THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS Vourae XLVI OCTOBER 1937 Noumea 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE AND THE HELLENIC-MACEDONIAN POLICY HANS KELSEN 1 F ALL the activities of the mind on which the Aristo- telian philosophy has exercised its influence through- out the Inst two thousand years, on none has the teaching of the Stagira sage acted so directly and so decisively as on ethical and political theory—an influence still apparent at the present day. The almost divine authority which Aristotle enjoyed in the sphere of the natural sciences has long since dis- appeared; his logic, once admired as the emanation of absolute truth, has been deposed, though only 1 few generations ago, from its hitherto commanding position. But the profound re- spect accortled to his Ethics and Politics remains undiminished ‘Their influence on the thought of our time can scarcely be over- estimated, Modem scientitic treatments ot the problems of a moral world-order and of a juridical state community still, in very great measure, betray the stamp of the Aristotelian sys- tem, But in that system Aristotle's Euiics and Politics are ex sentially connected with his Afetaphysics.* And thus it is the Metaphysics which appears as the foundation of the motal sys tem of values, whether these values be knowingly accepted in 1 Atleth, Die metsphyisches Grendlagm der Aviaichen Ekik (6002), B. 5 ‘ne Aristotelian ets oer the remastable example of « detailed system, the plo- Cipla of which are not found in Unesslves but fa quite» erent scence, Le metaphysis” 2 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS their original form or received through the dogmas of Christian theology into which they have gone over. But it is precisely the Melaphysics which is the least personal part of Aristotle's work, In this department he remained the pupil of Plato, although in no other did he so passionately com- bat the philosophy and the theory of ideasof his master. Plato’s principle of dualism, the opposition between idea and reality, dominates—although Aristotle will not allow its validity—the latter’s system. It appears in Aristotle in the form of a disjunc- tion between God and the world. The godhead of Aristotle, which is the object of all his metaphysics, is nothing more than the Platonic idea of the good, It is the transcendental absolute value, the highest unconditional ought, to which the world, the empirical being, by virtue of its inherent principle of value strives to comrespond. Aristotle arrives at this conception of God by two distinctions which appear to be implied in the notion of being (just as his metaphysics in general claims to be ontology, although in truth it is axiology, or at least may also be consid- ered as such). In the first place there is the opposition between the moved and the unmoved, which is represented at the same time 2s opposition between what can be perceived by the senses, material, existent in space, and the immaterial, not perceptible by the senses, inexistent in space. Secondly, there is the opposition between a final cause and the medium in which it becomes manifest, ie., the opposition between form and ma- terial, expressed in the struggle of form to overcome the resis- tance of the material. Both oppositions, i.c., the opposition be- tween the unmoved and the moved, and the opposition between form and material, are to be understood as such only as meas- ured by value, as antitheses between good and evil. And the decisivestep, which leads Aristotle to the comprehension of the godhead, consists in combining the two oppositions. ‘The im- ‘material, unmoved, inexistent in space, is the mover, which it- self remains unmoved. ‘There is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover is itselfARISTOTLE AND HELLENIC-MACEDONIAN POLICY 3 unmoved.”* “And since that which is moved and moves is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuslity.”* This un- moved mover is at the same time pure and absolute reason. ‘This is the highest good, the godhead.* The highest being “‘ex- ists of necessity; and in so far as it exists by necessity, its mode of being is good,”’ that is, in this connection, reason. ‘The sole function of God is contemplative thought. ‘The godhead, which asa personal being exists neither in will- ing nor in doing, but only in thinking is, according to Aristotle's description, in a state of “joyous glory” or “bliss.” This is nothing else than the highest possible degree of thet which men experience as happiness, always supposing they are virtuous. For happiness is the reward of virtue alone: it is virtue itself, And thus the bliss of God is but another way of saying that God and goodness are identical. Since the divine good is contemplative reason, the problem arises for Aristotle: What is the object of this thought? This is the form in which the question as to the contents of-the ought, as to the nature of the good, presents itself to the mind of Aristotle. As the divine reason can only have the best as the object of its thought, that object can only be itself, “The di- vine thought and its object will be the same, ie., the thinking will be one with the object of its thought." This is obviously tautology. What it is important to notice is that the question as to the essence of the good remains unanswered and being unanswerable is pushed aside. Aristotle proves himself in his metaphysics, just as Plato had done in his Politeia, unable to sive a material answer to the decisive question. Like Plato he is satisfied by affirming that an absolute good exists.? In what + Mtophysics :o12. The Boel transitions of Avitoue's tert have been takes keom The Werks of Aide, Tasted into Bagh under We edorsip of W. D- Ross M.A. Osan), Hon, ELD. (in) VTi eyes. TL sepa TBAT sage 7CL the author's trenise, “Die Platonicke Gaechighet” KenStaion, XXXVI, Part 1/1 (993), 98 4 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS consists he cannot say. Just as he can only affirm, without being able to prove, the existence of the godhead. Aristotle’s metaphysical theory of being, according to which perfection or goodness belongs to the essence of reality, and all reality, there- fore, as such, isin some degree good, this ontology is in truth a doctrine of value—a doctrine, indeed, of absolute value, i.e.,a theology. ‘This conception is very definitely expressed in the words: “The world refuses tobe governed badly”; to which the Homer quotation is added: “The rule of many is not good; cone ruler let there be.”” In the absolute being, in the being as such, this ontology recognizes an absolute monarchy. And as the being obviously is well governed, it can have