Safety Science, Vol. 22, No. 1-3, pp. 131-145.

1996
Copyright 6 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd
Pergamon
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0925-7535/96 $15.00 + 0.00

SO9257535(96)00011-2

RISK PERCEPTION BY OFFSHORE WORKERS

ON UK OIL AND GAS PLATFORMS

Rhona F/in, Kathtyn Mearns, Rachael Gordon,

Mark Fleming
The Offshore Management Centre, Aberdeen Business School,
The Robert Gordon University, Viewfield Road, Aberdeen AB9 ZPW, UK

Abstract-This paper reports the first investigation of risk perception by workers on offshore oil
and gas installations on the UK Continental Shelf, following changes in offshore safety
legislation in the wake of the Piper Alpha disaster in 1988. The Offshore Safety Case
regulations (Health and Safety Executive, 1992, A Guide to the Offshore /nsrullariom tsafefy
Case) Regularions) put the onus on the operator to identify the major hazards and to reduce the
risks to As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). The regulations specifically state that
Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA) must be used when preparing the Safety Case. However,
people do not use QRA when making everyday judgements about risk; they make subjective
judgements known as risk perceptions, which are influenced by a number of different factors.
This study was designed to complement the extensive QRA calculations that have already been
carried out in the development of Safety Cases. The aim was to measure subjective risk
perception in offshore personnel and examine how this relates to the more objective risk data
available, namely accident records and QRA calculations. This paper describes the Offshore
Risk Perception Questionnaire developed to collect the data and reports on UK offshore
workers’ perceptions of the risks associated with major and minor hazards, work tasks and other
activities aboard production platforms. Copyright 0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

1. Introduction

The explosion and destruction of the Piper Alpha, oil platform in July 1988 killed 167
people, injured and traumatized the 61 survivors, and caused grief and pain to the families of
those who died or were injured. This was the biggest death toll in an industrial accident in the
UK for over 50 years (Barrell, 1994). The resulting Public Inquiry (Cullen, 1990) was
exemplary in its thoroughness, and it established the most probable sequence of events that
occurred on the night leading up to the disaster. However, the Inquiry also revealed
managerial, training and legislative inadequacies that led to latent failures in the system, which
allowed these events to occur. The final report made a number of recommendations, which led
to the introduction of legislation similar to the CIMAH (Control of Industrial Major Accident
Hazards) regulations (in 1984) but in a considerably extended fashion. The Offshore Safety
Case regulations (HSE, 1992) put the onus on the operator to identify the major hazards and to

131
132 R. Flirt et al.

reduce the risks to As Low As is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). This has changed the
entire way that the health and safety of offshore workers are managed. According to Barrett
(19911, prior to the Piper Alpha disaster, the principal management objective was the
maximization of production with safe operation as a co-objective. Now production is only to
be obtained through safe operation, thus giving safety the dominant position over production.
Since November 1995 no UK offshore installation can operate without a Safety Case accepted
by the HSE.
The Offshore Safety Case legislation goes further than the CIMAH regulations by
specifically stating that Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA) must be used when preparing
the Safety Case. In the Offshore Safety Case regulations, QRA is defined as “the identifica-
tion of hazards and the evaluation of the extent of the risk arising therefrom, incorporating
calculations based upon the frequency and magnitude of hazardous events” (HSE, 1992, p. 4).
(For examples of formal risk assessment techniques in the offshore oil and gas industry, see
Tveit et al., 1980; Petterson and Nyg%rd, 1991). A difficulty in generating objective figures for
QRA is the human element, because of variation due to individual differences and an
incomplete understanding of the factors that influence work performance. Furthermore, people
do not use QRA when making everyday judgments about risk; they make subjective
judgements known as risk perceptions (see Meat-m and Flin, 1995). It would therefore be
useful for managers and legislators who are making objective judgements about risk to
understand workers’ subjective perceptions of risk, because it is these ideas and feelings about
hazards that ultimately influence behaviour.
The offshore oil industry operates worldwide with an offshore workforce of approximately
a quarter of a million persons (ILO, 1993); the UK sector currently employs 32,000
individuals (DTI, 1994) to work on production platforms, drilling rigs and support installa-
tions. (See Sutherland and Flin, 1989, for a description of the offshore work environment and
associated risks.) What are the principal hazards to which these workers are exposed?
“The rhreats to life and well-being of the workers on the installations take many forms and come from multiple
sources. The principal ones are threats to the structural integrity of the installation, e.g. the tearing loose of a
floating unit from its mooring or the capsizing of a mobile unit, fire and explosions, the blowout of a well,
accidents associated with the transfer of personnel and supplies to andfrom the installation, accidents associated
with drilling operations, falls, and dangers associated with diving. These combine in a unique fashion dangers
characteristic of much of industrial work in general with others specific to oil and gas operations and with those
associated with the marine environment.” (ILO, 1993, p. 23.)

