ART.
225
[G.R. No. 120567. March 20, 1998]
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs., NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, FERDINAND PINEDA and
GODOFREDO CABLING, respondents.
Facts: Private respondents are flight stewards of the petitioner. Both
were dismissed from the service for their alleged involvement in the
currency smuggling in Hong Kong. Aggrieved by said dismissal, private
respondents filed with the NLRC a petition for injunction. The NLRC
issued a temporary mandatory injunction enjoining petitioner to cease
and desist from enforcing its Memorandum of dismissal.
In support of the issuance of the writ of temporary injunction, the
NLRC adopted the view that: (1) private respondents cannot be validly
dismissed on the strength of petitioner's Code of Discipline which was
declared illegal by this Court for the reason that it was formulated by the
petitioner without the participation of its employees (2) the whimsical,
baseless and premature dismissals of private respondents which
"caused them grave and irreparable injury" is enjoinable as private
respondents are left "with no speedy and adequate remedy at law'
except the issuance of a temporary mandatory injunction; (3) the NLRC
is empowered not only to restrain any actual or threatened commission
of any or all prohibited or unlawful acts but also to require the
performance of a particular act in any labor dispute, which, if not
restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
damage to any party; and (4) the temporary mandatory power of the
NLRC was recognized by this Court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that the NLRC erred
in granting a temporary injunction order when it has no jurisdiction to
issue an injunction or restraining order since this may be issued only
under Article 218 of the Labor Code if the case involves or arises from
labor disputes.
The NLRC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The
now petitioner, for one, cannot validly claim that NLRC cannot exercise
its injunctive power under Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code on the
pretext that what NLRC have here is not a labor dispute as long as it
concedes that as defined by law, Labor Dispute includes any
controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment.
Issue: WON the NLRC even without a complaint for illegal dismissal filed
before the labor arbiter, entertain an action for injunction and issue such
writ enjoining petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. from enforcing its Orders
of dismissal against private respondents, and ordering petitioner to
reinstate the private respondents to their previous positions.
Ruling: No. It is an essential requirement that there must first be a labor
dispute between the contending parties before the labor arbiter. In the
present case, there is no labor dispute between the petitioner and
private respondents as there has yet been no complaint for illegal
dismissal filed with the labor arbiter by the private respondents against
the petitioner. The petition for injunction directly filed before the NLRC is
in reality an action for illegal dismissal. Thus, the NLRC exceeded its
jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order granting private
respondents' petition for injunction and ordering the petitioner to
reinstate private respondents. Under the Labor Code, the ordinary and
proper recourse of an illegally dismissed employee is to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal with the labor arbiter. In the case at bar, private
respondents disregarded this rule and directly went to the NLRC through
a petition for injunction praying that petitioner be enjoined from enforcing
its dismissal orders. Furthermore, an examination of private
respondents' petition for injunction reveals that it has no basis since
there is no showing of any urgency or irreparable injury which the private
respondents might suffer.
An injunction, as an extraordinary remedy, is not favored in labor
law considering that it generally has not proved to be an effective means
of settling labor disputes. It has been the policy of the State to encourage
the parties to use the non-judicial process of negotiation and
compromise, mediation and arbitration. Thus, injunctions may be issued
only in cases of extreme necessity based on legal grounds clearly
established, after due consultations or hearing and when all efforts at
conciliation are exhausted which factors, however, are clearly absent in
the present case.
Injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of one's
substantive rights or interest. It is not a cause of action in itself but merely
a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. It is resorted to only
when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. The
application of the injunctive writ rests upon the existence of an
emergency or of a special reason before the main case be regularly
heard. The essential conditions for granting such temporary injunctive
relief are that the complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient
to constitute a proper basis for injunction and that on the entire showing
from the contending parties, the injunction is reasonably necessary to
protect the legal rights of the plaintiff pending the litigation. Injunction is
also a special equitable relief granted only in cases where there is no
plain, adequate and complete remedy at law
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO LISTANA, SR., respondent.
G.R. No. 152611 August 5, 2003
Facts of the case:
Private respondent Listana voluntarily offered to sell his land of
246.0561 ha. in Sorsogon to the government, through the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). DAR valued the property at P5,871,689.03 but
Listana refused to sell at that price, so the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in an administrative proceeding
determined the just compensation of the land at P10,956,963.25 and
ordered the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the same to Listana. A
writ of execution was issued by PARAD to that effect but it was
apparently not complied with by LBP so a Motion for Contempt was
filed by Listana with the PARAD against petitioner LBP. PARAD
granted the Motion for Contempt and cited for indirect contempt and
ordered the arrest of ALEX A. LORAYES, the Manager of LBP. LBP
obtained a preliminary injunction from the Regional Trial Court of
Sorsogon enjoining DARAB from enforcing the arrest order against
Lorayes. Listana filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals. CA nullified the order of the RTC. Consequently, petitioner
LBP filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the order for the arrest of petitioner's manager, Mr. Alex
Lorayes by the PARAD, was valid.
Ruling:
The arrest order issued by PARAD against Lorayes was not valid
because the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified
"Motion for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were
themselves invalid. Said proceedings were invalid for the following
reasons:
First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition
with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case.
The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio; rather, it was
by a motion filed by respondent.
Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to
decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance of a
warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the
DARAB. Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from
respondent?s "Motion for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the
PARAD dated August 20, 2000 and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of
Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void.
FEDERICO S. ROBOSA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COM
MISSION G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012
FACTS:
The NLRC issued a TRO and directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other
company executives to cease and desist from dismissing any member
of the union and from implementing memorandum terminating the servi
ces of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismis
sals have been effected.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRC’s resolution.
They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s petit
ion for preliminary injunction. Then, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a
writ of preliminary injunction.The respondents moved for reconsideratio
n. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the respo
nsible CTMI officers in contempt of court.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge and issued a resoluti
on dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to proceed hearin
g the main case on the merits.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.
HELD:
Yes. Under Article 218 the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbite
rs) may hold any offending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and
impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law. The penalty for di
rect contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or am
ount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or t
he labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or
the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribe
d under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court do
es not require the labor arbiter or the NLRC to initiate indirect contempt
proceedings before the trial court. This mode is to be observed only w
hen there is no law granting them contempt powers. As is clear under
Article 218(d) of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter or the Commission is
empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in
direct or indirect contempt. Robosa, et al., therefore, have not improper
ly brought the indirect contempt charges against the respondents befor
e the NLRC.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 230682. November 29, 2017]
JOLO'S KIDDIE CARTS/FUN4KIDS/MARLO U.
CABILI, petitioners, vs. EVELYN A. CABALLA and
ANTHONY M. BAUTISTA,respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the
Resolutions dated July 28, 2016 2 and February 22, 2017 3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 146460 which dismissed
the petition for certiorari 4 filed by petitioners Jolo's Kiddie
Carts/Fun4Kids/Marlo U. Cabili (petitioners), due to a technical
ground, i.e., non-filing of a motion for reconsideration before filing a
petition for certiorari. cSEDTC
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from a complaint 5 for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of salaries/wages and 13th month pay,
non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, and separation pay,
damages, and attorney's fees filed by Evelyn A. Caballa (Caballa),
Anthony M. Bautista (Bautista; collectively, respondents), and one
Jocelyn 6 S. Colisao (Colisao) against petitioners before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Respondents and Colisao
alleged that petitioners hired them as staff members in the latter's
business; Caballa and Bautista were assigned to man petitioners'
stalls in SM Bacoor and SM Rosario in Cavite, respectively, while
Colisao was assigned in several SM branches, the most recent of
which was in SM North EDSA. 7 They were paid a daily salary that
reached P330.00 for a six (6)-day work week from 9:45 in the
morning until 9:00 o'clock in the evening. 8 They claimed that they
were never paid the monetary value of their unused service incentive
leaves, 13th month pay, overtime pay, and premium pay for work
during holidays; and that when petitioners found out that they
inquired from the Department of Labor and Employment about the
prevailing minimum wage rates, they were prohibited from reporting
to their work assignment without any justification. 9
For their part, 10 petitioners denied dismissing respondents
and Colisao, and maintained that they were the ones who
abandoned their work. 11 They likewise maintained that they paid
respondents and Colisao their wages and other benefits in
accordance with the law and that their money claims were bereft of
factual and legal bases. 12
The Labor Arbiter's (LA) Ruling
 In a Decision 13 dated November 27, 2015, the LA dismissed In a Decision 18 dated April 28, 2016, the NLRC modified the
the case insofar as Colisao is concerned for failure to LA ruling, finding no illegal dismissal nor abandonment of work.
prosecute. 14However, the LA ruled in favor of respondents, and Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioners to reinstate respondents
accordingly, ordered petitioners to solidarily pay them the following, to their former or substantially equivalent positions without loss of
plus attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total seniority rights and privileges; deleted the awards for payment of
monetary awards: backwages, separation pay, and moral and exemplary damages;
and affirmed the rest of the awards. 19 For this purpose, the NLRC
SeparationBackwages Wage 13th Moral Exemplary Total
attached a Computation of Monetary Award 20 detailing the
Pay Differential month damages damages
monetary awards due to respondents, as follows: (a) for Caballa,
pay
P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P109,870.80 as wage differential, and
Caballa 60,580.00 109,870.80 75,156.12 10,608.0010,000.00 5,000.00 P271,214.92 P75,156.12 as 13th month pay; (b) for Bautista, P15,623.00 as
holiday pay, P112,294.00 as wage differential, and P74,480.12 as
Bautista 60,580.00 112,294.00 74,480.12 10,608.0010,000.00 5,000.00 272,962.12
13th month pay; and (c) attorney's fees amounting to ten percent
–––––––––––– (10%) of the total monetary value awarded. 21
– Anent the procedural matters raised by petitioners, the NLRC
544,177.04 ruled that: (a) petitioners waived the issue of improper venue when
they failed to raise the same before the filing of position papers;
Plus 10% Attorney's Fees 54,417.70 and (b) respondents substantially complied with the requirement of
–––––––––––– verifying their position papers, and thus, the same is not fatal to their
– complaint. 22 As to the merits, while the NLRC agreed with the LA's
finding that there was no abandonment on the part of respondents,
GRAND TOTAL P598,594.7415 the latter were unable to adduce any proof that petitioners indeed
committed any overt or positive act operative of their dismissal. 23 In
The LA found that respondents' adequate substantiation of view of the finding that there was neither dismissal on the part of
their claim that they were no longer given any work assignment and petitioners nor abandonment on the part of respondents, the NLRC
were not allowed to go anywhere near their respective workstations, ordered the latter's reinstatement but without backwages. Finally, the
coupled with petitioners' failure to prove abandonment, justifies the NLRC held that respondents should be entitled to their holiday pay
finding that respondents were indeed dismissed without just cause as it is a statutory benefit which payment petitioners failed to
nor due process. 16 prove. 24
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed 17 to the NLRC. Dissatisfied, petitioners directly filed a petition
for certiorari 25 before the CA, without moving for reconsideration
before the NLRC. SDAaTC
The NLRC Ruling
 The CA Ruling As a rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari. 31 The
In a Resolution 26 dated July 28, 2016, the CA denied the rationale for this requirement is that "the law intends to afford the
petition due to petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration tribunal, board or office an opportunity to rectify the errors and
before the NLRC prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari before mistakes it may have lapsed into before resort to the courts of justice
the CA. It held that the prior filing of such motion before the lower can be had." 32 Notably, however, there are several recognized
tribunal is an indispensable requisite in elevating the case to the CA exceptions to the rule, one of which is when the order is a patent
via certiorari, and that petitioners' failure to do so resulted in the nullity. 33
NLRC ruling attaining finality. 27 In this case, records show that the LA ruled in favor of
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, 28 but the same was respondents, and accordingly, ordered petitioners to pay them the
denied in a Resolution 29 dated February 22, 2017; hence, this following monetary awards:
petition. 30 SeparationBackwages Wage 13th Moral Exemplary Total
Pay Differential month damages damages
pay
The Issue Before the Court
Caballa 60,580.00 109,870.80 75,156.12 10,608.0010,000.00 5,000.00 P271,214.92
The issues for the Court's resolution are whether or not the Bautista 60,580.00 112,294.00 74,480.12 10,608.0010,000.00 5,000.00 272,962.12
CA was correct in: (a) dismissing the petition for certiorari before it
due to petitioners' non-filing of a prior motion for reconsideration ––––––––––
before the NLRC; and (b) effectively affirming the NLRC ruling, –
which not only increased respondents' awards of wage differential 544,177.04
and 13th month pay, but also awarded an additional monetary award
as holiday pay. Plus 10% Attorney's Fees 54,417.70
––––––––––
The Court's Ruling –
GRAND TOTAL P598,594.74
The petition is partly meritorious.
Upon petitioners' appeal to the NLRC, the LA ruling was
modified, deleting the awards for separation pay, backwages, moral
I. damages, and exemplary damages, while affirming the awards for
wage differential and 13th month pay. In the Computation of
Monetary Award 34attached to the NLRC ruling — which according
to the NLRC itself, shall form part of its decision 35 — it was
indicated that Caballa's awards for wage differential and 13th month
pay are in the amounts of P109,870.80 and P75,156.12,
respectively; while the awards in Bautista's favor were pegged at
P112,294.00 and P74,480.12, respectively. However, a simple
counterchecking of the NLRC's computation with the LA ruling
readily reveals that: (a) the amounts of P109,870.80 and
P112,294.00 clearly pertain to the awards of backwages, which were
already deleted in the NLRC ruling; (b) the amounts of P75,156.12
and P74,480.12 pertain to the awards of wage differential;
and (c) the amount of P10,608.00 which pertain to the awards of 13th
month pay for both respondents, were no longer reflected in the
NLRC computation. While this is obviously just an oversight on the
part of the NLRC, it is not without any implications as such oversight
resulted in an unwarranted increase in the monetary awards due to
respondents. Clearly, such an increase is a patent nullity as it is
bereft of any factual and/or legal basis.
Verily, the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it based on the aforesaid technical ground,
as petitioners were justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA
even without first moving for reconsideration before the NLRC. In
such instance, court procedure dictates that the case be remanded
to the CA for a resolution on the merits. However, when there is
already enough basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits may
be had, as in this case, the Court may dispense with the time-
consuming procedure of remand in order to prevent further delays in
the disposition of the case and to better serve the ends of
justice. 36 In view of the foregoing — as well as the fact that
petitioners pray for a resolution on the merits 37 — the Court finds it
appropriate to exhaustively resolve the instant case.
II.
It must be stressed that to justify the grant of the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari, petitioners must satisfactorily show that the
court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion
conferred upon it. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment
exercised in a capricious and whimsical manner that is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. To be considered "grave," discretion must be
exercised in a despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by
or to act at all in contemplation of law. 38
In labor cases, grave abuse of discretion may be ascribed to
the NLRC when its findings and conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidence, which refers to that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion. Thus, if the NLRC's ruling has basis in the evidence
and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of
discretion exists and the CA should so declare and, accordingly,
dismiss the petition. 39
Guided by the foregoing considerations and as will be
explained hereunder, the Court finds that the NLRC did not gravely
abuse its discretion in ruling that: (a) petitioners are barred from
raising improper venue and that the verification requirement in
respondents' position paper was substantially complied with;
and (b) respondents were neither dismissed by petitioners nor
considered to have abandoned their jobs. However and as already
discussed, the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it awarded
respondents increased monetary benefits without any factual and/or
legal bases. acEHCD
III.
 Anent the first procedural issue, petitioners insist that since
respondents worked in Cavite, they should have filed their complaint
before the Regional Arbitration Branch IV of the NLRC and not in
Manila, pursuant to Section 1, Rule IV of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure. As such, the LA in Manila where the complaint was filed
had no jurisdiction to rule on the same. 40 However, such insistence
is misplaced as the aforesaid provision of the 2011 Rules of
Procedure clearly speaks of venue and not jurisdiction. Moreover,
paragraph (c) of the same provision explicitly provides that "[w]hen
venue is not objected to before the first scheduled mandatory
conference, such issue shall be deemed waived." Here, the NLRC
aptly pointed out that petitioners only raised improper venue for the
first time in their position paper, 41and as such, they are deemed to
have waived the same.
In this relation, Article 224 (formerly Article 217) 42 of
the Labor Code, as amended, clearly provides that the LAs shall
have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide, inter alia,
termination disputes and money claims arising from employer-
employee relations, as in this case. As such, the LA clearly had
jurisdiction to resolve respondents' complaint.
Another procedural issue raised by petitioners is that
respondents signed the Verification and Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping attached to their Position Paper a day earlier than the date
such pleading was filed by their counsel. In this regard, petitioners
assert that such is a fatal infirmity that necessitates the dismissal of
respondents' complaint. 43 However, the NLRC correctly ruled that
respondents' substantial compliance with the requirement, coupled
with their meritorious claims against petitioners, necessitates
dispensation with the strict compliance with the rules on verification
and certification against forum shopping in order to better serve the
ends of justice. InFernandez v. Villegas, 44 the Court held:
The Court laid down the following guidelines
with respect to non-compliance with the requirements
on or submission of a defective verification and
certification against forum shopping, viz.:
1) A distinction must be made between non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of
defective verification, and non-compliance with the
requirement on or submission of defective certification
against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance
therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may
order its submission or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending circumstances are such
that strict compliance with the Rule may be
dispensed with in order that the ends of justice
may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially
complied with when one who has ample knowledge to
swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or
petition signs the verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum
shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance"
or presence of "special circumstances or
compelling reasons."
 5) The certification against forum shopping must
be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as
parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable
circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and involve a
common cause of action or defense, the signature of
only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum
shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not
by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
xxx xxx xxx
Besides, it is settled that the verification of a
pleading is only a formal, not a jurisdictional
requirement intended to secure the assurance that
the matters alleged in a pleading are true and
correct. Therefore, the courts may simply order the
correction of the pleadings or act on them and
waive strict compliance with the rules, as in this
case.
xxx xxx xxx
Similar to the rules on verification, the rules on
forum shopping are designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice;
hence, it should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objectives. The requirement of strict
compliance with the provisions on certification
against forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature to the effect that the certification
cannot altogether be dispensed with or its
requirements completely disregarded. It does not
prohibit substantial compliance with the rules
under justifiable circumstances, as also in this
case. 45 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
IV.
In Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. v. Tanguin, 46 the Court was faced
with a situation where, on the one hand, the employee claimed she
was illegally dismissed by her employer; on the other, the employer
denied ever dismissing such employee and even accused the latter
of abandoning her job, as in this case. In resolving the matter, the
Court extensively discussed:
In cases of illegal dismissal, the employer bears
the burden of proof to prove that the termination was
for a valid or authorized cause.But before the
employer must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, the employees must first
establish by substantial evidence that indeed they
were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there
can be no question as to the legality or illegality
thereof. In Machica v. Roosevelt Services Center, Inc.,
the Court enunciated:
The rule is that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it;
thus, petitioners were burdened to
prove their allegation that
respondents dismissed them from
 their employment. It must be stressed
that the evidence to prove this fact must
be clear, positive and convincing. The
rule that the employer bears the burden
of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no
application here because the
respondents deny having dismissed the
petitioners. SDHTEC
xxx xxx xxx
The Court further agrees with the findings of the
LA, the NLRC[,] and the CA that Tanguin was not guilty
of abandonment. Tan Brothers Corporation of Basilan
City v. Escudero extensively discussed abandonment
in labor cases:
As defined under established
jurisprudence, abandonment is the
deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment. It
constitutes neglect of duty and is a just
cause for termination of employment
under paragraph (b) of Article 282 [now
Article 296] of the Labor Code. To
constitute abandonment, however,
there must be a clear and deliberate
intent to discontinue one's
employment without any intention of
returning. In this regard, two elements
must concur: (1) failure to report for
work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the
second element as the more
determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts.
Otherwise stated, absence must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly
pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore. It
has been ruled that the employer has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and
unjustified refusal of the employee to
resume his employment without any
intention of returning. 47(Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
As aptly ruled by the NLRC, respondents failed to prove their
allegation that petitioners dismissed them from work, as there was
no indication as to how the latter prevented them from reporting to
their work stations; or that the petitioners made any overt act that
would suggest that they indeed terminated respondents'
employment. 48 In the same vein, petitioners failed to prove that
respondents committed unequivocal acts that would clearly
constitute intent to abandon their employment. It may even be said
that respondents' failure to report for work may have been a direct
result of their belief, albeit misplaced, that they had already been
dismissed by petitioners. Such mistaken belief on the part of the
employee should not lead to a drastic conclusion that he has chosen
to abandon his work. 49 More importantly, respondents' filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal negates any intention on their part to
sever their employment relations with petitioners. 50 To reiterate,
abandonment of position is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly
inferred, much less legally presumed, from certain equivocal acts. 51
In light of the finding that respondents neither abandoned their
employment nor were illegally dismissed by petitioners, it is only
proper for the former to report back to work and for the latter to
reinstate them to their former positions or a substantially-equivalent
one in their stead. In this regard, jurisprudence provides that in
instances where there was neither dismissal by the employer nor
abandonment by the employee, the proper remedy is to reinstate the
employee to his former position but without the award of
backwages. 52
As for respondents' money claims for holiday pay, wage
differential, and 13th month pay, the NLRC properly observed that
petitioners failed to show that payment has been made. As such,
they must be held liable for the same. It is well-settled that "with
respect to labor cases, the burden of proving payment of monetary
claims rests on the employer, the rationale being that the pertinent
personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar
documents — which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are
not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute
control of the employer." 53 However and as already adverted to
earlier, the awards of wage differential and 13th month pay due to
respondents must be adjusted to properly reflect the computation
made by the LA, in that: (a) Caballa is entitled to wage differential
and 13th month pay in the amounts of P75,156.12 and P10,608.00,
respectively; while (b) Bautista's entitlement to such claims are in the
amounts of P74,480.12 and P10,608.00, respectively.
In the same manner, the NLRC correctly awarded attorney's
fees to respondents, in light of Article 111 (a) of the Labor
Code which states that: "[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages,
the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the amount of wages recovered," as in this
case. AScHCD
Finally, all monetary awards due to respondents shall earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the
finality of this Decision until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. 54
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated July 28, 2016 and February 22, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 146460 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated April 28, 2016 of the National Labor
Relations Commission isAFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, ordering
petitioners Jolo's Kiddie Carts/Fun4Kids/Marlo U. Cabili to pay:
a) Respondent Evelyn A. Caballa the amounts of P15,623.00
as holiday pay, P75,156.12 as wage differential, and
P10,608.00 as 13th month pay, plus attorney's fees
amounting to ten percent (10%) of the aforesaid
monetary awards. Further, said amounts shall then
earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the finality of the Decision until fully paid;
and
b) Respondent Anthony M. Bautista the amounts of
P15,623.00 as holiday pay, P74,480.12 as wage
differential, and P10,608.00 as 13th month pay, plus
attorney's fees amounting to ten percent (10%) of the
aforesaid monetary awards. Further, said amounts
shall then earn legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of the Decision until
fully paid.
Finally, the Temporary Restraining Order dated May 26, 2017
issued in relation to this case is hereby LIFTED. The Decision dated
April 28, 2016 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC
NCR Case No. 03-03168-15 (NLRC LAC No. 02-000701-16), as
modified, shall be implemented in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Jolo's Kiddie Carts v. Caballa, G.R. No. 230682, [November 29,
2017])
[G.R. No. 178379. August 22, 2017.]
CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO, * DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE
A. ZAFRA, ARTURO B. VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ,
NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ, and LUISITO R.
DILOY, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari 1 assailing the 6 March 2007 Decision 2 and the 14
June 2007 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
95747. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 28 February 2006
Resolution 4 and the 26 May 2006 Resolution 5 of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which granted the prayer for
preliminary injunction of respondent Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO) and denied therein petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. HTcADC
The Antecedent Facts
The case originated from a Notice of Strike (first strike) filed
on 16 May 1991 by the MERALCO Employees and Workers
Association (MEWA), composed of MERALCO's rank-and-file
employees, on the ground of Unfair Labor Practice (ULP).
Conciliation conferences conducted by the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) failed to settle the dispute and resulted to
a strike staged by MEWA on 6 June 1991. In an Order dated 6 June
1991, 6 then Acting Secretary Nieves R. Confesor of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) certified the labor dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration, ordered all the striking workers to
return to work, and directed MERALCO to accept the striking workers
back to work under the same terms and conditions existing prior to
the work stoppage.
On 26 July 1991, MERALCO terminated the services of
Crispin S. Frondozo (Frondozo), Danilo M. Perez (Perez), Jose A.
Zafra (Zafra), Arturo B. Vito (Vito), 7 Cesar S. Cruz (Cruz), Nazario
C. dela Cruz (N. dela Cruz), Luisito R. Diloy (Diloy), and Danilo D.
Dizon (Dizon) for having committed unlawful acts and violence
during the strike.
On 25 July 1991, MEWA filed a second Notice of Strike
(second strike) on the ground of discrimination and union busting that
resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and
workers. Then DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued an Order
dated 8 August 1991 8 that certified the issues raised in the second
strike to the NLRC for consolidation with the first strike and strictly
enjoined any strike or lockout pending resolution of the labor dispute.
The Order also directed MERALCO to suspend the effects of
termination of the employees and re-admit the employees under the
same terms and conditions without loss of seniority rights.
The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for
illegal dismissal:
(1) NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-04146-92 filed by Dizon,
Diloy, Patricio Maniacop, Wilfredo Lagason,
Venancio Arguzon, Jr., Rogelio Antonio, Lauro
Garcia, Alfredo Badilla, Jr., and Reynaldo Javier;
and
 (2) NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-06878-92 filed by
MEWA, Reynaldo M. Caberte (Caberte), Alfredo
dela Cruz (A. dela Cruz), Nataner F. Pingol
(Pingol), Vincent G. Rallos, Enrique T. Barrientos
(Barrientos), Melchor E. Banaga (Banaga), Zafra,
Perez, Vito, N. dela Cruz, Cruz, and Frondozo.
The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases with
NLRC NCR CC No. 000021-91 (In the Matter of the Labor Dispute
at the Manila Electric Company) and NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-
03381-93 (MEWA v. MERALCO). On 23 January 1998, the NLRC's
First Division rendered a Decision, 9 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. denying the motion for reconsideration of Patricio
Maniacop, et al. [the nine (9) quitclaiming
complainants] in NLRC Case No. 00-08-04146-92;
2. upholding Meralco's dismissal of Jose A. Zafra,
Alfredo dela Cruz, Reynaldo M. Caberte, Nataner F.
Pingol, Vincent G. Rallos, Enrique Barrientos, Danilo
M. Perez, Arturo B. Vito, Nazario C. dela Cruz, Melchor
E. Banaga, Cesar S. Cruz, and Crispin S. Frondozo in
view of the illegal acts they committed during the
subject strike;
3. directing complainants Danilo Dizon and Luisito
Diloy as well as respondent Meralco to submit a
memorandum of arguments relative to NLRC NCR
Case No. 00-08-04146-92; and
4. directing MEWA and Meralco to submit
memorandum of arguments in support of their
respective position in NLRC NCR CC No. 000021-91.
Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano is directed to
continue handling this case and to submit periodic
report[s] thereon.
SO ORDERED. 10
However, in a Decision promulgated on 14 December
2001, 11 the NLRC First Division modified the 23 January 1998
Decision and ruled:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of January 23, 1998 is hereby
MODIFIED: aScITE
1. Declaring the illegality of the strike of June 6-8, 1991
on the basis of the uncontested facts and allegations
of the respondent;
2. As a matter of consequence, the officers and
members who participated therein and who committed
the illegal acts perforce are hereby deemed to have
lost their employment status;
3. The dismissal of complainants Jose Zafra, Vicente
G. Rallos, Enrique T. Barrientos, Reynaldo M. Caberte,
Cesar S. Cruz, Nazario C. dela Cruz, Arturo B. Vito,
Melchor E. Banaga, Alfredo dela Cruz, Nataner F.
Pingol, Danilo M. Perez, and Crispin S. Frondozo [is]
hereby declared unjustified, their participation in the
commission of the prohibited and illegal acts not having
been proved;
4. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to
reinstate the twelve (12) complainants, without
however, payment of backwages, complainants
themselves having admitted participation in the strike.
SO ORDERED. 12
 In an Order dated 29 May 2002, 13 the NLRC ruled on the
motions for reconsideration filed by MERALCO, Dizon and Diloy, and
the 12 respondents in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-06878-92, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision appealed from is, as it is hereby MODIFIED:
ordering respondent MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
to reinstate to their former or equivalent positions
DANILO DIZON and LUISITO DILOY, without loss of
seniority rights and payment of backwages computed
from the time of their dismissal.
The rest of the decretal portion of the Decision
of December 14, 2001 stays.
SO ORDERED. 14
From the 14 December 2001 Decision and 29 May 2002
Order of the NLRC, two petitions for certiorari were filed before the
Court of Appeals:
1. CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 filed by MERALCO; and
2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by Frondozo,
Barrientos, Pingol, Caberte, Zafra, Perez, Cruz, A. dela
Cruz, and Banaga.
MERALCO moved for the consolidation of the two cases but
the motion was denied.
On 31 July 2002, the NLRC issued an Entry of
Judgment 15 stating that the 29 May 2002 NLRC Order became final
and executory on 19 July 2002. On 3 October 2002, Labor Arbiter
Veneranda C. Guerrero (Labor Arbiter Guerrero) issued a Writ of
Execution 16 directing the reinstatement of the 14 17respondents. In
a Manifestation dated 24 January 2003, 18 MERALCO informed the
NLRC of the payroll reinstatement of the 14 respondents.
On 30 May 2003, the Court of Appeals' Special Second
Division promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 19 in
favor of MERALCO. The Court of Appeals found that the strike of 6-
8 June 1991 was illegal because it occurred despite an assumption
order by the DOLE Secretary and because of the commission of
illegal acts marred with violence and coercion. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is
hereby granted. The decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 16 January 1998 and ruling of the NLRC dated
23 January 1998 are reinstated. Private respondents
Jose Zafra, Vincent G. Rallos, Enrique T. Barrientos,
Reynaldo M. Caberte, Cesar S. Cruz, Nazario C. [d]ela
Cruz, Arturo B. Vito, Melchor E. Banaga, Alfredo dela
Cruz, Nataner F. Pingol, Danilo M. Perez, Crispin
S. Frondozo, Danilo Dizon and Luisito Diloy are
dismissed from service.
SO ORDERED. 20
In view of the 30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals'
Special Second Division dismissing the 14 respondents from the
service, MERALCO stopped their payroll reinstatement.
On 11 June 2003, Labor Arbiter Guerrero approved the
computation of backwages and ordered the issuance of a Writ of
Execution for the satisfaction of the judgment award. MERALCO filed
a Manifestation calling the attention of Labor Arbiter Guerrero to the
30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals' Special Second
Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. In an Order dated 7 October
2003, Labor Arbiter Guerrero ruled that the Court of Appeals' 30 May
2003 Decision had not attained finality and as such, respondents
should be reinstated from the time they were removed from the
payroll until their actual/payroll reinstatement based on their latest
salary prior to their dismissal. An Alias Writ of Execution 21 was
issued on 10 October 2003 for the satisfaction of the judgment award
which resulted to the garnishment of MERALCO's funds deposited
with Equitable-PCI Bank.
Dizon, Diloy, and the other respondents filed their respective
motions for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480, which the
Court of Appeals' (Former) Special Second Division denied in its 18
December 2003 Resolution.
On 27 January 2004, the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth
Division promulgated its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 22 as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is PARTIALLY GIVEN DUE COURSE. The
assailed Decision of December 14, 2001 and the Order
of May 29, 2002 of public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission are hereby MODIFIED in that
respondent MERALCO is ordered to pay the
petitioners full backwages computed from July 26,
1991, when they were illegally dismissed, up to the
date of their actual reinstatement in the
service. HEITAD
SO ORDERED. 23
MERALCO filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
in the Resolution of 17 August 2004.
The respondents moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution for the satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the
recall of their payroll reinstatement. On 10 June 2004, Labor Arbiter
Guerrero granted the motion. On 14 June 2004, a Second Alias Writ
of Execution 24 was issued directing the Sheriff to cause the
reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount of
P2,851,453 representing backwages from 14 December 2001 to 15
January 2003 and from 1 June 2003 to 1 June 2004. 25 MERALCO
filed a motion to quash the Second Alias Writ of Execution but it was
denied on 2 July 2004. On 20 July 2004, the Sheriff reported that the
amount of P2,879,967.53 garnished funds had been delivered to and
deposited with the NLRC Cashier for the satisfaction of the monetary
award. 26 However, the reinstatement portion of the judgment
remained unimplemented due to the failure of MERALCO to reinstate
the respondents.
On 6 February 2004, Dizon and Diloy filed a petition before
this Court assailing the 30 May 2003 Decision and 18 December
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 161159.
On 12 February 2004, Frondozo, Barrientos, Pingol, Caberte,
Perez, Cruz, A. dela Cruz, and Banaga filed a petition before this
Court assailing the same 30 May 2003 Decision and 18 December
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals' Special Second Division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 161311.
On 11 October 2004, MERALCO filed a petition before this
Court questioning the 27 January 2004 and 17 August 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth Division promulgated in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72509. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 164998.
In a Resolution dated 23 February 2004, 27 this Court's Third
Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 161159 on the ground that
the petitioners failed to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering its Decision.
In a Resolution dated 3 March 2004, the Court's Second
Division referred G.R. No. 161311 for consolidation with G.R. No.
161159. 28
In a Resolution dated 24 May 2004, 29 the Court's Third
Division denied with finality the petitioners' motion for reconsideration
of the 23 February 2004 Resolution denying the petition in G.R. No.
161159 on the ground that no substantial arguments were raised to
warrant a reconsideration of the Court's Resolution. In the same
Resolution, the Court denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 for
failure of petitioners therein to show that a reversible error had been
committed by the appellate court.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 161311 filed a motion for
reconsideration of the 24 May 2004 Resolution denying their petition.
In its 28 July 2004 Resolution, 30the Court's Third Division denied
the motion with finality as no substantial arguments were raised to
warrant a reconsideration of the Resolution.
The 23 February 2004 Resolution became final and executory
on 15 July 2004. 31 The 24 May 2004 Resolution became final and
executory on 2 September 2004. 32
In a Resolution dated 15 June 2005, 33 the Court's First
Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 164998 for MERALCO's
failure to file a reply, amounting to failure to prosecute. MERALCO
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution
of 22 August 2005. The 15 June 2005 Resolution became final and
executory on 4 October 2005. 34
Meanwhile, MERALCO filed two motions before the NLRC:
(1) a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal filed on 5 July 2004
assailing the 10 June 2004 Order of Labor Arbiter Guerrero granting
the issuance of the Second Alias Writ of Execution and directing the
payment of backwages of P2,851,453 to respondents and ordering
their reinstatement actually or in the payroll, which was accompanied
by a bond equivalent to the amount of the accrued backwages; and
(2) an urgent motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction filed on 13 July 2004 directed against
the Second Alias Writ of Execution pending the resolution of its first
motion.
The Resolutions of the NLRC
In a Resolution dated 28 February 2006, 35 the NLRC
granted the prayer for preliminary injunction of MERALCO. The
NLRC considered the difficulty in proceeding with the execution
given the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeals' Special
Second Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 and the Court of Appeals'
Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 that were also passed
upon by this Court, respectively, in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311
and in G.R. No. 164998. The NLRC ruled:
At the outset, it must be stated that while this
Commission has broad powers within its sphere of
jurisdiction, it cannot encroach on judicial power which
is the exclusive domain of the courts. The Court of
Appeals has two contrasting rulings, one upholding the
legality of complainants' dismissal, and the other
declaring such dismissal illegal. This Commission has
no power to overrule what has been decided by the
courts. This is especially true with respect to judgments
that have become final and executory not only at the
level of the Court of Appeals, but also of the Supreme
Court.
Indeed, there is an insurmountable obstacle in
the execution of the decision favoring complainants. If
We let execution proceed, We will disregard the Court
of Appeals' ruling in the MERALCO petition. On the
other hand, We cannot declare complainants to have
been legally dismissed as this will contravene the Court
of Appeals' ruling in the Frondozo petition.
Confronted with this dilemma, and in deference
to the exercise of the judicial power as the courts may
find appropriate, this Commission has no recourse but
to enjoin all proceedings until the parties would have
 exhausted all available judicial remedies toward the
possible reconciliation of the contrasting decisions.
WHEREFORE, there being no speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
MERALCO's prayer for preliminary injunction is
GRANTED. All proceedings with this Commission as
well as with the Labor Arbiter are hereby enjoined and
suspended until further orders from the appropriate
court. ATICcS
SO ORDERED. 36
Two sets of respondents filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. In its Resolution promulgated on 26 May
2006, 37 the NLRC denied the motions.
Frondozo, Perez, Zafra, Vito, Cruz, N. dela Cruz, and Diloy
filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the
28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 6 March 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the 28 February 2006 and 26 May 2006 Resolutions of the NLRC.
According to the Court of Appeals, MERALCO's recourse was due
to the two separate petitions before it (CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 and
CA-G.R. SP No. 72509) that resulted in two contradictory rulings on
the matter of petitioners' dismissal. The Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the execution of a final judgment is a matter of
right on the part of the prevailing party and is mandatory and
ministerial on the part of the court or tribunal issuing the judgment.
However, the Court of Appeals stated that a suspension or refusal of
execution of judgment or order on equitable grounds can be justified
when there are facts or events transpiring after the judgment or order
had become final and executory, thus materially affecting the
judgment obligation.
The Court of Appeals stated:
In the case at bar, finality of the CA Decision in
SP No. 72480 on May 24, 2004, is a supervening event
which transpired after the CA Decision in SP 72509
(which was in favor of petitioners) had become final
and executory, and which decision directly contradicts
the ruling in the said case. It may also be noted that the
Resolution of the Supreme Court's Third Division in
G.R. No. 161311 categorically declared that the
petition filed by herein petitioners is being denied for
their failure to show that a reversible error has been
committed by the appellate court in rendering the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. Hence, with the
denial with finality of the petition for review in G.R. No.
161159 (161311) the CA Decision in SP
72480 upholding the dismissal of petitionershas clearly
become a legal obstacle to the enforcement of the final
and executory decision in SP 72509 which in effect
declared petitioners to have been illegally dismissed
and upheld their right to back wages computed from
December 14, 2001 and up to the date of their actual
reinstatement.
In fine, no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the NLRC in granting preliminary
injunction to private respondent MERALCO and
enjoining or suspending all proceedings for the
implementation of the 2nd alias writ of execution earlier
issued by Labor Arbiter Guerrero with respect to the
back wages/monetary award and reinstatement of
petitioners pursuant to the May 29, 2002 Decision of
the NLRC as affirmed/modified by the CA Decision in
SP No. 72509.
 As to the contention of petitioners that the NLRC
should have instead proceeded to reconcile or
harmonize the conflicting decisions rendered by the
two (2) divisions of the Court, We find the same
untenable and runs against established principles of
immutability of final judgments in this jurisdiction. In
fact, nothing is more settled in law than that once a
judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable
and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is
attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by
the highest court of the land.
We cannot but concur with the NLRC's
pronouncement that MERALCO has no speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the
preservation of its rights and interests, at least insofar
only and solely as to avoid the injurious consequences
of the 2nd alias writ of execution relative to the
reinstatement aspect of the final decision in CA-G.R.
No. SP 72509. 38
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
challenged Resolutions dated February 28, 2006 and
May 26, 2006 of the National Labor Relations
Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 39 (Italicization in the original)
The petitioners in CA-G.R. SP No. 95747 filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its 14 June 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition for review filed before this Court
by Frondozo, Perez, Zafra, Vito, Cruz, N. dela Cruz, and Diloy. 40
Petitioners alleged that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in upholding the 28 February 2006 and 26 May
2006 Resolutions of the NLRC, in not passing upon the issues of
reinstatement and release of the garnished amount against
MERALCO, and in ruling that the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480
is considered a bar in the implementation of the Decision in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72509.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
upholding the NLRC in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction
prayed for by MERALCO.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
The Court of Appeals cited the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC which provides that "[u]pon issuance of the
entry of judgment, the Commission, motu proprio or upon motion by
the proper party, may cause the execution of the judgment in the
certified case." According to the Court of Appeals, the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC did not make a distinction between
decisions or resolutions decided by the Labor Arbiter and those
decided by the Commission in certified cases when an order of
reinstatement is involved. Thus, even when the employer had
perfected an appeal, the Labor Arbiter must issue a writ of execution
for actual or payroll reinstatement of the employees illegally
dismissed from the service. The Court of Appeals also cited Article
223 of the Labor Code which provides that the reinstatement aspect
of the Labor Arbiter's Decision is immediately executory.
In this case, the applicable rule is Article 263 of the Labor
Code and the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment, as amended
by Resolution No. 02-02, series of 2002. Section 1, Rule III of the
NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides: TIADCc
Section 1. Execution Upon Final Judgment or
Order. Execution shall issue only upon a judgment or
order that finally disposes of an action or proceeding,
except in specific instances where the law provides for
execution pending appeal.
Article 263 (i) of the Labor Code, on the other hand, provides:
(i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the
Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or
resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from
the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the
certification or submission of the dispute, as the case
may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the
voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10)
calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.
A judicial review of the decisions of the NLRC may be filed before
the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court but the petition shall not stay the execution of the
assailed decision unless a restraining order is issued by the Court of
Appeals. 41
In this case, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment stating
that the 29 May 2002 NLRC Order became final and executory on
19 June 2002; a Writ of Execution was issued; and MERALCO
complied with the payroll reinstatement of petitioners. However, with
the promulgation of the 30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of
Appeals' Special Second Division, finding that the 6-8 June 1991
strike was illegal, illegal acts marred with violence and coercion were
committed, and dismissing petitioners from the service, MERALCO
stopped the payroll reinstatement. This prompted petitioners to move
for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the satisfaction of
their accrued wages arising from the recall of their payroll
reinstatement which Labor Arbiter Guerrero granted on 10 June
2004. Later, a second Alias Writ of Execution was issued.
As both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals stated, they were
confronted with two contradictory Decisions of two different Divisions
of the Court of Appeals. The petitions questioning these two
Decisions of the Court of Appeals were both denied by this Court and
the denial attained finality. The Court of Appeals sustained the NLRC
that the 30 May 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals' Special
Second Division is a subsequent development that justified the
suspension of the Alias Writs of Execution.
There are instances when writs of execution may be assailed.
They are:
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the
parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property
exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted
to the judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and
there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been
improvidently issued, or that it is defective in
 substance, or issued against the wrong party, or that
the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied,
or the writ was issued without authority. 42
The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the
situation of the parties making execution unjust or inequitable.
MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their
backwages is justified by the 30 May 2003 Decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 72480. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the
execution of judgment is anchored on the 27 January 2004 Decision
of the Court of Appeals' Fourteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No.
72509. Given this situation, we see no reversible error on the part of
the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of
discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a
capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of
its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 43 Thus, this
Court declared:
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a
specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only
be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility." Furthermore, the use
of a petition for certiorari is restricted only to "truly
extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court
or quasi-judicial body is wholly void." From the
foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil
action of certiorari under Rule 65 can only strike an act
down for having been done with grave abuse of
discretion if the petitioner could manifestly show that
such act was patent and gross. x x x. 44
Clearly, the NLRC did not act in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary, or despotic manner. It suspended the proceedings because
it cannot revise or modify the conflicting Decisions of the Court of
Appeals.
However, we need to resolve the issue on the conflicting
Decisions in order to put an end to this litigation.
The Court of Appeals stated that "the finality of the CA
Decision in SP No. 72480 on May 24, 2004, is a supervening event
which transpired after the CA Decision in SP No. 72509 (which was
in favor of petitioners) had become final and executory." 45 This is
not accurate. The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 was
promulgated on 30 May 2003. The Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
72509 was promulgated on 27 January 2004. Even when the cases
were elevated to this Court, G.R. No. 161159 and G.R. No. 161311
were resolved first before G.R. No. 164998. The Court's 23 February
2004 Resolution and the 24 May 2004 Resolution, both favoring
MERALCO, became final and executory on 15 July 2004 and 2
September 2004, respectively, while the Resolution of 15 June 2005
which denied MERALCO's petition for review became final and
executory on 4 October 2005, over a year after the final resolutions
in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311. AIDSTE
Further, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals that
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 72480 and 72509 attained finality without this
Court actually passing upon the merits of the illegal dismissal aspect,
this Court actually ruled on the merits of CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. The
Court's Third Division denied the petition in G.R. No. 161159 in its 23
February 2004 Resolution on the ground that the petitioners failed to
show that a reversible error had been committed by the Court of
Appeals in rendering its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480. The
 Court's Third Division also denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 in
its 24 May 2004 Resolution for failure of the petitioners to show that
a reversible error had been committed by the appellate court in the
same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 72480.
In Agoy v. Araneta Center, Inc., 46 this Court explained that
"[w]hen the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of
the CA and denies the petition, there is no need for the Court to fully
explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and
adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The decision sought
to be reviewed and set aside is correct." Hence, the Court's Third
Division adopted the findings and conclusions reached by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed petitioners
from the service. The finality of the denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos.
161159 and 161311 should be given greater weight than the denial
of the petition in G.R. No. 164998 on technicality. It can also be
interpreted that, in effect, the finality of the denial of the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 also removed the jurisdiction of the
Court's First Division and bound it to the final resolution in G.R. Nos.
161159 and 161311. The Court's First Division denied MERALCO's
petition for failure to prosecute only on 15 June 2005, long after the
denial of the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 became final
and executory on 15 July 2004 and 2 September 2004, respectively.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We REMAND this
case to the National Labor Relations Commission for the execution
of the 23 February 2004 and the 24 May 2004 Resolutions of this
Court's Third Division in G.R. Nos. 161159 and 161311 in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Frondozo v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 178379, [August 22,
2017])
ARTICLE 227
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner,
vs.
JAN CARLO GALA, Respondent.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari,1 seeking to annul the
decision2 and the resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) .
FACTS:
Respondent Jan Carlo Gala commenced employment with the
petitioner Meralco Electric Company (Meralco) as a probationary
lineman. He was assigned at Meralco’s Valenzuela Sector. He initially
served as member of the crew of Meralco’s Truck No. 1823 supervised
by Foreman Narciso Matis. After one month, he joined the crew of
Truck No. 1837 under the supervision of Foreman Raymundo Zuñiga,
Sr.
Barely four months on the job, Gala was dismissed for alleged
complicity in pilferages of Meralco’s electrical supplies, particularly, for
the incident which took place on May 25, 2006. On that day, Gala and
other Meralco workers were instructed to replace a worn-out electrical
pole at the Pacheco Subdivision in Valenzuela City. Gala and the other
linemen were directed to join Truck No. 1891, under the supervision of
Foreman Nemecio Hipolito.
Despite Gala’s explanation, Meralco proceeded with the investigation
and eventually terminated his employment on July 27, 2006.4 Gala
responded by filing an illegal dismissal complaint against Meralco.5
The Compulsory Arbitration Rulings
Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit. She held that Gala’s participation in the pilferage of
Meralco’s property rendered him unqualified to become a regular
employee.
Gala appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). In
its decision of May 2, 2008,7 the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter’s
ruling. It found that Gala had been illegally dismissed, since there was
“no concrete showing of complicity with the alleged
misconduct/dishonesty[.]”8 The NLRC, however, ruled out Gala’s
reinstatement, stating that his tenure lasted only up to the end of his
probationary period. It awarded him backwages and attorney’s fees.
Both parties moved for partial reconsideration; Gala, on the ground
that he should have been reinstated with full backwages, damages and
interests; and Meralco, on the ground that the NLRC erred in finding
that Gala had been illegally dismissed. The NLRC denied the motions.
Relying on the same grounds, Gala and Meralco elevated the case to
the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
The CA Decision
The CA denied Meralco’s petition for lack of merit and partially granted
Gala’s petition. It concurred with the NLRC that Gala had been illegally
dismissed, a ruling that was supported by the evidence. It opined that
nothing in the records show Gala’s knowledge of or complicity in the
pilferage. It found insufficient the joint affidavit10 of the members of
Meralco’s task force testifying that Gala and two other linemen knew
Llanes.
The CA modified the NLRC decision and ordered Gala’s reinstatement
with full backwages and other benefits. The CA also denied Meralco’s
motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for review on
certiorari.12
ISSUE:
Whether Gala’s reinstatement despite his probationary status is
proper.
The Court’s Ruling
We find merit in the petition.
Contrary to the conclusions of the CA and the NLRC, there is
substantial evidence supporting Meralco’s position that Gala had
become unfit to continue his employment with the company. Gala was
found, after an administrative investigation, to have failed to meet the
standards expected of him to become a regular employee and this
failure was mainly due to his “undeniable knowledge, if not
participation, in the pilferage activities done by their group, all to the
prejudice of the Company’s interests.”21
The evidence on record established Gala’s presence in the worksite
where the pilferage of company property happened.1âwphi1 It also
established that it was not only on May 25, 2006 that Llanes, the
pilferer, had been seen during a Meralco operation. He had been
previously noticed by Meralco employees, including Gala (based on his
admission),23 in past operations. If Gala had seen Llanes in earlier
projects or operations of the company, it is incredulous for him to say
that he did not know why Llanes was there or what Zuñiga and Llanes
were talking about. To our mind, the Meralco crew (the foremen and
the linemen) allowed or could have even asked Llanes to be there
during their operations for one and only purpose — to serve as their
conduit for pilfered company supplies to be sold to ready buyers
outside Meralco worksites.
We consider, too, and we find credible the company submission that
the Meralco crew who worked at the Pacheco Subdivision in
Valenzuela City on May 25, 2006 had not been returning unused
supplies and materials, to the prejudice of the company. From all
these, the allegedly hearsay evidence that is not competent in judicial
proceedings (as noted above), takes on special meaning and
relevance.
With respect to the video footage of the May 25, 2006 incident, Gala
himself admitted that he viewed the tape during the administrative
investigation, particularly in connection with the accusation against him
that he allowed Llanes (binatilyong may kapansanan sa bibig) to board
the Meralco trucks.26 The choice of evidence belongs to a party and RESOLUTION
the mere fact that the video was shown to Gala indicates that the video
was not an evidence that Meralco was trying to suppress. Gala could
have, if he had wanted to, served a subpoena for the production of the QUISUMBING, J p:
video footage as evidence. The fact that he did not does not
strengthen his case nor weaken the case of Meralco. This petition for certiorari seeks the reversal and setting
On the whole, the totality of the circumstances obtaining in the case aside of the Decision 1 dated January 31, 2002 and the
convinces us that Gala could not but have knowledge of the pilferage Resolution 2 dated September 12,
of company electrical supplies on May 25, 2006; he was complicit in its 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65465. The
commission, if not by direct participation, certainly, by his inaction while appellate court had affirmed the January 30, 2001 3 and April 20,
it was being perpetrated and by not reporting the incident to company 2001 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
authorities. Thus, we find substantial evidence to support the (NLRC).
conclusion that Gala does not deserve to remain in Meralco’s employ
as a regular employee. He violated his probationary employment The factual antecedents of this case are as follows.
agreement, especially the requirement for him “to observe at all times Labor Arbiter Manuel M. Manansala found
the highest degree of transparency, selflessness and integrity in the petitioner Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc.,
performance of their duties and responsibilities[.]”27 He failed to qualify a security agency, not liable for illegal dismissal in NLRC NCR 00-
as a regular employee.28 01-00833-96 and 00-02-01129-96 involving eight security guards
For ignoring the evidence in this case, the NLRC committed grave who were employees of the petitioner. However, the Labor Arbiter
abuse of discretion and, in sustaining the NLRC, the CA committed a directed the petitioner to pay the aforementioned security guards
reversible error. P81,750.00 in separation pay, P8,700.00 in unpaid salaries,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The P93,795.68 for underpayment and 10% attorney's fees based on the
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET total monetary award. 4
ASIDE. The complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the
NLRC which dismissed its appeal for two reasons — first, for having
been filed beyond the reglementary period within which to perfect the
NATIONWIDE SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES, appeal and second, for filing an insufficient appeal bond. It disposed
INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, as follows:
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is
JOSEPH DIMPAZ, HIPOLITO LOPEZ, EDWARD
hereby ordered that:
ODATO, FELICISIMO PABON and JOHNNY
AGBAY, respondents. 1. the instant appeal be considered DISMISSED;
and,
 2. the Decision appealed from be deemed FINAL
and EXECUTORY. aCIHcD
SO ORDERED. 5
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
then appealed to the Court of Appeals to have the appeal resolved
on the merits rather than on pure technicalities in the interest of due
process.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the case, holding that in a
special action for certiorari, the burden is on petitioner to prove not
merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent
NLRC. The dispositive portion of its decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
Resolutions dated 30 January 2001 and 20 April
2001 of the National Labor Relations Commission are
accordingly AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 6
The Court of Appeals likewise denied the petitioner's motion
for reconsideration. 7 Hence, this petition which raises the following
issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT TECHNICALITIES IN
LABOR CASES MUST PREVAIL OVER THE SPIRIT
AND INTENTION OF THE LABOR CODE UNDER
ARTICLE 221 THEREOF WHICH STATES:
"In any proceeding before the Commission
or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of Law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and
[i]ntention of this Code that the Commission
and its members and Labor Arbiters shall use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without [regard] to technicalities of law or
procedure, all [i]n the interest of due process."
Emphasis added.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE IN THE
CASE OF STAR ANGEL HANDICRAFT vs. NLRC, et
al., 236 SCRA 580 AND ROSEWOOD PROCESSING,
INC. VS. NLRC, G.R. [No.] 116476, May 21, 1998
FINDS APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE
[;] TSacAE
III.
WHETHER OR NOT SEPARATION PAY IS
JUSTIFIED AS AWARD IN CASES WHERE THE
EMPLOYEE IS TERMINATED DUE TO CONTRACT
EXPIRATION AS IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE REQUIREMENT ON
CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING
WHICH WAS RAISED BEFORE THE NLRC IS
ENFORCEABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE. 8
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it
dismissed its case based on technicalities while the private
respondents contend that the appeal to the NLRC had not been
perfected, since the appeal was filed outside the reglementary
period, and the bond was insufficient. 9 AECacT
 After considering all the circumstances in this case and the
submission by the parties, we are in agreement that the petition lacks
merit.
At the outset it must be pointed out here that the petition
for certiorari filed with the Court by petitioner under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is inappropriate. The proper remedy is a petition for
review under Rule 45 purely on questions of law. There being a
remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court available to the petitioner, the filing of a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 is improper.
But even if we bend our Rules to allow the present petition
for certiorari, still it will not prosper because we do not find any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Court of Appeals when it dismissed the
petition of the security agency. We must stress that under Rule 65,
the abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility. 10 No such
abuse of discretion happened here. The assailed decision by
the Court of Appeals was certainly not capricious nor arbitrary, nor
was it a whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to a
lack of jurisdiction. 11 TIEHDC
The Labor Code provides as follows:
ART. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both
parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such
appeal may be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
(a) If there is prima
facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the
Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured
through fraud or coercion, including graft and
corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law, and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are
raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage
or injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued
by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.
xxx xxx xxx
The New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC states:
Section 1. Periods of appeal. — Decisions,
resolutions or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by
any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt thereof; and in case of decisions, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Director of the
Department of Labor and Employment pursuant to
Article 129 of the Labor Code, within five (5) calendar
days from receipt thereof. If the 10th or 5th day, as the
case may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday,
the last day to perfect the appeal shall be the first
 working day following such Saturday, Sunday or
holiday.
No motion or request for extension of the period
within which to perfect an appeal shall be allowed.
In the instant case, both the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals found that petitioner received the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 16, 1999. This factual finding is
supported by sufficient evidence, 12 and we take it as binding on us.
Petitioner then simultaneously filed its "Appeal Memorandum",
"Notice of Appeal" and "Motion to Reduce Bond", by registered mail
on July 29, 1999, under Registry Receipt No. 003098. 13 These
were received by the NLRC on July 30, 1999. 14 The appeal to the
NLRC should have been perfected, as provided by its Rules, within a
period of 10 days from receipt by petitionerof the decision on July 16,
1999. Clearly, the filing of the appeal — three days after July 26,
1999 — was already beyond the reglementary period and in
violation of the NLRC Rules and the pertinent Article on Appeal in
the Labor Code. CHDAEc
Failure to perfect an appeal renders the decision final and
executory. 15 The right to appeal is a statutory right and one who
seeks to avail of the right must comply with the statute or the rules.
The rules, particularly the requirements for perfecting an appeal
within the reglementary period specified in the law, must be strictly
followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for the orderly discharge of judicial
business.16 It is only in highly meritorious cases that this Court will
opt not to strictly apply the rules and thus prevent a grave injustice
from being done. 17 The exception does not obtain here. Thus, we
are in agreement that the decision of the Labor Arbiter already
became final and executory because petitioner failed to file the
appeal within 10 calendar days from receipt of the decision.
Clearly, the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the appeal before it. It follows that the Court of Appeals,
too, did not err, nor gravely abuse its discretion, in sustaining the
NLRC Order, by dismissing the petition for certiorari before it. Hence,
with the primordial issue resolved, we find no need to tarry on the
other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 31, 2002 and the
Resolution dated September 12,
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65465 are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 155844 (Resolution), [July 14, 2008], 580 PHIL 135-143)
DIAMOND TAXI and/or BRYAN ONG v. FELIPE LLAMAS, JR.
FACTS: Respondent Llamas, a taxi driver for petitioner Diamond Taxi
(owned and operated by Petitioner Bryan Ong), filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter. Denying
the charge against them, petitioners alleged that respondent has been
absent without official leave for several days from July 14, 2005 until
August 1, 2005. They submitted a copy of the attendance logbook
showing that respondent has been absent on the said dates. They
claimed that respondent has violated several traffic regulations in the
years of 2000-2005 and that they issued to him several memoranda for
insubordination and refusal to heed management instructions. They
further claimed that the aforementioned acts constituted as grounds for
the termination of Llamas Employment.
Llamas failed to seasonably file his position paper. Hence, the Labor
Arbiter dismissed respondent complaint for lack of merit. Respondent
filed his position paper and claimed that he failed to seasonably file his
position paper because his previous counsel, despite his repeated
pleas, had continuously deferred compliance with the LA orders for its
submission. Hence, he was forced to secure the services of another
counsel in order to comply with the LA directive.
In his position paper, Llamas alleged that he had a misunderstanding
with Aljuver Ong, Bryan brother and operations manager of Diamond
Taxi, on July 13, 2005. He reported for work on July 14, 2005 but
Bryan refused to give him the key to his assigned taxi cab unless he
would sign a prepared resignation letter. He did not sign the
resignation letter. He reported for work again on July 15 and 16, 2005,
but Bryan insisted that he sign the resignation letter prior to the release
of the key to his assigned taxi cab. Hence, the filing of the illegal
dismissal complaint.
Llamas filed before the LA a motion for reconsideration of its decision
dismissing his complaint. The LA treated Llamas Motion as an appeal.
The NLRC dismissed for non-perfection Llamas Motion. It pointed out
that Llamas failed to attach the required certification of non-forum
shopping per Section 4, Rule VI of the 2005 NLRC Rules. Llamas
moved to reconsider NLRC resolution and attached the required
certification of non-forum shopping in his motion but the same was
denied which impelled Llamas to file a petition for certiorari before the
CA.
The CA reversed and set aside the assailed NLRC resolution and ruled
that the NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed Llamas' appeal purely on a technicality. The CA ruled further
that petitioners failed to prove overt acts showing Llamas' clear
intention to abandon his job. It was found, however, that petitioners
placed Llamas in a situation where he was forced to quit as his
continued employment has been rendered impossible, unreasonable
or unlikely, i.e., making him sign a resignation letter as a precondition
for giving him the key to his assigned taxi cab. These acts amounted to
constructive dismissal. The CA additionally noted that Llamas
immediately filed the illegal dismissal case that proved his desire to
return to work and negates the charge of abandonment.
ISSUES: [1] Whether or not the CA encroached on the NLRC
exclusive jurisdiction to review the merits of the LA decision?
[2] Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing Llamas' appeal on mere technicality?
[3] Whether or not Llamas abandoned his work?
HELD: The Court found no error in the course that the CA took in
resolving Llamas' petition for certiorari. The CA may resolve factual
issues by express legal mandate and pursuant to its equity jurisdiction.
The CA, in labor cases elevated to it via petition for certiorari, can grant
prerogative writs when it finds that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in arriving at its factual conclusions. To make this finding, the
CA necessarily has to view the evidence if only to determine if the
NLRC ruling had basis in evidence. It is in the sense and manner that
the CA, in a Rule 65 certiorari petition before it, had to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion on factual issues attended the
NLRC dismissal of Llamas' appeal.
Dismissal of an appeal based on mere technicalities inconsistent
to the constitutional mandate to protect labor
The Court agreed with the CA in ruling that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing Llamas' appeal.
Article 227 of the Labor Code mandates that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process. A strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, should not be allowed.
The CA correctly regarded the respondent as constructively dismissed.
Constructive dismissal exists when there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or
unlikely.
Petitioners failed to establish the alleged abandonment of respondent.
Mere absence of the employee does not constitute abandonment. It
was pointed out by the CA that Llamas filed the complaint two days
from the third time he was refused access to his assigned taxi cab.
Respondent could not be deemed to have abandoned his work.
Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc., 459 Phil. 506 laid down the
elements of abandonment: 1) x x x the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) x x x there must have been a clear intention [on the
part of the employee] to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act. DENIED.
SARA LEE PHILIPPINES v. EMILINDA D. MACATLANG, GR No.
180147, 2015-01-14
Facts:
In the Decision dated 4 June 2014, this Court directed SLPI, Aris, SLC,
Cesar Cruz, and FAPI, collectively known as the Corporations, to post
P725 Million, in cash or surety bond, within 10 days from the receipt of
the Decision.
On 30 October 2004, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5,984
Aris employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting
to P3,453,664,710.86.
The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce
Appeal Bond. They posted a P4.5 Million bond. The NLRC granted
the reduction of the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post
an additional P4.5 Million bond.
The 5,984 former Aris employees, represented by Emilinda Macatlang
(Macatlang petition), filed a petition for review before the Court of
Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to failure of the
Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is...
equivalent to the judgment award.
The Court of Appeals, on 26 March 2007, ordered the Corporations to
post an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion.
In our Decision dated 4 June 2014, we modified the Court of Appeals'
Decision
The Corporations are directed to post P725 Million, in cash or surety
bond, within TEN (10) days from the receipt of this DECISION.
Issues:
The Corporations score this Court for failing to consider the ruling in
McBurnie v. Ganzon[4] which purportedly required only the posting of a
bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award.
Ruling:
The Corporations gravely misappreciated the ruling in McBurnie. The
10% requirement pertains to the reasonable amount which the NLRC
would accept as the minimum of the bond that should accompany the
motion to reduce bond in order to suspend the period to perfect an...
appeal under the NLRC rules. The 10% is based on the judgment
award and should in no case be construed as the minimum amount of
bond to be posted in order to perfect appeal.
McBurnie made it clear that the... percentage of bond set is provisional
The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion and
determine... the final amount of bond that shall be posted by the
appellant, still in accordance with the standards of "meritorious
grounds" and "reasonable amount." Should the NLRC, after
considering the motion's merit, determine that a greater amount or the
full amount of the bond needs to... be posted by the appellant, then the
party shall comply accordingly. The appellant shall be given a period of
10 days from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the
appeal by posting the required appeal bond.
DELA ROSA LINER VS. BORELA
GR NO: 207286
DATE: July 29, 2015
PETITIONER: DELA ROSA LINER, INC. AND/OR ROSAURO DELA
ROSA, SR AND NORA DELAROSA
RESPONDENTS: CALIXTO B. BORELA AND ESTELO A. AMARILE
Facts: On September 23, 2011, respondents Calixto Borela, bus driver,
and Estelo Amarille, conductor, filed separate complaints (later
consolidated) against petitioners Dela Rosa Liner, Inc., a public
transport company for underpayment/non- payment of salaries and
other benefits, and violation of Wage Order Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16.
In a motion dated October 26, 2011, the petitioners asked the
labor arbiter to dismiss the case for forum shopping. They alleged that
on September 28, 2011, the CA 13th Division disposed of a similar case
between the parties after they entered into a compromise agreement
which covered all claims and causes of action they had against each
other in relation to the respondents' employment. The respondents
opposed the motion, contending that the causes of action in the present
case are different from the causes of action settled in the case the
petitioners cited
LA: upheld the petitioners' position and dismissed the complaint on
grounds of forum shopping.
NLRC: held that the respondents could not have committed forum
shopping as there was no identity of causes of action between the two
cases.
CA: found no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC ruling that the
respondents did not commit forum shopping when they filed their second
complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second complaint is barred by the rule on
forum shopping or by the principle of res judicata.
HELD: NO. Contrary to the petitioners' submission, respondents' second
complaint, a money claim, is not a "similar case" to the first complaint.
Thus, the filing of the second complaint did not constitute forum
shopping and the judgment in the first case is not a res judicata ruling
that bars the second complaint
The first complaint charged the petitioners with illegal dismissal
and unfair labor practice; while the second complaint was based on the
petitioners' alleged nonpayment/underpayment of their salaries and
monetary benefits, and violation of several wage orders. As the CA aptly
cited, the elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties; (2)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such
that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration. We concur with the CA that forum shopping and res
judicata are not applicable in the present case. There is no identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and the judgment rendered in the
previous action will not amount to res judicata in the action now under
consideration. There is also no identity of causes of action in the first
complaint and in the second complaint because the same facts or
evidence would not support both actions.
We likewise cannot accept the compromise agreement's
application "to all claims and damages or losses either party may have
against each other whether those damages or losses are known or
unknown, foreseen or unforeseen." This coverage is too sweeping and
effectively excludes any claims by the respondents against the
petitioners, including those that by law and jurisprudence cannot be
waived without appropriate consideration such as nonpayment or
underpayment of overtime pay and wages.
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION/EDUARD
O MANESE and PRINCESS CRUISE LINES,
LTD., petitioners, vs.
CYNTHIA DE JESUS, respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
A conditional settlement of a judgment award may be treated
as a compromise agreement and a judgment on the merits of the
case if it turns out to be highly prejudicial to one of the parties.
This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed
by Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo Manese, 2 and
Princess Cruise Lines, Limited (petitioners) assailing the August 17,
2012 Decision 3 and October 19, 2012 Resolution 4 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 119393. The assailed Court of Appeals
Decision upheld the November 24, 2010 Decision 5 and February
28, 2011 Resolution 6 of the National Labor Relations Commission
in NLRC NCR LAC No. 08-000481-09 (NLRC NCR No. (M) 09-
13352-08).
On February 28, 2006, Magsaysay Maritime Corporation
(Magsaysay), the local manning agent of Princess Cruise Lines,
Limited, hired Bernardine De Jesus (Bernardine) as an
Accommodation Supervisor for the cruise ship Regal Princess.
Based on the contract of employment 7 that he signed, Bernardine
was to receive a basic monthly wage of US$388.00 for a period of
10 months. AIDSTE
On March 9, 2006, Bernardine boarded Regal Princess and
he eventually disembarked 10 months later, or on January 16, 2007,
after his contract of employment ended. 8
Bernardine was soon diagnosed with Aortic Aneurysm and on
March 15, 2007, he had a coronary angiography. On March 21, 2007,
he underwent a Left Axillofemoral Bypass. 9 He died on March 26,
2007. 10
On September 24, 2008, respondent
Cynthia De Jesus (Cynthia), Bernardine's widow, filed a
complaint 11 against Magsaysay for "payment of death benefits,
medical expenses, sickness allowance, damages, and attorney's
fees." 12 Cynthia and Magsaysay were unable to amicably settle the
case; hence, they were directed to submit their respective position The National Labor Relations Commission upheld the Labor
papers. 13 Arbiter's finding that Bernardine's cardio-vascular disease was work-
related. 19
On June 30, 2009, the Labor Arbiter granted Cynthia's
complaint and directed Magsaysay to pay her claims for death The National Labor Relations Commission also noted that
benefits, additional benefits, burial expenses, and attorney's fees. 14 while the general rule in compensability of death is that a seafarer's
death must have occurred during the term of the employment
The Labor Arbiter ruled that it was highly improbable that
contract, an exception to this rule is when a seafarer contracted an
Bernardine developed a cardio-vascular disease which would lead
illness while under the contract and this illness caused his death: 20
to his death merely two (2) months after his repatriation. 15
In such case, even if the seaman died after the term of
The Labor Arbiter held that Cynthia sufficiently established
the contract, his beneficiaries are entitled to death
that her husband suffered chest pains while he was still aboard the
compensation and benefits. Thus, [w]here a seaman
Regal Princess. She claimed that he had reported his condition but
contracts an illness during the term of his employment
he was not provided with medical attention. Furthermore, he had also
and such illness causes the death of the seaman even
asked for medical attention upon his repatriation, but his request was
after the term of his contract, the beneficiaries of the
once again denied. 16 The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter
seaman are entitled, as a matter of right, to death
Decision read:
compensation and benefits. 21
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
As for Bernardine's failure to submit himself to a post-
judgment is hereby rendered finding respondents liable
employment medical examination, the National Labor Relations
to pay, jointly and severally, complainant's claims for
Commission remarked that this Court had already ruled that it could
death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment
be dispensed with. Furthermore, the National Labor Relations
Contract, amounting to US$50,000.00 and additional
Commission pointed out that the failure to undergo a post-
benefits amounting to US$21,000.00 for complainant's
employment medical examination within three (3) days from
three (3) minor children, in Philippine currency at the
repatriation leads to the forfeiture of medical benefits and sickness
prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment;
allowance, not death benefits. 22 The dispositive portion of the
US$1,000.00 representing burial expenses; and
National Labor Relations Commission Decision read:
attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the total
monetary award. WHEREFORE, the Decision of the labor arbiter
a quo dated June 30, 2009 rendered in NLRC NCR
All other claims are denied.
Case No. (M) 09-13352-08 is hereby AFFIRMED in
SO ORDERED. 17 toto.
On November 24, 2010, the National Labor Relations SO ORDERED. 23 (Emphasis in the original)
Commission 18 denied Magsaysay's appeal.
 On May 13, 2011, Magsaysay filed a Petition
for Certiorari 24 before the Court of Appeals.
On June 30, 2011, Magsaysay paid Cynthia P3,370,514.40
as conditional satisfaction of the judgment award against it and
without prejudice to its Petition for Certiorari pending before the
Court of Appeals. 25
On July 1, 2011, in light of the conditional settlement between
the parties, the Labor Arbiter considered the case closed and
terminated but without prejudice to Magsaysay's pending petition
before the Court of Appeals. 26
On August 17, 2012, the Court of Appeals 27 dismissed the
petition for being moot and academic. 28 On October 19, 2012, the
Court of Appeals 29 denied Magsaysay's motion for
reconsideration. 30
On December 19, 2012, petitioners filed their Petition for
Review on Certiorari 31 where they continue to assert that the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Certiorari for being
moot and academic. Petitioners emphasize that Leonis Navigation v.
Villamater 32 stated that if the Court of Appeals grants a petition
for certiorari, the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission will become void ab initio and will never attain
finality. 33
Petitioners maintain that Leonis ruled that even if the
employer voluntarily pays the judgment award, the seafarer's
beneficiary is estopped from claiming that the controversy has ended
with the Labor Arbiter's Order closing and terminating the case. This
is because the beneficiary acknowledged that the payment received
"was without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition
for certiorari pending before the [Court of Appeals]." 34
Furthermore, petitioners claim that Bernardine's death was
not compensable under the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) because he
died after his contract of employment was terminated. 35 Petitioners
put forth that "[f]rom then on, petitioners' responsibilities and
obligations to the deceased seafarer had ceased." 36
Petitioners also highlight that Bernardine was not repatriated
due to illness but because of the completion of his
contract. 37 Additionally, Bernardine failed to submit himself to a
post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his
repatriation, as required by the POEA-SEC. Thus, petitioners claim
that there was no basis for the death benefits claimed by Cynthia.
Petitioners point out that Bernardine did not complain of any illness
during the de-briefing session conducted before his repatriation. 38
Nonetheless, even if Bernardine complied with the rule on
post-employment medical examination, petitioners contend that
Aortic Aneurysm, which caused Bernardine's death, was not a
compensable occupational disease under the POEA-SEC. They
aver that it cannot be presumed that the cause of his death was work-
related. They posit that respondent utterly failed to substantiate her
claim that her husband's death was work-related. 39
On February 13, 2013, this Court required respondent Cynthia
to comment on the Petition for Review. 40
On May 3, 2013, respondent filed her Comment 41 where she
stresses that the ruling in Career Philippines Ship Management, Inc.
v. Madjus 42 is applicable to her case since both cases pertain to
voluntary satisfaction of claims for death benefits. 43 Furthermore,
just like in Career Philippines, by accepting the monetary award from
petitioners, respondent will no longer have any available remedy
against them, while petitioners are still free to pursue any of the
remedies available to them. 44
Respondent also argues that the issues raised before this
Court are the same factual issues already threshed out before the
Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Respondent contends that the findings of the administrative tribunals
are supported by substantial evidence; hence, they should be
accorded great weight and respect by this Court. 45
Respondent denies that her husband failed to comply with the
three (3)-day reporting requirement and claims that her husband
even asked to be provided with medical attention upon his
repatriation, but his request was denied:
The petitioners merely told him to take a rest
and after that, he will be re-deployed again.
Seaman De Jesus could not have immediately filed a
disability claim (as suggested by petitioners)
because he was not yet examined by a doctor due to
the refusal of petitioners to provide post-employment
medical attention. He was also hoping that his
condition would improve after taking a rest, as
suggested by petitioners.
However, his condition did not improve until he
suffered aortic aneurism on March 14,
2007. 46 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 12, 2013, this Court required petitioners to reply to
the Comment. 47
On November 4, 2013, petitioners filed their Reply 48 where
they deny respondent's allegation that they voluntarily offered to pay
the full judgment award. They claim that they even opposed
respondent's Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution and were
just forced to pay the judgment award since their petition before the
Court of Appeals did not stay the judgment award. 49
Petitioners reiterate that the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing the petition on the ground that the payment of the
judgment award rendered the petition moot and academic because
the payment made to respondent was without prejudice to the then
pending petition before the Court of Appeals. 50
Petitioners argue that the labor tribunals committed grave
abuse of discretion in awarding death benefits to Cynthia and her
three (3) minor children considering that Bernardine's death was not
compensable under the POEA-SEC and that respondent failed to
prove her claims of compensability with substantial evidence. 51
The parties filed their respective memoranda on February 12,
2014 52 and March 24, 2014, 53 in compliance with this Court's
December 2, 2013 Resolution. 54
This Court resolves the following issues:
First, whether or not the payment of money judgment has
rendered the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot
and academic; and
Second, whether or not the award of death benefits was
issued with grave abuse of discretion.
The petition is devoid of merit.
I
Petitioners cite Leonis Navigation v. Villamater 55 to support
their claim that their payment of the judgment award did not render
the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals moot and
academic. Leonis stated: EcTCAD
Simply put, the execution of the final and
executory decision or resolution of the NLRC shall
proceed despite the pendency of a petition
for certiorari, unless it is restrained by the proper court.
In the present case, petitioners already paid
Villamater's widow, Sonia, the amount of
[P]3,649,800.00, representing the total and permanent
disability award plus attorney's fees, pursuant to the
 Writ of Execution issued by the Labor Arbiter.
Thereafter, an Order was issued declaring the case as
"closed and terminated." However, although there was
no motion for reconsideration of this last Order, Sonia
was, nonetheless, estopped from claiming that the
controversy had already reached its end with the
issuance of the Order closing and terminating the case.
This is because the Acknowledgment Receipt she
signed when she received petitioners' payment was
without prejudice to the final outcome of the petition
for certiorari pending before the CA. 56
Respondent, in turn, cites Career Philippines Ship
Management, Inc. v. Madjus 57 to substantiate her claim that the
Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment Award was akin to an amicable
settlement, rendering the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals moot and academic. Career Philippines stated:
As for the "Conditional Satisfaction of
Judgment," the Court holds that it is valid, hence, the
"conditional" settlement of the judgment award insofar
as it operates as a final satisfaction thereof to render
the case moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, the Affidavit of Claimant attached to the
"Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment" states:
xxx xxx xxx
5. That I understand that the payment of
the judgment award of US$66,000.00 or
its peso equivalent of
PhP2,932,974.00 includes all my past,
present and future expenses and
claims, and all kinds of benefits due to
me under the POEA employment
contract and all collective bargaining
agreements and all labor laws and
regulations, civil law or any other law
whatsoever and all damages, pains
and sufferings in connection with my
claim.
6. That I have no further claims
whatsoever in any theory of law against
the Owners of MV "Tama Star" because
of the payment made to me. That I certify
and warrant that I will not file any
complaint or prosecute any suit of
action in the Philippines, Panama,
Japan or any country against the
shipowners and/or released
parties herein after receiving the
payment of US$66,000.00 or its peso
equivalent of PhP2,932,974.00
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In effect, while petitioner had the luxury of
having other remedies available to it such as its petition
for certiorari pending before the appellate court, and an
eventual appeal to this Court, respondent, on the other
hand, could no longer pursue other claims, including
for interests that may accrue during the pendency of
the case. 58 (Emphasis in the original)
Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Legaspi 59 clarified
that this Court ruled against the employer in Career Philippines not
because the parties entered into a conditional settlement but
because the conditional satisfaction of judgment was "highly
prejudicial to the employee." 60
 The agreement stated that the payment of the
monetary award was without prejudice to the right of
the employer to file a petition for certiorari and appeal,
while the employee agreed that she would no longer
file any complaint or prosecute any suit of action
against the employer after receiving the payment. 61
Equitable considerations were the underlying basis for the
ruling in Career Philippines 62 and this was accentuated
in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Pelagio, 63 which
summarized the ruling in Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v.
Legaspi as follows:
Ultimately, in Philippine Transmarine, the Court
ruled that since the agreement in that case was fair to
the parties in that it provided available remedies to both
parties, the certiorari petition was not rendered moot
despite the employer's satisfaction of the judgment
award, as the respondent had obliged himself to return
the payment if the petition would be granted. 64
In the instant case, the parties entered into a compromise
agreement when they executed a Conditional Satisfaction of
Judgment Award. 65
Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise
agreement as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced." Parties freely enter into a compromise agreement,
making it a judgment on the merits of the case with the effect
of res judicata upon them. 66
While the general rule is that a valid compromise agreement
has the power to render a pending case moot and academic, being
a contract, the parties may opt to modify the legal effects of their
compromise agreement to prevent the pending case from becoming
moot. 67
In the Conditional Satisfaction of Judgment
Award, 68 respondent acknowledged receiving the sum of
P3,370,514.40 from petitioners as conditional payment of the
judgment award. Both parties agreed that the payment of the
judgment award was without prejudice to the
pending certiorari proceedings before the Court of Appeals and was
only made to prevent the imminent execution being undertaken by
respondent and the National Labor Relations Commission. Finally,
in the event the judgment award of the labor tribunals is reversed by
the Court of Appeals or by this Court, respondent agreed to return
whatever she would have received back to petitioners and in the
same vein, if the Court of Appeals or this Court affirms the decisions
of the labor tribunals, petitioners shall pay respondent the balance of
the judgment award without need of demand. 69
Respondent, for herself and for her three (3) minor children
with Bernardine, then signed a Receipt of Payment 70 where she
reiterated the undertakings she took in the Conditional Satisfaction
of Judgement Award.
However, in the Affidavit of Heirship, 71 respondent was
prohibited from seeking further redress against petitioners, making
the compromise agreement ultimately prejudicial to
respondent: HSAcaE
I, CYNTHIA P. DE JESUS, with residence at
157 Isarog St., La Loma, Quezon City, Philippines,
after being duly sworn, depose and say:
xxx xxx xxx
[7.] That I understand that the payment of the
judgment award of US$79,200.00 or its peso
equivalent plus of Php3,370,514.40 includes all my
 past, present and future expenses and claims, and all
kinds of benefits due to me under the POEA
employment contract and all collective bargaining
agreements and all labor laws and regulations, civil law
or any other law whatsoever and all damages, pains
and sufferings in connection with my claim;
[8.] That I have no further claims whatsoever in
any theory of law against the Owners of
"REGAL PRINCESS" because of the payment made
to me. That I certify and warrant that I will not file any
complaint or prosecute any suit or action in the
Philippines, United States of America, Liberia, Kuwait,
Panama, United Kingdom or any other country against
the shipowners and/or the released parties herein after
receiving the payment of US$79,200.00 or its peso
equivalent of Php3,370,514.40[.] 72 (Emphasis
supplied)
This prohibition on the part of respondent to pursue any of the
available legal remedies should the Court of Appeals or this Court
reverse the judgment award of the labor tribunals or prosecute any
other suit or action in another country puts the seafarer's
beneficiaries at a grave disadvantage. Thus, Career Philippines is
applicable and the Court of Appeals did not err in treating the
conditional settlement as an amicable settlement, effectively
rendering the Petition for Certiorari moot and academic.
II
Despite our previous disquisition, this Court will still take up
the second issue brought before it for resolution.
Madridejos v. NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc. 73 discussed
that generally, this Court limits itself to questions of law in a Rule 45
petition:
As a rule, we only examine questions of law in a
Rule 45 petition. Thus, "we do not re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or substitute the findings of fact of the
[National Labor Relations Commission], an
administrative body that has expertise in its specialized
field." Similarly, we do not replace our "own judgment
for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight
of evidence lies or what evidence is credible." The
factual findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission, when confirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are usually "conclusive on this Court." 74
This Court sees no reason to depart from this rule.
Section 20 (A) of the POEA-SEC requires that for a seafarer
to be entitled to death benefits, he must have suffered a work-related
death during the term of his contract. This provision reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND
BENEFITS. —
A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR
DEATH
1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer,
during the term of his contract the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the
Philippine Currency equivalent to the
amount of Fifty Thousand US dollars
(US$50,000) and an additional amount of
Seven Thousand US dollars (US$7,000) to
each child under the age of twenty-one
(21) but not exceeding four (4) children, at
the exchange rate prevailing during the
time of payment.
 xxx xxx xxx
4. The other liabilities of the employer when the
seafarer dies as a result of work-related
injury or illness during the term of
