Pormento v.
Estrada (TOPIC: Presidential Term Limit) Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
FACTS: Respondent was elected President of the Republic in
the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10,
2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed
respondents’ candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification.
His petition was denied by the COMELEC en banc. As
such, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on May
7, 2010. However, under the Rules of Court, the filing of such
petition would not stay the execution of the judgment of the
COMELEC that is sought to be reviewed.
Hence, private respondent was able to participate as
a candidate for the position of President in the May 10, 2010
elections where he garnered the second highest number of
votes. Private respondent was not elected President the
second time he ran.
ISSUE: WON respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by
the ban on the President from any reelection.
RULING: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the
phrase “any reelection” will be premised on a person’s
second (whether immediate or not) election as President,
there is no case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No
live conflict of legal rights exists.
As such, one of the essential requisites for the
exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence of an
actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case. The
Court is not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract
propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case
before it.
Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior
to the proclamation of a President who has been duly elected
in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no longer true
today. Following the results of that elections, respondent was
not elected President for the second time. Thus, any
discussion of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose.
DISMISSED.
Walay principle gi-discuss. Ambot nganong gi-apil ni ni sir.
Fornier vs COMELEC (TOPIC: Definition of natural born
Filipino)
FACTS: On 31 December 2003, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed
his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, represented
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify FPJ upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners.
According to petitioner, FPJ’s mother, Bessie Kelley
Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child
of an alien mother.
The COMELEC dismissed the case hence the case at
bar.
ISSUE: WON FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen - YES
RULING: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution
expresses: No person may be elected President unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines xxx xxx
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship."
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to
be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Among the modes of acquiring citizenship, only
jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, jus
sanguinis or blood relationship became the primary basis of
citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would
tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant
of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in
evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be
a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years
old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954.
Also, the birth certificate of FPJ would disclose that
he was born on 20 August 1939. (Daghan pa kayo tong mga
documentary evidence gi-submit pero wa na nako apila kay
taas na kayo and because these two are the most crucial)
 Being public documents, the death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou and the birth certificate of FPJ constitute prima
facie proof of their content.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under
Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons
whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of he Omnibus Election
Code. DISMISSED.
POE V COMELEC
FACTS: (Facts not very important, you can skip directly to
Ruling on foundlings)
A day after Grace Poe filed her COC for President, Estrella
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or
cancel said COC. Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that
petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she
stated in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9
May 2016 Elections.
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued:
1. petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born
Filipino on account of the fact that she was a
foundling. Elamparo claimed that international law
does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings. Following this line of
reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to
begin with.
2. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a
natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that
status when she became a naturalized American
citizen (after she married her husband and moved to
USA). According to Elamparo, natural-born
citizenship must be continuous from birth.
Issue on residency (omitted)
Petitioner filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
xxx
(3) she did not make any material
misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention
deliberations show that foundlings were
considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international
law to have been born of citizens of the
place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No.
9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her
American citizenship prior to the filing of
her COC for President in the May 9,
2016 Elections and that the same is in full
force and effect and has not been
withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that
she did not possess natural-born status;
COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding
that petitioner's COC
contained material representations which are false.
ISSUE:
1. WON Poe is a Filipino citizen
2. WON Foundlings are considered Natural-born citizens.
RULING:
1. YES
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship
with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE. She has typical
Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black
hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face.
At the outset, it must be noted that
presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor
unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the
Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and
Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence
 that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a Spaniards, because the
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of presumption is that a child of
proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner unknown parentage is the son of
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should a Spaniard. This may be applied
have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. in the Philippines in that a child
Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the of unknown parentage born in
burden to her because such status did not exclude the the Philippines is deemed to be
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in Filipino, and there is no need. . . .
this case where there is a high probability, if not
Sr. Rafols:
certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
There is a need, because we are relating
2. Yes. Basis: Intent of the Framer; International
the conditions that are
law;
[required] to be Filipino.
As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent Sr. Montinola:
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would But that is the interpretation of the law,
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and therefore, there is no [more]
ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, need for amendment.
there is a need to examine the intent of the framers.
Xxx
[Intent of the Framers]

As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Sr. Busion:

Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934
Mr. President, don't you think it would be
Constitutional Convention show that the framers
better to leave this matter in the
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration.
hands of the Legislature?
The following exchange is recorded:
Sr. Roxas:
Sr. Rafols:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that
For an amendment. I propose that after
these cases are few and far in
subsection 2, the following is
between, that the
inserted: "The natural children of
constitution need [not] refer to
a foreign father and a Filipino
them. By international law the
mother not recognized by the
principle that children or people
father.
born in a country of unknown
xxx xxx xxx parents are citizens in this nation
is recognized, and it is not
President:
necessary to include a
[We] would like to request a clarification provision on the subject
from the proponent of the exhaustively. 116
amendment. The gentleman
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried
refers to natural children or to
out, it was not because there was any objection to the
any kind of illegitimate children?
notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not
Sr. Rafols: citizens but only because their number was not enough
to merit specific mention. Such was the
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
account, 117 cited by petitioner, of delegate
includes natural children of
and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:
unknown parentage, natural or
illegitimate children of unknown
parents.
During the debates on this
Sr. Montinola: provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
For clarification. The gentleman said "of amendment to include as Filipino
unknown parents." Current citizens the illegitimate children with a
codes consider them Filipino, foreign father of a mother who was a
that is, I refer to the Spanish citizen of the Philippines, and
Code wherein all children of also foundlings; but this amendment
unknown parentage born in was defeated primarily because the
Spanish territory are considered
 Convention believed that the cases,
being too few to warrant the inclusion
of a provision in the Constitution to
apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect
that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that
foundlings followed the nationality of
the place where they were found,
thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the
proposed amendment.
[International Law]
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations
The principles found in two conventions (1930 Hague
Convention and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness), while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under
which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the
country of birth," The second is the principle that a foundling
is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.
MARCOS v COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
______ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo,
the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte
and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with
the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency of 1 year.
NOTE: Leyte has 1st district and 2nd district; When Marcos
showed his interest in ruling for election, Montejo told her
that she is not a resident of Tacloban (place where Marcos
grew up) but of Tolosa (present place where she live) hence,
Marcos registered as a voter in Tolosa. Montejo then filed a
petition to Comelec to move the city of Tolosa to 2 nd district
such was not achieved, a very clear intention of Montejo to
remove Marcos from being his opponent.
Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" of
the amended certificate. The Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte denied such as it is filed out of time. Consequently,
Marcos filed the Amended CoC to the COMELEC's Head Office
in Intramuros, Manila
In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result
of an "honest misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify
by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she
has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence." She averred that she thought that what was
asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and
not residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative
District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood."
COMELEC’s Ruling: against Marcos. It held:
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been
considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports
not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business
or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.
(Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil
294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In
respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in
1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San
Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendiis pointed
to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
 Except for the time that she studied and worked for
some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan,
Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965,
she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a
registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of
Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she
had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy
for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be
a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in
Manila, coupled with her intention to stay (animus
manendi) there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she
is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City (animus non
revertendi), where she spent her childhood and school
days, as her place of domicile.
ISSUE:
1. WON the statement in a certificate of candidacy which
ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency
qualification requirement.
2. WON Marcos has complied the 1 year residency
requirement in Leyte. (MAIN TOPIC)
RULING:
1. No. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Own note:
Estoppel) It would be plainly ridiculous for a
candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would
lead to his or her disqualification. Honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact
of residence in the First District if such fact were
established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
2. Yes
In election cases, the term 'residence' has always been
considered as synonymous with 'domicile' which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. (Basis: Intent of framer – Constitutional
Deliberation) Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return.
[WHEN DOMICILE IS NOT LOST EVEN IF A PERSON IS IN
OTHER PLACE]
Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected does not
constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of
domicile) in our election law that in these and other election
law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an
individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.
[DOMICILE VS RESIDENCE]
"There is a difference between domicile and
residence. 'Residence' is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; 'domicile'
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning. A
man may have a residence in one place and a
domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to
remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but
he may have numerous places of residence. His
place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no
length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile." (Uytengsu vs. Republic)
[CONCLUSION]
Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions
between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes.
Respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in
Tacloban. She pursued her college studies in Tacloban
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her
cousin she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when
he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered
there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of
the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in
San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when
her husband was elected President of the Republic of the
Philippines, she lived with him in Malacañang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. In February 1986
(she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came
home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of
Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found
by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the past four
decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an
intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte.
[Presumption of Continuity or Residence and Changing of
Domicile]
As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is
gained.
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; (Animus Manendi)
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a
new one; and (Animus non revertendi)
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Domino vs. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of Representative in Sarangani indicating that he
had resided in the constituency for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the 1991 election.
Private respondents, however, filed with the Comelec a to
cancel the certificate of candidacy because he is neither a
resident nor a registered voter of the province of Sarangani.
The Comelec disqualified Domino as candidate for the
position and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy.
Issue: WON DOMINO was a resident of Sarangani for at least
one year immediately preceding the 1991 election?
Ruling: No.
Preamble: In Election Law, the term "residence," means the
same thing as "domicile.” Therefore, when respondents
questioned the residency requirement of Domino, they were
actually questioning his domicile requirement.
How to establish/change domicile
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Ilocos
Sur and that he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon
City. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has
established a new "domicile" of choice in Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully
effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond
with the purpose.
DOM: In other words, there must be animus manendi (in
the new “domicile” - Sarangani) coupled with animus non
revertendi (to the old “domicile” – Quezon City)
Domicile requires not only bodily presence but also an intent
to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
presence in Sarangani was sufficiently established by the
lease of a house and lot in 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their
locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical (presence) is not in
