Академический Документы
Профессиональный Документы
Культура Документы
Jiyun Zhao
Associate Professor
Dept. of Mechanical and Biomedical Engr.
City University of Hong Kong
1
Part I: Safety Approach
2
Heat Removal
• Pellet,
• Cladding,
• Reactor-primary-system,
• And the final barrier the containment structure.
3
Heat Removal
4
Heat Removal
After normal or accident shutdown, decay heat needs to be
removed successfully from the system.
5
Pressurized Water Reactor Schematic
6
Defense-in-Depth Approach
Prevention
– Proper Design and Training
Protection
– Monitoring and Control Systems
– Active shutdown and cooling systems
7
Energy Sources
The likelihood of severe fuel damage and release of radioactive
products as a result of a reactor accident depends directly on
the amount of energy available. Energy sources can be
classified according to the following origins:
• Stored energy
• Energy from nuclear transients(reactivity insertion)
• Decay heat
• Chemical reactions
• External events - seismic, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc.
8
Safety Analysis Report Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction and General Description of Plant
Chapter 2 Site Characteristics
Chapter 3 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems
Chapter 4 Reactor
Chapter 5 Reactor Coolant Systems and Connected Systems
Chapter 6 Engineered Safety Features
Chapter 7 Instrumentation and Controls
Chapter 8 Electric Power
Chapter 9 Auxiliary Systems
Chapter 10 Steam and Power Conversion System
Chapter 11 Radioactive Waste Management
Chapter 12 Radiation Protection
Chapter 13 Conduct of Operations
Chapter 14 Initial Test Program
Chapter 15 Accident Analysis
Chapter 16 Technical Specifications
Chapter 17 Quality Assurance
9
Part II: ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES
10
ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES
12
Design-Basis Accidents
Design-basis accidents for light water reactors (and, by extension, other
reactor types) are often classified according to the following general
characteristics:
1. Overcooling-increase in secondary-side [turbine plant] heat removal
2. Undercooling-decrease in secondary-side heat removal
3. Overfilling-increase in reactor coolant inventory
4. Loss of flow-decrease in reactor coolant system [RCS] flow rate
5. Loss of coolant-decrease in reactor coolant inventory
6. Reactivity-core reactivity and power distribution anomalies
7. Anticipated transient without scram [ATWS]
8. Spent fuel and waste system-radioactivity release from a spent fuel
assembly or reactor subsystem or component
9. External events-natural or human-caused events that can effect plant
operating and safety systems(such as aircraft impact, flood, and earthquake)
13
Overcooling
OvercooIing occurs when feedwater temperature decreases or its flow
increases and also when steam flow increases (e.g., ranging from
faulty pressure regulation to failure of PWR steamline piping).
Steam-Line Break
A major break in a steam line produces a “cold-water”/overcooling reactivity
insertion in multiple-loop systems which have negative power feedback. (In
the single-loop BWR, such a break is equivalent to a loss-of-coolant
accident.) A steam line break flashes liquid in the secondary side of the
steam generators. Enthalpy of vaporization is supplied by the secondary
liquid, which cools off removing heat from and overcooling the primary
water returning to the reactor. This cooling results in a positive reactivity
insertion due lo the negative temperature feedback. While large, negative
temperature feedbacks tend lo mitigate most other accidents, they can
enhance the severity of the steam-line break accident. These “cold water”
accidents, thus, may lead to limitations on the magnitude of the associated
negative reactivity coefficients.
14
Undercooling
15
Overfilling
16
Loss of cooling
due to reactor coolant system problem
17
Loss of cooling
Some of the most limiting of the design-basis accidents for
each reactor system are those associated with the loss of
ability of the coolant to remove heat from the fuel. Complete
loss of the coolant is the most severe accident. Small losses
of fluid and/or the loss of coolant flow may also have important
consequences.
21
Reactivity
Major reactivity accidents involve uncontrolled withdrawal,
other maloperation, and ejection (in a PWR) or drop (in a
BWR) of one or more control rod assemblies.
