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THE BATTLE OF EL ALAMEIN 1942

INTRODUCTION

1. Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1961, Great Britain had paid more

attention to the narrow neck of land between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

Simultaneously, the growing importance of oil supplies enhanced the importance of Egypt

to Britain. In 1935 Italy whom had already occupied Libya embarked on a campaign of

Colonial expansion against Ethiopia and joined Germany during the fall of France in May

1940. Both Britain and Egypt saw a danger of the encirclement by the Fascist powers and

steps were taken to modernize and strengthen the British Garrison in Egypt. On Feb 1941

after the defeat of Italy in Libya, the Germans realized the importance of Africa if it were

to be in the control of the Allied Forces and it’s effect towards them. A small mobile force

was assembled by the Germans to support the Italians defending the Western Province of

Libya. The German Commander was Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, the commander of a

Panzer division who had led the invasion of France in 1940.

2. The situation became critical and on 2nd December 1941, Hitler through directive

38 ordered Fliegerkorps XI with its 335 aircrafts from Russia to join Fliegerkorps X

commanded by Field Marshall Kesselring. The task was to take over Sicily and North

Africa. The mission was to secure control of the air and sea in the area between Southern

Italy and North Africa, thus securing communications with Libya and Cyrenaica. It will

also allow Malta Island be in subjection and paralyzing the enemy traffic through the

Mediterranean and British supplies to Tobruk and Malta Island.

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3. During a meeting between Hitler and Mossolini at the end of April 1942 the

dictators agreed that Rommel’s offensive action (commencing on 26 th May 1942) should

have priority and that Operation Hercules should be delayed until 10 th July 1942.

Rommel was cautioned to limit his offensive action until the Egyptian frontier area and

was to be concluded by 20th June 1942. Preparations for Operation Hercules were given

priority. Three Italian parachute battalions and a German Parachute Division were

planned for the initial assault followed by German armor and Italian infantry mounted in

landing crafts. This operation involved 35,000 men. Once the supply line is secured,

Rommel would be required to advance towards the Nile Delta. This scenario marked the

starting point of the conflict, which sparked the Battle of El Alamein.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to critically examine on the fundamental aspect and other

military applications that could be used as lesson learnt for the Malaysian Armed Forces

(MAF) in the Malaysian environment.

SCOPE

5. The scope of this paper are as follows:

a. Background of the Battle.

b. The Strategy and Plan.

(1) Background.

(2) The Operation.

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c. Analysis of the Battle.

(1) Achievement and Failure.

(2) Lesson Learnt.

f. Lesson Learnt to the MAF.

g. Conclusion.

BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE

6. It is difficult to imagine that half a century ago El Alamein, a nondescript

Egyptian town on the dusty road to Libya became the scene of a monumental struggle for

control of North Africa. As Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Africa-Corps pushed eastward

toward Cairo and the Suez Canal in the summer of 1942, its progress was blocked at El

Alamein due to the stiffening British and Australian resistance and natural obstacle. While

the ''Desert Fox's'' forces grappled for a way around the dessert, the British 8 th Army

struck at the Germans on 23rd Oct 1942 with pulverizing force.

7. This battle also illustrated the application of the principles of war tenets and the

basic fundamentals, both at tactical and operational levels within the single service

(Army) and joint operation. It also shows indicated logistics support plays a determining

factors in this campaign apart from other tactical aspects which shaped the campaign.

Battle of El Alamein can be seen significant ending Germany’s influence in Africa and

subsequently it turned into a launching pad for the Allied to thrust into Europe.

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8. General Area of Al Alamein. Before we embarked on the details of the battle, it

is appropriate if we should know where El Alamein is located and why this place was

chosen for this battle (See Annex A). “Tel el Alamein” as pronounced by the locals is a

station that took its name from the ridge between the railway and the sea. Basically this

small station is situated approximately 85 km from Alexandria on the coastal railway line

to Mersa Matruh in North Africa. This place was also known to the soldiers that was

stationed in Egypt as a natural transit point for them to rest before continuing their

journey to Mersa Matruh. Other significant landmarks that effects Al Alamein is the

Qaret El Himeiwat, which is situated 48 km to the south and has a track from Cairo to

Mersah Matruh. Further down to the same approach is the Qattara Depression, a vast salt

marsh 200 feet below sea level that has a barrier stretching nearly 340 km South-

Westerly. The Qattara Depression beginning some 50 km south of El Alamein and this the

huge indentation is filled with soft sand virtually impassable to tanks.

