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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 149

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 118712. October 6, 1995.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondents.
*
G.R. No. 118745. October 6, 1995.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the

Secretary of Agrarian Reform, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F.
SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., ET AL., respondents.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Constitutional Law; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law; Statutory

Construction; There is no ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant
an expanded construction of the term “deposit.”—It is very explicit
therefrom that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.”
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made
in any other form. If it were the intention to include a “trust account” among
the valid modes of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least,
qualifying words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly
deduced that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
“deposit.”

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Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulations cannot extend the law

and amend a legislative enactment for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.—The
conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial
department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be
stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be
legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the
law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that
administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative
enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails.
Same; Same; Same; The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular
No. 9.—In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular
No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in behalf
of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as heretofore
discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the deposit must
be made only in “cash” or in “LBP bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners
cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law.
Respondent court therefore did not commit any error in striking down
Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 151

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Social Justice; Social justice cannot be invoked to

trample on the rights of property owners who under our Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection.—The promulgation of the
“Association” decision endeavored to remove all legal obstacles in the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and clear
the way for the true freedom of the farmer. But despite this, cases involving
its implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts’ dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally emancipating the
farmers from their bondage will be attained in due time. It must be stressed,
however, that in the pursuit of this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to

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trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and
laws are also entitled to protection.

PETITIONS for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Gonzales, Aquino & Associates for Land Bank of the
Philippines.
Fernando A. Santiago for private respondents.

FRANCISCO, J.:

It has been declared that the duty of the court to protect the weak
and the underprivileged should not be carried out to such an extent
as deny justice to1 the landowner whenever truth and justice happen
to be on his side. As eloquently stated by Justice Isagani Cruz:

“x x x social justice—or any justice for that matter—is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true
that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in
favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy
and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because
they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice
must always
2
be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of
the law.”

______________

1 Gelos v. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 608, 615 (1992), quoting Justice Alicia
Sempio-Diy.
2 Ibid, p. 616.

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

In this agrarian dispute, it is once more imperative that the

aforestated principles be applied in its resolution.
Separate petitions for review were filed by petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) (G.R. No. 118745) and
Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 118712) following the
adverse ruling by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33465.
However, upon motion filed 3
by private respondents, the petitions
were ordered consolidated.
Petitioners assail the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on October 20, 1994, which granted private
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus and ruled as
follows:
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“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari and

Mandamus is hereby GRANTED:

a) DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990 is declared null

and void insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in
lieu of deposits in cash or bonds;
b) Respondent Landbank is ordered to immediately deposit—not
merely ‘earmark,’ ‘reserve’ or ‘deposit in trust’—with an
accessible bank designated by respondent DAR in the names of the
following petitioners the following amounts in cash and in
government financial instruments—within the parameters of Sec.
18(1) of RA 6657:

P1,455,207.31 — Pedro L. Yap

P 135,482.12 — Heirs of Emiliano Santiago
P15,914,127.77 — AMADCOR;

c) The DAR-designated bank is ordered to allow the petitioners to

withdraw the above-deposited amounts without prejudice to the
final determination of just compensation by the proper authorities;
and
d) Respondent DAR is ordered to 1) immediately conduct summary
administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation for
the lands of the petitioners giving the petitioners 15 days from
notice within which to submit evidence and to 2) decide
4
the cases
within 30 days after they are submitted for decision.”

_________________

3 Rollo, p. 7.
4 Rollo, pp. 122-123.

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VOL. 249, OCTOBER 6, 1995 153

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

Likewise, petitioners
5
seek the reversal of the Resolution dated
January 18, 1995, denying their motion for reconsideration.
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were
acquired by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL, Republic Act No. 6657).
Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR and the Landbank
with respect to the valuation and payment of compensation for their
land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657, private respondents
filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with

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prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private respondents

questioned
6
the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series
7
of 1992 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, and
sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just
compensation of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in
cash and bonds the amounts respectively “earmarked,” “reserved”
and “deposited in trust accounts” for private respondents, and to
allow them to withdraw the same.
Through a Resolution of the Second Division dated February 9,
1994, this Court referred the petition to respondent Court of Appeals
for proper determination and disposition.
As found by respondent court, the following are undisputed:

“Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that ‘(o)n 4 September 1992 the transfer
certificates of title (TCTs) of petitioner Yap were totally cancelled by the
Registrar of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of farmer
beneficiaries collectively, based on the request of the DAR together with a
certification of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77 and P719,869.54
have been earmarked for Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283, respectively, and issued in lieu thereof
TC-563 and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed beneficiaries
(ANNEXES ‘C’ & ‘D’)

________________

5 Rollo, p. 149.
6 Which provides formulas for the valuation of land expropriated under RA 6657.
7 Which provides for the opening of trust accounts in the Land Bank instead of depositing in
an accessible bank, in cash and bonds, the compensation for land expropriated by the DAR.

