga
settlementadvantageousto Rome but in forcingPhilip to fight - it was on the battlefield
that the greatest gloria was won. If Philip's indignantreaction is any indication, the
young Flamininuspicked appropriatelyunacceptableterms.
22 Polyb. 18.1.1-10.2; Livy 32.32.9-36.8.
23 eic p?vrq 'EXXci8o; xiuiazi 6%peltv, Polyb. 18.1.13.
24 Aitrwkoi rp&Tov?v tj;' EkXd8o; &aTIs; ?KO4UOV i4iaTacOat, Polyb. 18.2.6.

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states conquered by himself or from all states in his possession (Polyb. 18.7. 1).
Flamininus remained silent. Aristaenus and Phaeneas were about to reply, but
since the day was drawing to an end, the conference was adjourned. On the
second day of the conference, after a private session with Flamininus, Philip
presented his counterproposals,which fell short of a complete withdrawalfrom
Greece (Polyb. 18.8.6-10). "All those present"rejected Philip's proposals and
remained adamant that he withdraw from Greece entirely.25 The conference
was once again adjourneduntil the next day. On the third day they met on the
beach near Thronium. Philip asked permission to send an embassy to the senate.
Flamininus assured his Greek allies that it was unlikely that the senate would
grant Philip's wishes and argued for the expediency of acceding to Philip's
request (Polyb. 18.9.3-10). "They all quickly assented when they saw that
Flamininus was inclined to refer the matterto the senate."26
In Polybius' account of the three days of conference hardly a trace of
eleutheria sloganeering is to be found. Polybius' editing cannot be responsible,
since the whole account, though abbreviatedin parts, is still long. Some liberty
rhetoric would surely have been retained had it played a prominent role at the
conference, and Polybius would have no reason to suppress such references in
his narrative. What arises from Polybius' account - and this has consequence
for the eventual emergence of eleutheria propaganda- is the united front of the
allies under Flamininus' leadership. Philip's complete withdrawal from Greece
becomes the principal condition of all the allies; all are dissatisfied with
Philip's counterproposals; when Flamininus insists on referring the matter to
the senate they all comply.27

3. Embassies to Rome

Once Philip received permission from Flamininus and the allies to submit his
proposals to the senate, Flamininus proceeded to undermine the proposals. I
will not address Flamininus' intention of prolonging his command here, but
instead how he managed the campaign to ensure the failure of Philip's embassy,
a campaign in which, significantly for our purpose, eleutheria propaganda
played a prominent role.

25 S
cdvro)v &esv xap6vxov ... roito 8 njv 6ndanq beKwpetv t;'EXX68oq, Polyb. 18.9.1.
26 axixii cvyica a0eg&vov 6mcdvclov 6xa6 OELOpETv 6XX6rptov6vra ri;
tov Tirov ovUic
Elrt Trv G yKicTlOV dvabopd;, Polyb. 18.10.1.
27 F. M. Wood, "TheMilitaryandDiplomaticCampaignof T. QuinctiusFlamininusin 198
B. C.," AJP 62 (1941) 278-81, observesFlamininus'assumptionof controlof the Nicaea
conference,readingit as a step towardsrobbingtheGreeksof controlof theirown foreign

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 351

Flamininus and his allies decided to let Philip send an embassy to Rome but
resolved to send their own as well (Polyb. 18.10.2). According to Polybius,
Flamininus had planned the result of the conference at Nicaea; he then arranged
its sequel to his satisfaction as well: "With the outcome of the conference in
accord with Flamininus' intentions and his calculations from the very start, he
at once set about weaving the sequence of his design, carefully seeing to his
own security and creating no advantage for Philip."28Flamininus grantedPhilip
a truce for two months; Macedonian garrisons were to withdraw from Phocis
and Locris; Flamininus saw to it that his own allies would be secure during the
truce (Polyb. 18.10.4-6). "After that he [sc. Flamininus] went about completing
his plan by himself."29He sent Amynander to Rome, expecting him to follow
the instructions of Flamininus' friends in the city, and he sent his legates. The
allies sent their own envoys (Polyb. 18.10.7-11).
It is clear that prior to actually sending the ambassadors,Flamininus and his
allies had been consulting. They would have formed a common policy on how
to approach the senate to ensure either Philip's complete evacuation of Greece
or the continuation of the war. And in fact in Rome the allied representativesall
stressed the same chief point: "that so long as Chalcis, Corinth and Demetrias
were subject to the Macedonian, the Greeks could not even think of liberty.930
The various speeches were so similar that Polybius could conveniently com-
press them into one summary (Polyb. 18.11.3-12). Flamininus' management is
also discernible in the fact that the ambassadorsdid not come before the senate
until his allies and agents in Rome had been assured that his command would be
prorogued (Polyb. 18.11.1-2). Nor does Polybius mean that Flamininus intend-
ed to lobby the senate separately from the Greek ambassadors when he claims
that, "After that, he went about completing his plan by himself." This statement
refers to Flamininus' machinations to keep his command. As such machinations
would compromise his credibility with the Greeks, he was not about to consult
with them concerning these activities. As far as they knew, a united front
orchestrated and directed by Flamininus was being presented to the senate. The
actors need only look to Flamininus' agents for their cues.
What does this reading of the evidence tell us about the state of Roman
eleutheria propaganda at the time of the embassies to Rome? First of all, we
find a high degree of cooperation between Flamininus and his allies in the

28 tovi & ip6ygaro; rC Tir oov icata r6v aivXoyov KaMa voiv KaO Ca'6oi; ?S dtPX8
8laXoRyl(TOivs RPOKc%X(JPIIOTOq, napalL)iKa6 auw)VXi5 Tnq ?ZmNk85 i4V0aive, rd re
KaOavt6v dooakt6jievo; cngeXci)Wcai npoXiia xCotXiinc) notiv ou6kv, Polyb.
29 Xourov a-65t6; a8toa3T6
&' Trpo1cEi?vov ?it?EtXE, Polyb. 18.10.6.
30 zoiTo & ?itteMo5; vrnix?tiv iEt&p6OVvTO'Tl TUVKXTo)a lvTE;, Wu6tttf; XaXKiaoq Kai
TOV5KopivOouc Kai tfS ATuIgTptpi8o;ivn6 T6 MacKF86vixtaTTovwv o0X 0ot6v tto?
"EXXiiva;Evvotav Xaaev bX?u0epia;, Polyb. 18.11.4.