Given the importance of this hazardous industry to the British economy, it is surprising
how little human factors research has been undertaken. This study is the first to examine
workers’ perceptions of risk and safety on UKCS oil and gas installations, and it has been
designed to complement the extensive quantitative risk assessments (QRA) that have already
been carried out in the development of Safety Cases. Previous surveys of risk perception have
been conducted with Norwegian offshore workers (Marek et al., 1985; Rundmo, 1992a,b), and
the methodology used in the present study was designed in conjunction with Dr Rundmo of
Trondheim University who was conducting a follow-up to his original 1990 study for the
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Rundmo, 1995). The aim of this UK study was to measure
subjective risk assessment by offshore workers on production platforms and to examine how
this relates to the more objective risk data available, namely platform accident statistics and
platform QRA calculations. The results should help to determine what offshore personnel
perceive as risk elements within their work environment, how this relates to accident
involvement, and what underlying factors (e.g., occupation, offshore experience, age) govern
Risk perception by offshore workers 133

the perception of personal risk. This article describes the Offshore Risk Perception Question-
naire and reports offshore workers’ perceptions of the risks associated with major and minor
hazards, work tasks and other activities on six production platforms.

2. Method

2.1. Questionnaire design

The study was sponsored by six major oil and gas companies operating on the UKCS and
the Offshore Safety Division of the Health and Safety Executive. The content and structure of
the first draft of the questionnaire was based on a review of the literature on risk perception in
hazardous occupations (Meams, 1994), with particular reference to the Norwegian offshore
studies mentioned above and the nuclear industry (e.g., ACSNI, 1993; Lee, 1993; Sjoberg and
Drottz-Sjijberg, 1991). For each of the platforms involved, their accident statistics from
1991-1993, and their Safety Case risk calculations were examined. In order to ensure that the
questionnaire also represented the major categories of hazards for the UKCS, government
statistics from 1991 to 1993 on reported accidents for offshore oil and gas installations (OSD,
1994) were also considered.
A series of semi-structured interviews was carried out between October and November
1993 in order to ensure that current worker perceptions of risk were adequately covered by the
questionnaire. These interviews were also used to ensure that the terms being used in the
questionnaire were understood, since several sections of the questionnaire were translated
from Norwegian. For each of the six platforms involved in the study, a sample of 10
interviews was conducted. Both contractor and operator personnel were involved. Each
interview took one hour, and respondents were asked to comment on the clarity of the
questions as well as any topic areas omitted. Respondents were informed that interview data
would be treated as anonymous and that only aggregated results from all 60 interviews would
be produced.
Following the final revisions to the questionnaire and its review by the safety managers’
project steering group, it was pilot-tested in January 1994 by sending it to a sample of 150
offshore workers on a seventh UKCS production platform, which belonged to an operating
company not participating in the main project. Respondents were informed that only summary
results would be given to the company, and no individual responses would be identifiable. A
total of 45 offshore workers on this platform returned the questionnaire (30% response rate),
and the results showed that only minor modifications to the questionnaire were required. In
total, 1550 copies of the final questionnaire were sent out to the six participating platforms in
March 1994. The package included a copy of the 16-page questionnaire, a prepaid, return
envelope and a letter describing the purpose of the study.

2.2. Offshore risk perception questionnaire

The final version of the questionnaire had 14 sections, with a cover page of instructions.
Respondents were not asked for their names and were told that individual responses would not
be identifiable in the resulting reports. They were asked to give an account of their true
opinions without giving any idealistic picture of the working conditions or of themselves. As
an incentive, a prize of a El00 donation to charity was offered to the platform that returned the
highest percentage of questionnaires. The content of the questionnaire is described below. For
134 R. Flirt et al.

