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Cases for Legal Forms Subject

1. Heirs of Amparo Del Rosario v. Santos, G.R. No. L-46892 September 30, 1981

HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.


AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O. SANTOS, ARCHIMEDES O.
SANTOS, ERMELINA SANTOS RAVIDA, and ANDRES O. SANTOS, JR., defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-46892 September 30, 1981

FACTS: Amparo Del Rosario entered into a contract with Atty. Andres Santos and his wife Aurora
Santos whereby the latter sold to the former a 20,000 sq. m. of land which is to be segregated
from Lot 1. Said lot forms part of the several lots belonging to a certain Teofilo Custodio, of
which lots, Attorney Santos, by agreement with the latter, as his attorney’s fees, owns ½
interests thereof. Parties agreed that spouses Andres shall thereafter execute a Deed of
Confirmation of Sale in favor of Del Rosario as soon as the title has been released and the
subdivision plan of said Lot 1 has been approved by the Land Registration Commissioner. Due to
the failure of the spouses Andres to execute the deed after the fulfilment of the condition, Del
Rosario claims malicious breach of a Deed of Sale. Defendant thereafter filed a motion to
dismiss setting up the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the action
lack of cause of action as well as the defense of prescription. They further alleged that the deed
of sale was only an accommodation graciously extended, out of close friendship between the
defendants and the plaintiff, hence, tantamount to waiver, abandonment or otherwise
extinguishment of the demand set forth in the complaint. Finally, defendants alleged that the
claim on which the action or suit is founded is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and
that the cause or object of the contract did not exist at the time of the transaction. The lower
court resolved to deny the motion to dismiss. After actions by respective parties, the lower
court ordered the defendants to execute and convey to plaintiff the 200,000 sq. m. of land to be
taken either from Lot 4 or from Lot 5-A of Custodio’s lots, which defendants own ½ interest
thereof. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals which certified the records of the case to the Supreme Court for final determination.

ISSUE: WON THE SALE IS VALID AS TO THE CAUSE OR OBJECT OF THE CONTRACT.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the execution of the Deed of Sale is valid
notwithstanding the lack of any title to the lot by appellants at the time of execution of the
Deed of Sale in favor of appellee as there can be a sale of an expected thing in accordance with
Article 1461 of the NCC: “Article 1461: Things having a potential existence may be the object of
the contract of sale. The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope of expectancy is deemed subject to
the condition that the thing will come into existence. The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is
void.” The case at bar is not a case of a vain hope or expectancy which is void under the law. The
expectant right came into existence or materialized for the appellants actually derived titles
from Lot 1which subsequently became the object of subdivision.

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2. Goma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 168437, January 8, 2009

GAIN OR BENEFIT FROM, OR PREJUDICE TO A THIRD PARTY, IS NOT AN ELEMENT IN THE CRIME OF
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT

Goma v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 168437; January 8, 2009 VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS: This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 challenges the decision of the CA
affirming the decision of the RTC which convicted petitioners, Laurinio Goma and Natalio Umale, of
the crime of falsification of public document under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Three barangay councilors filed a complaint alleging Goma and Umale, as barangay chairperson and
secretary, respectively, falsified a barangay resolution dated September 24, 1995, allocating amount
of PhP18, 000 as disbursement for a seminar for the two officials when in truth and in fact no
meeting was held as no quorum was mustered on the said date. On the face of the resolution
appears the signatures of the petitioners in their respective official capacities and it also bore the
official seal of the barangay. The petitioners contend that said resolution was nothing more than a
mere proposal or a draft. After being convicted by the RTC, the petitioners appealed to the CA
alleging that the questioned resolution is not a public document, that they did not violate Art. 171(2)
of the RPC and that the penalty imposed is not proper. The same issues were raised in the Supreme
Court. However, they urge their acquittal on the theory that they did not benefit from, or that the
public was not prejudiced by, the said resolution.

ISSUES: Was the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third party
necessary to commit the crime of falsification of a public document?