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formationandpresentationof policy. Behindthis cooperationstood,presuma-

bly, dialogueandmutualeducation.Flamininuswas becomingbetteracquaint-
ed with the politicsandthe politicalrhetoricof the Greekmainland.He was on
his way to understanding the uses andabusesof eleutheria.Oneof his inadver-
tentteachersmaywell havebeenPhiliphimself.Flamininusseemsto havebeen
not unsympatheticto the Macedonianking, andit is Philip'spropagandawith
whichFlamininuswouldhavebeen mostfamiliar.Revealingly,the packageof
ideas used by Flamininuslaterin the proclamationat the IsthmianGameswas
one favoredby Philipaboveall Hellenisticmonarchs(see Section6). Second,
alreadyin commandof the militaryconductof the war,Flamininuswas assum-
ing control of the politics and public relationsof the war.31Like any good
Roman,he was capableof assimilatingthe usefulfromothers.Thatis, he was
movingtowardsa positionwherehe couldeasily makeanyacquiredpropagan-
da ploy, in this case eleutheria,his own.
These two factorsexplain the amplificationof eleutheriarhetoricin the
discussionand meetingsin Romebeforethe senate.Amongthe phrasesPoly-
bius puts in the mouths of the ambassadorsare "the thoughtof liberty,"
"breathingfreely," "the enjoymentof liberty,""easy resubjugationof the
Greeks,"32and in the final plea they begged the senate,"neitherto cheat the
Greeksof the hopes of libertynor to rob themselvesof the noblesthonor."33
Why does this rhetoricalamplificationoccur at this particularpoint in the
sequenceof events?Andwhy didtheseambassadors thinkthe libertyof Greece
was so importantto Romansenators?Flamininusprovidesthe key to these
questions.Forquite some time he hadbeen representingRome's dispositions,
views and desiresto her Greekallies. It was throughhim thatthe Greekshad
acquiredtheirsense of whatRome'slatestgoals in Greecewereandwhatsorts
of argumentswould carry the most weight in Rome. And Flamininuswas
directingthe embassies.
Thereis, in fact, no indicationwhatsoeverup to this pointthatthe senate
had the slightest interestin the "liberation"of Greece, whateverthat might
mean, or that the senatewas even awareof the advantagesof claimingto be
interested.ClearlyFlamininus,using his growingfamiliaritywith Greekpoli-

31 IgnoringFlamininus'directionof the event, Gruen,HW 145-6, seems to suggest thatthe

Greek ambassadorsin their speeches originatedthe emphasison eleutheria, which the
senate picked up and in turnpassed on to Flamininus,resultingin the Isthmiandeclara-
tion. See, too, Seager, CQ (1981) 108-9, whose pictureof sly Greeksfoisting upon the
senatean eleutheriapolicy also ignoresthe stagingof the embassyby Flamininusandhis
32 Respectively, 'vvotav Xazl3tv?evtOepia;; avanveiaat; eia1)pa6Oat ?n; iXE0BpiaQ;
Oqio; iadXtv i4' av6xv notaccaOat, all Polyb. 18.1 1.
33 "EOTSva;
VAree 'q,eioaax6 v ,epit Ti; Oe?Oepia; ?iXiO)v pA0' a'utoix anootepAjoac
1S KaQTOn5; vntypaori,Polyb. 18.11.11.

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 353

tics and propaganda,andperhapsinspiredsomewhatby the aspirationsof his

Greekassociates,addedthe liberationof Greeceto the ideologyandpropagan-
da of the war. The Greeksmust have been delighted.Doubtlesssome if not
many senators understoodthe logic and advantagesof eleutheria as both
propagandaand policy. But, ultimately,to the senate all this rhetorichad a
simplepoint.Unless Philipwerecompelledto give up the fetters,he wouldnot
be sufficientlychastisedor weakened.The eventualfate of 'liberated'Thessal-
ians, Magnesians,Euboeans,Locrians,PhociansandCorinthians34 was beyond
the senate's interestat this time. WhetherFlamininusseriouslyponderedthe
problemof the liberationof Greeceis unknown.Buthis on-the-jobeducationin
Greecemay have alreadybroughthometo him the obligationsof a conqueror,
perhapseven the obligationsof an exploiterof the termeleutheria.

4. The Conferenceat Tempe

In 197 afterPhilip'sdefeatat Cynoscephalae,Flamininusandhis Greekallies

arrangedto meet Philipat Tempeto discusstermsof peace.Relationsbetween
Flamininusand the Aetolianshad alreadybegun to deteriorate.35 Before the
meetingwith Philip,the Romansandtheirallies conferredamongthemselves.
Flamininusaskedeach of the Greeksto define the termsof peace. Alexander
the Aetolian assertedthat unless they deposedPhilip there would be neither
"lastingpeace for the Romansnorlastingfreedomfor the Greeks";36 norcould
Flamininus"executethe policy of his countryor fulfill the promiseshe had
madeto all the Greeks."37Flamininusin rebuttalarguedthatPhilip'sretention
of his throne would serve both justice and Greece's interests. Phaeneas the
Aetolian attempted to respond, but Flamininus cut him off rudely (Polyb.
The Aetolians depicted the two goals of the war as peace for the Romans
and freedomfor the Greeks.Althoughpeace is mentionedfirst, the Aetolian
statementssuggest that in Flamininus'representations
of his intentionsthese
two goals had been parallel,virtuallyequal. Flamininus'responseconfirms
this. He fully acknowledgeshis obligationto establishGreek freedom and
argues that he will do so, as expected, but without deposing Philip. This

