THE OMBUDSMAN, FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, Office of the Ombudsman, and The rule is that whether the
The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as required in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, is left
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION BUREAU, Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioners, vs. NESTOR S. VALEROSO,
FACTS:
Nestor Valeroso, the respondent, then occupying the position of Director II at the Bureau of Internal
Revenue was charged with Perjury and Dishonesty, Flasification of Official Documents and Conduct
prejudicial to the Best interest of the Service by the Fact finding and intelligence bureau of the office of
the ombudsman. Such accusations were due to the petitioner’s failure to disclose his ownership of
several properties and unexplained increase in net worth. This placed the petitioner under preventive
suspension for six months without pay.
The respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari in order to nullify the preventive
suspension against him. The petition is instituted on the ground that the element of strong evidence of
guilt was lacking, and that due process was denied when he was not informed about the nature of the
charges against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman is valid?
Held:
1. No. There is no dispute as to the power of the Ombudsman to place a public officer charged
with an administrative offense under preventive suspension. That power is clearly confined
under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which
reads:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may
preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if
in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's
continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. The preventive suspension
shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than
six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case
the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided. Clear it is from the above that the law sets forth two conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension pending an investigation,
to wit:
1. The evidence of guilt is strong; and
2. Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
a. The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty;
b. The charge would warrant removal from the service; or
c. The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
Here, respondent was charged with dishonesty, among other administrative and
criminal charges, and the Ombudsman particularly found strong evidence to support said
charge on the specified ground of "non-disclosure of assets and business interests." Questions
on the strength of the evidence to support the preventive suspension order are squarely
within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.
to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. In the very
words of Section 24, the Ombudsman may preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if
"in his judgment" the evidence presented before him tends to show that the official's guilt is strong and
if the further requisites enumerated in Section 24 are present. The Court cannot substitute its own
judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Ombudsman. Moreover, the charge of dishonesty is a grave offense which, if
duly proven, merits the penalty of dismissal from the service on commission of the first infraction.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, vs. PEDRO O. DACOYCOY,
PARDO, J.:
FACTS: On November 29, 1995, George P. Suan, a Citizens Crime Watch Vice-President, Allen Chapter,
Northern Samar, filed with the Civil Service Commission, Quezon City, a complaint against Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, for habitual drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism.
The Civil Service Regional Office No. 8, Tacloban City, filed charges against him. Accordingly, the
Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution finding no substantial evidence to support the
charge of habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil Service Commission found
respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment of his
two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility worker, respectively, and their assignment under
his immediate supervision and control as the Vocational School Administrator Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal from the service.
respondent Dacoycoy filed a motion for reconsideration; however, the Civil Service Commission
denied the motion.
respondent Dacoycoy filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunctioni[6] to set aside the Civil Service Commission’s resolutions.the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Civil Service Commission, Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N there is nepotism.
YES.
The law defines nepotism as follows:
“Sec. 59. Nepotism. – (1) All appointments to the national, provincial, city and municipal
governments or in any branch or instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled
corporations, made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of
the bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate supervision over him, are hereby prohibited.
“As used in this Section, the word “relative” and members of the family referred to are those
related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
(2) The following are exempted from the operations of the rules on nepotism: (a) persons
employed in a confidential capacity, (b) teachers, (c) physicians, and (d) members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines: Provided, however, That in each particular instance full report of such appointment
shall be made to the Commission.”
Under the definition of nepotism, one is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a
relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following:
 a) appointing authority;
b) recommending authority;
c) chief of the bureau or office, and
d) person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Clearly, there are four situations covered. In the last two mentioned situations, it is immaterial
who the appointing or recommending authority is. To constitute a violation of the law, it suffices that an
appointment is extended or issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the chief of the bureau or office, or the person exercising immediate supervision over the
appointee.
Respondent Dacoycoy is the Vocational School Administrator, Balicuatro College of Arts and
Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. It is true that he did not appoint or recommend his two sons to the
positions of driver and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades. In fact, it was Mr.
Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment of
Rito. However, it was respondent Dacoycoy who certified that “funds are available for the proposed
appointment of Rito Dacoycoy” and even rated his performance as “very satisfactory”. On the other
hand, his son Ped stated in his position description form that his father was “his next higher supervisor”.
The circumvention of the ban on nepotism is quite obvious. Unquestionably, Mr. Daclag was a
subordinate of respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees under his immediate supervision. Then
Mr. Daclag recommended the appointment of respondent’s two sons and placed them under
respondent’s immediate supervision serving as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are
career positions.
To our mind, the unseen but obvious hand of respondent Dacoycoy was behind the appointing or
recommending authority in the appointment of his two sons. Clearly, he is guilty of nepotism
GLORIA VS CA
FACTS:
Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and October 1990,
during the teachers' strikes, they did not report for work. For this reason, they were administratively
charged with (1) grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules
and Regulations and reasonable office regulations. (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross
insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without leave
(AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The investigation was concluded before the lapse of
90-day suspension and private respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo
was ordered dismissed from the service while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth
Somebang were ordered suspended for six months The MSPB denied their appeal. The appellate court
ruled that private respondents were entitled to the payment of their salaries, allowances and other
benefits during the period of their suspension beyond the 90-day period of preventive suspension
although they were found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations for having been
absent without leave during the teachers’ strike and were reprimanded.
