INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES PROJECT

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHA

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

“THE ROLE OF PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE

INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN STATUTES”

SUBMITTED TO : PROF.ABHIK
MAJUMDAR

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY ODISHA.

SUBMITTED BY:

PURNIMA SRIVASTAVA
(2011/B.A.LL.B /040)
RIYANKA ROY CHOUDHURY
(2011/BBA.LL.B./060)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3

UNDERSTANDING PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY .................................................... 4

Parliamentary history ................................................................................................................... 4

Legislative history ......................................................................................................................... 4

IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BINDING ................................................................................................ 4

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTION ..................................................................... 5

REASONS FOR THE COURT'S USAGE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY ...................................................5- 6

IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE MOTIVATED BY DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE JUSTICES ...........6-7

THE USE OF PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN

STATUTES: WITH REFERENCE TO CASE LAWS……………………………………….................7-9

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................. 10

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………............................11

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“The essence of law lies in the spirit, not its letter, for the letter is significant only as being the
external manifestation of the intention that underlies it” –Salmond

INTRODUCTION

Interpretation is as ancient as language. Highly structured “rules of interpretation” were developed

at a very primitive stage of the Hindu civilization. Interpretation is a knack of finding out the object
of an enactment by construing the words in their natural and ordinary meaning. The Court is not
supposed to interpret arbitrarily and thus certain basic principles have been evolved. These
principles are described as ‘rules of interpretation’. Its object is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature communicated expressly or impliedly in the language used. As stated by Salmond,

"By interpretation or construction is meant, the process by which the courts seek to ascertain the
meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is expressed."

When the words in a statute are unclear. It is the task of the court to interpret it by referring to
internal as well as external aids. Apart from the intrinsic aids such as preamble and the purview of
the act, the court considers resources beyond the act, these are called extrinsic aids. They mainly
deal with the history of the act.

But this Historical setting are not used as an aid if the words are clear, if the wordings are unclear,
the historical setting may be taken into account in order to achieve the proper construction.
Historical setting comprises of parliamentary history, historical facts, statement of objects and
reasons, report of expert committees.1

1 Ca. Rajkumar S. Adukia , Interpretation of Statutes

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UNDERSTANDING PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Parliamentary history stands for the procedure by which an act is enacted. This contains
conception of an idea, drafting of the bill, the debates, the amendments etc. Speech made during
over of the bill, amendments contemplated during the progress of the bill are considered in
parliamentary history while the papers sited before the cabinet which pronounced for the
introduction of the bill are not germane since these papers are not sited before the parliament.2

Legislative history means -

(i) The legislative antecedents of the statutory provision under consideration, i.e.
Corresponding provisions in previous enactment since repealed and re-enacted with or
without modification3
(ii) Pre parliamentary materials relating to the provision or the statue in which it is
contained ,e.g. reports of committees and commission
(iii) Parliamentary materials

IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BINDING

This notion is completely rejected. On contrary, there seems to be broad consent that legislative
history is just a tool with acts as a "guiding function" for the courts. Variation of opinion arises
regarding the relative weight to be provided to the historical interpretative method in relation to
other methods. Advocates of legal discourse theory suggest a ranking that usually places arguments
based on legislative intent higher than others." furthermore, increasing number of scholars are of
the view that while a categorical duty of the courts to stick to legislative history might not exist,
an obligation to refer the materials does .

2 Justice A.K. Srivastava, Interpretation of Statutes

3 These are not the same thing as statutes in parimateria
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LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENTION

It is important to differentiate between legislative history and legislative intent.

According to Black's Law Dictionary legislative intent means "the design or plan that the
legislature had at the time of enacting a statute."

It does not essentially reveal the meaning of each word; however it does offer courts with a ways
of selecting between competing interpretations. Few schools of legislative interpretation offer that
the court's obligation is to determine and uphold the intention of the legislature; while some should
the existence of a collective intention and the necessity to determine such, even if it does exist. For
those in the former school, it is one mode to discern legislative intent.

According to Black's Law Dictionary legislative history means

"The back ground and events leading to the enactment of a statute, including hearings committee
reports, and floor debates."

In the beginning of the definition- "the background and events" is in fact broader than the general
perception of legislative history and, if it were not restricted by the remainder of the definition,
would appear to cover more than the documents drafted during the legislative process.

It includes the "documents [legislatures generate] in the course of enacting statutes.