34 All mentionedby the Greekenvoys (Polyb. 18.11).

35 On which see Holleaux,tiudes V 86-113; K. Sacks, "Polybius'OtherView of Aetolia,"
JHS 95 (1975) 92-106; P. S. Derow, "Polybius,Rome, and the East,"JRS 69 (1979) 1-
15; J. Walsh, "Bones of Contention:Pharsalus,Phthiotic Thebes, Larisa Cremaste,
Echinus,"CPh 88 (1993) 35-46.
36 i 'PRoaiot; riv eipivnv f, to; `EXXjatrrv gXekOpiav Pipatov, Polyb. 18.36.6.
37 'riv ciS;icarpi8o; ipo6OEacv breXit notetv caOtT6 i8ia; Oi'osa?Et;, &d;xux aa
sacn-rlot; "EDA1rcn, Polyb. 18.36.7.

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exchangeshedsconsiderablelighton theongoingdialoguebetweenFlamininus
and his Greekallies. Before this time Flamininushad guaranteed,or, rather,
promisedas the accountsays, the Greekstheirliberty,and he had done so in
such a way that made it clear to the Greeksthat this was one of the war's
principalgoals. The fact that the ten commissionerssent to regulateGreek
affairsin the wakeof the warfelt no suchobligation38 suggeststhatthis policy
andpromisewas Flamininus'alone.
In Polybius'accountthereis, moreover,not the slightesthintthatFlamini-
nus and the Aetoliansare talkingat cross purposes;thereis no gap between
Flamininus'and the Greeks' understandingof this powerful slogan. Their
disagreementis overhow to accomplishGreekfreedom,notwhatit entails.The
consul seems to be fully at homein the worldof Greekpoliticaldiscourseand
thoroughlycommittedto it.
The Aetolians,however,werepreparedto demonstrateto the foreigncom-
manderthat the propagandaof libertyis a double-edgedswordimplyingre-
sponsibilitiesas well as advantagesfor its wielder.At Tempe,for the firsttime
in our sources,an ally turnsaboutandaccusesFlamininusof failingto provide
libertyfor the Greeks,andnotjust libertyper se, buta promisedliberty.Clearly
the Aetoliansbelieved the Romanswere obligedto free Greece,and the Ro-
mans could be assuredthat the Greekswould be monitoringtheir progress
towardsfulfillmentof the obligation.

5. The IsthmianDeclaration

In the spring of 196, the ten commissionerssent to aid Flamininusin the

settlementof Greece arrivedfrom Rome. They broughtwith them a senatus
consultumdeclaringthat"all the otherGreeksin Asia and Europewere to be
free and to be subjectto their own laws";39Philip was to surrenderto the
Romans several towns underhis control and garrisonedby him; he was to
withdrawgarrisonsfrom and leave free Euromus,Pedasa, Bargylia, Iasus,
Abydus, Thasos, Myrinaand Perinthus;40 Flamininusalso was to write to
Prusiasaboutthe liberationof Cius.41 Here we have an increasein standard

38 See next section.

idvtaq, w
39 soUc,gtv 6kXovs 'EXXTiva; te Kxara'a'v 'Auiav cai icara mv EOp&Xnv,
e0ipow VxdpX?&v Kcaitv6ot; Xpiaoat toi; i&ot;, Polyb. 18.44.2. See Dahlheim,
Struktur87; Will, Histoire 1I 167.
40 Polyb. 18.44.3-4. Free: ieuvO?pa;.
41 Polyb. 18.44.5. On the annalisticadditionsin Livy 33.30.1-11 see esp. Taubler,Imperium
228-39, moderatingcriticismin G. De Sanctis,Storiadei RomaniIVI (2nded., Florence,
1969;orig., Turin, 1923) 93, n. 185;Holleaux,AtudesV 86-103; Dahlheim,Struktur83-
4, n. 3, for a summaryof the opinio communisand bibliography.

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 355

Hellenistic eleutheria concepts and buzz words: the word eleutheria itself, the
phrase "subject to their own laws," and the notion "freedom from garrisoning."
Had the senate been studying Greek political terminology? It is more plausible
to see Flamininus' own hand in the document.42Let us not forget his unnamed
friends and agents who had managed things so well on his behalf when the
Greek ambassadors came to Rome after the conference at Nicaea. Again, after
Cynoscephalae, they succeeded in getting Flamininus' peace with Philip rati-
fied despite opposition. The senate voted for the peace "after a good deal of
discussion."43 Desirous of assuming Flamininus' command, M. Claudius Mar-
cellus44 agitatedagainstthe peace,andthe tribalassemblyconvenedonly after
the tribunes Q. Marcius Ralla and C. Atinius Labeo announced that they would
veto any further action unless the matter was referred to the people.45 "The
people ratified the treaty in accordancewith Flamininus' preference."46Flamini-
nus also retained his province and army (Livy 33.25.1 1).
That Flamininus could push his peace through in the face of such strong
resistance indicates that he was capable of shaping the language and substance
of the senatus consultumas well.47 After his victoryover Philip, he was the
Roman on the spot and the only Roman with direct experience of the situation
in Greece and Macedonia. Flamininus let his friends know what the immediate
circumstances requiredand probably even how to phrase the resolution in terms
likely to make friends among the Greeks; then they saw to it that the senate
passed such a senatus consultum.48