Petitioner contended that the continued suspension of private respondents was due to their
appeal, hence, the government should not be held answerable for payment of their salaries. Moreover,
petitioner claimed that private respondents are considered under preventive suspension during the
period of their appeal, thus, they are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their
suspension.
ISSUE: W/N he is entitled to salaries during the period of suspension
HELD: The Court ruled that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. It
cannot be considered unjustified even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of
salaries to the employee concerned. It is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of
the investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the investigation is not
finished, the employee shall be automatically reinstated. However, although employees who are
preventively suspended pending investigation are not entitled to the payment of their salaries even if
they are exonerated, the Court did not agree with the petitioner that they are not entitled to
compensation for the period of their suspension pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.
Because respondent is penalized before his sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in
the event he is exornerated. It would be unjust to deprive him of his pay as a result of the immediate
execution of the decision against him and continue to do so even after it is shown that he is innocent of
the charges for which he was suspended. To sustain the government’s theory would be to make the
administrative decision not only executory but final and executory. Consequently, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification as to the computation of the salaries
awarded to private respondents.
TERMINATION OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS
G.R. No. L-89 February 1, 1946
JOSE TOPACIO NUENO, MANUEL DE LA FUENTE, EUSTAQUIO C. BALAGTAS, and DELIA C.
DIÑO,petitioners,
vs.
GERARDO ANGELES, AGATON EVANGELISTA, ANDRES SANTA MARIA, VICENTE G. CRUZ, AMADO V.
HERNANDEZ and FELICIDAD MANUEL, respondents.
Facts: Petitioners were elected as members of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila in the general
elections held on December 10, 1940. They were slated to assume office for a term of three years.
However the elections of 1943 did not push through as the city was then under Japanese occupation. In
1945 due to physical impossibility of conducting a special election the President of the Commonwealth
appointed the 6 respondents as members of the Board. Petitioners then instituted this action against
respondents on the ground that the petitioners having been elected as members of the Municipal Board
of Manila in the general election held in December 1940 for three years, their term of office has not yet
expired because they have not served for said period due to the Japanese occupation. They also
contended that in view of the foregoing, they are entitled to hold-over or continue in office until their
successors are elected and qualified, and therefore respondents’ appointments are null and void.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to hold over their positions until such time when their
successors shall have qualified and elected?
Held: No. The contention that petitioners are entitled to continue in office because they have not
completely served for three years due to the war, is untenable, even assuming that they had not
discharged the duties of their office during the Japanese occupation of Manila. For the simple reason
that the term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the
time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of light, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the
incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may
be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. There is no principle,
law or doctrine by which the term of an office may be extended by reason of war.
Regarding the hold-over principle, our lawmakers have followed the policy and practice of those States
that provide expressly in their statutes for holding over of provincial, city and municipal officers as
provided in the Revised Administrative Code. However, the provisions relating to said principle have
been deemed repealed by the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 357 of the Election Code. Section 16
of the said law states that whenever (1) the election fails to take place on the date fixed by law (as in the
case at bar), or (2) results in a failure to elect, or (3) the officer-elect dies before assumption of office, or
(4) his election is not confirmed for disloyalty, or (5) he fails to qualify for reason of non-eligibility of
other reasons, the successor, to fill the vacancy shall be elected in a special election, if the President
does not exercise his discretion to fill the vacancy in the last three cases (3), (4) and (5) by appointment.
In the case at bar, since there was a physical impossibility of holding a special election, the same section
16 empowers the President to appoint a person to fill such temporary vacancy or interregnum, and the
person so appointed shall hold the office until the permanent successor has been elected or appointed
to fill the office for the unexpired term. Thus, the legislature expressly intended that there shall be no
hold-over of the previous occupant of the elective seat prior to assumption of office of his successor.
From the foregoing it clearly appears that petitioners are not entitled to hold-over, and after the
expiration of their term of office on December 31, 1943, the offices of members of the Municipal Board
of Manila became vacant from January 1, 1944, because of failure to hold the regular election on the
second Tuesday of December 1943 and the special election, and consequently to elect the would-be
incumbents. And during the interregnum or temporary vacancy from January 1, 1944, until the said
special election is held and new members elected or, in case of failure to elect, appointed by the
President (under section 16 [c] and [d] of Commonwealth Act No. 357) the President had, under section
16 (a) of the same Act, the power to appoint the respondents or any other, at his discretion, to fill said
temporary vacancy or vacancies. As the petitioners are not entitled to hold-over or continue, after the
expiration of their term, in the offices claimed by them and held now by the respondents, they have no
right to bring the present action and impugn the validity of the latter's appointments.
G.R. No 94070 April 10, 1992
ROSALINDA DE PERIO SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG and SECRETARY RAUL MANGLAPUS, respondents.
EN BANC, GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari* seeking to set aside Administrative Order No. 122 of the Office
of the President, finding the petitioner guilty of dishonesty and meting upon her, after appreciating
certain mitigating circumstances in her favor, the penalty of reprimand with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. The President affirmed Assignment Order
No. 58/88 dated April 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs recalling the petitioner to the home
office from her post as permanent representative to the Philippine Mission to the United Nations and
other International Organizations (MISUNPHIL, for short) in Geneva, Switzerland.