HELD: No. The elements of the crime of falsification of public documents are that the offender is a
public officer, employee, or notary public; that he takes advantage of his official position; that he
falsifies a document by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding;
and that such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding. Thus, erring public
officers’ failure to attain their objectives is not determinative of their guilt or innocence. In this case,
petitioners contend that they did not benefit from, or that the public was not prejudiced by, the
resolution in question, it not having been used to obtain the PhP18,000 seminar funds which is
bereft of merit because the simulation of a public document, done in a manner so as to give it the
appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity,
constitutes the crime of falsification. What is punished in falsification of public document is
principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as solemnly proclaimed
therein. Hence, the element of gain or benefit on the part of the offender or prejudice to a third
party as a result of the falsification, is not essential to maintain a charge for falsification of public
documents.

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3. Heirs of Gorgonio Medina v. Natividad (G.R. No. 177505, November 27, 2008)

Should a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) be in


writing and notarized in order to be valid?
No. Special Power of Attorney (SPA) is not required to be in writing and need not be
notarized in order to be valid. (De Leon, Comments and Cases on Partnership, Agency,
and Trust, p. 443, 2005 ed)

Is the intervention of a notary public required for the


validity of an Special Power of Attorney (SPA)?
General Rule:

A power of attorney is valid although no notary public intervened in its execution.


(Barretto v. Tuason, G.R. Nos. L-‐36811, 36827, 36840, 36872, Mar. 31, 1934) (De
Leon, p. 443, 2005 ed)

Exception:

When SPA is executed in a foreign country, it must be certified and authenticated


according to the Rules of Court, particularly Sec. 25, Rule 132.

Note: When the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a
notary public or other competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in
evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the foregoing provision of the
rules by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept of said public document and authenticated by
the seal of his office. (Medina v. Natividad, G.R. No. 177505, Nov. 27, 2008) The
failure to have the special power of attorney (executed in a foreign country)
authenticated is not merely a technicality – it is a question of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
over the person of the real party-in-interest was never acquired by the courts. (Ibid.)

4. Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, G.R. No. 140608, September 23, 2004)

PERMANENT SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs. VELARDE


G.R. NO. 140608 ; September 23, 2004

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FACTS:
Petitioner Bank wanted to recover a sum of money from Mariano Velarde amounting to 1M
pesos plus interests and penalties. There was a promissory note dated September 28,1983
pertinent to the loan.
In his Answer, respondent disclaims any liability on the instrument, the receipt of the said
amount of P1-Million shows that the amount was received by another person, not the herein
defendant. Hence, no liability attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative
defenses that, assuming the promissory note exists, it does not bind much less is there the
intention by the parties to bind the herein defendant. In other words, the documents relative to
the loan do not express the true intention of the parties.
On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole witness, Antonio Marquez, the
Assistant Department Manager of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) and the
designated Deputy Liquidator for petitioner bank, who identified the Promissory Note dated
September 28, 1983.
After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of presenting evidence, filed with
leave of court his demurrer to evidence, alleging the grounds that:
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
(b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING ARGUENTI THAT IT EXISTS, IS BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND/OR LACHES.14
The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996, found merit in respondent’s demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the complaint including respondent’s counterclaims, without
pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court and affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint in its Decision dated October 27, 1999. The appellate court found that petitioner
failed to present any evidence to prove the existence of respondent’s alleged loan obligations,
considering that respondent denied petitioner’s allegations in its complaint. It also found that
petitioner bank’s cause of action is already barred by prescription.

ISSUE:

HELD:
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court
which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or
due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant,
under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.
Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In
the early case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny the genuineness and
due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
… This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or
that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect
that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the

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genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground
not affecting either.
In fact, respondent’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and
genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a
document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was
signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it;
that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Also, it effectively
eliminated any defense relating to the authenticity and due execution of the document.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondent
specifically denied petitioner’s allegations regarding the loan documents
The Court also finds that petitioner’s claim is not barred by prescription.
Petitioner’s action for collection of a sum of money was based on a written contract and
prescribes after ten years from the time its right of action arose. The prescriptive period is
interrupted when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors. The interruption of
the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the said period would
commence anew from the receipt of the demand.

5. Tigno v. Spouses Aquino (G.R. No. 129416, November 25, 2004)

Tigno v. Spouses Aquino 444 SCRA 61 (2004)

FACTS:
1. Spouses Aquino filed a complaint against Isidro Bustria which sought to enforce an alleged sale
by Bustria to the Aquinos of a 120,000 square meter fishpond located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The
conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.

