Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College

EX WIRA GAGAH

SECOND BATTLE OF MARNE

Battle Study

By

Sub-Syndicate Group One (SSG 2):

Mej Saimi bin Jusoh (D145)

Mej Abu Samah bin Md Noh (D103)
Mej Mohd Khairi Yap bin Abdullah (D 131)
Mej Abdul Rahim bin Musa (D 153)
Maj Syamsunasir (O 529)

Directing Staff:

Lt Col Brian Patrick Woods (DS 30)

Dated
20 Jun 2003

2
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

1. Sub-Syndicate Group One (SSG 1) has completed a battle study on the Second Battle of
Marne - 1918. The products from this battle study are this service paper and an oral presentation.
SSG2 members are:

a. Mej Saimi bin Jusoh (D145) - Leader.

b. Mej Abu Samah bin Md Noh (D103).

c. Mej Mohd Khairi Yap bin Abdullah (D 131).

d. Mej Abdul Rahim bin Musa (D 153).

e. Maj Syamsunasir (O 529).

2. SSG 1 wishes to thank the MAFSC and MINDEF Library staff for their assistance in
researching this topic. Moreover, SSG 1 wishes to thank our Directing Staff, Lt Col Brian Patrick
Woods, who has been diligent in reviewing our draft submission and most constructive in his advice
to improve this Battle Study.

iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....................................................................................................................ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................................................iii

EX WIRA GAGAH BATTLE STUDY SECOND BATTLE OF MARNE.............................................4

INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................................4

AIM........................................................................................................................................................5

SCOPE...................................................................................................................................................5

BACKGROUND....................................................................................................................................5

Strategic Importance..........................................................................................................................5

ORBAT and Key Personnel............................................................................................................xx7

SECOND BATTLE OF MARNE DESCRIPTION.............................................................................xx

Phase I: The 5th Ludendorff Offensive, July 15-17, 1918................................................................xx

Phase II: The Aisne-Marne Counter Offensive, July 18-August 17, 1918...................................... xx

ANALYSIS..........................................................................................................................................16

Method of Analysis..........................................................................................................................xx

Concept of operations......................................................................................................................xx

Command and Control.....................................................................................................................xx

Application of the Principles of War................................................................................................xx

Intelligence.......................................................................................................................................xx

Operational Level Planning..............................................................................................................xx

Doctrine............................................................................................................................................21

Weapon Systems..............................................................................................................................21

Logistics...........................................................................................................................................22

Lessons – Counter Offensive...........................................................................................................23

CONCLUSION....................................................................................................................................24

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................................25

iv
v
COMD4EX1/SSG2

EX WIRA GAGAH BATTLE STUDY

SECOND BATTLE OF MARNE

Reference:

A. MAFSC COMD 4 EX 1 General Instruction dated 30 Jan 03

INTRODUCTION

1. Battle of the Marne, name of two battles of World War I (WWI); the first halted German
advance into northeastern France, and the second tipped the balance of power in favor of the
Allied forces. The battles took place near the Marne River in northeastern France.

2. The First Battle of Marne (September 6-9, 1914), a decisive battle that halted the German
advance near the Marne River, less than 48 km (30 mi) from Paris. The German forces had been
encountering little resistance in their march on Paris. Then, supposedly because of an error in
decoding an order, they wheeled to the southeast. Joseph Simon Gallieni, the military governor of
Paris, persuaded the French commander in chief, Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre, to attack the
flank thus exposed. Under Joffre's orders troops were rushed to the front by all available means,
including taxicabs, and the Allied attack was begun on September 6, 1918. On September 9,
1918, the Germans began to retreat, and the threat to Paris was ended.