Petitioner Rosalinda de Perio-Santos, a career service officer with the rank of Chief of Mission
II and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, was appointed on July 24, 1986, by her Excellency,
President Corazon C. Aguino, to the position of Permanent Representative of the Philippines to the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations and other International Organizations with station in Geneva,
Switzerland. On April 6, 1987, petitioner sought a leave of absence from the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) to spend the Easter Holidays in New York, U.S.A. Before they could leave Geneva, petitioner
received instructions from the home office directing her to proceed to Havana as a member of the
Philippine delegation to the UNCTAD G-77 Preparatory Conference from April 20-26, 1987. Instead of
buying an economy roundtrip ticket, she used for the Geneva-New York-Geneva portion of her trip the
two (2) discounted tickets costing only SFr. 1,597 for herself and her daughter Pia. They left Geneva for
New York en route to Havana on April 15, 1987. On the same day, the DFA approved her application for a
leave of absence with pay from April 27 to May 1, 1987. Instead of claiming reimbursement for SFr.
2,996, she requested, and received, reimbursement of only SFr. 1,597 which she spent for the Geneva to
New York, and New York to Geneva portion of her trip, thereby effecting savings of SFr.1,399 for the
Government. On September 21, 1987, the DFA required her to refund the amount representing her
daughter's round-trip ticket since DFA received a copy of the "facture" from the travel agency showing
that the amount of SFr.1,597 was in payment of (a) 1 billet adulte-Geneva/New York/Geneva SFr. 950,
and (b) 1 billet enfant-Geneva/New York/Geneva SFr. 673; and that the sum of SFr. 673 represented the
cost of her daughter's portion of the ticket.
ISSUES:
1. whether or not petitioner was guilty of dishonesty.
2. whether or not the order of recall was invalid.
HELD:
1. No. Her failure to disclose the fact that her discounted tickets included the fare for her child,
was harmless and inconsequential as the two (2) discounted Geneva-New York-Geneva tickets
for herself and her daughter were in fact inseparable, intransferable, non-cancellable and
non-refundable, in effect one whole fare only, for purposes of the discount. The Court
believes however that she did not intend to falsify or conceal the truth when she filed a claim
for the refund of the total cost of her discounted tickets (SFr.1,597). Her claim for the whole
discounted fare was based on the fact that her daughter's ticket was inseparable from her
own fare. They had to go together to be entitled to the special discount. Their fare was
indivisible, hence, the Government's offer to shoulder only the petitioner's portion of the
discounted fare (SFr. 950), excluding her daughter's portion (SFr. 647) was neither fair nor
reasonable.
2. No. the Court is not disposed to disturb the order of the DFA and the Office of the President recalling
the petitioner to the home office. There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that her tour of duty in
Geneva was for four (4) years, as provided in Section 260 of P.D. No. 1578 ("Instituting the
Administrative Code of 1978'), thus:
(b) Tour of duty — (1) The tour of duty of a foreign service officer at any post shall
be four (4) years commencing on the date of his arrival at the post, after which he
shall be transferred to another post.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, P.D. 1578 was one of those unpublished "secret"
decrees which this Court in Tañada, et al. vs. Tuvera, et al., 146 SCRA 446, declared to be
inoperative or without legal force and effect. P.D. 1578 was expressly repealed on May 5,
1987, by Executive Order No. 168, entitled "REPEALING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1578
ENTITLED 'INSTITUTING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1978.'"
The applicable law therefore is Section 6, Part B, Title III, of R.A. 708, "The Foreign Service Act
of the Philippines," enacted on June 5, 1952, providing that:
Sec. 6. Assignments and Transfers — A Foreign Service Officer may be assigned by
the Secretary to serve in the Department or in a diplomatic or consular post
 abroad: Provided, however, that the minimum period during which he may serve in
any foreign post shall be one year and the maximum period four years, except in
case of emergency or extraordinary circumstances, in which event he may be
tranferred from one foreign post to another or to the Department by the order of
the Secretary without regard to his length of service in his former post.
Since the petitioner had been appointed to her post on July 24, 1986, she had already served
the minimum one-year period of service when her recall on April 22, 1988 came. Her
reassignment to Manila did not have to be explained and justified by the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs nor the President of the Philippines
MARIO D. ORTIZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 78957. June 28, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos "for a term expiring May 17, 1992." On March 5, 1986, petitioner sent
President Corazon C. Aquino a letter which reads that he hereby places his position at President Aquino’s
disposal. On March 25, 1986, the Freedom Constitution was promulgated, Article III thereof provides: xxx
SEC. 3. Any public officer or employee separated from the service as a result of the reorganization
effected under this Proclamation shall, if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement
and other benefits accruing thereunder.
On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary conveyed the information to Commissioners
Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo and Layosa that the President had "accepted, with regrets, their respective
resignations, effective immediately." After the presidential acceptance of said "resignations," new
Commissioners composed the COMELEC, to which Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz and Marquinez
submitted on July 30, 1986 their respective applications for retirement.
To justify their petitions for retirement and their requests for payment of retirement benefits,
former COMELEC Commissioners invoked Section 1 of Republic Act No. l568 which provides that: when
the Auditor General or the Chairman or any Member of the Commission on Elections retires from the
service for having completed his term of office xxx Provided, That in case of resignation, he has rendered
not less than twenty years of service in the government, he shall receive an annuity payable monthly
during the residue of his natural life equivalent to the amount of monthly salary he was receiving on the
date of retirement, incapacity or resignation.
The COMELEC denied the applications for retirement of the Commissioners on the ground
that they were "not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.”