42 Similarly,Eckstein,Senate 296-7, thoughI do not concur with his interpretationof the

conferenceat Tempe;cf. Ferrary,Philhellenisme81-2. J. Rich, review of Gruen,HWin
LCM10.6 (1985) 91-2, emphasizesRomanfamiliaritywith freedompropaganda,but the
evidence he cites (cf. PCPS [ 1984] 135), in partsuspect,is hardlysufficientto supporthis
43 k6yov be xic6vov yEvogIev v, Polyb. 18.42.2.
44 Perhapswith L. FuriusPurpurio,the otherconsul (Livy 33.25.4).
45 Livy 33.25.4-7; cf. Polyb. 18.42.2-5. See Passerini,Athenaeum(1932) 108-9.
46 oij tiv dXX'6 ye 8ogoq Kacrxniv ToV Tirov ipoaipeatv Ki)VpwE &aq8taxiet;,
Polyb. 18.42.4.
47 The actualpeace treaty,ratifiedin Rome, and the senatus consultum,providingspecifi-
cations for carryingout the treaty's stipulationswhile generatingsome propagandafor
Rome, are two distincttransactions(see esp. Larsen,CP [1936] 342-8; cf., i.a., Taubler,
Imperium236-7; Walbank,Philip 177-8, CommentaryII 609-10). Yet since they were
complementarypartsof the same act, executed almost simultaneouslyand representing
the same policy secondedby the same body, the senate,we may assumeFlamininushada
hand in both (Ferrary,Philhellenisme81-2).
48 There is little value in Appian's assertions:"Philipagreed to all these conditions, and
when the senate learnedof the peace, it ratified it, but thinkinglittle of and despising
Flamininus'proposals,it orderedthatall the Greekcities subjectto Philipbe free andthat
Philip withdrawhis garrisonsfromthembeforethe coming IsthmianGames;thathe hand
over to Flamininusall his ships except one ship of six benchesand five deckedships; and

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that he pay the Romans500 silver talentsimmediatelyand send to Rome another500 in

annual installments over the next 10 years; that he surrenderall the prisoners and
desertersin his possession. The senate addedthese conditionsand Philip acceptedthem
all; which fact especially made Flamininus'smallness obvious"(AetagE'vovbeidvra
toi3 4PtXinnoi.otiv ?ev cipivqv i ~oiXi ga6oi3aa neic-pwev, -z;&Bi xpotdast; -Tc;
4Dagtvivo) jatKp1Jvaaa Kai Oa-Aioaaa Xctxke
v to;n6krt;, 6oat 'aav 'EXXrivi6g
imo64tkinnip, ndcaa; ?XciOfpa; eivat Kai T&; opoupz; an' ai),T6v 4UiAXuov e4ayayEiv
inpO T(lv ?nt6v(owv'Ia0giwv, vavS re 60a4 EXE,t, Xopi; iltpov; jud; ical aKazlxv n6vre?
Kata0pa'KTWv, nrapaSoi3vatx(r OXagtvivo,, Kai dpyupiov rdXav-r 'PWaiot; EaeVEYKtIV
irEv6aK6ata ?V aiAiKa n?vrQa6Ooaa
GX SEat U?Ka, iKcatoTu rTO po; .roiq ?5 'Popinv
dvaogpovra, 6mo8oOvat 8e Kai aiXidXoya Kai aik6joka aux6iv, 6oa hXot. ,rci p?v 8
1OUih XpOrGnKEV, Kai Oiktnto; 86?aro inavra , caQtiLdXtata i OiKpokoyia
0katictvivoU KaTaoav1; 'yvpveto, Mac 9.3); contra,Passerini,Athenaeum(1932) 110, n.
4 (he is willing to give Appiancredenceonly here!);Larsen,CPh [1936] 342, thoughI
agree with Larsen'sprincipalargument,thatthe senatusconsultumwas not the treaty;cf.
Will, Histoire II 162, on Appian's testimony,"particulierement importantici," with the
implicationsdrawn, 163-4. Eithera source intermediatebetween Polybius and Appian
has exploitedthe discrepanciesin Polybius'accountbetweenthe termsacceptedby Philip
at Tempe and the articles of the senatus consultumto enhancethe senate's role in the
settlementand demeanFlamininus("Das sind nicht FluchtigkeitenA.s, sonderntenden-
ziose Verdrehungendes Originals,die er aus seinem Gewahrsmanneubernommenhat,"
Schwarz,RE2, col. 220, for discussion,coil. 220-1; Taubler,Imperium236-7, n. 2; K. E.
Petzold,Die Eroffnungdes zweitenromisch-makedonischen Krieges[Berlin, 1940] 113-
4); or Appianhimself is interpretingthe discrepancyto Flamininus'detriment(P. Meloni,
It valore storico e lefonti del libro macedonicodi Appiano[Cagliari,1955] 93-5). The
discrepancy,of course, is no discrepancyat all (Briscoe, Latomus[1972] 44-5) for, as
stated,the senatusconsultummerelyregulatedtime tables,amountsandotherdetailsand
was not a rehashof this preliminaryagreement.Nor was the preliminaryagreementthe
peace treaty.The senate was to iron out "the remainingissues" (irepi Se rdivkoturdv,
Polyb. 18.38.2); not "furtherdetails," pace Larsen, CPh [1936] 146; nor "die nach
AbschluBdes Friedensvom Senat zu erwartendepolitische Losung fur Griechenland"
[my emphasis],B. Schleussner,Die Legatender romischenRepublik[Munich,1978] 41,
n. 100), which it doubtless did in the treaty itself. Despite attemptsto reconstructthe
treaty,we do not have any clear statementof its terms,any more thanwe have an exact
reproductionof the senatus consultum,but only its "chief points" (nr6avvexovra roi3
86yia,ro;, Polyb. 18.44.2; cf. Holleaux, Etudes IV 320; Walbank,Philip V 179-80,
Commentary11609). Restrictionson his fleet and an indemnitybeyond the initial 200
talents (not the war indemnity,but "une caution,"Will, Histoire II 162; cf. Briscoe,
Latomus[1972] 44-5, n. 3) paidto Flamininuswereneitherunexpectednorharsh(contra,
LarsenCP [1936] 346-7), and we can assumeappropriatestipulationsin the treatyitself
- the senatusconsultumin factcommunicatesnumbersanddeadlinesin bothcases. Philip
was defeated and preparedto accede to any demands,providedhe could maintainhis
kingdom (on his situation, Walbank Philip 172-6). Hence he yielded to the allies'
demandsand gave the senatecarte blancheto settle all else. So he instructedhis envoys.
Had the terms set by the senate seemed tantamountto his deposition, he could have
simply repudiatedthem later.Withthe Aetoliansandpossiblyothers(K. Sacks, "Polybi-
us' Other View of Aetolia," JHS 95 [1975] 103) pressing for his eliminationand his
situationdesperate,he was unlikelyto refuseany reasonabledemand.