3. The action of the Second Battle of Marne (July 15-August 4, 1918) marked the turning
point of the war. The Germans, according to as they are similar in nature, but the plan of General
Erich Ludendorff, attacked to the east and west of Reims. West of Reims they succeeded in
crossing the Marne but made little subsequent progress. On July 18, 1918, the Allied Commander
General Ferdinand Foch counterattacked with forces that included several American divisions.
One of the centers of fiercest combat was at Château-Thierry, where the American troops won
their first decisive victory. The German armies were forced back across the Marne. This
counterattack destroyed Ludendorff's plan for a massive attack in Flanders and gave the Allies
the initiative thereafter.

6
4. This service paper is a Battle Study of the Second Battle of Marne. The Second Battle of
Marne is a major land operation of World War I, in which Allied forces made up of French, British,
and United States of America troops successfully defended Marne from the German attack i.e. the
Germans failures to break through while the Allied Forces was able to organize a counterattack in
July 1918. The action was confined to the River Marne on the Western Front during the WWI. The
battle was devised by the General Ferdinand Foch.

AIM

5. The aim of this service paper is to provide as analysis of Second Battle of Marne so as to
understand the situation, cause and effects and how they apply to improve future operations.

SCOPE

6. To achieve the aim, this paper will cover the following topics in relation to the Second Battle
of Marne:

a. Background, including the campaign’s strategic importance, order of battle (ORBAT)

and key personnel.

b. Historical description of the Second Battle of Marne.

c. Analysis of the Second Battle of Marne, particularly strengths and weaknesses related
to the fundamentals of warfare and lessons from the campaign.

7. This service paper is an analysis of the Second Battle of Marne. The paper does not focus on
any one particular battle during the campaign, as they are similar in nature, but draws on the events
in the geographical area of Marne during July 15 - August 4, 1918.

BACKGROUND

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

8. The Second battle of Marne had its origins in the stalemate which had developed on the
Western Front by the end of 1914. The second major battle close to the River Marne took place

7
during the summer of 1918. During the Spring Offensive, the German Army advanced over the
Aisne in late May and reached the Marne on June 5, 1918. The French Army was in poor shape and
the Commander-in-Chief, Henri-Philippe Petain, knew that the British were busy dealing with the
German offensive at Lys. Eventually Sir Douglas Haig agreed to send Petain four divisions and two
divisions of the recently arrived US Army were also available. Over 85,000 American soldiers took
part in the battle.

9. The German attack on the Marne was launched by General Erich von Ludendorff on July 15,
1918. Twenty-three divisions of the First and Third Armies attacked the French Fourth Army in the
east of Reims and seventeen divisions of the Seventh army took on the French Fifth Army to the
west. The Germans failed to break through and General Ferdinand Foch was able to organize a
counterattack. This included 24 divisions of the French Army, and soldiers from the United States,
Britain and Italy. On July 20, 1918 the Germans began to withdraw. By the August 3, 1918 they were
back to where they were when they started the Spring Offensive in March 1918.

10. Allied casualties during the Second Battle of the Marne were heavy: French (95,000), British
(13,000) and United States (12,000). It is estimated that the German Army suffered an estimated
168,000 casualties and marked the last real attempt by the Central Powers to win the First World
War. In late May 1918, the German high command had ordered a major offensive from the Chemin
des Dames northeast of Paris towards the River Marne threatening both Paris and the Paris - Verdun
rail link. The 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the AEF helped defend along the Marne on either side of the
river town of Chateau Thierry. What resulted was a rounded bulge in western front thirty miles wide
at the base, extending south about 25 miles to its apex right at Chateau Thierry. With American
encouragement, a plan evolved to eliminate this salient with a two pronged assault from the west and
south.

11. In July, 1918 when it became clear that the Germans would renew their assault in the area, a
decision was made to absorb the assault, let the enemy tire themselves, and then counterattack soon
afterwards. There were two distinct parts to the Second Battle of Marne and they will be discussed
separately in this article.

8
12. Figure 1 shows the Second Battle of Marne area of interest.

Fig 1. Area of Interest

ORBAT AND KEY PERSONNEL

13.