itself sufficient to show that from said date he had
transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While
"residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place,
"domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that
place but also a declared and probable intent to make it one’s
fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
DOM: To establish domicile, actual/physical presence
must be coupled with intention to acquire domicile; Also,
“domicile” is a term broader than “residence,” since the
latter only requires actual/physical presence.
Lease Contract not indicative of abandonment of one’s
original domicile
The lease contract entered into in 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it
does not prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
Being a voter of QC shows Domino’s lack of intention to
abandon his residence in QC
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case
where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. The fact
that a party continuously voted in a particular locality is a
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his
domicile.
Torayno vs. COMELEC
Facts: During the 1995 elections, Emano ran for, was elected,
and proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental. It
was his third consecutive term as governor of the province. In
his Certificate of Candidacy, his residence was declared to be
in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.
In 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano
executed a Voter Registration Record in Cagayan de Oro City
(geographically located in the Province of Misamis Oriental),
in which he claimed 20 years of residence. In 1998, he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Cagayan de Oro City,
stating therein that he resided there for two years and five
months.
Petitioners Torayno Sr., et al, sought the disqualification of
Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had
allegedly failed to meet the one-year residence requirement.
Issue: WON respondent Emano's acquired a bona fide
domicile of choice for at least one (1) year in Cagayan de Oro
City prior to 1998 elections
Ruling: Yes.
Respondent Emano had been residing in CDO since 1973
Undeniably, Cagayan de Oro City was once an integral part of
Misamis Oriental and remains a geographical part of the
province. Not only is it at the center of the province; more
importantly, it is itself the seat of the provincial government.
As a consequence, the provincial officials who carry out their
functions in the city cannot avoid residing therein; much less,
getting acquainted with its concerns and interests. Emano,
having been the governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms
and consequently residing in Cagayan de Oro City within that
period, could not be said to be a stranger or newcomer to the
city in the last year of his third term, when he decided to
adopt it as his permanent place of residence. Private
respondent was actually and physically residing in Cagayan de
Oro City while discharging his duties as governor of Misamis
Oriental. He owned a house in the city and resided there
together with his family. He even paid his 1998 community
tax and registered as a voter therein. To all intents and
purposes of the Constitution and the law, he is a resident of
Cagayan de Oro City and eligible to run for mayor thereof
Thus, for all intents and purposes of the Constitution and the
law, private respondent is a resident of Cagayan de Oro City
and eligible to run for mayor because he was actually residing
in Cagayan de Oro City while he was discharging his duties as
Governor of Misamis Oriental.
Laws governing Election Contests are liberally construed to
favor Popular Mandate
There is no question that private respondent was the
overwhelming choice of the people of Cagayan de Oro City.
He won by a margin of about 30,000 votes. Thus, we find it
apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the
people as expressed through the ballot must be given fullest
effect. In case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to
give life and spirit to the popular mandate.
In Frivaldo vs. Comelec:
“To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate
that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will
of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice
to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions
that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and
promote.”
Election cases involve public interest; thus, laws governing
election contests must be liberally construed to the end that
the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not
be defeated by mere technical objections.
Residency Rationale
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a
qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in
order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with
the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and
all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies;
likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the seekers'
qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for.
ESTRADA v. DESIERTO (3 topics)
FACTS: From the beginning of his term, petitioner was
plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely
eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started
on October 4, 2000. Governor Chavit Singson went on air and
accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving
millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next
day, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
accusing the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November
1998 to August 2000.
The House Committee on Public Order and Security, decided
to investigate the exposé of Governor Singson. On the other
hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and
Michael Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the
petitioner.
On November 20, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their
oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., presiding.
Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of
11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private
prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust,
Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. The ruling
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of
anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight,
thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches
full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the
11 senators.
On January 19, the petitioner informed Executive Secretary
Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m.,
the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly
transfer of power started at Malacañang's Mabini Hall, Office
of the Executive Secretary. The negotiations consumed all
morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide
would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon
at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon Chief Justice Davide administered the
oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. At
2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang
Palace.
Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to
be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as
and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an
acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution."
ISSUE: whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.
RULING:
RESIGNATION of the PRESIDENT
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section
8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
"SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office or
resignation of the President, the Vice
President shall become the President to
serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal
from office, or resignation of both the
President and Vice President, the
President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as
President until the President or Vice
President shall have been elected and
qualified.
xxx xxx xxx."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President
or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001
when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is
a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there
must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not
governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As
long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot
be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In
the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its
legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the
seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was
going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for
the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the
people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future
challenge after occupying the office of the president which he
has given up, and (5) he called on this supporters to join him
in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not
give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's
valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in
the past tense.
DISABILITY of the PRESIDENT
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice
President has no power to adjudge the inability of the
petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. His significant submittal is that "Congress has the
ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine
whether the President is incapable of performing his
functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article
VII." This contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's
stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo
is only an Acting President.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as
the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of
inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review
the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and
thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the
Philippines. Following Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this
Court cannot "exercise its judicial power for this is an issue
"in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislative . . . branch of the government."
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed
solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue
which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing
the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign,
still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on
leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and
the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President
made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
VACANCY in the OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT, HOW
FILLED
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her VP. The next day, February 7,
the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the
nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. The House of
Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's
nomination in Resolution No. 178. Senator Guingona, Jr. took
his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.
TOLENTINO v. COMELEC
FACTS: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in
January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated
then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr as Vice-President.
Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who
took his oath as Vice-President.
Following Senator Guingona's confirmation, the Senate
passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC
to fill the vacancy through a special election to be held
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May
2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to
be elected in that election. Resolution No. 84 further
provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends
on 30 June 2004.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 provisionally
proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected
Senators. Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan
ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
On 20 June 2001, petitioners as voters and taxpayers, filed
the instant petition for prohibition. Petitioners contend that
COMELEC’s provisional proclamation is without jurisdiction
because it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be
filled in the special election as required under Section 2
of R.A. No. 6645 and it failed to specify in the Voters
Information Sheet the candidates seeking election under the
special or regular senatorial elections.
ISSUE: Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year
term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
RULING: YES!
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special
election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and
the House of Representatives "in the manner prescribed by
law”.
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time
and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature
directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is
indispensable to the election's validity. In a general election,
where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is
valid without any call by the body charged to administer the
election.
In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute
that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall
be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which
the special election is to be held and operates as the call for
that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus
prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body
charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to
do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election
emanate from the statute and not from any call for the
election by some authority and the law thus charges voters
with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides
that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to
fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next
succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election
to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator
Guingona's appointment as Vice-President in February 2001
could not be held at any other time but must be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on
14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of
this statutory notice and COMELEC's failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it.
Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC's
failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number
of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial
election or led them to believe that there was no such special
election.
More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of
Honasan. We simply cannot disenfranchise those who voted
for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELEC's
omission prejudiced voters in the exercise of their right of
suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special election.
Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use
means and methods to conduct the special election within
the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt the
Senate's proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This
Court has consistently acknowledged and affirmed
COMELEC's wide latitude of discretion in adopting means to
carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections subject only to the limitation that the means so
adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
PIMENTEL VS COMELEC
CAVEAT: (Three consolidated cases ni siya: SJS vs PDEA,
Laserna vs PDEA and Pimentel vs Comelec – Pimentel lang ta
focus kay didto ang about sa senatorial qualifications. Ang
two other cases were about if pwede i-drug test ang students
and ang private ug public officials.)
FACTS: On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules
and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent
portions of the said resolution read as follows:
Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
“SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.”
Also, the COMELEC Resolution provides:
“SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both
national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National
and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in
government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health. Xxx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and
file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices
enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate
herein required.”
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic
and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486. He invoked the
provisions of the Constitution:
Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural
- born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the
election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the
election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that
both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165
and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no
provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or
COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
ISSUE: Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those
laid down by the Constitution?
RULING: The provisions are unconstitutional. Hence, SC said
that:
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g)
of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is
null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be,
are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in
Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the
abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
“Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. Xxx However, the Constitution is the
shore of legislative authority against which the waves of
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.10”
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what
the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification,
the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC
Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in
the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under
the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be
of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
BONUS – NOT ABOUT SENATORIAL QUALIFICATIONS:
As to drug test sa students: justifiable ra because of the
safety and interest of the student population
As to drug test sa public and private officials: petitioners tried
to invoke the right to privacy, but failed to prove it sa court.
The drug test was considered justifiable for private officials
because there is “reduced expectation of privacy in the work
office”. It was considered justifiable pud for public officials
due to “high requirement of ethics in the public service”.
As to the drug test sa criminals: it was declared
unconstitutional since the accused persons “are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves”.
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY VS COMELEC (3 consolidated
cases)
FACTS: May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list
representation was held simultaneously with the national
elections. COMELEC then proclaimed 14 party-list
representatives from 13 parties.
On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA Party (People's Progressive Alliance
for Peace and Good Government Towards Alleviation of
Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a
"Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List
Representatives provided by the Constitution."
It alleged that the filling up of the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was
mandatory. It further claimed that the literal application of
the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit
under RA 7941 would defeat this constitutional provision, for
only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52
party-list representatives who should actually sit in the
House. Thereafter, other party list organizations also filed
their respective motions to intervene in the case.
COMELEC 2ND Division, via Resolution, granted PAG-ASA’s
petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would
thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled
up by eighty (80%) percent district representatives and
twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote
requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
COMELEC En banc affirmed such ruling via another
resolution.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier
been proclaimed winners on the basis of having obtained at
least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system,
objected to the proclamation of the 38 parties and assailed
the two resolutions.
ISSUES:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? NO.
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-
seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional? YES.
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should
the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?
RULING:
1. No. The twenty per cent allocation in the house for party-
list lawmakers is a mere ceiling and not mandatory. We rule
that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple message that
Congress was vested with the broad power to define and
prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of
representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives. And,
in the exercise of this constitutional prerogative, Congress
enacted RA 7941.
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number
of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent
of the total membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes
cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in
the House of Representatives;