employment are as follows:
a. The employer shall pay the deceased's
beneficiary all outstanding
obligations due the seafarer under
this Contract.
b. The employer shall transport the
remains and personal effects of the
seafarer to the Philippines at
employer's expense except if the
death occurred in a port where local
government laws or regulations do
not permit the transport of such
remains. In case death occurs at
sea, the disposition of the remains
shall be handled or dealt with in
accordance with the master's best
judgment. In all cases, the
employer/master shall
communicate with the manning
agency to advise for disposition of
seafarer's remains.
c. The employer shall pay the beneficiaries
of the seafarer the
Philippines [sic] currency
equivalent to the amount of One
Thousand US dollars (US$1,000)
for burial expenses at the exchange
rate prevailing during the time of
payment.
However, Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC acknowledges the
possibility of "compensation for the death of the seafarer
occurring after the employment contract on account of a work-
related illness" 75 as long as the following conditions are met:
(1) The seafarer's work must involve the risks described
herein;
(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the
seafarer's exposure to the described risks;
(3) The disease was contracted within a period of
exposure and under such other factors necessary
to contract it;
(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer. 76
Furthermore, a cardio-vascular disease may be considered
occupational under Section 32-A (11) if any of the established
conditions are met: AcICHD
The following diseases are considered as
occupational when contracted under working
conditions involving the risks described herein:
xxx xxx xxx
11. Cardio-Vascular Diseases. Any of the
following conditions must be met:
a. If the heart disease was known to have
been present during employment,
there must be proof that an acute
exacerbation was clearly
 precipitated by the unusual strain by
reasons of the nature of his work.
b. The strain of work that brings about an
acute attack must be sufficient
severity and must be followed within
24 hours by the clinical signs of a
cardiac insult to constitute causal
relationship.
c. If a person who was apparently
asymptomatic before being
subjected to strain at work showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac
injury during the performance of his
work and such symptoms and signs
persisted, it is reasonable to claim a
causal relationship. 77
In fulfilling these requisites, respondent must present no less
than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as "such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion." 78
Both labor tribunals found that Bernardine first experienced
chest pains while he was still onboard the cruise ship, i.e., during the
term of his employment contract. It was likewise established that
while Bernardine requested medical attention when he started to feel
ill and upon his repatriation, his requests were repeatedly ignored.
The Labor Arbiter held:
Complainant has clearly established that her
husband's condition was suffered while he was on
board the vessel and during the term of his
employment contract with the respondents. Strict rules
of evidence are not applicable in claims for
compensation and disability benefits. Against the self-
serving denials of the respondents, complainant has
shown that her husband, prior to his death, suffered
chest pains while on board and reported his condition
but he was not allowed to seek medical attention.
When he was repatriated, he asked the respondents
anew for medical check up but his request was again
denied. Having substantially established that the
causative circumstances leading to her husband's
death had transpired during his employment. We find
that complainant is entitled to the death compensation
and other benefits under the POEA Standard Contract.
Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is
the test of proof in compensation proceedings[.] 79
While the National Labor Relations Commission opined:
Evidently, the disease which led to the death of
Bernardine de Jesus is work-related, and in this
regard, We believe that complainant-appellee
presented sufficient evidence to show the nature of
the maritime employment of her late husband, as well
as the disease he suffered from and its causal
relationship to hismaritime employment. 80
The findings of the labor tribunals correspond with the
unassailed fact that Bernardine died from a cardio-vascular disease
merely two (2) months after his repatriation. This Court concurs with
the Labor Arbiter's observation that it was improbable for Bernardine
to have developed and died from a cardio-vascular disease within
the two (2) short months following his repatriation:
Seaman de Jesus died just over two (2) months
from his repatriation. It is quite improbable for him to
develop cardio-vascular disease which caused his
death during that short span of time. Medical studies
 cited on record recognize the fact that it is medically
impossible to acquire cardiovascular illnesses merely
days or weeks prior to one's death. . .
It is therefore evident that the illness which
caused Seaman de Jesus' death occurred during the
term of his employment contract, though it may not
have fully manifested at once. The fact that the
seaman's work exposed him to different climates and
unpredictable weather also helped trigger the onset of
his disease. There is therefore a reasonable
connection between the conditions of employment and
work actually performed by the deceased seafarer and
his illness. 81
Being factual in nature, this Court sees no reason to disturb
the findings of the labor tribunals as it has usually given deference to
the findings of fact of administrative agencies which have acquired
expertise in their specific jurisdiction. Their factual findings are
generally binding upon this Court, absent a showing a grave abuse
of discretion. 82
WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to deny the Petition. The
assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2012 and
Resolution dated October 19, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 119393 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. TAIaHE
||| (Magsaysay Maritime Corp. v. De Jesus, G.R. No. 203943, [August
30, 2017])
ART. 229
36. ISLRIZ TRADING vs CAPADA et. Al
FACTS: Respondents were helpers of Islriz Trading, a gravel and sand
business owned and operated by petitioner Victor Hugo Lu. Claiming
that they were illegally dismissed, respondents filed a Complaint for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, rest day
pay, allowances and separation pay against petitioner before the Labor
Arbiter. On his part, petitioner imputed abandonment of work against
respondents. LA Gan rendered decision against petitioner. Petitioner
appealed to the NLRC which granted the appeal and ordered
respondents’ reinstatement but without backwages. Respondents filed
an MR but was denied. Respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter anEx-
Parte Motion to Set Case for Conference with Motion, they averred that
despite the issuance and subsequent finality of the NLRC Resolution
which likewise ordered respondents’ reinstatement, petitioner still
refused to reinstate them. They prayed that in view of the orders of
reinstatement, a computation of the award of backwages be made and
that an Alias Writ of Execution for its enforcement be issued. The case
was then set for pre-execution conference. Since the parties failed to
come to terms of the issue of the monetary award, LA through Fiscal
Examiner Trinchera issued an undated computation. LA Castillon then
issued a writ of execution to enforce the monetary award in accordance
with the computation. By virtue of such writ, petitioner’s properties were
levied and set for auction sale where the respondents were the only
bidders. Later, petitioners claimed that they could not take possession
of the properties because they were padlocked by the petitioner. They
asked LA Castillon to issue a break/open order. Petitioner then filed a
motion to quash the writ of execution, notice of sale/levy. It stated that
NLRC’s decision did not include payment of backwages but only
reinstatement therefore the writ of execution was null and void. CA
dismissed the petition and agreed with LA Castillon’s ratiocination that
the subject of the writ were accrued salaries owing to respondents by
virtue of the reinstatement order of LA as provided in Article 223.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code is
applicable to this case?
2. Whether respondents may collect their wages during the period
between the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement pending appeal and
the NLRC Resolution overturning that of the Labor Arbiter?
HELD: 1. Yes. The Court held that even if the order of reinstatement of
the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court or tribunal.
It likewise settled the view thatthe Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement
is immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them
to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their
dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise
the options in the alternative, employer must pay the employee’s
salaries.
2. Yes. The court went on to declare that after the Labor Arbiter’s
decision is reversed by a higher tribunal, the employee may be barred
from collecting the accrued wages, if it is shown that the delay in
enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part
of the employer. It then provided for the twofold test in determining
whether an employee is barred from recovering his accrued wages, to
wit: (1) there must be actual delay or that the order of reinstatement
pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the delay
must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. If the delay
is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the employer may still be
required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision. Applying the two-fold test, Respondents have the
right to collect their accrued salaries during the period between the
Labor Arbiter’s Decision ordering their reinstatement pending appeal
and the NLRC Resolution overturning the same because petitioner’s
failure to reinstate them either actually or through payroll was due to
petitioner’s unjustified refusal to effect reinstatement. 1. A Writ of
Execution was issued by LA Gan on April 22, 2002. However, until the
issuance of the September 5, 2002 NLRC Resolution overturning Labor
Arbiter Gan’s Decision, petitioner still failed to reinstate respondents or
effect payroll reinstatement. This was what actually prompted
respondents to file anExParte Motion to Set Case for Conference with
Motionwherein they also prayed for the issuance of a computation of the
award of backwages and Alias Writ of Execution for its enforcement. It
cannot therefore be denied that there was an actual delay in the
execution of the reinstatement aspect of the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Gan prior to the issuance of the NLRC Resolution overturning the same.
2. After petitioner was served with the Writ of Execution dated April 22,
2002 he promised that he would first refer the matter to his counsel as
he could not effectively act on the order of execution without the latter’s
advice. He gave his word that upon conferment with his lawyer; he will
inform the Office of the Labor Arbiter of his action on the writ. Petitioner,
however, without any satisfactory reason, failed to fulfill this promise and
respondents remained to be not reinstated until the NLRC resolved
petitioner’s appeal.Evidently, the delay in the execution of respondents’
reinstatement was due to petitioner’s unjustified refusal to affect the
same.
37. GARCIA v KJ COMMERCIAL & REYNALDO QUE
FACTS: Respondent owns trucks and engages in the business of
distributing cement products. It employed as truck drivers and truck
helpers petitioners. petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary
increase. To pressure KJ Commercial to grant their demand, they
stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement
Plant Station in Sison, Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers
from reporting to work. Petitioners then filed with the LA a complaint for February and 25 June 2010 Resolutions and the Court of Appeals’ 29
illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary and non-payment of service April 2011 Decision are void for lack of jurisdiction?
incentive leave and thirteenth month pay. In his 30 October 2008
HELD: NO. Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter’s monetary award
Decision, LA decided in favor of respondents stating that complainants
has already reached finality, since private respondents were not able to
were illegally dismissed from their work and they are entitled to their
file a timely appeal before the NLRC, since they have failed to post the
separation in lieu of reinstatement equivalent to their salary for one (1)
required surety bond. KJ Commercial’s filing of a motion to reduce bond
month for every year of service and backwages from the time that they
and delayed posting of the P2,562,930 surety bond did not render the
were terminated. KJ Commercial appealed to the NLRC. It filed before
Labor Arbiter’s 30 October 2008 Decision final and executory. The Rules
the NLRC a motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond. In
of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond
its 9 March 2009 Decision, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for non-
subject to two conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a bond
perfection of the appeal and held that the P50,000.00 cash bond posted
in a reasonable amount is posted. The filing of a motion to reduce bond
by respondents-appellants which represents less than two (2) percent
and compliance with the two conditions stop the running of the period to
of the monetary award is dismally disproportionate to the monetary
perfect an appeal. The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the
award of P2,612,930.00 and that the amount of bond posted by
motion to reduce bond, and it may rule on the motion beyond the 10-day
respondents-appellants is not reasonable in relation to the monetary
period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the time of the
award. A motion to reduce bond that does not satisfy the conditions
filing of the motion to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable
required under NLRC Rules shall not stop the running of the period to
amount, there is no assurance whether the appellant’s motion is indeed
perfect an appeal. KJ filed a motion for reconsideration and posted a
based on “meritorious ground” and whether the bond he or she posted
P2,562,930 surety bond and . In its 8 February 2010 Resolution, NLRC
is of a “reasonable amount.” Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of
granted the motion stating that there has been an honest effort by the
failing to perfect an appeal. “While the bond requirement on appeals
appellants to comply with putting up the full amount of the required
involving monetary awards has been relaxed in certain cases, this can
appeal bond. Moreover, considering the merit of the appeal, by granting
only be done where there was substantial compliance of the Rules or
the motion for reconsideration, the paramount interest of justice is better
where the appellants, at the very least, exhibited willingness to pay by
served in the resolution of this case. Petitioners filed an MR which was
posting a partial bond.” In the present case, KJ Commercial showed
denied by NLRC on June 25, 2010. They then filed a petition for
willingness to post a partial bond. In fact, it posted a P50,000 cash bond.
certiorari with the CA. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC on 29 April
When the NLRC denied its motion, KJ Commercial filed a motion for
2011.
reconsideration and posted the full P2, 562,930 surety bond. The NLRC
ISSUES: Whether or not LA’s 30 October 2008 Decision became final then granted the motion for reconsideration.
and executory for non perfection of the appeal; thus, the NLRC’s 8
38. ONG vs CA FACTS: Ong, owner of Milestone Metal Mfg. was
charged before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages
and non-payment of monetary benefits by his employees, herein private
respondents. Ong allegedly had to adopt a rotation scheme reducing his
employees’ workdays to 3 days a week or less for indefinite period due
to economic crisis affecting his business. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor
of the respondents awarding P1.1M representing wage differential,
payment of benefits and attorney’s fees and ordered Ong to pay
separation pay equivalent to ½ month salary for every year of service of
respondents. Ong filed a notice and memorandum of appeal with the
NLRC but instead of posting the required cash or surety bond, he filed
a motion to reduce the appeal bond. The NLRC denied the motion and
the subsequent motion for reconsideration due to Ong’s failure to post
the required cash or surety bond. On appeal for certiorari, the CA
dismissed Ong’s appeal for non-perfection of appeal and his subsequent
appeal for reconsideration was likewise dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal
which was seasonably filed?
HELD: NO. The right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory
privilege i.e. it must comply with the requirements of the rule or law. Art.
223 of the Labor Code provides: “Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or orders
of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory xxx xxx In case of a judgment
involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond xxx xxx in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed
from.” Section 3, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC
provides: “Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. – (a) The appeal shall be
filed within the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule;
shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and
the posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule;
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the
grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief
prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received the
appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party
of such appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisite aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal.” The posting of cash or surety bond is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is
fatal and has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory
(Phil.Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. Cortina, G.R. No. 146094, 12
November 2003). For petitioner’s failure to post a full or partial appeal
bond within the prescribed period, his appeal was not perfected and the
NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal nor reverse the decision
of the Labor Arbiter which has become final and executory. The Court
denied and dismissed the petition for lack of merit, affirming the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals. No costs.
39. ROSEWOOD PROCESSING INC. vs NLRC
FACTS: Six (6) security guards, private respondents herein, filed a
complaint against their employer, Veterans Phil. Scout Security Agency
(Veterans for brevity), for illegal dismissal, unpaid wages, underpayment
of wages and nonpayment of other monetary benefits. Petitioner
Rosewood was impleaded as third-party respondent by Veterans being
an indirect employer of the guards during some points in time. The Labor
Arbiter rendered a decision ordering Veterans and Rosewood to pay
jointly and severally the complainants a total of P789,154.39 plus
attorney’s fees. Rosewood appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed for
failure to file the required appeal bond within the reglementary period.
Rosewood filed a motion for reconsideration contending that it timely
filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum on Appeal, a Motion to
Reduce Appeal Bond and a surety bond of P50,000 issued by Prudential
Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. The NLRC denied the motion for recon
for lack of merit.
ISSUES: 1). Whether or not petitioner’s appeal to the NLRC was held liable for back wages and separation pay as there is no showing
perfected on time? 2). Whether or not petitioner is solidarily liable with that it committed or conspired in the illegal dismissal of the security
the security agency for payment of salary differentials to the guards. The Court partially granted the petition. The assailed decision
complainants? of the NLRC was modified such that petitioner, with the Security Agency,
is solidarily liable to pay complainant’s wage differentials during the
HELD: 1). YES. While it is indisputable that the appeal to the
period that the complainants were actually under its employ. Petitioner
Commission of the decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter
was exonerated from payment of back wages and separation pay. The
should be made within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
NLRC was required to recompute the wage differentials liability of
decisions, awards, or orders and may be perfected only upon posting of
petitioner within 15 days from finality of its decision. No pronouncement
a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in
as to costs.
the judgment appealed from (Art. 223 of the Labor Code), the Court on
some cases (Quiambao vs NLRC, 254 SCRA 211, 216-217, March 4, 40. FILIPINAS SYSTEMS, INC. vs. NLRC
1996; Globe Gen. Services & Security Agency vs NLRC, 249 SCRA 408,
FACTS: A complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims were filed
414-415, October 23 1995) had relaxed the appeal bond requirement if
by private respondents against their employer, Filipinas Systems, Inc.
justified by substantial compliance with the rule. The Court noted that
(Filsystems for brevity). Filsystems failed to file its position paper in spite
the NLRC dismissed the appeal due to late filing of the appeal bond
of the order of the Labor Arbiter prompting the Labor Arbiter to decide in
while petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal 10 days after its receipt
favor of respondents in the illegal dismissal complaints and awarded
of the arbiter’s decision together with a motion to reduce the appeal bond
their monetary claims. Filsystems appealed to the NLRC submitting for
accompanied by a P50,000 surety bond. The Court held that with
the first time evidence showing that respondents were project
petitioner’s motion to reduce the bond together with a surety bond, it has
employees whose dismissal was due to the discontinuation of the project
substantially complied with the Labor Code. The Court also finds
they were assigned. Respondents questioned the jurisdiction of the
petitioner’s motion to reduce the appeal bond meritorious while the
NLRC over the appeal as petitioner belatedly file the appeal bond
NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in ignoring the merits of
however, the NLRC assumed jurisdiction and remanded the case to the
petitioner’s motions which caused its dismissal. 2). YES. The liability of
Labor Arbiter for further proceedings. Respondents’ motion for
petitioner as an indirect employer was provided under Articles 106, 107
reconsideration was denied so they appeal to the CA via a Petition for
and 109 of the Labor Code. However, petitioner’s liability to the guards
Certiorari. The CA ruled that the NLRC lacks jurisdiction over the appeal
as contractor of the security agency extends only to the period during
for late filing of the appeal bond and reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s
which they are working for the petitioner and ends when the guards were
decision. Peitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
reassigned to another contractor. Further, petitioner’s liability is only
limited to the wage difference if any, between the contract price with the ISSUES: Whether or not the NLRC acquired jurisdiction over
security agency and the statutory minimum wage. Petitioner cannot be petitioner’s appeal?
HELD: NO. Art. 223 of the Labor Code and Section 1 of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure provide a ten (10)-day period from receipt of the decision
of the Arbiter to file an appeal together with an appeal bond if the
decision involves a monetary award. Records showed that petitioners
received a copy of the Arbiter’s decision on October 31. Their
memorandum of appeal was dated November 9, but their appeal bond
was executed only on November 17; no partial payment of the bond was
made within the reglementary period nor did they submit an explanation
for its late filing. Thereof, the late filing of the bond divested the NLRC
of its jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s appeal. Further, petitioners
failed to submit their evidence to the Labor Arbiter in spite of the
opportunities given them and submit the evidence instead to the NLRC
when the decision became adverse to them. The Court dismissed the
petition; the decision of the Labor Arbiter was reinstated with the
modification that if reinstatement of respondents is not feasible,
petitioner should pay their separation pay in accordance with law.
41. Buenaobra, et. al. vs Lim King Guan
FACTS: Petitioners were employees of private respondent Unix
International Export Corporation (UNIX), a corporation engaged in the
business of manufacturing bags, wallets and the like. Sometime in 1991
and 1992, petitioners filed several cases against UNIX and its
incorporators and officers for unfair labor practice, illegal
lockout/dismissal, underpayment of wages, holiday pay, proportionate
13th month pay, unpaid wages, interest, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees. On February 23, 1993 the Labor Arbiter (LA) de
Vera decided in favor of the petitioners ordering UNIX to pay the former
the following (more than 8Million): P 5,821,838.40 as backwages; P
1,484,912.00 as separation pay; P 527,748.00 as wage differentials; P
33,830.00 as regular holiday pay differentials; and P 365,551.95 as
proportionate 13th month pay for 1990. The decision of the LA became
final and executory as neither of the parties appealed. However,
petitioners complained that the decision could not be executed because
UNIX allegedly diverted, invested and transferred all its money, assets
and properties to respondent Fuji Zipper Manufacturing Corporation
(FUJI) whose stockholders and officers were also those of UNIX. Thus,
on March 25, 1997, petitioners filed another complaint against
respondents UNIX, its corporate officers and stockholders of record, and
FUJI. Petitioners mainly prayed that respondents UNIX and FUJI be held
jointly and severally held liable for the payment of the monetary awards
ordered LA de Vera. A judgment was rendered by LA Pati in favor again
of the petitioners piercing the veil of corporate fiction of the two
respondent sister companies ordering them to pay the 8M plus 3M and
1M for moral and exemplary damages. On July 30, 1998, FUJI, its
officers and stockholders filed a memorandum on appeal and a motion
to dispense with the posting of a cash or surety appeal bond on the
ground that they were not the employers of petitioners before the NLRC.
They alleged that they could not be held responsible for petitioners’
claims and to require them to post the bond would be unjust and unfair,
and no sanctioned by law. The 3rd Division of the NLRC denied the
motion to exempt to post appeal bond and instead ordered them to post
the appeal bond of 8M within unextendable period of 10 days upon
receipt. The petitioners argued that timely posting of the appeal bond is
mandatory for the perfection of the appeal and should be complied with
hence they moved for the reconsideration of the decision rendered by
the 3rd division of the NLRC. The NLRC dismissed the petitioners’ MR
for lack of merit and allowed respondent’s Supplemental Memorandum
of Appeal. Hence, petitioners elevated it to the CA imputing grave abuse
of discretion to the NLRC, Third Division when it allowed private
respondents to post the mandated cash or surety bond four months after
the filing of their memorandum on appeal. CA dismissed it.
 ISSUES: Whether or not respondents be allowed to appeal and post an Pati’s later decision holding FUJI jointly and severally liable with UNIX
appeal bond even beyond the reglementary period provided in Article in the payment of the monetary awards adjudged by labor arbiter de
223 of the Labor Code. Vera against UNIX. In the absence of any showing that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion, or otherwise acted without or in
HELD: Affirmative. Respondent should be allowed to appeal and post
excess of jurisdiction, this Court is bound by its findings. Furthermore,
appeal bond. The petition has no merit. The provision of Article 223 of
the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed orders of the said Commission.
the Labor Code requiring the posting of bond on appeals involving
monetary awards must be given liberal interpretation in line with the 42. Lepanto vs Belio Icao
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. If only to
FACTS: Respondent Icao filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the reglementary
damages against herein petitioner Lepanto Consolidated Mining
periods may be relaxed if warranted. The NLRC, Third Division could
Company (LCMC) and its CEO Felipe Yap before the Arbitration Branch
not be said to have abused its discretion in requiring the posting of bond
of the NLRC. Icao was a former employee of the company and worked
after it denied private respondents’ motion to be exempted therefrom. It
as the Lead Miner in its underground mine in Paco, Mankayan, Benguet.
is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
On February 4, 2008, the company ordered the dismissal from
period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and
employment of Icao due to breach of trust and confidence and act of
failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of making the judgment final
highgrading (or act of concealing, possessing or unauthorized extraction
and executory. However, technicality should not be allowed to stand in
of highgrade material/ore without proper authority). This order stemmed
the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations
from what transpired on January 4, 2008, when Icao allegedly had in his
of the parties. We have allowed appeals from the decisions of the labor
possession a wrapped object containing gold bearing highgrade ores
arbiter to the NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the
found in his skullguard upon being apprehended by the security guards
interest of justice. The facts and circumstances of the instant case
of the company. Icao denied the charge against him and claimed that
warrant liberality considering the amount involved and the fact that
his dismissal from work was without just or authorized cause. The Labor
petitioner already obtained a favorable judgment on February 23, 1993
Arbiter ruled in favor of Icao on September 30, 2008. It found out that
against their employer UNIX. In the same decision which has already
the charge of highgrading was fabricated and there was no just cause
become final and executory, labor arbiter de Vera HELD: This Branch
for the dismissal of respondent. It further concluded that the claim of the
upholds and maintains in the absence of substantial evidence to the
security guards that Icao had inserted ores in his boots while in a
contrary that both respondent corporations have legitimate distinct and
standing position was not in accord with normal human physiological
separate juridical personalities. Thus, respondent Fuji Zipper
functioning and that it was inconsistent with normal human behavior for
Manufacturing, Inc. has been erroneously impleaded in this case. It is
a man, who knew that he was being chased for allegedly placing
only fair and just that respondent FUJI be afforded the opportunity to be
wrapped ore inside his boots, to then transfer the ore to his skullguard,
heard on appeal before the NLRC, especially in the light of labor arbiter
where it could be found once he was apprehended. LCMC was ordered
to pay Icao his full backwages amounting to P345, 879.45. LCMC
appealed to the NLRC. On February 29, 2009, the NLRC 1st Division
ruled for the dismissal on the ground that there was non-perfection of
the appeal provided for under Article 223 of the Labor Code and
consequently declaring LA’s decision to be final and executory. It noted
that instead of posting an appeal bond required under the Labor Code
for the perfection of an appeal, LCMC and its CEO filed a Consolidated
Motion For Release Of Cash Bond And To Apply Bond Subject For
Release As Payment For Appeal Bond (Consolidated Motion). They
requested therein that the NLRC release the cash bond of P401,610.84,
which they had posted in the separate case Dangiw Siggaao v. LCMC,
and apply the same cash bond to their present appeal bond liability.
They reasoned that since this Court had already decided Dangiw
Siggaao in their favor, and that the ruling therein had become final and
executory, the cash bond posted therein could now be released. They
also cited financial difficulty as a reason for resorting to this course of
action and prayed that, in the interest of justice, the motion be granted.
An appeal before the CA was made but to no avail, said court affirmed
the NLRC’s decision of dismissal due to non-perfection of appeal, that
the posting of the appeal bond is indispensable jurisdictional
requirement. However, the CA dropped the CEO as a party to this case
as it found that no specific act was alleged in private respondent’s
pleadings to show that he had a hand in Icao’s illegal dismissal; much
less, that he acted in bad faith.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioner complied with the appeal bond
requirement under the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules by filing a
Consolidated Motion to release the cash bond it posted in another case,
which had been decided with finality in its favor, with a view to applying
the same cash bond to the present case.
HELD: Affirmative, We reiterate our pronouncement in Araneta v.
Rodas,22where the Court said that when the law does not clearly
provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question
submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to determine the case
in one way or another, the judge must decide the question in conformity
with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case.
Applying this doctrine, we rule that petitioner substantially complied with
the mandatory requirement of posting an appeal bond for the reasons
explained below. First, there is no question that the appeal was filed
within the 10-day reglementary period.23Except for the alleged failure
to post an appeal bond, the appeal to the NLRC was therefore in order.
Second, it is also undisputed that petitioner has an unencumbered
amount of money in the form of cash in the custody of the NLRC in the
separate case Dangiw Siggaao, which was earlier decided in its favor.
Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, "[a] cash or surety
bond shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until
the case is finally decided, resolved or terminated, or the award
satisfied." Hence, it is clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a
case only for as long as 1) the case has not been finally decided,
resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied.
Therefore, once the appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be
satisfied, the bond is automatically released. Since the money is now
unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now have
unrestricted access to the cash which he may now use as he pleases –
as appeal bond in another case, for instance. This is what petitioner
simply did. Third, the cash bond in the amount ofP401,610.84 posted in
Dangiw Siggaao is more than enough to cover the appeal bond in the
amount ofP345,879.45 required in the present case. Fourth, this ruling
remains faithful to the spirit behind the appeal bond requirement which
is to ensure that workers will receive the money awarded in their favor
when the employer’s appeal eventually fails.There was no showing at
all of any attempt on the part of petitioner to evade the posting of the
appeal bond Court found exceptional circumstances that warranted an
extraordinary exercise of its power to exempt a party from the rules on
appeal bond, there is all the more reason in the present case to find that
petitioner substantially complied with the requirement. We emphasize
that in this case we are not even exempting petitioner from the rule, as
in fact we are enforcing compliance with the posting of an appeal bond.
We are simply liberally applying the rules on what constitutes
compliance with the requirement, given the special circumstances
surrounding the case as explained above.
43. Bergonio vs SEAIR
FACTS: In 2004, petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal
dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer of reinstatement against
respondents. On May 31, 2005, the LA ruled in favor of the petitioners
that they were illegally dismissed and suspended and ordered
respondent among others, to immediately reinstate the petitioners with
full backwages. On August 20, 2005, petitioners filed before LA a Motion
for issuance of Writ of Execution and for their immediate reinstatement.
A pre-execution conference was made and respondent manifested their
intention to reinstate petitioners in the payroll – but it did not materialize
and instead the respondents subsequently filed an Opposition to the
Motion for execution on October 3, 2005 arguing its “strained
relationship” with the petitioners because of threatening text messages.
On October 7, 2005, LA issued a Writ of Execution. However, it was
returned unsatisfied prompting the petitioners to file for a recomputation
of accrued wages that was granted by LA. On February 21, 2006, FOUR
MONTHS after the Oct. 7, 2005 issuance of the Writ of Execution,
repondents issued a Memorandum directing petitioner to report for work
on February 24, 2006 at Clark-Field, Pampanga but petitioners failed to
report prompting the respondent to move for the suspension of the
reinstatement. Meanwhile, the May 31, 2005 decision was appealed by
the respondent to the NLRC but the latter dismissed the same on the
ground of non-perfection of appeal on Nov. 29, ‘06. And on February 6,
2007, the NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment declaring the Nov 29, ‘06
decision final and executory. In this regard, another Writ of Execution
was issued by the LA together with A Notice of Garnishment sent to the
respondents’ depositary bank in the amount of 1.9M. On Dec. 18, ’07
respondents got a partly favorable decision when it elevated the case to
the CA, ruling that the dismissal of the petitioners was in fact valid. But
the petitioners filed with LA an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Immediate
Release of the Garnished amount and LA noted that due to respondents’
refusal to reinstate petitioners despite the final and executory nature of
the Reinstatement Order on May 31, ’05 - the accrued wages should be
computed until the the Dec. 18, ’07 CA decision reversing LA’s earlier
ruling of illegal dismissal, - amounting to P 3, 078, 366.33. The LA
granted the Urgent ExParte Motion and affirmed in toto by the NLRC on
July 16, ’08. Again, the respondent assailed the July 16, ’08 NLRC
decision before the CA. The appellate court ruled in favor of respondents
and remanded the case to the Computation and Examination Unit of the
NLRC for proper computation only up to Feb. 24, ’06. Furthermore, CA
agrees that the Reinstatement is immediate in nature and should be
executed even pending appeal until the decision is reversed by a higher
court --- applying this principle, the computation should be up to Dec. 18
CA decision BUT the CA further pointed out that the petitioners cannot
do this computation because the delay of the reinstatement was
WITHOUT the fault of the employer as it was petitioners who did not
show up on Feb. 24 return-to-work order of the respondent, in effect
barring them to compute backwages up to Dec. 18, ’07. Accordingly, CA
reversed, for grave abuse of discretion, the NLRC July 16, ’08 decision
that affirmed LA’s order to release the garnished amount and
recomputation of backwages.
 ISSUES: Whether or not the CA correctly found the NLRC in grave accrued wages proceeds from the immediate and self-executory nature
abuse of discretion in affirming the release of the garnished amount of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision. There are only 2
despite the respondents’ issuance of and the petitioners’ failure to exceptions in the above rule: 1) actual delay or the fact that the order of
comply with the February 21, 2006 return-to-work Memorandum. reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and
2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission
HELD: Negative. Under Article 223 (now 229) paragraph 3 of our Labor
In reversing the CA’s decision for its legal error we apply this exception
Code: Xxxx In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a
as two-fold test: FIRST, the existence of delay, whether there was actual
dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect
delay or whether the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not
is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The
executed prior to its reversal? We answer this test in the affirmative. To
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms
recall, on May 31, 2005, the LA rendered the decision finding the
and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the
petitioners illegally dismissed and ordering their immediate
option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of
reinstatement. Per the records, the respondents received copy of this
a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement
decision on July 8, 2005. From the time the respondents received copy
provided herein. Otherwise stated, a dismissed employee whose case
of the LA’s decision, and the issuance of the writ of execution, until the
was favorably decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending
CA reversed this decision on December 17, 2008, the respondents had
appeal upon reinstatement, which reinstatement is immediately
not reinstated the petitioners, either by actual reinstatement or in the
executory. Unless the appellate tribunal issues a restraining order, the
payroll. From these facts and without doubt, there was actual delay in
LA is duty bound to implement the order of reinstatement and the
the execution of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s May 31, 2005
employer has no option but to comply with it. Moreover, and equally
decision before it was reversed in the CA’s decision. SECOND, the
worth emphasizing, is that an order of reinstatement issued by the LA is
cause of the delay – whether the delay was not due to the employer’s
self- executory, i.e., the dismissed employee need not even apply for
unjustified act or omission. We answer this test in the negative; we find
and the LA need not even issue awrit of execution to trigger the
that the delay in the execution of the reinstatement pending appeal was
employer’s duty to reinstate the dismissed employee. The reversal by a
due to the respondents’ unjustified acts. In reversing, for grave abuse of
higher tribunal of the LA’s finding (of illegal dismissal), notwithstanding,
discretion, the NLRC’s order affirming the release of the garnished
an employer, who, despite the LA’s order of reinstatement, did not
amount, the CA relied on the fact of the issuance of the February 21,
reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the
2006 Memorandum and of the petitioners’ failure to comply with its
reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued
return-to-work directive. In other words, with the issuance of this
wages of the employee, i.e., the unpaid salary accruing up to the time
Memorandum, the CA considered the respondents as having sufficiently
the higher tribunal reverses the decision. The rule, therefore, is that an
complied with their obligation to reinstate the petitioners. And, the
employee may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the
subsequent delay in or the non-execution of the reinstatement order was
reversal by the higher tribunal. This entitlement of the employee to the
no longer the respondents’ fault, but rather of the petitioners who refused
to report back to work despite the directive. The Court is convinced that
the delay in the reinstatement pending appeal was due to respondents’
fault. For one, respondent filed several pleading to suspend the
execution of reinstatement. These pleadings to our mind show a
determined effort on the respondent’s part to prevent or suspend the
execution of reinstatement pending appeal. Another is that NO actual
intention to reinstate despite return-to-work directive being issued as it
was only sent to one paryt (Pelaez) who did not act in representation of
the others hence there was really no sufficient notice. All told, under the
facts and the surrounding circumstances, the delay was due to the acts
of the respondents that we find were unjustified. We reiterate and
emphasize, Article 223, paragraph 3, of the Labor Code mandates the
employer to immediately reinstate the dismissed employee, either by
actually reinstating him/her under the conditions prevailing prior to the
dismissal or, at the option of the employer, in the payroll. The
respondents' failure in this case to exercise either option rendered them
liable for the petitioners' accrued salary until the LA decision was
reversed by the CA on December 17, 2008. We, therefore, find that the
NLRC, in affirming the release of the garnished amount, merely
implemented the mandate of Article 223; it simply recognized as
immediate and self-executory the reinstatement aspect of the LA's
decision.
44: LOON vs POWER MASTER
FACTS: Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services
employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen in
various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in
Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for
money claims against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and
their officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the
respondents). The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were
not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive
leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further averred that the
respondents made them sign blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001,
the petitioners amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal
as their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents relieved
them from service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21, 2001 when Mr.
Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents’ behalf. The
respondents’ counsel also appeared in a preliminary mandatory
conference on July 5, 2001. LA’s Ruling: The LA awarded the petitioners
salary differential, service incentive leaves and 13th month pays. In
awarding these claims the LA stated that the burden in proving the
payment of these money claims rests with the employer. However, they
were not awarded backwages, overtime, holiday and premium pays for
failure to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on
holidays. Moreover, it was not decided that they were illegally dismissed
for failure to show notice of termination of employment. NLRC: Both
arties appealed to the ruling of the LA. NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling with
regard the payment of holiday pay and attorney’s fees but vacated the
awards of salary differential, 13th month pays and service incentive
leaves. Moreover, NLRC allowed the respondents to present pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they have been
deprived of due process. It also ruled that petitioners were legally
dismissed due to gross misconduct. CA: Ruling of the NLRC was
affirmed.
ISSUES: Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the
NLRC
HELD: Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, “an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.” In the present case, the respondents filed a
surety bond issued by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation (Security
Pacific) on June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific was still an
accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its
accreditation on February 16, 2003. Nonetheless, this subsequent
revocation should not prejudice the respondents who relied on its then
subsisting accreditation in good faith. In Del Rosario v. Philippine
Journalists, Inc., we ruled that a bonding company’s revocation of
authority is prospective in application. However, the respondents should
post a new bond issued by an accredited bonding company in
compliance with paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. This provision states that “[a] cash or surety bond shall be
valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is
finally decided, resolved or terminated or the award satisfied.”
45. Mcburnie vs Ganzon
FACTS: On October 2002, McBurnie, an Australian national, instituted
a complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary claims against the
respondents. McBurnie claimed that on May 11, 1999, he signed a five-
year employment agreement with the company EGI as an Executive
Vice-president who shall oversee the management of the company’s
hotels and resorts within the Philippines. He performed work for the
company until sometime in November 1999, when he figured in an
accident that compelled him to go back to Australia while recuperating
from his injuries. While in Australia, he was informed by respondent
Ganzon that his services were no longer needed because their intended
project would no longer push through. The respondents opposed the
complaint, contending that their agreement with McBurnie was to jointly
invest in and establish a company for the management of hotels. They
did not intend to create an employer employee relationship, and the
execution of the employment contract that was being invoked by
McBurnie was solely for the purpose of allowing McBurnie to obtain an
alien work permit in the Philippines. At the time McBurnie left for
Australia for his medical treatment, he had not yet obtained a work
permit. LA’s Ruling: The LA declared McBurnie as having been illegally
dismissed from employment, and thus entitled to receive from the
respondents the following amounts: (a) US$985,162.00 as salary and
benefits for the unexpired term of their employment contract, (b) P2,
000,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and (c) attorney’s fees
equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award. The respondents
appealed the LA’s Decision to the NLRC. On November 2004, they filed
their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted
an appeal bond in the amount of P100,000.00. The respondents
contended in their Motion to Reduce Bond, inter alia, that the monetary
awards of the LA were null and excessive, allegedly with the intention of
rendering them incapable of posting the necessary appeal bond. They
claimed that an award of "more than P60 Million Pesos to a single
foreigner who had no work permit and who left the country for good one
month after the purported commencement of his employment" was a
patent nullity. NLRC: NLRC denied the motion to reduce bond,
explaining that "in cases involving monetary award, an employer
seeking to appeal the LA’s decision to the Commission is unconditionally
required by Art. 223, Labor Code to post bond in the amount equivalent
to the monetary award. CA: Petitioners’ Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond
was granted. Petitioners were directed to post appeal bond in the
amount of P10,000,000.00. The NLRC was also directed to give due
course to petitioners’ appeal which was ordered to be remanded to the
NLRC for further proceedings. The CA explained that "while Art. 223 of
the Labor Code requiring bond equivalent to the monetary award is
explicit, Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, as
amended, recognized as exception a motion to reduce bond upon
meritorious grounds and upon posting of a bond in a reasonable amount
in relation to the monetary award." Moreover, the appellate court ruled
that such bond was unreasonable and excessive.
ISSUES: Whether or not the appeal bond should be reduced
HELD: In accordance with the foregoing, although the general rule
provides that an appeal in labor cases from a decision involving a
monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond, the Court has relaxed this requirement under certain
exceptional circumstances in order to resolve controversies on their
merits. These circumstances include: (1) the fundamental consideration
of substantial justice; (2) the prevention of miscarriage of justice or of
unjust enrichment; and (3) special circumstances of the case combined
with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved. The bond
requirement in appeals involving monetary awards has been and may
be relaxed in meritorious cases, including instances in which (1) there
was substantial compliance with the Rules, (2) surrounding facts and
circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce the bond, (3) a
liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond would serve
the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits, or (4) the
appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good faith
by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period. The Court held
that the reduction decided upon by the CA was the reasonable amount
to be posted as bond.
WATERFRONT CEBU CITY CASINO HOTEL, INC. AND MARCO
PROTACIO, v. ILDEBRANDO LEDESMA,
Facts:
Respondent Ledesma was employed as a House Detective at
Waterfront. The basis of the complaints was filed before Waterfront by
Christe Mandal, a supplier of a concessionaire of Waterfront, and
Rosanna Lofranco, who was seeking a job at the same hotel. During the
administrative hearings conducted by Waterfront, it found that Ledesma
kissed and mashed the breasts of Christe Mandal inside the hotel’s
elevator, and exhibited his penis and asked Rosanna Lofranco to
masturbate him at the conference room of the hotel. In 2008, Ledesma
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal thereafter the LA ruled that the
dismissal of ledesma is illegal. On appeal to the NLRC, the latter
reversed the ruling of the LA and held that Ledesma’s acts of sexual
overtures to Christe Mandal and Rosanna Lofranco constituted grave
misconduct justifying his dismissal from employment. Ledesma filed
motion for reconsideration but it was latter denied and the copy of the
said Resolution was received by Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s counsel,
on March 15, 2010.
On May 17, 2010,or sixty-three (63) days after Atty. Abellana received
a copy of the NLRC’s Resolution he filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Ledesma contended that
his receipt on March 24, 2010 (and not the receipt on March 15, 2010
by Atty. Abellana), is the reckoning date of the 60-day reglementary
period within which to file the petition. Hence, Ledesma claims that the
petition was timely filed on May 17, 2010. Waterfront on the otherhand
contend that the petition was belatedly filed. The CA, thereafter,
rendered a Decision, reversing the Decision of the NLRC and reinstating
the ruling of the LA that the dismissal is illegal.
Issue:
whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed with the CA?

