General Provisions – Rule 1
TAMANO VS. ORTIZ
FACTS: Sen. Tamano and Zorayda Tamano married in civil rites. Before Sen. Tamano
died, he married Estrellita in civil rites too. A year after Sen. Tamano’s death,
Zorayda and her son filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage of her
husband and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. Zorayda further claimed
that her husband claimed to be divorces and Estrellita as single, hence, their
marriage was fraudulent. Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that QC RTC
has no jurisdiction because only a party to a marriage could file an action for
annulment against the other spouse. Estrellita also contended that since Tamano
and Zorayda were both Muslims and married in Muslim rites, the jurisdiction to
hear and try the case is vested in Sharia courts pursuant to Art 155 of Code of
Muslim. RTC denied the petition and ruled it has jurisdiction since Estrellita and
Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code. Motion for
reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner referred to SC which ruled that it should
be referred to CA first. The CA ruled that the case would fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of sharia courts only when filed in places where there are sharia courts.
But in places where there are no sharia courts, the instant petition could be at RTC.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N Sharia courts and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject case and
the nature of action.
HELD: SC held that RTC has jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of
marriage and marital relations. In this case, both petitioner and the deceased were
married through a civil wedding. And whether or not they were likewise married in
a Muslim wedding, sharia courts are still not vested with original jurisdiction over
marriages married under civil and Muslim law.
DOMAGAS VS. JENSEN
FACTS:
Petitioner FilomenaDomagas filed a complaint for forcible entry against respondent
Vivian Jensen before the MTC alleging that the respondent by means of force,
strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a
portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon depriving the
petitioner of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the boundary line.
The summons and the complaint were not served on the respondent because the
latter was apparently out of the country. The Sheriff left the summons and
complaint with Oscar Layno (respondent's brother), who received the same.
The court rendered judgment against the respondent.The respondent failed to
appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of execution was issued.
The respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner before the RTC for the
annulment of the decision of the MTC on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure
to serve the complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the
MTC never acquired jurisdiction over her person. Respondent claimed she was a
resident of Oslo, Norway and although she owned the house where Oscar Layno
received the summons and the complaint, she had then leased it to Eduardo
Gonzales. She avers further that Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the
summons and the complaint for and in her behalf.
In her answer to the complaint, the petitioner alleged that the respondent was a
resident of Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan and was the owner of the
subject premises where Oscar Layno was when the Sheriff served the summons and
complaint; that the service of the complaint and summons by substituted service on
the respondent was proper since her brother Oscar Layno, a resident and registered
voter of Barangay. Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, received the complaint and
summons for and in her behalf.
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. The
trial court declared that there was no valid service of the complaint and summons
on the respondent considering that she left the Philippines for Oslo, Norway, and
her brother Oscar Layno was never authorized to receive the said complaint and
summons for and in her behalf.
The petitioner appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the appealed
decision with modifications. The CA ruled that the complaint was one for
ejectment, which is an action quasi in rem. The appellate court ruled that since the
defendant therein was temporarily out of the country, the summons and the
complaint should have been served via extraterritorial service under Section 15 in
relation to Section 16, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which likewise requires prior
leave of court. Considering that there was no prior leave of court and none of the
modes of service prescribed by the Rules of Court was followed by the petitioner,
the CA concluded that there was really no valid service of summons and complaint
upon the respondent, the defendant in Civil Case No. 879.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid service of the summons and complaint on the
respondent. Whether or not the action of the petitioner in the MTC against the
respondent herein is an action in personam or quasi in rem.
General Provisions – Rule 1
RULING:
The ruling of the CA that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry of the
petitioner against the respondent is an action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action
of the petitioner for forcible entry is a real action and one in personam because the
plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal obligation or liability on the defendant under
Article 539 of the New Civil Code, for the latter to vacate the property subject of the
action, restore physical possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages
by way of reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.
The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its character.
Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is
determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought
against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may
involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.
The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a
court, some responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of
this character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An action in personam is said to be
one which has for its object a judgment against the person, as distinguished from a
judgment against the propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an
action in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such
action is brought against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are
concerned, it is well-settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v.
Combs, the appellate court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and
obligations between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real
property are in personam.
On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status, ownership
or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate on these
questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and not to
ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgments
therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.
On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the summons and
complaint by the Sheriff:
In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary
for the court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a
resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service
outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave
of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient.
Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is null and void.
In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after his
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was in Oslo,
Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons and
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. — If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may
be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with
some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving
the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent
person in charge thereof.
Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court may
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory requirement of
substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and any substituted
service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered ineffective. As the
Court held in Hamilton v. Levy :
… The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service of summons must
be stated in the proof of service or Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted
service made in lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary because
substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It is a method
extraordinary in character and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation was made. Failure
to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the requirements of substituted service
renders said service ineffective.
General Provisions – Rule 1
In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or "residence"
are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not sufficient to leave
the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or place of abode, as the
case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the place where the person
named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though
he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. It is, thus, the service of the
summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable
age and discretion residing in the house of the defendant. Compliance with the
rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due
process as of jurisdiction.
As gleaned from the service return, there is no showing that the house where the
Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that of the respondent
herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to ascertain where the
residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned out that the occupant
of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that Oscar Layno was in the
premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service of the summons on a
person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered to have been left at the
residence or place or abode, where he has another place at which he ordinarily
stays and to which he intends to return.
The Voter’s Registration Record of Oscar Layno wherein he declared that he was a
resident of No. 572 Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan, as well as the Joint
Affidavit of Vicenta Peralta and OrlandoMacasalda cannot prevail over the Contract
of Lease the respondent had executed in favor of Eduardo Gonzales showing that
the latter had resided and occupied the house of the respondent as lessee since
November 24, 1997, and the affidavit of Eduardo Gonzales that Oscar Layno was
not residing in the said house.
In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence, the
MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such, the
decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
YU VS. PACLEB
NATURE OF THE CASE: This petition was filed to set aside the decision made by the
Court of Appeals in ruling that the respondent has the better right over the subject
property and is the true owner thereof.
FACTS: Respondent Baltazar Pacleb and his late first wife, Angelita Chan, are the
owners of parcel of land in Langcaan, Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by a transfer
certificate of title.
Sometime in September 1992, Ruperto Javier offered the said land to spouses
Ernesto and Elsie Yu. Javier claimed that he purchased the property from Rebecca
Del Rosario who bought it from spouses Baltazar Pacleb and Angelita Chan. Despite
the alleged sales being unregistered, the spouses Yu accepted the offer and made a
down payment and entered into an Agreement for the sale of the property. After
giving the amount, the spouses Yu discovered that a portion of the property was
tenanted by Ramon Pacleb, one of the respondent's sons. The petitioners then
demanded the cancellation of their agreement and the return of their initial
payment.
Javier then made arrangements with Ramon to vacate the property and to pay
Ramon for his disturbance compensation. With that, Javier and the spouses YU
proceeded to enter into a Contract to Sell. But, Javier failed to comply with his
obligations. So, on April 23, 1993, the petitioners filed with the RTC a Complaint for
specific performance and damages against Javier to compel Javier to deliver to
them ownership and possession, and the title to the property.
However, Javier did not appear in the proceedings and was declared in
default, so, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The
decision and its Certificate of Finality were annotated in the title of the property.
On March 10, 1995, the petitioners and Ramon and his wife entered into an
agreement that the spouses will pay Ramon P500,000 in exchange for the waiver of
his tenancy rights over the land.
On October 12, 1995, the respondent filed a Complaint for annulment of
deed of sale and other documents arising from it claiming that the deed of sale
supposedly executed between him and his late first wife and Del Rosario was
spurious and the signatures were forged. He also moved for the summons to be
served upon Del Rosario via publication since her address cannot be found, but was
denied. So, respondent moved to dismiss the case which was granted by the trial
court.
On November 23, 1995, the petitioners filed an action for forcible entry
against the respondent with the MTC. They contend that they had prior physical
possession over the property through their trustee Ramon Pacleb, until the
respondent ousted them in September 1995. The MTC and the RTC ruled in favor of
the petitioners, but the Court of Appeals set aside the decisions of the lower courts.
The CA decided that it was the respondent who had prior physical possession of the
property which was shown by his payment of real estate taxes thereon.
General Provisions – Rule 1
On May 29, 1996, respondent filed an instant case for removal of cloud from
title with damages alleging that the deed of sale between him and his late first wife
could not have been executed on the date appearing thereon. He claimed that he
was residing in the US at that time and that his late first wife died 20 years ago.