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 357

Now at last the Romans were forced to confront the problem of what to do
with Philip's former possessions.49 They intended the initial proclamation to
point in a suitable direction but not rashly to attempt too much. Thus the
ultimate fate of many a Greek state and city was left unclear.50Understandably,
the Aetolians could not let this opportunity pass. They noted that certain cities
were not really being set free but were being handed over to the Romans (Polyb.
18.45.1-6) - "it was a change of master, not the liberation of Greece which was
occurring."51Eleutheria was becoming burdensome to Flamininus.52But rather
than slough off the slogan or retrench, he resolved to follow through in an
ambitious liberation of Greece and make liars of the Aetolians. The commis-
sioners opposed him, but he won certain concessions.53
49 Will, Histoire II 165-6.
50 Eckstein, Senate 295-6.
51 yivvrca ge0dpgoat; 8?0o?(v, oVk OXfpoxai TrCv'EAXivov, Polyb. 18.45.6.
52 "T. QuinctiusFlamininusbegriffals ersterRomerdie verandertepolitischeLage, die mit
der Propagierungder griechischen Freiheitsformeldurch Rom entstanden war: Den
Romern war es nicht mehr ohne weiteres m6glich, von den Rechten, die sich aus der
InbesitznahmegriechischerStadte ergaben, nach eigenem ErmessenGebrauchzu ma-
chen. Nachdemsie grundsatzlichallen Griechendie altenFreiheitsrechtezuerkanntbzw.
diesen Eindruckerweckthatten,konntensie von den Griechenimmerdannuntermorali-
schen Druckgesetzt werden,wennsie aus politischenundstrategischenErwagungenvon
diesem Prinzip abwichen," R. Bernhardt,Imperiumund Eleutheria (diss. Hamburg,
1971) 38.
53 TheEuboeancitiesOreusandEretriaprovidea goodexample.Thetencommissionerswanted
to give OreusandEretriaon Euboeato thePergamenekingEumenes(Polyb. 18.47.10;Livy
33.34.10). The cities had been capturedwith Pergamenehelp (Oreus:Livy 31.45. Eretria:
Livy 32.16) andEumeneshadapparentlyrequestedthem.But Flamininusobjected.He was
concernedto preservea crucialaspectof eleutheria,freedomfromoccupationby foreign
kings (J. A. 0. Larsen,"RepresentationandDemocracyin HellenisticFederalism,"CPh40
[1945] 88-91; H. E. Stier, Roms Aufstieg zur Weltmachtund die griechische Welt [Cologne/
Opladen,1957] 145).Thereplacement of one kingwithanother- evena putativegood king-
would undermineFlamininus'eleutheriapropaganda.For Flamininus,the situationwas
particularlydelicatesince the AetolianswerecarefullyandaggressivelymonitoringRoman
fulfillmentof Flamininus'promises.As notedabove,the senatusconsultumbroughtby the
tencommissionersannouncingthe freedomof theGreekshaddoneso in a mannerthatcould
arousesuspicion.The AetoliansobservedthattheRomansseemedto be makinga distinction
betweencities to be set free, all in Asia, andcities to be handedover to the Romans,these
being in Europe.The Europeancities explicitlynamedwerefive in number,Chalcis,Deme-
triasandCorinth,thatis, thethreefetters,andOreusandEretria(Polyb.18.45.5)."Fromthese
facts,"theyclaimed,"itwas easy forall to see thattheRomansweretakingoverthe fettersof
GreecefromPhilipandthatit wasa changeof master,notthe liberationof theGreeks,which
wasoccurring"(Polyb.18.45.6).Accordingto Polybius,"theslanderouschargegrewandwas
believed by some"(18.45.8). Able to wrestbut a smallconcessionon the fettersfromthe
commissionersat this point(theliberationof CorinthwithoutAcrocorinth,Polyb. 18.45.12),
at leastFlamininuscouldpresenttheliberationof OreusandEretriafromroyal(of anystripe)
and Romanoccupationas a tokenof the sincerityof Rome's intentionto liberateGreece.
OreusandEretriathusbecamemembersof a revivedEuboeanLeague.

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The Isthmian proclamation, containing most of the chief elements of eleu-

theria propagandaand declaring the Romans' intention not to take Macedonia's
place as overlord of Greece, was the culmination of Flamininus' public rela-
tions campaign. In a sense, it was the final examination in his extensive course
in Greek political propaganda.Ironically, his principal teacher, the inspiration
for the language of the decree, was Philip.54
The proclamation was Flamininus' work. He was the only Roman bothered
by the contrast between its implications and the reality of 196, for only he
understood what the Greeks expected of such a declaration, and he himself as
architect and declarer was personally responsible for meeting these expecta-
tions. The extravagant language used in the proclamation at the Isthmian
Games would also serve as leverage against reluctant commissioners for the
execution of Flamininus' plans for Greece. Rome, through Flamininus, had
stated her intent.

