Oposa vs Factoran

Legal Standing: Common and General Interest

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR

G.R. NO. 101083. 224 SCRA 792 July 30, 1993

OPOSA et al, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondents.

Facts:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent, Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued approval of the Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests of the
country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

 Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of
defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with
the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

Issues:

 Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

 Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law.

 Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing violates the requirements of due process.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

  The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

1. The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his
opinion the requisites for a case to be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to
him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this civil case a class suit
and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the
decision Section 1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony
of nature.” Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations.

3. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

 The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.

1. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

1. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

1. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As
a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind.
  The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

1. The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, Justice Feliciano would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by
providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he
would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract,
concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein .

2. All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the
holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

Doctrine of Incorporation

G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.

Facts:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice
received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the
U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition
were attached along with the request. Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax

3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television

4. False statement or entries

5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then
requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to
assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time,
the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law
(PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the
Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in
criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.

2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.

3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Thus, this petition is now at bar.

Issue/s:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.

Discussions:

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a
local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable
and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of
international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.

Ruling/s:

No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution
should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of
another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.

3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:
 1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

Discussions:

SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they
agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in
line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)),
the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and
induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and
that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a prescription of
a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices
and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section
3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of
families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the
institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence,
persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid
as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are
not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding
whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening
procedures.
 5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to
provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise
their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should
an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing
the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen
as synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information
and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”
and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that
the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and
that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes
poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH
Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples
who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
 8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers
to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First,
the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of
the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro bono Besides the
PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to
render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
Tanada vs Angara

Justiciable Question; Theory of Auto-Limitation; Declaration of Principles and State Policies

G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997

Wigberto E. Tanada et al, in representation of various taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,

vs.

EDGARDO ANGARA, et al, respondents.

Facts:

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various NGO’s to
nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the “Filipino
First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction
of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the
service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the
predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused
by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said Agreement is an
assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress could not pass legislation that
would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation would not conform to the WTO
Agreement.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the
Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19,
Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise of legislative
power by Congress.
 4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this Honorable
Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final
Act.

Discussions:

 1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government.

 Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy controlled
by Filipinos, does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” The WTO
itself has some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s
vote equal in weight to that of any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more
effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than
outside the Organization. Which is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy
rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing
countries like the Philippines to “share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
their economic development.”

 In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by
generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own
laws. A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1,
Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a design patent, WTO
members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.

 The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the
adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the
adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. The Senate, after
deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby
making it “a part of the law of the land” is a legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
Rulings:

1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.”

2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at
the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary
act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or
derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of
mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their
otherwise absolute rights. As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
“adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.”

4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act required from its
signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the Senate was well-
aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August 25, 1994. After
reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring.
Magalona vs Ermita

Archipelagic Doctrine

G.R. No. 187167 16Aug2011

Prof. Merlin Magalona, et al., Petitioners,vs

Hon. Eduardo Ermita in his capacityas Executive Secretary, et al., Respondents.

Facts:

In March 2009, R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress to comply with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984.

Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that the law
decreased the national territory of the Philippines. Some of their particular arguments are as follows:

1. RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign
power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and
ancillary treaties.

2. RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free
policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

3. RA 9522’s treatmentof the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.

Hence, petitioners files action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.

Issues:

Whether or not RA 9522, the amendatory Philippine Baseline Law is unconstitutional.

Discussions:

The provision of Art I 198 Constitution clearly affirms the archipelagic doctrine, which we connect the outermost
points of our archipelago with straight baselines and consider all the waters enclosed thereby as internal waters.
RA 9522, as a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS
III, gave nothing less than an explicit definition in congruent with the archipelagic doctrine.
Rulings:

No. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional. It is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones
and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory. It is a vital step in safeguarding
the country’s maritime zones. It also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippine’s maritime zones and continental shelf.

Additionally, The Court finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the
Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that
extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the
coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its
archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources
therein.

The Court further stressed that the baseline laws are mere mechanisms for the UNCLOS III to precisely describe
the delimitations. It serves as a notice to the international family of states and it is in no way affecting or
producing any effect like enlargement or diminution of territories.
Manila Prince Hotel vs GSIS

Self Executing Statutes

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION
and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.

