EVIDENCE – CASES ON SPECIAL LAWS
Jann Claudine M. Amago 3 – A
RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE
1. People of the Philippines vs. Rufino Umanito
Facts:
The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC of Bauang, La Union,
Branch 67 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. Umanito
was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to
indemnify the private complainant in the sum of ₱50,000.00. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals offered the judgment of the trial court. Umanito
appealed the decision of the appellate court to this court.
In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged "many
incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the defense."2At the same
time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted
in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as
"BBB." In view of that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito,
the Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the father of
BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant is the father of BBB
Ruling: YES.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
appellant is the father of AAA's child. If he is not, his acquittal may be
ordained. The parties all agreed to undergo DNA sampling. In order to
protect the integrity of the biological samples, the [NBI] is enjoined to
strictly follow the measures laid down by the Honorable Supreme Court
in the instant case to wit:
1. the court a quo must ensure that the proper chain of custody
in the handling of the samples submitted by the parties is
adequately borne in the records, i.e.;
2. that the samples are collected by a neutral third party;
3. that the tested parties are appropriately identified at their
sample collection appointments;
4. that the samples are protected with tamper tape at the
collection site;
5. that all persons in possession thereof at each stage of testing
thoroughly inspected the samples for tampering and explained
his role in the custody of the samples and the acts he
performed in relation thereto.
6. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the
parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose
to the parties in advance the DNA test results.
7. The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of
the DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained
from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the
evidence until such time as the accused has been acquitted or
served his sentence
DNA samples were taken from the parties. The RTC ordered NBI to
submit the results within 30 days from extraction of biological samples. At
the hearing, Provincial Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Opiana, presented
Mary Ann T. Aranas, a Forensic Chemist of the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified on the examination she conducted, outlining
the procedure she adopted and the result thereofWith the procedure
adopted by the Forensic Chemist of the NBI, who is an expert and whose
integrity and dedication to her work is beyond reproach the manner how
the biological samples were collected, how they were handled and the
chain of custody thereof were properly established the court is convinced
that there is no possibility of contamination of the DNA samples taken
from the parties.
The accused did not object to the admission of Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of their sub-markings. He did not also present evidence to
controvert the results of the DNA analysis.
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
There is a COMPLETE MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the
alleles of Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB].
REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a
99.9999% Probability of Paternity that
Rufino Umanito y Millares is the biological
Father of [BBB]"
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence The disputable
presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not
contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the
accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing
nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
Umanito’s defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion
that while he had courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead to a
general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual relations with
the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and
that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth
to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped by
Umanito.
2. Rosendo Herrera vs. Rosendo Alba
Facts:
On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba
(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with
counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents
mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent
presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that
it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA
paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
The RTC granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity testing.
The petitioner opposed claiming that it was irrelevant, coercive and
violates his right against self-incrimination, thus, unconstitutional. The CA
affirmed the trial court’s order.
Issue: Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to
determine filiation
1
Ruling: PETITION HAS NO MERIT.
DNA Analysis as evidence
Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. xxx For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when completely obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in [the] future it would be useful to all concerned
in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
Admissibility of DNA analysis
In the case of Vallejo discussed the probative value, not
admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question
on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence. The Court moved
from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as
evidence to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA
analysis.
Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence
Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts
should be cautious in giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. In
assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should
consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of
these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.
Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to ascertain whether he has the
DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the
mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as
the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.
It is not enough to state that the childs DNA profile matches that of the
putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child
and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish
paternity.
For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an
American jurisdiction, trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a
minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (W) prior to a paternity
inclusion. W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a
putative father compared to the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals. An appropriate reference population database,
such as the Philippine population database, is required to compute for W.
Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions, W will never equal
to 100%. However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when the
putative father, mother and child are subjected to DNA analysis compared
to those conducted between the putative father and child alone. DNA
analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the
results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative
evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of
paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or
from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of
respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that
is communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the
use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial
evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his
body when it may be material. The gist of the privilege is the restriction
on testimonial compulsion.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative
parent to claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this
investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and
technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits
established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
3. Jesse U. Lucas vs. Jesus S. Lucas
Facts:
On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to
Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties
to DNA Testing) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
72, Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated that, sometime in 1967, his
mother, Elsie Uy (Elsie), migrated to Manila from Davao. On one occasion,
Elsie got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belens workplace,
and an intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually
got pregnant and e gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. Elsie later on
told petitioner that his father is respondent. Respondent allegedly
extended financial support to Elsie and petitioner for a period of about
two years. When the relationship of Elsie and respondent ended, Elsie
refused to accept respondents offer of support and decided to raise
petitioner on her own. While petitioner was growing up, Elsie made
several attempts to introduce petitioner to respondent, but all attempts
were in vain.
Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition.
Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His
counsel therefore went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained
a copy of the petition.
RTC found the petition sufficient in form and substance. The
respondent then filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the case. Petitioner appealed and the court decided in his favor. On
appeal, the CA ruled that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the respondent. The CA remarked that petitioner filed the petition to
establish illegitimate filiation, specifically seeking a DNA testing order to
abbreviate the proceedings. It noted that petitioner failed to show that
the four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
had been met. The CA further held that a DNA testing should not be
allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case.
Issue: Whether prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a
DNA testing order
2

Ruling: PETITION MERITORIOUS.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to
face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party
is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the
parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of
evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case
the first procedural aspect in a paternity case is therefore misplaced.
A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere
allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the
lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is
premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing
order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by
the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and
the Bar for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial
system. It provides the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements
for reliability and validity, the possible sources of error, the available
objections to the admission of DNA test results as evidence as well as the
probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks to ensure that the evidence
gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized effectively
and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing,
without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including
law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be
issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established. In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing
order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search,
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a
finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of
a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions
as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause.
Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing
must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood
testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary
matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing,
the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing
The condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction
to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during
the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must
present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance
of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the
DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish
paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court
may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
4. Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines; People of the
Philippines vs. Hubert Webb et. al
Facts:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela
and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four
years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed
that she had witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged
police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had
been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to
criminals. Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro
had become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution to its
success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct
and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-
examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this
case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to
submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s
cadaver, which specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of
the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule
on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to
a correct decision in the case. Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI
informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen, the
same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows,
however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case. This outcome prompted
accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the
government’s failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.
Issue: Whether Webb should be acquitted due to loss of DNA Evidence
Ruling: Not on the said ground.
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to
outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process
given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by
negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen taken from
Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was
raped and, consistent with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is
3
true that Alfaro identified Webb in her testimony as Carmela’s rapist and
killer but serious questions had been raised about her credibility. At the
very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the other
hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It
cannot be coached or allured by a promise of reward or financial
support. No two persons have the same DNA fingerprint, with the
exception of identical twins.,If on examination, the DNA of the subject
specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It is
that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that
Alfaro committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the
State to produce the semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the
ruling in Brady v. Maryland that he cites has long be overtaken by the
decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, where the U.S. Supreme Court held
that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen
specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is
able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here,
the State presented a medical expert who testified on the existence of the
specimen and Webb in fact sought to have the same subjected to DNA
test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule
governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet have
the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had
as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence. Consequently, the idea of
keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the
motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the
meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webbs application
for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on
at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the
other accused. They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but
merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision
in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to
have the DNA test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even
when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed the rules allowing
such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test
done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would
be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
RULE ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE
1. People of the Philippines vs. Noel Enojas, et.al
Facts:
PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of
Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they spotted a suspiciously
parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his
documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of
documents shown them, they invited him in their mobile car to the police
station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind.
Upon reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he approached the
store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a
shootout ensued. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other
who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing
his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with two more
armed robbers who managed to escape. He then went back to the patrol
car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that Enojas was involved in
the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a
mobile phone apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers
monitored the incoming messages and posed as Enojas. The accused
appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation and were
convicted of murder by RTC Las Pinas.
Issue: Whether or not the text messages are admissible
Ruling: YES.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted
them in conformity with the Court’s earlier Resolution applying the Rules
on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be
proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused
Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to
identify and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from
and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal
knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
*All of the accused were convicted based on circumstantial evidence. The
totality of all circumstances were sufficient to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. NPC vs.Hon. Ramon Codilla
Facts:
On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and
owned by the herein private respondent Bangpai shipping company under
its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power barge
of the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for
damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala of the herein public respondent
judge. During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner presented as
pieces of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the
court. Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence was filed before the
court to which the court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken
out of the records but has to be attached to the documents for proper
disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the latter. The
petitioner aver that such documents be admitted for the basic reason that
such is within the purview of the electronic evidence.
Issue: Whether or not photocopies are electronic evidence
Ruling: NO.