Held:
The Court finds Waterfront’s petition to be meritorious. Under
Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-
12-SC, reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file the petition. – The petition shall
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely
filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed
not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of the
motion.
Jurisprudence provides, present rule now mandatorily requires
compliance with the reglementary period. under the amendment by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can
no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a
petition for certiorari. The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No.
07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of
justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on
compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule
now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60
days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for
reconsideration. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded,
and the last included; hence, the last day to file his petition for certiorari
is on May 14, 2010, a Friday.
In this case, the petition for certiorari was filed with the CA beyond the
60-day period. Atty. Abellana, Ledesma’s counsel, admittedly received
a copy of the NLRC Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration
on March 15, 2010 while Ledesma received his copy on March 24,
2010. It must remember that, when a party to a suit appears by counsel,
service of every judgment and all orders of the court must be sent to the
counsel. This is so because notice to counsel is an effective notice to
the client, while notice to the client and not his counsel is not notice in
law. Receipt of notice by the counsel of record is the reckoning point of
the reglementary period. Notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon
the client.
Therefore, with the expiration of the 60-day period to file a petition for
certiorari, a review of the Resolution of the NLRC will be beyond the
jurisdiction of any court. No longer assailable, the NLRC Resolution
could not be altered or modified. A decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
ILAW BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM) NESTLE PHILIPPINES,
INC. CHAPTER (ICE CREAM AND CHILLED PRODUCTS
DIVISION), ITS OFFICERS, MEMBERS BONIFACIO T. FLORENDO,
EMILIANO B. PALANAS AND GENEROSO P. LAXAMANA VS.
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., GR NO. 198675,
SEPTEMBER 23, 2015
FACTS: Petitioner union staged a strike against herein respondent
company’s Ice Cream and Chilled Products Division, citing, as grounds,
respondent’s alleged violation of the collective bargaining agreement
(CBA), dismissal of union officers and members, discrimination and
other unfair labor practice (ULP) acts. Respondent, NESTLE filed a
Petition to Declare Strike Illegal. DOLE Acting Secretary certified strike
as illegal. After a series of conciliation meetings and discussions
between parties, they agreed to resolve their differences and came up
with a compromise agreement embodied in a MOA dated August 4,
1998 and subsequently approved by NLRC on October 12, 1998.
January 25, 2010, after a lapse of more than 11 years from the time of
execution of the subject MOA, petitioners filed a Motion of Writ of
Execution contending that they have not been paid the amounts they
are entitled to in accordance with the MOA. Respondents filed its
opposition contending that the petitioner’s remedy is already barred by
prescription because, under the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC, a
decision or order may be executed on motion within 5 years from the
date it becomes final and executor and that the same decision or order
may only be enforced by independent action within a period of 10 years
from the date of its finality.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner’s demand to be paid has prescribed.
RULING:
A compromise agreement is entered as a determination of a
controversy has the force and effect of a judgment. It is immediately
executor and not appealable, except for vices of consent or forgery. The
non-fulfillment of its terms and conditions justifies the issuance of a writ
of execution; in such an instance, execution becomes a ministerial duty
of the court.
Section 8, Rule XI, 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the
NLRC which states that:
A decision or order may be executed on motion within 5
years from the date it becomes final and executor. After the lapse
of such period, the judgment shall become dormant, and may
only be enforced by an independent action within a period of 10
years from date of its finality.
Section 4, (a) and 6, Rule III, of the NLRC Manual on Execution
of Judgment:
Section 4. Issuance of Writ.-Execution shall issue upon an
order, resolution or decision that finally disposes of the actions or
proceedings and after the counsel of record and the parties have
been duly furnished with the copies of the same in accordance
with the NLRC Rules of Procedure, provided:
a) The Commission or Labor Arbiter shall, motu proprio or
upon motion of any interested party, issued a writ of
execution on a judgment only within 5 years from the
date it becomes final and executory...
Section 6. Execution by Independent Action. –A judgment after
the lapse of 5 years from the date it becomes final and executor
and before it is barred by prescription, may only be enforced by
an independent action.
It is clear from the above law and rules that a judgment may be
executed on motion within 5 years from the date of its entry or from the
date it becomes final and executor. After the lapse of time, and before it
is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by
action or by the institution of a complaint in a regular form. In this case,
it is clear that the judgment of the NLRC, having been based on a
compromise embodied in a written contract, was immediately executor
upon its issuance on October 12, 1998. Thus, it could have been
executed by motion within 5 years. It was not. Nonetheless, it could have
been enforced by an independent action within the next 5 years, or
within 10 years from the time the NLRC Decision was promulgated. It
was not. While the Court fully recognizes the special protection which
the Constitution, labor laws, and social legislation accord the
workingman, the Court cannot, however alter or amend the law on
prescription to relieve petitioners of the consequences of their inaction.
Laws come to the assistance of the vigilant, not of the sleeping.
MANILA MINING CORPORATION,
vs.
LOWITO AMOR, ET. AL.
Facts:
Respondents Lowito Amor, Ceredon, Cesar, Martinez and Tabili,
Jr. were regular employees of petitioner Manila Mining Corporation, a
domestic corporation which operated a mining claim in Placer, Surigao
del Norte. In compliance with existing environmental laws, petitioner
maintained Tailing Pond No. 7 (TP No. 7), a tailings containment facility
required for the storage of waste materials generated by its mining
operations. When the mine tailings being pumped into TP No. 7 reached
the maximum level in December 2000, petitioner temporarily shut down
its mining operations. Although the DENR-EMB issued a temporary
authority on 25 January 2001 for it to be able to continue operating TP
No. 7 for another six (6) months and to increase its capacity, petitioner
failed to secure an extension permit when said temporary authority
eventually lapsed.
On 27 July 2001, petitioner served a notice, informing its employees of
the temporary suspension of its operations for six months and the
temporary lay-off of two-thirds of its employees. After the lapse of said
period, petitioner notified the DOLE on 11 December 2001 that it was
extending the temporary shutdown of its operations for another six
months. Because of petitioner’s continued failure to resume its
operations, respondents filed the complaint for constructive dismissal.
The LA ruled that petitioner liable for constructive dismissal. Petitioner
appealed in NLRC. NLRC reversed the decision of LA. Now,
Respondent appeal and filed Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Respondents argued that the appeal bond tendered by petitioner was
so grossly disproportionate to monetary award for the same to be
considered substantial compliance with the requirements for the
perfection of an appeal from a Labor Arbiter’s decision and petitioner’s
memorandum of appeal was filed 65 days after the lapse of
reglementary period for appeal. The CA grants the respondents’
petition and nullifying the NLRC. Hence, petitioner come to this court.
Issue:
Won the petitioner’s appeal filed with the NLRC was fatally
defective and won it had fully complied with the requirements of the labor
code for perfecting an appeal?
Held:
As provided in Section 6, Rule VI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, the Court hereby RESOLVES that henceforth, the following
guidelines shall be observed:
(a) The filing of a motion to reduce appeal bond shall be
entertained by the NLRC subject to the following conditions: (1)
there is meritorious ground; and (2) a bond in a reasonable
amount is posted;
(b) For purposes of compliance with condition no. (2), a motion
shall be accompanied by the posting of a provisional cash or
surety bond equivalent to ten percent (10), of the monetary award
subject of the appeal, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees;
 (c) Compliance with the foregoing conditions shall suffice to
suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period to perfect
an appeal from the labor arbiter's decision to the NLRC;
(d) The NLRC retains its authority and duty to resolve the motion
to reduce bond and determine the final amount of bond that shall
be posted by the appellant, still in accordance with the standards
of meritorious grounds and reasonable amount; and
(e) In the event that the NLRC denies the motion to reduce bond,
or requires a bond that exceeds the amount of the provisional
bond, the appellant shall be given a fresh period of ten (10) days
from notice of the NLRC order within which to perfect the appeal
by posting the required appeal bond.
In this case the court denied the claim of petitioner. As the first claim of
petitioner , they wanted for reduction of the appeal bond on the basis of
serious losses and reverses, this left to nonce. For the second claim of
petitioner that the amount of P100,000.00 which is the provisional bond
was sufficient to suspend the running of the 10-day reglementary period
to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiter's decision, the court denied
this argument due to the fact that the check submitted by petitioner was
dishonored upon presentment for payment, thereby rendering the tender
thereof ineffectual.
The right to appeal thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process
but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the
rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory.
Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of the case and can
no longer be revised, reviewed, changed or altered. Therefore, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
ANDY D. BALITE, DELFIN M. ANZALDO AND
MONALIZA DL.
BIHASA, petitioners, vs. SS VENTURES
INTERNATIONAL, INC., SUNG SIK LEE AND
EVELYN RAYALA, respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J p:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the 18 June 2010
Decision 1 rendered by the Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 109589. In its assailed decision, the appellate court
reversed the Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) which denied the Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond filed by
respondents SS Ventures International, Inc., Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn
Rayala.
In a Resolution 2 dated 30 December 2010, the appellate court
refused to reconsider its earlier decision.
The Facts
Respondent SS Ventures International, Inc. is a domestic
corporation duly engaged in the business of manufacturing footwear
products for local sales and export abroad. It is represented in this action
by respondents Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala. Petitioners On 30 December 2007, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
Andy Balite (Balite), Monaliza Bihasa (Bihasa) and Delfin Anzaldo Decision 3 in favor of petitioners and held that respondents are liable for
(Anzaldo) were regular employees of the respondent company until their illegal dismissal for failing to comply with the procedural and substantive
employments were severed for violation of various company policies. requirements in terminating employment. The decretal portion of the
Labor Arbiter Decision reads:
For his part, Balite was issued a Show Cause Memorandum by
the respondent company on 4 August 2005 charging him with the WHEREFORE, premises considered,
following infractions: (1) making false reports, malicious and fraudulent [petitioners] are hereby found to have been illegally
statements and rumor-mongering against the company; (2) threatening dismissed even as respondents are held liable therefore.
and intimidating co-workers; (3) refusing to cooperate in the conduct of
Consequently, respondent corporation is hereby
investigation; and (4) gross negligence in the care and use of the
ordered to reinstate [petitioners] to their former positions
company property resulting in the damage of the finished products. After
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges with
respondent found Balite's explanation insufficient, he was dismissed
backwages initially computed at this time and reflected
from employment, through a Notice of Termination on 6 September
below.
2005.
The reinstatement aspect of this decision is
Bihasa, on the other hand, was charged with absence without
immediately executory and thus respondents are hereby
leave on two occasions and with improper behavior, stubbornness,
required to submit a report of compliance therewith
arrogance and uncooperative attitude towards superiors and
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
employees. Bihasa was likewise terminated from the service on 5 May
2006 after her explanation in an administrative investigation was found Respondent corporation is likewise ordered to
unsatisfactory by the respondent company. pay [petitioners] their 13th month pay and 10% attorney's
fees.
Anzaldo was also dismissed from employment after purportedly
giving him due process. The records of the infractions he committed as Backwages 13th month pay Attorney's fees
well as the date of his termination, however, are not borne by the
records.
1. Andy Balite P162,969.04 P17,511.00 P18,048.00
Consequently, the three employees charged respondents with 2. Delfin Anzaldo 158,299.44 17,511.00 17,511.00
illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages, 13th month pay and 3. Monaliza Bihasa 116,506.62 17,511.00 13,401.75
attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter. All other claims are dismissed for lack of factual
In refuting the allegations of the petitioners, respondents averred or legal basis. 4 CIAcSa
that petitioners were separated from employment for just causes and Aggrieved, respondents interposed an appeal by filing a Notice
after affording them procedural due process of law. of Appeal and paying the corresponding appeal fee. However, instead
of filing the required appeal bond equivalent to the total amount of the
monetary award which is P490,308.00, respondents filed a Motion to
Reduce the Appeal Bond to P100,000.00 and appended therein a
manager's check bearing the said amount. Respondents cited financial
difficulty as justification for their inability to post the appeal bond in full
owing to the partial shutdown of respondent company's operations.
In a Resolution 5 dated 27 November 2008, the NLRC dismissed
the appeal filed by the respondents for non-perfection. The NLRC ruled
that posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award is
indispensable for the perfection of the appeal and the reduction of the
appeal bond, absent any showing of meritorious ground to justify the
same, is not warranted in the instant case.
Similarly ill-fated was respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 6 dated 30 April 2009.
On certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision
and allowed the relaxation of the rule on posting of the appeal bond.
According to the appellate court, there was substantial compliance with
the rules for the perfection of an appeal because respondents
seasonably filed their Memorandum of Appeal and posted an appeal
bond in the amount of P100,000.00. While the amount of the appeal
bond posted was not equivalent to the monetary award, the Court of
Appeals ruled that respondents were able to sufficiently prove their
incapability to post the required amount of bond. 7 The Court of Appeals
disposed in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the [NLRC], the
instant petition is GRANTED. The [NLRC's] Resolutions
dated November 27, 2008 and April 30, 2009,
respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. [The NLRC] is
hereby directed to decide petitioners' appeal on the
merits. 8
In a Resolution 9 dated 30 December 2010, the Court of Appeals
refused to reconsider its earlier decision.
Petitioners are now before this Court via this instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari 10 praying that the Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution be reversed and set aside on the ground that:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REVERSED THE
RESOLUTION OF THE NLRC DISMISSING
RESPONDENTS' APPEAL FOR NON-PERFECTION
THEREOF. 11
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners, in assailing the appellate court's decision, argue that
posting of an appeal bond in full is not only mandatory but a jurisdictional
requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the NLRC. They posit that the posting of an insufficient amount of
appeal bond, as in this case, resulted to the non-perfection of the appeal
rendering the decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.
Banking on the appellate court's decision, respondents, for their
part, urge the Court to relax the rules on appeal underscoring on the so-
called "utmost good faith" they demonstrated in filing a Motion to Reduce
Appeal Bond and in posting a cash bond in the amount of P100,000.00.
In justifying their inability to post the required appeal bond, respondents
reasoned that respondent company is in dire financial condition due to
lack of orders from customers constraining it to temporarily shut down
its operations resulting in significant loss of revenues. Respondents now
plea for the liberal interpretation of the rules so that the case can be
threshed out on the merits, and not on technicality.
 Time and again we reiterate the established rule that in the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the Court is not a trier award in the judgment appealed from. (Emphases ours).
of facts 12 and does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the
Implementing the aforestated provisions of the Labor Code are
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case
the provisions of Rule VI of the 2011 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC on
considering that the findings of facts of labor officials who are deemed
perfection of appeals which read:
to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdiction
are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are Section 1. Periods of Appeal. — Decisions,
binding upon this Court, when supported by substantial evidence. 13 awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
The NLRC ruled that no appeal had been perfected on time
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
because of respondents' failure to post the required amount of appeal
thereof. . . . If the 10th day or the 5th day, as the case
bond. As a result of which, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has attained
may be, falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday, the last
finality. The Court of Appeals, on the contrary, allowed the relaxation of
day to perfect the appeal shall be the first working day
the rules and held that respondents were justified in failing to pay the
following such Saturday, Sunday or holiday.
required appeal bond. Despite the non-posting of the appeal bond in full,
however, the appellate court deemed that respondents were able to xxx xxx xxx
seasonably perfect their appeal before the NLRC, thereby directing the
NLRC to resolve the case on the merits. ICAcHE Section 4. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. —
(a) The appeal shall be:
The pertinent rule on the matter is Article 223 of the Labor Code,
as amended, which sets forth the rules on appeal from the Labor (1) filed within the reglementary period as
Arbiter's monetary award: provided in Section 1 of this Rule;