a detailed account of its development and a copy of the full questionnaire, see Flin et al. (in
press).
Demographic details: Respondents were asked to give information regarding their sex, age,
marital status, number of children, job title, employer (operating or contracting company),
shift pattern, rotation pattern (weeks on/off), whether or not they were a supervisor or a
safety representative, and the extent of their offshore experience (years worked on this
platform, years worked offshore, and number of platforms worked on).
Current job situation: This section had 18 items that asked about the individual’s current
job in terms of perceived work demands, decision latitude and communication. These were
based on Rundmo (1992a,b).
Physical working environment: Respondents were asked to rate, on a five-point scale, how
exposed they were to 11 physical stressors in their workplace (e.g., noise, cold, working over
the side); this was similar to a scale used by Rundmo (1992a,b).
Perception of risks - hazards: In order to measure personnel’s perceptions of how safe
they felt from being injured from hazards on the installation, an 18-item scale was used. It
originated from Marek et al’s (1985) questionnaire and was also used by Rundmo (1992a,b),
where respondents were asked to rate on a 5-point scale. “How safe do you feel against being
exposed to injuries resulting from: [a number of hazardous circumstances]“. These are listed
in Tables 1 and 2.
In addition, respondents were asked to rate how safe they think it is to engage in eight other
occupations (e.g., deep-sea fishing) or activities (e.g., smoking) (listed in Table 5). These
items were added at the suggestion of one of the Offshore Installation Managers in order to
see how respondents would rate other “risky” occupations/activities in comparison with their
own work environment. This technique was being used to communicate comparative levels of
risk for working on offshore platforms with other activities by several companies in their
Safety Case presentations to staff.
Probability of injury: This section of eight items assessed respondents’ probability ratings
of injury occurring to themselves in the event of a major hazard. The events are listed in Table
3. Respondents were asked to rate their feelings of safety in accordance with their assessments
of the probability of the event occurring, and this allowed for comparison of the perceived
likelihood of events with QRA calculations in the Safety Cases.
Perception ofrisks - work tusks: Respondents were asked to rate how safe they felt (on a
5-point scale) when performing 26 work tasks (see Table 4), and were given the option “not
applicable” to tick if they did not perform such activities. They were also asked to rate on a
15-point scale how safe they felt in their job, taking account of the circumstances referred to
above.
Job satisfaction: A standard British measure of job satisfaction (Warr et al., 1979) was
included, which had been used peviously with offshore workers (Sutherland, 1994, Sutherland
and Cooper, 1986). It consisted of a 7-point scale describing worker’s satisfaction-dissatisfac-
tion on 16 items.
Safety facilities and others’ concern for safety: In order to assess how satisfied workers
were with the safety facilities on board, an 18-item 5-point scale was used. An additional
subsection of eight items was included in order to assess respondents’ perceptions of how
concerned others on the installation (e.g., platform management, safety representative, fellow
workers) were for their safety.
Safety attitudes: In order to identify attitudes of offshore workers towards safety, risks and
accidents, respondents were asked to rate, on a 5-point scale, to what degree they agreed or
Risk perception by offshore workers 135

disagreed with 16 statements regarding production versus safety (e.g., “There is sometimes
pressure to put production before personal safety”), fatalistic attitudes (e.g., “Accidents just
happen, there is little one can do to avoid them”) and accident causation (e.g., “Most
accidents could be prevented if a little care and attention was paid to preventive measures”).
The items were based on Rundmo’s 1992 questionnaire and a safety attitude scale that had
been used in the nuclear industry (Lee, 1993).
Occupational health: Three questions regarding the respondent’s current state of health
were included.
Platform safery case and accidents: This section of nine open questions was included to
assess respondents’ views on safety on their platform and the effects of their platform Safety
Case. They were also asked to list the three major risks and riskiest operations carried out on
their installation, the three most common minor injuries, and the main reasons for accidents on
offshore installations.
Personal accidents and near-misses: Respondents were asked if they had ever had an
accident where they needed medical attention, and if so, to describe the accident and its
severity on a 4-point scale: “return to your shift immediately/have the rest of the day
off/more than one day off/medivaced off the platform”. They were also asked if they had
ever seen anybody have an accident offshore, if they had had a near-miss, and if so, how many
and what type.
Personal supporr and h&from others: Respondents were asked to rate (on a 6-point scale)
how much support various work personnel, friends and family give them in relation to their
work, i.e. how much they can talk to them regarding a work or personal problem (from
Rundmo, 1992a,b) and House ( 198 1)).
Comments: The final page of the questionnaire asked respondents to make any additional
comments or to expand on any section of the questionnaire if they so wished.

2.3. Data coding and analyses

Responses on the 14 sections of the questionnaire were coded to give a total of 216
variables. The data were analysed using SPSS for Windows (Statistical Package for Social
Sciences), which provides a range of data management and statistical techniques (Norusis,
1992). Statistical methods used included analysis of variance, factor analysis, multiple
regression and path analysis. A full account can be found in Flin et al. (in press). (Participating
companies were provided with a confidential summary report for their own platform.) This
article examines the risk perception data in relation to demographic variables, accident
involvement and QRA calculations.

3. Results

Following a description of the sample characteristics, the results are presented in relation
to: perceptions of the risk of hazardous events; perceptions of the probability of injury from
hazardous events; perceptions of risks associated with work tasks; perceived safety of other
industries/activities; and comparisons between the average risk perception on each installa-
tion and the QRA calculations and accident statistics for each installation.
136 R. F/in et al.