Petitioner Ortiz moved for the reconsideration of said resolution; but the same was denied by the
COMELEC. Petitioner appealed to the Chairman of the COA, who referred the same to COMELEC. The
same, however, was not acted upon. Hence, this petition. The respondents posit the view that
petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the completion of his term of office, and, therefore,
having rendered only sixteen years of service to the government, he is not entitled to retirement
benefits.
Issue:
Whether or not a constitutional official whose "courtesy resignation" was accepted by the
President of the Philippines during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution may be entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended.
Held:
Petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by
the then nascent Aquino government may not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of
the law. Resignation is defined as the act of giving up or the act of an officer by which he declines his
office and renounces the further right to use it. To constitute a complete and operative act of resignation,
the officer or employee must show a clear intention to relinquish or surrender his position accompanied
by the act of relinquishment. Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express
or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce and relinquish the office, and its acceptance by
competent and lawful authority.
From the foregoing it is evident that petitioner's "resignation" lacks the element of clear
intention to surrender his position. We cannot presume such intention from his statement in his letter of
March 5, 1986 that he was placing his position at the disposal of the President. He did not categorically
state therein that he was unconditionally giving up his position. It should be remembered that said letter
was actually a response to Proclamation No. 1 which President Aquino issued on February 25, 1986 when
she called on all appointive public officials to tender their "courtesy resignation" as a "first step to
restore confidence in public administration.
Verily, a "courtesy resignation" can lot properly be interpreted as resignation in the legal sense
for it is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position. Rather, it
manifests his submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. A stringent
interpretation of courtesy resignations must therefore be observed, particularly in cases involving
constitutional officials like the petitioner whose removal from office entails an impeachment proceeding.
The curtailment of his term, not being attributable to any voluntary act on the part of the
petitioner, equity and justice demand that he should be deemed to have completed his term albeit much
ahead of the date stated in his appointment paper. Petitioner's case should be placed in the same
category as that of an official holding a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon his
superior's loss of confidence in him. His cessation from the service entails no removal but an expiration
of his term. As he is deemed to have completed his term of office, petitioner should be considered
retired from the service.
G.R. No. 149356 March 14, 2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the Department of Trade and Industry, Petitioner,
vs.WINSTON T. SINGUN
FACTS:
Singun, the respondent, a former Chief Trade and Idustry Development Specialist in Cagayan, wrote a
resignation letter to the Hipolito, regional director of DTI. However, prior to the acceptance of the said
resignation, undersecretary Ordonez, issued an order detailing the respondent to the Office of the
Undersecretary. However, Ordonez proclaimed that such detail order is without effect since, the
resignation of the respondent was already accepted as evidenced by a memorandum the latter had
issued. The respondent contended that his resignation is without effect because Ordonez failed to issue
a notice accepting his resignation and such was still revocable.
ISSUE
Whether respondent validly resigned from DTI-RO2 effective 14 January 2000?
Whether the detail order issued by Undersecretary Ordoñez effectively withdrew respondent’s
resignation.
HELD
1. NO. There was no indication that respondent received a copy of his 12 November 1999 application for
leave of absence and resignation as accepted by Director Hipolito. Neither was there any indication that
respondent received Director Hipolito’s 12 November 1999 Memorandum informing him of the
acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, we affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondent’s
resignation was incomplete and inoperative because respondent was not notified of the acceptance of
his resignation.
Resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to
surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority.28
To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office, there must be: (a) an intention to
relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and (c) an acceptance by the proper authority.
In our jurisdiction, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and
effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office.30 Resignation to
be effective must be accepted by competent authority, either in terms or by something tantamount to
an acceptance, such as the appointment of the successor.31 A public officer cannot abandon his office
before his resignation is accepted, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal provisions of Article
23832 of the Revised Penal Code. The final or conclusive act of a resignation’s acceptance is the notice of
acceptance. The incumbent official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his
resignation unless he had been duly notified therefor.
2. YES. Until the resignation is accepted, the tender or offer to resign is revocable.36 And the resignation
is not effective where it was withdrawn before it was accepted.37
In this case, since respondent’s resignation was not finally and conclusively accepted as he was not duly
notified of its acceptance, respondent could validly withdraw his resignation. There was no need for
Director Hipolito to accept the withdrawal of resignation since there was no valid acceptance of the
application of resignation in the first place. Undersecretary Ordoñez also validly issued the detail order as
respondent had not effectively resigned from DTI-RO2.
ESTRADA VS DESIERTO
Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur
Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January
16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the
name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada
government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also
appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he
was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President
Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.
Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied.
As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts show that
petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and
after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the state
of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized in the Phil. Daily
Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already
about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During
the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The
only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after
the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he
acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them;
(4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the assumption into
office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the nomination of
Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no
longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim of inability. The Court cannot pass
upon petitioner’s claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which
cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
ELISA O. GAMBOA, et al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. L-38068 September 30, 1981
GUERRERO, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners are the defendants in a civil case filed by herein private respondents with the CFI of Rizal, for
damages. Judgment was rendered by the trial court (then presided over by Judge Vivencio Ruiz) in favor
of the private respondents. The judgment having become final, a writ of execution was issued and
accordingly, a public auction sale was conducted by the Sheriff who issued a Sheriff's Certificate of Sale
of a Toyota Corolla taxi, model '69, and of a certificate of Public Convenience to operate 60 units of
taxicabs, in favor of private respondents, represented by Atty. Jesus Suntay, their counsel of record.
