CASES : RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

AAA v. Hon. Carbonell, 524 SCRA 496 [2007]

Personally determine v personally examine (SW v WA); not required to examine if WA

Antiquera v. People, 712 SCRA 339 [2013] (Terry v. Ohio)

Door ajar, but they actually pushed it open to see. Not valid warrantless arrest, inadmissible
evidence seized
People v. Aminuddin, 163 SCRA 502 [1988] – had sufficient time to get warrant.
People v. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 [1992]
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]
Inamoy yung bag->amoy weed->arrested in flagrante->valid search. weird
People v. Tangliben, 184 SCRA 220 [1990]
May informer, pinabuksan yung bag. Valid daw. “on the spot information”
People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751 [1999]
Informant+checkpoint
People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 [2013]
Valid warrantless arrest (b)
Abelita v. Doria, 596 SCRA 220 [2009]
Res judicata

Worldwide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106 [2014]

Private party can R41 appeal SW without conformity of OSG because it is not a criminal action
but a special criminal proceeding.
If SW is incident to a main criminal action, quashal order is interlocutory->R65 proper
If SW is independently obtained, quashal order is final ->R41 proper

Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160689 [2014]

Similar to Pp v Marti. Government action requirement.
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Romars International Gases Corp., G.R. No. 189669 [2015]
Omnibus motion rule APPLIED in quashal of SWs.

The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1,
Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion,
otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the
court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: (a) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by
statute of limitations. 9 It should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a
number of cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash
search warrants. 10 Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated in Abuan v.
People, 11 that "the motion to quash the search warrant which the accused
may file shall be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however,
that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to
suppress . . . ." (Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Romars International Gases
|||

Corp., G.R. No. 189669, [February 16, 2015])

Territorial jurisdiction requirements are construed strictly against the state, but improper
venue may be waived.
SWs are not criminal actions, but special criminal proceedings. Venue is NOT jurisdictional.

Yao Sr. v. People, 525 SCRA 108 [2007]

The facts and circumstances being referred thereto pertain to facts, data or
information personally known to the applicant and the witnesses he may
present. 27 The applicant or his witnesses must have personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense being complained of.
"Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere affidavits are not enough, and the judge
must depose in writing the complainant and his witnesses. 28
||| (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, [June 19, 2007], 552 PHIL 195-225)
 Even if we were to sustain the separate personality of MASAGANA from that
of the petitioners, the effect will be the same. The law does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search
warrants is directed. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of
the property sought to be seized. 48 Hence, even if, as petitioners claimed, the
properties seized belong to MASAGANA as a separate entity, their seizure pursuant
to the search warrants is still valid.
||| (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, [June 19, 2007], 552 PHIL 195-225)

The longstanding rule is that a description of the place to be searched is

sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community.
Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement. 41
||| (Yao, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 168306, [June 19, 2007], 552 PHIL 195-225)

Even if there are several structures inside the MASAGANA compound, there was
no need to particularize the areas to be searched because, as correctly stated by
Petron and Pilipinas Shell, these structures constitute the essential and necessary
components of the petitioners' business and cannot be treated separately as they
form part of one entire compound. The compound is owned and used solely by
MASAGANA. What the case law merely requires is that the place to be searched
can be distinguished in relation to the other places in the community.
Indubitably, this requisite was complied with in the instant case. (Yao, Sr. v.
|||

People, G.R. No. 168306, [June 19, 2007], 552 PHIL 195-225)

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHO MAY CONTEST

LEGALITY THEREOF CASE AT BAR. — It is well settled that the legality of a seizure
can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby
 (Lewis vs. U.S., 6 F. 2d. 22) and that the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties (In. re
Dooley, 48 F. 2d. 121: Rouda vs.U.S., 10 F. 2d. 916; Lusco vs. U.S., 287 F. 69;
Ganci vs. U.S., 287 F, 60; Moriz vs. U.S., 26 F. 2d. 444). Consequently, petitioner
in the case at bar may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of
the document, papers, and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporation adverted to, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings
against them in their individual capacity U.S., vs. Gaas, 17 F. 2d. 997;
People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384).
||| (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, [June 19, 1967], 126 PHIL 738-766)

2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Two

points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely:
(1) that no warrant issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall
particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has
been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was
impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent
proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in the case at bar do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code", — as
alleged in aforementioned applications — without reference to any determine
provision of said laws or coders.
||| (Stonehill v. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, [June 19, 1967], 126 PHIL 738-766)
Omar v. People, G.R. No. 182534 [2015]

To determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain

whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.21 There must be a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, which must precede
the search. For this purpose, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can
be made — the process cannot be reversed.22

The prosecution has the burden to prove the legality of the warrantless arrest from which the corpus
delicti of the crime - shabu- was obtained. For, without a valid warrantless arrest, the alleged
confiscation of the shabu resulting from a warrantless search on the petitioner’s body is surely a
violation of his constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. As a consequence, the
alleged shabu shall be inadmissible as evidence against him.

We clarify, however, that the filing of a criminal charge is not a condition precedent to prove a valid
warrantless arrest. Even if there is a criminal charge against an accused, the prosecution is not
relieved from its burden to prove that there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest preceding the
warrantless search that produced the corpus delicti of the crime.

Clearly, no arrest preceded the search on the person of the petitioner. When Tan and Tangcoy
allegedly saw the petitioner jaywalking, they did not arrest him but accosted him and pointed to him
the right place for crossing. In fact, according to the RTC, Tan and Tangcoy "immediately accosted
him and told him to cross [at] the designated area."29

Tan and Tangcoy did not intend to bring the petitioner under custody or to restrain his liberty. This
lack of intent to arrest him was bolstered by the fact that there was no criminal charge that was filed
against the petitioner for crossing a "no jaywalking" area.

The waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41 [ 209]

The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the
well-recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even
without a valid warrant:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. [Seizure] of evidence in "plain view". The elements are: a) a prior

valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the
right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search;
 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk;

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. 32

8. Search of vessels and aircraft; [and]

9. Inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of

fire, sanitary and building regulations.

(Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815 (Resolution), [September 3, 2009],

|||

614 PHIL 236-255)

When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search

the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. 38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person
of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter's
reach. 39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the
area of his immediate control. 40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence. 41 A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested. 42
(Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815 (Resolution), [September 3, 2009],
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614 PHIL 236-255)

People v. Tuazon, 532 SCRA 152 [2007] (Carroll v. US, 267 US 132)
Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA 690 [2007]
United Laboratories v. Isip, 461 SCRA 574 [2005]
People c. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334 [2014] (Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1)