6. Philip and Flamininus

It has been observed that the language of the Isthmian declaration was inspired
by standardHellenistic eleutheria propaganda55 and that the closest parallel to
the Isthmian declaration (in time and phraseology) is the decree of the Symma-
chy in 220 immediately before the Social War.56 J.-L. Ferrary has in fact
suggested that the Symmachy's decree is the model for Flamininus' Isthmian
declaration.57I agree, in part, though I think we need look more generally to
Philip's propagandaratherthan to just that one decree.
It is in Philip's propaganda that we find precisely the four principal ele-
ments of Flamininus' declaration, that is, liberty, freedom from garrisoning,
freedom from tributeand autonomy/enjoymentof one's own laws.58The decree
of the Symmachy in 220, issued underPhilip's direction, promised that commu-
nities under Aetolian control were to return"to their ancestral form of govern-
ment" (si;S t iacaptc roa XAvreixxaa), be "ungarrisoned,free from tribute, free"
(d4poupiPovu; &Oopokoyiyrou;?XcuOtpou; `vta;), and "in the enjoyment of
their ancestral constitution" (tokXcEi'ats;icat vo'got; XpcogEvou; 0to; iarpiot;,
Polyb. 4.25.7). In 218 Philip tried to win Elean support in the Social War by
promising that they would be "free, ungarrisoned,free from tribute and in the

54 See next section.

55 Gruen,HW 145-S I.
56 Most recently,Ferrary,Philhellenisme83-4.
57 Philhellnisme 83-8.
58 Perhaps,in turn,underAratus'influence;for Aratus'tutelageof Philip,Plut.Arat.46-52;
see F. W. Walbank,Aratusof Sicyon(Cambridge1933) 114-57 (passim),Philip,passim
(see index under'Aratusof Sicyon').

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 359

enjoyment of their ancestral form of government" (EiXeuEOpou; dopoupi'yTou;

aopoXo7',TovUxp?O*EvoU; TOi;ibiot; noXvtresiacn,Polyb.4.84.5). In 203 at
their request,Philippromisedthe Thasiansthatthey would be "ungarrisoned,
free from tribute,in the enjoymentof their own laws" (&OpoupiTovq, 64o-
poXoYiATOxv, avelLta?aOie1)T5xolx,
vogot; XpiiaOat tol; i8iot;) if they surren-
dered to him.59Clearlythese formulationsclosely, and in two cases exactly,
parallelthatof the Isthmiandeclaration.The only otherextantexampleof the
completefourpartformulawhichI couldfindis a treatybetweenPtolemyI and
the laseans datedapproximatelya centuryearlier,to between309 and 306,60
"being free and autonomousand ungarrisonedand not subject to tribute"
([?svOepoV5 ov]ta; i antov6goiom icaztdtpoupf'Tou; 1cat 6c4opo/Xoy-
Contrastwith Philip's rhetoricwhat we can cull from our sources of
AntiochusIII's eleutheriapropaganda.He promisedAlabandademocracyand
peace62and"toprotectthedemocracyandautonomy"([---ti1v/ &ipioKp]a[t]iav
ca; wavT]ovopiav&tauXdaaoetv)of the demosof Iasos.63A stele fromlasos
containsa letterof LaodiceIII, claimingthat"[sc. my brother,AntiochusIII]
restoredyourcity whenit hadmetwithunforeseendisastersandgave you back
your freedomand laws" (rrv u'gestpavno'/Xtvarugrt&aortvneptnewoiaav
6ipoa8oKVcTot; dva cria6gevo; TfivTe OxeuOpiav lpitv/ a6iui8eicev 1cat
Toi; vo6ou;).64A decreeof lasos honorsAntiochusIII "since he has caused
some [Greeks]to be free ratherthanslaves... he rescuedour city which was
previously enslaved and set it free" ([Xt]vac; a8vTt 8oi5Xwv ?XeVuO9pouq
1E7oU16oTo ia
nenoTlllCOO t6 /I [Ka]O'
cat To la0 6XovT
VX0 UM? t p;eey-
aia[v] / [...]a0zat dtvOp6nwv,tv 8? 'er?xpav nLoXvrp6Trep6[v]/ [TX?]y
Soueja; p'ua1ievo; ?1toiioev Veu0epa[v---]).65 A decree of Teos claims
that"hehimself [sc. Antiochus]set ourcity andland [free],as sacred,inviola-
ble and free fromtribute"(aci5os;[sc. 'Avx'ioxo;]/ dvice r[v] n6dtv Ka"-ry

59 Polyb. 15.24.1-2. Note the absenceof eleutheria,perhapstoo absurdto includeunderthe

circumstances.Still, the threedetailedelementsare present.
60 Carratelli,Annuario(1967-8) 440-4.
61 Text given here from Y. Garlan,"Allianceentre les lasiens et Ptoldmneler," ZPE 18
(1975) 196. 11.30-1; cf. 11.50-1, iXe-60epo; Cov)cai alk6vogo; icai &Opoi5pTJroq Qat
dOopo26yTiro;, and 11.54-5.
62 OGIS234, 11.19ff.
63 OGIS237, 11.1-2.
64 Carratelli,Annuario(1967-8) 445, no. 21, I. 6-9; for the attributionto LaodiceIII and a
date after 197, see J. & L. Robert, BE 84 (1971) 502-9, no. 621, tellingly against
Carratelli,Annuario(1967-8) 449-52, who attributesthe letterto LaodiceII.
65 Text given here from Y. Garlan,"Ddcretd'Iasos en l'honneurd'AntiochosIII,"ZPE 13
(1974) 197-8,11.45-8; cf. Carratelli,Annuario(1967-8) 447, no. 21, 11.45-8; on the date
after 197, J. & L. Robert,BE 84 (1971) 502-9, no. 621.