In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.

Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.

2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.

3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature

4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
 1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or
protected, is self-executing.

2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an
examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is
referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law.

3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

2. The Court agree.

1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage
of the Filipinos.

2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel
has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.

3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated
from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.

3. It is not premature.
 1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should
go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it
would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.

2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its
agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution
and the laws of the forum.

4. There was grave abuse of discretion.

1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the
Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would
rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government
develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters
for its actions.

2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the
bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of
shares of MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well.
The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided
in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST
from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the
matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and
documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department
of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order
No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative
powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk
Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on
July 7, 2006.

Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the
Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;

Held: YES

under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that
conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the
WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any
matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being
followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either

By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be

transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation
method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law.
The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
Lina Vs Pano

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON.CALIXTO CATAQUIZ,

petitioners, vs

. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAÑO and TONYCALVENTO,

respondents

G.R. No. 129093

FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto
Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor’s permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September
18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with
prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento
asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or
enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to
issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as
invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Paño,
promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan
Blg. 508, T. 1995.

ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid

HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local government’s objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid. This is part of the local government’s autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the
national government’s. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local
governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise,
the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance
prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate
and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs.
Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is
obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay

In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean up the Manila
Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their health and the
inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to life, health, and a
balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also averred under the Environmental Code, it is
MMDA’s duty to clean up the Manila Bay.

The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed the
decision on the ground that MMDA’s duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary duty hence it
cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTC’s order was for a general clean up of
the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend to specific incidents of
pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up such as that ordered by the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.

HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process of
implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does not mean
that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDA’s function to
alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In short, MMDA does
not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate the garbage disposal problem in Metro Manila, particularly in
the Manila Bay area. While the implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus.

Anent the issue on whether or not MMDA’s task under the Environmental Code involves a general clean up, the
Supreme Court ruled that MMDA’s mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform cleaning in general
and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with the other government
agencies, must act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.
CASE DIGEST
Rev. Ely Velez Pamatong Vs. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004

FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent COMELEC declared
petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not
nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.

Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that the COMELEC violated his
right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by
limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or
are nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most
qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications
for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national
organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.

ISSUE:

Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?

RULING:

No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege subject to limitations
imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation
of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing, and
there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts.

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to
be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative
in the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the
myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. Words and phrases
such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing
to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
The privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations. Some valid
limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code on "Nuisance Candidates.” As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by
the limitations are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at
bar, there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.

The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to
ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into
account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates,
the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and
resources in preparation for the election. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is
onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable
campaign would actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering
every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would
be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.

The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the
factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further
evidence is in order. The SC remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69
of the Omnibus Election Code.

Obiter Dictum: One of Pamatong's contentions was that he was an international lawyer and is thus more
qualified compared to the likes of Erap, who was only a high school dropout. Under the Constitution (Article VII,
Section 2), the only requirements are the following: (1) natural-born citizen of the Philippines; (2) registered
voter; (3) able to read and write; (4) at least forty years of age on the day of the election; and (5) resident of the
Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
[G.R. No. 139325. April 12, 2005]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and
JOEL C. LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United
States District Court of Hawaii, petitioners, vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City, and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its
court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii, namely:
Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., respondents.

Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the
Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting
to roughly 1.9 Billion U.S. Dollars in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of
international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the enforcement of
the Final Judgment, paying Php 410.00 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, Section 7(b) where the value
of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging
the non-payment of the correct filing fees. The Regional Trial Court of Makati dismissed the Complaint stating
that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign
court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was 472 Million Philippine pesos, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue:

Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee?

Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not
involving property”. The Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be
computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s
Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of
the US District Court. However, the Petitioners erred in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary
estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a
first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under Batasang
Pambansa 129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. Section 33 of Batasang Pambansa 129 refers to
instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum
of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. Section 16 of Batasang Pambansa 129
reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall
under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court
judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment
against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper
computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is Section7(b)(3),
involving “other actions not involving property.”