9. Significant of the Battle of El Alamein In order to analyse this question, we

need to look on the reasoning beyond the political objectives, strategic and tactical level

perspectives that indicates why El Alamein was so important during the World War II in

Africa both to the Allied and the Germans:

a. Political Interest. The political interpretation by the Allies and Axis were

different. The Allies was tried their best to influence the American to concentrate

in Africa in order to avoid the Axis manoeuvre in North Africa whilst the Axis

Forces was to emphasize their focus on Russian. To the axis, he Northern African

theatre was a secondary priority. Rommel was given the mission by Hitler to

provide blocking detachment in Africa in February 1941. The Prime Minister of

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Great Britain, Churchill, felt that to lose the Middle East might limit the Great

Britain’s task of winning the war and pursuing strategic objective. Churchill than

outlined the offensive effort in 1942 for the following political reasons:

(1) Great Britain and United States would control the North and West

African.

(2) The British and American naval and air would have air superiority

in the Atlantic.

(3) Control of the supply lines.

(4) Safeguarding and securing the British Isles.

b. Strategy. El Alamein became the strategic turning point for the war

between the Allied and Axis forces. Hitler had originally intended for his German

troops to play a supporting role for the Italians against the British offensive into

Libya. He assessed that Rommel’s success in his capture of Alexandria and

possibly Egypt could allow the Germans to focus on the offensive at the Russian

front. In contrast, the Allied had concentrated in the North Africa theatre. This

difference of opinion eventually led to the defeat of Rommel’s African Corp at

Alamein as resources were diverted to the Russian front.

c. Tactical/Operational. Battle of El Alamein is of tactical importance due

to its terrain and topography. If one studies the map of Egypt it could easily be

seen that this area has a high tactical value for the defender. The land between El

Alamein and Himeimat, acting as the bottleneck of a ‘Choke Point’ is the only

approach to invade Egypt from the West. These positions lay on the coast, covered

the road and is protected on the north flank by the sea. The main feature of this

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position was the observation gained from the ridge of El Alamein over the flat and

open ground towards the South West. Fifteen miles to the South- West is the peak

of Qaret el Abd which has good observation to the North. Between El Alamein

and Qarat el Abd the ground was generally flat except for a small ridge called

Ruweisat Ridge, which has no real obstacle to resist any movement.

THE STRATEGY AND PLAN

THE AXIS STRATEGY AND PLAN

10. After the defeat of the Italian forces at Libya in Feb 1941, the Germans realized

that the impact to its war effort if the whole of Africa falls into the hands of the Allied

Forces. El Alamein became the strategic point in North African campaign and could

facilitate German offensive at the European front. Therefore, General Erwin Rommel, a

Panzer Division commander who successfully led the invasion of France earlier, was

summoned to lead an army to assist and support the Italian at North Africa. This German

army is known as the African Corps.

11. Rommel began his North Africa campaign on 31st March 1941 positively by

victories against the 8th Army at Gazala and Tobruk. The 8th Army was forced to fall back

eastward to El Alamein, where the first battle of El Alamein was fought throughout July

1942. The 8th Army under the command of General Auchinleck managed to take

advantage of the terrain and stopped Rommel’s advance. By now, the Axis forces were a

long way from their source of supply.

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12. Logistic. The battle of El Alamein underlined the importance of logistic in the

success of battle. Hitler had ignored the logistic requirement as outlined by Rommel.

Rommel did not get the fuel and equipment as promised by the German HQ. The Panzer

Division was thus reduced to a defenceless formation with only sufficient fuel to

manoeuvre for about 100 miles.

THE ALLIED STRATEGY

13. When General Bernard Montgomery was appointed as the new commander of 8th

Army the situation at El Alamein began to turn into the favour of the Allied forces as

more troops and equipment reinforced the 8th Army. This scenario marked the starting

point to the more significant second battle of El Alamein, that eventually led to the retreat

of the Axis forces from North Africa. See Annex B.

14. If any adversary advancing from the West, three possibilities of avenues of

approach that could be interpreted will be as follows:

a. Course 1. Using Northern Approach between the railway and Ruweisat

Ridge.

b. Course 2. Through Centre Approach using North of Qaret el Abd and

eastward to the South of Gebel Kalkh, Hemeimat and Samaket Gaballa.

c. Course 3. Using Southern Approach from Qattara Depression and

northwards to the Rahman track.

