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DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE

Engada vs CA

FACTS: November 29, 1989 1:30 pm: Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney with the owner Sheila
Seyan as passnger. The speeding Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Rogelio Engada came from the opposing direction
and swerved to its left encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw. In attempt to avoid the pick-up, Seyan shouted at
Iran to swerve to the left but the Engada also swerved to its right hitting the Tamaraw at its right front passenger side
causing its head and chassis to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a
ricefield. Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan suffered a fracture on the right
femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt abdominal injury, and lacerations of the
upper-lower pole of the right kidney. Upon discharge, she Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota
Tamaraw jeepney ended up in the junk heap totalling a loss of P80,000

MTC: Engada guilty of damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries

CA: Affirmed MTC Engada appealed alleging that CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go
back to his lane by flashing the pick-up’s right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the
Tamaraw, had no more reason to swerve to his left

ISSUE: W/N under the doctrine of last clear chance Iran should be liable.

HELD: NO. CA affirmed. Engada's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision in abandoning his lane, he did
not see to it first that the opposite lane was free of oncoming traffic and was available for a safe passage after seeing
the Tamaraw jeepney ahead, he did not slow down emergency rule An individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid
the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may
appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence - Iran cannot be faulted at a
distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw, denied Iran
time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of.
LADECO vs. ANGALA LADECO vs. ANGALA G.R. No. 153076 - June 21, 2007

FACTS: On May 4, 1993, at about 2:45 p.m., a Datsun crewcab with plate no. PEC-93 was driven by Apolonio
Deocampo bumped into a 1958 Chevy pick-up with plate no. MAM-475 owned by Michael Raymond Angala and
driven by Bernulfo Borres. Lapanday Agricultural Development Corporation (LADECO) owned the crewcab which was
assigned to its manager Manuel Mendez. Deocampo was the driver and bodyguard of Mendez. Both vehicles were
running along Rafael Castillo St., Agdao, Davao City heading north towards Lanang, Davao City. The left door, front
left fender, and part of the front bumper of the pick-up were damaged. Respondent Angala filed an action for Quasi-
Delict, Damages, and Attorney’s fees against LADECO, its administrative officer Henry Berenguel and Deocampo.
Respondent alleged that his pick-up was slowing down to about five to ten kilometers per hour (kph) and was making
a left turn preparatory to turning south when it was bumped from behind by the crewcab which was running at around
60 to 70 kph. The crewcab stopped 21 meters from the point of impact. Respondent alleged that he heard a
screeching sound before the impact. Respondent was seated beside the driver and was looking at the speedometer
when the accident took place. Respondent testified that Borres made a signal because he noticed a blinking light
while looking at the speedometer. Respondent sent a demand letter to LADEDO for the payment of the damages he
incurred because of the accident but he did not receive any reply. Thus, respondent filed the case against LADECO,
Berenguel, and Deocampo.

In its March 3, 1995 Decision, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15 ruled in favor of defendant and
ordered LADECO and Deocampo to solidarily pay the damages.

The trial court found that Berenguel was not liable because he was not the owner of the crewcab. LADECO and
Deocampo filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on June 13, 1995.

Petitioner filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. However, the appellate court affirmed in toto the trial court’s
decision. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.

In its March 11, 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition
was filed before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the case at bar.

RULING: Yes. Since both parties are at fault in this case, the doctrine of last clear chance applies The doctrine of last
clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of
the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who has the last
clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, Deocampo had the last
clear chance to avoid the collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation
since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding bumping
the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to
running straight ahead. Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the
pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing
the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision.

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