2. A compromise agreement was entered into between them whereby Bustria agreed to recognize
the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos agreed to grant Bustria the right to repurchase the same
property after the lapse of seven 7 years.

3. Bustria died and was substituted by his daughter, Zenaida B. Tigno. On 1 December 1989, Tigno
attempted to repurchase the property by filing a Motion for Consignation and depositing 230,000
with the RTC, but this was opposed by the Aquinos arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet
demandable and that Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment.

4. RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.

5. Tigno filed an action for Revival of Judgment. The Aquinos filed an answer wherein they alleged
that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed of sale.

6. Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia, the
instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Cariño, who notarized the same. These

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two witnesses testified as to the occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria.
Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission the
deed of sale purportedly executed by Bustria

7. The admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false
and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and that its
existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and not even presented
by the Aquinos when they opposed Tigno's previous Motion for Consignation.

8. RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in evidence. RTC then ruled in favor of Tigno. The RTC
therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing the testimonies
of De Francia and Cariño as conflicting. The RTC likewise observed that nowhere in the alleged deed
of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria; that it was suspicious that
Bustria was not assisted or represented by his counsel in connection with the preparation and
execution of the deed of sale or that Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous
Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.

9. CA reversed the decision of RTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Aquino. The appellate court
ratiocinated that there were no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of
Cariño and De Francia that would taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of
the acknowledgment and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and
that the non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null
and ineffective. It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the presumption of
regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear, convincing and more than
merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale was notarized properly, hence admissible as evidence

RULING: No. SC ruled in favor of Tigno. RTC decision is reinstated.

RATIO: The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

6. Ocampo v. Land Bank of the Philippines (G.R. No. 164968, July 3, 2009)

GLORIA OCAMPO AND TERESITA TAN VS. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, URDANETA, PANGASINAN
BRANCH AND EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN GR No. 164968, July 3, 2009

Facts: This is an instant petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA (favoring Landbank).
In 1991, Ocampo and her daughter, Tan obtained from the Landbank a PhP10M quedan loan upon
issuance of promissory notes (PNs) which was released to them by: Amount Release Date Maturity Date
Remarks PhP3.996M 01/31/1991 07/30/1991 2 PNs PhP6M 04/05/1991 10/02/1991 3 PNs Quedan
Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation (Quedancor) guaranteed to pay Landbank their loan but only up to
80% of the outstanding loan plus interests at the time of maturity. Pursuant thereto, Ocampo and Tan

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delivered to Landbank quedans and executed a Deed of Assignment covering 41,690 cavans of palay
(equivalent to PhP9.996M – 100% of the loan) in favor of Quedancor. Ocampo and Tan constituted a
Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over 2 parcels of unregistered land owned by Ocampo to secure the
remaining 20%. Such encumbrance was annotated in the land title when Ocampo filed for the lands’
registration. When Ocampo failed to pay the 3 remaining PNs on Oct. 2, 1991, Lanbank filed the
following:  Claim for guarantee payment with Quedancor;  Criminal case of estafa against Ocampo for
disposing stocks of palay covered by the quedans;  Extrajudicial foreclosure of REM (re: 20% of loan)
The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff issued a notice of Extrajudicial Sale (Public Auction). RTC issued TRO on
the public auction and favored Ocampo and Tan when they filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
and Damages with Application of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against Landbank and the Sheriff on
the basis on forgery regarding the REM on the 20% of the loan. Upon Landbank’s appeal, the CA granted
its petition and reversed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

Issues: 1. WON the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was void?