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15. The Operation. The op was divided into four phase as follows:

a. Phase 1 (Prelim Operation). This was a deception plan that was

activated in early August. The deception proved to be successful as the Axis did

not expect the launch of the offensive on 23 rd Oct 1942. This was validated by

General Stumme on the same night saying that the enemy situation had not

changed . The Western Desert Air force conducted air raids on Rommel’s supply

routes,dump and airfield commencing from 21st Oct 1942. See Annex C.

b. Phase II (Op Lightfoot). The 30th Corps assault on the defence line

was challenged and disrupted by the extensive minefield (See Annex D). The

minefield clearance was hampered by the congestion of the 4 th Divisions along the

narrow frontage measuring approximately 4 miles. This delay caused the

armoured forces of the 10th Armoured Corps stranded in the partially opened lanes

of the minefield. Both 51st Highlander Division and 2nd New Zealand Division

were not able to achieve their objectives. This unstable situation for Montgomery

remained until 24th Oct 1942 forcing him to initiate for a renewed assault on the

ridge with his armoured units despite objection from his armoured commanders.

This renewed attempt resulted in much attrition to both armies with little change

to the overall situation. Faced with a stiff opposition from the defence

Montgomery eventually called off the attack in the Northern sector on 25 th Oct

1942 despite the progress he had already made in the diversion attack at the South

by the 13th Corps. See Annex E.

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c. Phase III (Crumbling Op). Montgomery revised his infantry forces that

was spearheaded by the s9th Australian Division toward the Rahman Track along

the coastline. This second attempt at ‘Break-in’ drew Rommel’s counter

penetration manoeuvre with his 15th Panzer and Littorio Division. The persistent

assault by the 9th Light Infantry Division caused Rommel to lost numerous tanks.

Concurrently Montgomery had regrouped his offensive forces and was able to

capitalize on the situation, shifted the weight of his assault to the original line of

thrust. Having committed his reserve Rommel was unable to counter penetrate

Montgomery’s adjusted main effort. This led to the break down of the defence

and allowed Montgomery to activate his subsequent break-out plan.

d. Phase IV (Break Out). Operation Supercharge commenced at 0100 hours

on 2nd Nov 1942. The1st and 10th Armoured Division spearheaded the break-out to

destroy Rommel’s remaining 90 tanks of the African Corps. What followed later

was the intensive tank engagement at Tel el Aqaqir between the two armoured

forces. Rommel’s anti tank screen was able to hold back the armour’s break-out,

allowing Rommel’s other forces to disengage and withdraw. When Rommel’s anti

tank screen failed, Montgomery three armoured divisions raced through the open

desert in an attempt to cut off Rommel’s withdrawal along the coastal road, but

eventually failed to do so. The Battle of El Alamein ended on 4 th Nov 1942 when

Rommel disengaged and withdrew his remnant force to South of Ghazal. See

Annex F.

16. Throughout the battle, the Royal Air Force managed to ward off the Luftwaffe’s

attacks and given continuous close and indirect support to the Army troops. The use of air

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power to bomb ports and supply routes had worn down the Panzerarmee’s logistic

resources.

17. Strategy Problem. Malta is a small island between Sicily and Tripoli and has a

strategic value both to the Allied and the Axis. Due to this factor the Commando Supreme

in Rome backed by Kesselring and Grand Admiral Reader proposed Operation Hercules

that is to the capture of Malta by a combined air and sea borne assault. Hitler was

reluctant to accept the idea. He was in favour of employing troops in Russia and North

Africa.

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

18. Some of the considerable reasons which have contributed to the success of the

Allied and the failure of his counterpart are as follows:

a. Strength. The Allied enjoyed an overall 2:1 advantage in manpower and

3:1 advantage in tanks compared with the Axis (See Table 1). The Allies also had

comparative technical advantage through the new American Sherman tanks and

bigger calibre anti-tank guns. Numerical superiority had given Montgomery

significant advantage in the battlefield, as can be seen in the favourable outcome

of the exchange that took place.