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without notice to petitioner Yap and without complying with the

requirement of Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in
cash and Landbank bonds in an accessible bank.’ (Rollo, p. 6).
“The above allegations are not disputed by any of the respondents.
“Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that the heirs of Emiliano
F. Santiago are the owners of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA
ECIJA with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by TCT No. NT-60359 of
the registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the late
Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November and December 1990, without notice
to the petitioners, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed
Actual tillers Deed of Undertaking (ANNEX ‘B’) to pay rentals to the
LandBank for the use of their farm lots equivalent to at least 25% of the net
harvest; that on 24 October 1991 the DAR Regional Director issued an
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order directing the Landbank to pay the landowner directly or through the
establishment of a trust fund in the amount of P135,482.12; that on 24
February 1992, the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12 in the name of
Emiliano F. Santiago. (ANNEX ‘E’; Rollo, p. 7); that the beneficiaries
stopped paying rentals to the landowners after they signed the Actual
Tiller’s Deed of Undertaking committing themselves to pay rentals to the
LandBank (Rollo, p. 133).
“The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent DAR, not Landbank
which required the execution of Actual Tillers Deed of Undertaking (ATDU,
for brevity); and 2) that respondent Landbank, although armed with the
ATDU, did not collect any amount as rental from the substituting
beneficiaries (Rollo, p. 99).
“Petitioner Agricultural Management and Development Corporation
(AMADCOR, for brevity) alleges—with respect to its properties located in
San Francisco, Quezon—that the properties of AMADCOR in San
Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 34314
with an area of 209.9215 hectares and another parcel covered by TCT No.
10832 with an area of 163.6189 hectares; that a summary administrative
proceeding to determine compensation of the property covered by TCT No.
34314 was conducted by the DARAB in Quezon City without notice to the
landowner; that a decision was rendered on 24 November 1992 (ANNEX
‘F’) fixing the compensation for the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
34314 with an area of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and ordering the
Landbank to pay or establish a trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the amount of P2,768,326.34
fixed in the decision was established by adding P1,986,489.73 to the first
trust account established on 19 December 1991 (ANNEX ‘G’). With respect
to petitioner

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

AMADCOR’s property in Tabaco, Albay, it is alleged that the property of

AMADCOR in Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466 of the
Register of Deeds of Albay with an area of 1,629.4578 hectares; that
emancipation patents were issued covering an area of 701.8999 hectares
which were registered on 15 February 1988 but no action was taken
thereafter by the DAR to fix the compensation for said land; that on 21
April 1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR was established in
the amount of P12,247,217.83, three notices of acquisition having been
previously rejected by AMADCOR. (Rollo, pp. 8-9)
“The above allegations are not disputed by the respondents except that
respondent Landbank claims that petitioner failed to participate in the
DARAB 8
proceedings (land valuation case) despite due notice to it (Rollo, p.
100).”

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Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series

of 1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible
bank designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it
is taken and 9the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e)
of RA 6657. Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR
and the Landbank merely “earmarked,” “deposited in trust” or
“reserved” the compensation in their names as landowners despite
the clear mandate that before taking possession of the10
property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds.

_________________

8 Rollo, pp. 109-111.

9 Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.—For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following shall be followed:

xxx xxx xxx

Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR
shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

10 Rollo, p. 111.

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Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No.

9 is a valid exercise
11
of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49
of RA 6657. Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of
the “Certificate of Deposit” by the Landbank was a substantial
compliance with Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and the ruling in the case
of Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., et al.
vs. Hon. Secretary of 12Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, July 14,
1989 (175 SCRA 343).
For its part, petitioner Landbank declared that the issuance of the
Certificates of Deposits was in consonance with Circular Nos. 29,
29-A and 54 of the Land Registration 13
Authority where the words
“reserved/deposited” were also used.
On October 20, 1994, the respondent14court rendered the assailed
decision in favor of private respondents. Petitioners filed 15
a motion
for reconsideration but respondent court denied the same.
Hence, the instant petitions.
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On March 20, 1995, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss

the petition in G.R. No. 118745 alleging that the appeal has no merit
and is merely
16
intended to delay the finality of the appealed
decision. The Court, however, denied the 17motion and instead
required the respondents to file their comments.
Petitioners submit that respondent court erred in (1) declaring as
null and void DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust accounts in lieu of
deposit in cash or in bonds, and (2) in holding that private
respondents are entitled as a matter of right to the immediate and
provisional release of the amounts deposited in trust pend-

_________________

11 Sec. 49. Rules and Regulations.—The PARC and the DAR shall have the power
to issue rules and regulations, whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the
objects and purposes of this Act. Said rules shall take effect ten (10) days after the
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
12 Rollo, pp. 111-112.
13 Rollo, p. 112.
14 Rollo, p. 107.
15 Rollo, p. 149.
16 Rollo, p. 63.
17 Rollo, p. 67.