22
Reactivity (control rod withdrawal)
23
Reactivity [Uncontrolled rod withdrawal from a
subcritical condition]
25
Reactivity [Control rod ejection (PWR only)]
26
Reactivity [Rod drop (BWR only)]
27
Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)
28
Spent fuel and waste system
A different category of accidents relates to events outside of the reactor
primary system. It includes potential radioactive releases from spent fuel
handling accidents in the containment and spent fuel storage buildings.
spent fuel cask drop accidents, and leak or failure of systems for handling
gaseous or liquid wastes.
Spent-Fuel Handling
Spent-fuel handling accidents differ from the previous design-basis
evaluations. Because the reactor vessel head is open, an accident may
allow the volatile fission products to be transported quickly to various parts
of the containment. Mechanical damage to the fuel assembly, criticality, or
failure to maintain adequate cooling could result in substantial release of
radioactivity.
31
Severe Accidents
The principal severe accident for LWR systems is a double-ended,
“guillotine” rupture of the largest primary coolant pipe that leads to an
unmitigated LOCA and core meltdown. The sequence of events including:
32
Fission-Product Release
The ultimate concern in the serious reactor accidents is the potential
release of fission products to the general environment. The “Reactor
Safety Study” (WASH-1400, 1975) identifies the following mechanisms
for escape of fission products from LWR fuel:
33
Fission-Product Release
34
Pellet-Cladding Gap
The inert noble gases leave the fuel rod as soon as the
cladding ruptures. The halogens and alkali metals tends to
react chemically with the cladding and other materials to
reduce their escape fraction to about one-third of what it would
be otherwise. Other fission products are characterized by low
volatility which limits their release to small fractions of one
percent.
35
Meltdown
The first large release of fission products in reactor accident sequences
occurs with fuel melting. If melting occurs on a pellet-by-pellet basis, the
high surface area can lead to large releases. On the other hand, if major
sections of fuel assemblies collapse into a molten mass before melting
themselves, a substantial portion of the fission products may be retained.
Most releases occur early in the melting process. Iron and oxide crusts
which form later are expected to reduce the overall escape of fission
products. The atmosphere of steam, hydrogen, and fission products would
not be likely to cause oxidation or accelerate release.
With melting, all of the noble gases and halogens are available for release,
although trapping in large masses may reduce the fraction to about 90
percent. The volatile alkali metals and tellurium-group elements are retained
based on chemical reactivity. The remaining products also experience small
releases.
36
Vaporization
When the molten mass of fuel and structural material
penetrates the reactor vessel, it is exposed to oxygen, steam
from the containment atmosphere, and cooling water,
respectively. Interaction of the molten fuel with concrete adds
CO2 to the local accident environment. The oxidizing
atmosphere may produce dense aerosol clouds [smokes] in
which some lighter particles follow the bulk flow while those
that are heavier condense out on structures or settle back to
the melt.
38
Leakage from Containment
Essentially all of the fission products released during the early
stages of the meltdown would move from the primary system
into the containment. These, plus the products released after
vessel melt-through, form the inventory available for leakage
to the general environment.
39
Leakage from Containment
The fission-product source available for release in LWR
accidents is often divided into four categories (WASH-
1400, 1975):
• noble gases
• elemental iodine
• organic iodides
• particulates and aerosols
41
Leakage from Containment
42
Leakage from Containment
45
47
48
49
Nuclear reactor heat removal
50
Energy production and transfer parameters
• Core power: Q
Calculate fuel rod volumetric heat rate, surface heat flux, and
linear heat rate.