On May 28, 1997, while the case was still pending, the respondent died,
hence, he was substituted by his surviving spouse and some of his children.
On December 27, 2002, the respondent's case was dismissed and the
petitioners were held to be purchasers in good faith. The trial court also held that
the petitioners' action for specific performance against Javier was already final, and
the trial court also ordered the respondents' heirs and all other persons claiming
under them to surrender the possession of the property to the petitioners. Upon
appeal by the respondent, the CA reversed the trial court's decision. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE: WON the action for specific performance filed by the petitioners against
Javier is not merely an action in personam, but an action in rem, and is thus,
conclusive and binding upon respondent even if he was not a party thereto since it
involves a question of possession and ownership of real property.
HELD: The action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioners against
Javier to compel him to perform his obligations under their Contract to Sell is an
action in personam.
The purpose of the action is to compel Javier to accept the full payment of the
purchase price, and to execute a deed of absolute sale over the property in favor of
the petitioners. The obligations of Javier mentioned attach to Javier alone and do
not burden the property. Thus, the complaint filed by the petitioners is an action in
personam and is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded therein and duly
heard or given an opportunity to be heard. So, the action cannot bind the
respondent since he was not a party therein and considering the fact that his
signature and that of his late first wife were forged in the deed of sale. Hence, the
petition is denied and the Court affirms the ruling of the CA finding the respondent
having a better right over the property as the true owner thereof.
CABUTIHAN VS. LANDCENTER
Facts:
 Cabutihan filed an action for specific performance against Landcenter
Construction and Development Corporation with the RTC of Pasig.
 According to Cabutihan, Landcenter Corporation did not comply with their
obligation in a Deed of Undertaking wherein they agreed that Cabutihan
would facilitate and assist Landcenter Corporation in recovering a parcel of
land located in Paranaque in consideration of 20% of the land to be
recovered.
 Thereafter, Landcenter Corporation filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue.
 They contended that since the primary objective of Cabutihan was to recover
a property, it is a real action. Hence, the case should have been filed in the
RTC of Paranaque where the land is situated pursuant to the rules.
 The RTC granted the motion to dismiss.
 Cabutihan assailed the said order.
Issue: WON the action filed by Cabutihan is a real action. NO
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that a breach of contract, two gives rise to two causes of
action arise namely: specific performance and rescission. In this case, Cabutihan
sought for the payment of the services she rendered in favor of Landcenter. The
action was based on a contract – the deed of undertaking.
Such action is for specific performance which is a personal action. Being a personal
action, the proper venue of the case is with the courts of the place where the
plaintiff or the defendant resides pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 4 of the Rules of
Court.
Hence, the case was properly filed with the RTC of Pasig. It need not be filed with
the RTC of Paranaque, the place where the property is located.
On other issues:
Jurisdiction over subject matter: Neither a misjoinder nor a non-joinder of parties is
a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court, on motion of any party or on the court’s own initiative at any stage of
the action.[24] The RTC should have ordered the joinder of such party, and
noncompliance with the said order would have been ground for dismissal of the
action.
Non-payment of docket fees. The relaxed rule was applied here. Sunlife Insurance
case.
Section 1. Ordinary civil actions, basis of.
 Every ordinary civil action must be based
on a cause of action.
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined.
 A cause of action is the act or omission by which a
party violates a right of another.
Cause of action:
General Provisions – Rule 1
1. Legal right – right to collect of Cabutihan
2. Obligation – to pay by Landcenter
3. Act or omission – non-payment
What is a personal action?
Action – an action where the issue is founded on a privity of contract or on quasi-
delict
As to cause or foundation: Real, personal and mixed action
As to object: Action in personam, in rem and quasi in rem
CITIZEN SURETY VS MELENCIO – HERRERA
Facts: Citizens Surety and Insurance Co (Citizens) alleged that at the request of
Santiago Dacanay, it issued 2 surety bonds to guarantee payment of P5K promissory
notes in favor Gregorio Fajardo and Manufacturers Bank & Trust Co respectively.
As security, the Santiago and Josefina Dacanay executed an Indemnity Agreement
to jointly indemnify Citizens for losses, costs and expenses (with 12% annual
interest) and a REM over a parcel of land in Baguio. The Dacanays failed to pay the
promissory notes compelling Citizens to pay. The Dacanays failed to reimburse
Citizens however, forcing the latter to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage and file a case to recover the unsatisfied balance.