Thereafter, herein petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside Sale on Execution" on the grounds
that the execution sale was attended by fraud, mistake and/or irregularity "so serious as to have worked
a grave injustice to defendants herein." The then presiding Judge Ruiz denied said motion. Herein
petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Judge Ruiz granted, setting aside the execution sale
on the grounds that it is defective and irregular.
Later, Judge Vivencio Ruiz tendered his resignation pursuant to and in compliance with Letter of
Instruction No. 11 issued by the President of the Philippines. The aforesaid order of Judge Ruiz was then,
setting aside the execution sale, promulgated and filed with the Clerk of Court. Subsequent thereto,
Judge Ruiz received the letter of acceptance by the President. Respondent Judge Arsenio Alcantara was
appointed in his stead.
Private respondents filed their "Motion to Annul and/or Set Aside Order, dated September 18, 1972".
Respondent Judge Alcantara granted private respondents' motion, and declared as null and void the
order of the former Judge Ruiz, thereby restoring the validity and efficacy of the execution sale in favor
of private respondents. The reasons stated in the questioned order were: (1) that Judge Ruiz ceased to
be a member of the Judiciary on the date of his resignation that was October 4, 1972, or, on the date of
acceptance thereof by the President in his letter of October 6, 1972; (2) that the order of September 18,
1972 was filed with the Clerk of Court only on October 18, 1972 — to be valid and binding, a judgment or
order must be duly signed and promulgated during the incumbency of the Judge whose signature
appears thereon; (3) that Judge Ruiz cannot even be considered a de facto officer after October 4 or 6,
1972 because — (a) the filing of the resignation of a public officer in the proper office, without any
objection constitutes a sufficient acceptance and notice of acceptance is not necessary; (b) good faith on
the part of Judge Ruiz did not exist when the order of September 18, 1972 was filed and promulgated
with the Clerk of Court on October 18, 1972, "on account of the fact that all orders except litigated order
of September 18, 1972 filed with the Clerk of Court on October 18, 1972 bore October dates as attested
by the certification of the Clerk of Court, and if it were true that the contested order was made on
September 18, 1972, why was it not released earlier than October 18, 1972 when several orders or
decisions bearing all October dates were released ahead of the order in question".
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration; however, respondent Judge denied petitioner's
motion. Petitioners likewise filed a "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Adduce Evidence in
Support of Motion" but it was denied for lack of sufficient merits.
Issue:
Whether or not Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz ceased to be judge de jure or de facto upon acceptance of his
resignation by the President of the Philippines.
Ruling:
No. One of the ways of terminating official relations is by resignation. To constitute a complete and
operative resignation of public office, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term,
accompanied by the act of relinquishment 6 and a resignation implies an expression of the incumbent in
some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce, and relinquish the office and the
acceptance by competent and lawful authority. 7 In Our jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for
resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective, otherwise the officer is subject to the penal
provisions of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code on Abandonment of office or position. Clearly, a
public officer cannot abandon his office or position before his resignation is accepted but the incumbent
official would not be in a position to determine the acceptance of his resignation unless he has been duly
notified therefor.
It must be noted that respondent Court of Appeals underscored the undeniable fact that while the
President's letter of acceptance was dated October 6, 1972, it was completely processed only on October
20, 1972 and officially received by Judge Ruiz on October 21, 1972. Thus, respondent Court's holding that
even if there were a strict interpretation as to when Judge Ruiz ceased to be a member of the Judiciary
although petitioners maintain that the date of his cessation from office is October 6, 1972, still, his acts
before the official notification of the acceptance of his resignation are those of a de facto officer, and
therefore, valid, is correct. Respondent Court of Appeals has also pointed out correctly that the
underlying principle of de facto acts is the protection of third parties and the public. It is for this reason
of public interest that the Secretary (now Minister) of Justice issued Circular No. 70 dated October 13,
1972, directing all categories of judges and fiscals to stay in their official stations and not to depart
therefrom without previous permission from the Office (referring to Ministry of Justice) and to continue
discharging their functions until notified of the action taken on their letters of resignation.
SB of San Andres Catanduanes v. CA
G.R. No. 118883January 16, 1998
Pnaganiban, J:
FACTS:
Augusto T. Antonio was elected bgy captain of Sapang Palay, San Andres. In that capacity, he was
appointed by the President as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of San Andres and
was later elected president of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC).Meanwhile, the election for
the president of Federation of the Association of Barangay Councils (FABC) was declared void by theDILG
for lack of quorum and there organization in the provincial council became necessary. Being president
of ABC, the DILG Sec. appointed Antonio as temporary member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Catanduanes. As such, Antonio tendered his resignation as member of SB.The VP of ABC,
Nenito Aquino was appointed as member of SB in replacementof Antonio.Later SC, invalidate the
decision of the DILG with regard to the election of the FABC president and also the appointmentof
Antonio as member of SP. Antonio wrote a letter to SB to reassume his position but it was denied on the
ground that he has already resigned.
ISSUE:
WON there is an effective resignation of abandonment of office.
HELD:
Antonio cannot assume his previous position because although there was no effective resignation, there
was an abandonment of office. To constitute a complete and operative resignation from public office,
there must be: (a) an intention to relinquish a part of the term; (b) an act of relinquishment; and(c) an
acceptance by the proper authority .In this case, there is no effective resignation because there is no
evidence that the resignation was accepted by any government functionary or office. However, Antonio
has effectively relinquished his membership in the Sangguniang Bayan due to his voluntary
abandonment of said post. This is clear when he did not simultaneously discharge the duties and
obligations of both positions. Neither did he, at that time, express an intention to resume his office
as member of the SB. His overt acts, silence, inaction and acquiescence, when Aquino succeeded him to
his original position, show that Antonio had abandoned the contested office. Antonio’s failure to
promptly assert hisalleged right implies his loss of interest in the position. His overt acts plainly show that
he really meant his resignation and understood its effects
FRANCISCO A. TAN vs. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-12525 February 19, 1960
PADILLA, J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Auditor General denying the petitioner's claim for back
salaries.