2. Yes to both. TWO PERCENT THRESHOLD: In imposing a two
percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only
those parties, organizations and coalitions having a sufficient
number of constituents deserving of representation are
actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned
from the deliberations on the proposed bill. . . The two
percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very
essence of "representation”. But to have meaningful
representation, the elected persons must have the mandate
of a sufficient number of people.
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless
of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two
additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation — the additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed "in
proportion to their total number of votes."
LIST OF FORMULAS (WARNING: SC REVISITED THIS
FORMULA IN BANAT VS COMELEC):

THREE-SEAT LIMIT: An important consideration in adopting

the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation ...Consistent with the
Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set
the seat-limit to three (3) for each qualified party,
organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled
the two percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures
the entry of various interest-representations into the
legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its
membership, would dominate the party-list seats, if not the
entire House.

3. How the additional seats of a qualified party be

determined:

1. Rank all the parties according to the votes each

obtained
2. Compute the ratio for each party by dividing its
votes by the total votes cast for the party-list
3. All those who garnered at least 2% shall have a
guaranteed seat. Only these parties shall be
considered in the computation of additional seats
4. The party having the highest number of votes is
referred to as the “first party”
5. Determine the number of seats the first party is
entitled to, in order to be able to compute that for
the other parties. (4% - additional 1; -6% - additional
2)
6. The number of seats allotted to the other parties
cannot possibly exceed that to which the first party
is entitled to.
BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (APRIL 21, 2009) EN BANC
DECISION
FACTS:
BANAT (GR 179271) - filed a Petition to Proclaim the
Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC).
The reason for filing is the implementation of the Veterans
Federation Party v Comelec ruling using the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats.

SUMMARY OF THE FOUR PARAMETERS OF THE PARTY-LIST Comelec, as the NBC, proclaimed 13 parties as
SYSTEM ACCORDING TO SC: winners. Then in allocating the additional seats, it reiterated
its ruling in Veterans Federation Party v Comelec.
For those obtaining 2% above – Guaranteed 1 seat

Formula in Veterans for additional seats for the

“FIRST PARTY”: (BUHAY ang number 1 nga party-list)
Number of Votes Proportion of votes of RULING:
first
Of first party party relative to total PARTY-LIST SEATS (1ST TOPIC)
-------------- = votes for party-list
system 4 INVIOLABLE PARAMETERS OF THE PHILIPPINE PARTY-LIST
Total votes for ELECTION:
Party-list system 1) combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership of the
The resulting Proportion of Votes received by the House of Rep, including those elected under the
first party (w/o rounding off) shall entitle it to additional party list
seats:
2) only those garnering a minimum of 2% of the total
If Equal to or at least 6% = 2 additional seats valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified
Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% = 1 to have a seat
additional
Less than 4% = no additional 3) each qualified party is entitled to a maximum of 3
seats (one qualifying seat) ( 2 additional seats)
Formula for Additional seats for the OTHER
QUALIFIED PARTIES in the Veteran’s ruling:
4) additional seats shall be in proportion to the party-
No. of Votes of list’s total number of votes
Concerned Party No. of additional
Additional
------------- x seats allocated to = seats Sec. 5 Art V - Composition of House of Rep:
for a  250 members elected from
No. of Votes of first party o Legislative districts apportioned among the
concerned provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
First Party party area

NBC nevertheless declared said petition of BANAT as moot o Party-list system of registered national, regional,
and academic and it implemented the Veteran’s formula. and sectoral parties or orgs.

BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER (GR  For the Party-list Representatives:
179295) – asked the Comelec acting as NBC should not use o Constitute 20% of the total number of
the Veteran’s formula as it violates the Constitution and RA representatives including those under the party
7941. This was nevertheless denied. list (This is also found in Sec 11 RA 7941)

ISSUES: o Term – 3 consecutive

1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives in Sec.
5(2) Art. VI of the Consti mandatory or merely a ceiling?
MERELY A CEILING
2) Is the 3-seat limit in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
YES
3) is the 2 % threshold prescribed in Sec. 11(b) of RA 7941 to
qualify for one seat constitutional? CONSTITUTIONAL FOR
GUARANTEED SEAT, UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ADDITIONAL
SEATS
4) How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5) can major political parties be barred from participating in
the party-list elections? YES
FOR COMPUTING THE NUMBER OF SEATS AVAILABLE TO
PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE NUMBER OF
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS: (SC followed Veteran’s formula)
Number of seats available
To legislative districts Number of seats
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x .20 = available to PLR
.80
14th Congress of the Phil has 220 district reps. So substitute
lang, and you get 55 available seats.
TAKE NOTE: There is no disagreement on the Computation of
the available seats as well as the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least
2% of the total PL votes.

The problem here is THE ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL SEATS
USING THE VETERAN’S FORMULA.
INTERPRETATIONS OF BANAT:
Deviating from the Veteran’s formula, BANAT presents 2
interpretations:
1st (44 seats will be awarded)
1.a) composition of PL is 20% x x x
1.b) 1 seat for every 2% of the total PL votes; then not more
than 3 seats
1.c) the remaining seats shall be proportionately allocated to
the PL candidates who have not secured the max 3 seats
under the 2% threshold, after deducting the seats obtained
by the PL groups and after deducting from their total the
votes corresponding to those seats
2nd (34 seats will be awarded)
Take note: It is assumed in this interpretation that the 2%
threshold will be declared unconstitutional
2.a) tally all the votes on a nationwide basis
2.b) rank them
2.c) allocate PL reps proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each candidate as against
the total nationwide votes cast for the PL system
ARGUMENT OF BAYAN MUNA, ABONO, and A TEACHER:
They criticize that the 2-4-6 formula and the
Veteran’s formula make it impossible to fill all the PL seats.
Both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats.
They reject the 3 seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold.
SC SAYS:
There is no problem with the 2% threshold to be
guaranteed 1 seat. However, the Veteran’s formula
erroneously interprets the clause in Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 “in
proportion to their total number of votes” to be in
proportion to the votes of the first party. This is contrary to
the language of RA 7941.
Pursuant to this, the 2% threshold for allocating the
ADDITIONAL SEATS is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL because
it would mathematically and physically prevent the filling up
of the available PL seats. (2% applies lang sa guaranteed
seats)
THE PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED NOW:
1. rank the PL candidates from the highest to the lowest
2. those receiving at least 2%, guaranteed 1 seat (1st ROUND
OF SEAT ALLOCATION)
 Votes obtained / Total Votes Cast in PL = percentage
3. those qualified shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated (2nd to 3rd ROUND DEPENDING
ON THE AVAILABLE SEATS LESS GUARANTEED SEATS)
4. not more than 3 seats
AND FOR COMPUTING THE ADDITIONAL SEATS:
(2nd round)
Take Note: the GUARANTEED SEATS FOR 2% THRESHOLD is
NO LONGER included because they have already been
allocated. So ang additional seats refer to the MAXIMUM
SEATS RESERVED LESS THE GUARANTEED SEATS
 Percentage x Remaining Available seats (in this case, 38
coz there are 55 max seats then in the 1st round, 17 seats
were allocated – if ganahan mo mu.view sa table, aron
mas maka.visualize, refer lang sa case)
o The whole integer of the product corresponds
to a party’s share in the remaining available
seats.
 Assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in
rank until all available seats are completely distributed.
CAN MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES PARTICIPATE? - YES
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-
party system that allowed all political parties to participate in
the party-list
elections. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941
prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings.
QUALIFICATIONS OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEES (2ND TOPIC)
1) natural born citizen of the Phil
2) registered voter
3) resident of the Phil for a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the elections
4) able to read and write
5) bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of
the election
6) at least 25 years of age on the day of election
 FOR A NOMIBEE OF THE YOUTH SECTOR
o Must at least be 25 but not more than 30 years
of age on the day of the election
o It attains 30 years of age during his term,
continue until the expiration of his term
TAKE NOTE: not necessary that the party-list organization's
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as
there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough
that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she
must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior
citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.
PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Diba major political parties can participate, but by virtue of 8-
7 vote, ruling in Veterans with respect to non-participation of
said parties is upheld.
2% threshold in distributing additional seats is
unconstitutional
Veteran’s formula for additional seats is not controlling.
BAYAN MUNA V COMELEC (JULY 8 2009) EN BANC
RESOLUTION
The House of Rep filed a motion for clarification for the
following issues:
1) There are only 219 legislative districts and not 220.