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360 J. WALSH

Xcbpav i1xiov tFpav icat dauXov ica' a4opoX6y/qtov);66M. Valerius Messala

tiy Xcipav iEpav
imitated this formula in his letter to the Teans, Tiqvio'ktv icacn
icaOco; icat vv3v E'unv icat adcXov icat d4opo/X6yiTov adicoToi 8flgou toi
'PTo)aiov.67When the Smyrnaeans were "revolting"68 in 196, Antiochus' agents
informed them that their wishes would be granted "but only when it was
sufficiently clear to the Smyrnaeans and everyone else that they held a liberty
granted by the king" (sed cum satis et ipsis et omnibus aliis appareret, ab rege
impetratam eos libertatem...habere, Livy 33.38.6). When L. Comelius in 196
demanded that Antiochus keep his hands off autonomous cities, Antiochus
responded that "it was not right that the autonomous cities of Asia receive their
liberty through the Cintvayi of the Romans, but through his own kindness" (ta';
8' awzovo6gou; tcov iKata Tilv 'Aatav nOXewvoV 8uta' ri; 'PNoaiwv Eutvayfq
&OV eivat wyXavtv 61; ?XVuOepia;,a&Xa'&ta'rS; a`toi xaptro;, Polyb.
18.51). According to Polybius, Antiochus undertook "the liberation of the
Greeks, as he himself had it proclaimed" (viv X? XXv 'EXXfvwvCXeuOtpwatv
d; ai-ro6;?m.yE'yXXero, 20.8.1). In other sources, Antiochus simply mentions
Antiochus' oath in a treaty with Lysimachia comes remarkablyclose to the
Isthmian formulation: "I will protect the city in autonomy and in democracy ...
ungarrisoned and free from tribute"([8t]a4uXadco-rovno6Xt / [?v ao5trovopiat
Kat] ?v 6r.iooKpatiat / [ ]oav icait dpou5pqrov / [Kcat d4opoX6y]Thov).70
Unfortunately, much of the text is restoration, and some would argue that the
inscription dates ratherto the reign of Antiochus 12' If, however, Ta9liklioglu/

66 P. Herrmann,"Antiochusder Grosse und Teos,"Anatolia9 (1965) p. 34, 11.17-9; cf. p.

35, 11.47-9, p. 38, 11.50-3, also includesfreedomfromimpositionsby Attalus,p. 34, 11.
19-20, p. 35, 11.32-4, datepost 204, Herrmann,Anatolia(1965) 93-100.
67 Syll.3 601, 11.19-21; see R. Sherk,RomanDocumentsfrom the GreekEast (Baltimore,
1969) 214-6, for commentaryand bibliography.
68 See Briscoe, 31-33 321.
69 Livy 35.32.10-1, 44.6, 48.8, 36.9.4. On Antiochus'eleutheriapolicy, see H. H. Schmitt,
Untersuchungenzur GeschichteAntiochosdes Grofienundseiner Zeit (HistoriaEinzel-
schriften,Heft 6, 1964) 96-9.
70 Ta1liklioglulFrisch,ZPE (1975) 101, 11.12-5.
71 J.-L. Ferrary-P.Gauthier,"Le Trait6entre le roi Antiochoset Lysimacheia,"JS (1981)
327-45, have mounteda formidableattackon the standarddating.FrancisPiejko, "The
TreatybetweenAntiochusIIIandLysimachia,"Historia37 (1988) 161-5, has vigorously
defendedthe standarddating.The matterseems to me uncertain,andI am unablehere to
discuss this complex issue in detail. I would only note that Piejko has, I think, tellingly
underminedone of Ferrary-Gauthier's most importantarguments:they aver that An-
tiochus III could not have made promisesof eleutheria,freedomfrom garrisoning,etc.,
since Antiochus' control and garrisoningof the city subsequentto its rebuildingare
clearly inconsistentwith the pledges of the inscription(330-5). The inconsistency,Piejko
observes, may howeverbe thatbetweenroyal publicrelationsand actualbehavior(163-
4, including examples;cf. A. H. M. Jones, The GreekCity [Oxford 1940] 101-12, and

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 361

Frisch's restorations are correct, and it was Antiochus III who took the oath, we
have at least three of four elements of the Isthmian declaration, and possibly all
four.72Yet Flamininus' propagandamay have been responsible for this corre-
spondence. After the Isthmian declaration, the ten commissioners split up and
set off in small groups on various missions. Three of them, P. Lentulus, L.
Terentius and P. Villius were to consult with Antiochus about his relations with
Ptolemy and other matters. The timing of the inscription is telling. Antiochus
was still busy rebuilding Lysimachia when he received the commissioners and
another Roman ambassador, L. Cornelius, there in 196.73Among other things,
L. Cornelius advised the king to leave the autonomous cities alone (Polyb.
18.50.7). Antiochus replied that he, not the Romans, should endow the cities of
Asia with freedom. The treaty with Lysimachia must have been issued about
this time or, more probably, a little later when the physical and political
foundations of the reborn city had been laid. The Roman ambassadors seemed
prepared to bully Antiochus with rhetoric concerning the freedom of Asia.
Antiochus was aware of the sensational proclamation at the Isthmian Games
and, we can be sure, had been informed of the precise phraseology. What had
proved to be a smashing public relations success for Rome could be exploited
by the king as well, and thus Antiochus could use in this treaty the same
eleutheria formula which Flamininus had employed. Besides, what better way
to tell the Romans to keep out of Asia than by using their own propaganda?74
Other Hellenistic monarchs would award or acknowledge some of the four
elements of eleutheria discussed here, but not the entire package (sometimes
democracy is added). For example, it is recorded that Seleucus II awarded
liberty (Oxu0c'pav) and freedom from tribute (ado[po]/IXyirrov) to the Smyr-
naeans,75that he "confirmed the autonomy and democracy of the people [sc. of

Gruen,HW 133-42, for discussion and myriadexamplesof Hellenistic cynicism in the

application of eleutheria propaganda).For the rest of this paper I assume that the
Antiochus of the inscriptionis AntiochusIII. In fact, the following analysis may help
explain Antiochus'motives in issuing this hypocritaldocument.
72 Ta?liklioglu/Frisch,ZPE (1975) 105, on [ h'av of 1. 14, "Perhaps[exCuftOpav?"
73 Polyb. 18.50-1; Livy 33.38.10-40.6; for the context- Livy describesAntiochus'efforts
to rebuild the city, then recordsthe arrivalof the senators,sub hoc tempore(33.39.1).
Note the tense in Polybius' version of Antiochus' reply to the Romans' charges, "[He
claimed that]by bringingthe Lysimacheanshome and resettlingthem he was doing the
Romansno harm"(AvalIaXEQX 5E ... Ova)K
(tKcetv PPuaiatomKcaaTycOv KaLiauvotCi4ov,
Polyb. 18.51.7).
74 Of course, the rhetoricalso serveda more local purpose,to make the rebornLysimachia
moreattractiveto immigrants.WhetherLysimachiawould ultimatelybe free as promised
was largelyirrelevantto Antiochus'repopulationplans,as it was to his immediatepublic
relationsvictoryover the Romanlegates.
75 OGIS 228, 11.7-9, dated 246 or 242, D. Magie, RomanRule in Asia Minor (Princeton,
1950)11934-5, n. 29.