14. The ORBAT for the Second Battle of Marne is summarized in Figure 1.

9
 Figure 1. Second Battle of Marne ORBAT

15. The key personnel during the Second Battle of Marne are summarized in Table 1.

10
 Table 1. Second Battle of Marne Key Personnel

Ser Role Name Remarks

(a) (b) (c) (d)
Allied Forces
1. Supreme Commander Gen Ferdinand Foch French Army General.
of the Allied Forces (1851-1929) Commanded the Allied
Armies on the Western
Front during the latter part
of WWI. Foch was chosen
by the Allies as commander
in chief of all Allied forces
on the Western front after
the 1918 German offensive.
He launched a series of counteroffensives that
shaped a final victory.
2. Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Sir He was C-in-C of the British
of the British Army Douglas Haig (1861- Expeditionary Force on the
1928) Western front from late 1915
until the end of WWI. He
was praised for the victory
achieved in the Second
Battle of Marne.

3. Commander-in-Chief Marshal Henri- Considered to be too

of the French Army Philippe Omer defensively minded, it was
Petain (1856-1951) Ferdinand Foch rather than
Petain who was given the
main role in the Allied
offensive in the autumn of
1918. Promoted to Field
Marshal two weeks after
the Armistice,
4. Commander of Gen Charles Mangin Mangin led the disastrous
French Tenth Army (1866-1923) attack at the Battle of the
Aisne. This resulted in his
losing his command but he
was recalled as head of the
French Tenth Army in the
summer of 1918. With the
Germans in retreat,
conditions were now more
appropriate for Mangin's
aggressive tactics. Margin led the Tenth Army
in the successful Second Battle of the Marne.

11
Ser Role Name Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d)
5. Commander of Gen Henri Berthelot Command of Fifth Army,
French Fifth Army (1863-1931) located west of Reims
during the crucial Second
Battle of the Marne.
Berthelot's handling of his
command was distinguished
by a stubborn determination
to hold to French pre-war
principles of the offensive. His predilection
for ignoring Commander-in-Chief Henri-
Philippe Petain's policy of elastic defence in
depth would probably have cost him his
command in the wake of the marked setback of
July 1918 were it not for stern U.S. resistance
at the Marne, halting the German advance.
Central Forces

3. Commander, German General Erich Von Expecting a successful

Forces Ludendorff (1865- resolution to the great
1937) German spring push in
1918, Ludendorff realised
that the war was lost once
the offensive failed, aware
that with the arrival of fresh
American troops the
impetus would quickly swing to the Allies. He
therefore, with Hindenburg, transferred power
back to the Reichstag on September 29, 1918,
demanding an immediate peace; subsequently
changing his mind, Ludendorff was forced to
resign on 26 October under pressure from Max
von Baden’s government.
7.

12
SECOND BATTLE OF MARNE DESCRIPTION

13
PHASE I: THE THE 5TH LUDENDORFF OFFENSIVE, JULY 15-17, 1918

14
PHASE II: THE AISNE-MARNE COUNTER OFFENSIVE, JULY 18-AUGUST 17, 1918

15
16
17
PHASE III: THE OISE-AISNE OFFENSIVE, AUGUST 18-SEPTEMBER 16, 1918

18
16. Table 2 outlines chronologically the Second Battle of Marne.

Table 2. The Second Battle of Marne

Ser Date Campaign Events

(a) (b) (c)
1. July 15, 1918 Three and one-half German Army attack in the early morning. The 3rd
Division of American Expeditionary Force (AEF) makes a strategically
important stand on the left end of the Marne River line.
2. July 17, 1918 German units occupy southern bank of Marne between Epernay and
Chateau Thierry and advance their line 7 miles east of Reims.
3. Jul 18, 1918 Allies counterattack against German forces, seizing initiative. French 10th
and 6th Army attack the salient from the west. Tanks are used effectively and
four American divisions lead a rapid advance. German high command
decides to reinforce the salient to avoid a route.
5. Jul 19, 1918 American units south of Soissons start meeting fanatical resistance. German
air force commands the air.
6. July 21, 1918 Second assault against the salient from the south. Five more AEF divisions
would eventually be committed
7. July 30-Aug 1, Battle before Sergy; River Ourcq line crossed.
1918