3.1. Sample characteristics

The distribution of the 622 respondents across the six participating UKCS offshore
installations varied due to differences in numbers of personnel on board and variations in
response rate. The maximum number of responses from a single installation was 208 and the
minimum was 57. The overall response rate was 40% (range 25-52% per platform). This
response rate is typical for an industrial survey with a long questionnaire and an anonymous
mailed response. The sample characteristics do suggest that the respondents constitute a
representative sample in terms of demographic factors. It is, however, very much lower than
the rate achieved by Rundmo (1992a,b) of 92%.
The average age of the 622 respondents was 40 years (98% were male), and they had
worked on offshore installations for an average of 10 years, and on the participating platforms
for an average of five years. Occupations represented were: technicians and mechanics (24%),
production (23%), maintenance (12%), caterers (lo%>, administration and management (8%),
drillers (8%), deck crew (6%), auxilliary staff (5%), medics (2%) and logistics (2%). A total
of 30% were supervisors (n = 182); 43% were employed by the operating company (n = 265).
Most personnel worked a two-weeks-on-two-weeks-off rotation (67%) rather than a two-on-
three-off rotation (23%), and were more likely to work the all-day shift (38%), and the
half-days-half-nights shift pattern (35%) rather than 24-hour-call (19%) or the all-night shift
(6%). A total of 60% of the personnel had worked on l-5 offshore installations, 24% had
worked on 6-10 installations, and 16% had worked on more than 10 installations. Of the 584
personnel who responded to this question, 48 (8%) were safety representatives and 61 (11%)
had been safety representatives. A total of 77% of personnel were married, 13% were single,
5% were divorced and 4% were separated.

3.2. Perception of risks

Offshore personnel were asked to rate on a 5-point scale how safe they felt from injury
with regard to the hazards on offshore platforms. The percentages shown in Tables 1 and 2
labelled “safe” are from the combination of the “very safe” and “safe” responses, and the
“unsafe” column represents the combination of “very unsafe” and “unsafe” ratings. These
categories were used by Rundmo (1992a,b) and some of his data are shown for comparison.
The data from this scale were factor analysed using principal component analysis with both

Table 1
UK offshore workers’ perceptions of installation hazards
Hazards to the installation Present Study ( n = 622) Rundmo ‘92
Factor loading % safe % neither % unsafe (n=915)
% safe

Blow-out 0.87 63 31 6 50
Explosion 0.85 56 36 7 46
Fire 0.85 61 32 6 47
Toxic gas leak 0.78 67 27 7 5.5
Structural failure 0.68 75 21 4 _
Helicopter crashing 0.59 61 31 8 57
Vessel hitting platform 0.54 56 34 11 _
Sabotage act 0.51 63 29 8 75
Cronbach’s aloha = 0.90
Risk perception by offshore workers 137

Table 2
UK offshoreworkers perceptionsof hazardsto the individual
Hazards to the individual Present study Rundmo ‘92
(n=622) (n=915)

Factor loading % state % neither % unsafe % safe

Hit by falling object 0.71 48 41 11 45

Fall to a lower level 0.7 I 80 17 4 62
Weather conditions 0.70 49 38 13
Medical problems 0.65 70 27 3 19
Fall overboard 0.64 88 t1 2
Slipping 0.62 38 49 14 43
Food poisoning 0.61 72 23 5
Bums 0.60 -68 29 3 74
Crushed by machinery 0.51 79 17 4 66
Electric shock 0.50 78 17 4 68
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.87

varimax and oblique rotations (missing values excluded listwise). Similar results were found
for both types of rotation. The number of factors to be extracted was initially obtained using
Kaiser’s criterion (extracting factors with eigenvalues greater than one>, which revealed three
factors. The third factor contained only three items, and thus the scree plot was inspected,
revealing two orthogonal factors: hazards to the installation (e.g., explosion, blow-out, fire),
and hazards to the individual (e.g., slipping, falling overboard). These two factors explained a
total of 54% of the variance, the first factor explained 45% and the second explained an
additional 9%. These factors are similar to the two factors “Disasters and major accidents”
and “Ordinary work injuries” obtained in the earlier Norwegian study (Rundmo, 1992a). The
frequency scores, factor loadings for each item and the reliability values (Cronbach’s alpha)
for the two factors are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
The results indicate that for the most part personnel felt safe from major hazards to the
installation, with only a minority (around 8%) indicating that they actually felt unsafe in
relation to these risk factors. The major hazards with which personnel felt least safe were
explosion, a vessel hitting the platform, fire and a helicopter crashing on the platform. A total
risk perception score was calculated for the items on this subscale (1 = very unsafe, 5 = very
safe). Personnel who had worked on more than 10 installations felt slightly safer with regard
to the hazards to the installation (m = 30.3) than did personnel who had worked on between
one and five installations (m = 28.4) [F(2, 604) = 4.36, p < .05].
In terms of hazards to the individual, personnel felt least safe from slipping, being hit by
falling objects, weather conditions, or being burnt. Analysis of variance on the total risk
perception scores for this sub-scale revealed a main effect between occupations in relation to
hazards to the individual [ F(8, 597) = 6.46, p < .OOl]. A post hoc comparison test (Tukey-B,
p < .05) indicated that administration/management (m = 41.2) and caterers (40.8) felt signifi-
cantly safer with regard to hazards to the individual than did drillers (36.41, deck crew (36.7),
technicians/mechanics (37.0), maintenance (37.2) and production staff (37.8).
An interaction effect [F(l, 591) = 6.03, p < .05] between seniority x employer was found
to modify a main effect of employer with regard to hazards to the individual [ F(8, 591) =
4.2, p < .05]. Operator staff who were supervisors (m = 40.1) felt significantly safer with
regard to hazards to the individual than contract staff supervisors (37.5), contract staff who
were not supervisors (37.8) or operating staff who were not supervisors (37.8). This significant
138 R. Flin et al.

