REPUBLIC V.

DAYOT

Facts:

 Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa Dayot (Felisa) were allegedly married at the Pasay City Hall on November 1986
 Jose filed for Declaration of Marriage
 He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham,
 No marriage was celebrated between the parties
 He did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for 5 years
 His consent to the marriage was secured through fraud

JOSE’s STORY

Jose claimed that he came to live only as a boarder in Felisa’s house in 1986. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested
Jose to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall to claim a package. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them and told that Jose needed to sign the papers for the
package to be released. He initially refused but eventually signed the papers upon Felisa’s persuasion saying that his
refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationsgip. It was on February 1987
when Jose discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw the paper lying on top of a table
at the sala of Felisa’s house. When he confronted Felisa, Felisa feigned ignorance

FELISA’s STORY

Felisa declared that she and Jose maintained their relationship as a man and a wife absent the legality of marriage in the
early part of 1980 but she delayed contracting marriage with Jose on account of their age difference. She expounded that
while their marriage is subsisting, Jose contracted marriage with Rufina Pascual. She filed for bigamy and the
Ombudsman found Jose liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and gave him penalty of suspension from service.

The RTC Decision

 dismissed the complaint and ruled that the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on November 1986 was valid.
 It gave more weight to Felisa’s statement.
 Jose’s story is impossible
 He could have detected something was wrong when they were at the City Hall to get a package
 He should put up his guard when he was told they were going to be killed if he didn’t sign the papers
 It took him 3 months to discover the papers he signed
 He acknowledged Felisa as his wife in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities
 He wrote Felisa’s name as the person to be contacted in case of emergency in his ID

 When Jose’s sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as a
witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate and she further testified that the signature appearing over the
name of Jose was the signature of her brother.

 On the matter of fraud, the New Civil Code requires an action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by
the injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud.

 Thus, He should have filed an annulment of marriage at the earliest possible opportunity
The CA Decision

 The CA applied the Civil Code to the marriage as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and
circumstances including fraud did not exist as grounds for annulment of marriage
 The action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the prescriptive period
 CA did not accept Jose’s assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
 It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with
the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years.
 The CA concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband
and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing
officer was misled by the statements contained therein
 the CA gave credibility to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the affidavit.
 The court noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and found no
legal impediment to their marriage.

JOSE’s Motion for Reconsideration

 His opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar.
 In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years before the marriage.
 Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

In Niñal v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis of
their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least five (5)
years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration
of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should
be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity – meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity – that is unbroken.
Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were
capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and
encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the
approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every
single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of
the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be
united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall
make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not covered
by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the absence of a
marriage license.

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended decision but to no avail. The OSG filed a petition for review praying
that the decision of CA be reversed.

Issue:

Whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

Ruling:

The court ruled affirmative

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in
remote places, (2) consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil marriage,
(5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof,
they executed an affidavit declaring that "they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other." One
of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the
parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite
of a marriage license. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman
must have attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.

The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is
precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a
marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June
1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa’s testimony
that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa’s own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to
live in her house.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in
nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule
45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body,
make contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of
Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals
remain conclusive on this Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
evidence.

Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the
requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.
 MANZANO V. SANCHEZ

Facts:

 Complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano claimed that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, married on
May 1966 and had four children with him.
 On March 1993, David contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge Roque
Sanchez who knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were separated.

 Hence, on May 1999, complainant charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-
Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator.

 The judge respondent averred that when he officiated the marriage between David and Luzviminda, he did not know
that David was legally married and what he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.

 Had he known that David was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again, otherwise, he could be
charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely
to harass him.

 After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge
be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

 Respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his
earlier Comment.
 Respondent Judge alleged that on the basis of two affidavits executed by David and Luzviminda, wherein they
expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; that since their
respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never
cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the cohabitation as husband and wife of David and Luzviminda be legally ratified by marriage pursuant to
Article 34 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

The Court find merit to this complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting
parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.
In order for a marriage be exempted from marriage license requirement pursuant to the provision on legal ratification of
marital cohabitation provided for by Article 34 of the Family Code, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years and are without legal
impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and
that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.
 Not all of these requirements were present in the case.
 In the affidavits executed and sworn to before respondent Judge, David and Luzviminda expressly stated the fact of
their prior existing marriage.
 Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.

 The fact that David and Luzviminda had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry pursuant to
Article 63(1) of the Family Code which allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but the marriage bonds are not severed. This is also true when the separation is merely de
facto.

 The cohabitation as husband and wife of David and Luzviminda for seven years, just like separation, does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who
are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve
as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior
existing marriage.

 Hence, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
The maxim ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that
judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary,
the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
 NINAL V. BAYADOG

Facts:

 On September 26, 1974, Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones. (Out of their marriage was the petitioners)
 Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985.
 One year and 8 months after, Pepito and respondent Norma Bayadog got married without any marriage license.
 In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license.
 On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
 After their father’s death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of their father and Norma
alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license.
 The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s
successional rights.
 Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the
persons who could file an action for annulment of marriage under Article 47 of the Family Code.