ART. 223. Appeal. — Decisions, awards, or (2) verified by the appellant himself/herself in
orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless accordance with Section 4, Rule 7 of
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties the Rules of Court, as amended;
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such (3) in the form a of a memorandum of appeal
decisions, awards, or orders. . . . . which shall state the grounds relied upon
xxx xxx xxx and the arguments in support thereof; the
relief prayed for; and with a statement of
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, the date when the appellant received the
an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon appealed decision, award or order;
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the (4) in three (3) legibly typewritten or printed
copies; and
 (5) accompanied by:
i) proof of payment of the required appeal
fee and legal research fee;
ii) posting of cash or surety bond as
provided in Section 6 of this Rule;
and
iii) proof of service upon the other parties.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) A mere notice of appeal without complying
with the other requisites aforestated shall not stop the
running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Appeal Fee. — The appellant shall pay
the prevailing appeal fee and legal research fee to the
Regional Arbitration Branch or Regional Office of origin,
and the official receipt of such payment shall form part of
the records of the case.
Section 6. Bond. — In case the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, or the Regional Director involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be
perfected only upon the posting of a bond, which
shall either be in the form of cash deposit or surety bond
equivalent in amount to the monetary award, exclusive
of damages and attorney's fees.
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission through the Chairman may on
justifiable grounds blacklist a bonding company,
notwithstanding its accreditation by the Supreme Court.
These statutory and regulatory provisions explicitly provide that
an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within
ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders
of the Labor Arbiter. In a judgment involving a monetary award, the
appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required
appeal fee; (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company; and (3) filing of a memorandum of
appeal. 14
In McBurnie v. Ganzon, 15 we harmonized the provision on
appeal that its procedures are fairly applied to both the petitioner and
the respondent, assuring by such application that neither one or the
other party is unfairly favored. We pronounced that the posting of a cash
or surety bond in an amount equivalent to 10% of the monetary award
pending resolution of the motion to reduce appeal bond shall be deemed
sufficient to perfect an appeal, to wit: DEICaA
It is in this light that the Court finds it necessary to
set a parameter for the litigants' and the NLRC's
guidance on the amount of bond that shall hereafter be
filed with a motion for a bond's reduction. To ensure that
the provisions of Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure that give parties the chance to seek a
reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out,
without however defeating the benefits of the bond
requirement in favor of a winning litigant, all motions to
reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be
accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond
equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject
of the appeal, which shall provisionally be deemed the
reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an
appellant's motion is pending resolution by the
Commission. In conformity with the NLRC Rules, the
monetary award, for the purpose of computing the
 necessary appeal bond, shall exclude damages and
attorney's fees. Only after the posting of a bond in the
required percentage shall an appellant's period to perfect
an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed
suspended.
The rule We set in McBurnie was clarified by the Court in Sara
Lee Philippines v. Ermilinda Macatlang. 16 Considering the peculiar
circumstances in Sara Lee, We determined what is the reasonable
amount of appeal bond. We underscored the fact that the amount of 10%
of the award is not a permissible bond but is only such amount that shall
be deemed reasonable in the meantime that the appellant's motion is
pending resolution by the Commission. The actual reasonable amount
yet to be determined is necessarily a bigger amount. In an effort to strike
a balance between the constitutional obligation of the state to afford
protection to labor on the one hand, and the opportunity afforded to the
employer to appeal on the other, We considered the appeal bond in the
amount of P725M which is equivalent to 25% of the monetary award
sufficient to perfect the appeal, viz.:
We sustain the Court of Appeals in so far as it
increases the amount of the required appeal bond. But
we deem it reasonable to reduce the amount of the
appeal bond to P725 Million. This directive already
considers that the award if not illegal, is extraordinarily
huge and that no insurance company would be willing to
issue a bond for such big money. The amount of P725
Million is approximately 25% of the basis above
calculated. It is a balancing of the constitutional
obligation of the state to afford protection to labor which,
specific to this case, is assurance that in case of
affirmance of the award, recovery is not negated; and on
the other end of the spectrum, the opportunity of the
employer to appeal.
By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this
case, the employees would still be assured of at least
substantial compensation, in case a judgment award is
affirmed. On the other hand, management will not be
effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal.
In line with Sara Lee and the objective that the appeal on the
merits to be threshed out soonest by the NLRC, the Court holds that the
appeal bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P100,000.00
which is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond
is sufficient to perfect an appeal. With the employer's demonstrated
good faith in filing the motion to reduce the bond on demonstrable
grounds coupled with the posting of the appeal bond in the requested
amount, as well as the filing of the memorandum of appeal, the right of
the employer to appeal must be upheld. This is in recognition of the
importance of the remedy of appeal, which is an essential part of our
judicial system and the need to ensure that every party litigant is given
the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause
freed from the constraints of technicalities. 17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Balite v. SS Ventures International, Inc., G.R. No. 195109, [February
4, 2015])
TURKS SHAWARMA v. PAJARON
Turks Shawarma Company/Gem Zenarosa Vs. Feliciano Z. Pajaron and
Larry A. Carbonilla
G.R. No. 207156.
January 16, 2017 Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in
dismissing petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection

FACTS:
HELD:
Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service
crew and Larey A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. No. The CA did not err in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing
Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection.
cause for their dismissal and petitioners also failed to comply with the
The Court has time and again held that "[t]he right to appeal is neither a
requirements of due process. On April 15, 2010, they filed their
natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day
with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same
premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against
must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right
petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated.
to appeal is lost."
Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they
It is clear from both the Labor Code (Article 223) and the NLRC Rules
averred that they actually abandoned their work. They likewise failed to
of Procedure (Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI) that there is legislative and
substantiate their claims that they were not paid labor standards
administrative intent to strictly apply the appeal bond requirement, and
benefits.
the Court should give utmost regard to this intention."21
The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and
The posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and
held them constructively and illegally dismissed. Then, petitioners
jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the
appealed before the NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory.22 This indispensable
required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners' appeal was dismissed by the
requisite for the perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if
NLRC for non-perfection. They filed a motion for reconsideration but the
they finally prevail in the case[,] the monetary award will be given to them
same was denied.
upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is further meant to
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. However, the CA discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment
rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that the of their obligations to the employees.
NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its merits even if we
petitioners' appeal for non-perfection. Hence, this present petition.
are to allow their appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously
ISSUE: examining the contracting positions and arguments of the parties, we
find that the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla
illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence. All told, we
find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC did not gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection
due to noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce
bond.
46. PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP vs. NLRC
FACTS: • Private respondent Lourdes A. de Jesus is petitioners’
reviser/trimmer since 1980. As reviser/trimmer, de Jesus based her
assigned work on a paper note, identified by its P.O. Number. On August
15, 1992, de Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the cloths’
ribs. She thereafter submitted tickets corresponding to the work done to
her supervisor. Three days later, de Jesus received from petitioners’
personnel manager a memorandum requiring her to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against her for dishonesty and
tampering of official records and documents with the intention of
cheating as P.O. No. 3853 allegedly required no trimming. The
memorandum also placed her under preventive suspension for thirty
days starting from August 19, 1992. In her handwritten explanation, de
Jesus maintained that she merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O.
No. 3853 as it has the same style and design as P.O. No. 3824 which
has an attached price list for trimming the ribs and admitted that she may
have been negligent in presuming that the same work was to be done
with P.O. No. 3853, but not for dishonesty or tampering Petitioners’
personnel department, nonetheless, she was terminated. • On
September 22, 1992, de Jesus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioners with the Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter: The Labor
Arbiter who heard the case noted that de Jesus was amply accorded
procedural due process in her termination from service. Nevertheless,
after observing that de Jesus made some further trimming on P.O. No.
3853 and that her dismissal was not justified, the Labor Arbiter held
petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal. Petitioners were accordingly
ordered to reinstate de Jesus to her previous position without loss of
seniority rights and with full back wages from the time of her suspension
on August 19, 1992 • Petitioners appealed to the public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) NLRC: In its July 21,
1994 decision, the NLRC ruled that de Jesus was negligent in presuming
that the ribs of P.O. No. 3853 should likewise be trimmed for having the
same style and design as P.O. No. 3824, thus petitioners cannot be
entirely faulted for dismissing de Jesus. The NLRC declared that the
status quo between them should be maintained and affirmed the Labor
Arbiter's order of reinstatement, but without back wages. The NLRC
further "directed petitioner to pay de Jesus her back salaries from the
date she filed her motion for execution on September 21, 1993 up to the
date of the promulgation of the decision. • Petitioners insist that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that de Jesus is entitled
to reinstatement to her previous position for she was not illegally
dismissed in the first place. Petitioners further add that de Jesus
breached the trust reposed in her, hence her dismissal from service is
proper on the basis of loss of confidence, citing as authority the cases
of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 197 SCRA 491; CocaCola
Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC, 172 SCRA 751, and Piedad v. Lanao del
Norte Electric Cooperative,154 SCRA 500. • Petitioners' also argued the
theory that an order for reinstatement is not self-executory. They stress
that there must be a writ of execution which may be issued by the NLRC
or by the Labor Arbiter motu proprio or on motion of an interested party.
They further maintain that even if a writ of execution was issued, a timely
appeal coupled by the posting of appropriate supersedes as bond, which
they did in this case, effectively forestalled and stayed execution of the
reinstatement order of the Labor Arbiter. • Private respondent de Jesus,
for her part, maintains that petitioners should have reinstated her
immediately after the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering her
reinstatement was promulgated since the law mandates that an order
for reinstatement is immediately executory. An appeal, she says, could
not stay the execution of a reinstatement order for she could either be
admitted back to work or merely reinstated in the payroll without need of
a writ of execution. De Jesus argues that a writ of execution is necessary
only for the enforcement of decisions, orders, or awards which have
acquired finality.
Issues: (1) Whether or not de Jesus was illegally dismissed. (2) Whether
or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ of execution.
HELD: (1) Yes, de Jesus was illegally dismissed. Based on the Labor
Arbiter's observations or from the NLRC's assessment, it distinctly
appears that petitioners' accusation of dishonesty and tampering of
official records and documents with intention of cheating against de
Jesus was not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.
Petitioners simply failed, both before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, to
discharge the burden of proof and to validly justify de Jesus' dismissal
from service. The law, in this light, directs the employers, such as herein
petitioners, not to terminate the services of an employee except for a
just or authorized cause under the Labor Code. Lack of a just cause in
the dismissal from service of an employee, as in this case, renders the
dismissal illegal, despite the employer's observance of procedural due
process.And while the NLRC stated that "there was no illegal dismissal
to speak of in the case at bar" and that petitioners cannot be entirely
faulted therefor, said statements are inordinate pronouncements which
did not remove the assailed dismissal from the realm of illegality. Neither
can these pronouncements preclude us from holding otherwise. Equally
unmeritorious is petitioners’ assertion that the dismissal is justified on
the basis of loss of confidence. While loss of confidence, as correctly
argued by petitioners, is one of the valid grounds for termination of
employment, the same, however, cannot be used as a pretext to
vindicate each and every instance of unwarranted dismissal. To be a
valid ground, it must shown that the employee concerned is responsible
for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his participation
therein rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position. In this case, petitioners were unsuccessful in
establishing their accusations of dishonesty and tampering of records
with intention of cheating. Indeed, even if petitioners’ allegations against
de Jesus were true, they just the same failed to prove that her position
needs the continued and unceasing trust of her employee’s functions.
Surely, de Jesus who occupies the position of a reviser/trimmer does
not require the petitioners’ perpetual and full confidence. In this regard,
petitioners’ reliance on the cases of Ocean Terminal Services, Inc. v.
NLRC; Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc. v. NLRC; and Piedad v. Lanao del
Norte Electric Cooperative, which when perused involve positions that
require the employers’ full trust and confidence, is wholly misplaced.
Undoubtedly, the position of a reviser/trimmer could not be equated with
that of a canvasser, sales agent, or a bill collector. Besides, the involved
employees in the three aforementioned cases were clearly proven guilty
of infractions unlike private respondent in the case at bar. Thus,
petitioners dependence on these cited cases is inaccurate, to say the
least. More, whether or not de Jesus meets the day’s quota of work she,
just the same, is paid the daily minimum wage (2) No, writ of execution
is not necessary for order of reinstatement. Under Article 223 of the
Labor Code, as amended, an employer has two options in order for him
to comply with an order of reinstatement, which is immediately
executory, even pending appeal. Firstly, he can admit the dismissed
employee back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing
prior to his dismissal or separation or to a substantially equivalent
position if the former position is already filled up. Secondly, he can
reinstate the employee merely in the payroll. Failing to exercise any of
the above options, the employer can be compelled under pain of
contempt, to pay instead the salary of the employee. This interpretation
is more in consonance with the constitutional protection to labor (Section
3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The right of a person to his labor is
deemed to be property within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty
that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary
and unjust deprivation of his job (Bondoc vs. People’s Bank and Trust
Co., Inc., 103 SCRA 599 [1981]). The employee should not be left
without any remedy in case the employer unreasonably delays
reinstatement. Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution
applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or
awards becomes final and executory. It cannot relate to an award or
order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which
Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an
award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending
appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the
execution for reinstatement. The legislative content is quite obvious, to
make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending
appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution
as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would
certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article
223, the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The reason is
simple. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be
delayed for numerous reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of
a scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the part of the Labor
Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby
setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by
Article 223. Statutes, as a rule, are to be construed in the light of the
purpose to be achieved and the evil sought to be remedied and where
statues are fairly susceptible of two or more construction, that
construction should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the
manifest intent of the law maker and promote the object for which the
statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which would
tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the
object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment.
47: ALEJANDRO ROQUERO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC
FACTS: Alejandro Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground
equipment mechanics of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for
brevity). From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and
Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using shabu in a raid
conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel. The two
alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the said act but were
instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced to them by
Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL.
When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men
entered the room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo and seized the drugs
and the paraphernalia used. They assailed their arrest and asserted that
they were instigated by PAL to take the drugs. They argued that Alipato
was not really a trainee of PAL but was placed in the premises to
instigate the commission of the crime. They based their argument on the
fact that Alipato was not arrested. Moreover, Alipato has no record of
employment with PAL. In a Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, Roquero
and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter: Dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo was upheld.
Both parties are found at fault, PAL for applying means to entice the
complainants into committing the infraction and the complainants for
giving in to the temptation and eventually indulging in the prohibited
activity. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay and
attorney’s fees to the complainants. While the case was on appeal with
the NLRC the complainants were acquitted by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Branch 114, Pasay City, in the criminal case which charged them
with “conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug in violation
of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425,” on the ground of
instigation. NLRC: The NLRC found PAL guilty of instigation and ordered
reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages.
Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a
writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted
the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that
they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court. PAL’s petition
was referred to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the case
with the Court of Appeals, PAL and Pabayo filed a Motion to
Withdraw/Dismiss the case with respect to Pabayo, after they voluntarily
entered into a compromise agreement. The motion was granted in a
Resolution promulgated by the Former Thirteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals on January 29, 2002. Court of Appeals: Reversed the
decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter
insofar as it upheld the dismissal of Roquero. However, it denied the
award of separation pay and attorney’s fees to Roquero on the ground
that one who has been validly dismissed is not entitled to those benefits.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the instigated employee shall be solely
responsible for an action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the
employer. (2) whether or not the executory nature of the decision, more
so the reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunal’s order be halted by a
petition having been filed in higher courts without any restraining order
or preliminary injunction. (3) Whether or not the employer who refused
to reinstate the employee despite a writ duly issued be held to pay the
salary of the subject employee from the time he was ordered reinstated
up to the time of the reversal of the decision.
HELD: (1) Instigation is only a defense against criminal liability. It cannot
be used as a shield against dismissal from employment especially when
the position involves the safety of human lives. Even if he was instigated
to take drugs he has no right to be reinstated to his position. He took the
drugs fully knowing that he was on duty and more so that it is prohibited
by company rules. Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for
possessing and using shabu. For serious misconduct to warrant the
dismissal of an employee, it (1) must be serious; (2) must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duty; and (3) must show that the
employee has become unit to continue working for the employer. It is of
public knowledge that drugs can damage the mental faculties of the
user. Roquero was tasked with the repair and maintenance of PAL’s
airplanes. He cannot discharge that duty if he is a drug user. His failure
to do his job can mean great loss of lives and properties. There was
procedural due process. PAL complied with the twin-notice requirement
before dismissing the petitioner. The twin-notice rule requires (1) the
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is being sought along with the opportunity for the
employee to air his side, and (2) the subsequent notice of the employer’s
decision to dismiss him. (2) The order of reinstatement is immediately
executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a
dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective
from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance
of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is
ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted.
Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate
him in the payroll. (3)Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the
salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the
decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.
Technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are
applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives
of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory
on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated
during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with
finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he
received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered
services during the period.
48: Air Philippines Corporation vs. Enrico Zamora
FACTS: Enrico Zamora (Zamora) was employed with Air Philippines
Corporation (APC) as Flight Deck Crew when applied for promotion to
the position of airplane captain and underwent the requisite training
program. After completing training, he inquired about his promotion but
APC did not act on it. APC continued to give him assignments as flight
deck crew. Thus, Zamora filed a Complaint with the Labor Arbiter. He
argued that the act of APC of withholding his promotion rendered his
continued employment with it oppressive and unjust. He therefore asked
that APC be held liable for constructive dismissal. APC denied that it
dismissed complainant. It pointed out that, when the complaint was filed
on May 14, 1997, complainant was still employed with it. It was only on
May 22, 1997 that complainant stopped reporting for work, not because
he was forced to resign, but because he had joined a rival airline,
GrandAir. Labor Arbiter: Declared APC liable for constructive dismissal
and ordered the reinstate complainant to his position as B-737 Captain
without loss of seniority right immediately upon receipt thereof, Pay
complainant his full backwages from May 15, 1997 up to the
promulgation of this decision, TWO MILLION PESOS (P2, 000,000.00)
in the concept of moral damages, ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent
to TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total award. Zamora immediately filed a
Motion for Execution of the order of reinstatement. Meanwhile, APC filed
with the NLRC an appeal assailing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that it
was liable for constructive dismissal. NLRC: The NLRC granted the
appeal in a Resolution dated and held that no dismissal, constructive or
otherwise, took place for it was Zamora himself who voluntarily
terminated his employment by not reporting for work and by joining a
competitor Grand Air. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Zamora, the NLRC, in a Resolution dated December 17, 1999,
modified its earlier Resolution. Court of Appeals: APC hereafter filed a
Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to have the December
17, 1999 Resolution of the NLRC partially annulled and its October 11,
2000 Resolution set aside on the ground that these were issued with
grave abuse of discretion. Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
failure of petitioner to attach copies of all pleadings (such complaint,
answer, position paper) and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations therein. APC filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and attached the documents required by the Court but
it was denied.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the dismissal issued by the Court of Appeals
was valid on the ground that petitioner failed to attach required
documents. (2) Whether or not the employer is obligated to reinstate and
pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal.
HELD: (1) It is readily apparent in this case that the Court of Appeals
was overzealous in its enforcement of the rules. The pleadings and other
documents it required of petitioner were not at all relevant to the petition.
It is noted that the only issue raised by petitioner was whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting respondent unpaid
salaries while declaring him guilty of abandonment of employment.
Certainly, copies of the Resolutions of the NLRC dated February 10,
1999, December 17, 1999 and October 11, 2000 would have sufficed as
basis for the Court of Appeals to resolve this issue. After all, it is in these
Resolutions that the NLRC purportedly made contrary findings. In sum,
we annul and set aside the January 11, 2000 and May 23, 2001
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals. (2) Rather than remand it to the
Court of Appeals for resolution, the main issue was resolved in an
expedite matters. The Supreme Court ruled that NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable to respondent for
P198, 502.30. The premise of the award of unpaid salary to respondent
is that prior to the reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor
Arbiter, the order of reinstatement embodied therein was already the
subject of an alias writ of execution even pending appeal. Although
petitioner did not comply with this writ of execution, its intransigence
made it liable nonetheless to the salaries of respondent pending appeal.
There is logic in this reasoning of the NLRC. In Roquero v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc. it was that technicalities have no room in labor cases where
the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to
effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat
them.Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if
the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required
to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more
so if he actually rendered services during the period. There is a policy
elevated in this ruling. In Aris (Phil.) Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, it was held that with respect to decisions reinstating
employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming
reason for its execution pending appeal. It is pursuant to the same power
(police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation,
pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily
since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing
threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or
separated employee and his family.
49: LANSANGAN vs. AMKOR TECHNOLOGY
FACTS: An anonymous e-mail was sent to the General Manager of
Amkor Technology Philippines (respondent) detailing allegations of
malfeasance on the part of its supervisory employees Lunesa
Lansangan and Rosita Cendaña (petitioners) for "stealing company
time." Respondent thus investigated the matter, requiring petitioners to
submit their written explanation. In handwritten letters, petitioners
admitted their wrongdoing. Respondent thereupon terminated
petitioners for "extremely serious offenses" as defined in its Code of
Discipline, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for illegal dismissal
against it. LA: Labor Arbiter Amansec, dismissed petitioners’ complaint,
he having found them guilty of "Swiping another employees’ I.D. card or
requesting another employee to swipe one’s I.D. card to gain personal
advantage and/or in the interest of cheating", an offense of dishonesty
punishable as a serious form of misconduct and fraud or breach of trust
under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The Arbiter, however, ordered the
reinstatement of petitioners to their former positions without backwages
"as a measure of equitable and compassionate relief" owing mainly to
petitioners’ prior unblemished employment records, show of remorse,
harshness of the penalty and defective attendance monitoring system of
respondent. NLRC: The LA’s decision was modified and the portion
regarding the reinstatement of the petitioners was deleted. CA: The CA
affirmed the finding that petitioners were guilty of misconduct and the
like, and further ordered respondent to "pay petitioners their
corresponding backwages without qualification and deduction for the
period covering October 20, 2004 (date of the Arbiter’s decision) up to
June 30, 2005 (date of the NLRC Decision)," citing Article 223 of the
Labor Code and Roquero v. Philippine Airlines.
ISSUES: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to receive backwages
pursuant to Article 223
HELD: Roquero, as well as Article 22318 of the Labor Code on which
the appellate court also relied, finds no application in the present case.
Article 223 concerns itself with an interim relief, granted to a dismissed
or separated employee while the case for illegal dismissal is pending
appeal, as what happened in Roquero. It does not apply where there is
no finding of illegal dismissal, as in the present case.
50. Genuino v NLRC FACTS: Citibank is an American banking
corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Genuino was
employed by Citibank as Treasury Sales Division Head with the rank of
Assistant Vice-president. On August 23, 1993, Citibank sent Genuino a
letter charging her with "knowledge and/or involvement" in transactions
"which were irregular or even fraudulent and was informed she was
under preventive suspension. She was further directed to explain in
writing why she should not be terminated. Petitioner’s counsel replied
and demanded a bill of particular regarding the charges against her. The
bank claimed that the petitioner and Mr. Dante Santos, using the
facilities of their family corporations (Torrance and Global) appear to
have participated in the diversion of bank clients' funds from Citibank to
other companies and that they made money in the process. Genuino did
not appear in the administrative investigation and thereafter Citibank
informed Genuino of the result of their investigation and was further
informed that her employment was terminated by Citibank on grounds
of (1) serious misconduct, (2) willful breach of the trust reposed upon
her by the bank, and (3) commission of a crime against the bank.
Genuino filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal suspension
and illegal dismissal with damages LA: that the dismissal was without
just cause and in violation of her right to due process, and the bank is
ordered to reinstate complainant immediately and pay other benefits,
with back wages. Both parties appealed to the NLRC. NLRC: reversed
the Labor Arbiter's decision and declared that the dismissal of the
complainant valid and legal but ORDERING bank to pay the salaries due
to the complainant from the date it reinstated complainant in the payroll.
The parties filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. CA
only modified the amount of indemnity (P5000). Citibank contends that
the Labor Arbiter’s decision in upholding the right of Genuino to
reinstatement is not supported by evidence thus there can be no right to
payroll reinstatement.
ISSUES: WON bank shall pay the salaries due the complainant from the
date or reinstatement up to the date of final decision.
HELD: The court held that the dismissal was for just cause but lacked
due process due to failure of the bank to meet the requirement of twin
notices. The first notice informing the employee of the charges should
neither be pro forma nor vague. It should set out clearly what the
employee is being held liable for. Since the notice of charges given to
Genuino is inadequate for not specifying the specific acts and
surrounding circumstances of the transactions, the dismissal could not
be in accordance with due process. However the Court nevertheless
fined Genuino's dismissal justified. Loss of confidence is a valid ground
for dismissing an employee. It is sufficient if there is some basis for such
loss of confidence. In this case, Genuino was tasked to solicit
investments and keep them in Citibank. Curiously, Genuino did not even
dissuade the depositors from withdrawing their monies from Citibank.
The Court was thus compelled to conclude that Genuino did not have
her employer's interest. Furthermore, Court cancels the directive of
NLRC directing the bank to pay salaries due to the complainant from the
date it reinstated complainant in the payroll up to and until the date of
this decision, view of the Court’s finding that the dismissal is valid. In any
event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned,
shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. If the decision of
the labor arbiter is later reversed on appeal upon the finding that the
ground for dismissal is valid, then the employer has the right to require
the dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries
s/he received while the case was pending appeal, or it can be deducted
from the accrued benefits that the dismissed employee was entitled to
receive from his/her employer under existing laws, collective bargaining
agreement provisions, and company practices. However, if the
employee was reinstated to work during the pendency of the appeal,
then the employee is entitled to the compensation received for actual
services rendered without need of refund.
GARCIA V. PAL- PAGE 73
MT. CARMEL V. RESUANA
BUENVIAJE V. CA
PFIZER INC. V. VELASCO
WHENPHIL CORP. V. ABING- PAGE 79
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC., NAPOLEON L.
NAZARENO, and RICARDO P. ISLA, * petitioners, vs.
JOSE LENI Z. SOLIDUM, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition 1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners Smart Communications, Inc. (Smart),
Napoleon L. Nazareno and Ricardo P. Isla (Isla) challenge the Court of
Appeals' 3 July 2012 Amended Decision 2 and 23 November 2012
Resolution 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115794, affirming the National Labor
Relations Commission's (NLRC) 30 July 2010 Resolution. 4 CTEacH
The Facts
On 26 April 2004, Smart hired respondent Jose Leni
Z. Solidum (Solidum) as Department Head for Smart Buddy Activation.
Smart Buddy Activation is under the Product Marketing Group which is
headed by Isla. On 21 September 2005, Isla gave Solidum a
memorandum 5 informing him of alleged acts of dishonesty, directing
him to explain why his employment should not be terminated, and
placing him under preventive suspension without pay for 30 days. On 28
September 2005, Solidum submitted his written explanation 6 in
response to the 21 September 2005 notice.
On 22 October 2005, Isla gave Solidum a memorandum 7 dated
21 October 2005 informing him of a modified set of alleged acts of
dishonesty, directing him to explain why his employment should not be
terminated, extending his preventive suspension by 10 days, and
inviting him to the administrative investigation scheduled on 26 October
2005.
On 11 November 2005, Isla gave Solidum a
memorandum 8 dated 9 November 2005 terminating his employment
"for fraud or willful breach of trust, falsification, misrepresentation,
conflict of interest, serious misconduct and dishonesty-related
offenses." 9
 Solidum filed against Smart a complaint 10 for illegal dismissal,
illegal suspension, non-payment of salaries, actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In his 3 July 2006 Decision, 11 the Labor Arbiter found
that Solidum's preventive suspension and dismissal were illegal and that
he was entitled to full back wages, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of complainant and
against respondents, as follows:
1. Declaring the 20-day extended preventive suspension
of complainant from October 22, 2005 to
November 10, 2005 illegal and tantamount to
constructive dismissal, and ordering respondents
to jointly and severally pay complainant his
corresponding salaries, benefits, privileges,
allowances and other incentives/bonuses during
the period from October 22 to November 10,
2005, in the amount of P236,061.94; HTDcCE
2. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay the
complainant's unpaid salaries, benefits,
privileges, allowances, and other
benefits/bonuses during the 30-day preventive
suspension, in the amount of P365,896.00;
3. Declaring the dismissal of complainant effective
November 11, 2005 as illegal, and ordering
respondents to reinstate the complainant to his
former position, immediately upon receipt of this
decision, either physically or in the payroll, at the
option of the former, and failure to exercise their
option within ten (10) days hereof, shall place the
complainant on payroll reinstatement, with
payment of accrued salaries, allowances,
benefits/incentives and bonuses;
4. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant his full backwages, inclusive of all
benefits bonuses, privileges, incentives,
allowances or their money equivalents, from date
of dismissal on November 11, 2005 until actual
reinstatement, partially computed as follows:
a. Backwages and benefits — P2,903,561.79
b. Quarterly performance bonus — P935,640.00
c. Monthly Gas allowance — P90,693.00
d. Monthly Rice allowance — P9,000.00
e. Monthly driver's allowance — P68,175.00
f. 13th month pay (pro-rata) — P265,569.68
g. Unpaid accumulated leaves 2004 & 2005 —
P472,123.87
h. Smart incentive entitlement —
P7,370,250.00[;]
5. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant for the foregone opportunity of
pursuing studies in the United Kingdom under the
British Chevening Scholarship Award, in the sum
of 20,189.00 British pounds or Peso
1,982,727.37[; and] DIETHS
6. Ordering respondents to jointly and severally pay
complainant moral damages in the amount of P2
 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P2
million, and attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
the judgment award.
SO ORDERED. 12
On 25 July 2006, Smart appealed to the NLRC. On 13 November
2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution ordering the sheriff to
collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidum's accrued
salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21 July to
20 October 2006. On 15 August and 25 October 2007, 11 February, 28
April, 23 July and 11 November 2008, and 22 January 2009, the Labor
Arbiter issued seven other alias writs of execution ordering the sheriff to
collect from petitioners Solidum's accrued salaries, allowances,
benefits, incentives and bonuses.
In its 26 January 2009 Resolution, 13 the NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiter's 3 July 2006 Decision and dismissed for lack of
merit Solidum's complaint. Solidum filed a motion 14 for reconsideration
dated 9 February 2009.
On 4 May 2009, Solidum filed with the Labor Arbiter an ex-parte
motion 15 praying that an alias writ of execution be issued directing the
sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93, representing Solidum's
accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses from 21
January to 20 April 2009. cITAaD
In its 29 May 2009 Decision, 16 the NLRC denied for lack of
merit Solidum's 9 February 2009 motion for reconsideration.
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In his 29 July 2009 Order, 17 the Labor Arbiter denied for lack of
merit Solidum's ex-parte motion praying that an alias writ of execution
be issued directing the sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93,
representing Solidum's accrued salaries, allowances, benefits,
incentives and bonuses from 21 January to 20 April 2009. The Labor
Arbiter held that:
In the instant case, the NLRC promulgated its
Decision dated January 26, 2009 reversing this Office's
Decision dated July 03, 2006. Also, the NLRC in its
Decision dated May 29, 2009 denied the complainant's
motion for reconsideration of its Decision dated January
26, 2009. This Office is mindful of the fact that the NLRC
is tasked with the review of decisions promulgated by
this Office, as such, it is a higher tribunal as
contemplated by law.
Verily, the recent decision of the NLRC reversing
the Decision of this Office prevents any future issuance
of any writ of execution on the reinstatement aspect in
line with Gracia, et al. vs. Philippine Airlines,
Inc. and International Container Terminal Services vs.
NLRC. 18
Solidum appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC's Ruling
In its 31 May 2010 Decision, 19 the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter's 29 July 2009 Order. The NLRC held that:
In the case at bar, records show that respondents
appealed from the Labor Arbiter's Decision to the
Commission on July 25, 2006. The Commission resolved
respondents' appeal on January 26, 2009, reversing the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated July 3, 2006. Notably,
there is no showing in the records that respondents
reinstated complainant to his former position. Hence,
pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended,
relative to the reinstatement aspect of the Labor Arbiter's
Decision, respondents are obligated to pay
complainant's salaries and benefits, computed from July
13, 2006, when respondents received a copy of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision which, among others, ordered
the reinstatement of complainant, up to the date of
finality of the Commission's resolution reversing the
Labor Arbiter's Decision, which, for this purpose, is
reckoned on May 29, 2009, when the Commission
denied complainant's Motion for Reconsideration.
Indeed, common sense dictates that
complainant's entitlement to reinstatement
salaries/wages and benefits, emanating from the Labor
Arbiter's order of reinstatement, presupposes that said
order of reinstatement is still enforceable. Here, the
Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement dated July 3, 2006
was no longer enforceable as of May 29, 2009 when the
Commission's resolution reversing the Labor Arbiter's
order of reinstatement is deemed to have become final
as hereinabove discussed. Patently then, complainant is
no longer entitled to reinstatement salaries/wages and
benefits after May 29, 2009.
Significantly, the Order of the Labor Arbiter being
appealed from by complainant, denied the latter's motion
for issuance of alias writ of execution for the collection of
his reinstatement salaries and benefits for the period
covering January 21, 2009 to April 20, 2009. The Labor
Arbiter thus committed serious error in denying
complainant's motion with respect to his reinstatement
salaries and benefits as he is entitled to the same for the
period starting July 13, 2006 to May 29,
2009. 20 ADTCaI
Solidum filed a motion 21 for partial reconsideration. Petitioners
filed a motion 22 for reconsideration. In its 30 July 2010 Resolution, the
NLRC granted Solidum's motion for partial reconsideration and denied
for lack of merit petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The NLRC held
that:
Our Entry of Judgment dated June 01, 2010
clearly states that the Decision promulgated by this
Commission on May 29, 2009 had become final and
executory on August 10, 2009. Thus, We so hold that the
date of finality of Our Decision reversing the Labor
Arbiter's Decision dated July 3, 2006 is August 10, 2009,
and the computation of complainant's reinstatement or
accrued salaries/wages and other benefits should be up
to August 10, 2009.
Anent respondents' Motion for Reconsideration, We
find the same unmeritorious. 23
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In his alias writ 24 of execution dated 22 October 2010, the Labor
Arbiter ordered the sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93,
representing Solidum's accrued salaries, allowances, benefits,
incentives and bonuses from 21 January to 20 April 2009.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its 25 January 2011 Decision, 25 the Court of Appeals granted
petitioners' petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and set aside the NLRC's 31 May 2010 Decision and
30 July 2010 Resolution. The Court of Appeals held that: EHScCA
The order of the Labor Arbiter denying Private
Respondent's ex-parte motion for issuance of Alias Writ
of Execution is not a final order as there was something
else to be done, namely, the resolution of his Complaint
for Illegal Dismissal against Petitioners on the merits.
The subject Order of the Labor Arbiter did not put an end
to the issues of illegal suspension and illegal dismissal,
and, thus, partakes the nature of an interlocutory order.
It is jurisprudential that an interlocutory order is not
appealable until after the rendition of the judgment on the
merits for a contrary rule would delay the administration
of justice and unduly burden the courts. Being
interlocutory in nature, the subject Order could not have
been validly appealed.
Moreover, as correctly argued by the Petitioners,
an appeal from an interlocutory order is a prohibited
pleading under Section 4 of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC. Consequently, the Labor
Arbiter's order being interlocutory and unappealable,
Public Respondent NLRC has no jurisdiction to rule on
the appeal except to dismiss the same. The assailed
Decision and the Resolution, rendered in excess of the
Public Respondent NLRC's jurisdiction, are therefore
null.
Besides and more importantly, records show that
the Decision, dated May 29, 2009, of the NLRC in the
Illegal Dismissal Case which effectively denied Private
Respondent's Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
Petitioners already attained finality on June 1, 2010.
Indeed, an Entry of Judgment was accordingly made.
Clearly, Private Respondent can neither pray nor cause
this Court to grant his Ex-parte Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Execution to reinstate him since his dismissal by
Petitioners was finally ruled to be legal; hence, the denial
of his complaint for lack of merit. Ruling on Private
Respondent's Ex-parte motion shall also have an effect
of reviewing a final judgment which the law and the court
abhor. It bears to stress that when a final judgment
becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. 26
Solidum filed a motion 27 for reconsideration.
In his alias writ 28 of execution dated 18 May 2011, the Labor
Arbiter ordered the sheriff to collect from petitioners P1,440,667.93,
representing Solidum's accrued salaries, allowances, benefits,
incentives and bonuses from 21 April to 20 July 2009. Petitioners filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion 29 to order Solidum to return
P2,881,335.86, representing the total amount under the 22 October
2010 and 18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.
In its 3 July 2012 Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals partly
granted Solidum's motion for reconsideration and denied petitioners'
motion to order the return of P2,881,335.86. The Court of Appeals held
that:
[T]here was a wrong appreciation of fact relative
to the date of finality of judgment. The true date when the
May 29, 2009 NLRC decision became final and
executory was on August 10, 2009 and not on June 1,
2010. (Rollo, page 1895) Conformably with the
foregoing, the involved portion of our ruling which is the
subject of the discussion at hand is hereby modified by
changing the stated date therein from June 1, 2010 to
August 10, 2009. HCDAcE
xxx xxx xxx
On the last issue for consideration — refund of
monetary award, We find necessary to quote the
following pronouncement of the High Court:
 xxx xxx xxx
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle
that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor
Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on
the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the
wages of the dismissed employee during the
period of appeal until reversal by the higher court.
(Juanito A. Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009)
In view thereof, no refund will thus be
permitted by this Court. 30
Petitioners filed a motion 31 for partial reconsideration with
motion to order the return of P2,881,335.86. In its 23 November 2012
Resolution, the Court of Appeals held that:
The move to reconsider the January 26, 2009 decision
of the NLRC was denied on May 29, 2009. Thereafter,
an Entry of Judgment was issued which provides in
particular the following: "this is to certify that on May
29, 2009, a DECISION was rendered . . . and that the
same has, pursuant to Rules of the Commission,
became [sic] final and executory on Aug. 10, 2009".
(Rollo, p. 1895) It appears therefore that the situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of the Section 14
had been the case here. In view of this, We find no
cogent reason to reverse our earlier ruling that August
10, 2009 is the true date of finality of subject decision.
xxx xxx xxx
In the light, however, of our earlier discussion on
the true date of finality of judgment, we cannot order the
return of the amounts released by way of the 8th and 9th
Alias Writ of Execution. The wages, allowances,
incentives/benefits and bonuses received through the
said writs covered the period from January 21, 2009 to
July 20, 2009, thus, the latter is not required to reimburse
the same due to the fact that one is entitled to such
amounts until the day that the reinstatement order was
reversed with finality (which in this case falls on August
10, 2009). (See Juanito A. Garcia vs. Philippine Airlines,
Inc. G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009) 32
Hence, the present petition.
The Issues
Petitioners raised as issues that the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that (1) the NLRC's 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009, and (2)Solidum was entitled to
P2,881,335.86, representing the total amount under the 22 October
2010 and 18 May 2011 alias writs of execution.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
The NLRC's 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory
on 10 August 2009 as shown on the entry of judgment. 33 The entry of
judgment states:
This is to certify that on May 29, 2009, a DECISION
was rendered in the above-entitled case, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows: acTDCI
"WHEREFORE, premises considered,
complainant's motion for reconsideration, as well
as respondents' motion for injunction are hereby
both DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Our
 January 26, 2009 Resolution is hereby
REITERATED.
SO ORDERED."
and that the same has pursuant to the Rules of the
Commission, become final and executory on Aug.
10, 2009 and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries
of Judgments.
Quezon City, Philippines, June 01, 2010. 34 (Boldfacing
supplied)
Moreover, the certification 35 issued by the NLRC states that the
NLRC's 29 May 2009 Decision became final and executory on 10
August 2009:
This is to certify that the Decision in NLRC Case
No. 00-11-09564-05/NLRC CA No. 049875-06,
entitled: Jose Leni Z. Solidum vs. Smart
Communications, Inc., Napoleon L. Nazareno, and/or
Ricky P. Isla, was promulgated on 29 May 2009; the
same was mailed on 11 June 2009 and in the
absence of return cards, the decision had become
final and executory on 10 August 2009, (after sixty
(60) calendar days from the date of mailing), and had
been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment,
pursuant to Rule VII Section 14 of the 2005 Revised
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which provides: "The
Executive Clerk or Deputy Executive Clerk shall consider
the decision, resolution or order as final and executory
after sixty (60) calendar days from date of mailing in the
absence of return cards, certifications from the post
office, or other proof of service to parties. 36 (Boldfacing
supplied)
Since the NLRC's 29 May 2009 Decision became final and
executory on 10 August 2009, Solidum is entitled to P2,881,335.86,
representing his accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and
bonuses for the period 21 January to 20 July 2009.
In Bago v. NLRC, 37 the Court held that employees are entitled
to their accrued salaries, allowances, benefits, incentives and bonuses
until the NLRC's reversal of the labor arbiter's order of reinstatement
becomes final and executory, as shown on the entry of judgment. The
Court held that: CDAcIT
Finally, on Arlyn's claim that respondents
"unilaterally withheld her payroll reinstatement" after the
NLRC reversed on September 27, 2004 the Labor
Arbiter's decision, Article 223, paragraph 6 of the Labor
Code provides that the decision of the NLRC on appeals
from decisions of the Labor Arbiter "shall become final
and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties." The 2002 New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC provided:
RULE VII
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 14. FINALITY OF DECISION
OF THE COMMISSION AND ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT. — (a) Finality of the Decisions,
Resolutions or Orders of the Commission. Except
as provided in Rule XI, Section 9, the decisions,
resolutions or orders of the Commission/Division
shall become executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of the same.
(b) Entry of Judgment. — Upon the
expiration of the ten (10) calendar day period
 provided in paragraph (a) of this section, the
decision/resolution/order shall, as far as
practicable, be entered in a book of entries of
judgment.
(c) Allowance for Delay of Mail in the
Issuance of Entries of Judgment. — In issuing
entries of judgment, the Executive Clerk of Court
or the Deputy Executive Clerk, in the absence of
a return card or certification from the post office
concerned, shall determine the finality of the
decision by making allowance for delay of mail,
computed sixty (60) calendar days from the date
of mailing of the decision, resolution or order.
That the Court of Appeals may take cognizance
of and resolve a petition for certiorari for the nullification
of the decisions of the NLRC on jurisdictional and due
process considerations does not affect the statutory
finality of the NLRC Decision. The 2002 New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC so provided: EAICTS
RULE VIII
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 6. EFFECT OF FILING OF
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON EXECUTION.
— A petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court shall not stay the
execution of the assailed decision unless a
temporary restraining order is issued by the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
In the case at bar, Arlyn received the September
27, 2004 NLRC decision on October 25, 2004, and the
January 31, 2005 NLRC Resolution denying her Motion
for Reconsideration on February 23, 2005. There is no
showing that the Court of Appeals issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the execution of the NLRC
decision, as affirmed by its Resolution of January 31,
2005.
If above-quoted paragraph (a) of Section 14 of
Rule VII of the 2002 NLRC New Rules of Procedure
were followed, the decision of the NLRC would have
become final and executory on March 7, 2005, ten
(10) calendar days from February 25, 2005. The
NLRC, however, issued on June 16, 2005 a Notice of
Entry of Judgment stating that the NLRC Resolution
of January 31, 2005 became final and executory on
April 16, 2005, apparently following the above-
quoted last paragraph of Section 14 of Rule VII. No
objection having been raised by any of the parties to
the declaration in the Notice of Entry of Judgment of
the date of finality of the NLRC January 31, 2005
Resolution, Arlyn's payroll reinstatement ended on
April 16, 2005. . . .
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the
foregoing discussions, DENIED and the questioned
decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in thatrespondent Standard
Insurance, Co., Inc. is ordered to pay the salaries due
petitioner, Arlyn Bago, from the time her payroll
reinstatement was withheld after the promulgation
on September 27, 2004 of the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission until April 16,
2005 when it became final and
executory. 38(Boldfacing supplied)
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' 3 The Facts
July 2012 Amended Decision and 23 November 2012 Resolution in CA- On October 28, 1968, PAL hired Bichara as a flight attendant.
G.R. SP No. 115794 areAFFIRMED. Sometime in 1971, PAL implemented a retrenchment program. By
SO ORDERED. CcAITa April of that year, Bicharavoluntarily resigned. On May 15, 1975, he
was rehired. 6
||| (Smart Communications, Inc. v. Solidum, G.R. No. 204646 , [April 15,
2015]) In August 1993, Bichara was included in PAL's Purser
Upgrading Program in which he graduated on December 13, 1993.
SY V. FAIRLAND- PAGE 79 As flight purser, he was required to take five (5) check rides for his
performance evaluation and earn at least an 85% rating for each ride.
YUPANGCO V. CA However, Bichara failed in the two (2) check rides with ratings of
ANDO V. CAMPO- PAGE 84 83.46% and 80.63%. Consequently, on March 21,
1994, Bichara was demoted to the position of flight steward. 7
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. On March 22, 1994, Bichara appealed his demotion to PAL,
ALEXANDER P. BICHARA, respondent. but no action was taken; hence, he filed a complaint for illegal
demotion against PAL 8 before the NLRC-Regional Arbitration
Branch, docketed as NLRC NCR 04-03414-94 (illegal demotion
case). Eventually, or on June 16, 1997, Labor Arbiter Ricardo C.
DECISION
Nora (LA Nora) issued a Decision 9 (June 16, 1997
Decision) declaring Bichara's demotion as illegal, and accordingly,
ordered PAL to reinstate Bichara to his position as flight
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p: purser. 10 PAL filed an appeal before the NLRC and later before the
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the CA, both of which, however, upheld LA Nora's finding. PAL no longer
Decision 2 dated January 24, 2014 and the Resolution 3 dated July appealed to the Court, thus, it rendered the June 16, 1997
30, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. Decision final and executory on February 5, 2004. 11 caITAC
118777, which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated During the pendency of the illegal demotion case 12 before
November 23, 2010 and the Resolution 5 dated January 21, 2011 of the CA, however, or on July 15, 1998, PAL implemented another
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR 00- retrenchment program that resulted in the termination of Bichara's
04-03414-94 (CA No. 013528-97) (AE-03-09), and thereby, ordered employment. 13 This prompted him, along with more than 1,400
petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to pay respondent Alexander other retrenched flight attendants, represented by the Flight
P. Bichara (Bichara) salary differentials, backwages, and retirement Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), to
benefits. file on June 22, 1998, a separate complaint for unfair labor practice,
illegal retrenchment with claims for reinstatement and payment of
salaries, allowances, backwages, and damages 14 against PAL,
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 06-05100-98 15 (illegal
retrenchment case). 16 This case was appealed all the way to this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 178083 entitled "Flight Attendants and
Stewards Assn. of the Phils. v. PAL, Patria T. Chiong, and
CA" (FASAP case), which remains pending as of this time. 17
On July 9, 2005, Bichara reached the 60 year-old
compulsory retirement age under the PAL-FASAP Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). 18
On January 31, 2008, Bichara filed a motion for execution of
LA Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, 19 which PAL opposed 20 by
arguing that the "complaint for illegal demotion . . . was overtaken by
supervening events, i.e., the retrenchment of [Bichara] in 1998 and
his having reached [the] compulsory retirement age in 2005." 21
The LA Ruling
In an Order 22 dated February 4, 2009 (February 4, 2009
Order), Labor Arbiter Antonio R. Macam (LA Macam)
granted Bichara's motion for execution, thus, directing the issuance
of a writ of execution against PAL and/or a certain Jose Garcia to
jointly and severally pay Bichara: (a) separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of
service counting from October 28, 1968 up to the present, excluding
the period from April 1, 1971 until May 15, 1975, or a period of 35
years; and (b) attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00. 23
LA Macam declared that, notwithstanding the pendency
before this Court of the illegal retrenchment case, i.e., FASAP
case, Bichara's termination was invalid, given that: (a) PAL did not
use a fair and reasonable criteria in effecting the
retrenchment; (b) PAL disregarded the labor arbiters' rulings in the
illegal demotion and illegal retrenchment cases which were both
immediately executory; and (c) retrenchment was made during the
pendency of the illegal demotion case without the permission of the
court where the case was pending. 24 For these
reasons, Bichara was entitled to reinstatement to his position as
flight purser. However, since Bicharamay no longer be reinstated in
view of his compulsory retirement in accordance with the CBA, LA
Macam, instead, ordered PAL to pay Bichara separation pay with the
salary base of a flight purser. 25
Aggrieved, PAL appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a Decision 26 dated November 23, 2010, the NLRC
reversed and set aside LA Macam's February 4, 2009 Order and
denied the motion for execution for being moot and academic,
considering Bichara's compulsory retirement in 2005, 27 without
prejudice to the latter's entitlement to backwages and retirement
benefits of a flight steward pursuant to this Court's final decision in
the FASAP case. 28
At the outset, the NLRC ruled that Bichara's reinstatement
could have taken effect, if at all, only on January 31, 2008 when he
sought the execution of the said relief. 29 In this light,
his reinstatement and corresponding backwages prior to said
date must therefore be based on the salary rate and other
benefits attached to the position of flight steward to which he was
demoted/reverted. 30 However, it declared that reinstatement is no
longer possible as the same was rendered moot and academic when
he compulsorily retired in 2005. 31 On the other hand, the NLRC
concluded that the matter of payment of monetary benefits is not for
it to order since it is a relief pertaining to the pending FASAP case;
as such, Bichara should pursue payment of backwages when the
decision in the FASAP case is due for execution. In this relation, the
NLRC remarked that LA Macam exceeded his authority in awarding
separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, since such relief is not
contemplated in the decision sought to be executed, i.e., the June
16, 1997 Decision. 32
Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were, however,
denied in a Resolution 33 dated January 21, 2011.
Dissatisfied, Bichara elevated the case to the CA through a petition
for review on certiorari.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 34 dated January 24, 2014, the CA reversed
and set aside the NLRC's ruling. It did not find LA Macam to have
exceeded his authority in ordering the payment of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement since, in a long line of cases, this Court has
consistently held that when reinstatement is not possible due to over
age, payment of separation pay is in place. 35 The CA, however,
observed that since Bichara was one of the retrenched employees
involved in the FASAP case, this Court's Decision dated October 2,
2009, wherein it ruled that the retrenchment was illegal and thereby
stated that "[f]light attendants who have reached their compulsory
retirement age of retirement shall receive backwages up to the date
of their retirement only," 36 should be made to apply. Thus, instead
of separation pay,Bichara is entitled to backwages from the time of
his retrenchment up to the time he reached the compulsory
retirement age of 60. In addition, since the June 16, 1997 Decision,
rendered in the illegal demotion case, had already become final and
executory, he is entitled to salary differentials of a flight purser from
a flight attendant from March 21, 1994, i.e., the date of his demotion,
up to the time of his retrenchment in July 1998. 37 He is also entitled
to retirement benefits in accordance with the existing CBA at the time
of his retirement. 38 ICHDca
PAL moved for reconsideration 39 which was denied in a
Resolution 40 dated July 30, 2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA
erred in reversing the NLRC's Decision and thereby
awarding Bichara the aforementioned monetary awards.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
A judgment should be implemented according to the terms of
its dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule. 41 As
such, where the writ of execution is not in harmony with and
exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the writ has pro
tanto no validity. 42
A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of
final judgments, which states that a final judgment may no longer
be altered, amended or modified, even if the alteration, amendment
or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court
renders it. Any attempt to insert, change or add matters not clearly
contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on
immutability of judgments. 43 But like any other rule, this principle
has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical errors; (2) the
so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party; (3) void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution
unjust and inequitable. 44
In this case, the final judgment sought to be executed is LA
Nora's June 16, 1997 Decision, which was confined to the directive
that PAL reinstate Bichara as a flight purser in view of his illegal
demotion to the position of flight attendant:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the illegality of
complainant's [Bichara] demotion/reversion to Flight
Steward and ordering the respondents [PAL] to
 reinstate the complainant to his position as Flight
Purser within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision.
The claim for damages is dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED. 45
Evidently, LA Macam went beyond the terms of the June 16,
1997 Decision when he, in his February 4, 2009 Order, directed the
issuance of a writ of executionordering the payment of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the
complainant's [Bichara] Motion for Execution, the same
is hereby GRANTED. Let a Writ of Execution be issued
ordering the respondents Philippine Airlines, Inc.
and/or Jose Garcia, in lieu of reinstating the
complainant to the position of Flight Purser, to jointly
and severally PAY to the complainant his separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month's pay for every year of
service counting from October 28, 1968 up to the
present, excluding the period from April 1, 1971 until
May 15, 1975, or a period of thirty-five (35) years and
to pay the complainant the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) for and as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 46
Unlike the cases 47 cited by the CA, which all involved illegal
dismissal cases, it would not be proper to accord such relief in this
case since, in those cases, the awards of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement were all hinged on the validity of the employee's
dismissal. Here, the validity of Bichara's termination is the subject
matter of a separate case, i.e., the FASAP case, which is still
pending before this Court, and is also beyond the ambit of the illegal
demotion proceedings. Hence, LA Macam exceeded his authority
when he ruled on this issue and directed PAL to
pay Bichara separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
PAL's supervening retrenchment of its employees, which
included Bichara, in July 1998, and his compulsory retirement in July
2005, however, prevent the enforcement of the reinstatement
of Bichara to the position of flight purser under the June 16, 1997
Decision. Nonetheless, since this Decision had already settled the
illegality of Bichara's demotion with finality, this Court finds
that Bichara should, instead, be awarded the salary differential of
a flight purser from a flight steward from the time of his illegal
demotion on March 21, 1994 up until the time he was retrenched in
July 1998. Notably, unlike LA Macam's award of separation pay in
lieu of reinstatement, the award of salary differential is not dependent
on the validity of his termination, as it is, in fact, intrinsically linked to
the illegality of Bichara's demotion. Hence, with this direct relation,
there should be no obstacle in rendering this award.
Further, it should be pointed out that the principle of
immutability of judgments, from which the above-stated rule on writ
of executions proceed, allow courts, as an exception, to recognize
circumstances that transpire after the finality of the decision which
would render its execution unjust and inequitable and act
accordingly. Thus, in view of the supervening events above-
mentioned, this Court deems the award of salary differential to be the
just and equitable award under the circumstances herein prevailing.
Jurisprudence holds that courts may modify or alter the judgment to
harmonize the same with justice and the facts when after judgment
has been rendered and the latter has become final, facts and
circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or
unjust, 48 as in this case. TCAScE
As a last point, it deserves mentioning that since Bichara's
illegal demotion has been finally decreed, he should be entitled
 to (a) backwages, at the salary rate of a flight purser, from the time DECISION
of retrenchment in July 1998 up until his compulsory retirement in
July 2005; (b) retirement benefits of a flight purser in accordance
with the existing CBA at the time of Bichara's retirement; PERALTA, J p:
and (c) attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages, if any, but
only if this Court, in the FASAP case, finally rules that the Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
subject retrenchment is invalid. Otherwise, he should only be Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
entitled to the above-stated salary differential, as well as the Court of Appeals Decision 1 dated June 8, 2011 and
corresponding separation pay required under the relevant CBA, or Resolution 2 dated October 7, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 115485,
Article 297 49 (formerly Article 283) of the Labor Code if no such which affirmed in toto the decision of the National Labor Relations
CBA provision exists. The awards of backwages, and retirement Commission (NLRC).
benefits, including attorney's fees, moral, and exemplary damages, The facts of the case follow.
if any, cannot, however, be executed in these proceedings since they
are incidents which pertain to the illegal retrenchment case, hence, On March 11, 1996, respondent Crisanto
executable only when the FASAP case is finally concluded. P. Uson (Uson) began his employment with Royal Class Venture
Phils., Inc. (Royal Class Venture) as an accounting
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The clerk. 3Eventually, he was promoted to the position of accounting
Decision dated January 24, 2014 and the Resolution dated July 30, supervisor, with a salary of Php13,000.00 a month, until he was
2014 of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 118777 are allegedly dismissed from employment on December 20, 2000. 4
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
entered ORDERING petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to pay On March 2, 2001, Uson filed with the Sub-Regional
respondent Alexander P. Bichara the salary differential of a flight Arbitration Branch No. 1, Dagupan City, of the NLRC a Complaint for
purser from a flight attendant from the time of his illegal demotion on Illegal Dismissal, with prayers for backwages, reinstatement, salaries
March 21, 1994 up until the time he was retrenched on July 15, 1998. and 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's
fees against Royal Class Venture. 5
SO ORDERED.
Royal Class Venture did not make an appearance in the case
||| (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Bichara, G.R. No. 213729, [September 2, despite its receipt of summons. 6
2015])
On May 15, 2001, Uson filed his Position Paper 7 as
complainant.
JOSE EMMANUEL
P. GUILLERMO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO On October 22, 2001, Labor Arbiter Jose G. De Vera rendered
P. USON, respondent. a Decision 8 in favor of the complainant Uson and ordering therein
respondent Royal Class Venture to reinstate him to his former
position and pay his backwages, 13th month pay as well as moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
Royal Class Venture, as the losing party, did not file an appeal
of the decision. 9 Consequently, upon Uson's motion, a Writ of
Execution 10 dated February 15, 2002 was issued to implement the
Labor Arbiter's decision.
On May 17, 2002, an Alias Writ of Execution 11 was issued.
But with the judgment still unsatisfied, a Second Alias Writ of
Execution 12 was issued on September 11, 2002.
Again, it was reported in the Sheriff's Return that the Second
Alias Writ of Execution dated September 11, 2002 remained
"unsatisfied." Thus, on November 14, 2002, Uson filed a Motion for
Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and Officers of
Respondent Liable for Satisfaction of the Decision. 13 The motion
quoted from a portion of the Sheriff's Return, which states:
On September 12, 2002, the undersigned
proceeded at the stated present business office
address of the respondent which is at Minien East, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan to serve the writ of execution.
Upon arrival, I found out that the establishment erected
thereat is not [in] the respondent's name but JOEL and
SONS CORPORATION, a family corporation owned by
the Guillermos of which, Jose Emmanuel
F. Guillermo the General Manager of the respondent,
is one of the stockholders who received the writ using
his nickname "Joey," [and who] concealed his real
identity and pretended that he [was] the brother of
Jose, which [was] contrary to the statement of the
guard-on-duty that Jose and Joey [were] one and the
same person. The former also informed the
undersigned that the respondent's (sic) corporation
has been dissolved.
On the succeeding day, as per [advice] by the
[complainant's] counsel that the respondent has an
account at the Bank of the Philippine Islands
Magsaysay Branch, A.B. Fernandez Ave., Dagupan
City, the undersigned immediately served a notice of
garnishment, thus, the bank replied on the same day
stating that the respondent [does] not have an account
with the branch. 14
On December 26, 2002, Labor Arbiter Irenarco R. Rimando
issued an Order 15 granting the motion filed by Uson. The order held
that officers of a corporation are jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of the corporation to the employees and there is no denial
of due process in holding them so even if the said officers were not
parties to the case when the judgment in favor of the employees was
rendered. 16 Thus, the Labor Arbiter pierced the veil of corporate
fiction of Royal Class Venture and held herein petitioner Jose
Emmanuel Guillermo (Guillermo), in his personal capacity, jointly
and severally liable with the corporation for the enforcement of the
claims of Uson. 17 CAIHTE
Guillermo filed, by way of special appearance, a Motion for
Reconsideration/To Set Aside the Order of December 26,
2002. 18 The same, however, was not granted as, this time, in an
Order dated November 24, 2003, Labor Arbiter Niña Fe S. Lazaga-
Rafols sustained the findings of the labor arbiters before her and
even castigatedGuillermo for his unexplained absence in the prior
proceedings despite notice, effectively putting responsibility
on Guillermo for the case's outcome against him. 19
On January 5, 2004, Guillermo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Order, 20 but the same was promptly
denied by the Labor Arbiter in an Order dated January 7, 2004. 21
 On January 26, 2004, Uson filed a Motion for Alias Writ of
Execution, 22 to which Guillermo filed a Comment and Opposition
on April 2, 2004. 23
On May 18, 2004, the Labor Arbiter issued an
Order 24 granting Uson's Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of
Execution and rejecting Guillermo's arguments posed in his
Comment and Opposition.
Guillermo elevated the matter to the NLRC by filing a
Memorandum of Appeal with Prayer for a (Writ of) Preliminary
Injunction dated June 10, 2004. 25
In a Decision 26 dated May 11, 2010, the NLRC
dismissed Guillermo's appeal and denied his prayers for injunction.
On August 20, 2010, Guillermo filed a Petition
for Certiorari 27 before the Court of Appeals, assailing the NLRC
decision.
On June 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered its assailed
Decision 28 which denied Guillermo's petition and upheld all the
findings of the NLRC.
The appellate court found that summons was in fact served
on Guillermo as President and General Manager of Royal Class
Venture, which was how the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over
the company. 29 But Guillermo subsequently refused to receive all
notices of hearings and conferences as well as the order to file Royal
Class Venture's position paper. 30 Then, it was learned during
execution that Royal Class Venture had been
dissolved. 31 However, the Court of Appeals held that although the
judgment had become final and executory, it may be modified or
altered "as when its execution becomes impossible or unjust." 32 It
also noted that the motion to hold officers and directors
like Guillermo personally liable, as well as the notices to hear the
same, was sent to them by registered mail, but no pleadings were
submitted and no appearances were made by anyone of them during
the said motion's pendency. 33 Thus, the court held Guillermo liable,
citing jurisprudence that hold the president of the corporation liable
for the latter's obligation to illegally dismissed employees. 34 Finally,
the court dismissed Guillermo's allegation that the case is an intra-
corporate controversy, stating that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 35
From the above decision of the appellate
court, Guillermo filed a Motion for Reconsideration 36 but the same
was again denied by the said court in the assailed
Resolution 37 dated October 7, 2011.
Hence, the instant petition.
Guillermo asserts that he was impleaded in the case only
more than a year after its Decision had become final and executory,
an act which he claims to be unsupported in law and
jurisprudence. 38 He contends that the decision had become final,
immutable and unalterable and that any amendment thereto is null
and void. 39 Guillermo assails the so-called "piercing the veil" of
corporate fiction which allegedly discriminated against him when he
alone was belatedly impleaded despite the existence of other
directors and officers in Royal Class Venture. 40 He also claims that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction because the case is one of an
intra-corporate controversy, with the complainant Uson also claiming
to be a stockholder and director of Royal Class Venture. 41
In his Comment, 42 Uson did not introduce any new
arguments but merely cited verbatim the disquisitions of the Court of
Appeals to counter Guillermo's assertions in his petition.
To resolve the case, the Court must confront the issue of
whether an officer of a corporation may be included as judgment
obligor in a labor case for the first time only after the decision of the
Labor Arbiter had become final and executory, and whether the twin
doctrines of "piercing the veil of corporate fiction" and personal
liability of company officers in labor cases apply.
The petition is denied.
In the earlier labor cases of Claparols v. Court of Industrial
Relations 43 and A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v.
NLRC, 44 persons who were not originally impleaded in the case
were, even during execution, held to be solidarily liable with the
employer corporation for the latter's unpaid obligations to
complainant-employees. These included a newly-formed corporation
which was considered a mere conduit or alter ego of the originally
impleaded corporation, and/or the officers or stockholders of the
latter corporation. 45 Liability attached, especially to the responsible
officers, even after final judgment and during execution, when there
was a failure to collect from the employer corporation the judgment
debt awarded to its workers. 46 In Naguiat v. NLRC, 47 the
president of the corporation was found, for the first time on appeal,
to be solidarily liable to the dismissed employees. Then, in Reynoso
v. Court of Appeals, 48 the veil of corporate fiction was pierced at the
stage of execution, against a corporation not previously impleaded,
when it was established that such corporation had dominant control
of the original party corporation, which was a smaller company, in
such a manner that the latter's closure was done by the former in
order to defraud its creditors, including a former worker. DETACa
The rulings of this Court in A.C.
Ransom, Naguiat, and Reynoso, however, have since been
tempered, at least in the aspects of the lifting of the corporate veil
and the assignment of personal liability to directors, trustees and
officers in labor cases. The subsequent cases of McLeod v.
NLRC, 49 Spouses Santos v. NLRC 50 and Carag v.
NLRC, 51 have all established, save for certain exceptions, the
primacy of Section 31 52 of the Corporation Code in the matter of
assigning such liability for a corporation's debts, including judgment
obligations in labor cases. According to these cases, a corporation is
still an artificial being invested by law with a personality separate and
distinct from that of its stockholders and from that of other
corporations to which it may be connected. 53 It is not in every
instance of inability to collect from a corporation that the veil of
corporate fiction is pierced, and the responsible officials are made
liable. Personal liability attaches only when, as enumerated by the
said Section 31 of the Corporation Code, there is a wilfull and
knowing assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation, there is
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the
corporation, or there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to
the corporation. 54 Further, in another labor case, Pantranco
Employees Association (PEA-PTGWO), et al. v. NLRC, et al., 55 the
doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is held to apply only in three
(3) basic areas, namely: (1) defeat of public convenience as when
the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation; (2) fraud cases or when the corporate entity is used to
justify a wrong, protect fraud, or defend a crime; or (3) alter
ego cases, where a corporation is merely a farce since it is a mere
alter ego or business conduit of a person, or where the corporation
is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted as to
make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of
another corporation. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific
provision of law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate
officer cannot be made personally liable for corporate
liabilities. 56 Indeed, in Reahs Corporation v. NLRC, 57 the
conferment of liability on officers for a corporation's obligations to
labor is held to be an exception to the general doctrine of separate
personality of a corporation.
It also bears emphasis that in cases where personal liability
attaches, not even all officers are made accountable. Rather, only
the "responsible officer," i.e., the person directly responsible for and
who "acted in bad faith" in committing the illegal dismissal or any act
violative of the Labor Code, is held solidarily liable, in cases wherein
the corporate veil is pierced. 58 In other instances, such as cases of
so-called corporate tort of a close corporation, it is the person
"actively engaged" in the management of the corporation who is held
liable. 59 In the absence of a clearly identifiable officer(s) directly
responsible for the legal infraction, the Court considers the president
of the corporation as such officer. 60
The common thread running among the aforementioned
cases, however, is that the veil of corporate fiction can be pierced,
and responsible corporate directors and officers or even a separate
but related corporation, may be impleaded and held answerable
solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on execution,
so long as it is established that such persons have deliberately used
the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or
have resorted to fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so. When the
shield of a separate corporate identity is used to commit wrongdoing
and opprobriously elude responsibility, the courts and the legal
authorities in a labor case have not hesitated to step in and shatter
the said shield and deny the usual protections to the offending party,
even after final judgment. The key element is the presence of fraud,
malice or bad faith. Bad faith, in this instance, does not connote bad
judgment or negligence but imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud. 61
As the foregoing implies, there is no hard and fast rule on
when corporate fiction may be disregarded; instead, each case must
be evaluated according to its peculiar circumstances. 62 For the
case at bar, applying the above criteria, a finding of personal and
solidary liability against a corporate officer like Guillermo must be
rooted on a satisfactory showing of fraud, bad faith or malice, or the
presence of any of the justifications for disregarding the corporate
fiction. As stated in McLeod, 63bad faith is a question of fact and is
evidentiary, so that the records must first bear evidence of malice
before a finding of such may be made.
It is our finding that such evidence exists in the record. Like
the A.C. Ransom, and Naguiat cases, the case at bar involves an
apparent family corporation. As in those two cases, the records of
the present case bear allegations and evidence that Guillermo, the
officer being held liable, is the person responsible in the actual
running of the company and for the malicious and illegal dismissal of
the complainant; he, likewise, was shown to have a role in dissolving
the original obligor company in an obvious "scheme to avoid liability"
which jurisprudence has always looked upon with a suspicious eye
in order to protect the rights of labor. 64
Part of the evidence on record is the second page of the
verified Position Paper of complainant (herein respondent) Crisanto
P. Uson, where it was clearly alleged that Uson was "illegally
dismissed by the President/General Manager of respondent
corporation (herein petitioner) Jose Emmanuel
P. Guillermo when Uson exposed the practice of the said
President/General Manager of dictating and undervaluing the shares
of stock of the corporation." 65 The statement is proof
that Guillermo was the responsible officer in charge of running the
company as well as the one who dismissed Uson from employment.
As this sworn allegation is uncontroverted — as neither the company
nor Guillermo appeared before the Labor Arbiter despite the service
of summons and notices — such stands as a fact of the case, and
now functions as clear evidence of Guillermo's bad faith in his
dismissal of Uson from employment, with the motive apparently
being anger at the latter's reporting of unlawful activities. aDSIHc
Then, it is also clearly reflected in the records that it
was Guillermo himself, as President and General Manager of the
company, who received the summons to the case, and who also
subsequently and without justifiable cause refused to receive all
notices and orders of the Labor Arbiter that followed. 66 This
makes Guillermoresponsible for his and his company's failure to
participate in the entire proceedings before the said office. The fact
is clearly narrated in the Decision and Orders of the Labor
Arbiter, Uson's Motions for the Issuance of Alias Writs of Execution,
as well as in the Decision of the NLRC and the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals, 67which Guillermo did not dispute in any of his
belated motions or pleadings, including in his petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals and even in the petition
currently before this Court. 68 Thus, again, the same now stands as
a finding of fact of the said lower tribunals which binds this Court and
which it has no power to alter or revisit. 69 Guillermo's knowledge of
the case's filing and existence and his unexplained refusal to
participate in it as the responsible official of his company, again is
anindicia of his bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment
of the labor tribunals.
Finally, the records likewise bear that Guillermo dissolved
Royal Class Venture and helped incorporate a new firm, located in
the same address as the former, wherein he is again a stockholder.
This is borne by the Sheriff's Return which reported: that at Royal
Class Venture's business address at Minien East, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, there is a new establishment named "Joel and Sons
Corporation," a family corporation owned by the Guillermos in which
Jose Emmanuel F. Guillermo is again one of the stockholders;
that Guillermo received the writ of execution but used the nickname
"Joey" and denied being Jose Emmanuel F. Guillermo and, instead,
pretended to be Jose's brother; that the guard on duty confirmed that
Jose and Joey are one and the same person; and that the
respondent corporation Royal Class Venture had been
dissolved. 70 Again, the facts contained in the Sheriff's Return were
not disputed nor controverted by Guillermo, either in the hearings
of Uson's Motions for Issuance of Alias Writs of Execution, in
subsequent motions or pleadings, or even in the petition before this
Court. Essentially, then, the facts form part of the records and now
stand as further proof of Guillermo's bad faith and malicious intent to
evade the judgment obligation.
The foregoing clearly indicate a pattern or scheme to avoid
the obligations to Uson and frustrate the execution of the judgment
award, which this Court, in the interest of justice, will not
countenance. ATICcS
As for Guillermo's assertion that the case is an intra-corporate
controversy, the Court sustains the finding of the appellate court that
the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are
determined by the allegations of the complaint at the time of its filing,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein. 71 Although Uson is also
a stockholder and director of Royal Class Venture, it is settled in
jurisprudence that not all conflicts between a stockholder and the
corporation are intra-corporate; an examination of the complaint
must be made on whether the complainant is involved in his capacity
as a stockholder or director, or as an employee. 72 If the latter is
found and the dispute does not meet the test of what qualifies as an
intra-corporate controversy, then the case is a labor case cognizable
by the NLRC and is not within the jurisdiction of any other
tribunal. 73 In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that he was
maliciously and illegally dismissed as an Accounting Supervisor
by Guillermo, the Company President and General Manager, an
allegation that was not even disputed by the latter nor by Royal Class
Venture. It raised no intra-corporate relationship issues between him
and the corporation or Guillermo; neither did it raise any issue
regarding the regulation of the corporation. As correctly found by the
appellate court, Uson's complaint and redress sought were centered
alone on his dismissal as an employee, and not upon any other
relationship he had with the company or with Guillermo. Thus, the
matter is clearly a labor dispute cognizable by the labor tribunals.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Salvador, Reynaldo Singsing, and Raffy Mascardo (respondents)
Decision dated June 8, 2011 and Resolution dated October 7, 2011 against Dutch Movers, Inc. (DMI), and/or spouses Cesar Lee and
in CA-G.R. SP No. 115485 areAFFIRMED. Yolanda Lee (petitioners), its alleged President/Owner, and Manager
respectively.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Guillermo v. Uson, G.R. No. 198967, [March 7, 2016]) In their Amended Complaint and Position
Paper, 9 respondents stated that DMI, a domestic corporation
engaged in hauling liquefied petroleum gas, employed Lequin as
DUTCH MOVERS, INC., CESAR LEE and YOLANDA truck driver, and the rest of respondents as helpers; on December
LEE, petitioners, vs. EDILBERTO 1 LEQUIN, 28, 2004, Cesar Lee, through the Supervisor Nazario Furio, informed
CHRISTOPHER R. SALVADOR, REYNALDO 2 L. them that DMI would cease its hauling operation for no reason; as
SINGSING, and RAFFY B. MASCARDO, respondents. such, they requested DMI to issue a formal notice regarding the
matter but to no avail. Later, upon respondents' request, the DOLE
NCR 10 issued a certification 11 revealing that DMI did not file any
DECISION notice of business closure. Thus, respondents argued that they were
illegally dismissed as their termination was without cause and only
on the pretext of closure.
DEL CASTILLO, J p: On October 28, 2005, LA Aliman D. Mangandog
dismissed 12 the case for lack of cause of action.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
On November 23, 2007, the NLRC reversed and set aside the
on Certiorari assailing the July 1, 2013 Decision 3 of the Court of
LA Decision. It ruled that respondents were illegally dismissed
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 113774. The CA reversed and set aside
because DMI simply placed them on standby, and no longer provide
the October 29, 2009 4 and January 29, 2010 5 Resolutions of the
them with work. The dispositive portion of the NLRC
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which in turn
Decision 13 reads:
reversed and set aside the Order 6dated September 4, 2009 of Labor
Arbiter Lilia S. Savari (LA Savari). HTcADC WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 28,
2005 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
Also challenged is the November 13, 2013 CA
new judgment is hereby rendered ordering
Resolution, 7 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the
respondent DutchMovers, Inc. to reinstate
assailed Decision.
complainants to their former positions without loss of
Factual Antecedents seniority rights and other privileges. Respondent
This case is an offshoot of the illegal dismissal corporation is also hereby ordered to pay complainants
Complaint 8 filed by Edilberto Lequin (Lequin), Christopher their full backwages from the time they were illegally
dismissed up to the date of their actual reinstatement
 and ten (10%) percent of the monetary award as for
attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 14
The NLRC Decision became final and executory on
December 30, 2007. 15 And, on February 14, 2008, the NLRC
issued an Entry of Judgment 16 on the case.
Consequently, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of
Execution. 17 Later, they submitted a Reiterating Motion for Writ of
Execution with Updated Computation of Full
Backwages. 18 Pending resolution of these motions, respondents
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Implead 19 stating that upon
investigation, they discovered that DMI no longer operates. They,
nonetheless, insisted that petitioners — who managed and operated
DMI, and consistently represented to respondents that they were the
owners of DMI — continue to work at Toyota Alabang, which they
(petitioners) also own and operate. They further averred that the
Articles of Incorporation (AOI) of DMI ironically did not include
petitioners as its directors or officers; and those named directors and
officers were persons unknown to them. They likewise claimed that
per inquiry with the SEC 20 and the DOLE, they learned that DMI did
not file any notice of business closure; and the creation and operation
of DMI was attended with fraud making it convenient for petitioners
to evade their legal obligations to them. CAIHTE
Given these developments, respondents prayed that
petitioners, and the officers named in DMI's AOI, which included
Edgar N. Smith and Millicent C. Smith (spouses Smith), be
impleaded, and be held solidarily liable with DMI in paying the
judgment awards.
In their Opposition to Motion to Implead, 21 spouses Smith
alleged that as part of their services as lawyers, they lent their names
to petitioners to assist them in incorporating DMI. Allegedly, after
such undertaking, spouses Smith promptly transferred their
supposed rights in DMI in favor of petitioners.
Spouses Smith stressed that they never participated in the
management and operations of DMI, and they were not its
stockholders, directors, officers, or managers at the time
respondents were terminated. They further insisted that they were
not afforded due process as they were not impleaded from the
inception of the illegal dismissal case; and hence, they cannot be
held liable for the liabilities of DMI.
On April 1, 2009, LA Savari issued an Order 22 holding
petitioners liable for the judgment awards. LA Savari decreed that
petitioners represented themselves to respondents as the owners of
DMI; and were the ones who managed the same. She further noted
that petitioners were afforded due process as they were impleaded
from the beginning of this case.
Later, respondents filed anew a Reiterating Motion for Writ of
Execution and Approve[d] Updated Computation of Full
Backwages. 23
On July 31, 2009, LA Savari issued a Writ of Execution, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
NOW THEREFORE, you [Deputy Sheriff] are
commanded to proceed to
respondents DUTCH MOVERS and/or CESAR LEE
and YOLANDA LEE with address at c/o Toyota
Alabang, Alabang Zapote Road, Las Piñas City or
wherever they may be found within the jurisdiction of
the Republic of the Philippines and collect from said
respondents the amount of THREE MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY SIX PESOS & 66/100 (Php3,818,186.66)
representing Complainants' awards plus 10%
 Attorney's fees in the amount of THREE HUNDRED
EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTEEN PESOS & 66/100 (Php381,818.66) and
execution fee in the amount of FORTY THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (Php40,500.00) or a total of
FOUR MILLION TWO HUNDRED FORTY
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS & 32/100
(Php4,240,505.32) x x x 24 aScITE
Petitioners moved 25 to quash the Writ of Execution
contending that the April 1, 2009 LA Order was void because the LA
has no jurisdiction to modify the final and executory NLRC Decision,
and the same cannot anymore be altered or modified since there was
no finding of bad faith against them.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
On September 4, 2009, LA Savari denied petitioners' Motion
to Quash because it did not contain any ground that must be set forth
in such motion.
Thus, petitioners appealed to the NLRC.
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
On October 29, 2009, the NLRC quashed the Writ of
Execution insofar as it held petitioners liable to pay the judgment
awards. The decretal portion of the NLRC Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
assailed Order dated September 4, 2009 denying
respondents' Motion to Quash Writ is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Writ of Execution
dated July 13, 26 2009 is hereby QUASHED insofar as
it holds individual respondents Cesar Lee and Yolanda
Lee liable for the judgment award against the
complainants.
Let the entire record of the case be forwarded to
the Labor Arbiter of origin for appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED. 27
The NLRC ruled that the Writ of Execution should only pertain
to DMI since petitioners were not held liable to pay the awards under
the final and executory NLRC Decision. It added that petitioners
could not be sued personally for the acts of DMI because the latter
had a separate and distinct personality from the persons comprising
it; and, there was no showing that petitioners were stockholders or
officers of DMI; or even granting that they were, they were not shown
to have acted in bad faith against respondents.
On January 29, 2010, the NLRC denied respondents' Motion
for Reconsideration. DETACa
Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC in quashing
the Writ of Execution insofar as it held petitioners liable to pay the
judgment awards.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 1, 2013, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC
Resolutions, and accordingly affirmed the Writ of Execution
impleading petitioners as party-respondents liable to answer for the
judgment awards.
The CA ratiocinated that as a rule, once a judgment becomes
final and executory, it cannot anymore be altered or modified;
however, an exception to this rule is when there is a supervening
event, which renders the execution of judgment unjust or impossible.
It added that petitioners were afforded due process as they were
impleaded from the beginning of the case; and, respondents
identified petitioners as the persons who hired them, and were the
ones behind DMI. It also noted that such participation of petitioners
was confirmed by DMI's two incorporators who attested that they lent
their names to petitioners to assist the latter in incorporating DMI;
and, after their undertaking, these individuals relinquished their
purported interests in DMI in favor of petitioners.
On November 13, 2013, the CA denied the Motion for
Reconsideration on the assailed Decision.
Thus, petitioners filed this Petition raising the following
grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENTS SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR
THE JUDGMENT AWARD TO RESPONDENTS
BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:
I
THE VALDERAMA VS. NLRC AND DAVID VS.
CA ARE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
II
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS TO PIERCE THE VEIL
OF CORPORATE FICTION OF DUTCH MOVERS,
INC. 28
Petitioners argue that the circumstances in Valderrama v.
National Labor Relations Commission 29 differ with those of the
instant case. They explain that inValderrama, the LA therein granted
a motion for clarification. In this case, however, the LA made
petitioners liable through a mere manifestation and motion to
implead filed by respondents. They further stated that in Valderrama,
the body of the decision pointed out the liability of the individual
respondents therein while here, there was no mention in the
November 23, 2007 NLRC Decision regarding petitioners' liability. As
such, they posit that they cannot be held liable under said NLRC
Decision. HEITAD
In addition, petitioners claim that there is no basis to pierce
the veil of corporate fiction because DMI had a separate and distinct
personality from the officers comprising it. They also insist that there
was no showing that the termination of respondents was attended by
bad faith.
In fine, petitioners argue that despite the allegation that they
operated and managed the affairs of DMI, they cannot be held
accountable for its liability in the absence of any showing of bad faith
on their part.
Respondents, on their end, counter that petitioners were
identified as the ones who owned and managed DMI and therefore,
they should be held liable to pay the judgment awards. They also
stress that petitioners were consistently impleaded since the filing of
the complaint and thus, they were given the opportunity to be heard.
Issue
Whether petitioners are personally liable to pay the judgment
awards in favor of respondents
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
To begin with, the Court is not a trier of facts and only
questions of law may be raised in a petition under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. This rule, nevertheless, allows certain
exceptions, which include such instance where the factual findings
of the CA are contrary to those of the lower court or tribunal.
Considering the divergent factual findings of the CA and the NLRC
in this case, the Court deems it necessary to examine, review and
evaluate anew the evidence on record. 30
 Moreover, after a thorough review of the records, the Court
finds that contrary to petitioners' claim, Valderrama v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 31 andDavid v. Court of Appeals 32 are
applicable here. In said cases, the Court held that the principle of
immutability of judgment, or the rule that once a judgment has
become final and executory, the same can no longer be altered or
modified and the court's duty is only to order its execution, is not
absolute. One of its exceptions is when there is a supervening event
occurring after the judgment becomes final and executory, which
renders the decision unenforceable. 33
To note, a supervening event refers to facts that transpired
after a judgment has become final and executory, or to new situation
that developed after the same attained finality. Supervening events
include matters that the parties were unaware of before or during trial
as they were not yet existing during that time. 34 aDSIHc
In Valderrama, the supervening event was the closure of
Commodex, the company therein, after the decision became final
and executory, and without any showing that it filed any proceeding
for bankruptcy. The Court held that therein petitioner, the owner of
Commodex, was personally liable for the judgment awards because
she controlled the company.
Similarly, supervening events transpired in this case after the
NLRC Decision became final and executory, which rendered its
execution impossible and unjust. Like in Valderrama, during the
execution stage, DMI ceased its operation, and the same did not file
any formal notice regarding it. Added to this, in their Opposition to
the Motion to Implead, spouses Smith revealed that they only lent
their names to petitioners, and they were included as incorporators
just to assist the latter in forming DMI; after such undertaking,
spouses Smith immediately transferred their rights in DMI to
petitioners, which proved that petitioners were the ones in control of
DMI, and used the same in furthering their business interests.
In considering the foregoing events, the Court is not unmindful
of the basic tenet that a corporation has a separate and distinct
personality from its stockholders, and from other corporations it may
be connected with. However, such personality may be disregarded,
or the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced attaching personal
liability against responsible person if the corporation's personality "is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime, or is used as a device to defeat the labor laws x x
x." 35 By responsible person, we refer to an individual or entity
responsible for, and who acted in bad faith in committing illegal
dismissal or in violation of the Labor Code; or one who actively
participated in the management of the corporation. Also, piercing the
veil of corporate fiction is allowed where a corporation is a mere alter
ego or a conduit of a person, or another corporation. 36
Here, the veil of corporate fiction must be pierced and
accordingly, petitioners should be held personally liable for judgment
awards because the peculiarity of the situation shows that they
controlled DMI; they actively participated in its operation such that
DMI existed not as a separate entity but only as business conduit of
petitioners. As will be shown below, petitioners controlled DMI by
making it appear to have no mind of its own, 37 and used DMI as
shield in evading legal liabilities, including payment of the judgment
awards in favor of respondents. 38 ATICcS
First, petitioners and DMI jointly filed their Position
Paper, 39 Reply, 40 and Rejoinder 41 in contesting respondents'
illegal dismissal. Perplexingly, petitioners argued that they were not
part of DMI and were not privy to its dealings; 42 yet, petitioners,
along with DMI, collectively raised arguments on the illegal dismissal
case against them.
Stated differently, petitioners denied having any participation
in the management and operation of DMI; however, they were aware
of and disclosed the circumstances surrounding respondents'
employment, and propounded arguments refuting that respondents
were illegally dismissed.
To note, petitioners revealed the annual compensation of
respondents and their length of service; they also set up the defense
that respondents were merely project employees, and were not
terminated but that DMI's contract with its client was discontinued
resulting in the absence of hauling projects for respondents.
If only to prove that they were not part of DMI, petitioners
could have revealed who operated it, and from whom they derived
the information embodied in their pleadings. Such failure to reveal
thus gives the Court reasons to give credence to respondents' firm
stand that petitioners are no strangers to DMI, and that they were the
ones who managed and operated it.
Second, the declarations made by spouses Smith further
bolster that petitioners and no other controlled DMI, to wit:
Complainants [herein respondents] in their own
motion admit that they never saw [spouses Smith] at
the office of [DMI], and do not know them at all. This is
because [spouses Smith's] services as lawyers had
long been dispensed by the Spouses Lee and had no
hand whatsoever in the management of the company.
The Smiths, as counsel of the spouses at [that] time,
[lent] their names as incorporators to facilitate the
[incorporation of DMI.] Respondent Edgard Smith was
then counsel of Toyota Alabang and acts as its
corporate secretary and as favor to his former client
and employer, Respondent Cesar Lee, agreed to help
incorporate [DMI] and even asked his wife
Respondent, Millicent Smith, to act as incorporator also
[to] complete the required 5 man incorporators. After
the incorporation they assigned and transferred all their
purported participation in the company to the
Respondents Spouses Cesar and Yolanda Lee, who
acted as managers and are the real owners of the
corporation. Even at the time complainant[s were] fired
from [their] employment respondents Spouses Smith
had already given up their shares. The failure to amend
the Articles of Incorporation of [DMI], and to apply for
closure is the fault of the new board, if any was
constituted subsequently, and not of Respondents
Smiths. Whatever fraud committed was not committed
by the Respondents Smiths, hence they could not be
made solidarily liable with Respondent Corporation or
with the spouses Lee. If bad faith or fraud did attend
the termination of complainant[s], respondents Smiths
would know nothing of it because they had ceased any
connection with [DMI] even prior to such time. And they
had at the inception of the corporation never exercised
management prerogatives in the selection, hiring, and
firing of employees of [DMI]. 43 ETHIDa
Spouses Smith categorically identified petitioners as the
owners and managers of DMI. In their Motion to Quash, however,
petitioners neither denied the allegation of spouses Smith nor
adduced evidence to establish that they were not the owners and
managers of DMI. They simply insisted that they could not be held
personally liable because of the immutability of the final and
executory NLRC Decision, and of the separate and distinct
personality of DMI.
Furthermore, the assailed CA Decision heavily relied on the
declarations of spouses Smith but still petitioners did not address the
matters raised by spouses Smith in the instant Petition with the
Court.
Indeed, despite sufficient opportunity to clarify matters and/or
to refute them, petitioners simply brushed aside the allegations of
spouses Smith that petitioners owned and managed DMI. Petitioners
just maintain that they did not act in bad faith; that the NLRC Decision
is final and executory; and that DMI has a distinct and separate
personality. Hence, for failure to address, clarify, or deny the
declarations of spouses Smith, the Court finds respondents' position
that petitioners owned, and operated DMI with merit.
Third, piercing the veil of corporate fiction is allowed, and
responsible persons may be impleaded, and be held solidarily liable
even after final judgment and on execution, provided that such
persons deliberately used the corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the
judgment obligation, or resorted to fraud, bad faith, or malice in
evading their obligation. 44
In this case, petitioners were impleaded from the inception of
this case. They had ample opportunity to debunk the claim that they
illegally dismissed respondents, and that they should be held
personally liable for having controlled DMI and actively participated
in its management, and for having used it to evade legal obligations
to respondents.
While it is true that one's control does not by itself result in the
disregard of corporate fiction; however, considering the irregularity in
the incorporation of DMI, then there is sufficient basis to hold that
such corporation was used for an illegal purpose, including evasion
of legal duties to its employees, and as such, the piercing of the
corporate veil is warranted. The act of hiding behind the cloak of
corporate fiction will not be allowed in such situation where it is used
to evade one's obligations, which "equitable piercing doctrine was
formulated to address and prevent." 45 TIADCc
Clearly, petitioners should be held liable for the judgment
awards as they resorted to such scheme to countermand labor laws
by causing the incorporation of DMI but without any indication that
they were part thereof. While such device to defeat labor laws may
be deemed ingenious and imaginative, the Court will not hesitate to
draw the line, and protect the right of workers to security of tenure,
including ensuring that they will receive the benefits they deserve
when they fall victims of illegal dismissal. 46
Finally, it appearing that respondents' reinstatement is no
longer feasible by reason of the closure of DMI, then separation pay
should be awarded to respondents instead. 47
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The July 1, 2013
Decision and November 13, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP 113774 are AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION that
instead of reinstatement, Dutch Movers, Inc. and spouses Cesar Lee
and Yolanda Lee are solidarily liable to pay respondents' separation
pay for every year of service.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Dutch Movers, Inc. v. Lequin, G.R. No. 210032, [April 25, 2017])
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10706
AN ACT PROTECTING SEAFARERS AGAINST AMBULANCE CHASING AND
IMPOSITION OF EXCESSIVE FEES, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the “Seafarers Protection Act”.
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. — It shall be the policy of the State to
promote and protect every Filipino seafarer desiring to work overseas by
securing the best possible terms and conditions of employment. As some
unscrupulous individuals have taken advantage of the plight of our seafarers who
met an accident, illness or death in the course of their service by exploiting the
compensation system, our seafarers have fallen prey to an unfair scheme where
ambulance chasers charge exorbitant fees, with the promise of huge monetary promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation
award. Towards this end, such practice shall be declared unlawful. of the provisions of this Act.