Table 3
Perceptions of the probability of injury if a hazardous event occurred
Hazard Low probability Average probability High probability
Explosion 31% 36% 33%
Blow-out 46% 32% 22%
Fire 32% 43% 25%
Helicopter crash on platform 54% 28% 18%
Structural failure 47% 29% 24%
Vessel hitting platform 56% 33% 11%
Toxic gas 45% 34% 21%
Sabotage act 50% 29% 21%

interaction was not reproduced with regard to major hazards nor feelings of safety with regard
to the work tasks. Personnel who were currently safety representatives tended to feel less safe
with regard to the hazards to the individual (m = 36.4) than those who were not safety
representatives (38.4) [ F(2, 573) = 3.74, p < .05].

3.3. Perceptions of the probability of injury from hazardous events

As shown in Table 3, workers generally felt that there was a low (rated as “low” or as
“very low”) or average probability of being injured if a hazardous event occurred. Only a
small percentage of respondents felt that there was a high probability of being injured if an
explosion, a fire, or structural failure took place, whereas half the respondents felt that there
was a low probability of injury to themselves if a helicopter crashed on the platform, a vessel
hit the platform, an act of sabotage, a toxic gas leak or a blow-out occurred.

3.4. Perceptions of risks associated with work tasks

Results shown in Table 4 reveal that personnel generally felt safe (80%) carrying out their
current work tasks. As not all tasks were undertaken by all personnel, Table 4 shows the
number of personnel who were involved in each task.
The majority of personnel felt safe while moving about on the platform, monitoring
production, performing preventive maintenance and cooking/serving. Half of the respondents
felt safe flying in a helicopter, and less than half felt safe when working with radioactive
substances. At the end of this section respondents were asked: “Generally speaking, how safe
do you feel in your job?” and the majority indicated that they felt “very safe” or “safe”,
while 17% felt “neither safe nor unsafe” and 3% felt either “unsafe or very unsafe”. When
the average feeling of safety for tasks undertaken was examined, there was a slight difference
between supervisors (m = 3.8) and non-supervisors (m = 3.7) with regard to their feelings of
safety regarding carrying out their work tasks [ F( 1, 602) = 4.86, p < .05]. A main effect for
shift pattern was found with regard to feelings of safety when carrying out work tasks
[ F( 1, 602) = 3.42, p < .Ol] with personnel who worked all nights (m = 3.9) feeling safer than
those who worked half-days and half-nights (m = 3.7). There were no differences between the
other categories.
Risk perception by offshore workers 139

3.5. Perceptions of major risks, riskiest operations and minor accidents

The results of the open-ended questions on platform risks showed first, that the major risks
to the installation mentioned (frequency in brackets) were: fire (315), explosion (2951, gas
leak (290), blow-out (114), helicopter operations (79), being hit by a vessel (56) and structural
failure (36) and, second, the personnel reported a wide variety of situations when asked to list
the riskiest operations performed on the installation. The most frequently mentioned were:
drilling (305), plant start-up (125), helicopter travel (105), production process (109), crane
operations (92), wireline work (61), well intervention (58), scaffolding (55), shut-down (50)
and hot work (49). Personnel were also asked to describe the riskiest operations they carry out.
These included: working over the side or at height (99), helicopter travel (85), manual
handling (49), crane operations (46), plant start-up (47), inspections (42), hot work (30) vessel
entry (28) and external work in bad weather (20).
The most common minor injuries were thought to be cuts (347), slips, trips, falls (267), eye
injuries (189), sprains and strains (159), bruises (138), hand and finger injuries (115) and back
injuries (125). The most frequent causes for accidents were stated as: lack of care and