52
Solution:
Rate of energy generation per pin:
Qcore 3411 × 1000
q= = = 66 .95 kW
total pin number in the core 193 × 264
Fuel rod volume:
πD 2 π × 0.0095 2
Vrod = H= × 3.66 = 0.000259m 3
4 4
"' q
q = = 66.95 / 0.000259= 258049.1kW / m3
Vrod
53
Fuel rod surface area:
" q
q = = 66.95 / 0.109233 = 612.9kW / m 2
S rod
' q
q = = 66.95 / 3.66 = 18.3kW / m
H
54
Fuel rods heat conduction
55
56
Fuel rods heat conduction
1 d dT
(kr ) + q' ' ' (r ) = 0 (1)
r dr dr
Fourier’s Law:
dT
q' ' = −k (2)
dr 57
Fuel pellet heat conduction
dT r2
kf r + q' ' ' + C = 0 (3)
dr 2
q ''' r 2
T (r ) = − + C1 ln r + C2 (4)
4k f
58
Fuel pellet heat conduction
Boundary conditions:
(1) At fuel pellet centerline, i.e. r=0, the heat flux must be
zero, therefore, from Fourier’s Law:
'' dT
q = −k f
r r =0 =0 (5)
dr
Since,
dT q ''' r C1 (6)
=− +
dr 2k f r
Boundary conditions:
(2) At fuel pellet surface, i.e. r=Rfo, T=Tfo,:
q ''' R 2fo
C 2 = T fo + (7)
4k f
C2 = Tm (8)
60
Fuel pellet thermal resistance
1
R pellet = (10)
4πk f
61
Fuel cladding heat conduction
T (r ) = C3 ln r + C4 (11)
For the heat transfer across the gas gap, a gap conductance
hg is defined and heat transfer equation is:
''
q = hg (T fo − Tci )
g
R fo + Rci
Where, the Rg is the radius at the middle plane of the gas gap, i.e. Rg =
2
64
Convection heat transfer between fuel
rod and coolant
For the convection heat transfer between fuel rod and coolant:
65
Maximum fuel and cladding temperature
66
Coolant temperature calculations
Qz = m(hz − hin )
For example: For a typical PWR, the design parameters are
listed as follows:
Core power: 3411MWt
Core pressure: 15.5MPa
Coolant inlet temperature: 286 oC
Core flow rate: 17.4x103 kg/s
Active fuel height: 3.66 m
Solution:
Water enthalpy at 15.5MPa, 286+273.15=559.15K, is 1264 kJ/kg.
therefore,
Q
hout = hin + m
hout=1264+(3411x103)/(17.4x103)=1460kJ/kg
68
Part IV: Critical Heat Flux
69
Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
71
Departure from Nucleate Boiling Ratio
(DNBR)
Critical Heat Flux is calculated using the correlations such
as W-3 correlation (see ref. below). The DNBR is defined
as: ''
qcr
DNBR = ''
q ( z)
As the correlations has uncertainties, for PWRs using the
W-3 correlation, the margin of safety has been to require
the minimum DNBR (MDNBR) at any location in the core to
be at least 1.3 at full power.
77
Criticality control
78
Criticality control
79
Prompt Neutrons and Delayed Neutrons
80
Prompt Neutrons and Delayed Neutrons
81
Reactor dynamics
• Prompt source
• Delayed source
• Time Dependent Neutron Balance Equation
82
Point kinetics equation
83
Reactivity Feedbacks
84
Reactivity Feedbacks
• Fuel Temperature
–Fuel density
–Doppler effect
• Moderator/Coolant
85
Fuel Temperature Feedback
An increase in fuel temperature generally affects the neutron balance by
decreasing fuel density and by changing the characteristics of the
absorption of resonance-energy neutrons (Doppler effect).
87
Fuel Temperature Feedback
(Doppler Broadening)
The Doppler effect can produce either a positive or negative
reactivity feedback. In fuel that is primarily fissile, the
increased absorption tends to occur in fission resonances that
enhance multiplication and cause positive feedback. Low
fissile content favors parasitic capture in fertile material with
resulting negative feedback.
88
Moderator/Coolant Feedback
The pressurized coolant in a PWR will expand with heating and reduce
reactivity. However, the presence of dissolved boric acid for reactivity
control produces an opposing effect. Boron density, and thus absorption,
decreases with water density producing a positive feedback. Thus, the
maximum boric acid concentration must be limited if the net feedback
from the coolant/moderator is to be negative.