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Table 1: Comparative of Strength

Ser Details Allies Axis

(a) (b) (c) (d)
1. Soldiers 195,000 104,000
2. Infantry Battalions 85 71
3. Light Tanks 1,300 500
4. Heavy Tanks 300 50
5. Anti – Tank Guns 1451 850
6. Guns, Field and Medium 908 500
7. Aircraft 800 300

b. Flexible Plan. During the second battle of El Alamein, Montgomery

changed his plan twice to suit with the situation. On 26 th October, he adjusted the

plan by deploying the XIII Corps, led by Australian 9 th Division to strike North

Westerly towards the coast. However due to heavy counter attack by Rommel’s

armour, Montgomery for the second time changed his plan by ordering the

Australian to attack on the coast. The XIII Corps pressed forward and the X Corps

was to strike through North-Westwards to distract and defeat Rommel’s Panzers.

c. Concentration of Forces. The 8th Army had enjoyed numerical

superiority when all arms co-operated successfully in an offensive battle. It took

more than 2 years to transform a mixed force of territorial, volunteers, conscripts

and the regulars into an Army capable of winning a decisive victory.

Montgomery’s persistence that the Division of all arms should be the basic

fighting formation eventually paid off.

d. Tri - Service Cooperation. The success of the Allied also depended on

the other two services, the Navy and the Air Force. The co-location of
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Headquarters of the 8th Army and the Desert Air Force made intimate and effective

cooperation between them possible.

e. Changes in Axis Strategy of Malta. The withdrawal of Fliegerkorps 11

from the battle at the end of April 1942 eased the Allied to regain superiority

control on the island. The complete withdrawal of Fliegerkorps 11 was the

consequence of a reappraisal of Axis strategy. Malta was later isolated and fell

back to the hands of the Allied. The failure of the Axis to capture Malta was the

root of Axis’s problems difficulties in it’s later part of the North African

Campaign.

f. Logistic Constraints. The loss of Malta to the Allied Forces has

jeopardised the Axis strategy both on strategic and tactical move in North Africa.

The role of Malta in denying supplies and reinforcements of all kinds, particularly

fuel and transport had restricted the Axis Forces logistics. The Panzerarmee was

not capable of winning a battle of attrition over 1,400 miles from its main base.

Rommel faced serious logistic problems and he had to rely on the coastal road.

The chronic shortage of supplying Rommel 1,420 miles east of Tripoli had created

a disastrous impact on the later part of his conduct of the battle. The limited

material support was than the main contributing factors to Rommel’s defeat in El

Alamein campaign. For the Allies, they concentrated almost all of their resources

into the Al Alamein campaign to ensure their success not for the Axis.

g. Leadership Styles. Basically Montgomery and Erwin Rommel had some

similiarity in leadership styles. Both of them were robust, highly effective and

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well orientated officers. As First World War veterans, they had vast experience in

terms of planning an operation at any level especially at the strategic level.

Rommel was more optimized but he had a tendency to be short-sighted in his

actions and this will finally lead to his failure in the Battle of El Alamein.

Montgomery seems to be more realistic and more of a far sighted character. His

high determination had rendered him success in commanding the 8 th Army and

accomplished the tasks given to him.

h. Lack of Air Power. The Allied strengthening of Malta’s defence requires

the recall of Fliegerkorps 11 from North Africa to Sicily to renew the air offensive

on the island, which proved to be a wrong decision. It only saw the surrender of

Axis air power over Egypt to the Royal Air Force at the end of the day and left

Rommel’s troops without any air support. Without air support. Rommel’s

Panzerarmee was subjected to constant Allied air strikes.

i. Failure to Confirm with Commander’s Orders. Rommel, against the

orders and intentions of both the Italians and German High Command, had

accomplished military miracles by withdrawing the Allied from Cyrenaica,

encircled Tobruk and dashed on as far as Sollum. His acts have a decisive effect

on the future of the campaign. He had disregarded the orders of his Italian and

German masters who finally proved that his disobedience did not lead him to

success in this particular battle.

j. Failure to Consider Staff and Professional Opinion. Rommel had

overruled all professional military advice particularly from the Staff and the

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Quartermasters. He had shown earlier that what was not possible by all rules of

reason and calculation could be done by determination, speed of action and the

exploitation of confusion caused by a surprise move, swiftly and boldly executed.