Table 4
The percentage of offshore workers who feel “safe” when executing work tasks

Operation Present study Rundmo ‘92

(n=622) (n=915)
No. involved % safe % unsafe % safe
Move about on the platform 601 87 1 85
Monitor production 25.5 86 1 94
Preventive maintenance 413 84 I 89
Cooking/serving 114 84 1 91
Clean the premises/housekeeping 431 83 0 98
Repair work 425 83 1 86
Cleaning equipment 421 82 I 90
Inspection 468 82 1 92
Stop process 250 81 3 87
Reduce throughput 229 80 I _
Work on scaffolding 471 79 3
Manual control of process 234 76 5 84
Manual lifting. handling 542 75 4 66
Start up process 242 74 7 81
Mechanical lifting, handling 377 72 3 83
Testing of equipment 454 71 4 81
Equipment isolated by others 483 67 7 _
Handle process material 287 67 3 _
Work with cranes 330 67 4
Well intervention 205 61 6
Non-routine operations 370 60 4 _
Process started up by others 474 60 6 _
When drilling is taking place 463 56 6 _
Completing task started by others 537 54 8 _
Flying in a helicopter 568 51 13 57
Working with radioactive substances 334 42 23 _
Overall 621 80 3
140 R. Flin et ul.

Table 5
Workers’ perceptions of how “safe” other industries/activities are
Activity % safe % neither % unsafe
Smoking > 10 cigarettes/day 5 27 68
Smoking < 10 cigarettes/day 10 36 54
Deep-sea fishing industry 16 38 45
Coal mining 16 39 46
Standby boat 44 43 13
Nuclear plant 47 30 23
Offshore petroleum industry 47 40 13
Onshore petrochemical industry 56 36 8

attention (2511, fatigue (loo), lack of planning (621, not adhering to procedures (50) human
error (58), pressure to produce (451, rushing a job (541, and negligence (39).

3.6. Perceived safety in other industries

In an attempt to provide some degree of comparison between the perceived risk of working
in the offshore oil industry compared to other high hazard industries, respondent were asked to
indicate how safe (again on a 5-point scale from “very safe” to “very unsafe”), they
perceived other British industries to be. They were also asked to rate how safe they felt
smoking to be, since this had been used by the companies as a reference point in some of their
risk communication campaigns. Table 5 shows the resulting responses.

3.7. Comparison between subjective and objective risk assessments

For each installation, respondents’ subjective risk assessment, expressed as feelings of

safety in regard to major and minor hazards (presented above), were compared with two
measures of objective risk assessment for each platform. These two measures were the
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) calculations from the installation Safety Case and
historical accident data from the previous three years. The two objective measures were
compared with the relevant subjective measure by ranking each of the installations on the
basis of the mean score for the relevant risk perception scale.

3.7.1. QRA Temporary Refuge calculations

The QRA calculations for five of the six participating installations were provided on a
confidential basis by their operating company. It is acknowledged that QRA calculations are
themselves only approximations of the actual risk, but they are sufficient for this purpose.
These data contained all identified major hazards for the installation and the calculated risk
usually expressed in terms of frequency per year, for example, risk to an individual of a
fatality per year. As platforms had different hazard profiles, the QRA values for Temporary
Refuge (TR) impairment frequency were taken as an overall measure of the hazards to the
installation. The TR failure value is a representative measure of how secure the platform is
with regard to the reliability of protective systems on the installation. It is a measure of the
cumulative failure of the systems, which takes both the probability and consequence of the
events into consideration. As can be seen in Table 6, each installation was placed in order of
Risk perception by ofishore workers 141

Table 6
Comparison between feelings of safety towards hazards to the installation and the lilrelihood of TR failure
Installations in order QRA calculations Mean feelings of Ranking for
of QRA calculations for the TR year safety for hazards to feelings of safety
for TR the installation

Installation 4 TR=x 30.8 I

Installation 6 TR=x+Y’ 30. I 2
Installation 1 I-R = x + Y I.* 29.3 4
Installation 2 TR = X + Y 1.2.3 29.1 3
Installation 3 TR = X + Y 1.2.3.4 21.3 5
Installation 5 Missing data

increasing likelihood of TR failure within the next year. Following this, the installations were
ranked on the basis of the mean scores for the workers’ feelings of safety in relation to major
hazards (Table 1).
Comparison between the rankings indicated a high but non-significant correlation due to
the small sample size ( p = 0.9). A one-way ANOVA revealed that there were differences
between installations with regard to perceived hazards [F(5, 604) = 3.95, p < .Ol). Respon-
dents on installations 4, 6 and 2 felt significantly (Tukey-B p < .OS>safer than respondents on
Installation 3, which does accord with the ranked objective risk calculations from the QRA.