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ing the final resolution of the cases it has filed for just
compensation.
Anent the first assignment of error, petitioners maintain that the
word “deposit” as used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred merely
to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the opening of a
trust account as a form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening of
a trust account as the acceptable form of deposit through
Administrative Circular No. 9, petitioner DAR did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion since it merely exercised its power to
promulgate rules and regulations in implementing the declared
policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides
as follows:

“Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands—x x x

x x x x x x.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with

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an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in

LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to
issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. x x x x x x x x.” (italics supplied)

It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in

“cash” or in “LBP bonds.” Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were
the intention to include a “trust account” among the valid modes of
deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced
that a “trust account” is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in
Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of
the term “deposit.”
The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not
absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set
aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave
abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of

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18
a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the
function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law
into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to
implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is
that administrative regulations
19
cannot extend the law and amend a
legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And
in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and 20
an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails.
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its
power to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative
Circular No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property
because, as heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very
specific that the deposit must be made only in “cash” or in “LBP
bonds.” In the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular
Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these implementing regulations
cannot outweigh the clear provision of the law. Respondent court
therefore did not commit any error in striking down Administrative
Circular No. 9 for being null and void.

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Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or not private

respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust
in their behalf pending the final resolution of the cases involving the
final valuation of their properties, petitioners assert the negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged distinction between the
deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and

_______________

18 Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 212 SCRA 425, 432 (1992).
19 Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 507, 54 (1991) citing Teoxon
v. Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33
SCRA 585, 589 (1970), citing Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 (1960); Animos vs.
Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 (1989).
20 Shell Philippines, Inc. vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA 628
(1988).

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21
payment of final compensation as provided under Section 18 of the
same law. According to petitioners, the right of the landowner to
withdraw the amount deposited in his behalf pertains only to the
final valuation as agreed upon by the landowner, the DAR and the
LBP or that adjudged by the court. It has no reference to amount
deposited in the trust account pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of
rejection by the landowner because the latter amount is only
provisional and intended merely to secure possession of the property
pending final valuation. To further bolster the contention petitioners
cite the following pronouncements in the case of “Association of
Small Landowners
22
in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform.”

“The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his
property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in
contravention of a well-accepted principle of eminent domain.
xxx xxx xxx
“The CARP Law, for its part conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
xxx xxx xxx
“Hence the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected.”

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Notably, however, the aforecited case was used by respondent court

in discarding petitioners’ assertion as it found that:

“x x x x x x despite the ‘revolutionary’ character of the expropriation

envisioned under RA 6657 which led the Supreme Court, in the

______________

21 Section 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.—The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and LBP in
accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other pertinent provisions
hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the just compensation for the land.
22 175 SCRA 343.

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of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude that ‘payments of the just
compensation is not always required to be made fully in money’—even as
the Supreme Court admits in the same case ‘that the traditional medium for
the payment of just compensation is money and no other’—the Supreme
Court in said case did not abandon the ‘recognized rule . . . that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner
23
to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just compensation.” (Italics supplied)

We agree with the observations of respondent court. The ruling in

the “Association” case merely recognized the extraordinary nature
of the expropriation to be undertaken under RA 6657 thereby
allowing a deviation from the traditional mode of payment of
compensation and recognized payment other than in cash. It did not,
however, dispense with the settled rule that there must be full
payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 and determination of
just compensation under Section 18 is unacceptable. To withhold the
right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already deposited
in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because
they rejected the DAR’s valuation, and notwithstanding that they
have already been deprived of the possession and use of such
properties, is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The
irresistible expropriation of private respondents’ properties was
painful enough for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all the
more by withholding that which rightfully belongs to private
respondents in exchange for the taking, under an authority (the
“Association” case) that is, however, misplaced. This is misery twice
bestowed on private respondents, which the Court must rectify.
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Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish between provisional

compensation under Section 16(e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for purposes of exercising the landowners’ right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in both situations is the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession

_______________

23 Decision, Court of Appeals, p. 14.

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Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals

of his property for which he should be fairly and immediately

compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the cardinal rule that:

“x x x x x x within the context of the State’s inherent power of eminent

domain, just compensation means not only the correct determination of the
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land
within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered ‘just’ for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while
being made to wait for a decade or more 24
before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss.” (Italics supplied)

The promulgation of the “Association” decision endeavored to

remove all legal obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform25
Program and clear the way for the
true freedom of the farmer. But despite this, cases involving its
implementation continue to multiply and clog the courts’ dockets.
Nevertheless, we are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their bondage will be attained in due
time. It must be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of this
objective, vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally
important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the
rights of property owners,26who under our Constitution and laws are
also entitled to protection.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), On official leave.

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1/12/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 249

24 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 207, 213 (1990) citing
Cosculluela vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 393,400 (1988); Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya, 153 SCRA 291, 302 (1987).
25 175 SCRA 343, 392.
26 Mata vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 748, 753 (1992).

162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.—Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court,

the landowners cannot be deprived of its right over the land.
(Greater Balanga Dev. Corp vs. Municipality of Balanga, 239
SCRA 436 [1994])

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