Accordingly, the allotted seats for party-list representation
should only be 54 and not 55. The House of Representatives
seeks clarification on which of the party-list representatives
shall be admitted to the Roll of Members considering that the
Court declared as winners 55 party-list representatives.
2) The House of Representatives wishes to be guided on
whether it should enroll in its Roll of Members the 32 named
party-list representatives enumerated in Table 3 or only such
number of representatives that would complete the 250
member maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to admit all 32,
will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional
provision considering that the total members would now rise
to 270.
3) The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold
only in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it
distributed first seats to party-list groups which did not attain
the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one
seat. Clarification is, therefore, sought whether the term
"additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all
remaining available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of
Representatives wishes to be clarified whether there is no
more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list
representative.
4) For the guidance of the House of Representatives,
clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid down in
Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-
list representatives is not mandatory," has been abandoned.
CLARIFICATIONS MADE BY THE SC:
1) It is provided under Sec 5 (1) Art VI of the 1987 Consti
that the max number of members of the House of Rep
shall be at 250. Nevertheless, an increase in the number
of members is allowed which is clear from the phrase
“unless otherwise provided by law”.
 Increase may be done by the legislature through
Piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law
authorizing a general increase.
2) The formula to determine the number of seats available
for party list allows a corresponding increase in the number
of seats available whenever a legislative district is created
by law.
 This means that there is no need for the legislature to
create an additional party-list seat whenever four
additional legislative districts (four is entitled to 1 rep)
are created by law.
 Moreover, the actual count of legislative districts in the
2007 election was not 220 but 219, following the
declaration that rendered void the creation of the
Province of Sharif Kabunsuan, thus only 54 seats were
available, not 55.
 The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not
mandatory. Actual occupancy of the party-list seats
depends on the number of participants in the party-list
election
3) The 2% threshold is constitutional with respect to the
allocation of the guaranteed seats (1st round)
 In the second round allocation of additional seats, there
is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list
seat because the Court has struck down the application
of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats.
 However, a party-list organization has to obtain a
sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second
round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient
number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of
each election
 In the second step of the second round of seat allocation,
the preference in the distribution of seats should be in
accordance with the higher percentage and higher rank,
without limiting the distribution to parties receiving two-
percent of the votes. 6 To limit the distribution of seats
 to the two-percenters would mathematically prevent the
filling up of all the available party-list seats
4) In response to Roa-Borje’s (lain nga intervenor ni sya)
position claiming the perceived need for ABSOLUTE
proportionality in the allocation of PL seats. . .
 the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT require absolute
proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats
 Section 5 (1) of Article VI requires that legislative districts
shall be apportioned according to proportional
representation. However, this principle of proportional
representation applies only to legislative districts, not to
the party-list system. The allocation of seats under the
party-list system is governed by the last phrase of
Section 5 (1), which states that the party-list
representatives shall be "those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system," giving the
Legislature wide discretion in formulating the allocation
of party-list seats.
5) Again, nag provide nasad ug FOUR PARAMETERS IN A PHIL
STYLE PL ELECTION SYSTEM:
1. 20% of the total number of the House of Rep
membership is the maximum number of seats
available to party-list organizations, such that
there is automatically one party-list seat for
every four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering 2 % of the total votes means 1
guaranteed seat in the 1st round of allocation
3. Additional seats, total seats less guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed even to those
receiving less than 2% for the 2nd round.
Otherwise, it would be mathematically
impossible if the 2% threshold would still be
observed in allocating the additional seats.
4. 3 seat cap is constitutional. This is intended to
prevent any party from dominating the party-list
system.
TOPIC: Succesion, Effect on term continuity
Borja vs Comelec, GR No. 133495
Facts: Respondent Capco was elected vice mayor for a term
ending in 1992. He succeeded as Mayor in 1989 upon the
death of the Mayor. Thereafter, he ran and was elected as
Mayor for the next two succeeding terms ending in 1995 and
1998 which in effect allowed him to serve 3 consecutive
terms as Mayor.
He ran again as Mayor during the 1998 elections, but this
time, petitioner Borja, who was also running for the position
of Mayor, questioned his eligibility arguing that respondent
has already served three consecutive terms thereby
disqualifying him for the position of mayor.
Eventually, respondent won in the elections and was
proclaimed as the Mayor but petitioner appealed COMELEC’S
decision in upholding respondent’s eligibility to run.
Issue: WON respondent should be disqualified from running.
Held: No, the court here delved into the debates and
deliberations in the constitutional commissions wherein it