By making the greatest possible use of captured resources, he could maintain his

force far beyond the distance which the Staff and Higher Command had

considered possible. He was to repeat this performance, but he was not lucky this

time and it finally led him to his defeat.

k. Approaches To Advance. These avenues of approach would follow the

best going and also generally by-pass the defensive positions, which would have

taken about two infantry divisions to hold. El Alamein is a piece of terrain, which

has a high tactical value, and it will render a tactical advantage to those who are

able to dominate it.

l. Minefield and Anti-Tank Guns. Another development necessitated by

desert warfare was mine-sweeping armoured vehicles. The explosive mine that

includes anti-tank and anti-personnel, played a great part in the Desert Campaign,

and it was a significant defensive and delaying weapon for the Axis forces in

particular. It was estimated that the Axis forces alone laid some 450,000 mines

during operations around El Alamein. Two minefields protected the Panzerarmee

front about two miles apart. Anti-tank guns manning the main position behind the

western field. `Devil’s Guerdons’, random mining and bobby trapping were

designed to hamper lateral movement and an assault on the main position.

LESSON LEARNT

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19. In this battle both forces had taken several actions which could be developed into

skill in historical battle inquiry and interpretation. The lesson learnt could relate to three

fundamental aspects that encompasses on command and control, application of principle

of war and logistic implication in order to win the battle. Deliberation on these factors are

as follows:

a. Command and Control. To get better command and control of his

forces, despite the shortage of fuel and vulnerability to air attacks had forced

Rommel had to split up his armoured formations into six roughly equal groups

and to station them close behind his infantry. They would be ready to counter-

attack any penetration before it became a break-through. The Armoured reserves

were mixture of 15 Panzer, Littorio Divisions, 21 Panzer and Ariete Divisions.

General reserves were provided by two mobile divisions, ninety light and Trieste.

b. Application of Principles of War. The Battle of El Alamein provides a

useful illustration of the application of the principles of war within the Army and

at the strategic levels between the tri services. There are some key lessons learnt

from the battle which constitute the success of the Allied and the failure of its

counterpart. It will be more appropriate to relate it back to the principles of war.

The key lessons are as follows:

(1) Morale. Success in battle depends as much on the morale of a

force. After taking over the command of the 8th Army, Montgomery

immediately set about creating better morale and a new army with strong

bond of cooperation and willingness to win the war. He courted the rank

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and file of Britain’s citizen army like which no commander before him and

brought in new calibre generals to strengthen his force.

(2) Concentration of Force. To focus and concentrate the strength of

forces against the opponent at the decisive time and place is the second

main principle of war. The bottleneck nature of the El Alamein position

which was heavily nuked made it extremely difficult for attacking forces

to manoeuvre under all circumstances. But Montgomery compounded the

problem by concentrating most of his strength against a four mile stretch

of front near the northern end of the line.

(3) Cooperation. This was clearly been shown in ‘Operation

Lightfoot’ when the tri-service of the Allied force successfully launched

offensive action without facing much problem. This would surely effect

the joint cooperation which is very much essential in this battle especially

in order to achieve concentration of force and to maximize combat power.

(4) Surprise. Surprise can be achieved by creating a situation for

which the enemy is not prepared. It assists in his dislocation and forces

him into hurried and non-calculated action. The task must be accomplished

rapidly and fully utilising the surprise element generated by the swift

reaction and movement. In this battle, the Allies opened their offensive on

the night 23rd October 1942 by bombarding the enemy location. A major

attack near the coast was unusual in the desert campaign and had come as

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a surprise. Success would give access to the coastal road and cut off a large

part of the Panzerarmee.

(5) Flexibility. Both plans and dispositions should be flexible and

able to adapt to the circumstances since operations will rarely developed as

planned. During the second battle of El Alamein, Montgomery changed

twice his plan to suit with the situation. On 26th October, he ordered a halt

on his armies’ movement to adjust his plan by deploying XIII Corps, led

by Australian 9th Division to strike north-westwards towards the coast.

However, due to heavy counter attack by Rommel’s armour, Montgomery

for the second time changed his plan by commanded the Australian to

attack on the coast, XIII Corps pressed forward and X Corps was to strike

north-westwards to distract and defeat Rommel’s Panzers.

(6) Offensive Action. No campaign or operation can succeed even if

it is fundamentally defensive in nature unless there is a marked degree of

offensive action. On 2nd September 1942 after Rommel called off the battle

after and fell back, Montgomery then planned to launch attack to enemy

position. On 23rd October 1942, the 8th Army hits back and eventually

penetrated through DAK defences on 4th November 1942.