19
 ANALYSIS

METHOD OF ANALYSIS

17. Research on the Second Battle of Marne was conducted using multiple references, including
extensive books, journals and internet sites dedicated to the campaign. A significant number of
resources were made available through the Australian War Museum (AWM) and other
Commonwealth war museums. From this research, an analysis of the Second Battle of Marne was
conducted under the subject headings of:

d. Concept of Operations.

e. Command and Control.

f. Application of The Principles of War.

g. Intelligence.

h. Operational Level Planning.

i. Doctrine.

j. Weapon Systems.

k. Logistics.

l. Lessons for Counter Offensive.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

18. Land.

a. German Attack. The fifth and final drive on either side of Rhiems (Jul 15-17, 1918)
was also intended to round-out the line and pin down Allied reserves as a preliminary to a
resumption of the Flanders attack. The 1st and parts of the 7th and 3rd Army had 50 divisions
available, 29 divisions in line (of which two were exempted from the attack) and 21 divisions
in the rear. At least 30 of these divisions were ostensible Stoss formations, although that

20
 designation seems to have meant relatively little by this time. Most were veterans of prior
attacks. The offensive was supported by 6,353 guns, 2,200 MW and some 900 planes.

The terrain in which the land forces operated is shown in Figure 2.

21
.

Figure 2. Example of Second Battle of Marne Terrain

19. Air. Throughout WW I, air arms played an increasing role in land combat. German use of
massed, radio-equipped aircraft for close air support proved highly effective during the Second
Battle of Marne.

22
20. Examples of Second Battle of Marne aircraft are shown in Figure 3.

Maurice Farmans (Allied) Voisin V (Allied) Newport (French)

Morane-Saulnier British BE2

Figure 3. Second Battle of Marne Aircraft Examples

COMMAND AND CONTROL

xx.

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR

xx. Germans Offensive. Throughout the spring the Germans offensives on the Western
Front had succeeded, with gains being made across much of the front-line. By June 1918, the
advance had crossed the River Aisne and reached the River Marne. At this point the French were

23
desperate. Paris appeared to be within reach of the Germans and the British army were busy trying
to halt the German advance at Lys.

xx. Allied Forces Defensive. Marshal Petain managed to persuade the British to divert 4
divisions of troops to Marne, along with 2 divisions of the American army: who had only just arrived
in France. Ludendorff, the German Field Marshal, ordered 40 divisions to attack the entrenched
French army on July 15, 1918. For the past few month such weight of numbers had resulted in a
gradual rolling back of the Allied defenses. This time however the French line held firm, despite very
heavy casualties.

xx. Allied Forces Counter Offensive. The Allies then turned to the offensive and by early
August 1918 had succeeded in regaining all of the land in this sector that had been taken by the
Germans from March through to August 1918. This victory for the Allies was particularly
significant. The Germans had thrown everything they had available at the Allied Lines throughout
the Spring Offensive, indeed the generals had told the men that to win the war they needed to break
through whilst on that particular offensive. Being held and then pushed backwards had a serious
psychological impact on the German troops and hierarchy. They still held strong positions, the one's
that they had successfully defended for most of the war, but now they had lost the will to fight and
the belief that they could win the war on the battlefield.

INTELLIGENCE

xx. The intelligent aspect is more importance but during this battle both of two forces have their
own decision in order to conduct a battle. The intelligent on both the German Army order of battle
and on the topography of River Marne was all but nonexistent.

xx. Up till German attack of July 15, 1918, the U.S 3 rd Division reinforced it’s positions on it’s
long front of 8 kilometres along the River Marne, and sent out patrols on the north bank to obtain
intelligence information. On the evening of the July 14, 1918, through captured prisoners to the east
of Reims, the Allies learned that the German offensive was to begin after midnight. The Allies
Forces exploiting this information with efficiency, at midnight less fifteen minutes began intensive
fire which caused important losses amongst the troops massed for the attack on the river.