The petitioner was head teacher in Habuhab barrio school, Caibiran, Leyte, with P140 monthly salary or
P1680 annually. Petitioner was charged with gross misconduct for an immoral act committed in the
evening of 4 June 1948. On 14 June 1949 the Commissioner of Civil Service found him guilty and required
him "to resign from the service, with prejudice to reinstatement in the teaching service, effective on his
last day of duty with pay." He appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals. On 26 June 1954 the Civil
Service Board of Appeals reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service and acquitted him of
the charge. On 4 June 1955 the petitioner wrote to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Leyte
"accepting the reinstatement offered to take effect on June 13, 1955”. However, in view of ill health he
applied "for an indefinite sick leave of absence." The petitioner was suffering from "Hypertension
(labile)" and the doctor advised him to take a rest.
On 14 July 1955 he wrote to the Division Superintendent of Schools of Leyte requesting payment of back
salaries from 6 August 1949 to 12 June 1955, inclusive, at the rate of P1680 per annum, or total of
P9,598.58. On 16 February 1956 the Undersecretary of Education disregarded the Director's
recommendation and denied the petitioner's claim on the ground that he was out of the service from 6
August 1949 to 1 March 1951, inclusive, he having been dismissed by the Commissioner of Civil Service
for grave misconduct; that although the decision of the Commissioner was reversed on appeal by the
Civil Service Board of Appeals, payment of back salaries to him during the period of removal from office
was a matter of discretion; and that funds were not available.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of dismissal from service becomes final and executory that prohibits
petitioner from receiving back salary
Held:
No. The decision did not become final and executory. The appeal taken by the petitioner to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service finding him guilty of
grave misconduct and requiring him to resign from the service precluded the execution of the decision of
the Commissioner of Civil Service. The decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals reversing that of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and absolving the petitioner from the charge was not reversed or modified
by the President. It, therefore, became the final decision on the petitioner's case. The petitioner's
removal from office was not in accordance with law; his reinstatement became a ministerial duty of the
proper authority; and the payment of back salary was merely incidental to reinstatement.
The fact that during the pendency of the petitioner's appeal in the Civil Service Board of Appeals, he
worked as clerk in the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of Leyte, does not constitute abandonment of
his former position. He was ordered to resign from the service with prejudice to reinstatement and by
virtue thereof was prevented from exercising the functions of his position and receiving the
corresponding compensation. Finding employment in another branch of the government does not
constitute abandonment of his former position. To deny him the right to collect his back salaries during
such period would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charge which caused
his dismissal from the service.
Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the petitioner entitled to receive and the Government bound to
pay him the sum of P3,784.57
[G.R. No. 133132. February 15, 2001.]
ALEXIS C. CANONIZADO vs. HON. ALEXANDER P. AGUIRRE
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration to the Court's decision declaring Section 8 of Republic Act No. 8551
void for being violative of petitioners' constitutional guaranteed right to security of tenure.
Petitioners, Commissioners of the National Police Commission, with the effectivity of the law, were
removed from office and in their stead appointed respondents Aguirre, Adiong and two other generals.
Petitioners seasonably assailed the constitutionality of the said law. Meanwhile, pending appeal,
petitioner Canonizado was appointed and assumed the Office of Inspector General of the Internal Affairs
Service (IAS) of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The respondents alleged that petitioner's
appointment constituted abandonment of his claim for reinstatement since the offices of NAPOLCOM
and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's appointment constituted abandonment of his claim for reinstatement since
the offices of NAPOLCOM and Inspector General of the IAS are incompatible.
HELD:
NO. It is held that there is no question that the positions of NAPOLCOM Commissioner and Inspector
General of the IAS are incompatible with each other. However, the rule does not apply where there
was no discharge of functions of the two offices simultaneously; and that acceptance of a second
position pending appeal does not constitute abandonment. He had the right to live during the
pendency of his appeal and naturally the right to accept any form of employment. Prohibiting
petitioner from accepting a second position during the pendency of his petition would be to unjustly
compel him to bear the consequences of an unconstitutional act which under no circumstances can be
attributed to him.
Generally speaking, a person holding a public office may abandon such office by nonuser or
acquiescence. Non-user refers to a neglect to use a right or privilege or to exercise an office. However,
nonperformance of the duties of an office does not constitute abandonment where such
nonperformance results from temporary disability or from involuntary failure to perform. Abandonment
may also result from an acquiescence by the officer in his wrongful removal or discharge, for instance,
after a summary removal, an unreasonable delay by an officer illegally removed in taking steps to
vindicate his rights may constitute an abandonment of the office. Where, while desiring and intending to
hold the office, and with no willful desire or intention to abandon it, the public officer vacates it in
deference to the requirements of a statute which is afterwards declared unconstitutional, such a
surrender will not be deemed an abandonment and the officer may recover the office.