2. Assuming it was valid, WON the loan was already extinguished?

Held: 1. NO. The Deed of REM was valid. There is no forgery. Ocampo and Tan failed to present any
evidence to disprove the genuineness or authenticity of their signatures. In fact, Ocampo admitted in
her direct examination that such signature was hers, although she claimed that she was made to sign a
blank form (printed form with blanks yet to be filled up). Moreover, the bank personnel who were also
signatories to the deed confirmed their appearances despite her testimony that she cannot say for
certain if she appeared before the notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged before
a notary public is a public document that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its existence and due
execution. The real issue is fraud and not forgery. Ocampo claimed that she was led to believe by
Landbank that the form she signed was to process her PhP5M loan application and not to secure the
subject 20% of the loan. However, Ocampo was unable to establish clearly and precisely how Landbank
committed the alleged fraud. She failed to lay down the deception through insidious words or
machinations or misrepresentations made by Landbank so that she signed the blank form. Granting for
the sake of argument that there was fraud, such contract was merely voidable where an action should
have been instituted within 4 yours from discovery, i.e. when the REM was registered with the Register
of Deeds.

2. NO. The loan was not yet extinguished. Ocampo claimed that she already paid the quedan loan when
she executed the Deed of Assignment in favor of Quedancor. The loan was between Ocampo and
Landbank. Yet, she did not include Landbank as party to the Deed of Assignment despite evidence on
record showing her indebtedness to Landbank (e.g. registration/annotation of REM). Ocampo hastily
executed the Deed of Assignment and conveyed some of her properties to Quedancor without prior
notice to Landbank. Dacion en pago is the delivery and transmission of ownership of a thing by the
debtor to the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation. As properly ruled
by the CA, the required consent is absent in this case. Landbank had no participation much less
consented to the execution of the Deed of Assignment. Hence, no extinguishment of loan can be had.
Even if the Deed of Assignment has the effect of valid payment, the extinguishment is only up to the

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extent of 80% of the quedan loan. Thus, it leaves a balance of 20% which can be fully satisfied by the
foreclosure of the REM. Petition denie

7. Heirs of Arcilla v. Teodoro, (G.R. No. 162886, August 11, 2008)

Heirs of the Spouses Arcilla vs. Teodoro


561 SCRA 545
Doctrine:
Document Notarized in a foreign country does not need be certified in accordance with Rule 24, Sec 132
of the Rules of Court.

Facts:
Teodoro filed an application for land registration of two parcels of land allegedly purchased the subject
lots from her father as shown by a Deed of Sale. Heirs of Arcilla filed an Opposition contending that they
are the owners since their father purchased the lots in question from Manuel Sarmiento whichis
evidenced by several tax declarations attached to the record. The Heirs moved to dismiss the application
of Teodoro and sought their declaration as the true and absolute owners pro-indiviso of the subject lots
and the registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title in their names. Heirs filed a
Motion for Admission contending that through oversight and inadvertence she failed to include in her
application, the verification and certificate against forum shopping Teodoro filed a Motion to Dismiss
Application on the ground that respondent should have filed the certificate against forum shopping
simultaneously with the petition for land registration and that any violation shall be a cause for the
dismissal of the application upon motion and after hearing.

Issue:
Whether the certification of non-forum shopping subsequently submitted by respondent does not
require a certification from an officer of the foreign service of the Philippines as provided under Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Held:
The certification of non-forum shopping executed in a foreign country is not covered by Section 24, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 24, Rule 132 explicitly refers only to paragraph (a) of Sec. 19. If the rule
comprehends to cover notarial documents, the rule could have included the same. Thus, petitioners-
oppositors' contention that the certificate of forum shopping that was submitted was defective, as it did
not bear the certification provided under Sec. 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, is devoid of any merit.
What is important is the fact that the respondent-applicant certified before a commissioned officer
clothed with powers to administer oath that she has not and will not commit forum shopping. It cannot
be overemphasized that the required certification of an officer in the foreign service under Section 24
refers only to the documents enumerated in Section 19(a), to wit: written official acts or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers of the Philippines
or of a foreign country. The Court agrees with the CA that had the Court intended to include notarial
documents as one of the public documents contemplated by the provisions of Section 24, it should not
have specified only the documents referred to under paragraph (a) of Section 19

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8. Gonzales v. Padiernos, (A.C. NO. 6713, December 8, 2008)

Gonzales v. Atty. Padiernos


573 SCRA 164 (2008)

FACTS: The complainant alleged in her complaint for disbarment that on three (3)
separate occasions the respondent notarized the following documents: (1) a Deed of
Absolute Sale; (2) a Subdivision Agreement; and (3) an affidavit of Non-Tenancy, all
purportedly signed and executed by complainant. All three documents carried forged
signatures and falsely certified that the complainant personally appeared before the
respondent and that she was known to the respondent to be the same person who
executed the foregoing and acknowledged to him that the same is her own free act and
voluntary deed. The complainant claimed that she never appeared before respondent
on the dates the documents were notarized because she was then in the United States.