3.7.2. Historical accident data

Five of the six companies provided accident statistics for the previous three years (or less in
the case of newer installations). The level of detail of the accident data provided by the
companies varied, thus the frequency of Lost Time Accidents (no. of LTAs x l,OOOOOO/no.
man-hours worked) was used as a measure, as it allowed for comparisons across installations.
In Table 7 the installations have been placed in order of increasing frequency of LTAs, and
the installations were ranked on the basis of the mean scores for risk perception in relation to
the hazards to the individual (Table 2). As can be seen in Table 7, the installations are
generally ranked in the same order (with the exception of installation 5) according to
respondents’ feelings of safety, as they are by the frequency of LTAs, although the degree of
correlation was not found to be significant ( p = 0.4). In addition, a one-way ANOVA showed
no significant differences between installations with regard to the mean scores for perceptions
of the hazards to the individual.

Table 7
Comparison between feelings of safety towards hazards to the individual and the frequency of LTAs
Installations in Average LTA frequency Mean feelings Ranking for
increasing order of for the past 2-3 years safety for hazards to feelings of safety
frequency of LTAs the invidiual

Installation 1 Average X 38.9 I

Installation 6 Average X + Y’ 38.1 3
Installation 2 Average X + Y ‘.* 37.9 4
Installation 3 Average X + Y ‘.2.3 36. I 5
Installation 5 Average X + Y ‘.2.3.4 38.2 2
Installation 4 Missing data
142 R. Flin et al.

4. Discussion

Overall, a majority of personnel felt safe with regard to hazards to the installation, hazards
to themselves and when carrying out their work tasks, with only a small proportion feeling
unsafe. Hazards to the installation are those major hazards that can have potentially catas-
trophic effects not only to the installation, but also to the personnel on board. Although these
events are less likely to occur than everyday accidents, such as slipping or tripping, they are
potentially more severe in terms of consequence and could be perceived differently from other
hazards (including work task hazards). The group of major hazards did emerge as a separate
factor on the risk perception scale, indicating that respondents regarded these events as a
distinct category. It is interesting to note that, while only half the sample reported feeling safe
with regard to explosion and a vessel hitting the platform, the perceptions of the consequences
of these occurrences differed considerably. Rundmo (1992a) suggests that Norwegian offshore
personnel most frequently perceive risk in connection with disasters and major accidents
because they focus on the consequences of an accident rather than the probability of it
occurring. We also asked respondents how they rated the probability of being injured if a
major hazard occurred. This showed that a third of the sample thought there was a high
probability of being injured if an explosion did occur, whereas only a minority (11%) felt this
in relation to a vessel collision. Thus, it appears that given the apparently equivalent feelings
of safety in regard to these two events, the likelihood of a vessel collision is regarded as more
likely than an explosion, which for some North Sea platforms would match QRA calculations.
Comparison with the existing Norwegian data from Marek et al. (1985) and Rundmo (1992a)
shows that the relative ranking of major hazards in terms of feelings of safety is similar,
explosion and fire appearing as the prime concerns. Levels of reported feelings of safety are
rather lower in the Norwegian studies. However, Marek’s report is based on data collected in
the early 1980s and Rundmo’s on data collected in 1990. A follow-up study by Rundmo,
which was undertaken around the same time as the present study, has since been completed,
and a direct comparison between the Norwegian and British data is underway (Rundmo et al.,
in prep).
There are indications that those personnel who work on installations whose QRA calcula-
tions suggest a relatively less safe working environment than on other installations tend to feel
less safe regarding hazards to the installation than those working on more “safe” installations
(i.e., the greater the survivability, according to QRA calculations, the safer people feel with
regard to being injured from hazards to the installation). The type of installation worked on
was not the only factor affecting judgements of risk and feelings of safety amongst personnel.
Personnel who had worked on a number of installations (11 + ) were found to feel safer with
regard to the hazards to the installation than those who had only worked on a few installations
(between 1 and 5). These results may indicate that experience on many installations makes
workers feel safer either because they have a better knowledge of the probability of major
hazards, they are less concerned about them, or the most experienced workers have lower
exposure to hazards. It should also be noted that in relation to major hazards, the new Safety
Case regime has placed a strong emphasis on emergency response procedures and the
competence of offshore personnel in safety-critical positions (see Flin et al., in press).
There were no differences in total feelings of safety for individual hazards across the six
installations; however, there were differences between occupations. Those personnel who were
involved in administrative, management and catering jobs tended to feel safer from occupa-
tional accidents than did drillers, deck crew, technicians, mechanics, maintenance, construc-
Risk perception by offshore workers 143