REASONS FOR THE COURT'S USAGE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Many scholars have tried to understand the motive of judges for citing legislative history.The usage
of legislative history is motivated by a combination of legal and ideological considerations.

Usually, the legal variables have a considerably greater impact on the possibility of legislative
history use than the ideological variables, but the influence of the ideological variables cannot be

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denied. The intricacy of a statute amplifies the likelihood of legislative history usage, while
routinely amended statutes are less prone to obtain such treatment. 4

The age of the statute is also relevant, but its outcome is neither linear nor monotonic: extremely
new and old statutes are less likely to extract legislative history usage than statutes of intermediate
age. The facts also recommend that the usage of legislative history by one justice induces other
justices to respond in the similar kind.

With regard to the effect of ideological factors, liberal justices are usually more likely than
conservative justices to use legislative history. Consequently, the rightward shift in the ideological
composition of the Court has greatly corresponded with a falloff in the overall usage of legislative
history since the mid-1980s.5

IS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY USAGE MOTIVATED BY DISAGREEMENT AMONG THE

JUSTICES

There is one question that has to be delving into, to what limit, if any, do the Justices refer to
legislative history in order to retort to the arguments and positions of other Justices?

Difference over the meaning of a statute enhances the usage of legislative history. When Justices
differ on the merits, it is expected from them to resort to legislative history as a way of
strengthening their own arguments, and weakening those of the opponents.

It appears that Court's legislative history opinions yields little aid for this hypothesis. Indeed, the
opposite view can be:

4 James J. Brudney &Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' reliance on Legislative history: Principle, Strategy, and
The Scalia effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. &lab. L. 117 (2008)
5 David s. Law & David Zaring, law versus ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of legislative history51 Wm. & Mary l.

Rev. 1653 2009-2010

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Opinions for a unanimous Court are considerably more likely to refer to legislative history than
other kinds of opinions. However, this finding is deceptive. It is an error to suppose that unanimity
enhances legislative history usage. Most of the majority opinions are unanimous opinions and
majority opinions-unanimous or else-are more likely to refer to legislative history than are minority
opinions.6

THE USE OF PARLIAMENTARY AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN THE

INTERPRETATION OF INDIAN STATUTES: WITH REFERENCE TO CASE LAWS

The parliamentary history may be referred for ascertaining the intention, but not for construction,
is pedantic. In fact all such material out freely to be referred to and it is only by resort to such
material that the object of the legislation and how the legislature intended to achieve that object by
the particular statute can be correctly ascertained by the court 7. The reliance which is placed on
legislative history by the courts in determining an issue can be seen in many case laws.

In Administrator-General of Bengal v. Premlal Mullick 8 , the question was whether a Hindu

executor was a “private executor” within the meaning of Section 31 Administrator General’s Act,
1874. The Privy Council held reversing the High Court, that he was a “private executor” within
the meaning of Section 31 of the Act. Their Lordships observed:
“The two learned Judges, who constituted the majority in the appellate court, although they do not
base their judgement upon them, refer to the proceedings of the legislature which resulted in the
passing of the Act of 1874 as legitimate age to the construction of Section 31. Their Lordships

6 David s. Law & David Zaring, Law versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative history 51 Wm. & Mary l.
Rev. 1653 2009-2010
7 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the new modified

textualism, 119 Yale l.J. 1750 (2014)

8 (1894-95) 22 IA 107: ILR (1895) 22 Cal 788
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think it right to expresses their dissent from that proposition. The same reasons which exclude
these considerations when the clauses of an Act of the British Legislature are under construction
are equally cogent in the case of an Indian statute”9.

In Balchand Jain v. State of M.P10. for holding that an order for anticipatory bail could be issued
under Section 438, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, to a person apprehending arrest under Rule
184 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, the Court relied on the legislative
history of the provision and on the recommendations of the Law Commission and observations in
the Law Commission Report.
In Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma11, Rownand, J. observed:
Sen, J. ,has said in his judgement that it is not open to us to take into account historical facts or any
extraneous evidence either as to whether an emergency existed or whether the Governor General
had judged an emergency to have arisen.
But according to Lord Halsbury in Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co., such topics as the
history of legislation and the facts which give rise to the enactment may usefully be employed to
interpret the meaning of the statute, though they do not afford conclusive argument12.
In State of Travancore-Cochin v. Bombay Co. Ltd13, the respondents claimed exemption from sales
tax on the ground that their commodities to foreign buyers in CIF or FOB contracts were sales "in
the course of export of the goods out of the territory of India” within the meaning of Article
2860)(b) of the Constitution. The High Court held in favour of the respondents