but one ruler, the godhead, who, himself immovable, moves the world to good and who is to be represented as sole ruler. The Aristotelian theology has a markedly monotheistic character. ‘This would place it in direct opposition to polytheism, the offidal state religion, But it was this very opposition which Aristotle sought to avoid. In contradiction to the concept which he had developed of one immovable mover, the source of all movement, and who therefore must be represented as the unique being of his kind, Aristotle now discovers behind the planets, as the self-moving stars, other unmoved movers, there- fore divine beings. He develops this theory thus: And since we ee that besides the simple spatial movement of the wai verse, which we call the fist and immovable substance [i the frst im movable mover] produces, there are other spatial moversents—those of the planets—which are eternal... each ofthese movements also must be caused by 2 substance both The admission that in addition to the first mover still other im- movable movers exist breaks up the Aristotelian system. Be- tween the first mover and the other immovable movers no con- nection can exist. Aristotle endeavors to get over this difficulty by hinting at the existence of ranks among the immovable 1 Aethy pitp34 an vet oie, hid 0738ARISTOTLE AND HELLENIC-MACEDONIAN POLICY § movers." The first mover is said to be placed—in a certain sense—over the other unmoved movers. But in this ontology no criterion can be found according to which the producer of the simple spatial movement of the universe, i-c., the mover of the fixed stars, namely the first mover, can be said to be superior to the movers of the planets. For, according to the Aristotelian ontology, superiority and subordination are represented solely by the relation of the mover to the moved, by the relation of the subject to the object of the movement. The relation be- tween the first unmoved mover who, a sole godhead, stands as & monarch over the universe, and the unmoved movers of the planets, who represent a multitude of gods, remains incompre- hensible. Obviously Aristotle believed a concession necessary to the polytheistic state religion, even at the cost of a flagrant contradiction. This may be clearly wen in his mention of “'s tradition handed down by our forefathers in the most remote ages to their posterity in the form of a myth.” According to this tradition there are a multitude of gods and these gods are represented in human shape. Aristotle even says of this myth that it had been woven “with a view to the persuasion of the multitude and to its legal and utilitarian expediency,” but he adds: “They say these gods are in the form of men ar like some of the other animals, and they say other things consequent on and similar to those we hhave mentioned. But if one were to separate the frst peint from these ‘additions and take it alone—that they thought the frst substances to be rods—one must regard this as an inspired utterance and relect that, while probably each art and each science has often been developed as fat 28 possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present, like relies of the ancient treasure. Only thus fr, then, is the opinion of our ancestors and of our earliest predecessors lear to us” The object of this reasoning is plain. From the standpoint of the Aristotelian metaphysics the official popular religion may 1.0798 1. sor 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS be accepted as an “inspired utterance.” And thus the Aristo- telian metaphysics, which furnishes a foundation for monothe- ism, justifies also polytheism. 0 Although Aristotle sincerely endeavors both in his ethics and in his metaphysics to free himself from the philosophy of Plato, ‘a Metween Uh statement of the doctrine tat theweare mumberotunmoved movers, srho ae the cause of the divine ties moving in the heavens, andthe rections ox ‘opule relision,a special paragraph is itroduce. This paragraph in det contra, eden to the conclusion reached in ibe preceding, that Gere arc a multitude of ‘unmoved woversand dhrcfore gals. For aow it & asrte based on the fact that evidently there fr but ose heaven" that “Che Gyt cause of movement, which ital simmoved, at concerns the denition and the sumbe, ie one" Thin pase sage (Met. 2074) gives che impression of a later interpoation of which te als ie clearly to stengthen the monstheisic character of the Aristotelian metaphysics, ‘Thich had beea somewhat weakined by bis remus on the popular ziion. The Fefectons on ths poljtbeiti rliion are connected directy—ar to tir subject tnatter—wvkh the doczine ofthe numberof unmoved mover but day ae separated Irons it by the femarhs covalalag Un defonte of moheia, Morcovet, the Set sentence of the dscuson about the poplar religion: “Ons forefathers in the ron remote ages have handed down to ther posterity tradition inthe form of a myth, ‘hat thee bodies are gods,” refers clealy no to the last sentence the smmeiatly preceding yaragraph bot totheane before that. “Since there cannot bean ininite regress, {he ead of every movement willbe ope of the divine bodies which move though the heaven.” But the iso qeston of these bodies in the paragraph which bas for its ceatial theme the mosothcbtc idea. The intention of the interpolator fs betrayed by the cort made to remove the connection which undeabtedly exsted between the doctsine of the excten» of te plaral mover sd the act te futily by metaptyaic, ‘he polpthaistc popular riginn. In hie mmarbahie study, “Div Entitahang der Goutedehee des Anstotles” GStaunasberichie der Akademie der Wiserschaten it ‘Wea, Phlsophsch-Hisvoricbe Klase, Vol. CCX (rot, Faper s), Hats vor Arai tba convincingly proved that Aratotl’'® Gest conceptnn was tha, the hollow ball onsiting of thee the hiner ofthe Gnd stacy, by ite own natural force tum the ‘hole globe of the earth and that theft eameved mover mas intodvced only Tater iter a very comiderbie change of doctrine had takes place. THs cowsists in the ‘ecopaitin of the priocple: no movement withoot a mover, In PAstcr vit Ari, tees the principal argument of this volte face the Ansotelan connology. Ur itis Cleary evident that Astle acres ll movement inthe wold tothe fet moved Imover_Araim stim the design ofthe pilowpher to fuse anexeasvelymonartical conception. “If movenent shall always be presen in tbe universe, and n0 interrap- ‘on of he same shall ake place hen of oeceity something st be prsent whic & the Gint mover (ebether i be one or several and tis Set mover mast be unmoved.” (Pay. chap. 6) Arnim balives thatthe wands “wether ibe ene, ar ever Deine incompatile withthe conception af a single unmoved mover, ates later ines.