24
OPERATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

xx. The deployment of AEF was first introduced to large scale battle in France during the Second
Battle of Marne. The intervention on the battlefield of 300,000 American troops of the AEF during
mid-1918 was instrumental in halting the German drives for Paris.

DOCTRINE

xx. The doctrine that had been practiced during the Second Battle of Marne is divided into two:
All-arms Doctrine and Amphibious Doctrine.

WEAPON SYSTEMS

xx. Land Weapon Systems.

m. Allied. Others land weapon used as per Table 3.

n. The Allied's artillery learned the importance of camouflage; the value of counter
battery fire; the use of aerial observation; the relative merits of high explosive and shrapnel;
and, most important of all, the need for centralised command and control of the guns. An
example is shown in Figure 4. Replacement guns and spare parts were both in short supply.
Repair crews often resorted to "cannibalism" - the practice of taking spare parts from one gun
to repair another. The rugged terrain also made it hard to move guns around the beachhead.

25
 Figure 4. An Australian 5-inch howitzer in position on North Beach (Source: AWM)

Table 3. Example of Guns Available to ANZAC Forces in Gallipoli (May - November 1915)
Gun 1 May 1915 15 July 1915 1 November 1915
(a) (b) (c) (d)
3 pounder AA 2
10 pounder 12 12 12
12 pounder AA 1
18 pounder 28 28 52
4 inch gun 2
4.7 inch gun 1 1
4.5 inch howitzer 4 4 8
5 inch howitzer 20 20
6 inch howitzer 3 7
TOTAL 44 68 105

LOGISTICS

xx. The Gallipoli campaign was a logistical nightmare.

a. Medical and Hygiene.

b. Burial of Dead.

26
 c. Supply.

LESSONS – COUNTER OFFENSIVE

xx. This research paper has already discussed the impact of Second Battle of Marne had on the
the importance of defensive operation so that offensive counter attack can be carried out. However
the significance of this campaign to modern counter offensive operations has merit for further study.
Lesson are drawn by comparison of Second Battle of Marne conduct against governing factors for
the success of offensive operations; surprise, forethought, co-operation between the commanders, as
clear objective, and good planning. The factors are summarised as follows:

a. Surprise.

b. Forethought.

c. Co-operation Between the Commanders.

d. A Clear Objective.

e. Planning.

27
 CONCLUSION

3. Gallipoli still offers useful lessons for the modern battlefield, despite being nearly ninety
years old. The campaign has many lessons for amphibious operations and the securing of a
beachhead. Lessons are also evident for protracted operations and ship-to-shore logistics. Along
with other campaigns in World War I, Gallipoli offers insight into the need for rapid doctrine changes
in line with new technology. It’s failures in logistics, intelligence and command and control should
be observed and avoided in future operations. Lest we forget.

28
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

James R.R, London, 1965,Gallipoli, B. T. Batsford Ltd, MTAT Library

Evans Colonel M.H.H, Amphibious Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore, Brassey`s
Australia Pty Ltd, 1st edition 1990

Evans M. From Legend to Learning: Gallipoli and the Military Revolution of World War I,
Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper Number 10, April 2000

McDonald J. Great Battlefields of the World, London: Marshal, 1985

Jul 03

SAIMI BIN JUSOH

Maj
SSG 2 Leader

Second Battle of the Marne. Fifth and last German attack -

the Friedensturm - of their Spring Offensive.
15 July -
WESTERN -- 18/07 - Massive Allied counter-attack south-west of the
04
FRONT Marne
August
-- 22/07 - Germans on retreat
-- 02/08 - French retake Soissons

29
30
31