(7) Security. Reasonable security is the basis of any plan and

campaign which provide adequate defence for vital and vulnerable in order

to obtain freedom of action. For example, General Auchinleck was

determined to make El Alamein position as ideal for defence. Taking the

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form of 61 km bottleneck between the Mediterranean to the north and the

impassable salt marshes and soft sand of the Quattara Depression on the

south, meant that the Axis forces could not outflank El Alamein and thus

could only take it through frontal assault.

c. Logistics Implication. The Battle of El Alamein at North Africa

Campaign can be considered one of the examples that has strong influence both in

logistic and administration aspect. The failure of the German Higher Command

acknowledged the fact that the success of El Alamein lies mainly because of the

inefficient logistic support which had caused great victory to Allied. Although

occasional convoys could be fought through the Mediterranean with heavy naval

escorts, the British supply route to the Middle East was expanded from 6000 to

20,000 km. It took from two weeks to three months to arrive to the designated

destination through the Cape route. In contrast, Axis shipping could use the short

route across the Mediterranean from Southern Italian ports to Tripoli which

merely 850 km. Consequently the Axis was able to reinforce and supply their

forces in North Africa faster than the British.

LESSONS LEARNT TO MAF

20. The Battle of El Alamein can be considered as one of the most significant military

battle in World War II. This event could be promoted for better understanding to the

intellectual development and military judgement for future reference especially for the

MAF. Aspects which being identified to be compatible towards our organisation towards

this battle will be as follows:

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a. Warfare and Doctrine. Although desert warfare is totally different

to the Malaysian environment, which is the combination of jungle and

conventional warfare, the application of tactics are similar to our Malaysian

warfare and doctrine such as breaching an obstacle. This can be done through:

(1) Bouncing through in an encounter crossing obstacle.

(2) To outflank.

(3) To breach.

During the Malaysian Emergency whereby the British were using the similar

tactics to counter the communist activities as being mentioned in the “War of The

Running Dogs” book.

b. The Ground is Neutral. Set against these benefits was the sheer size of

the terrain. In North Africa, as in other desert campaigns, the besetting difficulty

was that of supply. For much of this war, a strategic 'see-- saw' effect operated - a

side defeated in battle recovered its strength far more quickly than the victor. The

loser would retire towards his bases, usually growing steadily stronger as he

absorbed his supply depots and reinforcements. In contrast, the further the victor

advanced, the more he outstripped his supply lines. As his forces grew weaker, the

advance would grind to a halt. By now the previously defeated side had recovered

sufficiently to attack, and a fresh large-scale engagement would often reverse the

outcome of the last and lead to the rapid movement of the front line in the

opposite direction. The MAF must know that the battle ground will not benefit

any parties that fail to make the first initiative to conquer ant ground that will give

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better advantage than the enemy and benefit them in the war. Appreciate the

ground in detail and chose the best spot.

c. Priorities of Strategies. Aggravating the problem of supply was the

necessity of dividing limited manpower and supplies throughout other fronts in

other theatres of the War. This division of strategic priorities was felt on both

sides. North Africa was of great importance to Britain, she had many strategic

interests there and the Suez Canal was the most important artery of the Empire.

Yet early in 1941 General O'Connor was robbed of the chance of destroying the

opposing Italian Army by the need to send an expeditionary force to Greece. In

the same year Auchinleck's Crusader offensive was weakened by the re-routing of

troops originally destined for Egypt to the Far East. Similarly, with the start of the

German invasion of Russia in June 1941, Rommel's increasingly desperate

appeals for fuel, munitions, equipment and reinforcements were often ignored by

the German High Command. Malaysia Armed Forces the strategy in any conflict

to ensure that all aspect such as logistics, men and morale are need to prioritize. It

must be treated at the highest priority to ensure that the soldiers are well prepared

for the battle.

d. Air Power and Special Forces. Ultimately, the victor would be the side

that received the best supplies in the shortest time. Air strength was vital for this

and Britain moved fast to reinforce the Royal Air Force in North Africa during the

three years of the campaign over 5,000 aircraft were transported via circuitous

routes to Cairo. From Malta RAF bombers attacked ships carrying supplies from

Italy destined for the Axis forces in Africa, and the sabotage of Rommel's supplies

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was also carried out by British special forces, highly trained troops who

performed raids deep behind the enemy lines. The Malaysian Armed Forces

(MAF) need to conduct more training on air operation as it will allow the MAF to

be prepared for any battle. The aircraft of special air operations forces should

remain capable of conducting conventional combat operations in conjunction with

other tactical air support element.