was revealed that the three consecutive term limit rule
contemplates of a term wherein a candidate was elected in
that position. It does not include a term of office wherein an
official merely succeeded in the position of a higher official
due to permanent vacancy unless there is an election held for
such vacancy like in the case the house of representatives. In
other words, succession that occurs by operation of law is not
included, while succession that occurs via special election is
included in the consecutive term.
Hence, the term of office during which respondent succeeded
as Mayor should not be included in the count of the three
consecutive term rule because it took effect by operation of
law. Therefore, in effect respondent is still eligible to run for
one more term.
*mao ni ruling sa SC:
“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials
must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as
the right to serve in the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served
three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times before the disqualification can apply”
Montebon vs Comelec, GR No. 180444
Facts: Petitioners, who were candidates for municipal
councilor sought the disqualification of respondent in the
election who was also running for a position in the municipal
council during the 2007 elections. Respondent has already
been elected as municipal councilor for three terms from
1988 to 2007. But during the term of 2001-2004, he
succeeded as Vice Mayor upon the retirement of the
incumbent vice mayor.
Petitioners argued that respondent’s assumption as Vice
Mayor should not be considered as an interruption and that it
amounts to a voluntary renunciation. Respondent counters
that his succession as Vice Mayor served as an interruption to
the three consecutive term rule and hence, he is not
disqualified.
Issue: WON there was interruption.
Held: Yes, there was an interruption because succession in
the case of local government officials takes effect by
operation of law and hence, is NOT a voluntary renunciation.
What is considered under law as not interrupting the three
consecutive term rule is only voluntary renunciation which is
one where it takes effect through the conduct of the official
and not by operation of law. Hence, respondent is still
qualified to run as municipal councilor.
* SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor. —
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may
be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein. . .
* Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be
three years and no such officials shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Ruling SC:
“Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service.
Thus, respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor in
January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office
as municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the
service of his 2001-2004 term.”
Montebon v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent
Potencioso Jr. were candidates for Municipal councilors in the
municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. Petitioners filed a
disqualification case against Potencioso alleging that he had
already served for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor 1998-2001, 2001-2004, & 2004-2007 thus he is
proscribed from running again for the same position.
Respondent contended that his second term (2001-2004) was
interrupted when he succeeded the vice mayor due to
retirement thus he is not disqualified. Petitioners contended
that there was no interruption during the second term as
such was a voluntary renunciation.
Issue: WON respondent is disqualified from running for a 4th
consecutive term?
Ruling: Succession in local government offices is by operation
of law. Sec. 44 of the LGC provides that if a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest
ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.
SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor,
Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or mayor, the vice governor or vice mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a
permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become
the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the case
may be.Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to
their ranking as defined herein
In this case respondent was the highest ranking sanggunian
member thus it is clear that there was no voluntary
renunciation of his office in his part since the interruption of
his service was made by operation of law.
Aldovino v. COMELEC
Facts: Respondent Asilo was elected as city councilor of
Lucena for three consecutive terms (1998-2001, 2001-2004,
& 2004-2007). During his second term, the Sandiganbayan
ordered for a 90 days preventive suspension by reason of a
criminal case he was facing at that time. Subsequently, it was
lifted and thus he was able to resume his office. During the
2007 election, he filed for his certificate of candidacy for the
same position. This prompted the petitioners to file for a
disqualification case against him for violation of the three
term limit.
Issue: WON the preventive suspension issue against the
respondent constituted as an interruption in view of the 3
term limit?
Ruling: Temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not
be considered an effective interruption of a term because it
does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions
of his office for a reason provided by law.
What the law contemplates when it comes to
interruption of office is that there is a loss of title to
the office. In this there was no actual loss of title to
hold office but merely the person is prevented in
exercising such function.
(Additional just in case)
Preventive suspension an interim remedial measure
to address the situation of an official who have been
charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or
potential for eventual guilt or liability.
It is given when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the
gravity of the offense charged. The purpose of which is to
prevent the public officer influence or pose a threat against
to the witness or to the integrity of the record or witness.

A public officer under such is prevented from exercising the

functions of his office as well as from receiving salary
nonetheless, he does not lose title to hold office.