Eelectronic document refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of
written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically.5 It includes digitally
signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means
which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic
document.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein,
such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the
documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of
the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered
as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
4
processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that
since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process,
then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules
on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered
photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is
consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional
equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Furthermore, no error can be ascribed to the court a quo in
denying admission and excluding from the records petitioner’s Exhibits
The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate
the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being
incompetent pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of
discovery, and modern technique of electronic copying, the best evidence
rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and
the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the
originals.8 But the modern justification for the rule has expanded from
the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central
position in the law.9The importance of the precise terms of writings in the
world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable
evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete
duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.
R.A. NO. 4200 – ANTIWIRETAPPING LAW
1. Francisco Chavez vs. Raul Gonzales
Facts:
Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired
the Garci Tapes where the parties to the conversation discussed "rigging"
the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6 June
2005, Presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye (Bunye) held a press
conference in Malacañang Palace, where he played before the
presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations
between a woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both
recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the
second compact disc had been "spliced" to make it appear that President
Arroyo was talking to Garcillano. On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press
release warning radio and television stations that airing the Garci Tapes is
a "cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses
or authorizations" issued to them.5 On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met
with officers of the broadcasters group, Kapisanan ng mga Broadcasters
sa Pilipinas (KBP), to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a
joint press statement expressing commitment to press freedom
Issue: WON the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11 June
2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of
expression
Ruling:
Having settled the applicable standard to content-based
restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at
bar. To recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the
presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This
rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one
at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c)
the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the
quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at
bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not
abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and
present danger test. It appears that the great evil which government
wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of
the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar, however, are
confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying
the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the
Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape
recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also
suspect. The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one
supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered
version. Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the whos and the
hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the
tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of
its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the
invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the
tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-
wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even
if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but
does not endanger national security. There are laws of great significance
but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support
suppression of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just
a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the
press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and
public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded
by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting
freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not
be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all
means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the
State for they breed their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need
to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of
free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can
lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no
showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly
endangers the national security of the State.
This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We
slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary
of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In
resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press
statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up
with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements
were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory
body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf
of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already
converted to a formal order or official circular.Otherwise, the non
5
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the
easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press
statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute
impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and
press.
There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained
acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC,
a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the
radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice,
the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to
prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the
warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent
Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left
alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This
silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too
deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.
2. Gaanan vs. IAC
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon
were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms
for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone
call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who
is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the
direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went
on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to
secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone
extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to
deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his
wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico
who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation
Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself
should receive the money. When he received the money at the Igloo
Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating
that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the
case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant.
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of
violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner
to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition
for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not a telephone extension is covered by RA 4200
Ruling: NO.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between
complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the
sense that the words uttered were made between one person and
another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. The
main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the
meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement."
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a
device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the
spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension
in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there
for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order
to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to
discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities
or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to
gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the
use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.
An extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
3. Ramirez vs. CA
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez
in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and
other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion.
The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of
petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly
taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic
Act 4200. The court declared that the allegations constituted an offense
under RA 4200.
Issue: Whether the petitioner violated RA 4200
Ruling: YES.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute. Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means
of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
6
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's private communications. Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
is authenticated by the testimony of a witness (1) that he personally
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be he recorded; and (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the such are claimed to belong. In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he
acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere the one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the
authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there
an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2)
communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private that some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
"communication" to a point of absurdity.
5.
4. Navarro vs. CA
Facts:
Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique Lingan, in
Lucena City wnet to the police station to report alledged indecent show
in one of the night establishment shows in the City. At the station, a
heated confrontation followed between victim Lingan and accused
policeman Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters,
lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the accused's gun
below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow, resulted the victim to fell
and died under treatment. The exchange of words was recorded on tape,
specifically the frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation
that it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial, Jalbuena,
the other media man testified. Presented in evidence to confirm his
testimony was a voice recording he had made of the heated discussion at
the police station between the accused police officer Navarro and the
deceased, Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.

Issue: Whether or not the tape recording is admissible

Ruling: YES. APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT.

Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of
Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness, having a grudge
against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the
conviction of the accused is not, for this reason alone, unreliable. Trial
courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions,
gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent
to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence. In
the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court
erred in according weight to the testimony of Jalbuena.
Indeed, Jalbuenas testimony is confirmed by the voice recording he had
made. It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No.
4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The
law provides:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
....
SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.