e. Mine Warfare and Anti-Tank Guns. It has effectively imposed

delays to the Allied 30 Corps assaults and created massive jams to its friendly

forces. The total depth of the position from the outpost line to the rear of the main

infantry position from the outpost line to the rear of the main infantry defenses

varied from five to six miles. This had caused some difficulties to the advancing

force causing a number of casualties. The use of anti-tank gun had also slowed the

advancement of the forces. The MAF should take note the tactics of using mine

warfare and anti-tank gun, it can hamper the enemies advance. However the

planning and proper execution is vital for this tactic.

f. Leadership. When Montgomery was appointed Commander of the

Eighth Army in August 1942 he immediately set about the task of building up

reinforcement levels of aircraft, artillery and tanks, as well as ammunition, fuel

and other essentials. Rommel had his own principal whereby he stood firm to any

decision that he had made and this made him proud to his soldiers. In the MAF

context, leadership can be divided into three levels:

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(1) Top Level. This is where the formation commanders fits in. The

commanders must be competent to make up firm decisions and stand on

it’s decision and outcome.

(2) Middle Level. This is where the executioners take their

roles. They must ensure that all directions from the Commanders are

executed and understood by the soldiers. Monitoring is an important aspect

here to ensure it’s success.

(3) Low Level. These are the ones who will perform the orders that

were originated from the Commanders and translated into orders by the

middle level executives.

g. Logistics Support. The final advance of the Eighth Army from Egypt to

Tunisia in pursuit of a retreating enemy covered some 1 500 miles, and its success

was due to the effective management of supplies over such a huge distance.

Supply depots in the field were established behind the advancing formations, and

the capture and retention of workable ports such as Tobruk were essential. But,

ultimately, the British and Commonwealth forces were victorious thanks to

Churchill's appreciation of the strategic significance of the Desert War and his

commitment to ensuring his commanders in Egypt received as much aid as was

available. MAF must positioned it’s logistics support unit as far as possible if the

defensive phase is short. In this way they will obtain some protection from the

fighting units but they must not be too far forward as to be within the range of the

enemy fire power.

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CONCLUSION

21. The Battle of Al Alamein, though ended with the British victory in driving

out the Axis from Africa, it was also a victory to the Axis for being able to defend and

extract themselves successfully without total casualties or surrender. Based on this

result of the battle, there are seven lesson learnt that can be learn; effective command

and control with a sound and competent leadership, the proper application of the

principles of war, good logistics support to enhance the morale of the men, proper

usage of the warfare doctrine, prioritizing the strategies that will be adapted, proper

application of airpower and the usage of mine and anti-tank gun.

22. All these seven lesson learnt are applicable to the MAF in the Malaysian

environment as such failing to carry out certain factors would end up MAF in low

defence of it’s country. More importantly the mine warfare used by the Axis in it’s

defence against the Allies had managed them to be extracted out successfully from the

North Africa.

23. Malaysia should rely on it’s mine warfare capability and knowledge to find

ways and means of war to overcome each land warfare capability after having signing

the Ottawa Convention. MAF should also apply those factors or fundamentals both as

defender as well as the aggressor.

24. If we can consider all these lesson learned for the MAF as stated and

mentioned earlier, we are sure that those mistakes or shortfalls will not be repeated by

the MAF.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bisheh Wav, The North African Campaign 1940 - 1943, Longman & Green Co Ltd.
London, New York, 1955.

Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein, Canberra, Australia, 1966.

Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, Goerge G. Harap and Co Ltd.
London, 1955.

John Strawson, El Alamein , J.M Dent and Sons Ltd. London, 1981.

Kenneth Macksey, Rommel Battles and Campaigns, Arms and Armour Press, London,
1979.

Kenneth Macksey, Military Errors of World War II, Arms and Armour Press Ltd,
Australia, 1987.

Lt Col C.E.E. Sloan, RE, Mine Warfare on Land, Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1986.

Liddle Harts, History of the Second World War, Cassell and Co Ltd. London, 1970.

Maj Jen F.W. Won Mellenthin (eds), Panzer Battles, University of Oklahoma Press, USA.
1971.

Paolo Caccia Dominioni, Alamein 1933 - 1962, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London,
1966.

W.G.F Jackson, The North African Campaign 1940 - 1943, B.T. Batsford Ltd. London,
1975.

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