In her amended complaint, complainant prayed for the revocation of the respondent's
notarial commission and his suspension from the practice of law

ISSUE: Whether respondent’s notarial commission should be revoked

HELD: Yes, under the Rules of Notarial Practice: Acknowledgment refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public
and present an integrally complete instrument on document; (b) is attested to be
personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and (c) represents to the
notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed
by him for the purpose stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has
executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he
acts in a particular representative capacity that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity.

Under the given facts, the respondent clearly failed to faithfully comply with the
foregoing rules when he notarized the three documents subject of the present
complaint. The respondent did not know the complainant personally, yet he did not
require proof of identity from the person who appeared before him and executed and
authenticated the three documents. Had the respondent done so, the fraudulent transfer
of complainant's property could have been prevented.

Through his negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public resulting in
the loss of property of an unsuspecting private citizen, the respondent eroded the
complainants and the public’s confidence in the notarial system; he brought disrepute
to the system. The respondent should be reminded that a notarial document is, on its

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face and by authority of law, entitled to full faith and credit. For this reason, notaries
public must observe utmost care in complying with the formalities intended to ensure
the integrity of the notarized document and the act or acts it embodies.

9. Destreza v. Riñoza-Plazo (G.R. No. 176863, October 30, 2009)

G.R. No. 176863 October 30, 2009


GREGORIO DESTREZA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA-PLAZO and MA. FE ALARAS, Respondents.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
that affirmed with modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nasugbu,
Batangas, in the action for nullification of deed of absolute sale and the corresponding transfer
certificate of title that respondents filed against petitioner

 The notarized deed of sale should be admitted as evidence despite the failure of the Notary
Public in submitting his notarial report to the notarial section of the RTC Manila. It is the swearing
of a person before the Notary Public and the latter’s act of signing and affixing his seal on the
deed that is material and not the submission of the notarial report.
 No rule requires a party, who relies on a notarized deed of sale for establishing his ownership, to
present further evidence of such deed’s genuineness lest the presumption of its due execution be
for naught.

10. Bangayan v. RCBC (G.R. No. 149193, April 4, 2011)

RICARDO B. BANGAYAN vs. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION AND


PHILIP SARIA
G.R. No. 149193 April 4, 2011
Ponente: SERENO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Bangayan had a savings account and a current account with one of the
branches of respondent Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC). Bangayan purportedly
signed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement with respondent RCBC in favor of nine
corporations. Under the Surety Agreement, the funds in petitioner Bangayan’s accounts with
RCBC would be used as security to guarantee any existing and future loan obligations,
advances, credits/increases and other obligations, including any and all expenses that these
corporations may incur with respondent bank. Bangayan contests the veracity and due
authenticity of the Agreement on the ground that his signature thereon was not genuine, and
that the agreement was not notarized. Respondent RCBC refutes this claim.

Then occurred different transactions between RCBC with other entities in relation to the Surety
Agreement. RCBC issued commercial letters of credit in favor of different corporations. Mr. Lao,
of RCBC, claimed that the bank would not have extended the letters of credit in favor of the
three corporations without petitioner Bangayan acting as surety. After all the transactions in
relation to the letters of credit issued by RCBC in relation to the Surety Agreement, Bangayan’s
account was depleted.

Two of the seven checks that were drawn against petitioner Bangayan’s Current Account were
presented for payment to respondent RCBC were returned by respondent RCBC with the notation

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"REFER TO DRAWER. Five other checks of petitioner Bangayan were presented for payment to
respondent RCBC. These five checks were dishonored by respondent RCBC on the ground that
they had been drawn against insufficient funds ("DAIF") and were likewise returned.