SECTION 3. Prohibition on Ambulance Chasing. — It shall be unlawful for any
person to engage in ambulance chasing or the act of soliciting, personally or
through an agent, from seafarers, or their heirs, the pursuit of any claim against
them employers for the purpose of recovery of monetary claim or benefit,
including legal interest, arising from accident, illness or death, in exchange of an
amount or fee which shall be retained or deducted from the monetary claim or
benefit granted to or awarded to the seafarers or their heirs.
SECTION 7. Repealing Clause. — All laws, orders, issuances, decrees, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
SECTION 8. Effectvity Clause. — This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

SECTION 4. Imposition of Excessive Fees. — When any contract or ART. 232

arrangement between a seafarer or his/her heirs, and a person who appears for
or represents them in any case for recovery of monetary claim or benefit, EU OF BAYERS V. BAYERS- PAGE 84
including legal interest, arising from accident, illness or death before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) or any labor arbiter, the National
MONTANO V. VERCES
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) or its
regional offices, or other quasi-judicial bodies handling labor disputes stipulates DIOKNO V. CACDAD- PAGE 88
that the person who appears for or represents them shall be entitled to fees, such
fees shall not exceed ten percent (10%) of the compensation or benefit awarded ART. 233
to the seafarer or his/her heirs.
MAGBANUA V. UY- PAGE 89
For purposes of this Act, fees referred to in this section shall mean the total
amount of compensation of the person who appears for or represents the SOLOMON V. POWERTECH
seafarer, or his/her heirs for services rendered.
PHILIPPINES JOURNALIST V. NLRC- PAGE 94
SECTION 5. Penalties. — Any person who violates Section 3 of this Act shall be
punished by a fine of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but not ART. 238
more than one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or by imprisonment of
one (1) year but not more than two (2) years, or both fine and imprisonment. The COLEGIO V. AEF OF LETRAN- PAGE 94
same penalties shall be imposed upon any person who shall be in collusion in
the commission of the prohibited act in Section 3 hereof.
MARIWASA TO EDGARDO MARINO- PAGE 96 TO 120
1âwphi1

SECTION 6. Implementing Rules and Regulations. — Within ninety (90) days

from the approval of this Act, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, in ERGONOMIC SYSTEMS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
coordination with the Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) and the POEA, shall PHILLIP C. NG and MA. LOURMINDA O.
NG, petitioners, vs. EMERITO C. ENAJE,
BENEDICTO P. ABELLO, ALEX M. MALAYLAY,
FRANCISCO Q. ENCABO, JR., RICO SAMSON,
ROWENA BETITIO, FELIPE N. CUSTOSA, JAIME
A. JUATAN, LEOVINO J. MULINTAPANG,
NELSON L. ONTE, EMILIANO P. RONE, ROLIETO
LLAMADO, AMORPIO R. ADRIANO, JIMMY
ALCANTARA, BERNARDO ANTONI, HERMINITO
BEDRIJO, ROMEO BELARMINO, YOLANDA
CANOPIN, ALMELITO CUABO, RICARDO DEL
PILAR, ELMER DESQUITADO, WINEFREDO
DESQUITADO, DEMETRIO DIAZ, ERICK
ECRAELA, QUINTERO ENRIQUEZ, CRISANTO
FERNANDEZ, ROMMEL FLORES, NELSON
FRIAS, PEDRITO GIRON, DOMINADOR C.
GUIMALDO, JR., AMBROSIO HENARES,
TERENCIO HENARES, ALBERT LACHICA,
ALBERTO LORENZO, JOEL MALAYLAY, SUSAN
MALBAS, ROLANDO MAMARIL, TEDDY
MONTIBLE, FERNANDO OFALDA, RONNIE V.
OLIVAY, RAUL PAGOLONG, LORENZO
RANIEGO, AMADO V. SAMSON IV, ROEL P.
SORIANO, JONATHAN SUALIBIO, ESTEBAN
SUMICAO, JOSEPH TABADAY, EPIFANIO
TABAREZ, REGIE TOTING, REYNALDO TOTING,
NORMAN VALENZUELA, ROLANDO YONSON,
DIOSCORO BALAJADIA, NERRY BALINAS,
NOEL BALMEO, ARNALDO A. CASTRO,
GERONCIO DELA CUEVA, ALBERTO GAPASIN,
JULIUS GENOVA, LORETO GRACILLA, JR.,
ROBERTO S. INGIENTE, ROQUE JOVEN,
PATERNO LINOGO, ISAGANI MASANGKA,
ANGELITO MONTILLA, PECIFICO
NIGPARANON, NOBE SALVADOR, MANUEL
OAVENGA, REYNADO ORTIZ, ROMEO
QUINTANA, JERNALD REMOTIN, REYNALDO
ROBLESA, SAMUEL ROSALES, ROBERTO
SANTOS, RONALDO M. SANTOS, ROCKY
TALOLONG, EMILIO TONGA, BERNARDO
VALDEZ, DANTE L. VELASCO, RENE V.
VICENTE, JAIME BENTUCO, MARINO CACAO,
CARLITO DELA CERNA, CHRISTOPHER
MASAGCA, CHRISTOPHER PALOMARES,
ROLANDO PATOTOY, ASER PESADO, JR.,
LEONILO RICAFORT, FELIX SANCHEZ and
FRANCIS O. ZANTUA, respondents.
DECISION
MARTIRES, J : p
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision, 1 dated 21 September 2010, and Resolution, 2 dated
14 January 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP
No. 102802, which affirmed with modification the
decision, 3 dated 31 October 2007, and resolution, 4 dated 21
December 2007, of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR No. RAB IV-01-16813-03-
L. The NLRC, in turn, affirmed the decision, 5 dated 31 January
2005, of Labor Arbiter Generoso V. Santos (LA) in NLRC NCR
No. RAB IV-01-16813-03-L, a case for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.EATCcI
THE FACTS
Respondents were union officers and members
of Ergonomic System Employees Union-Workers Alliance
Trade Unions (local union). On 29 October 1999, the local
union entered into a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) 6 with petitioner Ergonomic Systems
Philippines, Inc. (ESPI), 7 which was valid for five (5) years or
until October 2004. The local union, which was affiliated with
Workers Alliance Trade Unions-Trade Union Congress of the
Philippines (Federation), was not independently registered.
Thus, on 15 November 2001, before the CBA expired, the union
officers secured the independent registration of the local union
with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Later on, the union officers were charged
before the Federation and investigated for attending and
participating in other union's seminars and activities using union
leaves without the knowledge and consent of the Federation
and ESPI as well as in initiating and conspiring in the
disaffiliation before the freedom period. 8
On 10 January 2002, the Federation rendered a
decision 9 finding respondents-union officers Emerito C. Enaje,
Benedicto P. Abello, Alex M. Malaylay, Francisco G. Encabo,
Jr., Rico Samson, Rowena Betitio, Felipe N. Custosa, Jaime A.
Juatan, Leovino Mulintapang, Nelson L. Onte, Emiliano P.
Rone, and Rolieto Llamado guilty of disloyalty. They were
penalized with immediate expulsion from the Federation. 10
On 11 January 2002, the Federation furnished ESPI with
a copy of its decision against respondents-union officers and
recommended the termination of their employment by invoking
Sections 2 and 3, Article 2 of the CBA. 11
ESPI notified respondents-union officers of the
Federation's demand and gave them 48 hours to explain.
Except for Nelson Onte, Emiliano Rone, and Rico Samson, the
rest of the officers refused to receive the notices. Thereafter, on
20 February 2002, respondents-union officers were issued
letters of termination, which they again refused to receive. On
26 February 2002, ESPI submitted to the DOLE a list of the
dismissed employees. On the same day, the local union filed a
notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). 12
From 21 February to 23 February 2002, the local union
staged a series of noise barrage and "slow down" activities.
Meanwhile, on 22 February 2002, 40 union members identified
as: Amorpio Adriano, Jimmy Alcantara, Bernardo Antoni,
Herminito Bedrijo, Romeo Belarmino, Yolanda Canopin,
Almelito Cuabo, Ricardo Del Pilar, Elmer Desquitado,
Winefredo Desquitado, Demetrio Diaz, Erick Ecraela, Quintero
Enriquez, Crisanto Fernandez, Rommel Flores, Nelson Frias,
Pedrito Geron, Dominador Guimaldo, Ambrosio Henarez,
Terencio Henares, Albert Lachica, Alberto Lorenzo, Joel
Malaylay, Susan Malbas, Rolando Manaril, Teddy Montible,
Fernando Ofaldo, Ronie Olivay, Raul Pagolong, Lorenzo
Raniego, Amado Samson-Ty, Roel Soriano, Jonathan Sualibio,
Esteban Sumicao, Joseph Tabaday, Epifanio Tabarez, Regie
Toting, Reynaldo Toting, Norman Valenzuela and Rolando
Yonson refused to submit their Daily Production Reports
(DPRs).
On 26 February 2002, 28 union members namely
Dioscoro Balajadia, Nerry Balinas, Noel Balmeo, Arnaldo
Castro, Geroncio Dela Cueva, Alberto Gapasin, Julius Genova,
Loreto Gracilla, Roberto Ingiente, Jr., Roque Joven, Paterno
Linogo, Isagani Masangka, Angelito Montilla, Pecifico
Nigparanon, Salvador Nobe, Manuel Oavenga, Reynaldo Ortiz,
Romeo Quintana, Jernard Remotin, Reynaldo Roblesa,
Samuel Rosales, Roberto Santos, Ronaldo Santos, Rocky
Talolong, Emilio Tonga, Bernardo Valdez, Dante Velasco and
Rene Vicente abandoned their work and held a picket line
outside the premises of ESPI.
Then, from 26 February 2002 to 2 March 2002, 10 union
members, namely Jaime Bentuco, Marina Cacao, Carlito Dela
Cerna, Christopher Masagca, Christopher Palomares, Rolando
Patotoy, Aser Pesado, Jr., Leonilo Ricafort, Felix Sanchez and
Francis Santua did not report for work without official leave. The
union members were required to submit their explanation why
they should not be sanctioned for their refusal to submit DPRs
and abandonment of work, but they either refused to receive
the notices or received them under protest. Further, they did not
submit their explanation as required. Subsequently, for refusal
to submit DPRs and for abandonment, respondents-union
members were issued letters of termination. 13
On 27 January 2003, the respondents filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against ESPI,
Phillip C. Ng, and Ma. Lourminda O. Ng(petitioners). 14 DHITCc
The Labor Arbiter's Ruling
In a decision, dated 31 January 2005, the LA held that
the local union was the real party in interest and the Federation
was merely an agent in the CBA; thus, the union officers and
members who caused the implied disaffiliation did not violate
the union security clause. Consequently, their dismissal was
unwarranted. Nevertheless, the LA ruled that since ESPI
effected the dismissal in response to the Federation's demand
which appeared to be justified by a reading of the union security
clause, it would be unjust to hold ESPI liable for the normal
consequences of illegal dismissal.
The LA further opined that there was no ground for the
dismissal of the union members because the refusal to submit
DPRs and failure to report for work were meant to protest the
dismissal of their officers, not to sever employer-employee
relationship. He added that neither ESPI nor the respondents
were at fault for they were merely protecting their respective
interests. In sum, the LA ordered all the respondents to return
to work but without back wages. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered ordering the complainants to report
back to their former jobs within ten (10) days from
receipt of this Decision and the respondent company is
in turn directed to accept them back but without back
wages. In the event however, that this is no longer
possible, the respondent company is ordered to pay
the complainants their separation pay computed at
one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months to be considered as
one (1) whole year. The respondent is likewise ordered
to pay complainants attorney's fees equivalent to ten
(10%) percent of the total thereof as attorney's fees.
 All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 15
Unconvinced, petitioners and respondents appealed
before the NLRC.
The NLRC Ruling
In a decision, dated 31 October 2007, the NLRC affirmed
the ruling of the LA. It adjudged that the dismissal of the union
officers was effected only in response to the demand of the
Federation and to comply with the union security clause under
the CBA. The NLRC concluded that since there was no
disloyalty to the union, but only disaffiliation from the Federation
which was a mere agent in the CBA, the cause for the
respondents' dismissal was non-existent. It disposed the case
in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appeals separately filed by complainants and
respondents from the Decision of Labor Arbiter
Generoso V. Santos dated January 31, 2005 are both
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The appeal filed by complainants from the Order
dated January 4, 2007 is likewise DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
The assailed Orders are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 16
Undeterred, petitioners and respondents moved for
reconsideration. Their motions, however, were denied by the
NLRC in a resolution, dated 21 December 2007.
The CA Ruling
In its decision, dated 21 September 2010, the CA
affirmed with modification the NLRC ruling. It held that ESPI
and the respondents acted in good faith when the former
dismissed the latter and when the latter, in turn, staged a strike
without complying with the legal requirements. The CA,
however, pronounced that the concept of separation pay as an
alternative to reinstatement holds true only in cases wherein
there is illegal dismissal, a fact which does not exist in this case.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Labor
Arbiter, as sustained by the National Labor Relations
Commission, reverting the employer-employee
position of the parties to the status quo ante is
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION, in that the provision
on the award of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
is deleted.
SO ORDERED. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners and respondents moved for
reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a
resolution, dated 14 January 2011.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE FEDERATION MAY INVOKE THE
UNION SECURITY CLAUSE IN DEMANDING
THE RESPONDENTS' DISMISSAL; cEaSHC
 II. WHETHER THE STRIKE CONDUCTED BY THE
RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS;
III. WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS' DISMISSAL
FROM EMPLOYMENT WAS VALID.
The petitioners argue that the respondents failed to
comply with two (2) of the procedural requirements for a valid
strike, i.e., taking of a strike vote and observance of the seven-
day period after submission of the strike vote report; that mere
participation of union officers in the illegal strike is a ground for
termination of employment; that the union members committed
illegal acts during the strike which warranted their
dismissal, i.e., obstruction of the free ingress to and egress
from ESPI's premises and commission of acts of violence,
coercion or intimidation; that the respondents are not entitled to
reinstatement or separation pay because they were validly
dismissed from employment; that the union members who
unjustly refused to submit their DPRs and abandoned their work
were rightfully terminated because their acts constituted
serious misconduct or willful disobedience of lawful orders; and
that reinstatement is no longer possible because the industrial
building owned by Ergo Contracts Philippines, Inc. was totally
destroyed by fire on 6 February 2005. 18
In their comment, 19 the respondents counter that they
were not legally terminated because the grounds relied upon by
the petitioners were non-existent; that as ruled by the NLRC,
they merely disaffiliated from the Federation but they were not
disloyal to the local union; that reinstatement is not physically
impossible because it was the industrial building owned by Ergo
Contracts Philippines, Inc. that was gutted down by fire, not that
of ESPI; that even if the manufacturing plant of ESPI was
indeed destroyed by fire, the petitioners have other offices
around the country where the respondents may be reinstated;
and that having failed to comply with the order to reinstate them
and having ceased operations, the petitioners must be ordered
to pay their separation pay.
In their reply, 20 the petitioners aver that the respondents
violated the union security clause under the CBA; that their
termination was effected in response to the Federation's
demand to dismiss them; that they did not comply with the
requisites of a valid strike; that they refused to submit their
DPRs and abandoned their work; and that the award of
separation pay had no basis because the respondents had
been legally dismissed from their employment.
THE COURT'S RULING
Only the local union may
invoke the union security
clause in the CBA.
The controversy between ESPI and the respondents
originated from the Federation's act of expelling the union
officers and demanding their dismissal from ESPI. Thus, to
arrive at a proper resolution of this case, one question to be
answered is whether the Federation may invoke the union
security clause in the CBA.
"Union security is a generic term, which is applied to and
comprehends 'closed shop,' 'union shop,' 'maintenance of
membership,' or any other form of agreement which imposes
upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union
membership as a condition affecting employment. There is
union shop when all new regular employees are required to join
the union within a certain period as a condition for their
continued employment. There is maintenance of membership
shop when employees, who are union members as of the
effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become
members, must maintain union membership as a condition for
continued employment until they are promoted or transferred
out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A
closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an
enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and
his employees or their representatives, no person may be
employed in any or certain agreed departments of the
enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration
of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a
union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in
interest are a part." 21
Before an employer terminates an employee pursuant to
the union security clause, it needs to determine and prove that:
(1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is
requesting the enforcement of the union security provision in
the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the
decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. 22
In this case, the primordial requisite, i.e., the union is
requesting the enforcement of the union security provision in
the CBA, is clearly lacking. Under the Labor Code, a chartered
local union acquires legal personality through the charter
certificate issued by a duly registered federation or national
union and reported to the Regional Office. 23 "A local union
does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is
affiliated. It is a separate and distinct voluntary association
owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation
does not divest the local union of its own personality, neither
does it give the mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a contract
of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter.
Hence, local unions are considered principals while the
federation is deemed to be merely their agent." 24 CTIEac
The union security clause in the CBA between ESPI and
the local union provides:
SECTION 1. Union Shop. All regular, permanent
employees covered by this Agreement who are
members of the UNION as of the date of effectivity of
this Agreement as well as any employees who shall
subsequently become members of the UNION during
the lifetime of this Agreement or any extension, thereof,
shall as a condition of continued employment, maintain
their membership in the UNION during the term of this
Agreement or any extension thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
SECTION 3. The COMPANY shall terminate the
services of any concerned employee when so
requested by the UNION for any of the following
reasons:
a. Voluntary Resignation from the Union
during the term of this Agreement or any
extension thereof;
 b. Non-payment of membership fee,
regular monthly dues, mutual aid benefit
and other assessments submitted by the
UNION to the COMPANY;
c. Violation of the UNION Constitution
and Bylaws. The UNION shall furnish the
COMPANY a copy of their Constitution
and Bylaws and any amendment
thereafter.
d. Joining of another Union whose
interest is adverse to the UNION,
AWATU, during the lifetime of this
Agreement.
e. Other acts which are inimical to the
interests of the UNION and AWATU. 25
There is no doubt that the union referred to in the
foregoing provisions is the Ergonomic Systems Employees
Union or the local union as provided in Article I of the CBA. 26 A
perusal of the CBA shows that the local union, not the
Federation, was recognized as the sole and exclusive collective
bargaining agent for all its workers and employees in all matters
concerning wages, hours of work, and other terms and
conditions of employment. Consequently, only the union may
invoke the union security clause in case any of its members
commits a violation thereof. Even assuming that the union
officers were disloyal to the Federation and committed acts
inimical to its interest, such circumstance did not give the
Federation the prerogative to demand the union officers'
dismissal pursuant to the union security clause which, in the
first place, only the union may rightfully invoke. Certainly, it
does not give the Federation the privilege to act independently
of the local union. At most, what the Federation could do is to
refuse to recognize the local union as its affiliate and revoke the
charter certificate it issued to the latter. In fact, even if the local
union itself disaffiliated from the Federation, the latter still has
no right to demand the dismissal from employment of the union
officers and members because concomitant to the union's
prerogative to affiliate with a federation is its right to disaffiliate
therefrom which the Court explained in Philippine Skylanders,
Inc. v. NLRC,27 viz.:
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its
mother federation is not a novel thesis unillumined by
case law. In the landmark case of Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc., we upheld
the right of local unions to separate from their mother
federation on the ground that as separate and
voluntary associations, local unions do not owe their
creation and existence to the national federation to
which they are affiliated but, instead, to the will of their
members. The sole essence of affiliation is to increase,
by collective action, the common bargaining power of
local unions for the effective enhancement and
protection of their interests. Admittedly, there are times
when without succor and support local unions may find
it hard, unaided by other support groups, to secure
justice for themselves.
Yet the local unions remain the basic units of
association, free to serve their own interests subject to
the restraints imposed by the constitution and bylaws
of the national federation, and free also to renounce the
affiliation upon the terms laid down in the agreement
which brought such affiliation into existence. 28
 In sum, the Federation could not demand the dismissal
from employment of the union officers on the basis of the union
security clause found in the CBA between ESPI and the local
union.
A strike is deemed illegal for
failure to take a strike vote and
to submit a report thereon to
the NCMB.
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their
struggle with management in the course of setting their terms
and conditions of employment. As such, it either breathes life to
or destroys the union and its members. 29
Procedurally, for a strike to be valid, it must comply with
Article 278 30 of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a
notice of strike be filed with the NCMB 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor
practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of the total
union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained
by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a
notice be given to the NCMB of the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike. These requirements are
mandatory, and the union's failure to comply renders the strike
illegal. 31
SaCIDT
The union filed a notice of strike on 20 February
2002. 32 The strike commenced on 21 February 2002. 33 The
strike vote was taken on 2 April 2002 34 and the report thereon
was submitted to the NCMB on 4 April 2002. 35 Indeed, the first
requisite or the cooling-off period need not be observed when
the ground relied upon for the conduct of strike is union-
busting. 36 Nevertheless, the second and third requirements
are still mandatory. In this case, it is apparent that the union
conducted a strike without seeking a strike vote and without
submitting a report thereon to the DOLE. Thus, the strike which
commenced on 21 February 2002 was illegal.
Liabilities of union officers
and members
Article 279 (a) 37 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 279. Prohibited activities. — (a) x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Any union officer who knowingly participates in an
illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: Provided, That mere participation
of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute
sufficient ground for termination of his employment,
even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
In the determination of the consequences of illegal
strikes, the law makes a distinction between union members
and union officers. The services of an ordinary union member
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike;
proof must be adduced showing that he or she committed illegal
acts during the strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may
be dismissed, not only when he actually commits an illegal act
during a strike, but also if he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike. 38
 In the present case, respondents-union officers stand to
be dismissed as they conducted a strike despite knowledge that
a strike vote had not yet been approved by majority of the union
and the corresponding strike vote report had not been
submitted to the NCMB.
With respect to respondents-union members, the
petitioners merely alleged that they committed illegal acts
during the strike such as obstruction of ingress to and egress
from the premises of ESPI and execution of acts of violence
and intimidation. There is, however, a dearth of evidence to
prove such claims. Hence, there is no basis to dismiss
respondents-union members from employment on the ground
that they committed illegal acts during the strike.
Dismissed respondents-union
members are not entitled to
back wages.
While it is true that the award of back wages is a legal
consequence of a finding of illegal dismissal, in G & S Transport
Corporation v. Infante, 39 the Court pronounced that the
dismissed workers are entitled only to reinstatement
considering that they did not render work for the employer
during the strike, viz.:
With respect to back wages, the principle of a "fair
day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the
basic factor in determining the award thereof. If
there is no work performed by the employee there can
be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was
able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked
out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working. While it was found that
respondents expressed their intention to report back to
work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case.
In Philippine Marine Officers' Guild v. Compañia
Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and
Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the
Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is
required that the strike be legal, a situation that does
not obtain in the case at bar.40 (emphases supplied)
Thus, in the case at bar, respondents-union members'
reinstatement without back wages suffices for the appropriate
relief. Fairness and justice dictate that back wages be denied
the employees who participated in the illegal concerted
activities to the great detriment of the employer. 41
Nevertheless, separation pay is made an alternative
relief in lieu of reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a)
when reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the
passage of a long period of time or because of the realities of
the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employer's
interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d)
reinstatement does not serve the best interests of the parties
involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the workers'
continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between
the employer and employee. 42 cHECAS
Given the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence
of the strike, the Court rules that the award of separation pay of
one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement, is in order. This relief strikes a balance between
the respondents-union members who may not have known that
 they were participating in an illegal strike but who, nevertheless, DECISION
have rendered service to the company for years prior to the
illegal strike which caused a rift in their relations, and the
employer who definitely suffered losses on account of MENDOZA, J : p

respondents-union members' failure to report to work during the

The right to self-organization is not limited to unionism.
illegal strike.
Workers may also form or join an association for mutual aid and
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. protection and for other legitimate purposes.TAIaHE

The 21 September 2010 Decision and 14 January 2011

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 102802
reverse and set aside the July 4, 2013 Decision 1 and the
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that petitioners are
January 28, 2014 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals(CA) in
hereby ORDERED to pay each of the above-named individual
CA-G.R. SP No. 123397, which reversed the November 28,
respondents, except union officers who are hereby declared
2011 Resolution 3 of the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) and
validly dismissed, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
reinstated the April 20, 2010 Decision 4 of the Department of
salary for every year of service. Whatever sums already
Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Director, cancelling
received from petitioners under any release, waiver or quitclaim
the registration of Samahan ng Manggagawa
shall be deducted from the total separation pay due to each of
sa Hanjin Shipyard (Samahan) as a worker's association under
them.
Article 243 (now Article 249) of the Labor Code.
SO ORDERED.
The Facts
(Ergonomic Systems Philippines, Inc. v. Enaje, G.R. No. 195163,
|||