By accepting the position of Inspector General during the pendency of the present case — brought
precisely to assail the constitutionality of his removal from the NAPOLCOM — Canonizado cannot be
deemed to have abandoned his claim for reinstatement to the latter position. First of all, Canonizado did
not voluntarily leave his post as Commissioner, but was compelled to do soon the strength of Section 8
of RA 8551. In our decision of 25 January 2000, we struck down the above quoted provision for being
violative of petitioners' constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. Thus, Canonizado
harbored no willful desire or intention to abandon his official duties. In fact, Canonizado, together with
petitioners Edgar Dula Torres and Rogelio A. Pureza, lost no time disputing what they perceived to be an
illegal removal; a few weeks after RA 8551 took effect on 6 March 1998, petitioners instituted the
current action on 15 April 1998, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of said law. The
removal of petitioners from their positions by virtue of a constitutionally infirm act necessarily negates a
finding of voluntary relinquishment.
It is a well settled rule that he who, while occupying one office, accepts another incompatible with the
first, ipso facto vacates the first office and his title is thereby terminated without any other act or
proceeding. Public policy considerations dictate against allowing the same individual to perform
inconsistent and incompatible duties. The incompatibility contemplated is not the mere physical
impossibility of one person's performing the duties of the two offices due to a lack of time or the inability
to be in two places at the same moment, but that which proceeds from the nature and relations of the
two positions to each other as to give rise to contrariety and antagonism should one person attempt to
faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of one toward the incumbent of the other.
NOTES:
ABANDONMENT, DEFINITION. — Abandonment of an office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office
by the holder, with the intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute
abandonment of office, it must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute
relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the law will
infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs from and is accompanied by
deliberation and freedom of choice. There are, therefore, two essential elements of abandonment: first,
an intention to abandon and second an overt or "external" act by which the intention is carried into
effect.
De Los Santos vs. Mallare
G.R. No. L-3881, August 31, 1950
Tuason, J.
FACTS: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by
the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and
on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position.
On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same
position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and
Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-
defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these
proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may remove a city engineer, a position that is neither confidential,
policy determining nor highly technical at pleasure.
HELD: No. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in
the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in
the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures
freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal
trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to
execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and
duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are
essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A
city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or
superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is, we believe, employed in the
Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical
competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are
eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men
possessing executive ability. Nevertheless, the President may not remove the city engineer at pleasure as
Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code which authorized the same was repealed when the
Constitution took effect.
G.R. No. 78053 June 4, 1990
FRANCISCO L. MENDOZA vs. HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING as Secretary of Education, Culture and
Sports
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
(The issues raised in these consolidated cases refer to the validity of various reorganization programs in
different agencies and/or departments of the government implementing the orders issued pursuant to
the President's Proclamation No. 1 declaring as policy the reorganization of the government and
Proclamation No. 3 "DECLARING A NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS MANDATED BY THE
PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION AND PROVIDING
FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION." In addition to the
pleadings filed, the parties discussed the basic issues raised in these petitions during the hearings held on
January 24 and 31, 1989.)
FACTS:
In G.R. No. 78053, the petitioner questions the validity of the March 19, 1987 letter-order of the then
Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Lourdes R. Quisumbing which terminated his
employment as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City.
Petitioner Mendoza was the Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City who was reappointed by
respondent Quisumbing as such with a "PERMANENT" status. He has served the Department of
Education for forty-two (42) years, moving up the ranks in the public schools system. Executive Order No.
117 was issued by the President reorganizing the DECS. The petitioner received the letter-order
informing him that pursuant to Executive Order No. 117 which provides for a reorganization of the DECS
and the implementing guidelines thereof he would be considered separated from the service effective
without prejudice to availment of benefits. The letter particularly stated that consistent with the
mandate of reorganization to achieve greater efficiency and effectiveness, all incumbent
officials/personnel are on 'holdover' status unless advised otherwise. In his place, Secretary Quisumbing
appointed Dr. Socorro L. Sering, on a permanent status on March 2, 1988. In the meantime, the
petitioner wrote Secretary Quisumbing requesting reconsideration of the letter-order. The letter was
forwarded to the Reorganization Appeals Board (RAB). The motion for reconsideration remained unacted
upon, hence on June 24, 1987, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction. In a resolution dated September 19, 1988, the RAB
recommended that action on the petitioner's letter- reconsideration be deferred pending resolution of
the instant petition.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 78053 argues against the "holdover" feature of the challenged order in this
manner:
xxx xxx xxx
... To reduce four hundred thousand officers and employees most of them permanent, to
holdover status preparatory to their eventual separation from the service many of them
beyond middle age and too late to start a new career, is not only tyranny but cruelty of the
first magnitude. Reorganizations can be accomplished without disruption of family life, so well
respected and protected by the. 1986 (sic) Constitution when it says with honor and oxide,
'The State recognizes sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution.' Moreover, this step is not in keeping with the mandate
of the Freedom Constitution which tasks the President to make effective the guarantees of
human rights against violations thereof. (Rollo, G.R. No. 78053, p. 5)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the separation of the petitioner from office allegedly resulting from the reorganization is
valid.
HELD:
NO. The ritual invocation of the abolition of office is not sufficient to justify the termination of the
services of an officer or employee in such abolished office. It is a paramount principle in Public Officers'
Law that the power to abolish public offices vested in the legislature is not absolute. It is subject to the
limitations that it be exercised in good faith, should never be for personal or political reasons, and
cannot, be implemented in a manner contrary to law. If an executive department is bloated with
unnecessary employees, there can be no objection to a law abolishing the useless or non-essential items.
Speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court was very emphatic in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr., supra that
an abolition which is not bona-fide but is merely a device to circumvent the constitutional security of
tenure of civil service employees is null and void.
These principles were reiterated in De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]) where we sustained a
bona-fide reorganization, to wit:
...It is a well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. And of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office....' As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the
abolition must be made in good faith. (at pp. 321-322).
It is apparent that the petitioner's termination as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City was
pursuant to the public respondent's view that under Section 24 of Executive Order No. 117 all incumbent
officials/personnel of DECS were on hold-over status unless advised otherwise.
The dismissal of all employees and their being placed on holdover status is particularly objectionable in
the DECS. There could have been no intention to get rid of hundreds of thousands of school teachers.
The use of "reorganization" even under the concept advocated by the Solicitor General appears trivial if
not unnecessary. To use reorganization of the biggest Department in the government in order to avoid
the hassles of bringing administrative charges against Mendoza and perhaps a few other
alleged persona-non-gratas like him is precisely what this Court rejects when we apply the bona-fide
rule. One does not burn down a house if his purpose is to roast alleged pests. There was grave abuse of
discretion when the petitioner's services were terminated by a mere letter-order on the justification that
the petitioner, together with the entire personnel of the DECS, was only in a hold-over capacity. If the
petitioner is guilty of wrongdoing, it is an easy matter to the charges against him instead of placing the
entire DECS on hold-over status in order to run after him.
The petition is GRANTED. The LETTER-ORDER dated MARCH 19, 1987 issued by the public respondent
which terminated the services of the petitioner is SET ASIDE. The successor of the public respondent, the
former Lourdes R. Quisumbing as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, is ordered to restore the
petitioner to his position as Schools Division Superintendent of Surigao City without loss; of seniority
rights and with back salaries reckoned from the date of his termination.
Dario vs. Mison
G.R. No. 81954 August 8, 1989
SARMIENTO, J.:
FACTS:
The President promulgated Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF
FINANCE” which provides for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing
pattern therefor. Thereafter, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino people adopted the new Constitution. On
January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement whereby it provides that by February 28, 1988, the employees
covered by Executive Order 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of Customs by the
President of the Philippines on reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-appointment, or b) offered
another position in the same department or agency or c) informed of their termination. Commissioner
Mison also constituted a Reorganization Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from removals
under the above Memorandum which notices of termination were sent to 394 Customs officials. Some
sought reinstatement from the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went
directly to the Supreme Court.
Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA 6656 was then
passed also known as ACT TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVICE OFFICERS AND
EMPLOYEES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION, providing that all officers
and employees who are found by the Civil Service Commission to have been separated in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated or reappointed without loss of seniority and shall be
entitled to full pay for the period of separation. Unless also separated for cause, all officers and
employees, including casuals and temporary employees, who have been separated pursuant to
reorganization shall, if entitled thereto, be paid the appropriate separation pay and retirement and other
benefits under existing laws within ninety (90) days from the date of the effectivity of their separation or
from the date of the receipt of the resolution of their appeals as the case may be: Provided, That
application for clearance has been filed and no action thereon has been made by the corresponding
department or agency. Those who are not entitled to said benefits shall be paid a separation gratuity in
the amount equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. Such separation pay and
retirement benefits shall have priority of payment out of the savings of the department or agency
concerned.
ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not CSC erred in its decision;
2.) Whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution is a grant of a license upon the
Government to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-
authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.
HELD:
On the first issue:
NO. All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature
and extent. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the
"fetters" of due process and security of tenure. At this point, we must distinguish removals from
separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization
carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the
Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and
explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not obliged to prove anything because the
Constitution allows it.
Like Dario Vicente Feria, the petitioner in G.R. No. 81967, was a Deputy Commissioner at
the Bureau until his separation directed by Commissioner Mison. And like Dario he claims that under the
1987 Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by
Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127, having been appointed on April 22, 1986 — during the effectivity
of the Provisional Constitution. He adds that under Executive Order No. 39, "ENLARGING THE POWERS
AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS," the Commissioner of Customs has the power
"[t]o appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the President," and that his position,
which is that of a Presidential appointee, is beyond the control of Commissioner Mison for purposes of
reorganization.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 82023, collectors and examiners in venous ports of the
Philippines, say, on the other hand, that the purpose of reorganization is to end corruption at the Bureau
of Customs and that since there is no finding that they are guilty of corruption, they cannot be validly
dismissed from the service.
On the second issue:
 NO, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And
the separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to
Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the
resignations of career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been
accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil
service employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted
under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other
positive, must concur, to wit:
1. The separation must not be for cause, and
2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.
By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution
ended on February 25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. It can only mean, then, that
whatever reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily,
upon the mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are
merely continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started.
We are through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the
second stage - that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic
document. What must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolutionary
powers, the President was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive
Order No. 17, which established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that
accompanies reorganizations -notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for
cause," and in spite of the fact that such removals would have been valid and unquestionable.
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the
basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service. Assuming, then, that this
reorganization allows removals "not for cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a
revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would
have been powerless, in any event, to order dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Lastly,
reorganizations must be carried out in good faith. In this case, Mison failed to prove that the
reorganization was indeed made in good faith because he hired more people to replace those that he
fired and no legitimate structural changes have been made. To sum up, the President could have validly
removed officials before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution even without cause because it was a
revolutionary government. However, from the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose
its right to reorganize resulting to removals but such reorganization must be made in good faith.