Thus, Bangayan, demanded that respondent bank restore all the funds to his account and
indemnify him for damages. Bangayan filed a complaint for damages against respondent
RCBC. In its defense, RCBC claims that Bangayan signed a Surety Agreement in favor of
several companies that defaulted in their payment of customs duties that resulted in the
imposition of a lien over the accounts. Also, it funded a letter of credit of Lotec Marketing with
the account of petitioner Bangayan, who agreed to guarantee Lotec Marketing’s obligations
under the Surety Agreement; and, that the bank applied Bangayan’s deposits to satisfy part of
Lotec Marketing’s obligation which resulted in the depletion of the bank accounts.

ISSUE: Whether respondent RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks, and, consequently,
whether petitioner Bangayan is entitled to damages arising from the dishonor.

HELD: Yes. RCBC was justified in dishonoring the checks. Bangayan is not entitled to
damages.

Whatever damage to petitioner Bangayan’s interest or reputation from the dishonor of the seven
checks was a consequence of his agreement to act as surety for the corporations and their
failure to pay their loan obligations, advances and other expenses.

First, there was no malice or bad faith on the part of respondent RCBC in the dishonor of the
checks, since its actions were justified by petitioner Bangayan’s obligations under the Surety
Agreement. Both the trial and the appellate courts gave credence to the Surety Agreement,
which categorically guaranteed the four corporations’ obligations to respondent RCBC under the
letters of credit. As petitioner failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating that his signature
was forged, there being no positive and convincing evidence to prove such fact, there is no
reason to overturn the factual findings of the lower courts with respect to the genuineness and
due execution of the Surety Agreement. Second, the mere absence of notarization does not
necessarily render the Surety Agreement invalid. Third, that the annex of the Surety Agreement
does not bear petitioner Bangayan’s signature is not a sufficient ground to invalidate the main
agreement altogether. Fourth, petitioner Bangayan never contested the existence of the Surety
Agreement prior to the filing of the Complaint. It must be also be emphasized that petitioner
Bangayan did not complain against the four corporations which had benefitted from his bank
account.

With respect to the first two dishonored checks, respondent RCBC had already put on hold
petitioner Bangayan’s account to answer for the customs duties being demanded from the bank
by the BOC. On the other hand, the five other checks were subsequently dishonored because
petitioner Bangayan’s account was by that time already depleted due to the partial payment of
Lotec Marketing’s loan obligation.

Under Articles 2199 and 2200 of the Civil Code, actual or compensatory damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of or in recompense for loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a
sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done.

In all seven dishonored checks, respondent RCBC properly exercised its right as a creditor
under the Surety Agreement to apply the petitioner Bangayan’s funds in his accounts as
security for the obligations of the four corporations under the letters of credit. Thus, petitioner

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Bangayan cannot attribute any wrong or misconduct to respondent RCBC since there was no
malice or bad faith on the part of respondent in dishonoring the checks. Any damage to
petitioner arising from the dishonor of those checks was brought about, not by the bank’s
actions, but by the corporations that defaulted on their obligations that petitioner had guaranteed
to pay. The trial and the appellate courts, therefore, committed no reversible error in disallowing
the award of damages to petitioner.

11. Pantoja-Mumar v. Flores (A.C. No. 5426, April 3, 2007)

Mumar vs. Atty Flores


A.C. No. 5426 April 3, 2007

CHITA PANTOJA-MUMAR, Complainant, - versus - ATTY. JANUARIO C. FLORES, Respondent.

The instant administrative case stemmed from the complaint filed by Chita Pantoja-Mumar charging
respondent Atty.Januario C. Flores with fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, falsification of document,
breach of duty and violation of his oath as a lawyer.

Complainant is one of the compulsory heirs of the late Jose Pantoja, Sr. It appears that respondent had
prepared an Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale for her and 11 other co-heirs covering a three-
hectare property in Pangdan, Cambanay,Danao City. The deed was executed in favor of the spouses
Filomena and Edilberto Perez, who were later able to secure a torrens title over the property under their
names.

In the verified Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent had prepared the Extrajudicial Partition
with Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1987, but averred that the transaction did not push through,
and the deed was not notarized.