tion and production staff, which is not surprising given their relative exposure to outdoor and
industrial work conditions. Gauld (1993) found that 43% of 762 injury evacuations from UK
offshore installations were maintenance personnel as opposed to 3% involving catering staff.
Operating company supervisors felt significantly safer than contractor supervisors and non-
promoted employees. Again, this needs to be examined more closely, as it may relate to
relative risk exposure in terms of working conditions. In contrast, safety representatives tended
to feel less safe with regard to individual hazards than did other respondents. This may
indicate that since they represent the workforce with respect to safety issues, they may have a
different view of the frequency of accidents or potential hazards on the installation.
A majority of respondents indicated that they generally felt safe when completing their
work tasks. However, working with radioactive materials, completing a task started by others
and being on the platform when drilling is taking place only produced “feeling safe”
responses in half of the sample. Helicopter travel was another item that showed fewer people
feeling safe (5 1%), which is very similar to the 57% of Norwegians feeling safe in relation to
helicopter travel reported by Rundmo (1992a). This may be an accurate judgement of the
relative risks, as helicopter flight is the most hazardous aspect of offshore life (in terms of
QRA) for a number of installations across the North Sea.
Most personnel indicated that they felt safe moving about on the platform, monitoring
production, working on preventive maintenance and cooking/serving. The more senior the
personnel, the more safe they felt with regard to the work tasks they carried out. However, this
may reflect the types of tasks they tend to perform, rather than the level of responsibility they
hold, as supervisors tend to have monitoring and inspecting roles rather than active participa-
tion roles. When personnel were asked about the riskiest operations they carried out on the
installation, working over the side or at height, manual handling, plant start-up and crane
operations were mentioned most frequently. Respondents’ perceptions of the most likely
injuries were cuts, slips/falls, eye injuries, sprains, bruises and back injuries. This would
appear to be a good awareness of relative risks, as Gauld (1993) reported that of 718 offshore
medical evacuations due to more serious injuries, 26% were sprains/strains, 22% were
fractures, 9% were open wounds, 8% were contusions, and 7% were foreign bodies in the eye.
The OSD (1994) statistics show that slips/falls constitute 25-28% of serious injuries and that
the largest proportion of injuries are related to drilling/workover, construction, maintenance
and deck operations.
In terms of the relative risks of working in the offshore industry, respondents felt that it
was as safe as working on a nuclear plant or a stand-by boat but significantly safer than
working in the deep-sea fishing or coal mining industries. In terms of industry accident
statistics, it is difficult to draw direct comparisons. It is estimated that there are 110,700
smoking-attributable deaths per year in the UK for ages 35 and over, constituting 17% of the
total number of deaths in this age group (Grampian Health Board, 1994). By comparison, in
the years 1990-1993 there were 34 deaths in the fishing industry (MAIB, 1993). In 1993 there
were eight deaths in coal mines and open cast coal workings, eight deaths in the chemical
industry (nearest approximation to the category “onshore petrochemical industry”), four in
the category “extraction of mineral oil and natural gas” and none in nuclear fuel production.
However, when the offshore fatality rates include deaths due to helicopter accidents, there
were 18 deaths from 1991-1993 (OSD, 1994), which illustrates the difficulty of making direct
industry comparisons due to different coding practices.
In conclusion, the Offshore Risk Perception Questionnaire provides a useful tool for
measuring perceptions of risk and other aspects of safety. The offshore population is now a
144 R. Flin et al.

very experienced workforce, and the results indicate that they appear to be aware of the most
likely causes of injury. This study does not answer the thorny question of what the ideal level
of offshore workers’ risk perception is. Do workers who underestimate the risks behave less
cautiously? Would it be better if workers overestimated the risks and consequently behaved
with a higher degree of vigilance? Or as Rundmo (1992a,b) suggests, does this lead to stress
and thereby increase the likelihood of unsafe behaviour? The focus on accuracy of risk
perception may in fact be misplaced. Analysis of the full data set (Flin et al., in press) and a
recent study of offshore safety culture (Alexander et al., 1995) suggest that organizational and
managerial factors as well as safety attitudes (e.g., perceived pressure to put production before
safety) may play a greater role in workplace risk-taking behaviour than simply knowledge of
risk. The questionnaire is now being refined for further research that is intended to address
these issues.

Acknowledgements

This project is funded by six operating companies: Amerada Hess, British Gas, BP,
Conoco, Elf Enterprise, Total Oil Marine and the Offshore Safety Division, HSE. The views
presented are those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the position or policy
of the companies involved or of the Health and Safety Executive. We would also like to thank
Dr Rundmo of the University of Trondheim for his help with development of the questionnaire
and the offshore personnel who assisted with the project.

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