At petitioner’s request, the respondent Judge caused summons to be made by
publication in the Philippines Herald. But despite such publication and deposit of
copy with the Manila post office, the defendant did not appear within 60 days from
the last publication.
Plaintiff sought the defendants to be declared in default, but the Judge eventually
dismissed the case, the suit being in personam and the defendants not having
appeared.
Issue:W/N summons made by publication is sufficient for the court to acquire
jurisdiction
Held:
No. In an action strictly in personam, personal service of summons, within the
forum, is essential to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court. In
other words, summons by publication cannot – consistently with the due process
clause in the Bill of Rights – confer upon the court jurisdiction over said defendants.
The proper recourse for the creditor is to locate properties, real or personal, of the
resident defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them two be attached,
in which case, the attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi
in rem and the summons by publication may be valid.
Given the skill of debtors to conceal their properties however, the decision of the
respondent Judge should be set aside and held pending in the archives until
petitioner tracks down the whereabouts of the defendant’s person or properties.
GO VS UCPB
Doctrine: The cancellation of the real estate mortgage is a real action, considering
that a real estate mortgage is a real right and a real property by itself; and an action
for cancellation of real estate mortgage is necessarily an action affecting the title to
the property.
Facts:
Petitioner Go and Looyuko are co-owners of Noah’s Ark International, Noah’s Ark
Sugar Carriers, etc. Their application for an Omnibus Line accommodation with
respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) in the amount of P900, 000, 000
was approved.
- The transaction was secured by Real Estate Mortgages over parcels of land
located at Mandaluyong City and registered in the name of Mr. Looyuko; and
another property also located at Mandaluyong City, registered in the name of
Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery.
- UCPB subsequently cancelled the approved Omnibus Line accommodation; so, Go
demanded from UCPB the return of the two TCTS (No. 64070 and No. 3325)
covered by Real Estate Mortgages. UCPB however refused to return the same and
proceeded to have the two (2) pre-signed Real Estate Mortgages notarized and
caused the registration thereof before the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City.
- UCPB filed the with the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of
Mandaluyong City an extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged land that was
registered in the name of Looyuko , for nonpayment of the obligation secured by
said mortgage. Public auction sale was set. Hence, Go filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage and damages, with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, against respondent bank
and its officers with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. The complaint was later
amended.
General Provisions – Rule 1
- Respondent bank, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss based on
the several grounds. Among which is that the complaint was filed in the wrong
venue.
Trial Court: issued an order granting petitioner’s application for a writ of
preliminary injunction. Correspondingly, the auction sale was enjoined. The trial
court denied respondent bank’s motion to dismiss. A motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied. UCPB filed a petition for certiorari.
CA: set aside orders issued by the trial court and directed the trial court to dismiss
case on the ground of improper venue. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner, which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner argues: that a case for cancellation of mortgage is a personal action and
since he resides at Pasig City, venue was properly laid therein. He tries to make a
point by alluding to the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena.
Issue: WON petitioner’s complaint for cancellation of real estate mortgage is a
personal or real action for the purpose of determining venue. [It is a real action
which should be commenced and tried in Mandaluyong City, the place where the
subject property lies.]
Held/Ratio: In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as
provided for in Section 1, Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein. These include partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property. The venue for real
actions is the same for regional trial courts and municipal trial courts -- the court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part
thereof lies. Personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property,
for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for
the recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.
The venue for personal actions is likewise the same for the regional and municipal
trial courts -- the court of the place where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of the plaintiff, as indicated in Section 2 of Rule 4. It is quite
clear then that the controlling factor in determining venue for cases of the above
nature is the primary objective for which said cases are filed.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that annulment of foreclosure sale is a real
action. Particularly in Carandang v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that an action
for nullification of the mortgage documents and foreclosure of the mortgaged
property is a real action that affects the title to the property. Petitioner’s reliance
in the case of Francisco S. Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena is misplaced. Firstly,
said case was primarily an action to compel the mortgagee bank to accept payment
of the mortgage debt and to release the mortgage. That action, which is not
expressly included in the enumeration found in Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, does not involve titles to the mortgaged lots. It is a personal
action and not a real action. Hence, the venue of the plaintiffs’ personal action is
the place where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
In the case at bar, the action for cancellation of real estate mortgage filed by herein
petitioner was primarily an action to compel private respondent bank to return to
him the properties over which the bank had already initiated foreclosure
proceedings . The prime objective is to recover said real properties. Secondly,
Carandang distinctly articulated that the ruling in Hernandez does not apply where
the mortgaged property had already been foreclosed. Here, bank had already
initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, and were it not for the timely
issuance of a restraining order secured by petitioner Go in the lower court, the
same would have already been sold at a public auction. In a relatively recent case,
Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals. It was succinctly stated that the prayer
for the nullification of the mortgage is a prayer affecting real property, hence, is a
real action.