The Investigating Commissioner found that while the validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Sale is yet to be resolved in the civil case, the acts and omissions of respondent as notary public
have been duly established. According to the Investigating Commissioner:

1. The document, although already signed by some of the co-heirs/co-owners on or before December
29, 1987, was not finalized because the transaction was not pursued; however, the date of notarization
was indicated therein to be December 29, 1987;

2. Respondent notarized the document on or after June 13, 1988, without the authority and/or in the
absence of some of the supposed signatories;

3. Respondent did not see one of the co-heirs, Maximina Pantoja, actually affix her thumbmark to the
document; and

4. Respondent notarized the document even if Complainant, also a co-heir, did not sign it.

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The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that these acts and omissions were established through
respondents own admission that he notarized the document even if Maximina Pantoja did not affix her
thumbmark in his presence, and that complainant did not appear before him to sign the deed. The
Investigating Commissioner also considered respondents testimony in Civil Case No. DNA-574. Citing
Gonzales v. Ramos, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that the notarial commission of respondent
be revoked; and that he be disqualified from reappointment as notary public for a period of two years
and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months.

Issue: WON respondent violated the Notarial law and his lawyer’s oath?

Held:

It cannot be overemphasized that notarization of documents is not an empty, meaningless or routinary


act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized
may act as notaries public. It is through the act of notarization that a private document is converted into
a public one, making it admissible in evidence without need of preliminary proof of authenticity and due
execution. Indeed, a notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for
this reason, notaries public must observe utmost care in complying with the elementary formalities in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined. Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before
him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. A notary public is duty-bound to
require the person executing a document to be personally present, to swear before him that he is that
person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely executed the same.

Thus, in notarizing the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that all the vendors-signatories
thereto were the very same persons who executed it and personally appeared before him to attest to
the contents and truth of what are stated therein, respondent undermined the confidence of the public
on notarial documents; he thereby breached Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law
and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof, which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

It must be stressed that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the
power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons, and
in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment
less severe such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine would accomplish the end desired. Considering that
this is the respondents first administrative offense, the Court modifies the IBPs recommendation of a
two-year suspension from the practice of law to one year.

12. Agagon v. Bustamante (A.C. No. 5510, December 20, 2007)

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13. Baylon v. Almo (A.C. No. 6962, June 25, 2008)

A.C. No. 6962 June 25, 2008 Charles B. Baylon vs. Atty. Jose A. Almo

FACTS:
Charles B. Baylon (Baylon) claimed that Pacita Filio, Rodolfo Llantino, Jr. and his wife, Rosemarie Baylon
conspired in preparing Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing his wife mortgage his real property
in Signal Village, Taguig. According to Baylon, the SPA was executed on June 17, 1996 when he is out of
the country where he presented a certification from the Government of Singapore that he was
vaccinated in that country on June 17, 1996 and a certification from the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration proving that he was not in the country from March 21, 1995 to January 28, 1997. He also
claimed that his signature was forged on the said SPA. He alleged that because of this SPA his real
property was mortgage and foreclosed due to his wife failure to settle the mortgage. Atty. Jose A. Almo
(Almo) acknowledged notarizing the SPA, however according to him he initially refused to notarize it
when Rosemarie came to his office and Baylon was not present. He added that he would only notarize
the SPA when Rosemarie return to his office on June 26, 1996, together with the person named Charles
Baylon. He believed that he is in good faith when the person introduced to him was Baylon because they
presented a Community Tax Certificate stating the name Charles Baylon. Thus, Almo denied being part
in any arrangement to commit fraud, deceit or falsehood. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the IBP Board of Governors that the respondent be
strongly admonished for notorizing the SPA, his notarial commission be revoked, and be barred from
being a notarial commission for one year. This recommendation was justified by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline stated that “reasonable diligence should have compelled
herein respondent to ascertain the true identity of the person seeking his legal services considering the
nature of the document. The only saving grace on the part of respondent is that he relied on the fact
that the person being authorized under the SPA to act as agent
and who accompanied the impostor.”
On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors affirmed the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigation Commissioner that Atty. Almo is suspended from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission is revoked and disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for two years.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almo negligently performs his duties as a notary public.

HELD:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the IBP that Atty. Almo had been negligent in the
performance of his duties as a notary public. As explained in the case of Santiago vs. Rafanan,
“No
tarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof

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