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Smyrnal" (4eppatwio v [sc. YCXsiico;I tCdt Uwto 'v a-/tovogiav icai

blioKpc'av),76 and that "autonomyand democracyand otherthings [were]
grantedto the Smymaeansby KingSeleucus"(revX? w5Tovoj?iav Kca8tgoicpa-
tiav Kai r&XXa taz / Fwticexopigva Egupvaiot; vnr6toi Paane ;xXe"-
icoU,11.65-6). AntiochusI7 or AntiochusII78acknowledgedErythrae'sauton-
omy andfreedomfromtribute,79 andat a muchearlierdate,butworthyof note,
AntigonosI Monophthalmosdeclared"thatall the Greekswere free, ungarri-
soned and autonomous"(elvat 6? iccaitoi "EXXiiva;iiavta; ?X?VeOpoU;,
d4poupifjrol;, avrovogou;).80
It makes perfect sense that Flamininuswould have learnedsome of the
applicationof eleutheriapropagandafrom Philip. Philip was the Hellenistic
monarchwith whomFlamininuswas mostfamiliar.It is his propaganda which
Flamininuswould have heard, heard about and read most often. Flamininus'
allies must have had their sharein his educationas well, and it is doubtless
throughthemthatthe consuldiscoveredthe profoundpowerwhichthe concept
of freedom had over the Greeks. But only Philip had been exploiting this
concepton a grandscale, fromthe lofty positionof one of the greatmonarchs,a
positionwhichFlamininushad,in a sense, inherited.

7. Epilogue

WhyexactlyFlamininusdecidedupona propaganda andpolicyof liberationis,

unfortunately,unknownto us. He mayhaveviewedeleutheriaas a convenient
sloganto exploit.He mayhaveconsideredthefreedomof theGreeksthelogical
and most practicalsolution for the problemof the disposition of a post-
MacedonianGreece.If so, theearlyestablishmentof liberationpropaganda and
policy would facilitatetheirlaterimplementationwhile winningallies to the
Romancause.Orhe mayhavebeengenuinelysympatheticto thepassionof his
Greekallies for eleutheria.We shouldrememberthatFlamininuswas still a
very young man when he manufacturedthis Graeco-Romancrusadefor the
liberationof Greece. For all their careerism,even the most grizzledRoman

76 OGIS 229, 11.10-11, dated c. 243?, H. H. Schmitt,Die Vertrdgeder griechisch-rdmi-

schen Weltvon 338 bis 200 v. Chr. (Munich,1969) 172-3, with bibliography.
77 OGIS223, p. 351, n. 1; cf. C. Habicht,GottmenschentumundgriechischeStddte(Munich
1972) 95-9.
78 C. B. Welles, Royal Correspondencein the HellenisticPeriod (New Haven, 1934) 81-2;
cf. W. Orth,KeniglicherMachtanspruchundsttldtischeFreiheit(Munich, 1977) 78-97,
on the dating.
79 OGIS223, 11.21-8.
80 Diod. Sic. 19.61.3; cf. esp. Plut. Dem. 8; on Antigonus' and Demetrius' policy, see
especially A. Heuss, Stadtund Herrscherdes Hellenismus(Leipzig 1937) 217-8.

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Flamininusand the Propagandaof Liberation 363

aristocratswereparticularlysensitiveto publicopinion,or rather,it was public

opinion,gloria, which authenticateda Roman'ssuccess. Romanopinionmat-
teredmost, of course,but for a young,relativelyinexperiencedmanof excep-
tional ambition like Flamininusthe opinion of the importantGreeks who
surroundedhim counted;the adulationof the massof the Greekshadits allure.
This is notto suggestthathe wouldhavehesitatedto sacrificethe aspirationsof
his allies if his careerdemanded.But the courseof events andhis own talents
made such a choice unnecessary.The sage managementPolybiusso admired
enabledFlamininusto become Rome's avengerof the perfidiousPhilip,con-
quererof fabledMacedonia,liberatorof grateful,adoringGreeks,andbenefi-
cent arbiterof Greece'saffairs- whileacquittinghimselfnoblyin all fourroles.
The result?Flamininuscelebrateda sensationaltriumphin Rome,becameone
of the mostpowerfulRomansof his era,was hailedandworshippedas liberator
of Greece, and enjoyed the exercise of power in Greece unparalleledsince
Alexanderthe Great.
At first,Flamininusmayhaveonly consideredthe immediateadvantagesof
his freedompropaganda,but laterhe vigorouslyadvocatedthe policy of free-
dom beforethe ten commissioners.Perhapshe wantedto maintainhis prestige
amongthe Greeks,prestigewhichdependedon the fulfillmentof his promises
as muchas on his militaryvictory.Perhapshe thoughtliberationthe best policy
for leaving Greece peaceful and well-disposedtowardsRome. Perhapshe
simply felt committedto the policy because it was his policy. Whateverhis
motives,the RomanswithdrewfromGreece,andcenturieslaterPlutarchcould
extol his liberationof Greecewithouta traceof irony.Andalthoughthe policy
of freedomfor the Greeksdid not survivethe influenceof its discoverer,the
pronouncementsof subsequentRoman commandersand legates in Greece
show thatthe propagandacertainlydid.

LoyolaCollege in Maryland,Baltimore JosephJ. Walsh

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