On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through its authorized

[December 13, 2017])
representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for
ABARIA TO WESLEYAN - PAGE 120 TO 125 registration 5 of its name "Samahan ng mga Manggagawa
sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE. Attached to the application
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA were the list of names of the association's officers and
SA HANJIN SHIPYARD rep. by its President, members, signatures of the attendees of the February 7, 2010
ALFIE ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF meeting, copies of their Constitution and By-laws. The
LABOR RELATIONS, HANJIN HEAVY application stated that the association had a total of 120
INDUSTRIES AND CONSTRUCTION CO., LTD. members.
(HHIC-PHIL.), respondents. On February 26, 2010, the DOLE Regional Office No. 3,
City of San Fernando, Pampanga (DOLE-Pampanga), issued
the corresponding certificate of registration 6 in favor of
Samahan.
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries
and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), with offices at
Greenbeach 1, Renondo Peninsula, Sitio Agustin, Barangay
Cawag, Subic Bay Freeport Zone, filed a petition 7 with DOLE-
Pampanga praying for the cancellation of registration of
Samahan's association on the ground that its members did not
fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the second
sentence of Article 243 (now 249). cDHAES
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent, itinerant,
rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite
employers may form a workers' association. It further posited
that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had
definite employers and the continued existence and registration
of the association would prejudice the company's goodwill.
On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a supplemental
petition, 8 adding the alternative ground that Samahan
committed a misrepresentation in connection with the list of
members and/or voters who took part in the ratification of their
constitution and by-laws in its application for
registration. Hanjin claimed that Samahan made it appear that
its members were all qualified to become members of the
workers' association.
On March 26, 2010, DOLE-Pampanga called for a
conference, wherein Samahan requested for a 10-day period to
file a responsive pleading. No pleading, however, was
submitted. Instead, Samahan filed a motion to dismiss on April
14, 2010. 9
The Ruling of the DOLE Regional Director
On April 20, 2010, DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis
ruled in favor of Hanjin. He found that the preamble, as stated
in the Constitution and By-Laws of Samahan, was an admission
on its part that all of its members were employees of Hanjin, to
wit:
KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa
sa HANJIN Shipyard (SAMAHAN) ay naglalayong na
isulong ang pagpapabuti ng kondisyon sa paggawa at
katiyakan sa hanapbuhay sa pamamagitan ng patuloy
na pagpapaunlad ng kasanayan ng para sa mga
kasapi nito. Naniniwala na sa pamamagitan ng aming
mga angking lakas, kaalaman at kasanayan ay aming
maitataguyod at makapag-aambag sa kaunlaran ng
isang lipunan. Na mararating at makakamit ang antas
ng pagkilala, pagdakila at pagpapahalaga sa mga tulad
naming mga manggagawa.
xxx xxx xxx 10
The same claim was made by Samahan in its motion to
dismiss, but it failed to adduce evidence that the remaining 63
members were also employees of Hanjin. Its admission
bolstered Hanjin's claim that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration as it made
an express representation that all of its members were
employees of the former. Having a definite employer, these 57
members should have formed a labor union for collective
bargaining. 11 The dispositive portion of the decision of the Dole
Regional Director, reads: ASEcHI
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. Consequently, the
 Certificate of Registration as Legitimate Workers
Association (LWA) issued to the SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA HANJIN SHIPYARD
(SAMAHAN) with Registration Numbers RO300-1002-
WA-009 dated February 26, 2010 is hereby
CANCELLED, and said association is dropped from
the roster of labor organizations of this Office.
SO DECIDED. 12
The Ruling of the Bureau of Labor Relations
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal 13 before the BLR,
arguing that Hanjin had no right to petition for the cancellation
of its registration. Samahan pointed out that the words
"Hanjin Shipyard," as used in its application for registration,
referred to a workplace and not as employer or company. It
explained that when a shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales,
it became known as Hanjin Shipyard. Further, the remaining 63
members signed the Sama-Samang Pagpapatunay which
stated that they were either working or had worked at Hanjin.
Thus, the alleged misrepresentation committed by Samahan
had no leg to stand on. 14
In its Comment to the Appeal, 15 Hanjin averred that it
was a party-in-interest. It reiterated that Samahan committed
misrepresentation in its application for registration before DOLE
Pampanga. While Samahan insisted that the remaining 63
members were either working, or had at least worked in Hanjin,
only 10 attested to such fact, thus, leaving its 53 members
without any workplace to claim.
On September 6, 2010, the BLR granted Samahan's
appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. It
stated that the law clearly afforded the right to self-organization
to all workers including those without definite employers. 16 As
an expression of the right to self-organization, industrial,
commercial and self-employed workers could form a workers'
association if they so desired but subject to the limitation that it
was only for mutual aid and protection. 17 Nowhere could it be
found that to form a workers' association was prohibited or that
the exercise of a workers' right to self-organization was limited
to collective bargaining. 18ITAaHc
The BLR was of the opinion that there was no
misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The phrase, "KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard," if translated,
would be: "We, the workers at Hanjin Shipyard." The use of the
preposition "at" instead of "of" would indicate that
"Hanjin Shipyard" was intended to describe a
place. 19 Should Hanjin feel that the use of its name had
affected the goodwill of the company, the remedy was not to
seek the cancellation of the association's registration. At most,
the use by Samahan of the name "Hanjin Shipyard" would only
warrant a change in the name of the association. 20 Thus, the
dispositive portion of the BLR decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of DOLE Region III Director
Ernesto C. Bihis dated 20 April 2010 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, Samahan ng mga Manggagawa
sa Hanjin Shipyard shall remain in the roster of
legitimate workers' association. 21
On October 14, 2010, Hanjin filed its motion for
reconsideration. 22
 In its Resolution, 23 dated November 28, 2011, the BLR
affirmed its September 6, 2010 Decision, but directed Samahan
to remove the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from its name. The BLR
explained that the Labor Code had no provision on the use of
trade or business name in the naming of a worker's association,
such matters being governed by the Corporation Code.
According to the BLR, the most equitable relief that would strike
a balance between the contending interests of Samahan
andHanjin was to direct Samahan to drop the name
"Hanjin Shipyard" without delisting it from the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our
Decision dated 6 September 2010 is hereby
AFFIRMED with a DIRECTIVE for SAMAHAN to
remove "HANJIN SHIPYARD" from its name.
SO RESOLVED. 24
Unsatisfied, Samahan filed a petition
for certiorari 25 under Rule 65 before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 123397. CHTAIc
In its March 21, 2012 Resolution, 26 the CA dismissed the
petition because of Samahan's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed November 28, 2011 Resolution.
On April 17, 2012, Samahan filed its motion for
reconsideration 27 and on July 18, 2012, Hanjin filed its
comment 28 to oppose the same. On October 22, 2012, the CA
issued a resolution granting Samahan's motion for
reconsideration and reinstating the petition. Hanjin was
directed to file a comment five (5) days from receipt of notice. 29
On December 12, 2012, Hanjin filed its comment on the
petition, 30 arguing that to require Samahan to change its name
was not tantamount to interfering with the workers' right to self-
organization. 31 Thus, it prayed, among others, for the dismissal
of the petition for Samahan's failure to file the required motion
for reconsideration. 32
On January 17, 2013, Samahan filed its reply. 33
On March 22, 2013, Hanjin filed its memorandum. 34
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On July 4, 2013, the CA rendered its decision, holding
that the registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers'
association was contrary to the provisions of Article 243 of
the Labor Code. 35 It stressed that only 57 out of the 120
members were actually working in Hanjin while the phrase in
the preamble of Samahan's Constitution and By-laws, "KAMI,
ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard," created an
impression that all its members were employees of HHIC. Such
unqualified manifestation which was used in its application for
registration, was a clear proof of misrepresentation which
warranted the cancellation of Samahan's registration. EATCcI
It also stated that the members of Samahan could not
register it as a legitimate worker's association because the
place where Hanjin's industry was located was not a rural area.
Neither was there any evidence to show that the members of
the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers. 36
At any rate, the CA was of the view that dropping the
words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association name would not
prejudice or impair its right to self-organization because it could
adopt other appropriate names. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and
the BLR's directive, ordering that the words
"Hanjin Shipyard" be removed from petitioner
association's name, is AFFIRMED. The Decision dated
April 20, 2010 of the DOLE Regional Director in Case
No. RO300-1003-CP-001, which ordered the
cancellation of petitioner association's registration is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED. 37
Hence, this petition, raising the following:
ISSUES
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SAMAHAN CANNOT FORM A
WORKERS' ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES
IN HANJIN AND INSTEAD SHOULD HAVE
FORMED A UNION, HENCE THEIR
REGISTRATION AS A WORKERS'
ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE REMOVAL/DELETION OF
THE WORD "HANJIN" IN THE NAME OF THE
UNION BY REASON OF THE COMPANY'S
PROPERTY RIGHT OVER THE COMPANY
NAME "HANJIN." 38
Samahan argues that the right to form a workers'
association is not exclusive to intermittent, ambulant and
itinerant workers. While the Labor Code allows the workers "to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing"
for the purpose of collective bargaining, it does not prohibit
them from forming a labor organization simply for purposes of
mutual aid and protection. All members of Samahan have one
common place of work, Hanjin Shipyard. Thus, there is no
reason why they cannot use "Hanjin Shipyard" in their
name. 39 DHITCc
Hanjin counters that Samahan failed to adduce sufficient
basis that all its members were employees of Hanjin or its
legitimate contractors, and that the use of the name
"Hanjin Shipyard" would create an impression that all its
members were employees of HHIC. 40
Samahan reiterates its stand that workers with a definite
employer can organize any association for purposes of mutual
aid and protection. Inherent in the workers' right to self-
organization is its right to name its own organization. Samahan
referred "Hanjin Shipyard" as their common place of work.
Therefore, they may adopt the same in their association's
name. 41
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
Right to self-organization includes
right to form a union, workers '
association and labor management
councils
More often than not, the right to self-organization
connotes unionism. Workers, however, can also form and join
a workers' association as well as labor-management councils
(LMC). Expressed in the highest law of the land is the right of
all workers to self-organization. Section 3, Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law. . . .cEaSHC
[Emphasis Supplied]
And Section 8, Article III of the 1987 Constitution also
states:
Section 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
In relation thereto, Article 3 of the Labor Code provides:
Article 3. Declaration of basic policy. The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
race or creed and regulate the relations between
workers and employers. The State shall assure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work.
[Emphasis Supplied]
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the
right to self-organization includes the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual
aid and protection. This is in line with the policy of the State to
foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united
labor movement as well as to make sure that workers
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare. 42
The right to form a union or association or to self-
organization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or
freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that
the employee may act for himself without being prevented by
law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as
he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. 43
In view of the revered right of every worker to self-
organization, the law expressly allows and even encourages
the formation of labor organizations. A labor organization is
defined as "any union or association of employees which exists
in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of
dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of
employment." 44 A labor organization has two broad rights: (1)
to bargain collectively and (2) to deal with the employer
concerning terms and conditions of employment. To bargain
collectively is a right given to a union once it registers itself with
the DOLE. Dealing with the employer, on the other hand, is a
generic description of interaction between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours and
other terms and conditions of employment, even if the
employees' group is not registered with the DOLE. 45 CTIEac
 A union refers to any labor organization in the private
sector organized for collective bargaining and for other
legitimate purpose, 46 while a workers' association is an
organization of workers formed for the mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose other
than collective bargaining. 47
Many associations or groups of employees, or even
combinations of only several persons, may qualify as a labor
organization yet fall short of constituting a labor union. While
every labor union is a labor organization, not every labor
organization is a labor union. The difference is one of
organization, composition and operation. 48
Collective bargaining is just one of the forms of employee
participation. Despite so much interest in and the promotion of
collective bargaining, it is incorrect to say that it is the device
and no other, which secures industrial democracy. It is equally
misleading to say that collective bargaining is the end-goal of
employee representation. Rather, the real aim is employee
participation in whatever form it may appear, bargaining or no
bargaining, union or no union. 49 Any labor organization which
may or may not be a union may deal with the employer. This
explains why a workers' association or organization does not
always have to be a labor union and why employer-employee
collective interactions are not always collective bargaining. 50
To further strengthen employee participation, Article 255
(now 261) 51 of the Labor Code mandates that workers shall
have the right to participate in policy and decision-making
processes of the establishment where they are employed
insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits
and welfare. For this purpose, workers and employers may form
LMCs.
A cursory reading of the law demonstrates that a
common element between unionism and the formation of LMCs
is the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Where
neither party is an employer nor an employee of the other, no
duty to bargain collectively would exist. 52 In the same manner,
expressed in Article 255 (now 261) is the requirement that such
workers be employed in the establishment before they can
participate in policy and decision making processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee
relationship is not mandatory in the formation of workers'
association. What the law simply requires is that the members
of the workers' association, at the very least, share the same
interest. The very definition of a workers' association speaks of
"mutual aid and protection."
Right to choose whether to form or
join a union or workers' association
belongs to workers themselves SaCIDT
In the case at bench, the Court cannot sanction the
opinion of the CA that Samahan should have formed a union
for purposes of collective bargaining instead of a workers'
association because the choice belonged to it. The right to form
or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to
refuse or refrain from exercising the said right. It is self-evident
that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right
granted by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise
such a conferred right. 53 Also inherent in the right to self-
organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for
purposes of collective bargaining or a workers' association for
purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to
certain limitations as provided by law. For instance, the Labor
Code specifically disallows managerial employees from joining,
assisting or forming any labor union. Meanwhile, supervisory
employees, while eligible for membership in labor
organizations, are proscribed from joining the collective
bargaining unit of the rank and file employees. 54 Even
government employees have the right to self-organization. It is
not, however, regarded as existing or available for purposes of
collective bargaining, but simply for the furtherance and
protection of their interests. 55
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite
employers, hence, they should have formed a union instead of
a workers' association. The Court disagrees. There is no
provision in the Labor Code that states that employees with
definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
The Court cannot subscribe either to Hanjin's position
that Samahan's members cannot form the association because
they are not covered by the second sentence of Article 243
(now 249), to wit: cHECAS
Article 243. Coverage and employees' right to
self-organization. All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and agricultural enterprises and in religious,
charitable, medical, or educational institutions, whether
operating for profit or not, shall have the right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and
itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural
workers and those without any definite employers
may form labor organizations for their mutual aid
and protection. (As amended by Batas Pambansa
Bilang 70, May 1, 1980)
[Emphasis Supplied]
Further, Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2
of Department Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003, which
provides:
RULE II
COVERAGE OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
Section 1. Policy. — It is the policy of the State
to promote the free and responsible exercise of the
right to self-organization through the establishment of
a simplified mechanism for the speedy registration of
labor unions and workers associations, determination
of representation status and resolution of inter/intra-
union and other related labor relations disputes. Only
legitimate or registered labor unions shall have the
right to represent their members for collective
bargaining and other purposes. Workers' associations
shall have the right to represent their members for
purposes other than collective bargaining.
Section 2. Who may join labor unions and
workers' associations. — All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises,
including employees of government owned or
controlled corporations without original charters
established under the Corporation Code, as well as
employees of religious, charitable, medical or
 educational institutions whether operating for profit or
not, shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor unions for purposes of
collective bargaining: provided, however, that
supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor union of the rank-and-file
employees but may form, join or assist separate labor
unions of their own. Managerial employees shall not be
eligible to form, join or assist any labor unions for
purposes of collective bargaining. Alien employees
with valid working permits issued by the Department
may exercise the right to self-organization and join or
assist labor unions for purposes of collective
bargaining if they are nationals of a country which
grants the same or similar rights to Filipino workers, as
certified by the Department of Foreign Affairs. AHDacC
For purposes of this section, any employee,
whether employed for a definite period or not, shall
beginning on the first day of his/her service, be eligible
for membership in any labor organization.
All other workers, including ambulant,
intermittent and other workers, the self-employed, rural
workers and those without any definite employers may
form labor organizations for their mutual aid and
protection and other legitimate purposes except
collective bargaining.
[Emphases Supplied]
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing
rules which provides that workers, with definite employers,
cannot form or join a workers' association for mutual aid and
protection. Section 2 thereof even broadens the coverage of
workers who can form or join a workers' association. Thus, the
Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to form a
workers' association is not exclusive to ambulant, intermittent
and itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a
workers' association lies with the workers themselves, and
whether they have definite employers or not.
No misrepresentation on the part
of Samahan to warrant cancellation
of registration
In this case, Samahan's registration was cancelled not
because its members were prohibited from forming a workers'
association but because they allegedly committed
misrepresentation for using the phrase, "KAMI, ang mga
Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard."
Misrepresentation, as a ground for the cancellation of
registration of a labor organization, is committed "in connection
with the adoption, or ratification of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of
members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and
by-laws or amendments thereto, and those in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and
the list of voters, . . . ." 56
In Takata Corporation v. Bureau of Relations, 57 the
DOLE Regional Director granted the petition for the cancellation
of certificate of registration of Samahang Lakas Manggagawa
sa Takata (Salamat) after finding that the employees who
attended the organizational meeting fell short of the 20% union
registration requirement. The BLR, however, reversed the
ruling of the DOLE Regional Director, stating that petitioner
Takata Corporation (Takata) failed to prove deliberate and
malicious misrepresentation on the part of respondent Salamat.
Although Takata claimed that in the list of members, there was
an employee whose name appeared twice and another was
merely a project employee, such facts were not considered
misrepresentations in the absence of showing that the
respondent deliberately did so for the purpose of increasing
their union membership. The Court ruled in favor of Salamat.
In S.S. Ventures International v. S.S. Ventures Labor
Union, 58 the petition for cancellation of certificate of registration
was denied. The Court wrote:
If the union's application is infected by
falsification and like serious irregularities,
especially those appearing on the face of the
application and its attachments, a union should be
denied recognition as a legitimate labor
organization. Prescinding from these considerations,
the issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration
No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its
application for registration and the supporting
documents thereof are prima facie free from any
vitiating irregularities. Another factor which militates
against the veracity of the allegations in
the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of particularities
on how, when and where respondent union
perpetrated the alleged fraud on each member.
Such details are crucial for in the proceedings for
cancellation of union registration on the ground of
fraud or misrepresentation, what needs to be
established is that the specific act or omission of the
union deprived the complaining employees-members
of their right to choose.
[Emphases Supplied]
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
misrepresentation, to be a ground for the cancellation of the
certificate of registration, must be done maliciously and
deliberately. Further, the mistakes appearing in the application
or attachments must be grave or refer to significant matters.
The details as to how the alleged fraud was committed must
IDSEAH
also be indubitably shown.
The records of this case reveal no deliberate or malicious
intent to commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The
use of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa
sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the constitution and
by-laws did not constitute misrepresentation so as to warrant
the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of
registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this phrase
constitutes a malicious and deliberate misrepresentation.
Neither was there any showing that the alleged
misrepresentation was serious in character. Misrepresentation
is a devious charge that cannot simply be entertained by mere
surmises and conjectures.
Even granting arguendo that Samahan's members
misrepresented themselves as employees or workers
of Hanjin, said misrepresentation does not relate to the
adoption or ratification of its constitution and by-laws or to the
election of its officers.
aCIHcD
Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard"
from the association's name, however,
does not infringe on Samahan's right to
self-organization
 Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that
"Hanjin Shipyard" must be removed in the name of the
association. A legitimate workers' association refers to an
association of workers organized for mutual aid and protection
of its members or for any legitimate purpose other than
collective bargaining registered with the DOLE.59 Having been
granted a certificate of registration, Samahan's association is
now recognized by law as a legitimate workers' association.
According to Samahan, inherent in the workers' right to
self-organization is its right to name its own organization. It
seems to equate the dropping of words "Hanjin Shipyard" from
its name as a restraint in its exercise of the right to self-
organization. Hanjin, on the other hand, invokes that
"Hanjin Shipyard" is a registered trade name and, thus, it is
within their right to prohibit its use.
As there is no provision under our labor laws which speak
of the use of name by a workers' association, the Court refers
to the Corporation Code, which governs the names of juridical
persons. Section 18 thereof provides:
No corporate name may be allowed by the
Securities and Exchange Commission if the proposed
name is identical or deceptively or confusingly
similar to that of any existing corporation or to any
other name already protected by law or is patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. When
a change in the corporate name is approved, the
Commission shall issue an amended certificate of
incorporation under the amended name. ScHADI
[Emphases Supplied]
The policy underlying the prohibition in Section 18
against the registration of a corporate name which is "identical
or deceptively or confusingly similar" to that of any existing
corporation or which is "patently deceptive" or "patently
confusing" or "contrary to existing laws," is the avoidance of
fraud upon the public which would have occasion to deal with
the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and
duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and
supervision over corporations. 60
For the same reason, it would be misleading for the
members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as
it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are
employed by Hanjin.
Further, Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of
2003 explicitly states:
The change of name of a labor organization
shall not affect its legal personality. All the rights and
obligations of a labor organization under its old name
shall continue to be exercised by the labor organization
under its new name.
Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words
"Hanjin Shipyard," no abridgement of Samahan's right to self-
organization was committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
The July 4, 2013 Decision and the January 28, 2014 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSEDand SET
ASIDE. The September 6, 2010 Resolution of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, as modified by its November 28, 2011
Resolution, is REINSTATED. aICcHA
 SO ORDERED. ManagementFaculty Association (AFA) is a labor organization
(Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard v. Bureau of
|||
composed of members of the AIM faculty, duly registered under
Certificate of Registration No. NCR-UR-12-4076-2004.
Labor Relations, G.R. No. 211145, [October 14, 2015])
On May 16, 2007, respondent filed a petition for
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA V. CHARTER CHEMICAL- PAGE 26 certification election 6 seeking to represent a bargaining unit
CATHAY- PAGE 125 in AIM consisting of forty (40) faculty members. The case
was docketed as DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-
ASIAN INSTITUTE OF 007.Petitioner opposed the petition, claiming that respondent's
MANAGEMENT, petitioner, vs. ASIAN INSTITUTE members are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory, but rather,
OF managerial employees. 7
MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATION, respo On July 11, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for
ndent. cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration 8 —
docketed as DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-0707-001-LRD — on
the grounds of misrepresentation in registration and that
DECISION respondent is composed of managerial employees who are
prohibited from organizing as a union.
On August 30, 2007, the Med-Arbiter in DOLE Case No.
DEL CASTILLO, J : p NCR-OD-M-0705-007 issued an Order 9 denying the petition
for certification election on the ground that
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assails the AIM's faculty members are managerial employees. This Order
January 8, 2013 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which was appealed by respondent before the Secretary of the
dismissed the Petition for Certiorari 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),10who reversed
114122, and its subsequent June 27, 2013 the same via a February 20, 2009 Decision 11 and May 4, 2009
Resolution 4 denying herein petitioner's Motion for Resolution, 12 decreeing thus:
Reconsideration. 5
WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by the Asian
Factual Antecedents Institute of Management Faculty Association (AIMFA)
Petitioner Asian Institute of Management (AIM) is a duly is GRANTED. The Order dated 30 August 2007 of
DOLE-NCR Mediator-Arbiter Michael T. Parado is
registered non-stock, non-profit educational institution.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Asian Institute of
 Accordingly, let the entire records of the case be OD-M-0705-007, or respondent's petition for certification
remanded to DOLE-NCR for the conduct of a election. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 109487, the petition is
certification election among the faculty members of the based on the arguments that 1) the bargaining unit within AIM
Asian Institute of Management (AIM),with the following sought to be represented is composed of managerial
choices: employees who are not eligible to join, assist, or form any labor
1. ASIAN INSTITUTE OF organization, and 2) respondent is not a legitimate labor
MANAGEMENT FACULTY ASSOCIATIO organization that may conduct a certification election.
N (AIMFA);and
On October 22, 2010, the CA rendered its
2. No Union. Decision 19 containing the following pronouncement: CAIHTE

SO ORDERED. 13 AIM insists that the members of its tenure-

Meanwhile, in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-0707-001-LRD, track faculty are managerial employees, and therefore,
an Order 14 dated February 16, 2009 was issued by DOLE- ineligible to join, assist or form a labor organization. It
NCR Regional Director Raymundo G. Agravante granting AIM's ascribes gave abuse of discretion on SOLE 20 for its
rash conclusion that the members of said tenure-
petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of
track faculty are not managerial employees solely
registration and ordering its delisting from the roster of
because the faculty's actions are still subject to
legitimate labor organizations. This Order was appealed by evaluation, review or final approval by the board of
respondent before the Bureau of Labor trustees ("BOT").AIM argues that the BOT does not
Relations 15 (BLR),which, in a December 29, 2009 manage the day-to-day affairs, nor the making and
Decision, 16 reversed the same and ordered respondent's implementing of policies of the Institute, as such
retention in the roster of legitimate labor organizations. The functions are vested with the tenure-track faculty.
BLR held that the grounds relied upon in the petition for We agree.
cancellation are not among the grounds authorized under
Article 239 of the Labor Code, 17 and that respondent's Article 212(m) of the Labor Code defines
members are not managerial employees. Petitioner moved to managerial employees as:
reconsider, but was rebuffed in a March 18, 2010 Resolution. 18 'ART. 212. Definitions. — x x x
CA-G.R. SP No. 109487 and G.R. No. 197089 (m) 'Managerial employee' is
one who is vested with powers or
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, prerogatives to lay down and execute
questioning the DOLE Secretary's February 20, 2009 Decision management policies and/or to hire,
and May 4, 2009 Resolution relative to DOLE Case No. NCR- transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
 discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are
those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such
managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment. All employees
not falling within any of the above
definitions are considered rank-and-file
employees for purposes of this Book.'
There are, therefore, two (2) kinds of managerial
employees under Art. 212(m) of the Labor Code.
Those who 'lay down x x x management policies,' such
as the Board of Trustees, and those who 'execute
management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees.'
xxx xxx xxx
On its face, the SOLE's opinion is already
erroneous because in claiming that the 'test of
'supervisory' or 'managerial status' depends on
whether a person possesses authority to act in the
interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article
212(m) of the Labor Code and Section 1(m) of its
Implementing Rules,' he obviously was referring to
the old definition of a managerial employee.Such is
evident in his use of 'supervisory or managerial status,'
and reference to 'Section 1(m)of its Implementing
Rules.' For presently, as aforequoted in Article 212(m)
of the Labor Code and as amended by Republic Act
6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, a
managerial employee is already different from a
supervisory employee.x x x aScITE
xxx xxx xxx
In further opining that a managerial employee
is one whose 'authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of
independent judgment,' a description which fits now
a supervisory employee under Section 1(t),Rule I,
Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code, it then follows that the SOLE was not aware of
the change in the law and thus gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
concluding that AIM's 'tenure-
track'faculty are not managerial employees.
SOLE further committed grave abuse of
discretion when it concluded that said tenure-
track faculty members are not managerial employees
on the basis of a 'footnote' in AIM's Policy Manual,
which provides that 'the policy[-]making authority of
the faculty members is merely recommendatory in
nature considering that the faculty standards they
formulate are still subject to evaluation, review or
final approval by the [AIM]'s Board of Trustees.' x x
x
xxx xxx xxx
Clearly, AIM's tenure-track faculty do not merely
recommend faculty standards. They 'determine
all faculty standards,' and are thus managerial
employees. The standards' being subjected to the
approval of the Board of Trustees would not make
ATM's tenure-track faculty non-managerial because as
earlier mentioned, managerial employees are now of
two categories: (1) those who 'lay down policies,' such
as the members of the Board of Trustees, and (2) those
who 'executemanagement policies (etc.),' such as
AIM's tenure-track faculty.
xxx xxx xxx
It was also grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the SOLE when he opined that AIM's tenure-
track faculty members are not managerial
employees, relying on an impression that they were
subjected to rigid observance of regular hours of work
as professors. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
More importantly, it behooves the SOLE to
deny AFA's appeal in light of the February 16, 2009
Order of Regional Director Agravante delisting
AFA from the roster of legitimate labor
organizations.For, only legitimate labor
organizations are given the right to be certified as
sole and exclusive bargaining agent in an
establishment.
xxx xxx xxx
Here, the SOLE committed gave abuse of
discretion by giving due course to AFA's petition for
certification election, despite the fact that: (1) AFA's
members are managerial employees; and (2) AFA is
not a legitimate labor organization. These facts
rendered AFA ineligible, and without any right to file a
petition for certification election, the object of which is
to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of qualified AIM employees.
WHEREFORE,the instant petition
is GRANTED.The assailed Decision dated February
20, 2009 and Resolution dated May 4, 2009 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.The Order dated
August 30, 2007 of Mediator-Arbiter Parado is
hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis in the original)
Respondent sought reconsideration, but was denied. It
thus instituted a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this
Court on July 4, 2011. The Petition, docketed as G.R. No.
197089, remains pending to date.
The Assailed Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Meanwhile, relative to DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-0707-
001-LRD or petitioner AIM's petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration, petitioner filed on May
24, 2010 a Petition for Certiorari 22 before the CA, questioning
the BLR's December 29, 2009 decision and March 18, 2010
resolution. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 114122,
alleged that the BLR committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting respondent's appeal and affirming its certificate of
registration notwithstanding that its members are managerial
employees who may not join, assist, or form a labor union or
organization.
On January 8, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision, stating as follows:
The petition lacks merit.
xxx xxx xxx
 It is therefore incumbent upon the Institute to
prove that the BLR committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the questioned Decision. Towards
this end, AIM must lay the basis by showing that any of
the grounds provided under Article 239 of the Labor
Code, exists, to wit:
Article 239. Grounds for
cancellation of union registration. — The
following may constitute grounds for
cancellation of union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud in connection with the
adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto, the minutes of
ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false
statements or fraud in connection with
the election of officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the
members. HEITAD
Article 238 of the Labor Code provides that the
enumeration of the grounds for cancellation of union
registration, is exclusive;in other words, no other
grounds for cancellation is acceptable, except for the
three (3) grounds stated in Article 239. The scope of
the grounds for cancellation has been explained —
For the purpose of de-certifying a
union such as respondent, it must be
shown that there was misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud in connection
with the adoption or ratification of
the constitution and by-laws or
amendments thereto; the minutes of
ratification; or, in connection with the
election of officers, the minutes of the
election of officers, the list of voters, or
failure to submit these documents
together with the list of the newly elected-
appointed officers and their postal
addresses to the BLR.
The bare fact that two signatures
appeared twice on the list of those who
participated in the organizational meeting
would not, to our mind, provide a valid
reason to cancel respondent's certificate
of registration. The cancellation of a
union's registration doubtless has an
impairing dimension on the right of labor
to self-organization. For fraud and
misrepresentation to be grounds for
cancellation of union registration under
the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud
and misrepresentation must be grave
and compelling enough to vitiate the
consent of a majority of union
members. 23
In this regard, it has also been held that:
Another factor which militates
against the veracity of the allegations in
the Sinumpaang Petisyon is the lack of
 particularities on how, when and where
respondent union perpetrated the
alleged fraud on each member. Such
details are crucial for, in the proceedings
for cancellation of union registration on
the ground of fraud or misrepresentation,
what needs to be established is that the
specific act or omission of the union
deprived the complaining employees-
members of their right to choose. 24
A cursory reading of the Petition shows that AIM
did NOT allege any specific act of fraud or
misrepresentation committed by AFA. What is clear is
that the Institute seeks the cancellation of the
registration of AFA based on Article 245 of the Labor
Code on the ineligibility of managerial employees to
form or join labor unions. Unfortunately for the
petitioner, even assuming that there is a violation of
Article 245, such violation will not result in the
cancellation of the certificate of registration of a labor
organization.
It should be stressed that a Decision had
already been issued by the DOLE in the Certification
Election case; and the Decision ordered the conduct of
a certification election among the faculty members of
the Institute, basing its directive on the finding that the
members of AFA were not managerial employees and
are therefore eligible to form, assist and join a labor
union. As a matter of fact, the certification election had
already been held on October 16, 2009, albeit the
results have not yet been resolved as
inclusion/exclusion proceedings are still pending
before the DOLE. The remedy available to the Institute
is not the instant Petition, but to question the status of
the individual union members of the AFA in the
inclusion/exclusion proceedings pursuant to Article
245-A of the Labor Code, which reads:
Article 245-A. Effect of inclusion
as members of employees outside the
bargaining unit. — The inclusion as union
members of employees outside the
bargaining unit shall not be a ground for
the cancellation of the registration of the
union. Said employees are automatically
deemed removed from the list of
membership of said union.
Petitioner insists that Article 245-A is not
applicable to this case as all AFA members are
managerial employees. We are not persuaded.
The determination of whether any or all of the
members of AFA should be considered as managerial
employees is better left to the DOLE because,
It has also been established that
in the determination of whether or not
certain employees are managerial
employees, this Court accords due
respect and therefore sustains the
findings of fact made by quasi-judicial
agencies which are supported by
substantial evidence considering their
expertise in their respective fields. 25
From the discussion, it is manifestly clear that
the petitioner failed to prove that the BLR committed
 grave abuse of discretion; consequently, the Petition
must fail.
WHEREFORE,the Petition is
hereby DENIED.The Decision and Resolution of public
respondent Bureau of Labor Relations in BLR-A-C-19-
3-6-09 (NCR-OD-0707-001) are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA via its June 27, 2013 Resolution. Hence, the
instant Petition.
In a November 10, 2014 Resolution, 27 the Court
resolved to give due course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioner claims that the CA seriously erred in affirming
the dispositions of the BLR and thus validating the respondent's
certificate of registration notwithstanding the fact that its
members are all managerial employees who are disqualified
from joining, assisting, or forming a labor organization.
Petitioner's Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside
and that the DOLE-NCR Regional Director's February 16, 2009
Order granting AIM's petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration and ordering its delisting from the
roster of legitimate labor organizations be reinstated instead,
petitioner maintains in its Petition and Reply 28 that
respondent's members are all managerial employees; that the
CA erred in declaring that even if respondent's members are all
managerial employees, this alone is not a ground for
cancellation of its certificate of registration; that precisely, the
finding in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007, which the CA
affirmed in CA-G.R. SP No. 109487, is that respondent's
members are managerial employees; that respondent's
declaration that its members are eligible to join, assist, or form
a labor organization is an act of misrepresentation, given the
finding in CA-G.R. SP No. 109487 that they are managerial
employees; and that the grounds for cancellation of union
registration enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code are
not exclusive. ATICcS
Respondent's Arguments
In its Comment, 29 respondent maintains that the CA was
right to treat petitioner's case for cancellation of its union
registration with circumspection; that petitioner's ground for
filing the petition for cancellation is not recognized under Article
239; that petitioner's accusation of misrepresentation is
unsubstantiated, and is being raised for the first time at this
stage; that its members are not managerial employees; and that
petitioner's opposition to respondent's attempts at self-
organization constitutes harassment, oppression, and violates
the latter's rights under the Labor Code and the Constitution.
Our Ruling
In Holy Child Catholic School v. Hon. Sto. Tomas,30 this
Court declared that "[i]n case of alleged inclusion of disqualified
employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer
like petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the
union's certificate of registration due to misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended."
 On the basis of the ruling in the above-cited case, it can
be said that petitioner was correct in filing a petition for
cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration.
Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration — that its members are
managerial employees and for this reason, its registration is
thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245
of the Labor Code which declares that managerial employees
are ineligible to join any labor organization — is, in a sense, an
accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation for
registering under the claim that its members are not managerial
|||
same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in
the first suit. x x x Identity of cause of action is not
required, but merely identity of issues. 31 (Citation
omitted)
WHEREFORE,considering that the outcome of this case
depends on the resolution of the issue relative to the nature of
respondent's membership pending in G.R. No. 197089, this
case is ordered CONSOLIDATED with G.R. No. 197089.
SO ORDERED.
(Asian Institute of Management v. Asian Institute of Management

employees. Faculty Association, G.R. No. 207971, [January 23, 2017])

However, the issue of whether respondent's members GEN SANTOS COKE- PAGE 128
are managerial employees is still pending resolution by way of
petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 197089, which is the UST FACULTY- PAGE 129
culmination of all proceedings in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-
0705-007 — where the issue relative to the nature of
respondent's membership was first raised by petitioner itself
and is there fiercely contested. The resolution of this issue
cannot be pre-empted; until it is determined with finality in G.R.
No. 197089, the petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration on the grounds alleged by petitioner
cannot be resolved. As a matter of courtesy and in order to
avoid conflicting decisions, We must await the resolution of the
petition in G.R. No. 197089.
x x x If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the
determination of that particular point or question, a
former judgment between the same parties or their
privies will be final and conclusive in the second if that