9 St. J. Langan, Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed., 1969)

10 (1976) 4 SCC 572 :1976 SCC (CRI) 689
11 AIR 1943 FC 36: 1943 FCR 96: (1943) 2 MAD LJ 207.
12 Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (4th ed., 2003)

13 AIR 1952 SC 366: 1952 SCR 1112

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In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, it was held: Constitutional law raises, in a legal context,
problems of economic, social, moral and political theory and practice to which non-lawyers have
much to contribute. When judges are confronted by issues to which there is no legal answer, there
is no reason (other than a desire to maintain a fiction that the law pros-ides the answer) for judicial
discretion to be exercised in a vacuum, immune from non-legal learning and extra-legal dispute.
The judges must also consider while deciding an issue of constitutional adjudication as to what
would be the moral, social and economic consequences of a decision either way.
In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala 14 , it was held that Constituent Assembly Debates
although not conclusive, yet show the intention of the framers of the Constitution enacting
provisions of the Constitution and the Constituent Assembly Debates can throw light in
ascertaining the intention behind such provisions. Reference to Constituent Assembly Debates in
interpreting a Constitutional provision: In Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, H.R. Khanna, J.
observed that the speeches in the Constituent Assembly can be referred to for ascertaining the
history of the constitutional provision.
In Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India15, while justifying the separate treatment given to
minority institutions on the basis of constitutional provision the Court observed that it is a settled
position that in statutory interpretation external aids have only a limited use. [I respectfully submit
that all aids external and internal are for the purpose of finding out the object of a statutory
provision or a word or phrase and that interpretation is on the basis that it achieves that object and
fits the context.] The difference between consolidation and codification is that in the latter both
statutes and case law are integrated and enacted as a whole after the necessary dovetailing,
reconciliation and distillation16.

14 (1973) 4 SCC 225: AIR 1973 SC 1461

15 (2008) 6 SCC 1
16 Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation Of Statutes (4th Ed., 2003)

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CONCLUSION

The conception that the legislative history must be sternly adhered to barely has any advocates
now a days. It is just a tool and "aid" or "guide" as stated in Pepper v. Hart17. It is, though, a
worthwhile duty for legal academics to examine the possibilities and confines of a hierarchical
order of different legislative materials, ranging from preparatory reports by expert panels to
commentary by the Ministry. Besides, judges and legal scholars should observe the detail process
of how statutes are made in order to be in a better position to consider their value.

Regarding Law Commission’s Report it was held that, “It can also be referred to where a particular
enactment or amendment is the result of recommendations of Law Commission Report.”

This judgment was further validated by The Supreme Court in Rosy and another v State of Kerala
and others , where they considered Law Commission of India, 41st Report for interpretation of
section 200 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.

Finally as far as Statement of Objects and Reasons, accompanying a legislative bill is concerned;
court has cleared that in Devadoss v. Veera Makali Amman Koil Athalur18

“It is permissible to refer to it for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the
surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the statute sought to remedy.
But, it cannot be used to ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive provision of the
statute.” Thus it has been understood that there has been quite a bit ambiguity in interpretation of
statutes through legislature history. Hence it needs to be adhered to and intent of the
parliamentarian is of the prime importance for understanding the intent of the legislature in the
framework of the statutes.

17 [1993] AC 593
18 AIR 1998 SC 750
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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Statutes Referred
• Constitution of India, 1949
• Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
Books Referred
• Vepa P. Sarathi, Interpretation of Statutes (4th ed., 2003)
• G.P. Singh, Principles Of Statutory Interpretation (11th Ed., 2008)
Articles Referred
• Kenneth R. Dortzbach, Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer
and the Use of Legislative History Volume 80, Issue 1 2006

• James J. Brudney&Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' reliance on Legislative history:

Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia effect, Berkeley J. Emp. &lab. L. 117 (2008)

• Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological

Consensus and the new modified textualism, 119 Yale l.J. 1750 (2014)

Internet Sources
• http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/23251934?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searc
hText=The&searchText=role&searchText=of&searchText=parliamentary&Statutes

• http://ijtr.nic.in/articles/art21.pdf
• http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Interpretation-of-Statute5430.aUwTmSwSN
• http://www.nhs.vic.edu.au/library/legaldate/LegalDate_Vol_19_No2.pdf

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