GOCHAN VS GOCHAN
https://www.scribd.com/document/288623890/Gochan-v-Gochan-Digest
FACTS:
 Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Respondents
offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual petitioners
in consideration of the sum of P200,000,000:00. Petitioners accepted and paid
the said amount to respondents.
 Respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners to
execute a "promissory note. The former drafted the promissory note in his own
handwriting and had the same signed by the petitioners. Unbeknown to
petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the "promissory note" a phrase that
says, "Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale."6
 Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific performance and
damages alleging that the petitioners that offered to buy their shares of
stock,in consideration of P200M and multiple properties. Accordingly,
respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of the
properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which they
acknowledge to have received from petitioners plus damages.
General Provisions – Rule 1
 Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defences one of
which is the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct
docket fees;
 Trial court ruled in favor of the defendants. It cited that respondents paid the
necessary filing and docket fees of at least P165K.
 MR denied. Petition for certiorari with CA dismissed. MR denied. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
1. Did the respondent filed and paid the necessary docket fees to warrant
court’s jurisdiction?
2. What is the real nature of the case?
3. What should be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket fees?
HELD:
1. NO
2. Real action not specific performance
3. Assessed value of the property, or the estimated value
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
(SIOL) v. Asuncion,12 this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that
vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
Petitioners, that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects title
to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of the
real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket
fees.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve the
issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading. The caption of the complaint below was denominated
as one for "specific performance and damages." The relief sought, however, is the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
Real action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as
indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of
real property.
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall
be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by
the claimant
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance, to the
effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period. However,
the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as
applied in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents
have never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the
correct docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case
they filed was one for specific performance and damages and that they actually
paid the correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint.
NOTE: The parties in the Sun Insurance case expressed willingness to pay the
correct docket fees
MANCHESTER VS CA
A complaint for specific performance was filed by Manchester Development
Corporation against City Land Development Corporation to compel the latter to
execute a deed of sale in favor Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land
forfeited the former’s tender of payment for a certain transaction thereby causing
damages to Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This amount was alleged in
the BODY of their Complaint but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of P410.00 only. Said docket fee is
premised on the allegation of Manchester that their action is primarily for specific
performance hence it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled that
there is an under assessment of docket fees hence it ordered Manchester to amend
its complaint. Manchester complied but what it did was to lower the amount of
General Provisions – Rule 1
claim for damages to P10M. Said amount was however again not stated in the
PRAYER.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amended complaint should be admitted.
HELD: No. The docket fee, its computation, should be based on the original
complaint. A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the appropriate docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court. Here, since the proper docket fee was
not paid for the original complaint, it’s as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
consequence, there is no original complaint duly filed which can be amended. So,
any subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of the amended complaint is
void.
Manchester’s defense that this case is primarily an action for specific performance
is not merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on the allegations and the
prayer of the complaint, this case is an action for damages and for specific
performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary estimation.
Further, the amount for damages in the original complaint was already provided in
the body of the complaint. Its omission in the PRAYER clearly constitutes an attempt
to evade the payment of the proper filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar
irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court ruled that from this case on, all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the
amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also
in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not
bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
SUN INSURANCE VS ASUNCION
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance (or SIOL) files a complaint for the annulment of a decision
on the consignation of fire insurance policy. Subsequently, the Private Respondent
(PR) files a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, PR also claims for
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state
the amount of damages sought although from the body of the complaint it can be
inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence, PR originally paid only PhP 210.00
in docket fees.The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for
subsequent re-assessments of the amount of damages sought as well as the
corresponding docket fees. The respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
Issue: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent
did not pay the correct or sufficient docket fees?
YES.
It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglamentary period. Same rule goes for permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings.