89
Reactor Control
• Control Rods
-Relatively fast but rod worth an issue
-Rod ejection
-Rapid withdrawal
• Soluable Boron
90
Part VI: Nuclear Reactor Stability
91
Gen-IV Nuclear Systems
Six reactor types recommended by Gen-IV International Form
for R&D
92
Supercritical Fluids Used in Gen-IV Nuclear Systems
• Supercritical CO2 is candidate working fluid for all remaining five Gen-IV
reactors
Direct Brayton cycle (GFR)
Indirect Brayton cycle (VHTR, MSR, SFR, LFR)
93
Comparison of SCWR and Gen-II/III Light
Water Reactors
Thermal-Hydraulic parameters Neutronic parameters
BWR and SCWR has much higher density change – the concern of density wave
stability
94
Mechanism of Density Wave Instability
If some external forces or disturbances create an oscillation in
the inlet flow, the local coolant density in a two-phase or
compressible system will experience a fluctuation and a density
wave will propagate towards the exit along with the flow. This
density wave will cause the local pressure drop to fluctuate or
oscillate with some time delay with respect to the inlet flow. In
some situations, the channel total pressure drop may
experience an 180o phase lag with respect to the inlet flow as
shown in next slide. The constant external pressure boundary
condition of a parallel channel system such as a BWR or
SCWR will then generate a positive inlet velocity feedback to
the oscillating channel, which will increase the oscillation
amplitude of the original flow and the system will become
unstable.
95
Mechanism of Density Wave Instability
The mechanism of single channel DWO in a parallel channel system can be
illustrated by:
Feedback flow
Exit
Total Pressure drop Constant external pressure drop
Inlet
Inlet flow
96
Single channel density wave instability
wout
win
97
Core wide out-of-phase density wave instability
Upper plenum
P=25MPa
T=280oC
Upper Plenum
wout
Water rods
Water rods
Downcomer
Coolant
Coolant
Fuel
Fuel
∆p 1 2
Qw Q Q Qw
98
Core wide in-phase density wave instability
Upper
Feedwater pipe dome
Coolant
Water rods
Fuel
Downcomer
Qw Q
Feedwater
pump
Lower plenum
99
Neutronic Dynamic Coupling
Fluid dynamics
Neutronic oscillation
Fuel rod dynamics
100
Fundamental mode of neutron dynamics is excited
during in-phase instability
t=0
t = T/2
t=T
101
First subcritical mode of neutron dynamics is
excited during Out-of-phase instability
t=0
t = T/2
t=T
102
Example Simulation Models
103
Three region supercritical water model
Water Density (kg/m^3)
900
800
700
600 Density versus
500 temperature at
400
25MPa
300
200 Light fluid
100 region (region 3)
0
250 300 350 400 450 500 550
Temperature (degree C) L B
Heavy and light
Specific heat (kJ/kg-K)
80
70 fluid mixture
60 region (region 2)
Specific heat A
50
40
versus λ2
temperature at
30
20
25 MPa λ1 Heavy fluid
10 region (region 1)
0
250 300 350 400 450 500 550
Temperature (degree C)
104
Fuel dynamics model – BNL lumped model
105
Neutronic dynamics model – Point kinetics with modal
expansion
dnm ρ ms − β ρ m0 6
= nm + + ∑ λi ci ,m
dt Λm Λ m i =1
dci ,m βi
= nm − λi ci ,m
dt Λm
106
Decay Ratio
u(t)
t1 u (t 2 )
t2 DR =
u (t1 )
t
108
Ledinegg instability
If the operating condition is in region 1, such as point 1, the
system will be stable. Because if the inlet flow has a small
perturbation, such as a small increase, the fluid pressure drop
across the channel will be above the constant external
pressure drop condition which will decrease the inlet flow rate
such that the operating point will go back to point 1. Thus, the
system can operate at point 1 stably. The same phenomenon
will happen in region 3 which is also a stable region. However,
if the operating point is in region 2, such as at operating point 2,
a small increase of inlet flow will decrease the channel
pressure drop below the constant external pressure drop. Thus,
the inlet flow will increase again, until the operation shifts to
point 3. On the other hand, a decrease in the flow of point 2 will
shift the system to point 1. Thus, the operation in region 2 is
unstable.
109
Part VII: Current Methods and Future Trend on the Reactor
Simulations
110
Issues and R&D requirements for the existing
nuclear power reactors
111
AREVA technologies on the advanced fuel
assembly designs
Advanced fuel development:
• M5 fuel cladding materials
• High performance HTPTM fuel assembly design
112
AREVA Technologies-Current Simulation Methods
Current reactor design analysis tools are separate and applied in series using
simplistic models and conservatisms in the analyses for neutronics, thermal
hydraulics, fuel rod performance, reactor safety and structural mechanics.
113
AREVA Technologies - A 12-channel subchannel analysis model
114
AREVA Technologies-Future Simulation Trend
115