Issue:

Whether or not Pepito and Norma living together as husband and wife for at least five years exempts them from obtaining
a marriage license under Article 34 of the Family Code.

Ruling:

Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each other during the entire five-year continuous
period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband
and wife during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being
lawfully married, which impediment may have either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without the
benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where
the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law
cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the
marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at
anytime within the 5 years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and
placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties
should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as
a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license
unless the circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order
to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge
of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
The Civil Code provides:

Art. 63: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 64: Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall
forthwith make an investigation, examining persons under oath. . . .

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Art. 17 provides in part: . . . This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to
the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. . . .

Art. 18 reads in part: . . . In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. . . .

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple marriages by
the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first
spouse shall be illegal and void, subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the contracting of two or more
marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery. The
law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first marriage was dissolved to
the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first
wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already
lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by
law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The
subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot
make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife".

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement of a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.
 COSCA vs. PALAYPAYON
Facts:

 The complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

 Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.

 Complainants filed an administrative complaint with the OCA on October 5, 1992 on the following charges:

(1) illegal solemnization of marriage;

(2) falsification of the monthly reports of cases;
(3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court;
(4) non-issuance of receipt for cash bond received;
(5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and
(6) requiring payment of filing fees from exempted entities.

The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for
investigation report and recommendation.

 Complainants alleged that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license.

 Thus, the couples were able to get married by simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent Nelia B.
Esmeralda-Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license  their marriage contacts did not reflect ny marriage
license number

 In addition, respondent judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization,
the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which usually
several days after the ceremony. The marriage contracts were not file with the local civil registrar.

 Complainant Ramon Sambo, who prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of
marriage licenses and its effect on the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of
said marriages.

 Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were
already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her
appointment.
- She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is in the
custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and
- that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation for this administrative case.

o Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were kept by respondent
Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the contracting parties
of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.
Issue: Is the respondent judge liable of illegally solemnizing the marriages?

Ruling:
Yes. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license, he is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying with the formal requisites of marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines; he shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or contract, the
same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage
certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage.

Whole Decision

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is charged with having
solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of couples

In all these mentioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number of the marriage was
solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up. While the contracting parties and their
witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except
that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this
marriage under Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy of the marriage
certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon without a marriage
license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge Palaypayon solemnized their marriage sufficiently show that Judge
Palaypayon really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after
ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage license. In the meantime, they
already started living together as husband and wife believing that the formal requisites of marriage were complied with.

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the parties allegedly did not
have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and
both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.

With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon
explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage. It was actually a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. This happened because of the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he
consent to be photographed to show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the
wedding reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the reception
would be held was more than 20 kilometers away from the poblacion of Tinambac.

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the marriage certificate or
contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil Registrar were not furnished a copy of the
marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony
cannot prevail over the testimony of Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were
advised by Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had not been
impeached.
The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificate in front of
Judge Palaypayon and on his table cannot possibly be just to show a simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two
pictures may convince a person of the explanation of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be photographed as if he
was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not even know for the alleged reasons given. It
would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it
appear that Bocaya and Besmonte were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.

With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized their
marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The
contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband and wife for almost six
(6) years already.

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated that Abellano was only
18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living together as husband and wife for almost 6 years
already before they got married as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old
when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should have been aware of
this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualification of the contracting parties who
might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license
requirement.

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again Abellano and Edralin, this
time with a marriage license. The explanation given by Judge Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same
couple for the second time is that he did not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family
Code as (a) marriage at all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be
placed in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.

This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second time with a marriage
license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear
that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already
signed the marriage certificate. If it was true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a
marriage license was not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized
their marriage for the second time?

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a marriage at all as the
marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized and that the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35,
36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a
copy of the marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid Judge Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from
responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the
Family Code it is his duty to furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario, Selpo
and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage
1). Both Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their
marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both admitted that they did not know
who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain
Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared
before the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga their marriage contract was signed by them and by
their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy. Like the other aforementioned marriages, the
solemnization fee was also paid as shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy.

Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly because there was no
marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the marriage was solemnized. When she was asked,
however, why did she sign the marriage contract as a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already
solemnized.

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage contract of Gamay and
Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the impression that she did not even know that the
marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and Gaor (Exh. D). The
contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid the solemnization fee, but Judge
Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the
affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony. Medina, however, did not testify in
this case and so his affidavit has no probative value.

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting parties and their
witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned
the task of preparing the marriage contract, to already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as
what happened to Gamay and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as
he has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday.

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because the contracting parties
are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they take each other as husband and wife before
the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2) witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage
contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and procedure before solemnizing
a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and
by the testimony of respondent Baroy herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the
contracting parties and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their
marriage

Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing 3 to 4 marriages everyday. On
the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that his court had only 27 pending cases and he solemnized
only 7 marriages for the whole month. His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he solemnized
only 4 marriages during the whole month.
In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has presented and marked in
evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons and certification issued by the Local Civil
Registrar. These persons who executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts
and certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized these marriages
illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.

 On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage
are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an
irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

 The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or
civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the
Government.