In herein case, obviously, there was the intent on the part of PR to defraud the
government of the docket fee due not only in the filing of the original complaint but
also in the filing of the second amended complaint. However, a more liberal
interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike in Manchester, the
private respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
Where a trial court acquires jurisdiction in like manner, but subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
TACAY VS RTC OF TAGUM
https://www.scribd.com/document/332788940/Tacay-v-Rtc-of-Tagum-Digest
FACTS: These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the
RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against three
defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was
the owner of 790 sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560. The previous owner
of such land allowed the three defendants to use or occupy the same by mere
tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use the property, demanded the
defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore, but such
demands were refused. The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss
filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual,
nominal and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being
a ground to bar the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. The
Motions to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages in the complaint were
expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint
Petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as a temporary
restraining order against the RTC.
General Provisions – Rule 1
ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF
THE PROPERTY ARE RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE COURT’S
JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.
HELD: Yes. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages
as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing
of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the
meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action
involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related
damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action
may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority
by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. What
should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no
amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion,
a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise
amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees
therefore within the relevant prescriptive period.
AYALA CORP VS MADAYAG
https://www.scribd.com/document/358966973/15-Ayala-Corp-v-Madayag
NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS VS PRESIDING JUDGE OF NEGROS
https://www.scribd.com/document/247257686/NOPA-vs-Presiding-Judge-of-
Negros
Facts:
Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts denominated as Molasses
Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid in full, but was only able to receive a
partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to the quality of the
products being delivered. More than six years after NOPA filed its answer, NOPA
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file the
correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in his
complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the value of
the unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the proper docket
fees. RTC denied the motion to dismiss. CA dismissed petition for certiorari ruling
that there was no substantial compliance with the procedural requirements
because petitioner failed to allege in its verification that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records and
failure to attach the necessary documents on its pleadings as required by Section 1,
Rule 65, Rules in Civil Procedure.
Issue Whether or not CA committed error?
Ruling: No. Clearly, the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 00-2-10 to Sec. 4, Rule
7 was in order to make the verification requirement stricter, such that the party
cannot now merely state under oath that he believes the statements made in the
pleading. He cannot even merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such
statements are true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under
oath to be either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records. A
pleading, therefore, wherein the verification is merely based on the party’s
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion of the
court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar, the Court of
Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the deficiency in the
Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA’s motion for reconsideration with
attached amended petition for certiorari. As ruled in Lino Luna v. Arcenas, decisions
of a trial court which "lie in discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the
case be civil or criminal at law or in equity. Where such rulings have to do with
minor matters, not affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of
review in appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the
statute; but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to declare that where the
exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects adversely the
substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to review on appeal in any case
wherein a clear and affirmative showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a
total lack of its exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as
its improper exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the facts
upon which the ruling is based. In its very nature, the discretionary control
conferred upon the trial judge over the proceedings had before him implies the
absence of any hard-and-fast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance
with which it may be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not
a willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a sound, judicial
discretion which should always be exercised with due regard to the rights of the
parties and the demands of equity and justice.
HEIRS OF HINOG VS MELICOR
General Provisions – Rule 1
FACTS:
On May 21, 1991, private respondents, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for
"Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages"
against Bertuldo Hinog. Bertuldo filed his Answer alleging ownership of the
disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. However, on June 24, 1998,
while trial was still pending, Bertuldo died without completing his evidence.
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve issues because the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct
resort to certiorari unless redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate
courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national
interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary
remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services
was terminated by petitioner Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Petalcorin then entered his
appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.

Atty. Petalcorin filed a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify
all court proceedings on the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the
complaint the amount of damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees; and
that non-payment of the correct docket fee is jurisdictional. The trial court ordered
the complaint to be expunged from the records. However, on March 22, 1999, the
trial court reinstated the case after private respondents have paid the deficiency
docket fee.

On November 24, 1999, petitioners filed before the Supreme Court petition for
certiorari and prohibition. They alleged that Judge Melicor committed grave abuse
of discretion in allowing the case to be reinstated after payment of the deficiency
docket fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not direct recourse to the Supreme Court for Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition is proper.

HELD: No, it is not proper.

The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is not exclusive.
It is shared with Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. Although the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitioners for extraordinary
writs.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some
instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum